@openvtc/trust-tasks 0.14.2 → 0.16.0

package/src/vault/list/0.3/payload.ts

@@ -3,38 +3,8 @@
  * Source: specs/vault/list/0.3/payload.schema.json
  */
 
-/**
- * Optional filter — only entries of this secret kind are returned.
- */
-export type SecretKind =
-  | "password"
-  | "passkey"
-  | "oauthTokens"
-  | "didSelfIssued"
-  | "didcommPeer"
-  | "bearerToken"
-  | "sshKey"
-  | "custom";
-/**
- * A single binding target for a vault entry. Tagged union over the discriminator `kind`. A VaultEntry's `targets` array MAY mix any number of these.
- */
-export type SiteTarget = WebOrigin | Did | IosApp | AndroidApp;
-/**
- * Discriminator for the kind of secret this entry holds. The secret material itself is NEVER returned in metadata views; the kind is exposed so consumers can render an appropriate UI affordance and so policy decisions can route by kind.
- */
-export type SecretKind1 =
-  | "password"
-  | "passkey"
-  | "oauthTokens"
-  | "didSelfIssued"
-  | "didcommPeer"
-  | "bearerToken"
-  | "sshKey"
-  | "custom";
-/**
- * Digest over the encrypted blob bytes (post-encryption), so the consumer can verify integrity after fetch. Taken over the bytes as stored, not over a canonicalization: the blob is an opaque artifact, not a JSON document.
- */
-export type DigestMultibase = string;
+import type { AndroidApp_VaultV0_2 as AndroidApp, AttachmentRef_VaultV0_3 as AttachmentRef, Did_VaultV0_2 as Did, DigestMultibase, Ext, IosApp_VaultV0_2 as IosApp, SecretKind_VaultV0_2 as SecretKind, SiteTarget_VaultV0_2 as SiteTarget, VaultEntry_VaultV0_3 as VaultEntry, WebOrigin_VaultV0_2 as WebOrigin } from "../../../_shared/components.js";
+
 
 /**
  * Query a vault maintainer for the metadata view of stored entries. All filters are AND-combined. Pagination is opaque-cursor based; the maintainer chooses page size within the caller's bound and its own ceiling. Secret material is NEVER returned by this task — even when the requesting consumer has VaultRead capability for the entry, the secret is only released via vault/release/0.1.
@@ -60,6 +30,9 @@ export interface VaultListPayload {
    * Optional filter — only entries with at least one `targets[]` entry of kind `androidApp` whose `packageName` exactly equals this value. The typical Android Companion lookup.
    */
   targetAndroidPackage?: string;
+  /**
+   * Optional filter — only entries of this secret kind are returned.
+   */
   secretKind?: SecretKind;
   /**
    * Optional filter — only entries whose `tags` array contains this tag.
@@ -89,18 +62,15 @@ export interface VaultListPayload {
    * Opaque continuation token returned by the maintainer in a previous response. Consumers MUST treat the cursor as opaque and re-send it verbatim.
    */
   cursor?: string;
+  /**
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
+   */
   ext?: Ext;
   /**
    * Archival-lifecycle view selector. Omitted or `active` lists only live entries; `archived` and `deleted` list those respectively (a `deleted` entry is a tombstone still inside its grace window); `all` lists every entry regardless of lifecycle state.
    */
   status?: "active" | "archived" | "deleted" | "all";
 }
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
- */
-export interface Ext {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
 /**
  * The success response to a vault/list request. Carried in a Trust Task document whose type is https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/list/0.1#response.
  */
@@ -121,158 +91,15 @@ export interface VaultListResponsePayload {
    * Names of VaultEntry fields the maintainer redacted from every returned entry (for example, ['lastUsedAt'] when releasing to a consumer whose policy does not permit timing-data exposure).
    */
   redactedFields?: string[];
-  ext?: Ext2;
-}
-export interface VaultEntry {
-  /**
-   * Opaque vault-maintainer-assigned identifier for the entry. ULID/UUID/base32 are common; the wire spec only requires non-empty string equality.
-   */
-  id: string;
-  /**
-   * Identifier of the trust context (persona) the entry belongs to. Opaque string interpreted by the vault maintainer; corresponds to a single ContextRecord on the VTA side.
-   */
-  contextId: string;
-  /**
-   * One or more binding targets — web origins, mobile app identifiers, and/or DIDs — that this credential applies to. A request from any matching target uses this entry. A typical entry for a service that exists as both a website and mobile apps will list a web origin, an iOS bundle id, and an Android package id; passkeys for that service typically list only the origin (because iOS Associated Domains and Android Asset Links bind apps to the domain at the OS level).
-   *
-   * @minItems 1
-   */
-  targets: [SiteTarget, ...SiteTarget[]];
-  /**
-   * Human-readable display name (e.g. "Work GitHub", "Personal bank — checking"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not.
-   */
-  label: string;
-  secretKind: SecretKind1;
-  /**
-   * User-defined tags for organisation and filtering (e.g. ["family", "finance"]). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum count; the wire spec does not.
-   */
-  tags?: string[];
-  /**
-   * Non-sensitive notes the user attached to the entry. Visible in metadata view (suitable for support contact, account number, expiry policy memos). SENSITIVE notes belong in the secret payload as a `secureNotes` field — those are only released by vault/release/0.1.
-   */
-  notes?: string;
-  /**
-   * Optional URI of an icon to display in the consumer UI. Maintainers MAY fetch and cache; consumers SHOULD treat as untrusted content and fetch via a sandboxed pipeline.
-   */
-  favicon?: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque maintainer-defined selector strings fed to the policy engine when this entry is requested (e.g. "recent_uv_required", "network_class=corp", "step_up_push"). Consumers MUST treat selectors as opaque; they exist for policy authoring on the maintainer side.
-   */
-  selectors?: string[];
-  /**
-   * Names of additional fields the user has attached (e.g. ["security-question-1", "account-number"]). The VALUES live in the secret payload and are only delivered by vault/release/0.1. Exposing names in metadata lets the consumer render the right form layout before requesting release.
-   */
-  customFieldNames?: string[];
-  /**
-   * References to encrypted blobs associated with the entry (recovery codes, PEM files, screenshots of authenticator setup). The blobs themselves are fetched via a separate mechanism the maintainer documents; metadata view exposes only the descriptor.
-   */
-  attachments?: AttachmentRef[];
-  /**
-   * Optional time after which the credential is no longer expected to be valid (e.g. an OAuth refresh token's known expiry, a time-limited API token, an enterprise password rotation policy). Maintainers MAY surface this in the consumer UI as a warning.
-   */
-  expiresAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * Set by the maintainer (via HIBP integration or equivalent) when the password material associated with this entry is known to appear in a public breach. Consumers SHOULD surface this prominently. Cleared when the user rotates the password and the new password is not in any known breach.
-   */
-  breachedAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * Set whenever the password component of the secret payload is rotated. Maintainers MUST update this on every secret-material change for entries of kind `password` (or any kind that carries a password component). Used by consumers to surface rotation-overdue warnings.
-   */
-  passwordChangedAt?: string;
-  createdAt: string;
   /**
-   * VID of the consumer that originally created the entry.
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
    */
-  createdBy?: string;
-  updatedAt: string;
-  /**
-   * VID of the consumer that last modified the entry.
-   */
-  updatedBy?: string;
-  /**
-   * Most recent time the entry was used (either released or proxy-login performed). Maintainers MAY return this with reduced precision (e.g. hour-floored) when releasing to a less-trusted consumer.
-   */
-  lastUsedAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * Monotonic version counter incremented on every mutation. Used by consumers for optimistic-concurrency checks on vault/upsert and as the seq baseline for vault/sync.
-   */
-  version: number;
-  /**
-   * Optional cached DID the entry will act AS for DID-shaped flows — mirrors the `did` field of the entry's secret payload when `secretKind` carries one (`didSelfIssued`, `didcommPeer`). Absent for kinds that have no DID concept (`password`, `passkey`, `oauthTokens`, `bearerToken`, `sshKey`, `custom`). MAINTAINER-DERIVED, NOT CONSUMER-SUPPLIED: the maintainer MUST recompute this from the canonical secret at every upsert / secret rotation; a producer-supplied value on `vault/upsert/0.1` MUST be ignored (no error, but no honour). Read-only on the wire, present in metadata views so consumers can drive RP-side flows (e.g. fetch `/auth/challenge` keyed on the principal DID before requesting a proxy-login) without releasing the secret.
-   */
-  principalDid?: string;
-  ext?: Ext1;
-}
-export interface WebOrigin {
-  kind: "webOrigin";
-  /**
-   * Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. "https://github.com". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard.
-   */
-  origin: string;
-}
-export interface Did {
-  kind: "did";
-  /**
-   * DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry.
-   */
-  did: string;
-}
-export interface IosApp {
-  kind: "iosApp";
-  /**
-   * iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. "com.github.stwalkerster.codehub"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration).
-   */
-  bundleId: string;
-  /**
-   * Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices.
-   */
-  teamId?: string;
-}
-export interface AndroidApp {
-  kind: "androidApp";
-  /**
-   * Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. "com.github.android").
-   */
-  packageName: string;
-  /**
-   * SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing).
-   *
-   * @minItems 1
-   */
-  sha256CertFingerprints: [string, ...string[]];
-}
-export interface AttachmentRef {
-  /**
-   * Opaque maintainer-assigned id for this attachment; used to fetch the blob via a separate mechanism.
-   */
-  id: string;
-  /**
-   * User-supplied filename (e.g. "recovery-codes.txt").
-   */
-  name: string;
-  /**
-   * Size of the encrypted blob in bytes. Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum per attachment and per entry.
-   */
-  sizeBytes: number;
-  digestMultibase: DigestMultibase;
-  /**
-   * Optional MIME type hint for the consumer UI (e.g. "text/plain", "application/x-pem-file").
-   */
-  contentType?: string;
-}
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces.
- */
-export interface Ext1 {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
- */
-export interface Ext2 {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
+  ext?: Ext;
 }
 
+/** Shared definitions this specification references, re-exported under the names it used to declare them with. */
+export type { AndroidApp, AttachmentRef, Did, DigestMultibase, Ext, IosApp, SecretKind, SiteTarget, VaultEntry, WebOrigin };
+
 /** Trust Task type URI. */
 export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/list/0.3" as const;
 
@@ -470,7 +297,8 @@ export const PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
         "label": {
           "type": "string",
           "minLength": 1,
-          "description": "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not."
+          "maxLength": 256,
+          "description": "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Bounded on the wire at 256 characters; a maintainer MAY enforce a shorter limit."
         },
         "secretKind": {
           "$ref": "#/$defs/SecretKind",
@@ -830,7 +658,8 @@ export const RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA = {
         "label": {
           "type": "string",
           "minLength": 1,
-          "description": "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Maintainers MAY enforce a maximum length; the wire spec does not."
+          "maxLength": 256,
+          "description": "Human-readable display name (e.g. \"Work GitHub\", \"Personal bank — checking\"). Bounded on the wire at 256 characters; a maintainer MAY enforce a shorter limit."
         },
         "secretKind": {
           "$ref": "#/$defs/SecretKind",
@@ -1111,6 +940,7 @@ export const SPEC = {
   isBearer: false,
   isProofRequired: false,
   isRecipientRequired: true,
+  isIssuedAtRequired: false,
   payloadSchema: PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
 } as const;
 
@@ -1124,5 +954,6 @@ export const RESPONSE_SPEC = {
   isBearer: false,
   isProofRequired: false,
   isRecipientRequired: true,
+  isIssuedAtRequired: false,
   payloadSchema: RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
 } as const;

package/src/vault/proxy-login/0.1/payload.ts

@@ -3,14 +3,8 @@
  * Source: specs/vault/proxy-login/0.1/payload.schema.json
  */
 
-/**
- * Optional — when an entry has multiple targets, names which one the consumer is acting against. The maintainer matches this against the entry's `targets[]`; if not supplied, the maintainer chooses the most specific target compatible with the requesting consumer's form factor (e.g. an iOS Companion gets the iOS-app target if one exists; otherwise the web-origin target).
- */
-export type SiteTarget = WebOrigin | Did | IosApp | AndroidApp;
-/**
- * Pluggable cipher envelope containing the SessionBlob cleartext (see `vault/_shared/0.1/session-blob`). The consumer unseals to recover cookies/headers, then injects into its browser session for the bound origin. Consumers reject envelope kinds they don't implement with `vault/proxy-login:envelopeUnsupported`.
- */
-export type SealedEnvelope = DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope | HpkeArmoredEnvelope | TspMessageEnvelope;
+import type { AndroidApp_VaultV0_1 as AndroidApp, ConsumerContext, Did_VaultV0_1 as Did, DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope_VaultV0_1 as DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope, Ext, HpkeArmoredEnvelope_VaultV0_1 as HpkeArmoredEnvelope, IosApp_VaultV0_1 as IosApp, SealedEnvelope_VaultV0_1 as SealedEnvelope, SiteTarget_VaultV0_1 as SiteTarget, StepUpProof_VaultV0_1 as StepUpProof, TspMessageEnvelope_VaultV0_1 as TspMessageEnvelope, WebOrigin_VaultV0_1 as WebOrigin } from "../../../_shared/components.js";
+
 
 /**
  * Consumer requests that the vault maintainer perform a login at the bound third-party site on the consumer's behalf, using the entry's secret material WITHOUT releasing it to the consumer. The maintainer returns a SessionBlob in a pluggable cipher envelope (see vault/_shared/0.1/sealed-envelope) containing the resulting cookies/headers the consumer can use to operate the session — but never the long-term credential.
@@ -20,8 +14,17 @@ export interface VaultProxyLoginPayload {
    * Vault entry id to log in with.
    */
   entryId: string;
+  /**
+   * Optional — when an entry has multiple targets, names which one the consumer is acting against. The maintainer matches this against the entry's `targets[]`; if not supplied, the maintainer chooses the most specific target compatible with the requesting consumer's form factor (e.g. an iOS Companion gets the iOS-app target if one exists; otherwise the web-origin target).
+   */
   target?: SiteTarget;
+  /**
+   * Caller's situational context — fed to the maintainer's policy engine to decide proxy vs fill, require step-up, etc. Producers populate what they can observe; fields are advisory and the maintainer MUST cross-check anything security-relevant against its own state.
+   */
   consumerContext?: ConsumerContext;
+  /**
+   * Optional — included on retry after a prior proxy-login attempt returned `stepUpRequired`.
+   */
   stepUpProof?: StepUpProof;
   /**
    * Optional caller-supplied nonce the maintainer SHOULD embed verbatim in the resulting session credential when one applies — typically the relying party's challenge for SIOPv2-shaped flows, where the SIOP id_token's `nonce` claim MUST match the RP's authorization-request `nonce` for the RP to verify the token. When omitted, the maintainer generates its own nonce; that path is appropriate for flows where the consumer doesn't need to bind the credential to an external challenge (e.g. push-mode logins that don't pre-fetch a challenge). Drivers that have no nonce concept (Password POST, OAuth refresh) ignore this field.
@@ -33,127 +36,16 @@ export interface VaultProxyLoginPayload {
   ttlSecondsHint?: number;
   ext?: Ext;
 }
-export interface WebOrigin {
-  kind: "web-origin";
-  /**
-   * Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. "https://github.com". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard.
-   */
-  origin: string;
-}
-export interface Did {
-  kind: "did";
-  /**
-   * DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry.
-   */
-  did: string;
-}
-export interface IosApp {
-  kind: "ios-app";
-  /**
-   * iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. "com.github.stwalkerster.codehub"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration).
-   */
-  bundleId: string;
-  /**
-   * Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices.
-   */
-  teamId?: string;
-}
-export interface AndroidApp {
-  kind: "android-app";
-  /**
-   * Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. "com.github.android").
-   */
-  packageName: string;
-  /**
-   * SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing).
-   *
-   * @minItems 1
-   */
-  sha256CertFingerprints: [string, ...string[]];
-}
-/**
- * Caller's situational context — fed to the maintainer's policy engine to decide proxy vs fill, require step-up, etc. Producers populate what they can observe; fields are advisory and the maintainer MUST cross-check anything security-relevant against its own state.
- */
-export interface ConsumerContext {
-  /**
-   * Device-binding id assigned at registration. The maintainer cross-checks this against the authenticated transport identity.
-   */
-  deviceId?: string;
-  /**
-   * Most recent local user-verification on the consumer device (WebAuthn UV, biometric unlock). The maintainer's policy may require this to be within N seconds.
-   */
-  lastUserVerificationAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * Producer-supplied network classification. Advisory.
-   */
-  networkClass?: "unknown" | "home" | "corp" | "public" | "vpn";
-}
-/**
- * Optional — included on retry after a prior proxy-login attempt returned `stepUpRequired`.
- */
-export interface StepUpProof {
-  kind: "webauthn-uv" | "push-approval" | "totp";
-  /**
-   * Format depends on kind: WebAuthn assertion (base64url), DIDComm approval-response message id, or 6–8-digit TOTP code.
-   */
-  proof: string;
+export interface VaultProxyLoginResponsePayload {
   /**
-   * Maintainer-issued challenge id the proof responds to.
+   * Pluggable cipher envelope containing the SessionBlob cleartext (see `vault/_shared/0.1/session-blob`). The consumer unseals to recover cookies/headers, then injects into its browser session for the bound origin. Consumers reject envelope kinds they don't implement with `vault/proxy-login:envelopeUnsupported`.
    */
-  challengeId: string;
-}
-/**
- * Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.
- */
-export interface Ext {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
-export interface VaultProxyLoginResponsePayload {
   sealedSessionBlob: SealedEnvelope;
   ext?: Ext;
 }
-/**
- * DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.
- *
- * M2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.
- */
-export interface DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope {
-  envelope: "didcomm-authcrypt";
-  /**
-   * Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON.
-   */
-  jwe: string;
-}
-/**
- * OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`did-signed` / `attested` / `pinned-only`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.
- *
- * No open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.
- */
-export interface HpkeArmoredEnvelope {
-  envelope: "hpke-armored";
-  /**
-   * ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24.
-   */
-  armored: string;
-  /**
-   * did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key.
-   */
-  recipientKeyId: string;
-  /**
-   * Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `did-signed` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinned-only` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production).
-   */
-  producerAssertion?: "did-signed" | "attested" | "pinned-only";
-}
-/**
- * Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tsp-message` envelopes explicitly (`envelopeUnsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.
- */
-export interface TspMessageEnvelope {
-  envelope: "tsp-message";
-  /**
-   * Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format
-   */
-  message: string;
-}
+
+/** Shared definitions this specification references, re-exported under the names it used to declare them with. */
+export type { AndroidApp, ConsumerContext, Did, DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope, Ext, HpkeArmoredEnvelope, IosApp, SealedEnvelope, SiteTarget, StepUpProof, TspMessageEnvelope, WebOrigin };
 
 /** Trust Task type URI. */
 export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/proxy-login/0.1" as const;
@@ -797,6 +689,7 @@ export const SPEC = {
   isBearer: false,
   isProofRequired: true,
   isRecipientRequired: true,
+  isIssuedAtRequired: true,
   payloadSchema: PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
 } as const;
 
@@ -810,5 +703,6 @@ export const RESPONSE_SPEC = {
   isBearer: false,
   isProofRequired: true,
   isRecipientRequired: true,
+  isIssuedAtRequired: true,
   payloadSchema: RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
 } as const;

package/src/vault/proxy-login/0.2/payload.ts

@@ -3,14 +3,8 @@
  * Source: specs/vault/proxy-login/0.2/payload.schema.json
  */
 
-/**
- * Optional — when an entry has multiple targets, names which one the consumer is acting against. The maintainer matches this against the entry's `targets[]`; if not supplied, the maintainer chooses the most specific target compatible with the requesting consumer's form factor (e.g. an iOS Companion gets the iOS-app target if one exists; otherwise the web-origin target).
- */
-export type SiteTarget = WebOrigin | Did | IosApp | AndroidApp;
-/**
- * Pluggable cipher envelope containing the SessionBlob cleartext (see `vault/_shared/0.1/session-blob`). The consumer unseals to recover cookies/headers, then injects into its browser session for the bound origin. Consumers reject envelope kinds they don't implement with `vault/proxy-login:envelopeUnsupported`.
- */
-export type SealedEnvelope = DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope | HpkeArmoredEnvelope | TspMessageEnvelope;
+import type { AndroidApp_VaultV0_2 as AndroidApp, ConsumerContext, Did_VaultV0_2 as Did, DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope_VaultV0_2 as DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope, Ext, HpkeArmoredEnvelope_VaultV0_2 as HpkeArmoredEnvelope, IosApp_VaultV0_2 as IosApp, SealedEnvelope_VaultV0_2 as SealedEnvelope, SiteTarget_VaultV0_2 as SiteTarget, StepUpProof_VaultV0_2 as StepUpProof, TspMessageEnvelope_VaultV0_2 as TspMessageEnvelope, WebOrigin_VaultV0_2 as WebOrigin } from "../../../_shared/components.js";
+
 
 /**
  * Consumer requests that the vault maintainer perform a login at the bound third-party site on the consumer's behalf, using the entry's secret material WITHOUT releasing it to the consumer. The maintainer returns a SessionBlob in a pluggable cipher envelope (see vault/_shared/0.1/sealed-envelope) containing the resulting cookies/headers the consumer can use to operate the session — but never the long-term credential.
@@ -20,8 +14,17 @@ export interface VaultProxyLoginPayload {
    * Vault entry id to log in with.
    */
   entryId: string;
+  /**
+   * Optional — when an entry has multiple targets, names which one the consumer is acting against. The maintainer matches this against the entry's `targets[]`; if not supplied, the maintainer chooses the most specific target compatible with the requesting consumer's form factor (e.g. an iOS Companion gets the iOS-app target if one exists; otherwise the web-origin target).
+   */
   target?: SiteTarget;
+  /**
+   * Caller's situational context — fed to the maintainer's policy engine to decide proxy vs fill, require step-up, etc. Producers populate what they can observe; fields are advisory and the maintainer MUST cross-check anything security-relevant against its own state.
+   */
   consumerContext?: ConsumerContext;
+  /**
+   * Optional — included on retry after a prior proxy-login attempt returned `stepUpRequired`.
+   */
   stepUpProof?: StepUpProof;
   /**
    * Optional caller-supplied nonce the maintainer SHOULD embed verbatim in the resulting session credential when one applies — typically the relying party's challenge for SIOPv2-shaped flows, where the SIOP id_token's `nonce` claim MUST match the RP's authorization-request `nonce` for the RP to verify the token. When omitted, the maintainer generates its own nonce; that path is appropriate for flows where the consumer doesn't need to bind the credential to an external challenge (e.g. push-mode logins that don't pre-fetch a challenge). Drivers that have no nonce concept (Password POST, OAuth refresh) ignore this field.
@@ -33,127 +36,16 @@ export interface VaultProxyLoginPayload {
   ttlSecondsHint?: number;
   ext?: Ext;
 }
-export interface WebOrigin {
-  kind: "webOrigin";
-  /**
-   * Web origin per RFC 6454 (scheme + host + optional port), e.g. "https://github.com". Compared by exact string equality after canonicalisation (lowercase host, default port elided). Consumers wanting subdomain coverage SHOULD add multiple targets, not encode a wildcard.
-   */
-  origin: string;
-}
-export interface Did {
-  kind: "did";
-  /**
-   * DID identifying the relying party (e.g. did:web:rp.example). The vault maintainer is responsible for any DID resolution required to act on this entry.
-   */
-  did: string;
-}
-export interface IosApp {
-  kind: "iosApp";
-  /**
-   * iOS bundle identifier in reverse-DNS form (e.g. "com.github.stwalkerster.codehub"). Compared by exact string equality. Matches when an iOS Companion identifies the requesting app via its bundle id (typically via the OS Credential Manager integration).
-   */
-  bundleId: string;
-  /**
-   * Optional Apple Developer Team identifier (10-character alphanumeric). When supplied, the maintainer SHOULD also verify the team id of the requesting app before matching — defense in depth against bundle-id squatting on jailbroken devices.
-   */
-  teamId?: string;
-}
-export interface AndroidApp {
-  kind: "androidApp";
-  /**
-   * Android package name in reverse-DNS form (e.g. "com.github.android").
-   */
-  packageName: string;
-  /**
-   * SHA-256 fingerprints of the app's signing certificates, in colon-separated hex (the format `apksigner` and the Play Console emit). At least one fingerprint MUST be present. The maintainer matches when ANY of the provided fingerprints matches the requesting app's signature — this supports apps signed by multiple keys (e.g. during certificate rotation via Play App Signing).
-   *
-   * @minItems 1
-   */
-  sha256CertFingerprints: [string, ...string[]];
-}
-/**
- * Caller's situational context — fed to the maintainer's policy engine to decide proxy vs fill, require step-up, etc. Producers populate what they can observe; fields are advisory and the maintainer MUST cross-check anything security-relevant against its own state.
- */
-export interface ConsumerContext {
-  /**
-   * Device-binding id assigned at registration. The maintainer cross-checks this against the authenticated transport identity.
-   */
-  deviceId?: string;
-  /**
-   * Most recent local user-verification on the consumer device (WebAuthn UV, biometric unlock). The maintainer's policy may require this to be within N seconds.
-   */
-  lastUserVerificationAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * Producer-supplied network classification. Advisory.
-   */
-  networkClass?: "unknown" | "home" | "corp" | "public" | "vpn";
-}
-/**
- * Optional — included on retry after a prior proxy-login attempt returned `stepUpRequired`.
- */
-export interface StepUpProof {
-  kind: "webauthnUv" | "pushApproval" | "totp";
-  /**
-   * Format depends on kind: WebAuthn assertion (base64url), DIDComm approval-response message id, or 6–8-digit TOTP code.
-   */
-  proof: string;
+export interface VaultProxyLoginResponsePayload {
   /**
-   * Maintainer-issued challenge id the proof responds to.
+   * Pluggable cipher envelope containing the SessionBlob cleartext (see `vault/_shared/0.1/session-blob`). The consumer unseals to recover cookies/headers, then injects into its browser session for the bound origin. Consumers reject envelope kinds they don't implement with `vault/proxy-login:envelopeUnsupported`.
    */
-  challengeId: string;
-}
-/**
- * Vendor-namespaced extension object per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Each immediate key MUST be a reverse-DNS namespace; structure under each namespace is opaque to the framework.
- */
-export interface Ext {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
-export interface VaultProxyLoginResponsePayload {
   sealedSessionBlob: SealedEnvelope;
   ext?: Ext;
 }
-/**
- * DIDComm v2 authcrypt JWE (ECDH-1PU + A256CBC-HS512, X25519/P-256 key agreement). Sender authentication is the JWE's `skid` — the producer's DID#keyAgreement. The maintainer's keyAgreement key is the recipient. Cleartext is JCS-canonical JSON of the variant's payload type.
- *
- * M2A is the only implementation today; this is also the canonical default for new code.
- */
-export interface DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope {
-  envelope: "didcommAuthcrypt";
-  /**
-   * Compact DIDComm v2 JWE (base64url-encoded, dot-separated). Unpacks via the framework's standard DIDComm machinery; cleartext is the payload-specific JSON.
-   */
-  jwe: string;
-}
-/**
- * OpenPGP-style ASCII-armored HPKE bundle — the existing OpenVTC sealed-transfer wire form (X25519-HKDF-SHA256 KEM + ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD, framed in armor with Bundle-Id / Digest-Algo headers and a CRC24 checksum). Producer assertion (`didSigned` / `attested` / `pinnedOnly`) is the integrity / authenticity anchor.
- *
- * No open-source implementation reads this yet outside vta-sdk's `sealed_transfer` crate; new code SHOULD prefer the DIDComm variant. Defined here for parity with the existing offline-bundle / cross-VTA workflows that the design plan reserves for M5+.
- */
-export interface HpkeArmoredEnvelope {
-  envelope: "hpkeArmored";
-  /**
-   * ASCII-armored bundle text. Multi-line base64 with framing headers + CRC24.
-   */
-  armored: string;
-  /**
-   * did:key identifier of the X25519 public key the envelope was sealed to. The recipient uses this to select the matching private key.
-   */
-  recipientKeyId: string;
-  /**
-   * Producer-assertion mode per the sealed-transfer framework. `didSigned` = Ed25519 signature by issuer; `attested` = TEE attestation quote (e.g. Nitro); `pinnedOnly` = OOB SHA-256 digest only (dev/test, NOT for production).
-   */
-  producerAssertion?: "didSigned" | "attested" | "pinnedOnly";
-}
-/**
- * Trust Spanning Protocol message (https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/). Reserved variant; no OpenVTC component reads or emits this today. Listed in the union so implementations can declare intent to use TSP in discovery and so consumers reject `tspMessage` envelopes explicitly (`envelopeUnsupported`) until they're wired up — rather than silently failing in DIDComm parsing.
- */
-export interface TspMessageEnvelope {
-  envelope: "tspMessage";
-  /**
-   * Base64url-encoded TSP message bytes. Format reference: https://trustoverip.github.io/tswg-tsp-specification/#message-format
-   */
-  message: string;
-}
+
+/** Shared definitions this specification references, re-exported under the names it used to declare them with. */
+export type { AndroidApp, ConsumerContext, Did, DidcommAuthcryptEnvelope, Ext, HpkeArmoredEnvelope, IosApp, SealedEnvelope, SiteTarget, StepUpProof, TspMessageEnvelope, WebOrigin };
 
 /** Trust Task type URI. */
 export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/proxy-login/0.2" as const;
@@ -797,6 +689,7 @@ export const SPEC = {
   isBearer: false,
   isProofRequired: true,
   isRecipientRequired: true,
+  isIssuedAtRequired: true,
   payloadSchema: PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
 } as const;
 
@@ -810,5 +703,6 @@ export const RESPONSE_SPEC = {
   isBearer: false,
   isProofRequired: true,
   isRecipientRequired: true,
+  isIssuedAtRequired: true,
   payloadSchema: RESPONSE_PAYLOAD_SCHEMA,
 } as const;