@openvtc/trust-tasks 0.6.4 → 0.6.5

package/dist/vault/upsert/0.3/payload.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,305 @@
+/**
+ * Generated by scripts/build-ts-bindings.mjs — DO NOT EDIT BY HAND.
+ * Source: specs/vault/upsert/0.3/payload.schema.json
+ */
+/**
+ * A single binding target for a vault entry. Tagged union over the discriminator `kind`. A VaultEntry's `targets` array MAY mix any number of these.
+ */
+export type SiteTarget = WebOrigin | Did | IosApp | AndroidApp;
+/**
+ * Discriminator for the secret type stored in the entry. Definitions:
+ * - `password` — username + password (+ optional TOTP seed).
+ * - `passkey` — WebAuthn discoverable credential (private key + rpId + userHandle).
+ * - `oauthTokens` — OAuth 2.0 refresh + access token bundle for a specific provider.
+ * - `didSelfIssued` — Self-Issued OpenID Provider v2 (SIOP) credential: the entry points at a DID + signing key already managed by the VTA.
+ * - `didcommPeer` — DIDComm peer identity used to authenticate against a DIDComm-speaking relying party.
+ * - `bearerToken` — opaque bearer token carried in a maintainer-named header (covers API tokens, long-lived JWTs, personal-access tokens).
+ * - `sshKey` — SSH private key + comment.
+ * - `custom` — arbitrary structured fields; release-time consumer responsible for interpretation.
+ */
+export type SecretKind = "password" | "passkey" | "oauthTokens" | "didSelfIssued" | "didcommPeer" | "bearerToken" | "sshKey" | "custom";
+/**
+ * Pluggable cipher envelope (discriminated by `envelope`) whose cleartext is a JCS-canonical JSON conforming to `vault/_shared/0.1/vault-secret#/$defs/VaultSecret`. The supported envelope kinds are listed in the SealedEnvelope shared schema; M2A consumers reject any kind they don't implement with `vault/upsert:envelope_unsupported`. REQUIRED on create unless `secretKind` is `didSelfIssued` or `didcommPeer` (those carry only references to maintainer-internal key ids and have no extra secret bytes). On update, omit if the secret material is unchanged; populate if the secret is being rotated.
+ */
+export type SealedEnvelope = DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope | HpkeArmoredEnvelope | TspMessageEnvelope;
+/**
+ * Discriminator for the secret type stored in the entry. Definitions:
+ * - `password` — username + password (+ optional TOTP seed).
+ * - `passkey` — WebAuthn discoverable credential (private key + rpId + userHandle).
+ * - `oauthTokens` — OAuth 2.0 refresh + access token bundle for a specific provider.
+ * - `didSelfIssued` — Self-Issued OpenID Provider v2 (SIOP) credential: the entry points at a DID + signing key already managed by the VTA.
+ * - `didcommPeer` — DIDComm peer identity used to authenticate against a DIDComm-speaking relying party.
+ * - `bearerToken` — opaque bearer token carried in a maintainer-named header (covers API tokens, long-lived JWTs, personal-access tokens).
+ * - `sshKey` — SSH private key + comment.
+ * - `custom` — arbitrary structured fields; release-time consumer responsible for interpretation.
+ */
+export type SecretKind1 = "password" | "passkey" | "oauthTokens" | "didSelfIssued" | "didcommPeer" | "bearerToken" | "sshKey" | "custom";
+/**
+ * Digest over the encrypted blob bytes (post-encryption), so the consumer can verify integrity after fetch. Taken over the bytes as stored, not over a canonicalization: the blob is an opaque artifact, not a JSON document.
+ */
+export type DigestMultibase = string;
+/**
+ * Create a new vault entry or update an existing one. The secret material — if present — rides inside a pluggable cipher envelope (see `vault/_shared/0.1/sealed-envelope`), so the Trust Task carries ciphertext and an authenticator, not plaintext. Updates may be partial: any populated metadata field replaces the current value; omitted fields are left untouched; explicit null clears the field (per `clearFields`). Optimistic-concurrency check via `expectedVersion`.
+ */
+export interface VaultUpsertPayload {
+    /**
+     * Entry id. Omit to create; supply to update. Maintainers MAY accept consumer-supplied ids on create (recommended: ULID) or MAY assign their own and return the assigned id in the response.
+     */
+    id?: string;
+    /**
+     * When updating, the consumer's last-observed `version` for the entry. The maintainer rejects with `vault/upsert:version_conflict` if the current version differs. Omit on create.
+     */
+    expectedVersion?: number;
+    /**
+     * Trust context the entry belongs to. Cannot be changed by upsert; to move an entry between contexts the consumer MUST delete and recreate.
+     */
+    contextId: string;
+    /**
+     * @minItems 1
+     */
+    targets: [SiteTarget, ...SiteTarget[]];
+    label: string;
+    secretKind: SecretKind;
+    tags?: string[];
+    notes?: string;
+    favicon?: string;
+    selectors?: string[];
+    customFieldNames?: string[];
+    expiresAt?: string;
+    sealedSecret?: SealedEnvelope;
+    /**
+     * List of metadata fields to explicitly clear on this upsert. Distinguishes "don't touch" (field omitted from payload) from "clear" (field listed here).
+     */
+    clearFields?: ("notes" | "favicon" | "expiresAt" | "tags" | "selectors" | "customFieldNames")[];
+    ext?: Ext;
+}
+export interface WebOrigin {
+    kind: "webOrigin";
+    /**
+     * Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. "https://github.com". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard.
+     */
+    origin: string;
+}
+export interface Did {
+    kind: "did";
+    /**
+     * DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry.
+     */
+    did: string;
+}
+export interface IosApp {
+    kind: "iosApp";
+    /**
+     * iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. "com.github.stwalkerster.codehub"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration).
+     */
+    bundleId: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices.
+     */
+    teamId?: string;
+}
+export interface AndroidApp {
+    kind: "androidApp";
+    /**
+     * Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. "com.github.android").
+     */
+    packageName: string;
+    /**
+     * SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing).
+     *
+     * @minItems 1
+     */
+    sha256CertFingerprints: [string, ...string[]];
+}
+/**
+ * DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.
+ *
+ * M2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.
+ */
+export interface DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope {
+    envelope: "didcommAuthcrypt";
+    /**
+     * Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON.
+     */
+    jwe: string;
+}
+/**
+ * OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`didSigned` / `attested` / `pinnedOnly`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.
+ *
+ * No open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.
+ */
+export interface HpkeArmoredEnvelope {
+    envelope: "hpkeArmored";
+    /**
+     * ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24.
+     */
+    armored: string;
+    /**
+     * did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key.
+     */
+    recipientKeyId: string;
+    /**
+     * Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `didSigned` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinnedOnly` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production).
+     */
+    producerAssertion?: "didSigned" | "attested" | "pinnedOnly";
+}
+/**
+ * Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tspMessage` envelopes explicitly (`envelope_unsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.
+ */
+export interface TspMessageEnvelope {
+    envelope: "tspMessage";
+    /**
+     * Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format
+     */
+    message: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.
+ */
+export interface Ext {
+    [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
+}
+export interface VaultUpsertResponsePayload {
+    entry: VaultEntry;
+    /**
+     * true when this upsert created a new entry; false when it updated an existing one.
+     */
+    created?: boolean;
+    ext?: Ext;
+}
+export interface VaultEntry {
+    /**
+     * Opaque vault-maintainer-assigned identifier for the entry. ULID/UUID/base32 are common; the wire spec only requires non-empty string equality.
+     */
+    id: string;
+    /**
+     * Identifier of the trust context (persona) the entry belongs to. Opaque string interpreted by the vault maintainer; corresponds to a single ContextRecord on the VTA side.
+     */
+    contextId: string;
+    /**
+     * One or more binding targets — web origins, mobile app identifiers, and/or DIDs — that this credential applies to. A request from any matching target uses this entry. A typical entry for a service that exists as both a website and mobile apps will list a web origin, an iOS bundle id, and an Android package id; passkeys for that service typically list only the origin (because iOS Associated Domains and Android Asset Links bind apps to the domain at the OS level).
+     *
+     * @minItems 1
+     */
+    targets: [SiteTarget, ...SiteTarget[]];
+    /**
+     * Human-readable display name (e.g. "Work GitHub", "Personal bank — checking"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not.
+     */
+    label: string;
+    secretKind: SecretKind1;
+    /**
+     * User-defined tags for organisation and filtering (e.g. ["family", "finance"]). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum count; the wire spec does not.
+     */
+    tags?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Non-sensitive notes the user attached to the entry. Visible in metadata view (suitable for support contact, account number, expiry policy memos). SENSITIVE notes belong in the secret payload as a `secureNotes` field — those are only released by vault/release/0.1.
+     */
+    notes?: string;
+    /**
+     * Optional URI of an icon to display in the consumer UI. Maintainers MAY fetch and cache; consumers SHOULD treat as untrusted content and fetch via a sandboxed pipeline.
+     */
+    favicon?: string;
+    /**
+     * Opaque maintainer-defined selector strings fed to the policy engine when this entry is requested (e.g. "recent_uv_required", "network_class=corp", "step_up_push"). Consumers MUST treat selectors as opaque; they exist for policy authoring on the maintainer side.
+     */
+    selectors?: string[];
+    /**
+     * Names of additional fields the user has attached (e.g. ["security-question-1", "account-number"]). The VALUES live in the secret payload and are only delivered by vault/release/0.1. Exposing names in metadata lets the consumer render the right form layout before requesting release.
+     */
+    customFieldNames?: string[];
+    /**
+     * References to encrypted blobs associated with the entry (recovery codes, PEM files, screenshots of authenticator setup). The blobs themselves are fetched via a separate mechanism the maintainer documents; metadata view exposes only the descriptor.
+     */
+    attachments?: AttachmentRef[];
+    /**
+     * Optional time after which the credential is no longer expected to be valid (e.g. an OAuth refresh token's known expiry, a time-limited API token, an enterprise password rotation policy). Maintainers MAY surface this in the consumer UI as a warning.
+     */
+    expiresAt?: string;
+    /**
+     * Set by the maintainer (via HIBP integration or equivalent) when the password material associated with this entry is known to appear in a public breach. Consumers SHOULD surface this prominently. Cleared when the user rotates the password and the new password is not in any known breach.
+     */
+    breachedAt?: string;
+    /**
+     * Set whenever the password component of the secret payload is rotated. Maintainers MUST update this on every secret-material change for entries of kind `password` (or any kind that carries a password component). Used by consumers to surface rotation-overdue warnings.
+     */
+    passwordChangedAt?: string;
+    createdAt: string;
+    /**
+     * VID of the consumer that originally created the entry.
+     */
+    createdBy?: string;
+    updatedAt: string;
+    /**
+     * VID of the consumer that last modified the entry.
+     */
+    updatedBy?: string;
+    /**
+     * Most recent time the entry was used (either released or proxy-login performed). Maintainers MAY return this with reduced precision (e.g. hour-floored) when releasing to a less-trusted consumer.
+     */
+    lastUsedAt?: string;
+    /**
+     * Monotonic version counter incremented on every mutation. Used by consumers for optimistic-concurrency checks on vault/upsert and as the seq baseline for vault/sync.
+     */
+    version: number;
+    /**
+     * Optional cached DID the entry will act AS for DID-shaped flows — mirrors the `did` field of the entry's secret payload when `secretKind` carries one (`didSelfIssued`, `didcommPeer`). Absent for kinds that have no DID concept (`password`, `passkey`, `oauthTokens`, `bearerToken`, `sshKey`, `custom`). MAINTAINER-DERIVED, NOT CONSUMER-SUPPLIED: the maintainer MUST recompute this from the canonical secret at every upsert / secret rotation; a producer-supplied value on `vault/upsert/0.1` MUST be ignored (no error, but no honour). Read-only on the wire, present in metadata views so consumers can drive RP-side flows (e.g. fetch `/auth/challenge` keyed on the principal DID before requesting a proxy-login) without releasing the secret.
+     */
+    principalDid?: string;
+    ext?: Ext1;
+}
+export interface AttachmentRef {
+    /**
+     * Opaque maintainer-assigned id for this attachment; used to fetch the blob via a separate mechanism.
+     */
+    id: string;
+    /**
+     * User-supplied filename (e.g. "recovery-codes.txt").
+     */
+    name: string;
+    /**
+     * Size of the encrypted blob in bytes. Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum per attachment and per entry.
+     */
+    sizeBytes: number;
+    digestMultibase: DigestMultibase;
+    /**
+     * Optional MIME type hint for the consumer UI (e.g. "text/plain", "application/x-pem-file").
+     */
+    contentType?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.
+ */
+export interface Ext1 {
+    [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
+}
+/** Trust Task type URI. */
+export declare const TYPE_URI: "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.3";
+/** Stable alias for this specification's request payload shape. */
+export type Payload = VaultUpsertPayload;
+/** Trust Task response type URI (request type URI + "#response"). */
+export declare const RESPONSE_TYPE_URI: "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.3#response";
+/** Stable alias for this specification's success-response payload shape. */
+export type Response = VaultUpsertResponsePayload;
+/**
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the request variant, from this specification's
+ * front matter. Pass to `consumeInbound` — items 5b, 7 and 8 are
+ * per-specification and cannot be derived from the document alone.
+ */
+export declare const SPEC: {
+    readonly typeUri: "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.3";
+    readonly isBearer: false;
+    readonly isProofRequired: true;
+    readonly isRecipientRequired: true;
+};
+/**
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the success-response variant. `isRecipientRequired`
+ * tracks the *issuer* party's requirement because a response swaps the
+ * parties (§7.3 item 5).
+ */
+export declare const RESPONSE_SPEC: {
+    readonly typeUri: "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.3#response";
+    readonly isBearer: false;
+    readonly isProofRequired: true;
+    readonly isRecipientRequired: true;
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=payload.d.ts.map

package/dist/vault/upsert/0.3/payload.d.ts.map

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package/dist/vault/upsert/0.3/payload.js

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+/**
+ * Generated by scripts/build-ts-bindings.mjs — DO NOT EDIT BY HAND.
+ * Source: specs/vault/upsert/0.3/payload.schema.json
+ */
+/** Trust Task type URI. */
+export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.3";
+/** Trust Task response type URI (request type URI + "#response"). */
+export const RESPONSE_TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/upsert/0.3#response";
+/**
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the request variant, from this specification's
+ * front matter. Pass to `consumeInbound` — items 5b, 7 and 8 are
+ * per-specification and cannot be derived from the document alone.
+ */
+export const SPEC = {
+    typeUri: TYPE_URI,
+    isBearer: false,
+    isProofRequired: true,
+    isRecipientRequired: true,
+};
+/**
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the success-response variant. `isRecipientRequired`
+ * tracks the *issuer* party's requirement because a response swaps the
+ * parties (§7.3 item 5).
+ */
+export const RESPONSE_SPEC = {
+    typeUri: RESPONSE_TYPE_URI,
+    isBearer: false,
+    isProofRequired: true,
+    isRecipientRequired: true,
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=payload.js.map

package/dist/vault/upsert/0.3/payload.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"payload.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../src/vault/upsert/0.3/payload.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;GAGG;AAkSH,2BAA2B;AAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,8CAAuD,CAAC;AAKhF,qEAAqE;AACrE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,uDAAgE,CAAC;AAKlG;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;IAClB,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ;IACjB,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;CACjB,CAAC;AAEX;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG;IAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;IAC1B,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;CACjB,CAAC"}

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@openvtc/trust-tasks",
-  "version": "0.6.4",
+  "version": "0.6.5",
   "description": "Generated TypeScript bindings for the Trust Tasks framework registry.",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",

package/src/index.ts

@@ -178,6 +178,7 @@ export * as PolicyUpsert_v0_1 from "./policy/upsert/0.1/payload.js";
 export * as PolicyUpsert_v0_2 from "./policy/upsert/0.2/payload.js";
 export * as ProvisionIntegration_v0_1 from "./provision/integration/0.1/payload.js";
 export * as ProvisionIntegration_v0_2 from "./provision/integration/0.2/payload.js";
+export * as ProvisionIntegration_v0_3 from "./provision/integration/0.3/payload.js";
 export * as PushProvision_v0_1 from "./push/provision/0.1/payload.js";
 export * as PushProvision_v0_2 from "./push/provision/0.2/payload.js";
 export * as PushRegister_v0_1 from "./push/register/0.1/payload.js";
@@ -219,11 +220,18 @@ export * as SealedEnvelopeShared_v0_2 from "./vault/_shared/0.2/sealed-envelope.
 export * as SessionBlobShared_v0_2 from "./vault/_shared/0.2/session-blob.js";
 export * as VaultEntryShared_v0_2 from "./vault/_shared/0.2/vault-entry.js";
 export * as VaultSecretShared_v0_2 from "./vault/_shared/0.2/vault-secret.js";
+export * as ConsumerContextShared_v0_3 from "./vault/_shared/0.3/consumer-context.js";
+export * as SealedEnvelopeShared_v0_3 from "./vault/_shared/0.3/sealed-envelope.js";
+export * as SessionBlobShared_v0_3 from "./vault/_shared/0.3/session-blob.js";
+export * as VaultEntryShared_v0_3 from "./vault/_shared/0.3/vault-entry.js";
+export * as VaultSecretShared_v0_3 from "./vault/_shared/0.3/vault-secret.js";
 export * as VaultDelete_v0_1 from "./vault/delete/0.1/payload.js";
 export * as VaultGet_v0_1 from "./vault/get/0.1/payload.js";
 export * as VaultGet_v0_2 from "./vault/get/0.2/payload.js";
+export * as VaultGet_v0_3 from "./vault/get/0.3/payload.js";
 export * as VaultList_v0_1 from "./vault/list/0.1/payload.js";
 export * as VaultList_v0_2 from "./vault/list/0.2/payload.js";
+export * as VaultList_v0_3 from "./vault/list/0.3/payload.js";
 export * as VaultProxyLogin_v0_1 from "./vault/proxy-login/0.1/payload.js";
 export * as VaultProxyLogin_v0_2 from "./vault/proxy-login/0.2/payload.js";
 export * as VaultRelease_v0_1 from "./vault/release/0.1/payload.js";
@@ -234,6 +242,7 @@ export * as VaultSync_v0_1 from "./vault/sync/0.1/payload.js";
 export * as VaultSync_v0_2 from "./vault/sync/0.2/payload.js";
 export * as VaultUpsert_v0_1 from "./vault/upsert/0.1/payload.js";
 export * as VaultUpsert_v0_2 from "./vault/upsert/0.2/payload.js";
+export * as VaultUpsert_v0_3 from "./vault/upsert/0.3/payload.js";
 export * as VaultUsage_v0_1 from "./vault/usage/0.1/payload.js";
 export * as VaultUsage_v0_2 from "./vault/usage/0.2/payload.js";
 export * as VrcRelationshipsIssue_v0_1 from "./vrc/relationships/issue/0.1/payload.js";