@openvtc/trust-tasks 0.26.14 → 0.26.16
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +183 -0
- package/dist/_shared/components.d.ts +392 -1
- package/dist/_shared/components.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +20 -0
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/_shared/0.1/personal-label.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/rooms/_shared/0.1/personal-label.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/_shared/0.1/personal-label.js +6 -0
- package/dist/rooms/_shared/0.1/personal-label.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/_shared/0.1/room.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/_shared/0.1/room.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/get/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/get/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/get/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/get/0.2/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/get/0.2/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/get/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/upload/begin/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/upload/begin/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/upload/begin/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/upload/begin/0.2/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/upload/begin/0.2/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/blobs/upload/begin/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/chain/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/chain/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/chain/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/commits/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/commits/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/commits/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/mint/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/mint/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/mint/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/prune/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/prune/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/epoch/prune/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/info/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/info/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/info/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/keys/act/0.4/payload.d.ts +546 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/act/0.4/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/act/0.4/payload.js +305 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/act/0.4/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/label/0.1/payload.d.ts +757 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/label/0.1/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/label/0.1/payload.js +388 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/label/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/list/0.2/payload.d.ts +667 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/list/0.2/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/list/0.2/payload.js +350 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/list/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/present/0.2/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/keys/present/0.2/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/keys/present/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/keys/profile/read/0.1/payload.d.ts +1652 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/profile/read/0.1/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/profile/read/0.1/payload.js +649 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/profile/read/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/profile/write/0.1/payload.d.ts +583 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/profile/write/0.1/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/profile/write/0.1/payload.js +319 -0
- package/dist/rooms/keys/profile/write/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/owner/claim/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/owner/claim/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/owner/claim/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/owner/group/remove/0.2/payload.d.ts +600 -0
- package/dist/rooms/owner/group/remove/0.2/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/owner/group/remove/0.2/payload.js +310 -0
- package/dist/rooms/owner/group/remove/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/owner/revoke/0.1/payload.d.ts +1481 -0
- package/dist/rooms/owner/revoke/0.1/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/owner/revoke/0.1/payload.js +811 -0
- package/dist/rooms/owner/revoke/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/owner/transfer/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/owner/transfer/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/owner/transfer/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/records/curate/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/records/curate/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/records/curate/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/records/get/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/records/get/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/records/get/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/records/get/0.2/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/records/get/0.2/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/records/get/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/records/list/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/records/list/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/records/list/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/records/list/0.2/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/records/list/0.2/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/records/list/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/records/put/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/records/put/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/records/put/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/records/put/0.2/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/records/put/0.2/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/records/put/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/rooms/revocations/get/0.1/payload.d.ts +905 -0
- package/dist/rooms/revocations/get/0.1/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/revocations/get/0.1/payload.js +512 -0
- package/dist/rooms/revocations/get/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/revocations/put/0.1/payload.d.ts +1021 -0
- package/dist/rooms/revocations/put/0.1/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/revocations/put/0.1/payload.js +583 -0
- package/dist/rooms/revocations/put/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/rooms/usage/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/rooms/usage/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/rooms/usage/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/vtc/_shared/0.1/community-room.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/vtc/_shared/0.1/community-room.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/vtc/community/theme/show/0.1/payload.d.ts +238 -0
- package/dist/vtc/community/theme/show/0.1/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/community/theme/show/0.1/payload.js +135 -0
- package/dist/vtc/community/theme/show/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/community/theme/update/0.1/payload.d.ts +286 -0
- package/dist/vtc/community/theme/update/0.1/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/community/theme/update/0.1/payload.js +157 -0
- package/dist/vtc/community/theme/update/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.2/payload.d.ts +989 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.2/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.2/payload.js +559 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.3/payload.d.ts +1013 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.3/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.3/payload.js +577 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.3/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/get/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/get/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/get/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/get/0.2/payload.d.ts +887 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/get/0.2/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/get/0.2/payload.js +517 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/get/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/list/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/list/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/list/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/list/0.2/payload.d.ts +960 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/list/0.2/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/list/0.2/payload.js +544 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/list/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/members/remove/0.2/payload.d.ts +681 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/members/remove/0.2/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/members/remove/0.2/payload.js +393 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/members/remove/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/update/0.1/payload.d.ts +1013 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/update/0.1/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/update/0.1/payload.js +573 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/update/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/update/0.2/payload.d.ts +1037 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/update/0.2/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/update/0.2/payload.js +593 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/community/update/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/offers/list/0.1/payload.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/offers/list/0.1/payload.js +2 -2
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/offers/list/0.1/payload.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/offers/list/0.2/payload.d.ts +736 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/offers/list/0.2/payload.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/offers/list/0.2/payload.js +430 -0
- package/dist/vtc/rooms/offers/list/0.2/payload.js.map +1 -0
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/src/_shared/components.ts +426 -1
- package/src/index.ts +20 -0
- package/src/rooms/_shared/0.1/personal-label.ts +17 -0
- package/src/rooms/_shared/0.1/room.ts +1 -1
- package/src/rooms/blobs/get/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/blobs/get/0.2/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/blobs/upload/begin/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/blobs/upload/begin/0.2/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/epoch/chain/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/epoch/commits/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/epoch/mint/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/epoch/prune/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/info/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/keys/act/0.4/payload.ts +380 -0
- package/src/rooms/keys/label/0.1/payload.ts +474 -0
- package/src/rooms/keys/list/0.2/payload.ts +412 -0
- package/src/rooms/keys/present/0.2/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/keys/profile/read/0.1/payload.ts +1617 -0
- package/src/rooms/keys/profile/write/0.1/payload.ts +388 -0
- package/src/rooms/owner/claim/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/owner/group/remove/0.2/payload.ts +415 -0
- package/src/rooms/owner/revoke/0.1/payload.ts +954 -0
- package/src/rooms/owner/transfer/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/records/curate/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/records/get/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/records/get/0.2/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/records/list/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/records/list/0.2/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/records/put/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/records/put/0.2/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/rooms/revocations/get/0.1/payload.ts +562 -0
- package/src/rooms/revocations/put/0.1/payload.ts +637 -0
- package/src/rooms/usage/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/vtc/_shared/0.1/community-room.ts +1 -1
- package/src/vtc/community/theme/show/0.1/payload.ts +170 -0
- package/src/vtc/community/theme/update/0.1/payload.ts +204 -0
- package/src/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.2/payload.ts +613 -0
- package/src/vtc/rooms/community/create/0.3/payload.ts +635 -0
- package/src/vtc/rooms/community/get/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/vtc/rooms/community/get/0.2/payload.ts +549 -0
- package/src/vtc/rooms/community/list/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/vtc/rooms/community/list/0.2/payload.ts +591 -0
- package/src/vtc/rooms/community/members/remove/0.2/payload.ts +439 -0
- package/src/vtc/rooms/community/update/0.1/payload.ts +629 -0
- package/src/vtc/rooms/community/update/0.2/payload.ts +653 -0
- package/src/vtc/rooms/offers/list/0.1/payload.ts +2 -2
- package/src/vtc/rooms/offers/list/0.2/payload.ts +473 -0
|
@@ -148,7 +148,7 @@ export declare const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
|
|
|
148
148
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
149
149
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
150
150
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
151
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
151
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
152
152
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
153
153
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
154
154
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -236,7 +236,7 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
|
|
|
236
236
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
237
237
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
238
238
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
239
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
239
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
240
240
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
241
241
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
242
242
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ export declare const SPEC: {
|
|
|
364
364
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
365
365
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
366
366
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
367
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
367
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
368
368
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
369
369
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
370
370
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -463,7 +463,7 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_SPEC: {
|
|
|
463
463
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
464
464
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
465
465
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
466
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
466
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
467
467
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
468
468
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
469
469
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ export const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
|
|
|
121
121
|
"membership",
|
|
122
122
|
"authority"
|
|
123
123
|
],
|
|
124
|
-
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
|
|
124
|
+
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
|
|
125
125
|
"properties": {
|
|
126
126
|
"membership": {
|
|
127
127
|
"type": "string",
|
|
@@ -219,7 +219,7 @@ export const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
|
|
|
219
219
|
"membership",
|
|
220
220
|
"authority"
|
|
221
221
|
],
|
|
222
|
-
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
|
|
222
|
+
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
|
|
223
223
|
"properties": {
|
|
224
224
|
"membership": {
|
|
225
225
|
"type": "string",
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"payload.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/rooms/epoch/chain/0.1/payload.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;GAGG;AA0CH,2BAA2B;AAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,mDAA4D,CAAC;AAKrF,qEAAqE;AACrE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,4DAAqE,CAAC;AAKvG;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG;IAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,KAAK,EAAE,mDAAmD;IAC1D,OAAO,EAAE,6BAA6B;IACtC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;IAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;IAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,QAAQ;QACR,cAAc;KACf;IACD,YAAY,EAAE;QACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;SAClE;QACD,cAAc,EAAE;YACd,MAAM,EAAE,+BAA+B;YACvC,aAAa,EAAE,uNAAuN;SACvO;QACD,WAAW,EAAE;YACX,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,aAAa,EAAE,iNAAiN;SACjO;QACD,OAAO,EAAE;YACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,0EAA0E;SAC1F;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;YACrB,aAAa,EAAE,yDAAyD;SACzE;KACF;IACD,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,OAAO,EAAE,sCAAsC;YAC/C,aAAa,EAAE,iWAAiW;YAChX,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,OAAO;aACR;YACD,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,aAAa,EAAE,iPAAiP;oBAChQ,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB;qBAC5B;iBACF;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;SACF;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,WAAW,EAAE;YACX,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;YACpB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,OAAO;gBACP,SAAS;gBACT,OAAO;aACR;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,uuBAAuuB;YACtvB,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,oNAAoN;iBACpO;gBACD,SAAS,EAAE;oBACT,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,6aAA6a;iBAC7b;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,wBAAwB;iBACxC;aACF;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"payload.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/rooms/epoch/chain/0.1/payload.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;GAGG;AA0CH,2BAA2B;AAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,mDAA4D,CAAC;AAKrF,qEAAqE;AACrE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,4DAAqE,CAAC;AAKvG;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG;IAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,KAAK,EAAE,mDAAmD;IAC1D,OAAO,EAAE,6BAA6B;IACtC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;IAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;IAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,QAAQ;QACR,cAAc;KACf;IACD,YAAY,EAAE;QACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,aAAa,EAAE,kDAAkD;SAClE;QACD,cAAc,EAAE;YACd,MAAM,EAAE,+BAA+B;YACvC,aAAa,EAAE,uNAAuN;SACvO;QACD,WAAW,EAAE;YACX,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,aAAa,EAAE,iNAAiN;SACjO;QACD,OAAO,EAAE;YACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,0EAA0E;SAC1F;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;YACrB,aAAa,EAAE,yDAAyD;SACzE;KACF;IACD,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,OAAO,EAAE,sCAAsC;YAC/C,aAAa,EAAE,iWAAiW;YAChX,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,OAAO;aACR;YACD,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,aAAa,EAAE,iPAAiP;oBAChQ,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB;qBAC5B;iBACF;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;SACF;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,WAAW,EAAE;YACX,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;YACpB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,OAAO;gBACP,SAAS;gBACT,OAAO;aACR;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,uuBAAuuB;YACtvB,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,oNAAoN;iBACpO;gBACD,SAAS,EAAE;oBACT,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,6aAA6a;iBAC7b;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,wBAAwB;iBACxC;aACF;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,giEAAgiE;YAC/iE,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,YAAY,EAAE;oBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,4JAA4J;iBAC5K;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;qBACjB;oBACD,aAAa,EAAE,odAAod;iBACpe;gBACD,gBAAgB,EAAE;oBAChB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,mYAAmY;iBACnZ;aACF;SACF;KACF;CACO,CAAC;AAEX,mEAAmE;AACnE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG;IACrC,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,MAAM,EAAE,kBAAkB;IAC1B,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,OAAO,EAAE,sCAAsC;YAC/C,aAAa,EAAE,iWAAiW;YAChX,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,OAAO;aACR;YACD,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,aAAa,EAAE,iPAAiP;oBAChQ,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB;qBAC5B;iBACF;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;SACF;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,WAAW,EAAE;YACX,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;YACpB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,OAAO;gBACP,SAAS;gBACT,OAAO;aACR;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,uuBAAuuB;YACtvB,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,oNAAoN;iBACpO;gBACD,SAAS,EAAE;oBACT,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,6aAA6a;iBAC7b;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,wBAAwB;iBACxC;aACF;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,giEAAgiE;YAC/iE,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,YAAY,EAAE;oBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,4JAA4J;iBAC5K;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;qBACjB;oBACD,aAAa,EAAE,odAAod;iBACpe;gBACD,gBAAgB,EAAE;oBAChB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,mYAAmY;iBACnZ;aACF;SACF;KACF;CACO,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;IAClB,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ;IACjB,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;IACzB,kBAAkB,EAAE,IAAI;IACxB,aAAa,EAAE,cAAc;CACrB,CAAC;AAEX;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG;IAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;IAC1B,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;IACzB,kBAAkB,EAAE,IAAI;IACxB,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB;CAC9B,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -169,7 +169,7 @@ export declare const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
|
|
|
169
169
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
170
170
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
171
171
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
172
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
172
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
173
173
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
174
174
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
175
175
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -255,7 +255,7 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
|
|
|
255
255
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
256
256
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
257
257
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
258
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
258
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
259
259
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
260
260
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
261
261
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ export declare const SPEC: {
|
|
|
382
382
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
383
383
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
384
384
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
385
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
385
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
386
386
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
387
387
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
388
388
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -479,7 +479,7 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_SPEC: {
|
|
|
479
479
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
480
480
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
481
481
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
482
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
482
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
483
483
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
484
484
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
485
485
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ export const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
|
|
|
120
120
|
"membership",
|
|
121
121
|
"authority"
|
|
122
122
|
],
|
|
123
|
-
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
|
|
123
|
+
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
|
|
124
124
|
"properties": {
|
|
125
125
|
"membership": {
|
|
126
126
|
"type": "string",
|
|
@@ -215,7 +215,7 @@ export const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
|
|
|
215
215
|
"membership",
|
|
216
216
|
"authority"
|
|
217
217
|
],
|
|
218
|
-
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
|
|
218
|
+
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
|
|
219
219
|
"properties": {
|
|
220
220
|
"membership": {
|
|
221
221
|
"type": "string",
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"payload.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/rooms/epoch/commits/0.1/payload.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;GAGG;AAgEH,2BAA2B;AAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,qDAA8D,CAAC;AAKvF,qEAAqE;AACrE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,8DAAuE,CAAC;AAKzG;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG;IAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,KAAK,EAAE,qDAAqD;IAC5D,OAAO,EAAE,+BAA+B;IACxC,aAAa,EAAE,6LAA6L;IAC5M,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;IAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;IAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,QAAQ;QACR,YAAY;QACZ,cAAc;KACf;IACD,YAAY,EAAE;QACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,aAAa,EAAE,0BAA0B;SAC1C;QACD,YAAY,EAAE;YACZ,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,aAAa,EAAE,qUAAqU;SACrV;QACD,OAAO,EAAE;YACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,qJAAqJ;SACrK;QACD,cAAc,EAAE;YACd,MAAM,EAAE,+BAA+B;YACvC,aAAa,EAAE,qPAAqP;SACrQ;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;YACrB,aAAa,EAAE,yDAAyD;SACzE;KACF;IACD,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,SAAS;aACV;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,6GAA6G;YAC5H,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,SAAS,EAAE;oBACT,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG;oBACf,aAAa,EAAE,gZAAgZ;oBAC/Z,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;wBAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;wBAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;4BACV,OAAO;4BACP,QAAQ;yBACT;wBACD,YAAY,EAAE;4BACZ,OAAO,EAAE;gCACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;gCACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;gCACZ,aAAa,EAAE,iCAAiC;6BACjD;4BACD,QAAQ,EAAE;gCACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;gCAChB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM;gCACnB,aAAa,EAAE,8HAA8H;6BAC9I;yBACF;qBACF;iBACF;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,8UAA8U;iBAC9V;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;YACD,OAAO,EAAE,wCAAwC;SAClD;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"payload.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/rooms/epoch/commits/0.1/payload.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;GAGG;AAgEH,2BAA2B;AAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,qDAA8D,CAAC;AAKvF,qEAAqE;AACrE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,8DAAuE,CAAC;AAKzG;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG;IAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,KAAK,EAAE,qDAAqD;IAC5D,OAAO,EAAE,+BAA+B;IACxC,aAAa,EAAE,6LAA6L;IAC5M,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;IAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;IAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,QAAQ;QACR,YAAY;QACZ,cAAc;KACf;IACD,YAAY,EAAE;QACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,aAAa,EAAE,0BAA0B;SAC1C;QACD,YAAY,EAAE;YACZ,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,aAAa,EAAE,qUAAqU;SACrV;QACD,OAAO,EAAE;YACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,SAAS,EAAE,GAAG;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,qJAAqJ;SACrK;QACD,cAAc,EAAE;YACd,MAAM,EAAE,+BAA+B;YACvC,aAAa,EAAE,qPAAqP;SACrQ;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;YACrB,aAAa,EAAE,yDAAyD;SACzE;KACF;IACD,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,SAAS;aACV;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,6GAA6G;YAC5H,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,SAAS,EAAE;oBACT,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG;oBACf,aAAa,EAAE,gZAAgZ;oBAC/Z,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;wBAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;wBAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;4BACV,OAAO;4BACP,QAAQ;yBACT;wBACD,YAAY,EAAE;4BACZ,OAAO,EAAE;gCACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;gCACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;gCACZ,aAAa,EAAE,iCAAiC;6BACjD;4BACD,QAAQ,EAAE;gCACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;gCAChB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM;gCACnB,aAAa,EAAE,8HAA8H;6BAC9I;yBACF;qBACF;iBACF;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,8UAA8U;iBAC9V;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;YACD,OAAO,EAAE,wCAAwC;SAClD;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,giEAAgiE;YAC/iE,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,YAAY,EAAE;oBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,4JAA4J;iBAC5K;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;qBACjB;oBACD,aAAa,EAAE,odAAod;iBACpe;gBACD,gBAAgB,EAAE;oBAChB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,mYAAmY;iBACnZ;aACF;SACF;KACF;CACO,CAAC;AAEX,mEAAmE;AACnE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG;IACrC,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,MAAM,EAAE,kBAAkB;IAC1B,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,SAAS;aACV;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,6GAA6G;YAC5H,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,SAAS,EAAE;oBACT,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,GAAG;oBACf,aAAa,EAAE,gZAAgZ;oBAC/Z,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;wBAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;wBAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;4BACV,OAAO;4BACP,QAAQ;yBACT;wBACD,YAAY,EAAE;4BACZ,OAAO,EAAE;gCACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;gCACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;gCACZ,aAAa,EAAE,iCAAiC;6BACjD;4BACD,QAAQ,EAAE;gCACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;gCAChB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM;gCACnB,aAAa,EAAE,8HAA8H;6BAC9I;yBACF;qBACF;iBACF;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,8UAA8U;iBAC9V;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;YACD,OAAO,EAAE,wCAAwC;SAClD;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,giEAAgiE;YAC/iE,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,YAAY,EAAE;oBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,4JAA4J;iBAC5K;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;qBACjB;oBACD,aAAa,EAAE,odAAod;iBACpe;gBACD,gBAAgB,EAAE;oBAChB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,mYAAmY;iBACnZ;aACF;SACF;KACF;CACO,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;IAClB,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ;IACjB,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;IACzB,kBAAkB,EAAE,IAAI;IACxB,aAAa,EAAE,cAAc;CACrB,CAAC;AAEX;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG;IAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;IAC1B,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;IACzB,kBAAkB,EAAE,IAAI;IACxB,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB;CAC9B,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -165,7 +165,7 @@ export declare const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
|
|
|
165
165
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
166
166
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
167
167
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
168
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
168
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
169
169
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
170
170
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
171
171
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -250,7 +250,7 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
|
|
|
250
250
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
251
251
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
252
252
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
253
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
253
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
254
254
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
255
255
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
256
256
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -384,7 +384,7 @@ export declare const SPEC: {
|
|
|
384
384
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
385
385
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
386
386
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
387
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
387
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
388
388
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
389
389
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
390
390
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -480,7 +480,7 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_SPEC: {
|
|
|
480
480
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
481
481
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
482
482
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
483
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
483
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
484
484
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
485
485
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
486
486
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -128,7 +128,7 @@ export const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
|
|
|
128
128
|
"membership",
|
|
129
129
|
"authority"
|
|
130
130
|
],
|
|
131
|
-
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
|
|
131
|
+
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
|
|
132
132
|
"properties": {
|
|
133
133
|
"membership": {
|
|
134
134
|
"type": "string",
|
|
@@ -223,7 +223,7 @@ export const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
|
|
|
223
223
|
"membership",
|
|
224
224
|
"authority"
|
|
225
225
|
],
|
|
226
|
-
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
|
|
226
|
+
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
|
|
227
227
|
"properties": {
|
|
228
228
|
"membership": {
|
|
229
229
|
"type": "string",
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"payload.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/rooms/epoch/mint/0.1/payload.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;GAGG;AAqDH,2BAA2B;AAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,kDAA2D,CAAC;AAKpF,qEAAqE;AACrE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,2DAAoE,CAAC;AAKtG;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG;IAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,KAAK,EAAE,kDAAkD;IACzD,OAAO,EAAE,4BAA4B;IACrC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;IAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;IAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,QAAQ;QACR,OAAO;QACP,cAAc;KACf;IACD,YAAY,EAAE;QACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,aAAa,EAAE,gCAAgC;SAChD;QACD,OAAO,EAAE;YACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,aAAa,EAAE,mIAAmI;SACnJ;QACD,cAAc,EAAE;YACd,MAAM,EAAE,+BAA+B;YACvC,aAAa,EAAE,wSAAwS;SACxT;QACD,MAAM,EAAE;YACN,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB;YAC3B,aAAa,EAAE,y0BAAy0B;YACx1B,UAAU,EAAE,yOAAyO;SACtP;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM;YACnB,aAAa,EAAE,qpCAAqpC;SACrqC;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI;YACjB,aAAa,EAAE,mEAAmE;SACnF;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;YACrB,aAAa,EAAE,yDAAyD;SACzE;KACF;IACD,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,OAAO,EAAE,qCAAqC;YAC9C,aAAa,EAAE,uGAAuG;YACtH,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,OAAO;aACR;YACD,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;iBACb;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;SACF;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,WAAW,EAAE;YACX,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;YACpB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,OAAO;gBACP,SAAS;gBACT,OAAO;aACR;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,uuBAAuuB;YACtvB,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,oNAAoN;iBACpO;gBACD,SAAS,EAAE;oBACT,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,6aAA6a;iBAC7b;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,wBAAwB;iBACxC;aACF;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"payload.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/rooms/epoch/mint/0.1/payload.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;GAGG;AAqDH,2BAA2B;AAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,kDAA2D,CAAC;AAKpF,qEAAqE;AACrE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,2DAAoE,CAAC;AAKtG;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG;IAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,KAAK,EAAE,kDAAkD;IACzD,OAAO,EAAE,4BAA4B;IACrC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;IAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;IAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,QAAQ;QACR,OAAO;QACP,cAAc;KACf;IACD,YAAY,EAAE;QACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,aAAa,EAAE,gCAAgC;SAChD;QACD,OAAO,EAAE;YACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,aAAa,EAAE,mIAAmI;SACnJ;QACD,cAAc,EAAE;YACd,MAAM,EAAE,+BAA+B;YACvC,aAAa,EAAE,wSAAwS;SACxT;QACD,MAAM,EAAE;YACN,MAAM,EAAE,mBAAmB;YAC3B,aAAa,EAAE,y0BAAy0B;YACx1B,UAAU,EAAE,yOAAyO;SACtP;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM;YACnB,aAAa,EAAE,qpCAAqpC;SACrqC;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,WAAW,EAAE,IAAI;YACjB,aAAa,EAAE,mEAAmE;SACnF;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;YACrB,aAAa,EAAE,yDAAyD;SACzE;KACF;IACD,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,OAAO,EAAE,qCAAqC;YAC9C,aAAa,EAAE,uGAAuG;YACtH,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,OAAO;aACR;YACD,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;iBACb;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;SACF;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,WAAW,EAAE;YACX,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;YACpB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,OAAO;gBACP,SAAS;gBACT,OAAO;aACR;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,uuBAAuuB;YACtvB,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,oNAAoN;iBACpO;gBACD,SAAS,EAAE;oBACT,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,6aAA6a;iBAC7b;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,wBAAwB;iBACxC;aACF;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,giEAAgiE;YAC/iE,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,YAAY,EAAE;oBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,4JAA4J;iBAC5K;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;qBACjB;oBACD,aAAa,EAAE,odAAod;iBACpe;gBACD,gBAAgB,EAAE;oBAChB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,mYAAmY;iBACnZ;aACF;SACF;KACF;CACO,CAAC;AAEX,mEAAmE;AACnE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG;IACrC,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,MAAM,EAAE,kBAAkB;IAC1B,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,OAAO,EAAE,qCAAqC;YAC9C,aAAa,EAAE,uGAAuG;YACtH,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,OAAO;aACR;YACD,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;iBACb;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;SACF;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,WAAW,EAAE;YACX,OAAO,EAAE,WAAW;YACpB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,OAAO;gBACP,SAAS;gBACT,OAAO;aACR;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,uuBAAuuB;YACtvB,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,oNAAoN;iBACpO;gBACD,SAAS,EAAE;oBACT,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,6aAA6a;iBAC7b;gBACD,OAAO,EAAE;oBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,wBAAwB;iBACxC;aACF;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,giEAAgiE;YAC/iE,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,YAAY,EAAE;oBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,4JAA4J;iBAC5K;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;qBACjB;oBACD,aAAa,EAAE,odAAod;iBACpe;gBACD,gBAAgB,EAAE;oBAChB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,mYAAmY;iBACnZ;aACF;SACF;KACF;CACO,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;IAClB,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ;IACjB,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;IACzB,kBAAkB,EAAE,IAAI;IACxB,aAAa,EAAE,cAAc;CACrB,CAAC;AAEX;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG;IAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;IAC1B,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;IACzB,kBAAkB,EAAE,IAAI;IACxB,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB;CAC9B,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ export declare const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
|
|
|
138
138
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
139
139
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
140
140
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
141
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
141
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
142
142
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
143
143
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
144
144
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -207,7 +207,7 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
|
|
|
207
207
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
208
208
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
209
209
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
210
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
210
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
211
211
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
212
212
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
213
213
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -316,7 +316,7 @@ export declare const SPEC: {
|
|
|
316
316
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
317
317
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
318
318
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
319
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
319
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
320
320
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
321
321
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
322
322
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -396,7 +396,7 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_SPEC: {
|
|
|
396
396
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
397
397
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
398
398
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
399
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
399
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
400
400
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
401
401
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
402
402
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ export const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
|
|
|
100
100
|
"membership",
|
|
101
101
|
"authority"
|
|
102
102
|
],
|
|
103
|
-
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
|
|
103
|
+
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
|
|
104
104
|
"properties": {
|
|
105
105
|
"membership": {
|
|
106
106
|
"type": "string",
|
|
@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ export const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
|
|
|
176
176
|
"membership",
|
|
177
177
|
"authority"
|
|
178
178
|
],
|
|
179
|
-
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
|
|
179
|
+
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
|
|
180
180
|
"properties": {
|
|
181
181
|
"membership": {
|
|
182
182
|
"type": "string",
|
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"payload.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/rooms/epoch/prune/0.1/payload.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;GAGG;AAmDH,2BAA2B;AAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,mDAA4D,CAAC;AAKrF,qEAAqE;AACrE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,4DAAqE,CAAC;AAKvG;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG;IAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,KAAK,EAAE,mDAAmD;IAC1D,OAAO,EAAE,6BAA6B;IACtC,aAAa,EAAE,2LAA2L;IAC1M,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;IAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;IAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,QAAQ;QACR,aAAa;QACb,cAAc;KACf;IACD,YAAY,EAAE;QACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,aAAa,EAAE,oBAAoB;SACpC;QACD,aAAa,EAAE;YACb,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,aAAa,EAAE,4QAA4Q;SAC5R;QACD,cAAc,EAAE;YACd,MAAM,EAAE,+BAA+B;YACvC,aAAa,EAAE,qSAAqS;SACrT;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG;YAChB,aAAa,EAAE,oLAAoL;SACpM;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;YACrB,aAAa,EAAE,yDAAyD;SACzE;KACF;IACD,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,QAAQ;gBACR,cAAc;aACf;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,yGAAyG;YACxH,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,qLAAqL;iBACrM;gBACD,cAAc,EAAE;oBACd,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,4UAA4U;iBAC5V;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;YACD,OAAO,EAAE,sCAAsC;SAChD;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,
|
|
1
|
+
{"version":3,"file":"payload.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../../../../src/rooms/epoch/prune/0.1/payload.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA;;;GAGG;AAmDH,2BAA2B;AAC3B,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,QAAQ,GAAG,mDAA4D,CAAC;AAKrF,qEAAqE;AACrE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,iBAAiB,GAAG,4DAAqE,CAAC;AAKvG;;;;;;;;GAQG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,cAAc,GAAG;IAC5B,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,KAAK,EAAE,mDAAmD;IAC1D,OAAO,EAAE,6BAA6B;IACtC,aAAa,EAAE,2LAA2L;IAC1M,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;IAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;IAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;QACV,QAAQ;QACR,aAAa;QACb,cAAc;KACf;IACD,YAAY,EAAE;QACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,aAAa,EAAE,oBAAoB;SACpC;QACD,aAAa,EAAE;YACb,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;YACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;YACZ,aAAa,EAAE,4QAA4Q;SAC5R;QACD,cAAc,EAAE;YACd,MAAM,EAAE,+BAA+B;YACvC,aAAa,EAAE,qSAAqS;SACrT;QACD,QAAQ,EAAE;YACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,WAAW,EAAE,GAAG;YAChB,aAAa,EAAE,oLAAoL;SACpM;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;YACrB,aAAa,EAAE,yDAAyD;SACzE;KACF;IACD,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,QAAQ;gBACR,cAAc;aACf;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,yGAAyG;YACxH,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,qLAAqL;iBACrM;gBACD,cAAc,EAAE;oBACd,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,4UAA4U;iBAC5V;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;YACD,OAAO,EAAE,sCAAsC;SAChD;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,giEAAgiE;YAC/iE,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,YAAY,EAAE;oBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,4JAA4J;iBAC5K;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;qBACjB;oBACD,aAAa,EAAE,odAAod;iBACpe;gBACD,gBAAgB,EAAE;oBAChB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,mYAAmY;iBACnZ;aACF;SACF;KACF;CACO,CAAC;AAEX,mEAAmE;AACnE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,uBAAuB,GAAG;IACrC,SAAS,EAAE,8CAA8C;IACzD,MAAM,EAAE,kBAAkB;IAC1B,OAAO,EAAE;QACP,UAAU,EAAE;YACV,SAAS,EAAE,UAAU;YACrB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,QAAQ;gBACR,QAAQ;gBACR,cAAc;aACf;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,yGAAyG;YACxH,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;iBACjB;gBACD,QAAQ,EAAE;oBACR,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,qLAAqL;iBACrM;gBACD,cAAc,EAAE;oBACd,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS;oBACjB,SAAS,EAAE,CAAC;oBACZ,aAAa,EAAE,4UAA4U;iBAC5V;gBACD,KAAK,EAAE;oBACL,MAAM,EAAE,aAAa;iBACtB;aACF;YACD,OAAO,EAAE,sCAAsC;SAChD;QACD,KAAK,EAAE;YACL,OAAO,EAAE,KAAK;YACd,aAAa,EAAE,uKAAuK;YACtL,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,eAAe,EAAE,CAAC;YAClB,sBAAsB,EAAE,IAAI;YAC5B,eAAe,EAAE;gBACf,SAAS,EAAE,mCAAmC;aAC/C;SACF;QACD,uBAAuB,EAAE;YACvB,OAAO,EAAE,uBAAuB;YAChC,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;YAChB,sBAAsB,EAAE,KAAK;YAC7B,UAAU,EAAE;gBACV,YAAY;gBACZ,WAAW;aACZ;YACD,aAAa,EAAE,giEAAgiE;YAC/iE,YAAY,EAAE;gBACZ,YAAY,EAAE;oBACZ,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,4JAA4J;iBAC5K;gBACD,WAAW,EAAE;oBACX,MAAM,EAAE,OAAO;oBACf,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,UAAU,EAAE,CAAC;oBACb,OAAO,EAAE;wBACP,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;qBACjB;oBACD,aAAa,EAAE,odAAod;iBACpe;gBACD,gBAAgB,EAAE;oBAChB,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ;oBAChB,aAAa,EAAE,mYAAmY;iBACnZ;aACF;SACF;KACF;CACO,CAAC;AAEX;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,IAAI,GAAG;IAClB,OAAO,EAAE,QAAQ;IACjB,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;IACzB,kBAAkB,EAAE,IAAI;IACxB,aAAa,EAAE,cAAc;CACrB,CAAC;AAEX;;;;GAIG;AACH,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,aAAa,GAAG;IAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,iBAAiB;IAC1B,QAAQ,EAAE,KAAK;IACf,eAAe,EAAE,IAAI;IACrB,mBAAmB,EAAE,IAAI;IACzB,kBAAkB,EAAE,IAAI;IACxB,aAAa,EAAE,uBAAuB;CAC9B,CAAC"}
|
|
@@ -262,7 +262,7 @@ export declare const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
|
|
|
262
262
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
263
263
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
264
264
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
265
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
265
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
266
266
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
267
267
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
268
268
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA: {
|
|
|
451
451
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
452
452
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
453
453
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
454
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
454
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
455
455
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
456
456
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
457
457
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -670,7 +670,7 @@ export declare const SPEC: {
|
|
|
670
670
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
671
671
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
672
672
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
673
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
673
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
674
674
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
675
675
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
676
676
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -870,7 +870,7 @@ export declare const RESPONSE_SPEC: {
|
|
|
870
870
|
readonly type: "object";
|
|
871
871
|
readonly additionalProperties: false;
|
|
872
872
|
readonly required: readonly ["membership", "authority"];
|
|
873
|
-
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.";
|
|
873
|
+
readonly description: "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.";
|
|
874
874
|
readonly properties: {
|
|
875
875
|
readonly membership: {
|
|
876
876
|
readonly type: "string";
|
|
@@ -229,7 +229,7 @@ export const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
|
|
|
229
229
|
"membership",
|
|
230
230
|
"authority"
|
|
231
231
|
],
|
|
232
|
-
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
|
|
232
|
+
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
|
|
233
233
|
"properties": {
|
|
234
234
|
"membership": {
|
|
235
235
|
"type": "string",
|
|
@@ -445,7 +445,7 @@ export const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
|
|
|
445
445
|
"membership",
|
|
446
446
|
"authority"
|
|
447
447
|
],
|
|
448
|
-
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.",
|
|
448
|
+
"description": "What a party presents to act on a room. Carries the whole authority chain: a host MUST NOT dereference an authority credential's `parent` to fetch a link it was not given. Resolving over the network would make verification depend on availability, turn every identifier into a request the host can be induced to make against an address the holder chooses, and signal credential use to whoever hosts the identifier. A host MUST bind the presenter to the chain's leaf. A chain that verifies is evidence that authority was conferred on somebody; it is not evidence that the party presenting it is that somebody. The leaf's subject MUST equal the party the host authenticated for this request — an identity the transport established or a document `proof` proved, never one named in a payload. A host that omits this check authorizes every captured presentation, and the omission is silent, because the chain still verifies.\n\n**Every credential is its issuer's attestation, and only its issuer's.** For the membership credential and for every link of `authority`, a host MUST verify the credential's `proof` with a key that the credential's own `issuer` lists for `assertionMethod` in its DID document, and MUST refuse a credential whose proof names a verification method that is not its issuer's. A proof that verifies under some other party's key is that party's statement, not the issuer's, and confers nothing. The same binding holds for every other document a room signs, such as a `RevocationList`.\n\n**A chain that verifies may still be revoked.** A host that has accepted a `RevocationList` for the room (`rooms/revocations/put`) MUST, from the moment it accepted it, refuse every presentation in which the membership credential or any link of `authority` is revoked by that list, under every task and every version of every task it serves for the room. A chain from which any link is revoked is refused whole: a credential delegated from a revoked one confers nothing, however it was attenuated. The refusal is the same `permissionDenied` as any other failed presentation.",
|
|
449
449
|
"properties": {
|
|
450
450
|
"membership": {
|
|
451
451
|
"type": "string",
|