@openvtc/trust-tasks 0.27.1 → 0.27.3

package/dist/rooms/epoch/chain/0.2/payload.js

@@ -0,0 +1,292 @@
+/**
+ * Generated by scripts/build-ts-bindings.mjs — DO NOT EDIT BY HAND.
+ * Source: specs/rooms/epoch/chain/0.2/payload.schema.json
+ */
+/** Trust Task type URI. */
+export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/chain/0.2";
+/** Trust Task response type URI (request type URI + "#response"). */
+export const RESPONSE_TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/chain/0.2#response";
+/**
+ * This specification's payload schema, as a value.
+ *
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 item 2 is performed against this. It is shipped as data
+ * rather than only as a `.json` file because TypeScript types are erased
+ * at runtime: without a schema a consumer has nothing to validate, and
+ * every REQUIRED payload member is optional in practice. Cross-file
+ * `$ref`s are already inlined, so it needs no resolver.
+ */
+export const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
+    "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+    "$id": "https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/chain/0.2",
+    "title": "Rooms Epoch Chain — payload",
+    "type": "object",
+    "additionalProperties": false,
+    "required": [
+        "roomId",
+        "presentation"
+    ],
+    "properties": {
+        "roomId": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "description": "The room whose epoch key chain is being fetched."
+        },
+        "presentation": {
+            "$ref": "#/$defs/AuthorityPresentation",
+            "description": "Must confer the `read` action at this room's scope. Reading the room and reading the parts of it written earlier are the same act, so they take the same grant; a separate one would be a grant nobody could explain."
+        },
+        "fromEpoch": {
+            "type": "integer",
+            "minimum": 2,
+            "description": "Return only links whose `epoch` is at or below this. The chain is walked downwards, so this is how a member who already holds the top of it asks for the rest. Absent means from the room's current epoch down."
+        },
+        "limit": {
+            "type": "integer",
+            "minimum": 1,
+            "maximum": 500,
+            "description": "Maximum links to return, highest `epoch` first. A host MAY return fewer."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+            "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+            "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1."
+        }
+    },
+    "$defs": {
+        "Response": {
+            "$anchor": "response",
+            "title": "Rooms Epoch Chain — response payload",
+            "description": "Success response to rooms/epoch/chain. Type https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/chain/0.2#response. Carries ciphertext a host cannot read, and — once the room's chain has been pruned — the room's epoch floor, which every party keeping the room's rungs or keys on a member's behalf discards below.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "roomId",
+                "links"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "roomId": {
+                    "type": "string"
+                },
+                "links": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "description": "The links, highest `epoch` first. Contiguous within the range returned: a host MUST NOT omit a rung it holds while returning a lower one, because a member cannot walk past a gap and would read the omission as history that had been severed.",
+                    "items": {
+                        "$ref": "#/$defs/EpochLink"
+                    }
+                },
+                "epochFloor": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/EpochFloor",
+                    "description": "The room's epoch floor, on every response — whatever `fromEpoch` and `limit` the request named, and with an empty `links` too — once the room's chain has ever been pruned at this host; absent when it never has. A requester that keeps rungs or keys for the room applies it (`EpochFloor`): discards what it holds below, and never stores it again. `links` never carries a rung numbered at or below it."
+                },
+                "ext": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext"
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "Ext": {
+            "title": "Ext",
+            "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "minProperties": 1,
+            "additionalProperties": true,
+            "propertyNames": {
+                "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
+            }
+        },
+        "EpochFloor": {
+            "title": "EpochFloor",
+            "type": "integer",
+            "minimum": 1,
+            "description": "The earliest epoch whose storage key a room still lets anybody derive: its chain was pruned below it (`rooms/epoch/prune`), and every epoch under it is meant to be unreadable — at the host, and, as far as each of them conforms, at every member's key holder. Absent means the room's chain has never been pruned.\n\n**The off-by-one, stated once.** A rung (`EpochLink`) numbered `e` opens with epoch `e`'s key and yields epoch `e − 1`'s. A prune with `beforeEpoch: N` drops the rungs numbered below `N`, so rung `N` survives and still yields epoch `N − 1`'s key; the floor after it is therefore `N − 1`, never `N`. A party applying a floor `F` discards the rungs numbered `F` and below — rung `F` would yield `F − 1` — and every key for an epoch below `F`.\n\n**Monotonic.** A floor only rises. A host raises the room's to the higher of the floor it held and `beforeEpoch − 1` at each prune it performs, and never lowers it; every other party keeps the highest it has learnt for the room, from any source, and never lowers it either. A lower floor learnt later — from a stale response, or a host that has not been pruned — changes nothing.\n\n**A host** that holds a floor for a room MUST NOT store, accept or serve a rung numbered at or below it, and MUST serve the floor wherever a response can carry it (`rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2, `rooms/epoch/prune` 0.2).\n\n**A member's key holder** — and any client of the member that keeps the room's rungs or keys itself — on learning a floor `F` above the one it held, by any means (`rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 in its own reads, `rooms/keys/backfill` 0.2, `rooms/keys/chain` 0.2 from its principal):\n  1. MUST discard every rung it holds for the room numbered `F` or below, and every storage key, file key or other key material it holds or has cached for an epoch below `F` — including one it derived in passing while applying commits through those epochs (`rooms/keys/commit`, `rooms/epoch/commits`);\n  2. MUST NOT store such a rung or key again from any source — a delivery from its principal, a backfill, a repair, a catch-up, or a host that has not been pruned — and MUST NOT ask for one;\n  3. MUST refuse to derive or use a key for an epoch below `F`, answering exactly as it answers for an epoch its chain does not reach (`beyondChain`, with an earliest epoch at or above `F`), whatever it still holds;\n  4. MUST keep `F` itself for as long as it holds anything for the room, since it is what makes items 2 and 3 enforceable after the material is gone.\n\nA key holder SHOULD learn the floor whenever it fetches rungs or catches up, and SHOULD ask for it — a `rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 read carries it whatever `fromEpoch` and `limit` it names — at least as often as it otherwise reads the room. One that never asks never learns, and keeps what it held.\n\n**What a floor does not do, stated plainly.** It is honoured by parties that conform; it does not reach into one that does not, and it recalls nothing. Plaintext a key holder already returned, records a member already opened, files already downloaded and decrypted, exports, and any key a member's own software extracted are beyond it. What it guarantees cryptographically is what the prune guarantees: a party that had not derived a key below the floor before the host erased its rungs can never derive it afterwards. What it adds is that every conforming key holder stops being able to — so that a restart, a new device or an agent's next recall reads nothing below the floor, rather than everything its holder happened to keep."
+        },
+        "EpochLink": {
+            "title": "EpochLink",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "epoch",
+                "wrapped",
+                "nonce"
+            ],
+            "description": "One rung of a room's epoch key chain: the storage key of epoch `epoch - 1`, sealed under the storage key of `epoch`. A group key schedule offers no way to derive an earlier epoch's key from a later one — that property is what makes removing a member mean something — so without a chain the first membership change makes every record already in the room unopenable by everyone, including whoever wrote it. The chain is the one-way street run deliberately the other way: a member holding the current key walks it backwards to any retained epoch, and a member holding an earlier key still derives nothing later. Removal stays forward-only; reading stays possible. What a chain costs is stated where it is chosen, in the room's retention policy.",
+            "properties": {
+                "epoch": {
+                    "type": "integer",
+                    "minimum": 2,
+                    "description": "The epoch whose storage key opens this link; it wraps the storage key of `epoch - 1`. Never 1: a room's first epoch has no predecessor, so a link claiming one wraps something that is not an earlier epoch's key."
+                },
+                "wrapped": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "The wrapped predecessor key, base64url. Bound by AEAD associated data to `roomId` and to this link's own position in the chain, so a link lifted to another rung, or served under another room, fails to open rather than yielding a key that is wrong. The binding is load-bearing rather than decorative: every rung is a fixed-length key sealed under a fixed-length key, so nothing about the ciphertext itself says where it belongs."
+                },
+                "nonce": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "AEAD nonce, base64url."
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "AuthorityPresentation": {
+            "title": "AuthorityPresentation",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "membership",
+                "authority"
+            ],
+            "description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
+            "properties": {
+                "membership": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "The presenter's membership credential for this room, or — on a `private` room — a zero-knowledge presentation of it. Serialized per the governing profile."
+                },
+                "authority": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "minItems": 1,
+                    "maxItems": 8,
+                    "items": {
+                        "type": "string"
+                    },
+                    "description": "The authority chain, LEAF FIRST: the first element is the credential being relied on and the last MUST be one issued by the room itself. Every link the presenter relies on is present, because the host will not fetch one. Capped at 8: verification is linear in chain length and runs on every operation, so an unbounded chain is a denial-of-service surface against the host. The known uses need 2 to 3 — a person attenuating to an agent, and that agent to a sub-agent."
+                },
+                "subjectBinding": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "REQUIRED on a `private` room, where the subject identifier is withheld: a proof that the membership credential and the authority chain's leaf describe the SAME subject. Without it two parties pool credentials — one contributes membership, the other authority — and the combination verifies as a single party holding both. A host MUST refuse a private-room presentation that omits this."
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+};
+/** As {@link PAYLOAD_SCHEMA}, for the success-response variant. */
+export const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
+    "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+    "$ref": "#/$defs/Response",
+    "$defs": {
+        "Response": {
+            "$anchor": "response",
+            "title": "Rooms Epoch Chain — response payload",
+            "description": "Success response to rooms/epoch/chain. Type https://trusttasks.org/spec/rooms/epoch/chain/0.2#response. Carries ciphertext a host cannot read, and — once the room's chain has been pruned — the room's epoch floor, which every party keeping the room's rungs or keys on a member's behalf discards below.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "roomId",
+                "links"
+            ],
+            "properties": {
+                "roomId": {
+                    "type": "string"
+                },
+                "links": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "description": "The links, highest `epoch` first. Contiguous within the range returned: a host MUST NOT omit a rung it holds while returning a lower one, because a member cannot walk past a gap and would read the omission as history that had been severed.",
+                    "items": {
+                        "$ref": "#/$defs/EpochLink"
+                    }
+                },
+                "epochFloor": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/EpochFloor",
+                    "description": "The room's epoch floor, on every response — whatever `fromEpoch` and `limit` the request named, and with an empty `links` too — once the room's chain has ever been pruned at this host; absent when it never has. A requester that keeps rungs or keys for the room applies it (`EpochFloor`): discards what it holds below, and never stores it again. `links` never carries a rung numbered at or below it."
+                },
+                "ext": {
+                    "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext"
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "Ext": {
+            "title": "Ext",
+            "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
+            "type": "object",
+            "minProperties": 1,
+            "additionalProperties": true,
+            "propertyNames": {
+                "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
+            }
+        },
+        "EpochFloor": {
+            "title": "EpochFloor",
+            "type": "integer",
+            "minimum": 1,
+            "description": "The earliest epoch whose storage key a room still lets anybody derive: its chain was pruned below it (`rooms/epoch/prune`), and every epoch under it is meant to be unreadable — at the host, and, as far as each of them conforms, at every member's key holder. Absent means the room's chain has never been pruned.\n\n**The off-by-one, stated once.** A rung (`EpochLink`) numbered `e` opens with epoch `e`'s key and yields epoch `e − 1`'s. A prune with `beforeEpoch: N` drops the rungs numbered below `N`, so rung `N` survives and still yields epoch `N − 1`'s key; the floor after it is therefore `N − 1`, never `N`. A party applying a floor `F` discards the rungs numbered `F` and below — rung `F` would yield `F − 1` — and every key for an epoch below `F`.\n\n**Monotonic.** A floor only rises. A host raises the room's to the higher of the floor it held and `beforeEpoch − 1` at each prune it performs, and never lowers it; every other party keeps the highest it has learnt for the room, from any source, and never lowers it either. A lower floor learnt later — from a stale response, or a host that has not been pruned — changes nothing.\n\n**A host** that holds a floor for a room MUST NOT store, accept or serve a rung numbered at or below it, and MUST serve the floor wherever a response can carry it (`rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2, `rooms/epoch/prune` 0.2).\n\n**A member's key holder** — and any client of the member that keeps the room's rungs or keys itself — on learning a floor `F` above the one it held, by any means (`rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 in its own reads, `rooms/keys/backfill` 0.2, `rooms/keys/chain` 0.2 from its principal):\n  1. MUST discard every rung it holds for the room numbered `F` or below, and every storage key, file key or other key material it holds or has cached for an epoch below `F` — including one it derived in passing while applying commits through those epochs (`rooms/keys/commit`, `rooms/epoch/commits`);\n  2. MUST NOT store such a rung or key again from any source — a delivery from its principal, a backfill, a repair, a catch-up, or a host that has not been pruned — and MUST NOT ask for one;\n  3. MUST refuse to derive or use a key for an epoch below `F`, answering exactly as it answers for an epoch its chain does not reach (`beyondChain`, with an earliest epoch at or above `F`), whatever it still holds;\n  4. MUST keep `F` itself for as long as it holds anything for the room, since it is what makes items 2 and 3 enforceable after the material is gone.\n\nA key holder SHOULD learn the floor whenever it fetches rungs or catches up, and SHOULD ask for it — a `rooms/epoch/chain` 0.2 read carries it whatever `fromEpoch` and `limit` it names — at least as often as it otherwise reads the room. One that never asks never learns, and keeps what it held.\n\n**What a floor does not do, stated plainly.** It is honoured by parties that conform; it does not reach into one that does not, and it recalls nothing. Plaintext a key holder already returned, records a member already opened, files already downloaded and decrypted, exports, and any key a member's own software extracted are beyond it. What it guarantees cryptographically is what the prune guarantees: a party that had not derived a key below the floor before the host erased its rungs can never derive it afterwards. What it adds is that every conforming key holder stops being able to — so that a restart, a new device or an agent's next recall reads nothing below the floor, rather than everything its holder happened to keep."
+        },
+        "EpochLink": {
+            "title": "EpochLink",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "epoch",
+                "wrapped",
+                "nonce"
+            ],
+            "description": "One rung of a room's epoch key chain: the storage key of epoch `epoch - 1`, sealed under the storage key of `epoch`. A group key schedule offers no way to derive an earlier epoch's key from a later one — that property is what makes removing a member mean something — so without a chain the first membership change makes every record already in the room unopenable by everyone, including whoever wrote it. The chain is the one-way street run deliberately the other way: a member holding the current key walks it backwards to any retained epoch, and a member holding an earlier key still derives nothing later. Removal stays forward-only; reading stays possible. What a chain costs is stated where it is chosen, in the room's retention policy.",
+            "properties": {
+                "epoch": {
+                    "type": "integer",
+                    "minimum": 2,
+                    "description": "The epoch whose storage key opens this link; it wraps the storage key of `epoch - 1`. Never 1: a room's first epoch has no predecessor, so a link claiming one wraps something that is not an earlier epoch's key."
+                },
+                "wrapped": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "The wrapped predecessor key, base64url. Bound by AEAD associated data to `roomId` and to this link's own position in the chain, so a link lifted to another rung, or served under another room, fails to open rather than yielding a key that is wrong. The binding is load-bearing rather than decorative: every rung is a fixed-length key sealed under a fixed-length key, so nothing about the ciphertext itself says where it belongs."
+                },
+                "nonce": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "AEAD nonce, base64url."
+                }
+            }
+        },
+        "AuthorityPresentation": {
+            "title": "AuthorityPresentation",
+            "type": "object",
+            "additionalProperties": false,
+            "required": [
+                "membership",
+                "authority"
+            ],
+            "description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
+            "properties": {
+                "membership": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "The presenter's membership credential for this room, or — on a `private` room — a zero-knowledge presentation of it. Serialized per the governing profile."
+                },
+                "authority": {
+                    "type": "array",
+                    "minItems": 1,
+                    "maxItems": 8,
+                    "items": {
+                        "type": "string"
+                    },
+                    "description": "The authority chain, LEAF FIRST: the first element is the credential being relied on and the last MUST be one issued by the room itself. Every link the presenter relies on is present, because the host will not fetch one. Capped at 8: verification is linear in chain length and runs on every operation, so an unbounded chain is a denial-of-service surface against the host. The known uses need 2 to 3 — a person attenuating to an agent, and that agent to a sub-agent."
+                },
+                "subjectBinding": {
+                    "type": "string",
+                    "description": "REQUIRED on a `private` room, where the subject identifier is withheld: a proof that the membership credential and the authority chain's leaf describe the SAME subject. Without it two parties pool credentials — one contributes membership, the other authority — and the combination verifies as a single party holding both. A host MUST refuse a private-room presentation that omits this."
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+};
+/**
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the request variant, from this specification's
+ * front matter. Pass to `consumeInbound` — items 5b, 7 and 8 are
+ * per-specification and cannot be derived from the document alone, and
+ * item 2 needs the schema this carries.
+ */
+export const SPEC = {
+    typeUri: TYPE_URI,
+    isBearer: false,
+    isProofRequired: true,
+    isRecipientRequired: true,
+    isIssuedAtRequired: true,
+    payloadSchema: PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
+};
+/**
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the success-response variant. `isRecipientRequired`
+ * tracks the *issuer* party's requirement because a response swaps the
+ * parties (§7.3 item 5).
+ */
+export const RESPONSE_SPEC = {
+    typeUri: RESPONSE_TYPE_URI,
+    isBearer: false,
+    isProofRequired: true,
+    isRecipientRequired: true,
+    isIssuedAtRequired: true,
+    payloadSchema: RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=payload.js.map

package/dist/rooms/epoch/chain/0.2/payload.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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