@openvtc/trust-tasks 0.21.13 → 0.21.15

package/src/auth/authenticate/0.3/payload.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,527 @@
+/**
+ * Generated by scripts/build-ts-bindings.mjs — DO NOT EDIT BY HAND.
+ * Source: specs/auth/authenticate/0.3/payload.schema.json
+ */
+
+import type { Ext, Session_AuthV0_3 as Session, TokenBundle } from "../../../_shared/components.js";
+
+
+/**
+ * The subject presents a previously-issued challenge along with the framework `proof` that binds the document to a VID. The proof IS the authentication. 0.3 adds an optional proxied form: `principal` names a party the signer authenticates *as*, distinct from `issuer` (the signer, e.g. a VTA acting on the principal's behalf), together with `delegationEvidence` establishing the entitlement. Absent `principal`, or `principal` equal to `issuer`, is the ordinary auth/authenticate/0.2 form unchanged. 0.3 also carries forward the optional `sessionKey` member from 0.2.
+ */
+export interface AuthAuthenticate {
+  /**
+   * The exact challenge value returned by a prior auth/challenge call. Consumers MUST reject mismatch, expired, or re-used challenges.
+   */
+  challenge: string;
+  /**
+   * The sessionId returned alongside the challenge. Consumers use it to look up the server-side challenge binding.
+   */
+  sessionId: string;
+  /**
+   * Optional capability tags being requested on the issued tokens. The consumer's authorization layer decides which are granted; the issued TokenBundle's `scope` MAY be a subset.
+   */
+  scope?: string[];
+  /**
+   * The VID being authenticated as, when it differs from the signer of this document. Present and unequal to `issuer` marks a *proxied* authenticate: `issuer` is a delegate (typically the principal's VTA) presenting its own proof, and `payload.delegationEvidence` MUST also be present, describing what entitles `issuer` to act for `principal`. Omitted, or equal to `issuer`, is the ordinary case: the signer authenticates as itself, exactly as auth/authenticate/0.2. See Authorization and Security & Privacy.
+   */
+  principal?: string;
+  /**
+   * REQUIRED whenever `principal` is present and differs from `issuer`; MUST be omitted otherwise. Describes the evidence that entitles `issuer` to authenticate as `principal`. The framework does not prescribe its shape — see Authorization — but the consumer's policy MUST verify it independently rather than take `issuer`'s claim of entitlement at face value.
+   */
+  delegationEvidence?: {
+    /**
+     * Consumer-defined vocabulary naming the evidence class (e.g. "vtaContext", "mandateCredential"). The framework imposes no syntax; an unrecognized `kind` is refused with `auth/authenticate:delegationNotRecognized`.
+     */
+    kind: string;
+    /**
+     * The evidence itself, inline — typically a Verifiable Credential or other signed assertion binding `issuer` to `principal`. Opaque to the framework; shape is consumer- or ecosystem-defined by `kind`.
+     */
+    credential?: {};
+    /**
+     * Alternative to inlining `credential`: an opaque reference (an id, a URL) to evidence the consumer already holds — for example a previously-registered VTA context binding. Consumer-defined; mutually informative with `credential`, not mutually exclusive — a producer MAY supply both.
+     */
+    reference?: string;
+    /**
+     * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
+     */
+    ext?: Ext;
+  };
+  /**
+   * A did:key VID the producer asks the consumer to bind to the session this authenticate document creates. The producer MUST hold the corresponding private key and SHOULD keep it non-extractable (for example, a WebCrypto non-extractable key). Once bound, the consumer MUST accept a framework `proof` made by this key, with `proofPurpose: authentication`, as the session's `subject` — for this session only, bounded by the session's `expiresAt` and `acr`, and never where a specification requires an `assertionMethod` attestation (SPEC.md §7.2 item 10; see Security & Privacy). Behaves identically whether or not this document is a proxied authenticate. The consumer MAY refuse a key type it does not support with `auth/authenticate:sessionKeyUnsupported`.
+   */
+  sessionKey?: string;
+  /**
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
+   */
+  ext?: Ext;
+}
+/**
+ * Issued by the auth service after verifying the proof on the authenticate document (and, for a proxied request, the delegation evidence). Carried in a Trust Task document whose type is https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.3#response.
+ */
+export interface AuthAuthenticateResponsePayload {
+  /**
+   * The session the consumer has just created for this subject. `session.subject` is `principal` for a proxied request, `issuer` otherwise; `session.actor` is present and equal to `issuer` only for a proxied request. Carries `sessionKey` when the request bound one.
+   */
+  session: Session;
+  /**
+   * Access + optional refresh tokens. Consumers MAY omit a refresh token when their policy doesn't support refresh.
+   */
+  tokens: TokenBundle;
+  /**
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
+   */
+  ext?: Ext;
+}
+
+/** Shared definitions this specification references, re-exported under the names it used to declare them with. */
+export type { Ext, Session, TokenBundle };
+
+/** Trust Task type URI. */
+export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.3" as const;
+
+/** Stable alias for this specification's request payload shape. */
+export type Payload = AuthAuthenticate;
+
+/** Trust Task response type URI (request type URI + "#response"). */
+export const RESPONSE_TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.3#response" as const;
+
+/** Stable alias for this specification's success-response payload shape. */
+export type Response = AuthAuthenticateResponsePayload;
+
+/**
+ * This specification's payload schema, as a value.
+ *
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 item 2 is performed against this. It is shipped as data
+ * rather than only as a `.json` file because TypeScript types are erased
+ * at runtime: without a schema a consumer has nothing to validate, and
+ * every REQUIRED payload member is optional in practice. Cross-file
+ * `$ref`s are already inlined, so it needs no resolver.
+ */
+export const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$id": "https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.3",
+  "title": "Auth — Authenticate",
+  "description": "The subject presents a previously-issued challenge along with the framework `proof` that binds the document to a VID. The proof IS the authentication. 0.3 adds an optional proxied form: `principal` names a party the signer authenticates *as*, distinct from `issuer` (the signer, e.g. a VTA acting on the principal's behalf), together with `delegationEvidence` establishing the entitlement. Absent `principal`, or `principal` equal to `issuer`, is the ordinary auth/authenticate/0.2 form unchanged. 0.3 also carries forward the optional `sessionKey` member from 0.2.",
+  "type": "object",
+  "additionalProperties": false,
+  "required": [
+    "challenge",
+    "sessionId"
+  ],
+  "properties": {
+    "challenge": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "minLength": 16,
+      "description": "The exact challenge value returned by a prior auth/challenge call. Consumers MUST reject mismatch, expired, or re-used challenges."
+    },
+    "sessionId": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "minLength": 1,
+      "description": "The sessionId returned alongside the challenge. Consumers use it to look up the server-side challenge binding."
+    },
+    "scope": {
+      "type": "array",
+      "items": {
+        "type": "string",
+        "minLength": 1
+      },
+      "description": "Optional capability tags being requested on the issued tokens. The consumer's authorization layer decides which are granted; the issued TokenBundle's `scope` MAY be a subset."
+    },
+    "principal": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^did:",
+      "maxLength": 2048,
+      "description": "The VID being authenticated as, when it differs from the signer of this document. Present and unequal to `issuer` marks a *proxied* authenticate: `issuer` is a delegate (typically the principal's VTA) presenting its own proof, and `payload.delegationEvidence` MUST also be present, describing what entitles `issuer` to act for `principal`. Omitted, or equal to `issuer`, is the ordinary case: the signer authenticates as itself, exactly as auth/authenticate/0.2. See Authorization and Security & Privacy."
+    },
+    "delegationEvidence": {
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "kind"
+      ],
+      "description": "REQUIRED whenever `principal` is present and differs from `issuer`; MUST be omitted otherwise. Describes the evidence that entitles `issuer` to authenticate as `principal`. The framework does not prescribe its shape — see Authorization — but the consumer's policy MUST verify it independently rather than take `issuer`'s claim of entitlement at face value.",
+      "properties": {
+        "kind": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 64,
+          "description": "Consumer-defined vocabulary naming the evidence class (e.g. \"vtaContext\", \"mandateCredential\"). The framework imposes no syntax; an unrecognized `kind` is refused with `auth/authenticate:delegationNotRecognized`."
+        },
+        "credential": {
+          "type": "object",
+          "description": "The evidence itself, inline — typically a Verifiable Credential or other signed assertion binding `issuer` to `principal`. Opaque to the framework; shape is consumer- or ecosystem-defined by `kind`."
+        },
+        "reference": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 2048,
+          "description": "Alternative to inlining `credential`: an opaque reference (an id, a URL) to evidence the consumer already holds — for example a previously-registered VTA context binding. Consumer-defined; mutually informative with `credential`, not mutually exclusive — a producer MAY supply both."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+          "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "sessionKey": {
+      "type": "string",
+      "pattern": "^did:key:z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+$",
+      "maxLength": 512,
+      "description": "A did:key VID the producer asks the consumer to bind to the session this authenticate document creates. The producer MUST hold the corresponding private key and SHOULD keep it non-extractable (for example, a WebCrypto non-extractable key). Once bound, the consumer MUST accept a framework `proof` made by this key, with `proofPurpose: authentication`, as the session's `subject` — for this session only, bounded by the session's `expiresAt` and `acr`, and never where a specification requires an `assertionMethod` attestation (SPEC.md §7.2 item 10; see Security & Privacy). Behaves identically whether or not this document is a proxied authenticate. The consumer MAY refuse a key type it does not support with `auth/authenticate:sessionKeyUnsupported`."
+    },
+    "ext": {
+      "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+      "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1."
+    }
+  },
+  "$defs": {
+    "Response": {
+      "$anchor": "response",
+      "title": "Auth Authenticate — response payload",
+      "description": "Issued by the auth service after verifying the proof on the authenticate document (and, for a proxied request, the delegation evidence). Carried in a Trust Task document whose type is https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.3#response.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "session",
+        "tokens"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "session": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Session",
+          "description": "The session the consumer has just created for this subject. `session.subject` is `principal` for a proxied request, `issuer` otherwise; `session.actor` is present and equal to `issuer` only for a proxied request. Carries `sessionKey` when the request bound one."
+        },
+        "tokens": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/TokenBundle",
+          "description": "Access + optional refresh tokens. Consumers MAY omit a refresh token when their policy doesn't support refresh."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+          "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "Ext": {
+      "title": "Ext",
+      "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "minProperties": 1,
+      "additionalProperties": true,
+      "propertyNames": {
+        "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
+      }
+    },
+    "TokenBundle": {
+      "$anchor": "tokenBundle",
+      "title": "TokenBundle",
+      "description": "An access token (typically short-lived JWT) paired with an optional refresh token (typically long-lived opaque string). The shapes follow OAuth 2.0 (RFC 6749 §5.1) conventions but are not coupled to any particular OAuth profile.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "accessToken",
+        "tokenType",
+        "expiresIn"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "accessToken": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Bearer-style access token. Consumers presenting this token to downstream services prove the holder of the original session. Format is consumer-defined — JWT is common, but opaque strings are also valid."
+        },
+        "refreshToken": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Long-lived token redeemable via auth/refresh for a new access token. MAY be absent when the issuer does not support refresh."
+        },
+        "tokenType": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Token presentation scheme. Almost always \"Bearer\"; reserved for future schemes."
+        },
+        "expiresIn": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1,
+          "description": "Seconds from issuance until the access token expires."
+        },
+        "refreshExpiresIn": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1,
+          "description": "Seconds from issuance until the refresh token expires, when one was issued."
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          },
+          "description": "Capability tags effective on this token. Format is consumer-defined; the framework imposes no syntax."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+          "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "Session": {
+      "$anchor": "session",
+      "title": "Session",
+      "description": "A logical authentication context bound to a subject. Producers and consumers exchange Session-shaped data in challenge issuance, authentication responses, and introspection (whoami).",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "id",
+        "subject",
+        "issuedAt",
+        "expiresAt"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "id": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Opaque, server-chosen session identifier. Stable for the lifetime of the session. Consumers MUST treat the value as opaque; no structure is implied."
+        },
+        "subject": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "The authenticated party's VID (typically a DID URL). For a session established by a proxied login (auth/authenticate/0.3), this is the *principal* being authenticated as — never the delegate that signed the authenticate document; see `actor`."
+        },
+        "issuedAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "ISO-8601 timestamp when the session was created."
+        },
+        "expiresAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "ISO-8601 timestamp when the session ceases to be valid. Producers SHOULD refresh before this time; consumers MUST reject after. A consumer honouring `absoluteExpiresAt` MUST NOT advance this value past it, by refresh or any other means."
+        },
+        "amr": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "minItems": 1,
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          },
+          "description": "Authentication Methods References per [RFC 8176]. Typical values: \"did\" (challenge-response), \"passkey\" (WebAuthn), \"vta\" (verifiable-trust agent approval). Multi-factor sessions list every method used."
+        },
+        "acr": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "Authentication Context Class Reference per [OIDC Core §2]. Profiles define their own values; the recommended set is \"aal1\" (single-factor DID auth), \"aal2\" (a second possession-or-biometric factor confirmed), and \"aal3\" (hardware-bound second factor)."
+        },
+        "sessionKey": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "pattern": "^did:key:z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+$",
+          "maxLength": 512,
+          "description": "The did:key VID bound to this session by auth/authenticate/0.2 or 0.3, when the producer registered one. Present here so introspection (auth/whoami, auth/sessions/list) can show the binding a client already holds; it is descriptive, not an additional grant — the binding, its scope and its lifetime are governed entirely by the auth/authenticate specification version that established it. Absent when the session was established without a session key, or by a specification version that does not carry one."
+        },
+        "actor": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 2048,
+          "description": "The delegate's VID — the party whose `proof` actually authenticated this session — when this session was established by a *proxied* login (auth/authenticate/0.3, `payload.principal` present and distinct from `issuer`). Absent whenever `subject` authenticated with its own key, including every auth/authenticate/0.1 and /0.2 session and an auth/authenticate/0.3 request where `principal` is absent or equals `issuer`. Carrying `actor` separately from `subject` is what lets an audit trail, a revocation, or a response to a compromised delegate name the true acting party without conflating it with the principal it acted for — see auth/authenticate/0.3 Security & Privacy (Correlation)."
+        },
+        "absoluteExpiresAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "The instant beyond which this session's `expiresAt` MUST NOT be advanced, by auth/refresh/0.2 or by any other means — an absolute session lifetime set once at authentication and never moved forward. Consumers that impose no such ceiling beyond the session's own rolling `expiresAt` omit this member; its absence is not itself a claim that the session is unbounded, only that this response does not state a bound. See auth/refresh/0.2 Conformance and Security & Privacy for the enforcement rule."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+          "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1."
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+} as const;
+
+/** As {@link PAYLOAD_SCHEMA}, for the success-response variant. */
+export const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
+  "$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
+  "$ref": "#/$defs/Response",
+  "$defs": {
+    "Response": {
+      "$anchor": "response",
+      "title": "Auth Authenticate — response payload",
+      "description": "Issued by the auth service after verifying the proof on the authenticate document (and, for a proxied request, the delegation evidence). Carried in a Trust Task document whose type is https://trusttasks.org/spec/auth/authenticate/0.3#response.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "session",
+        "tokens"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "session": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Session",
+          "description": "The session the consumer has just created for this subject. `session.subject` is `principal` for a proxied request, `issuer` otherwise; `session.actor` is present and equal to `issuer` only for a proxied request. Carries `sessionKey` when the request bound one."
+        },
+        "tokens": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/TokenBundle",
+          "description": "Access + optional refresh tokens. Consumers MAY omit a refresh token when their policy doesn't support refresh."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+          "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "Ext": {
+      "title": "Ext",
+      "description": "Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "minProperties": 1,
+      "additionalProperties": true,
+      "propertyNames": {
+        "pattern": "^[a-z][a-z0-9-]*(\\.[a-z0-9-]+)+$"
+      }
+    },
+    "TokenBundle": {
+      "$anchor": "tokenBundle",
+      "title": "TokenBundle",
+      "description": "An access token (typically short-lived JWT) paired with an optional refresh token (typically long-lived opaque string). The shapes follow OAuth 2.0 (RFC 6749 §5.1) conventions but are not coupled to any particular OAuth profile.",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "accessToken",
+        "tokenType",
+        "expiresIn"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "accessToken": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Bearer-style access token. Consumers presenting this token to downstream services prove the holder of the original session. Format is consumer-defined — JWT is common, but opaque strings are also valid."
+        },
+        "refreshToken": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Long-lived token redeemable via auth/refresh for a new access token. MAY be absent when the issuer does not support refresh."
+        },
+        "tokenType": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Token presentation scheme. Almost always \"Bearer\"; reserved for future schemes."
+        },
+        "expiresIn": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1,
+          "description": "Seconds from issuance until the access token expires."
+        },
+        "refreshExpiresIn": {
+          "type": "integer",
+          "minimum": 1,
+          "description": "Seconds from issuance until the refresh token expires, when one was issued."
+        },
+        "scope": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          },
+          "description": "Capability tags effective on this token. Format is consumer-defined; the framework imposes no syntax."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+          "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1."
+        }
+      }
+    },
+    "Session": {
+      "$anchor": "session",
+      "title": "Session",
+      "description": "A logical authentication context bound to a subject. Producers and consumers exchange Session-shaped data in challenge issuance, authentication responses, and introspection (whoami).",
+      "type": "object",
+      "additionalProperties": false,
+      "required": [
+        "id",
+        "subject",
+        "issuedAt",
+        "expiresAt"
+      ],
+      "properties": {
+        "id": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "Opaque, server-chosen session identifier. Stable for the lifetime of the session. Consumers MUST treat the value as opaque; no structure is implied."
+        },
+        "subject": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "description": "The authenticated party's VID (typically a DID URL). For a session established by a proxied login (auth/authenticate/0.3), this is the *principal* being authenticated as — never the delegate that signed the authenticate document; see `actor`."
+        },
+        "issuedAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "ISO-8601 timestamp when the session was created."
+        },
+        "expiresAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "ISO-8601 timestamp when the session ceases to be valid. Producers SHOULD refresh before this time; consumers MUST reject after. A consumer honouring `absoluteExpiresAt` MUST NOT advance this value past it, by refresh or any other means."
+        },
+        "amr": {
+          "type": "array",
+          "minItems": 1,
+          "items": {
+            "type": "string",
+            "minLength": 1
+          },
+          "description": "Authentication Methods References per [RFC 8176]. Typical values: \"did\" (challenge-response), \"passkey\" (WebAuthn), \"vta\" (verifiable-trust agent approval). Multi-factor sessions list every method used."
+        },
+        "acr": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "description": "Authentication Context Class Reference per [OIDC Core §2]. Profiles define their own values; the recommended set is \"aal1\" (single-factor DID auth), \"aal2\" (a second possession-or-biometric factor confirmed), and \"aal3\" (hardware-bound second factor)."
+        },
+        "sessionKey": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "pattern": "^did:key:z[1-9A-HJ-NP-Za-km-z]+$",
+          "maxLength": 512,
+          "description": "The did:key VID bound to this session by auth/authenticate/0.2 or 0.3, when the producer registered one. Present here so introspection (auth/whoami, auth/sessions/list) can show the binding a client already holds; it is descriptive, not an additional grant — the binding, its scope and its lifetime are governed entirely by the auth/authenticate specification version that established it. Absent when the session was established without a session key, or by a specification version that does not carry one."
+        },
+        "actor": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "minLength": 1,
+          "maxLength": 2048,
+          "description": "The delegate's VID — the party whose `proof` actually authenticated this session — when this session was established by a *proxied* login (auth/authenticate/0.3, `payload.principal` present and distinct from `issuer`). Absent whenever `subject` authenticated with its own key, including every auth/authenticate/0.1 and /0.2 session and an auth/authenticate/0.3 request where `principal` is absent or equals `issuer`. Carrying `actor` separately from `subject` is what lets an audit trail, a revocation, or a response to a compromised delegate name the true acting party without conflating it with the principal it acted for — see auth/authenticate/0.3 Security & Privacy (Correlation)."
+        },
+        "absoluteExpiresAt": {
+          "type": "string",
+          "format": "date-time",
+          "description": "The instant beyond which this session's `expiresAt` MUST NOT be advanced, by auth/refresh/0.2 or by any other means — an absolute session lifetime set once at authentication and never moved forward. Consumers that impose no such ceiling beyond the session's own rolling `expiresAt` omit this member; its absence is not itself a claim that the session is unbounded, only that this response does not state a bound. See auth/refresh/0.2 Conformance and Security & Privacy for the enforcement rule."
+        },
+        "ext": {
+          "$ref": "#/$defs/Ext",
+          "description": "Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1."
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+} as const;
+
+/**
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the request variant, from this specification's
+ * front matter. Pass to `consumeInbound` — items 5b, 7 and 8 are
+ * per-specification and cannot be derived from the document alone, and
+ * item 2 needs the schema this carries.
+ */
+export const SPEC = {
+  typeUri: TYPE_URI,
+  isBearer: false,
+  isProofRequired: true,
+  isRecipientRequired: true,
+  isIssuedAtRequired: true,
+  payloadSchema: PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
+} as const;
+
+/**
+ * SPEC.md §7.2 policy for the success-response variant. `isRecipientRequired`
+ * tracks the *issuer* party's requirement because a response swaps the
+ * parties (§7.3 item 5).
+ */
+export const RESPONSE_SPEC = {
+  typeUri: RESPONSE_TYPE_URI,
+  isBearer: false,
+  isProofRequired: true,
+  isRecipientRequired: true,
+  isIssuedAtRequired: true,
+  payloadSchema: RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
+} as const;