@openvtc/trust-tasks 0.8.1 → 0.9.0

package/dist/vault/upsert/0.3/payload.js

@@ -6,16 +6,992 @@
 export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.3";
 /** Trust Task response type URI (request type URI + "#response"). */
 export const RESPONSE_TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.3#response";
+/**
+ * This specification's payload schema, as a value.
+ *
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 item 2 is performed against this. It is shipped as data
+ * rather than only as a `.json` file because TypeScript types are erased
+ * at runtime: without a schema a consumer has nothing to validate, and
+ * every REQUIRED payload member is optional in practice. Cross-file
+ * `$ref`s are already inlined, so it needs no resolver.
+ */
+export const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
+    "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+    "$id": "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.3",
+    "title": "Vault Upsert — payload",
+    "description": "Create a new vault entry or update an existing one. The secret material — if present — rides inside a pluggable cipher envelope (see `vault/_shared/0.1/sealed-envelope`), so the Trust Task carries ciphertext and an authenticator, not plaintext. Updates may be partial: any populated metadata field replaces the current value; omitted fields are left untouched; explicit null clears the field (per `clearFields`). Optimistic-concurrency check via `expectedVersion`.",
+    "type": "object",
+    "additionalProperties": false,
+    "required": [
+        "contextId",
+        "targets",
+        "label",
+        "secretKind"
+    ],
+    "properties": {
+        "id": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "description": "Entry id. Omit to create; supply to update. Maintainers MAY accept consumer-supplied ids on create (recommended: ULID) or MAY assign their own and return the assigned id in the response."
+        },
+        "expectedVersion": {
+            "type": "integer",
+            "minimum": 0,
+            "description": "When updating, the consumer's last-observed `version` for the entry. The maintainer rejects with `vault/upsert:version_conflict` if the current version differs. Omit on create."
+        },
+        "contextId": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1,
+            "description": "Trust context the entry belongs to. Cannot be changed by upsert; to move an entry between contexts the consumer MUST delete and recreate."
+        },
+        "targets": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "minItems": 1,
+            "items": {
+                "$ref": "#/$defs/SiteTarget"
+            }
+        },
+        "label": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+        },
+        "secretKind": {
+            "$ref": "#/$defs/SecretKind"
+        },
+        "tags": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "items": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1,
+                "maxLength": 64
+            },
+            "uniqueItems": true
+        },
+        "notes": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "maxLength": 4096
+        },
+        "favicon": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "format": "uri"
+        },
+        "selectors": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "items": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1
+            },
+            "uniqueItems": true
+        },
+        "customFieldNames": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "items": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "minLength": 1,
+                "maxLength": 128
+            },
+            "uniqueItems": true
+        },
+        "expiresAt": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "format": "date-time"
+        },
+        "sealedSecret": {
+            "$ref": "#/$defs/SealedEnvelope",
+            "description": "Pluggable cipher envelope (discriminated by `envelope`) whose cleartext is a JCS-canonical JSON conforming to `vault/_shared/0.1/vault-secret#/$defs/VaultSecret`. The supported envelope kinds are listed in the SealedEnvelope shared schema; M2A consumers reject any kind they don't implement with `vault/upsert:envelope_unsupported`. REQUIRED on create unless `secretKind` is `didSelfIssued` or `didcommPeer` (those carry only references to maintainer-internal key ids and have no extra secret bytes). On update, omit if the secret material is unchanged; populate if the secret is being rotated."
+        },
+        "clearFields": {
+            "type": "array",
+            "items": {
+                "type": "string",
+                "enum": [
+                    "notes",
+                    "favicon",
+                    "expiresAt",
+                    "tags",
+                    "selectors",
+                    "customFieldNames"
+                ]
+            },
+            "uniqueItems": true,
+            "description": "List of metadata fields to explicitly clear on this upsert. Distinguishes \"don't touch\" (field omitted from payload) from \"clear\" (field listed here)."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+            "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext"
+        }
+    },
+    "$defs": {
+        "Response": {
+            "$anchor": "response",
+            "title": "Vault Upsert — response payload",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "entry"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "entry": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/VaultEntry"
+                },
+                "created": {
+                    "type": "boolean",
+                    "description": "true when this upsert created a new entry; false when it updated an existing one."
+                },
+                "ext": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext"
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "Ext": {
+            "title": "Ext",
+            "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "minProperties": 1,
+            "additionalProperties": true,
+            "propertyNames": {
+                "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
+            }
+        },
+        "VaultEntry": {
+            "title": "VaultEntry",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "id",
+                "contextId",
+                "targets",
+                "label",
+                "secretKind",
+                "createdAt",
+                "updatedAt",
+                "version"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "id": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Opaque vault-maintainer-assigned identifier for the entry. ULID/UUID/base32 are common; the wire spec only requires non-empty string equality."
+                },
+                "contextId": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Identifier of the trust context (persona) the entry belongs to. Opaque string interpreted by the vault maintainer; corresponds to a single ContextRecord on the VTA side."
+                },
+                "targets": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "minItems": 1,
+                    "items": {
+                        "$ref": "#/$defs/SiteTarget"
+                    },
+                    "description": "One or more binding targets — web origins, mobile app identifiers, and/or DIDs — that this credential applies to. A request from any matching target uses this entry. A typical entry for a service that exists as both a website and mobile apps will list a web origin, an iOS bundle id, and an Android package id; passkeys for that service typically list only the origin (because iOS Associated Domains and Android Asset Links bind apps to the domain at the OS level)."
+                },
+                "label": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not."
+                },
+                "secretKind": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/SecretKind",
+                    "description": "Discriminator for the kind of secret this entry holds. The secret material itself is NEVER returned in metadata views; the kind is exposed so consumers can render an appropriate UI affordance and so policy decisions can route by kind."
+                },
+                "tags": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "items": {
+                        "type": "string",
+                        "minLength": 1,
+                        "maxLength": 64
+                    },
+                    "uniqueItems": true,
+                    "description": "User-defined tags for organisation and filtering (e.g. [\"family\", \"finance\"]). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum count; the wire spec does not."
+                },
+                "notes": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "maxLength": 4096,
+                    "description": "Non-sensitive notes the user attached to the entry. Visible in metadata view (suitable for support contact, account number, expiry policy memos). SENSITIVE notes belong in the secret payload as a `secureNotes` field — those are only released by vault/release/0.1."
+                },
+                "favicon": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "uri",
+                    "description": "Optional URI of an icon to display in the consumer UI. Maintainers MAY fetch and cache; consumers SHOULD treat as untrusted content and fetch via a sandboxed pipeline."
+                },
+                "selectors": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "items": {
+                        "type": "string",
+                        "minLength": 1
+                    },
+                    "uniqueItems": true,
+                    "description": "Opaque maintainer-defined selector strings fed to the policy engine when this entry is requested (e.g. \"recent_uv_required\", \"network_class=corp\", \"step_up_push\"). Consumers MUST treat selectors as opaque; they exist for policy authoring on the maintainer side."
+                },
+                "customFieldNames": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "items": {
+                        "type": "string",
+                        "minLength": 1,
+                        "maxLength": 128
+                    },
+                    "uniqueItems": true,
+                    "description": "Names of additional fields the user has attached (e.g. [\"security-question-1\", \"account-number\"]). The VALUES live in the secret payload and are only delivered by vault/release/0.1. Exposing names in metadata lets the consumer render the right form layout before requesting release."
+                },
+                "attachments": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "items": {
+                        "$ref": "#/$defs/AttachmentRef"
+                    },
+                    "description": "References to encrypted blobs associated with the entry (recovery codes, PEM files, screenshots of authenticator setup). The blobs themselves are fetched via a separate mechanism the maintainer documents; metadata view exposes only the descriptor."
+                },
+                "expiresAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time",
+                    "description": "Optional time after which the credential is no longer expected to be valid (e.g. an OAuth refresh token's known expiry, a time-limited API token, an enterprise password rotation policy). Maintainers MAY surface this in the consumer UI as a warning."
+                },
+                "breachedAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time",
+                    "description": "Set by the maintainer (via HIBP integration or equivalent) when the password material associated with this entry is known to appear in a public breach. Consumers SHOULD surface this prominently. Cleared when the user rotates the password and the new password is not in any known breach."
+                },
+                "passwordChangedAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time",
+                    "description": "Set whenever the password component of the secret payload is rotated. Maintainers MUST update this on every secret-material change for entries of kind `password` (or any kind that carries a password component). Used by consumers to surface rotation-overdue warnings."
+                },
+                "createdAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time"
+                },
+                "createdBy": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "VID of the consumer that originally created the entry."
+                },
+                "updatedAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time"
+                },
+                "updatedBy": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "VID of the consumer that last modified the entry."
+                },
+                "lastUsedAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time",
+                    "description": "Most recent time the entry was used (either released or proxy-login performed). Maintainers MAY return this with reduced precision (e.g. hour-floored) when releasing to a less-trusted consumer."
+                },
+                "version": {
+                    "type": "integer",
+                    "minimum": 0,
+                    "description": "Monotonic version counter incremented on every mutation. Used by consumers for optimistic-concurrency checks on vault/upsert and as the seq baseline for vault/sync."
+                },
+                "principalDid": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Optional cached DID the entry will act AS for DID-shaped flows — mirrors the `did` field of the entry's secret payload when `secretKind` carries one (`didSelfIssued`, `didcommPeer`). Absent for kinds that have no DID concept (`password`, `passkey`, `oauthTokens`, `bearerToken`, `sshKey`, `custom`). MAINTAINER-DERIVED, NOT CONSUMER-SUPPLIED: the maintainer MUST recompute this from the canonical secret at every upsert / secret rotation; a producer-supplied value on `vault/upsert/0.1` MUST be ignored (no error, but no honour). Read-only on the wire, present in metadata views so consumers can drive RP-side flows (e.g. fetch `/auth/challenge` keyed on the principal DID before requesting a proxy-login) without releasing the secret."
+                },
+                "ext": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+                    "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces."
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "AttachmentRef": {
+            "title": "AttachmentRef",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "id",
+                "name",
+                "sizeBytes",
+                "digestMultibase"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "id": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Opaque maintainer-assigned id for this attachment; used to fetch the blob via a separate mechanism."
+                },
+                "name": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "maxLength": 256,
+                    "description": "User-supplied filename (e.g. \"recovery-codes.txt\")."
+                },
+                "sizeBytes": {
+                    "type": "integer",
+                    "minimum": 0,
+                    "description": "Size of the encrypted blob in bytes. Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum per attachment and per entry."
+                },
+                "digestMultibase": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/DigestMultibase",
+                    "description": "Digest over the encrypted blob bytes (post-encryption), so the consumer can verify integrity after fetch. Taken over the bytes as stored, not over a canonicalization: the blob is an opaque artifact, not a JSON document."
+                },
+                "contentType": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "Optional MIME type hint for the consumer UI (e.g. \"text/plain\", \"application/x-pem-file\")."
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "DigestMultibase": {
+            "title": "DigestMultibase",
+            "description": "A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.\n\nMultihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.\n\nThis definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.\n\nRestricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that \"interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values\", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.",
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 16,
+            "pattern": "^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$",
+            "examples": [
+                "zQmbWqxBEKC3P8tqsKc98xmWNzrzDtRLMiMPL8wBuTGsMnR"
+            ]
+        },
+        "SecretKind": {
+            "title": "SecretKind",
+            "type": "string",
+            "enum": [
+                "password",
+                "passkey",
+                "oauthTokens",
+                "didSelfIssued",
+                "didcommPeer",
+                "bearerToken",
+                "sshKey",
+                "custom"
+            ],
+            "description": "Discriminator for the secret type stored in the entry. Definitions:\n- `password` — username + password (+ optional TOTP seed).\n- `passkey` — WebAuthn discoverable credential (private key + rpId + userHandle).\n- `oauthTokens` — OAuth 2.0 refresh + access token bundle for a specific provider.\n- `didSelfIssued` — Self-Issued OpenID Provider v2 (SIOP) credential: the entry points at a DID + signing key already managed by the VTA.\n- `didcommPeer` — DIDComm peer identity used to authenticate against a DIDComm-speaking relying party.\n- `bearerToken` — opaque bearer token carried in a maintainer-named header (covers API tokens, long-lived JWTs, personal-access tokens).\n- `sshKey` — SSH private key + comment.\n- `custom` — arbitrary structured fields; release-time consumer responsible for interpretation."
+        },
+        "SiteTarget": {
+            "title": "SiteTarget",
+            "description": "A single binding target for a vault entry. Tagged union over the discriminator `kind`. A VaultEntry's `targets` array MAY mix any number of these.",
+            "oneOf": [
+                {
+                    "title": "WebOrigin",
+                    "type": "object",
+                    "additionalProperties": false,
+                    "required": [
+                        "kind",
+                        "origin"
+                    ],
+                    "properties": {
+                        "kind": {
+                            "const": "webOrigin"
+                        },
+                        "origin": {
+                            "type": "string",
+                            "format": "uri",
+                            "description": "Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. \"https://github.com\". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard."
+                        }
+                    }
+                },
+                {
+                    "title": "Did",
+                    "type": "object",
+                    "additionalProperties": false,
+                    "required": [
+                        "kind",
+                        "did"
+                    ],
+                    "properties": {
+                        "kind": {
+                            "const": "did"
+                        },
+                        "did": {
+                            "type": "string",
+                            "minLength": 1,
+                            "description": "DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry."
+                        }
+                    }
+                },
+                {
+                    "title": "IosApp",
+                    "type": "object",
+                    "additionalProperties": false,
+                    "required": [
+                        "kind",
+                        "bundleId"
+                    ],
+                    "properties": {
+                        "kind": {
+                            "const": "iosApp"
+                        },
+                        "bundleId": {
+                            "type": "string",
+                            "minLength": 1,
+                            "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9.-]+$",
+                            "description": "iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.stwalkerster.codehub\"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration)."
+                        },
+                        "teamId": {
+                            "type": "string",
+                            "minLength": 1,
+                            "pattern": "^[A-Z0-9]+$",
+                            "description": "Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices."
+                        }
+                    }
+                },
+                {
+                    "title": "AndroidApp",
+                    "type": "object",
+                    "additionalProperties": false,
+                    "required": [
+                        "kind",
+                        "packageName",
+                        "sha256CertFingerprints"
+                    ],
+                    "properties": {
+                        "kind": {
+                            "const": "androidApp"
+                        },
+                        "packageName": {
+                            "type": "string",
+                            "minLength": 1,
+                            "pattern": "^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*(\\.[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*)+$",
+                            "description": "Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.android\")."
+                        },
+                        "sha256CertFingerprints": {
+                            "type": "array",
+                            "minItems": 1,
+                            "items": {
+                                "type": "string",
+                                "pattern": "^[0-9A-F]{2}(:[0-9A-F]{2}){31}$"
+                            },
+                            "uniqueItems": true,
+                            "description": "SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing)."
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        "SealedEnvelope": {
+            "title": "SealedEnvelope",
+            "description": "Discriminated by `envelope`. Exactly one variant matches per document.",
+            "oneOf": [
+                {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope"
+                },
+                {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/HpkeArmoredEnvelope"
+                },
+                {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/TspMessageEnvelope"
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        "TspMessageEnvelope": {
+            "title": "TspMessageEnvelope",
+            "description": "Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tspMessage` envelopes explicitly (`envelope_unsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "envelope",
+                "message"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "envelope": {
+                    "const": "tspMessage"
+                },
+                "message": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format"
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "HpkeArmoredEnvelope": {
+            "title": "HpkeArmoredEnvelope",
+            "description": "OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`didSigned` / `attested` / `pinnedOnly`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.\n\nNo open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "envelope",
+                "armored",
+                "recipientKeyId"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "envelope": {
+                    "const": "hpkeArmored"
+                },
+                "armored": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24."
+                },
+                "recipientKeyId": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key."
+                },
+                "producerAssertion": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "enum": [
+                        "didSigned",
+                        "attested",
+                        "pinnedOnly"
+                    ],
+                    "default": "didSigned",
+                    "description": "Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `didSigned` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinnedOnly` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production)."
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope": {
+            "title": "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope",
+            "description": "DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.\n\nM2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "envelope",
+                "jwe"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "envelope": {
+                    "const": "didcommAuthcrypt"
+                },
+                "jwe": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON."
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+};
+/** As {@link PAYLOAD_SCHEMA}, for the success-response variant. */
+export const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
+    "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+    "$ref": "#/$defs/Response",
+    "$defs": {
+        "Response": {
+            "$anchor": "response",
+            "title": "Vault Upsert — response payload",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "entry"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "entry": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/VaultEntry"
+                },
+                "created": {
+                    "type": "boolean",
+                    "description": "true when this upsert created a new entry; false when it updated an existing one."
+                },
+                "ext": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext"
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "Ext": {
+            "title": "Ext",
+            "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "minProperties": 1,
+            "additionalProperties": true,
+            "propertyNames": {
+                "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
+            }
+        },
+        "VaultEntry": {
+            "title": "VaultEntry",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "id",
+                "contextId",
+                "targets",
+                "label",
+                "secretKind",
+                "createdAt",
+                "updatedAt",
+                "version"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "id": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Opaque vault-maintainer-assigned identifier for the entry. ULID/UUID/base32 are common; the wire spec only requires non-empty string equality."
+                },
+                "contextId": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Identifier of the trust context (persona) the entry belongs to. Opaque string interpreted by the vault maintainer; corresponds to a single ContextRecord on the VTA side."
+                },
+                "targets": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "minItems": 1,
+                    "items": {
+                        "$ref": "#/$defs/SiteTarget"
+                    },
+                    "description": "One or more binding targets — web origins, mobile app identifiers, and/or DIDs — that this credential applies to. A request from any matching target uses this entry. A typical entry for a service that exists as both a website and mobile apps will list a web origin, an iOS bundle id, and an Android package id; passkeys for that service typically list only the origin (because iOS Associated Domains and Android Asset Links bind apps to the domain at the OS level)."
+                },
+                "label": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not."
+                },
+                "secretKind": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/SecretKind",
+                    "description": "Discriminator for the kind of secret this entry holds. The secret material itself is NEVER returned in metadata views; the kind is exposed so consumers can render an appropriate UI affordance and so policy decisions can route by kind."
+                },
+                "tags": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "items": {
+                        "type": "string",
+                        "minLength": 1,
+                        "maxLength": 64
+                    },
+                    "uniqueItems": true,
+                    "description": "User-defined tags for organisation and filtering (e.g. [\"family\", \"finance\"]). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum count; the wire spec does not."
+                },
+                "notes": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "maxLength": 4096,
+                    "description": "Non-sensitive notes the user attached to the entry. Visible in metadata view (suitable for support contact, account number, expiry policy memos). SENSITIVE notes belong in the secret payload as a `secureNotes` field — those are only released by vault/release/0.1."
+                },
+                "favicon": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "uri",
+                    "description": "Optional URI of an icon to display in the consumer UI. Maintainers MAY fetch and cache; consumers SHOULD treat as untrusted content and fetch via a sandboxed pipeline."
+                },
+                "selectors": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "items": {
+                        "type": "string",
+                        "minLength": 1
+                    },
+                    "uniqueItems": true,
+                    "description": "Opaque maintainer-defined selector strings fed to the policy engine when this entry is requested (e.g. \"recent_uv_required\", \"network_class=corp\", \"step_up_push\"). Consumers MUST treat selectors as opaque; they exist for policy authoring on the maintainer side."
+                },
+                "customFieldNames": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "items": {
+                        "type": "string",
+                        "minLength": 1,
+                        "maxLength": 128
+                    },
+                    "uniqueItems": true,
+                    "description": "Names of additional fields the user has attached (e.g. [\"security-question-1\", \"account-number\"]). The VALUES live in the secret payload and are only delivered by vault/release/0.1. Exposing names in metadata lets the consumer render the right form layout before requesting release."
+                },
+                "attachments": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "items": {
+                        "$ref": "#/$defs/AttachmentRef"
+                    },
+                    "description": "References to encrypted blobs associated with the entry (recovery codes, PEM files, screenshots of authenticator setup). The blobs themselves are fetched via a separate mechanism the maintainer documents; metadata view exposes only the descriptor."
+                },
+                "expiresAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time",
+                    "description": "Optional time after which the credential is no longer expected to be valid (e.g. an OAuth refresh token's known expiry, a time-limited API token, an enterprise password rotation policy). Maintainers MAY surface this in the consumer UI as a warning."
+                },
+                "breachedAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time",
+                    "description": "Set by the maintainer (via HIBP integration or equivalent) when the password material associated with this entry is known to appear in a public breach. Consumers SHOULD surface this prominently. Cleared when the user rotates the password and the new password is not in any known breach."
+                },
+                "passwordChangedAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time",
+                    "description": "Set whenever the password component of the secret payload is rotated. Maintainers MUST update this on every secret-material change for entries of kind `password` (or any kind that carries a password component). Used by consumers to surface rotation-overdue warnings."
+                },
+                "createdAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time"
+                },
+                "createdBy": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "VID of the consumer that originally created the entry."
+                },
+                "updatedAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time"
+                },
+                "updatedBy": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "VID of the consumer that last modified the entry."
+                },
+                "lastUsedAt": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "format": "date-time",
+                    "description": "Most recent time the entry was used (either released or proxy-login performed). Maintainers MAY return this with reduced precision (e.g. hour-floored) when releasing to a less-trusted consumer."
+                },
+                "version": {
+                    "type": "integer",
+                    "minimum": 0,
+                    "description": "Monotonic version counter incremented on every mutation. Used by consumers for optimistic-concurrency checks on vault/upsert and as the seq baseline for vault/sync."
+                },
+                "principalDid": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Optional cached DID the entry will act AS for DID-shaped flows — mirrors the `did` field of the entry's secret payload when `secretKind` carries one (`didSelfIssued`, `didcommPeer`). Absent for kinds that have no DID concept (`password`, `passkey`, `oauthTokens`, `bearerToken`, `sshKey`, `custom`). MAINTAINER-DERIVED, NOT CONSUMER-SUPPLIED: the maintainer MUST recompute this from the canonical secret at every upsert / secret rotation; a producer-supplied value on `vault/upsert/0.1` MUST be ignored (no error, but no honour). Read-only on the wire, present in metadata views so consumers can drive RP-side flows (e.g. fetch `/auth/challenge` keyed on the principal DID before requesting a proxy-login) without releasing the secret."
+                },
+                "ext": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+                    "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces."
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "AttachmentRef": {
+            "title": "AttachmentRef",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "id",
+                "name",
+                "sizeBytes",
+                "digestMultibase"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "id": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Opaque maintainer-assigned id for this attachment; used to fetch the blob via a separate mechanism."
+                },
+                "name": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "maxLength": 256,
+                    "description": "User-supplied filename (e.g. \"recovery-codes.txt\")."
+                },
+                "sizeBytes": {
+                    "type": "integer",
+                    "minimum": 0,
+                    "description": "Size of the encrypted blob in bytes. Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum per attachment and per entry."
+                },
+                "digestMultibase": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/DigestMultibase",
+                    "description": "Digest over the encrypted blob bytes (post-encryption), so the consumer can verify integrity after fetch. Taken over the bytes as stored, not over a canonicalization: the blob is an opaque artifact, not a JSON document."
+                },
+                "contentType": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "Optional MIME type hint for the consumer UI (e.g. \"text/plain\", \"application/x-pem-file\")."
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "DigestMultibase": {
+            "title": "DigestMultibase",
+            "description": "A cryptographic digest as a multibase-encoded multihash — the encoding the W3C Verifiable Credentials Data Model 2.0 defines for `digestMultibase`, and the one `did:webvh` uses for its SCID and entry hashes.\n\nMultihash carries the hash algorithm in-band, so the value is self-describing and the wire format survives an algorithm change without a schema revision; multibase does the same for the base encoding, so a verifier never infers base58 from base64url by context. A bare hex string or a `sha-256:`-style prefix hard-codes one algorithm into the wire contract and is non-conforming here.\n\nThis definition constrains the *encoding only*. What the digest is computed over is stated by each referencing field, because it differs legitimately: a digest over a JSON document is taken over its RFC 8785 (JCS) canonicalization, while a digest over an opaque artifact is taken over its bytes. A field whose input is a JSON document and which does not name a canonicalization is not reproducible.\n\nRestricted to the two multibase headers W3C Controlled Identifiers 1.0 §2.4 normatively requires — `z` (base58btc) and `u` (base64url-no-pad). CID permits others but states that \"interoperability is not guaranteed between implementations using such values\", and a registry whose purpose is interoperability should not mint digests a conforming verifier may be unable to read. The alphabets are enforced rather than assumed: base58btc excludes 0, O, I and l, and an earlier permissive pattern let three published examples carry digests that were not valid base58 at all. base58btc is RECOMMENDED, for consistency with `did:key` and `did:webvh`.",
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 16,
+            "pattern": "^(z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+|u[A-Za-z0-9_-]+)$",
+            "examples": [
+                "zQmbWqxBEKC3P8tqsKc98xmWNzrzDtRLMiMPL8wBuTGsMnR"
+            ]
+        },
+        "SecretKind": {
+            "title": "SecretKind",
+            "type": "string",
+            "enum": [
+                "password",
+                "passkey",
+                "oauthTokens",
+                "didSelfIssued",
+                "didcommPeer",
+                "bearerToken",
+                "sshKey",
+                "custom"
+            ],
+            "description": "Discriminator for the secret type stored in the entry. Definitions:\n- `password` — username + password (+ optional TOTP seed).\n- `passkey` — WebAuthn discoverable credential (private key + rpId + userHandle).\n- `oauthTokens` — OAuth 2.0 refresh + access token bundle for a specific provider.\n- `didSelfIssued` — Self-Issued OpenID Provider v2 (SIOP) credential: the entry points at a DID + signing key already managed by the VTA.\n- `didcommPeer` — DIDComm peer identity used to authenticate against a DIDComm-speaking relying party.\n- `bearerToken` — opaque bearer token carried in a maintainer-named header (covers API tokens, long-lived JWTs, personal-access tokens).\n- `sshKey` — SSH private key + comment.\n- `custom` — arbitrary structured fields; release-time consumer responsible for interpretation."
+        },
+        "SiteTarget": {
+            "title": "SiteTarget",
+            "description": "A single binding target for a vault entry. Tagged union over the discriminator `kind`. A VaultEntry's `targets` array MAY mix any number of these.",
+            "oneOf": [
+                {
+                    "title": "WebOrigin",
+                    "type": "object",
+                    "additionalProperties": false,
+                    "required": [
+                        "kind",
+                        "origin"
+                    ],
+                    "properties": {
+                        "kind": {
+                            "const": "webOrigin"
+                        },
+                        "origin": {
+                            "type": "string",
+                            "format": "uri",
+                            "description": "Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. \"https://github.com\". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard."
+                        }
+                    }
+                },
+                {
+                    "title": "Did",
+                    "type": "object",
+                    "additionalProperties": false,
+                    "required": [
+                        "kind",
+                        "did"
+                    ],
+                    "properties": {
+                        "kind": {
+                            "const": "did"
+                        },
+                        "did": {
+                            "type": "string",
+                            "minLength": 1,
+                            "description": "DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry."
+                        }
+                    }
+                },
+                {
+                    "title": "IosApp",
+                    "type": "object",
+                    "additionalProperties": false,
+                    "required": [
+                        "kind",
+                        "bundleId"
+                    ],
+                    "properties": {
+                        "kind": {
+                            "const": "iosApp"
+                        },
+                        "bundleId": {
+                            "type": "string",
+                            "minLength": 1,
+                            "pattern": "^[A-Za-z0-9.-]+$",
+                            "description": "iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.stwalkerster.codehub\"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration)."
+                        },
+                        "teamId": {
+                            "type": "string",
+                            "minLength": 1,
+                            "pattern": "^[A-Z0-9]+$",
+                            "description": "Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices."
+                        }
+                    }
+                },
+                {
+                    "title": "AndroidApp",
+                    "type": "object",
+                    "additionalProperties": false,
+                    "required": [
+                        "kind",
+                        "packageName",
+                        "sha256CertFingerprints"
+                    ],
+                    "properties": {
+                        "kind": {
+                            "const": "androidApp"
+                        },
+                        "packageName": {
+                            "type": "string",
+                            "minLength": 1,
+                            "pattern": "^[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*(\\.[A-Za-z][A-Za-z0-9_]*)+$",
+                            "description": "Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. \"com.github.android\")."
+                        },
+                        "sha256CertFingerprints": {
+                            "type": "array",
+                            "minItems": 1,
+                            "items": {
+                                "type": "string",
+                                "pattern": "^[0-9A-F]{2}(:[0-9A-F]{2}){31}$"
+                            },
+                            "uniqueItems": true,
+                            "description": "SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing)."
+                        }
+                    }
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        "SealedEnvelope": {
+            "title": "SealedEnvelope",
+            "description": "Discriminated by `envelope`. Exactly one variant matches per document.",
+            "oneOf": [
+                {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope"
+                },
+                {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/HpkeArmoredEnvelope"
+                },
+                {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/TspMessageEnvelope"
+                }
+            ]
+        },
+        "TspMessageEnvelope": {
+            "title": "TspMessageEnvelope",
+            "description": "Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tspMessage` envelopes explicitly (`envelope_unsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "envelope",
+                "message"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "envelope": {
+                    "const": "tspMessage"
+                },
+                "message": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format"
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "HpkeArmoredEnvelope": {
+            "title": "HpkeArmoredEnvelope",
+            "description": "OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`didSigned` / `attested` / `pinnedOnly`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.\n\nNo open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "envelope",
+                "armored",
+                "recipientKeyId"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "envelope": {
+                    "const": "hpkeArmored"
+                },
+                "armored": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24."
+                },
+                "recipientKeyId": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key."
+                },
+                "producerAssertion": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "enum": [
+                        "didSigned",
+                        "attested",
+                        "pinnedOnly"
+                    ],
+                    "default": "didSigned",
+                    "description": "Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `didSigned` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinnedOnly` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production)."
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope": {
+            "title": "DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope",
+            "description": "DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.\n\nM2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "envelope",
+                "jwe"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "envelope": {
+                    "const": "didcommAuthcrypt"
+                },
+                "jwe": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "minLength": 1,
+                    "description": "Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON."
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+};
 /**
  * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the request variant, from this specification's
  * front matter. Pass to `consumeInbound` — items 5b, 7 and 8 are
- * per-specification and cannot be derived from the document alone.
+ * per-specification and cannot be derived from the document alone, and
+ * item 2 needs the schema this carries.
  */
 export const SPEC = {
     typeUri: TYPE_URI,
     isBearer: false,
     isProofRequired: true,
     isRecipientRequired: true,
+    payloadSchema: PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
 };
 /**
  * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the success-response variant. `isRecipientRequired`
@@ -27,5 +1003,6 @@ export const RESPONSE_SPEC = {
     isBearer: false,
     isProofRequired: true,
     isRecipientRequired: true,
+    payloadSchema: RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
 };
 //# sourceMappingURL=payload.js.map