@openvtc/trust-tasks 0.14.1 → 0.15.0

package/src/acl/_shared/0.1/acl-entry.ts

@@ -11,3 +11,9 @@
 export interface AclEntrySharedDefinitionForTheAclSpecFamily {
   [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
 }
+
+/**
+ * The definitions this shared schema publishes, hoisted to one declaration each.
+ * See "../../../_shared/components.js".
+ */
+export type { AclEntry } from "../../../_shared/components.js";

package/src/acl/change-role/0.1/payload.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
  * Source: specs/acl/change-role/0.1/payload.schema.json
  */
 
+import type { AclEntry, Ext } from "../../../_shared/components.js";
+
+
 export interface ACLChangeRolePayload {
   /**
    * VID of the party whose role is changing.
@@ -20,104 +23,28 @@ export interface ACLChangeRolePayload {
    * Optional human-readable rationale.
    */
   reason?: string;
+  /**
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
+   */
   ext?: Ext;
 }
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
- */
-export interface Ext {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
 /**
  * The success response to an acl/change-role request. Carried in a Trust Task document whose type is https://trusttasks.org/spec/acl/change-role/0.1#response.
  */
 export interface ACLChangeRoleResponsePayload {
-  entry: AclEntry;
-  ext?: Ext2;
-}
-/**
- * The AclEntry the maintainer now holds for the subject. entry.role MUST equal the request's payload.toRole.
- */
-export interface AclEntry {
   /**
-   * VID of the party in the ACL. Compared by exact string equality (SPEC.md §4.8); producers SHOULD emit canonical form.
+   * The AclEntry the maintainer now holds for the subject. entry.role MUST equal the request's payload.toRole.
    */
-  subject: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque role identifier interpreted by the ACL maintainer.
-   */
-  role: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque scope identifiers (e.g. contexts, domains, resource prefixes).
-   */
-  scopes?: string[];
-  /**
-   * Key identifiers this subject may invoke the maintainer's signing oracle on. INTERSECTS WITH `scopes` — it can only narrow, never widen: a key named here that lies outside the entry's scopes remains unreachable, exactly as if it were not named. ABSENT means every key within the entry's scopes (the behaviour of entries that pre-date this member); explicit `null` is equivalent to absent, and producers SHOULD omit the member instead. PRESENT-BUT-EMPTY means authorized on NO keys — the opposite of absent, and deliberately so: emptiness is never a wildcard (CONVENTIONS.md §5). A consumer MUST preserve and enforce the absent-vs-empty distinction end to end; collapsing the two (e.g. by testing emptiness alone) re-creates the empty-means-unrestricted class of privilege-escalation defect this family's conventions exist to prevent.
-   */
-  allowedKeys?: string[] | null;
-  /**
-   * Optional human-readable label.
-   */
-  label?: string;
-  createdAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * VID of the party that originally added this entry.
-   */
-  createdBy?: string;
-  updatedAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * VID of the party that last modified this entry.
-   */
-  updatedBy?: string;
-  /**
-   * Optional time after which the entry is no longer effective.
-   */
-  expiresAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * Per-entry authentication step-up configuration, consumed by the ACL maintainer when it gates an operation behind a step-up (see auth/step-up/policy/0.1). ADDITIVE-ONLY: a per-entry setting MAY raise the assurance required of this subject above the maintainer's system-wide floor, but MUST NOT lower it. The maintainer resolves the effective requirement as the strictest of (system floor, this entry).
-   */
-  stepUp?: {
-    /**
-     * VID authorized to ratify step-up for this subject — the `recipient` the maintainer addresses an auth/step-up/approve-request to (e.g. the holder's mobile authenticator or browser companion). Absent → the subject is its own approver (mode `self`) when it holds a usable authenticator; if neither an `approver` nor a self authenticator exists, no step-up method is available for this subject and the maintainer's fail-closed rule applies.
-     */
-    approver?: string;
-    /**
-     * Minimum step-up mode this subject MUST satisfy for gated operations, raising the system floor. `self` = the subject re-authenticates its own session; `delegated` = a separate `approver` MUST ratify. Omitted → the system floor applies unchanged. A value weaker than the resolved floor is ignored (additive-only).
-     */
-    require?: "self" | "delegated";
-  };
+  entry: AclEntry;
   /**
-   * Approve-authority: what this subject may **confer on others** by ratifying an approval, as distinct from `scopes`, which is what it may **exercise itself**. The two axes are independent, and that independence is the point — it is what lets a maintainer configure a least-privilege approver who can authorize an operation in a scope it has no authority to perform.
-   *
-   * OMISSION MEANS NOTHING IS CONFERRED. An absent `approve`, an absent `all`, and an empty `scopes` are all equivalent to "this subject may ratify nothing". A consumer that does not implement this member therefore confers less than the producer intended rather than more, which is the direction a missed member has to fail in.
-   *
-   * A subject with approve-authority is NOT thereby authorized to act. Consumers MUST resolve the two axes separately: reading `approve` to answer "may this party ratify X" and `scopes` to answer "may this party do X". Collapsing them grants an approver the ability to perform what it was only meant to sign off on.
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
    */
-  approve?: {
-    /**
-     * The subject may confer ANY scope. Takes precedence over `scopes`, which a consumer MUST ignore when this is true. Absent or false → only the scopes listed below, if any.
-     */
-    all?: boolean;
-    /**
-     * Opaque scope identifiers this subject may confer, drawn from the same vocabulary as the entry's own `scopes`. Where a maintainer's scopes are hierarchical, conferring a scope confers its descendants — the same containment rule the maintainer already applies to `scopes`, so the two axes cannot disagree about what a scope means. An empty array confers nothing; it is not a wildcard.
-     */
-    scopes?: string[];
-  };
-  ext?: Ext1;
-}
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces.
- */
-export interface Ext1 {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
- */
-export interface Ext2 {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
+  ext?: Ext;
 }
 
+/** Shared definitions this specification references, re-exported under the names it used to declare them with. */
+export type { AclEntry, Ext };
+
 /** Trust Task type URI. */
 export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/acl/change-role/0.1" as const;
 

package/src/acl/grant/0.1/payload.ts

@@ -3,179 +3,39 @@
  * Source: specs/acl/grant/0.1/payload.schema.json
  */
 
+import type { AclEntry, Ext } from "../../../_shared/components.js";
+
+
 export interface ACLGrantPayload {
+  /**
+   * The AclEntry the producer wants the maintainer to hold for the subject (intent). The maintainer's response carries the realized AclEntry it now holds.
+   */
   entry: AclEntry;
   /**
    * Optional human-readable rationale.
    */
   reason?: string;
-  ext?: Ext1;
-}
-/**
- * The AclEntry the producer wants the maintainer to hold for the subject (intent). The maintainer's response carries the realized AclEntry it now holds.
- */
-export interface AclEntry {
-  /**
-   * VID of the party in the ACL. Compared by exact string equality (SPEC.md §4.8); producers SHOULD emit canonical form.
-   */
-  subject: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque role identifier interpreted by the ACL maintainer.
-   */
-  role: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque scope identifiers (e.g. contexts, domains, resource prefixes).
-   */
-  scopes?: string[];
-  /**
-   * Key identifiers this subject may invoke the maintainer's signing oracle on. INTERSECTS WITH `scopes` — it can only narrow, never widen: a key named here that lies outside the entry's scopes remains unreachable, exactly as if it were not named. ABSENT means every key within the entry's scopes (the behaviour of entries that pre-date this member); explicit `null` is equivalent to absent, and producers SHOULD omit the member instead. PRESENT-BUT-EMPTY means authorized on NO keys — the opposite of absent, and deliberately so: emptiness is never a wildcard (CONVENTIONS.md §5). A consumer MUST preserve and enforce the absent-vs-empty distinction end to end; collapsing the two (e.g. by testing emptiness alone) re-creates the empty-means-unrestricted class of privilege-escalation defect this family's conventions exist to prevent.
-   */
-  allowedKeys?: string[] | null;
-  /**
-   * Optional human-readable label.
-   */
-  label?: string;
-  createdAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * VID of the party that originally added this entry.
-   */
-  createdBy?: string;
-  updatedAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * VID of the party that last modified this entry.
-   */
-  updatedBy?: string;
   /**
-   * Optional time after which the entry is no longer effective.
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
    */
-  expiresAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * Per-entry authentication step-up configuration, consumed by the ACL maintainer when it gates an operation behind a step-up (see auth/step-up/policy/0.1). ADDITIVE-ONLY: a per-entry setting MAY raise the assurance required of this subject above the maintainer's system-wide floor, but MUST NOT lower it. The maintainer resolves the effective requirement as the strictest of (system floor, this entry).
-   */
-  stepUp?: {
-    /**
-     * VID authorized to ratify step-up for this subject — the `recipient` the maintainer addresses an auth/step-up/approve-request to (e.g. the holder's mobile authenticator or browser companion). Absent → the subject is its own approver (mode `self`) when it holds a usable authenticator; if neither an `approver` nor a self authenticator exists, no step-up method is available for this subject and the maintainer's fail-closed rule applies.
-     */
-    approver?: string;
-    /**
-     * Minimum step-up mode this subject MUST satisfy for gated operations, raising the system floor. `self` = the subject re-authenticates its own session; `delegated` = a separate `approver` MUST ratify. Omitted → the system floor applies unchanged. A value weaker than the resolved floor is ignored (additive-only).
-     */
-    require?: "self" | "delegated";
-  };
-  /**
-   * Approve-authority: what this subject may **confer on others** by ratifying an approval, as distinct from `scopes`, which is what it may **exercise itself**. The two axes are independent, and that independence is the point — it is what lets a maintainer configure a least-privilege approver who can authorize an operation in a scope it has no authority to perform.
-   *
-   * OMISSION MEANS NOTHING IS CONFERRED. An absent `approve`, an absent `all`, and an empty `scopes` are all equivalent to "this subject may ratify nothing". A consumer that does not implement this member therefore confers less than the producer intended rather than more, which is the direction a missed member has to fail in.
-   *
-   * A subject with approve-authority is NOT thereby authorized to act. Consumers MUST resolve the two axes separately: reading `approve` to answer "may this party ratify X" and `scopes` to answer "may this party do X". Collapsing them grants an approver the ability to perform what it was only meant to sign off on.
-   */
-  approve?: {
-    /**
-     * The subject may confer ANY scope. Takes precedence over `scopes`, which a consumer MUST ignore when this is true. Absent or false → only the scopes listed below, if any.
-     */
-    all?: boolean;
-    /**
-     * Opaque scope identifiers this subject may confer, drawn from the same vocabulary as the entry's own `scopes`. Where a maintainer's scopes are hierarchical, conferring a scope confers its descendants — the same containment rule the maintainer already applies to `scopes`, so the two axes cannot disagree about what a scope means. An empty array confers nothing; it is not a wildcard.
-     */
-    scopes?: string[];
-  };
   ext?: Ext;
 }
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces.
- */
-export interface Ext {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
- */
-export interface Ext1 {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
 /**
  * The success response to an acl/grant request. Carried in a Trust Task document whose type is https://trusttasks.org/spec/acl/grant/0.1#response.
  */
 export interface ACLGrantResponsePayload {
-  entry: AclEntry1;
-  ext?: Ext2;
-}
-/**
- * The canonical AclEntry the maintainer now holds for the subject.
- */
-export interface AclEntry1 {
-  /**
-   * VID of the party in the ACL. Compared by exact string equality (SPEC.md §4.8); producers SHOULD emit canonical form.
-   */
-  subject: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque role identifier interpreted by the ACL maintainer.
-   */
-  role: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque scope identifiers (e.g. contexts, domains, resource prefixes).
-   */
-  scopes?: string[];
-  /**
-   * Key identifiers this subject may invoke the maintainer's signing oracle on. INTERSECTS WITH `scopes` — it can only narrow, never widen: a key named here that lies outside the entry's scopes remains unreachable, exactly as if it were not named. ABSENT means every key within the entry's scopes (the behaviour of entries that pre-date this member); explicit `null` is equivalent to absent, and producers SHOULD omit the member instead. PRESENT-BUT-EMPTY means authorized on NO keys — the opposite of absent, and deliberately so: emptiness is never a wildcard (CONVENTIONS.md §5). A consumer MUST preserve and enforce the absent-vs-empty distinction end to end; collapsing the two (e.g. by testing emptiness alone) re-creates the empty-means-unrestricted class of privilege-escalation defect this family's conventions exist to prevent.
-   */
-  allowedKeys?: string[] | null;
   /**
-   * Optional human-readable label.
+   * The canonical AclEntry the maintainer now holds for the subject.
    */
-  label?: string;
-  createdAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * VID of the party that originally added this entry.
-   */
-  createdBy?: string;
-  updatedAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * VID of the party that last modified this entry.
-   */
-  updatedBy?: string;
-  /**
-   * Optional time after which the entry is no longer effective.
-   */
-  expiresAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * Per-entry authentication step-up configuration, consumed by the ACL maintainer when it gates an operation behind a step-up (see auth/step-up/policy/0.1). ADDITIVE-ONLY: a per-entry setting MAY raise the assurance required of this subject above the maintainer's system-wide floor, but MUST NOT lower it. The maintainer resolves the effective requirement as the strictest of (system floor, this entry).
-   */
-  stepUp?: {
-    /**
-     * VID authorized to ratify step-up for this subject — the `recipient` the maintainer addresses an auth/step-up/approve-request to (e.g. the holder's mobile authenticator or browser companion). Absent → the subject is its own approver (mode `self`) when it holds a usable authenticator; if neither an `approver` nor a self authenticator exists, no step-up method is available for this subject and the maintainer's fail-closed rule applies.
-     */
-    approver?: string;
-    /**
-     * Minimum step-up mode this subject MUST satisfy for gated operations, raising the system floor. `self` = the subject re-authenticates its own session; `delegated` = a separate `approver` MUST ratify. Omitted → the system floor applies unchanged. A value weaker than the resolved floor is ignored (additive-only).
-     */
-    require?: "self" | "delegated";
-  };
+  entry: AclEntry;
   /**
-   * Approve-authority: what this subject may **confer on others** by ratifying an approval, as distinct from `scopes`, which is what it may **exercise itself**. The two axes are independent, and that independence is the point — it is what lets a maintainer configure a least-privilege approver who can authorize an operation in a scope it has no authority to perform.
-   *
-   * OMISSION MEANS NOTHING IS CONFERRED. An absent `approve`, an absent `all`, and an empty `scopes` are all equivalent to "this subject may ratify nothing". A consumer that does not implement this member therefore confers less than the producer intended rather than more, which is the direction a missed member has to fail in.
-   *
-   * A subject with approve-authority is NOT thereby authorized to act. Consumers MUST resolve the two axes separately: reading `approve` to answer "may this party ratify X" and `scopes` to answer "may this party do X". Collapsing them grants an approver the ability to perform what it was only meant to sign off on.
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
    */
-  approve?: {
-    /**
-     * The subject may confer ANY scope. Takes precedence over `scopes`, which a consumer MUST ignore when this is true. Absent or false → only the scopes listed below, if any.
-     */
-    all?: boolean;
-    /**
-     * Opaque scope identifiers this subject may confer, drawn from the same vocabulary as the entry's own `scopes`. Where a maintainer's scopes are hierarchical, conferring a scope confers its descendants — the same containment rule the maintainer already applies to `scopes`, so the two axes cannot disagree about what a scope means. An empty array confers nothing; it is not a wildcard.
-     */
-    scopes?: string[];
-  };
   ext?: Ext;
 }
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
- */
-export interface Ext2 {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
+
+/** Shared definitions this specification references, re-exported under the names it used to declare them with. */
+export type { AclEntry, Ext };
 
 /** Trust Task type URI. */
 export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/acl/grant/0.1" as const;

package/src/acl/list/0.1/payload.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
  * Source: specs/acl/list/0.1/payload.schema.json
  */
 
+import type { AclEntry, Ext } from "../../../_shared/components.js";
+
+
 export interface ACLListPayload {
   /**
    * Optional filter — only entries with this role are returned.
@@ -28,14 +31,11 @@ export interface ACLListPayload {
    * Opaque continuation token returned by the maintainer in a previous response.
    */
   cursor?: string;
+  /**
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
+   */
   ext?: Ext;
 }
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
- */
-export interface Ext {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
 /**
  * The success response to an acl/list request. Carried in a Trust Task document whose type is https://trusttasks.org/spec/acl/list/0.1#response.
  */
@@ -56,88 +56,15 @@ export interface ACLListResponsePayload {
    * Names of AclEntry fields the maintainer redacted from every returned entry (for example, ['label'] or ['ext.vnd.example.audit']).
    */
   redactedFields?: string[];
-  ext?: Ext2;
-}
-export interface AclEntry {
-  /**
-   * VID of the party in the ACL. Compared by exact string equality (SPEC.md §4.8); producers SHOULD emit canonical form.
-   */
-  subject: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque role identifier interpreted by the ACL maintainer.
-   */
-  role: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque scope identifiers (e.g. contexts, domains, resource prefixes).
-   */
-  scopes?: string[];
-  /**
-   * Key identifiers this subject may invoke the maintainer's signing oracle on. INTERSECTS WITH `scopes` — it can only narrow, never widen: a key named here that lies outside the entry's scopes remains unreachable, exactly as if it were not named. ABSENT means every key within the entry's scopes (the behaviour of entries that pre-date this member); explicit `null` is equivalent to absent, and producers SHOULD omit the member instead. PRESENT-BUT-EMPTY means authorized on NO keys — the opposite of absent, and deliberately so: emptiness is never a wildcard (CONVENTIONS.md §5). A consumer MUST preserve and enforce the absent-vs-empty distinction end to end; collapsing the two (e.g. by testing emptiness alone) re-creates the empty-means-unrestricted class of privilege-escalation defect this family's conventions exist to prevent.
-   */
-  allowedKeys?: string[] | null;
-  /**
-   * Optional human-readable label.
-   */
-  label?: string;
-  createdAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * VID of the party that originally added this entry.
-   */
-  createdBy?: string;
-  updatedAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * VID of the party that last modified this entry.
-   */
-  updatedBy?: string;
-  /**
-   * Optional time after which the entry is no longer effective.
-   */
-  expiresAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * Per-entry authentication step-up configuration, consumed by the ACL maintainer when it gates an operation behind a step-up (see auth/step-up/policy/0.1). ADDITIVE-ONLY: a per-entry setting MAY raise the assurance required of this subject above the maintainer's system-wide floor, but MUST NOT lower it. The maintainer resolves the effective requirement as the strictest of (system floor, this entry).
-   */
-  stepUp?: {
-    /**
-     * VID authorized to ratify step-up for this subject — the `recipient` the maintainer addresses an auth/step-up/approve-request to (e.g. the holder's mobile authenticator or browser companion). Absent → the subject is its own approver (mode `self`) when it holds a usable authenticator; if neither an `approver` nor a self authenticator exists, no step-up method is available for this subject and the maintainer's fail-closed rule applies.
-     */
-    approver?: string;
-    /**
-     * Minimum step-up mode this subject MUST satisfy for gated operations, raising the system floor. `self` = the subject re-authenticates its own session; `delegated` = a separate `approver` MUST ratify. Omitted → the system floor applies unchanged. A value weaker than the resolved floor is ignored (additive-only).
-     */
-    require?: "self" | "delegated";
-  };
   /**
-   * Approve-authority: what this subject may **confer on others** by ratifying an approval, as distinct from `scopes`, which is what it may **exercise itself**. The two axes are independent, and that independence is the point — it is what lets a maintainer configure a least-privilege approver who can authorize an operation in a scope it has no authority to perform.
-   *
-   * OMISSION MEANS NOTHING IS CONFERRED. An absent `approve`, an absent `all`, and an empty `scopes` are all equivalent to "this subject may ratify nothing". A consumer that does not implement this member therefore confers less than the producer intended rather than more, which is the direction a missed member has to fail in.
-   *
-   * A subject with approve-authority is NOT thereby authorized to act. Consumers MUST resolve the two axes separately: reading `approve` to answer "may this party ratify X" and `scopes` to answer "may this party do X". Collapsing them grants an approver the ability to perform what it was only meant to sign off on.
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
    */
-  approve?: {
-    /**
-     * The subject may confer ANY scope. Takes precedence over `scopes`, which a consumer MUST ignore when this is true. Absent or false → only the scopes listed below, if any.
-     */
-    all?: boolean;
-    /**
-     * Opaque scope identifiers this subject may confer, drawn from the same vocabulary as the entry's own `scopes`. Where a maintainer's scopes are hierarchical, conferring a scope confers its descendants — the same containment rule the maintainer already applies to `scopes`, so the two axes cannot disagree about what a scope means. An empty array confers nothing; it is not a wildcard.
-     */
-    scopes?: string[];
-  };
-  ext?: Ext1;
-}
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces.
- */
-export interface Ext1 {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
- */
-export interface Ext2 {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
+  ext?: Ext;
 }
 
+/** Shared definitions this specification references, re-exported under the names it used to declare them with. */
+export type { AclEntry, Ext };
+
 /** Trust Task type URI. */
 export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/acl/list/0.1" as const;
 

package/src/acl/revoke/0.1/payload.ts

@@ -3,6 +3,9 @@
  * Source: specs/acl/revoke/0.1/payload.schema.json
  */
 
+import type { AclEntry, Ext } from "../../../_shared/components.js";
+
+
 export interface ACLRevokePayload {
   /**
    * VID of the party being revoked (or scope-reduced).
@@ -18,14 +21,11 @@ export interface ACLRevokePayload {
    * Optional human-readable rationale for the revocation.
    */
   reason?: string;
+  /**
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
+   */
   ext?: Ext;
 }
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
- */
-export interface Ext {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
 /**
  * The success response to an acl/revoke request. Carried in a Trust Task document whose type is https://trusttasks.org/spec/acl/revoke/0.1#response.
  */
@@ -34,88 +34,15 @@ export interface ACLRevokeResponsePayload {
    * The AclEntry the maintainer now holds for the subject. null for a full removal; an AclEntry with reduced scopes for a scope reduction.
    */
   entry: null | AclEntry;
-  ext?: Ext2;
-}
-export interface AclEntry {
-  /**
-   * VID of the party in the ACL. Compared by exact string equality (SPEC.md §4.8); producers SHOULD emit canonical form.
-   */
-  subject: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque role identifier interpreted by the ACL maintainer.
-   */
-  role: string;
-  /**
-   * Opaque scope identifiers (e.g. contexts, domains, resource prefixes).
-   */
-  scopes?: string[];
-  /**
-   * Key identifiers this subject may invoke the maintainer's signing oracle on. INTERSECTS WITH `scopes` — it can only narrow, never widen: a key named here that lies outside the entry's scopes remains unreachable, exactly as if it were not named. ABSENT means every key within the entry's scopes (the behaviour of entries that pre-date this member); explicit `null` is equivalent to absent, and producers SHOULD omit the member instead. PRESENT-BUT-EMPTY means authorized on NO keys — the opposite of absent, and deliberately so: emptiness is never a wildcard (CONVENTIONS.md §5). A consumer MUST preserve and enforce the absent-vs-empty distinction end to end; collapsing the two (e.g. by testing emptiness alone) re-creates the empty-means-unrestricted class of privilege-escalation defect this family's conventions exist to prevent.
-   */
-  allowedKeys?: string[] | null;
-  /**
-   * Optional human-readable label.
-   */
-  label?: string;
-  createdAt?: string;
   /**
-   * VID of the party that originally added this entry.
+   * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
    */
-  createdBy?: string;
-  updatedAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * VID of the party that last modified this entry.
-   */
-  updatedBy?: string;
-  /**
-   * Optional time after which the entry is no longer effective.
-   */
-  expiresAt?: string;
-  /**
-   * Per-entry authentication step-up configuration, consumed by the ACL maintainer when it gates an operation behind a step-up (see auth/step-up/policy/0.1). ADDITIVE-ONLY: a per-entry setting MAY raise the assurance required of this subject above the maintainer's system-wide floor, but MUST NOT lower it. The maintainer resolves the effective requirement as the strictest of (system floor, this entry).
-   */
-  stepUp?: {
-    /**
-     * VID authorized to ratify step-up for this subject — the `recipient` the maintainer addresses an auth/step-up/approve-request to (e.g. the holder's mobile authenticator or browser companion). Absent → the subject is its own approver (mode `self`) when it holds a usable authenticator; if neither an `approver` nor a self authenticator exists, no step-up method is available for this subject and the maintainer's fail-closed rule applies.
-     */
-    approver?: string;
-    /**
-     * Minimum step-up mode this subject MUST satisfy for gated operations, raising the system floor. `self` = the subject re-authenticates its own session; `delegated` = a separate `approver` MUST ratify. Omitted → the system floor applies unchanged. A value weaker than the resolved floor is ignored (additive-only).
-     */
-    require?: "self" | "delegated";
-  };
-  /**
-   * Approve-authority: what this subject may **confer on others** by ratifying an approval, as distinct from `scopes`, which is what it may **exercise itself**. The two axes are independent, and that independence is the point — it is what lets a maintainer configure a least-privilege approver who can authorize an operation in a scope it has no authority to perform.
-   *
-   * OMISSION MEANS NOTHING IS CONFERRED. An absent `approve`, an absent `all`, and an empty `scopes` are all equivalent to "this subject may ratify nothing". A consumer that does not implement this member therefore confers less than the producer intended rather than more, which is the direction a missed member has to fail in.
-   *
-   * A subject with approve-authority is NOT thereby authorized to act. Consumers MUST resolve the two axes separately: reading `approve` to answer "may this party ratify X" and `scopes` to answer "may this party do X". Collapsing them grants an approver the ability to perform what it was only meant to sign off on.
-   */
-  approve?: {
-    /**
-     * The subject may confer ANY scope. Takes precedence over `scopes`, which a consumer MUST ignore when this is true. Absent or false → only the scopes listed below, if any.
-     */
-    all?: boolean;
-    /**
-     * Opaque scope identifiers this subject may confer, drawn from the same vocabulary as the entry's own `scopes`. Where a maintainer's scopes are hierarchical, conferring a scope confers its descendants — the same containment rule the maintainer already applies to `scopes`, so the two axes cannot disagree about what a scope means. An empty array confers nothing; it is not a wildcard.
-     */
-    scopes?: string[];
-  };
-  ext?: Ext1;
-}
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1. Reverse-DNS-namespaced; consumers MUST ignore unrecognized namespaces.
- */
-export interface Ext1 {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
-}
-/**
- * Ecosystem-defined extension members per SPEC.md §4.5.1.
- */
-export interface Ext2 {
-  [k: string]: unknown | undefined;
+  ext?: Ext;
 }
 
+/** Shared definitions this specification references, re-exported under the names it used to declare them with. */
+export type { AclEntry, Ext };
+
 /** Trust Task type URI. */
 export const TYPE_URI = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/acl/revoke/0.1" as const;