@openvtc/pnm-core 0.1.0

package/dist/vault/list.js

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+// Vault — list (M1).
+//
+// Posts a `https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/list/0.1` envelope to the VTA's
+// trust-task dispatcher (`POST /api/trust-tasks`) and returns the metadata
+// view of stored credentials. Read-only — secret material never crosses the
+// wire (it's only released by `vault/release/0.1`, which lands in M2).
+//
+// Authentication: the wallet authcrypts a `atm/1.0/authenticate` DIDComm
+// message to the VTA's keyAgreement key (same primitive `swapAclRest` uses)
+// to obtain a short-lived bearer token, then attaches the token to the
+// trust-tasks POST. No token caching in M1 — every list call does a fresh
+// auth round-trip. Caching can land in M2 alongside vault/sync.
+//
+// Holder authentication: the wallet's holder did:peer must be in the VTA's
+// ACL (placed there by the M0.7 swap-acl flow) and must carry the derived
+// `VaultRead` capability — Admin / Initiator / Application / Reader pass;
+// Monitor is denied.
+import { packAuthcrypt } from "../didcomm/index.js";
+const TASK_VAULT_LIST_0_1 = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/list/0.1";
+const TASK_VAULT_LIST_0_1_RESPONSE = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/list/0.1#response";
+const VTA_AUTHENTICATE = "https://affinidi.com/atm/1.0/authenticate";
+/**
+ * Authenticate to the VTA over REST + DIDComm-authcrypt, then post the
+ * canonical vault/list/0.1 Trust Task envelope and return the parsed
+ * entries. Single round-trip's worth of auth — no token cache in M1.
+ */
+export async function vaultListRest(opts) {
+    const { baseUrl, holder, service, filter } = opts;
+    const f = opts.fetch ?? fetch.bind(globalThis);
+    const base = baseUrl.replace(/\/+$/, "");
+    // 1. /auth/challenge → flat { challenge, sessionId, expiresAt } per
+    //    `vti_common::auth::handlers::challenge::ChallengeResponse`. Fields
+    //    are top-level, NOT nested under a `data` envelope.
+    const cRes = await f(`${base}/auth/challenge`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/json" },
+        body: JSON.stringify({ did: holder.did }),
+    });
+    if (!cRes.ok) {
+        throw new Error(`vta /auth/challenge failed (${cRes.status}): ${await cRes.text()}`);
+    }
+    const cBody = (await cRes.json());
+    if (!cBody.sessionId || !cBody.challenge) {
+        throw new Error(`vta /auth/challenge: malformed response: ${JSON.stringify(cBody)}`);
+    }
+    // 2. Authcrypt an `atm/1.0/authenticate` message to the VTA.
+    const authMsg = {
+        id: globalThis.crypto.randomUUID(),
+        type: VTA_AUTHENTICATE,
+        from: holder.did,
+        to: [service.did],
+        body: { challenge: cBody.challenge, session_id: cBody.sessionId },
+    };
+    const packed = await packAuthcrypt(authMsg, holder, [
+        { kid: service.keyAgreementKid, jwk: service.keyAgreementPublicJwk },
+    ]);
+    // 3. POST the packed JWE to /auth/ → AuthenticateResponse with
+    //    { session, tokens: { accessToken, ... } } per vta-sdk's
+    //    `protocols::auth::AuthenticateResponse`. Tokens are nested under
+    //    `tokens`, NOT `data`.
+    const aRes = await f(`${base}/auth/`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/didcomm-encrypted+json" },
+        body: packed,
+    });
+    if (!aRes.ok) {
+        throw new Error(`vta /auth/ failed (${aRes.status}): ${await aRes.text()}`);
+    }
+    const aBody = (await aRes.json());
+    const accessToken = aBody.tokens?.accessToken;
+    if (!accessToken) {
+        throw new Error(`vta /auth/: malformed response: ${JSON.stringify(aBody)}`);
+    }
+    // 4. POST /api/trust-tasks with the vault/list/0.1 envelope.
+    const envelope = {
+        id: globalThis.crypto.randomUUID(),
+        type: TASK_VAULT_LIST_0_1,
+        issuer: holder.did,
+        recipient: service.did,
+        issuedAt: new Date().toISOString(),
+        payload: filter ?? {},
+    };
+    const tRes = await f(`${base}/api/trust-tasks`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        headers: {
+            "content-type": "application/json",
+            authorization: `Bearer ${accessToken}`,
+        },
+        body: JSON.stringify(envelope),
+    });
+    if (!tRes.ok) {
+        throw new Error(`vta /api/trust-tasks vault/list failed (${tRes.status}): ${await tRes.text()}`);
+    }
+    const tBody = (await tRes.json());
+    if (tBody.type !== TASK_VAULT_LIST_0_1_RESPONSE) {
+        throw new Error(`vault/list: unexpected response type ${tBody.type ?? "(none)"} — ${JSON.stringify(tBody)}`);
+    }
+    const entries = tBody.payload?.entries ?? [];
+    return {
+        entries,
+        truncated: tBody.payload?.truncated ?? false,
+        ...(tBody.payload?.cursor ? { cursor: tBody.payload.cursor } : {}),
+        ...(tBody.payload?.redactedFields ? { redactedFields: tBody.payload.redactedFields } : {}),
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=list.js.map

package/dist/vault/list.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/vault/proxy-login.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+import { type Identity } from "../didcomm/index.js";
+import type { SiteTarget } from "./list.js";
+import { type VtaAuthInputs } from "./transport.js";
+/** Refresh hint the maintainer attaches to the SessionBlob — the holder
+ *  uses this to decide whether to background-refresh, refresh on 401, or
+ *  wait for the maintainer to drive renewal. Mirrors
+ *  `vault/_shared/0.1/session-blob#/$defs/RefreshHint`. */
+export type SessionRefreshHint = "maintainer-only" | "on-401" | "before-expiry";
+/** A single cookie returned in a SessionBlob. Mirrors
+ *  `vault/_shared/0.1/session-blob#/$defs/CookieJarEntry`. */
+export interface SessionCookie {
+    name: string;
+    value: string;
+    domain: string;
+    path: string;
+    /** RFC 3339 — cookie's own expiry as the third party set it. The
+     *  holder MUST treat the blob-level `expiresAt` as an outer bound
+     *  regardless of this field. */
+    expires?: string;
+    secure?: boolean;
+    httpOnly?: boolean;
+    sameSite?: "Strict" | "Lax" | "None";
+}
+/** A request header the holder attaches to outbound requests to the
+ *  bound origin. Typically `Authorization: Bearer <id_token>` for the
+ *  SIOP path. */
+export interface SessionHeader {
+    name: string;
+    value: string;
+}
+/** A storage entry (localStorage / sessionStorage) the holder writes
+ *  into the bound origin. */
+export interface SessionStorageItem {
+    key: string;
+    value: string;
+}
+/** The cleartext payload of a successful `vault/proxy-login/0.1`
+ *  response. Mirrors `vault/_shared/0.1/session-blob`. */
+export interface SessionBlob {
+    /** Maintainer-assigned opaque id. Echoed at the response root for
+     *  audit logging without unsealing. */
+    sessionId: string;
+    /** RFC 3339. Holder MUST discard the blob at this time. */
+    expiresAt: string;
+    cookies?: SessionCookie[];
+    headers?: SessionHeader[];
+    localStorage?: SessionStorageItem[];
+    sessionStorage?: SessionStorageItem[];
+    /** Web origin this session is for. Holder MUST refuse to inject the
+     *  session into any other origin. Absent only for pure-DIDComm RPs
+     *  (no browser origin to bind to). */
+    bindOrigin?: string;
+    refreshHint?: SessionRefreshHint;
+}
+export interface VaultProxyLoginRestOptions extends VtaAuthInputs {
+    entryId: string;
+    /** When the entry has multiple targets, names which one to log in
+     *  against. The maintainer falls back to the entry's first DID-shaped
+     *  or web-origin target if omitted. */
+    target?: SiteTarget;
+    /** Caller-supplied nonce, embedded verbatim by the maintainer as the
+     *  SIOP id_token's `nonce` claim. The canonical use is threading the
+     *  RP's `/auth/challenge` value through so the resulting id_token
+     *  passes the RP's exact-match nonce check. Drivers without a nonce
+     *  concept (Password POST, OAuth refresh) ignore. Bounded
+     *  `[1, 512]` chars by the canonical schema; longer values would fail
+     *  server-side validation. */
+    nonce?: string;
+    /** Caller-supplied TTL ceiling in seconds; the maintainer caps further.
+     *  Honoured up to the server's cap (300 s in M2B.2b). */
+    ttlSecondsHint?: number;
+}
+export interface VaultProxyLoginResponse {
+    /** Cleartext session material. The caller MUST schedule a wipe at
+     *  `expiresAt` and MUST NOT inject the session into any origin other
+     *  than `sessionBlob.bindOrigin`. */
+    sessionBlob: SessionBlob;
+    /** Mirrors `sessionBlob.sessionId` — exposed for audit logging before
+     *  unsealing. */
+    sessionId: string;
+    /** Mirrors `sessionBlob.expiresAt`. */
+    expiresAt: string;
+}
+/**
+ * Ask the VTA to perform a login at the bound third party using the
+ * vault entry's secret material; receive an authcrypt-sealed
+ * `SessionBlob` (cookies / headers) that lets the holder operate the
+ * resulting session WITHOUT ever holding the long-term credential.
+ *
+ * The unpacked SessionBlob is returned in plaintext — callers MUST:
+ *   1. Schedule a wipe at `expiresAt` (setTimeout in the popup; the
+ *      countdown pattern in `vault/release` is the reference).
+ *   2. Refuse to inject the session into any origin other than
+ *      `sessionBlob.bindOrigin` (the holder's content script / DNR
+ *      rules enforce this — @openvtc/pnm-core is browser-agnostic and only
+ *      surfaces the constraint).
+ */
+export declare function vaultProxyLoginRest(opts: VaultProxyLoginRestOptions): Promise<VaultProxyLoginResponse>;
+export type { Identity };
+//# sourceMappingURL=proxy-login.d.ts.map

package/dist/vault/proxy-login.d.ts.map

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package/dist/vault/proxy-login.js

@@ -0,0 +1,106 @@
+// Vault — proxy-login (M2B.3).
+//
+// Posts a `https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/proxy-login/0.1` envelope.
+// The VTA performs the login at the bound third-party site on the
+// holder's behalf, returns a `SessionBlob` (cookies + headers needed to
+// operate the resulting session) inside a `didcomm-authcrypt` JWE, and
+// the holder unpacks it locally — exactly the same outer machinery as
+// `vault/release`, just with a `SessionBlob` cleartext payload instead
+// of a `VaultSecret`.
+//
+// The long-term credential (the entry's password, DID signing key, or
+// OAuth refresh token) never leaves the VTA in this flow. The holder
+// only ever sees the short-lived session material — a SIOPv2 id_token
+// for DID-self-issued entries (M2B.2b), a cookie jar for Password POST
+// (M2B.5), etc.
+//
+// Callers MUST treat the returned `sessionBlob` like a release secret:
+// in-memory only, wiped no later than `expiresAt`. The maintainer caps
+// `expiresAt` server-side; the wallet honours it via a setTimeout that
+// clears the in-memory copy.
+//
+// M2B.3 implements the response side; the actual injection of cookies /
+// headers into the page lives in the extension (declarativeNetRequest
+// for headers, chrome.cookies.set for cookies) — those bindings live in
+// the extension layer because @openvtc/pnm-core is browser-agnostic.
+import { unpackMessage } from "../didcomm/index.js";
+import { getVtaBearer, postTrustTask } from "./transport.js";
+const TASK_VAULT_PROXY_LOGIN = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/proxy-login/0.1";
+const TASK_VAULT_PROXY_LOGIN_RESPONSE = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/proxy-login/0.1#response";
+/**
+ * Ask the VTA to perform a login at the bound third party using the
+ * vault entry's secret material; receive an authcrypt-sealed
+ * `SessionBlob` (cookies / headers) that lets the holder operate the
+ * resulting session WITHOUT ever holding the long-term credential.
+ *
+ * The unpacked SessionBlob is returned in plaintext — callers MUST:
+ *   1. Schedule a wipe at `expiresAt` (setTimeout in the popup; the
+ *      countdown pattern in `vault/release` is the reference).
+ *   2. Refuse to inject the session into any origin other than
+ *      `sessionBlob.bindOrigin` (the holder's content script / DNR
+ *      rules enforce this — @openvtc/pnm-core is browser-agnostic and only
+ *      surfaces the constraint).
+ */
+export async function vaultProxyLoginRest(opts) {
+    const bearer = await getVtaBearer({
+        baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,
+        holder: opts.holder,
+        service: opts.service,
+        ...(opts.fetch ? { fetch: opts.fetch } : {}),
+    });
+    const wire = await postTrustTask({
+        baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,
+        bearer,
+        envelope: {
+            type: TASK_VAULT_PROXY_LOGIN,
+            payload: {
+                entryId: opts.entryId,
+                ...(opts.target !== undefined ? { target: opts.target } : {}),
+                ...(opts.nonce !== undefined ? { nonce: opts.nonce } : {}),
+                ...(opts.ttlSecondsHint !== undefined
+                    ? { ttlSecondsHint: opts.ttlSecondsHint }
+                    : {}),
+            },
+            issuer: opts.holder.did,
+            recipient: opts.service.did,
+        },
+        expectedResponseType: TASK_VAULT_PROXY_LOGIN_RESPONSE,
+        operationLabel: "vault/proxy-login/0.1",
+        ...(opts.fetch ? { fetch: opts.fetch } : {}),
+    });
+    if (wire.sealedSessionBlob.envelope !== "didcomm-authcrypt") {
+        throw new Error(`vault/proxy-login: unsupported envelope ${wire.sealedSessionBlob.envelope} — this wallet only understands didcomm-authcrypt`);
+    }
+    // The VTA authcrypts the SessionBlob to the holder; the unpacker
+    // needs the VTA's keyAgreement public JWK to verify the sender
+    // binding (the `skid` in the JWE's protected header). Without it,
+    // vti-didcomm-js raises "sender.publicJwk required for authcrypt".
+    // The service endpoint structure carries the resolved VTA pubkey
+    // from the holder's onboarding handshake.
+    const unpacked = await unpackMessage({
+        input: wire.sealedSessionBlob.jwe,
+        sender_public_jwk: opts.service.keyAgreementPublicJwk,
+    }, opts.holder);
+    if (unpacked.kind !== "encrypted") {
+        throw new Error(`vault/proxy-login: unpacked JWE was not authcrypt-encrypted (kind=${unpacked.kind})`);
+    }
+    // Defence-in-depth: anoncrypt-only would be a downgrade — the VTA
+    // MUST authenticate as the signer so a relay can't substitute a
+    // different SessionBlob.
+    if (!unpacked.authenticated) {
+        throw new Error("vault/proxy-login: unpacked JWE was not authenticated (anoncrypt downgrade)");
+    }
+    const body = unpacked.message.body;
+    if (!body || typeof body !== "object") {
+        throw new Error("vault/proxy-login: unpacked DIDComm message has no body");
+    }
+    // Cast at the wire boundary — the server has already canonical-schema-
+    // validated the SessionBlob shape before sealing it.
+    const sessionBlob = body;
+    return {
+        sessionBlob,
+        sessionId: wire.sessionId,
+        expiresAt: wire.expiresAt,
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=proxy-login.js.map

package/dist/vault/proxy-login.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/vault/release.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import { type Identity } from "../didcomm/index.js";
+import type { SecretKind } from "./list.js";
+import { type VtaAuthInputs } from "./transport.js";
+import type { VaultSecret } from "./upsert.js";
+export interface VaultReleaseRestOptions extends VtaAuthInputs {
+    entryId: string;
+    /** Caller's preferred cache TTL in seconds. The maintainer caps
+     *  server-side (M2A.3 ceiling is 60 s); honoured up to the cap. */
+    ttlSecondsHint?: number;
+}
+export interface VaultReleaseResponse {
+    /** Unpacked secret material. Caller MUST wipe / zero this reference
+     *  no later than `ttlSeconds` after the release call returned. */
+    secret: VaultSecret;
+    /** Maintainer-declared discriminator — mirrors `secret.kind`. */
+    secretKind: SecretKind;
+    /** Enforced cache TTL. Already capped by the maintainer; the caller
+     *  MUST honour it. */
+    ttlSeconds: number;
+}
+/**
+ * Release the cleartext secret material of a vault entry. The
+ * maintainer authcrypts the secret to the holder's keyAgreement key;
+ * this helper unpacks the resulting JWE locally.
+ *
+ * The unpacked secret is returned in plaintext — callers MUST schedule
+ * a wipe at `ttlSeconds` (e.g. via `setTimeout`) and MUST NOT persist
+ * the cleartext beyond that window (no disk, no logs, no syncing
+ * storage).
+ */
+export declare function vaultReleaseRest(opts: VaultReleaseRestOptions): Promise<VaultReleaseResponse>;
+export type { Identity };
+//# sourceMappingURL=release.d.ts.map

package/dist/vault/release.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/vault/release.js

@@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
+// Vault — release (M2A.5).
+//
+// Posts a `https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/release/0.1` envelope and
+// unpacks the maintainer's authcrypt-sealed response into the cleartext
+// `VaultSecret`. The secret bytes only ever live in the holder's local
+// memory for the duration of the `ttlSeconds` the maintainer caps; the
+// caller MUST wipe them at TTL even if the user hasn't finished
+// interacting (in practice: a `setTimeout` that clears the popup's
+// "reveal" state).
+import { unpackMessage } from "../didcomm/index.js";
+import { getVtaBearer, postTrustTask } from "./transport.js";
+const TASK_VAULT_RELEASE = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/release/0.1";
+const TASK_VAULT_RELEASE_RESPONSE = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/release/0.1#response";
+/**
+ * Release the cleartext secret material of a vault entry. The
+ * maintainer authcrypts the secret to the holder's keyAgreement key;
+ * this helper unpacks the resulting JWE locally.
+ *
+ * The unpacked secret is returned in plaintext — callers MUST schedule
+ * a wipe at `ttlSeconds` (e.g. via `setTimeout`) and MUST NOT persist
+ * the cleartext beyond that window (no disk, no logs, no syncing
+ * storage).
+ */
+export async function vaultReleaseRest(opts) {
+    const bearer = await getVtaBearer({
+        baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,
+        holder: opts.holder,
+        service: opts.service,
+        ...(opts.fetch ? { fetch: opts.fetch } : {}),
+    });
+    const wire = await postTrustTask({
+        baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,
+        bearer,
+        envelope: {
+            type: TASK_VAULT_RELEASE,
+            payload: {
+                entryId: opts.entryId,
+                ...(opts.ttlSecondsHint !== undefined
+                    ? { ttlSecondsHint: opts.ttlSecondsHint }
+                    : {}),
+            },
+            issuer: opts.holder.did,
+            recipient: opts.service.did,
+        },
+        expectedResponseType: TASK_VAULT_RELEASE_RESPONSE,
+        operationLabel: "vault/release/0.1",
+        ...(opts.fetch ? { fetch: opts.fetch } : {}),
+    });
+    if (wire.sealedSecret.envelope !== "didcomm-authcrypt") {
+        throw new Error(`vault/release: unsupported envelope ${wire.sealedSecret.envelope} — this wallet only understands didcomm-authcrypt`);
+    }
+    // The VTA authcrypts the secret to the holder; the unpacker needs
+    // the VTA's keyAgreement public JWK to verify the sender binding.
+    // Same shape as vault/proxy-login — see that file for the longer
+    // explanation. Latent in this file since M2A.3 (release was never
+    // end-to-end tested with a real VTA before M2B.4 demos exposed
+    // the failure on the parallel proxy-login path).
+    const unpacked = await unpackMessage({
+        input: wire.sealedSecret.jwe,
+        sender_public_jwk: opts.service.keyAgreementPublicJwk,
+    }, opts.holder);
+    if (unpacked.kind !== "encrypted") {
+        throw new Error(`vault/release: unpacked JWE was not authcrypt-encrypted (kind=${unpacked.kind})`);
+    }
+    // Defence-in-depth: the unpacked message MUST be authenticated (the
+    // VTA's signature verified) — anoncrypt-only would be a downgrade.
+    if (!unpacked.authenticated) {
+        throw new Error("vault/release: unpacked JWE was not authenticated (anoncrypt downgrade)");
+    }
+    // The cleartext body IS the VaultSecret JSON. Cast it directly — the
+    // server-side validation already ensured the variant discriminator
+    // matches `secretKind`.
+    const body = unpacked.message.body;
+    if (!body || typeof body !== "object") {
+        throw new Error("vault/release: unpacked DIDComm message has no body");
+    }
+    return {
+        secret: body,
+        secretKind: wire.secretKind,
+        ttlSeconds: wire.ttlSeconds,
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=release.js.map

package/dist/vault/release.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/vault/sign-trust-task.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+import { type VtaAuthInputs } from "./transport.js";
+import type { TrustTaskEnvelope } from "../trust-tasks/sign.js";
+export interface VaultSignTrustTaskRestOptions extends VtaAuthInputs {
+    /** Identifier of the vault entry whose principal will sign. MUST
+     *  point at a `did-self-issued` or `didcomm-peer` entry — other
+     *  kinds reject with `vault/sign-trust-task:not_signable`. */
+    entryId: string;
+    /** The Trust Task document to sign. MUST have no `proof` field.
+     *  MUST set `issuer = <entry.principalDid>`. The VTA refuses to
+     *  silently rewrite issuer (`envelope_issuer_mismatch`). */
+    unsignedEnvelope: TrustTaskEnvelope;
+}
+export interface VaultSignTrustTaskResponse {
+    /** The supplied envelope with a `proof` field attached.
+     *  `proof.verificationMethod = <principalDid>#<signingKeyId>`;
+     *  `proof.cryptosuite = "eddsa-jcs-2022"`;
+     *  `proof.proofPurpose = "assertionMethod"`. */
+    signedEnvelope: TrustTaskEnvelope;
+}
+/**
+ * Ask the VTA to sign a Trust Task envelope as the principal of a
+ * vault entry. The returned `signedEnvelope` is byte-identical to
+ * the input except for the attached `proof` field.
+ */
+export declare function vaultSignTrustTaskRest(opts: VaultSignTrustTaskRestOptions): Promise<VaultSignTrustTaskResponse>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=sign-trust-task.d.ts.map

package/dist/vault/sign-trust-task.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/vault/sign-trust-task.js

@@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
+// Vault — sign-trust-task.
+//
+// Posts a `https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/sign-trust-task/0.1`
+// envelope. The VTA attaches an eddsa-jcs-2022 Data Integrity proof
+// to the supplied envelope, signing as the principal DID of a
+// `did-self-issued` or `didcomm-peer` vault entry. The long-term
+// signing key never leaves the VTA.
+//
+// This is the per-envelope signing complement to `vault/proxy-login`:
+// proxy-login mints a session credential at session-start; sign-trust-
+// task signs individual follow-up tasks during that session so the
+// RP's `proof.verificationMethod == authenticated session DID` check
+// passes.
+//
+// Unlike `vault/release` / `vault/proxy-login`, the response is NOT
+// authcrypt-sealed — the signed envelope is destined for the RP
+// (which has to be able to verify it anyway) and carries no
+// long-term secret material. The proof itself is the only sensitive
+// output, and it's deliberately public.
+import { postTrustTask, getVtaBearer } from "./transport.js";
+const TASK_VAULT_SIGN_TRUST_TASK = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/sign-trust-task/0.1";
+const TASK_VAULT_SIGN_TRUST_TASK_RESPONSE = "https://trusttasks.org/spec/vault/sign-trust-task/0.1#response";
+/**
+ * Ask the VTA to sign a Trust Task envelope as the principal of a
+ * vault entry. The returned `signedEnvelope` is byte-identical to
+ * the input except for the attached `proof` field.
+ */
+export async function vaultSignTrustTaskRest(opts) {
+    const bearer = await getVtaBearer({
+        baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,
+        holder: opts.holder,
+        service: opts.service,
+        ...(opts.fetch ? { fetch: opts.fetch } : {}),
+    });
+    const wire = await postTrustTask({
+        baseUrl: opts.baseUrl,
+        bearer,
+        envelope: {
+            type: TASK_VAULT_SIGN_TRUST_TASK,
+            payload: {
+                entryId: opts.entryId,
+                unsignedEnvelope: opts.unsignedEnvelope,
+            },
+            issuer: opts.holder.did,
+            recipient: opts.service.did,
+        },
+        expectedResponseType: TASK_VAULT_SIGN_TRUST_TASK_RESPONSE,
+        operationLabel: "vault/sign-trust-task/0.1",
+        ...(opts.fetch ? { fetch: opts.fetch } : {}),
+    });
+    return { signedEnvelope: wire.signedEnvelope };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=sign-trust-task.js.map

package/dist/vault/sign-trust-task.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/vault/transport.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
+import { type Identity } from "../didcomm/index.js";
+import type { RemoteDidcommEndpoint } from "../vta/didcomm.js";
+export interface VtaAuthInputs {
+    /** VTA REST base URL — from the connection state's `restBaseUrl`. */
+    baseUrl: string;
+    /** Authcrypt sender — the holder's DIDComm identity post-onboarding. */
+    holder: Identity;
+    /** VTA's keyAgreement endpoint (resolved via `resolveKeyAgreement`). */
+    service: RemoteDidcommEndpoint;
+    /** fetch impl (defaults to global). */
+    fetch?: typeof fetch;
+}
+/**
+ * Run /auth/challenge → authcrypt /auth/ → bearer token. The token's
+ * 15-minute TTL is more than enough for a single trust-task POST; we
+ * don't cache because the next vault op happens whenever the user
+ * clicks something and would likely fall outside the cache window.
+ */
+export declare function getVtaBearer(opts: VtaAuthInputs): Promise<string>;
+export interface VaultTaskRequest {
+    /** Trust Task type URI (matches the request URI in the canonical spec). */
+    type: string;
+    /** Payload object — task-specific shape. */
+    payload: unknown;
+    /** Optional issuer DID; set when the consumer signs a `proof`. */
+    issuer?: string;
+    /** Optional recipient DID — the maintainer's DID. Audience-binds the doc. */
+    recipient?: string;
+}
+export interface PostTrustTaskOpts<R> {
+    baseUrl: string;
+    bearer: string;
+    envelope: VaultTaskRequest;
+    /** Expected response `type` URI (the `<request>#response` form). */
+    expectedResponseType: string;
+    fetch?: typeof fetch;
+    /** Internal: used to enrich error messages. */
+    operationLabel?: string;
+}
+/**
+ * POST an authenticated Trust Task envelope to /api/trust-tasks. The
+ * framework's dispatcher returns either a `<task>#response` document
+ * (success) or a `trust-task-error/0.1` document (reject). This helper
+ * differentiates the two: success returns the parsed `payload` cast as
+ * `R`; reject throws an `Error` carrying the framework's error code +
+ * comment so callers see "vault/upsert:version_conflict — ..." rather
+ * than a raw 400.
+ */
+export declare function postTrustTask<R>(opts: PostTrustTaskOpts<R>): Promise<R>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=transport.d.ts.map

package/dist/vault/transport.d.ts.map

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