@openrig/cli 0.5.0 → 0.5.2

package/node_modules/@openrig/daemon/dist/domain/queue-repository.js

@@ -0,0 +1,1876 @@
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { loadHumanRegistry } from "./gateway/human-registry.js";
+import { resolveExternal } from "./gateway/external-admission.js";
+import { QueueTransitionLog } from "./queue-transition-log.js";
+import { WAKE_INTENT_PREFIX } from "./outbox-handler.js";
+import { wrapPaneEnvelope } from "../lib/pane-envelope.js";
+import { getSelfHostId } from "./hosts/fanout-contract.js";
+import { parseSessionName } from "./session-name.js";
+import { computeClosureRequiredAt, validateClosure, } from "./hot-potato-enforcer.js";
+import { isHumanSeatSession, validateHumanPark, validateHumanRoute } from "./human-route-enforcer.js";
+export const QUEUE_STATES = [
+    "pending",
+    "in-progress",
+    "done",
+    "blocked",
+    "failed",
+    "denied",
+    "canceled",
+    "handed-off",
+];
+/** OPR.0.4.6.FS-1 (W2 P1): the queue's terminal state set, named ONCE. The
+ *  archiver (queue-retention.ts) AND the inline closure guards below all consume
+ *  THIS predicate, so a future terminal-state addition can never silently
+ *  diverge the archiver from the queue (arch D3-REFINEMENT P1; widen-never-sibling).
+ *  `['done','handed-off']` is the full terminal set — workflow step closures exit
+ *  `handoff -> state=handed-off`, the highest-volume terminal class. The `satisfies`
+ *  clause is the compile guard: removing a state from QUEUE_STATES fails here. */
+export const TERMINAL_QUEUE_STATES = ["done", "handed-off"];
+export function isTerminalState(state) {
+    return TERMINAL_QUEUE_STATES.includes(state);
+}
+/** 0.5.1-53 — the ACTIVE (still-progressing) states. A blocker is "live" iff active; any other
+ *  state (done/handed-off/canceled/denied/failed) means the block will never lift. This is DISTINCT
+ *  from the archiver's TERMINAL_QUEUE_STATES (done/handed-off) — a narrower concept — so it is named
+ *  separately and derived from QUEUE_STATES (the `satisfies` guard fails if a state is removed). */
+export const ACTIVE_QUEUE_STATES = ["pending", "in-progress", "blocked"];
+export function isBlockerLive(state) {
+    return ACTIVE_QUEUE_STATES.includes(state);
+}
+/** 0.5.1-53 Atom 1a — typed non-qitem gate blocker prefixes. A park may be gated on a fold / auth /
+ *  external condition that is NOT a qitem and NOT a human seat; these prefixes make such a gate a
+ *  first-class, compact-visible, downstream-classifiable blocker (the ruling detail rides a transition). */
+export const TYPED_GATE_BLOCKER_PREFIXES = ["fold:", "auth:", "external:"];
+export function typedGateBlockerPrefix(value) {
+    return TYPED_GATE_BLOCKER_PREFIXES.find((p) => value.startsWith(p)) ?? null;
+}
+/** A well-formed typed gate blocker: a recognized prefix AND a non-empty gate body. */
+export function isTypedGateBlocker(value) {
+    if (typeof value !== "string")
+        return false;
+    const p = typedGateBlockerPrefix(value);
+    return p != null && value.slice(p.length).trim().length > 0;
+}
+/**
+ * 0.5.1-54 DR-1 (classifier fold, PM ruling qitem-20260811163927-74493d76) — classify a create-path
+ * nudge FAILURE so the surfaced count becomes ACTIONABLE (constraint iii). Two classes:
+ *   - "permanent-topology": the destination is not resolvable on THIS daemon (the nudge can never
+ *     succeed here — a local-registry lookup reporting "not found" for a seat that lives on another
+ *     daemon). Retrying is a guaranteed-permanent failure repeated on a schedule → NOT retryable;
+ *     these belong to the ADDRESSING family, not to retry machinery. (The live corpus: 9/10 strands.)
+ *   - "transient": a live, resolvable seat that refused THIS attempt (busy at an interactive prompt) or
+ *     the attempt timed out — the only class a future bounded re-attempt (DR-2, held n=1) would touch.
+ *   - "unknown": a failure whose text matches NEITHER known pattern. NOT silently defaulted to transient
+ *     (ship-block ruling qitem-20260811170941-5eadb968): defaulting would assert "a live seat refused
+ *     this attempt" for a string that only means "did not match the permanent pattern" — two different
+ *     claims. An unknown must read as unknown (the same rule the ACTIVITY hookless=unknown ruling names);
+ *     a default that collapses unknown into a known class is the exact sin, mirrored.
+ * Returns null when `lastNudgeResult` is not a recorded failure (`failed:%`).
+ *
+ * Each class is a POSITIVE match — there is no default class. DR-2 (retry) stays HELD at n=1; this is
+ * READ-side labeling only, making the strand's nature legible (addressing-fix vs retry vs triage-the-unknown).
+ */
+export function classifyNudgeFailure(lastNudgeResult) {
+    if (typeof lastNudgeResult !== "string" || !lastNudgeResult.startsWith("failed:"))
+        return null;
+    // permanent-topology: local-registry "not found" — the destination is not resolvable on THIS daemon.
+    if (/\bnot found\b/i.test(lastNudgeResult))
+        return "permanent-topology";
+    // transient: a live seat refused this attempt (busy at a prompt) or the attempt timed out.
+    if (/interactive prompt|\btimed?\s?out\b/i.test(lastNudgeResult))
+        return "transient";
+    // unknown: matched neither — do NOT collapse into transient. Honest label > convenient default.
+    return "unknown";
+}
+export const QUEUE_PRIORITIES = ["routine", "urgent", "critical"];
+export class QueueRepositoryError extends Error {
+    code;
+    meta;
+    constructor(code, message, meta) {
+        super(message);
+        this.code = code;
+        this.meta = meta;
+    }
+}
+/** OPR.0.4.6.WF5 (guard-named fix shape): exported so the workflow
+ *  domain can PREALLOCATE a gate packet's id — the class-(c) exception
+ *  identity tags need occurrence:<gatePacketId> ON the packet at create
+ *  (one item, tagged in its own create — never a second item, never a
+ *  post-create tag rewrite). The queue still mints ids for every caller
+ *  that does not preallocate. */
+export function newQitemId() {
+    const ts = new Date().toISOString().replace(/[-:T.Z]/g, "").slice(0, 14);
+    const hex = Math.floor(Math.random() * 0xffffffff)
+        .toString(16)
+        .padStart(8, "0");
+    return `qitem-${ts}-${hex}`;
+}
+/**
+ * OPR.0.4.6.MH3 Q-a: is this the SQLite PRIMARY KEY conflict on
+ * queue_items.qitem_id? better-sqlite3 sets `.code` on its SqliteError; the
+ * message check is a defensive twin so a driver-name change never silently
+ * turns an idempotent absorb into a 500.
+ */
+export function isQitemPrimaryKeyConflict(err) {
+    if (!(err instanceof Error))
+        return false;
+    const code = err.code ?? "";
+    if (code === "SQLITE_CONSTRAINT_PRIMARYKEY" || code === "SQLITE_CONSTRAINT_UNIQUE")
+        return true;
+    return /UNIQUE constraint failed: queue_items\.qitem_id/.test(err.message);
+}
+/**
+ * OPR.0.4.6.MH3 D-1 (FR-4/FR-5): the deterministic cross-host SUCCESSOR id.
+ *
+ * A cross-host handoff exposes no caller `--id`, so the successor's dedup
+ * identity must come from the operation itself: the id is a PURE, STATELESS
+ * function of (source qitemId, destination session, destination host). Same
+ * arguments → same id on every re-drive, across daemon restarts, with zero
+ * local state — so the origin-side PRIMARY KEY absorb (Q-a) converges every
+ * interrupted-close re-drive. Source→successor is 1:1 by construction (a
+ * closed source is terminal; nothing re-opens it). The `qitem-xh-` namespace
+ * makes collision with organic `qitem-<ts>-<hex>` ids structurally impossible
+ * (plan R-2). The compound key is JSON-encoded — no hand-rolled separators.
+ *
+ * n1 residual (arch-named, inherent to the ratified at-least-once/no-2PC
+ * fence — NOT a dedup bug): a re-drive naming a DIFFERENT destination before
+ * the source close lands is a NEW handoff decision and derives a DIFFERENT
+ * id, so it cannot absorb the earlier successor — that earlier successor can
+ * remain live on the target host. The chain_of_record + cross-host provenance
+ * tags keep such an orphan visible/traceable; the source-close conflict check
+ * surfaces the disagreement rather than overwriting it.
+ */
+export function deriveCrossHostSuccessorId(sourceQitemId, destinationSession, hostId) {
+    const digest = createHash("sha256")
+        .update(JSON.stringify([sourceQitemId, destinationSession, hostId]))
+        .digest("hex")
+        .slice(0, 16);
+    return `qitem-xh-${digest}`;
+}
+/** PL-007 — defensive column probe. Older test fixtures bypass the
+ *  canonical migration list, so target_repo may be absent. Mirrors
+ *  the `hasNodeColumn` pattern in rig-repository.ts. */
+function detectQueueColumn(db, columnName) {
+    try {
+        return db.prepare("PRAGMA table_info(queue_items)").all()
+            .some((row) => row.name === columnName);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+/**
+ * L3 — Queue repository. Owns CRUD over `queue_items` plus the wired-in
+ * append-only transition log and hot-potato strict-rejection contract.
+ *
+ * Pattern mirrors `chat-repository.ts` (single class, atomic transactions,
+ * persist-event-then-notify). Cross-rig validation hook is `validateRig` —
+ * Phase A wires no-op; Phase B can plug in the rig registry to reject
+ * phantom-rig destinations. POC compatibility: `qitem_id` shape preserved.
+ */
+// Reduced column set for compact list rows (body/summary/evidence_ref omitted →
+// rowToItem backfills them empty). Shared by `list` and `findOverdue` (Slice 15)
+// so the compact projection cannot drift between the two.
+const COMPACT_QUEUE_COLUMNS = "qitem_id, ts_created, ts_updated, source_session, destination_session, state, priority, tier, tags, blocked_on, handed_off_to, handed_off_from, expires_at, closure_reason, closure_target, closure_required_at, claimed_at, last_nudge_attempt, last_nudge_result, last_heartbeat, resolution, target_repo";
+export function stampSelfHostSuffix(session) {
+    if (session === undefined)
+        return undefined;
+    const selfId = getSelfHostId();
+    if (!selfId)
+        return session;
+    if (session.split("@").length !== 2)
+        return session; // not a bare member@rig — untouched
+    return `${session}@${selfId}`;
+}
+/**
+ * 51-09 increment 4b — additive TEACHING for the unknown_destination_rig refusal
+ * (arch ruling c9964404, mechanism ii). 3-part destinations ALREADY refuse (BR-1:
+ * member@rig@host greedy-folds to rig "rig@host", misses, rejects) — the code is
+ * UNCHANGED (C1). When the rejected destination's greedy-parsed rig token CONTAINS
+ * '@', return ADDITIVE structured fields (FR-7 precedent) teaching the out-of-band
+ * path: the split echo + a hint naming `--host`. C4: a SELF-suffixed destination
+ * names the self case and is NEVER auto-stripped/routed home (self-strip is option
+ * (i), routed to arch). Returns undefined for 2-part / non-canonical tokens (the
+ * refusal is byte-unchanged there). One helper, all four refusal sites (C2). Reads
+ * the FR-8 parse contract; the parse family stays byte-identical (C3).
+ */
+export function destinationRigTeaching(session) {
+    const parsed = parseSessionName(session);
+    if (parsed.kind !== "canonical" || !parsed.rig.includes("@"))
+        return undefined;
+    const at = parsed.rig.lastIndexOf("@");
+    const rig = parsed.rig.slice(0, at);
+    const host = parsed.rig.slice(at + 1);
+    const bare = `${parsed.member}@${rig}`;
+    const selfId = getSelfHostId();
+    const selfHost = !!selfId && host === selfId;
+    return {
+        destinationSplit: { member: parsed.member, rig, host },
+        selfHost,
+        hint: selfHost
+            ? `the host suffix '@${host}' is THIS host — the host never rides in the session string; resend the destination as ${bare}`
+            : `host does not ride in the session string; use --host ${host} with destination ${bare}`,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * M1 A4b — entity-level teaching for an UNREGISTERED <local>@external destination (the
+ * ENTITY half of proof-2; the DOMAIN half is the closed-set fall-through to
+ * unknown_destination_rig, A1/A2). A row addressed to a valid @external domain whose
+ * entity is not in the registry refuses LOUDLY with the structured teaching from the
+ * gateway resolver (how to register + "not an agent seat"). Loads the registry only for
+ * the (rare) @external refusal path. Undefined for non-@external / registered / scheme.
+ */
+export function externalAdmissionTeaching(session) {
+    const parsed = parseSessionName(session);
+    if (parsed.kind !== "external")
+        return undefined;
+    const reg = loadHumanRegistry();
+    const entities = reg.ok ? reg.entities.map((e) => ({ entityId: e.entityId, address: e.address })) : [];
+    const res = resolveExternal(parsed.local, entities);
+    if (res.kind !== "unregistered")
+        return undefined; // registered/scheme were admitted upstream
+    return { externalDomain: parsed.domain, unregisteredEntity: parsed.local, hint: res.error };
+}
+/** The refusal teaching for ANY rejected destination: the @external entity teaching
+ *  (A4b) OR the host-suffix teaching (4b). One helper, all four refusal sites. */
+export function destinationRefusalTeaching(session) {
+    return externalAdmissionTeaching(session) ?? destinationRigTeaching(session);
+}
+/**
+ * MF6: does a transport error/reason string denote a TIMEOUT (ambiguous — the
+ * send may have landed) rather than a definite failure? Used to classify a wake
+ * delivery as `indeterminate` vs `failed`.
+ */
+function isWakeTimeoutSignal(s) {
+    return !!s && /timeout|timed\s*out|etimedout/i.test(s);
+}
+export class QueueRepository {
+    db;
+    transitionLog;
+    eventBus;
+    validateRig;
+    transport;
+    /** W1 (transactional closure): the durable wake-intent store. A terminal act
+     *  (handoff / handoff-and-complete) stages an outbox intent row INSIDE its
+     *  db.transaction so close + transition + intent commit as one act or none;
+     *  the delivery drains from that committed intent afterward. Wired post-
+     *  construction by startup (dep-graph ordering, like transport).
+     *
+     *  ABSENT = the test/bootstrap path, and what that means differs by caller —
+     *  it is NOT a blanket best-effort fallback:
+     *   • a nudge-intended TERMINAL close+successor act FAILS CLOSED (MF2):
+     *     {@link assertTerminalClosureHasIntent} throws `wake_intent_store_unavailable`
+     *     rather than produce an executed-but-unwoken item (pass `nudge:false` for a
+     *     wake-less close);
+     *   • {@link deliverWakeForSuccessor} — and only it — falls back to the pre-W1
+     *     best-effort {@link maybeNudge} when no store is attached (P34 made that
+     *     fallback real code rather than a promise in a comment). */
+    outbox;
+    resolveOccupantGeneration;
+    /** PL-007 Workspace Primitive — true when migration 038 has applied the
+     *  queue_items.target_repo column. Older test fixtures that bypass the
+     *  canonical migration list don't have the column; INSERTs degrade to
+     *  the pre-PL-007 statement and target_repo input is silently dropped.
+     *  Production daemons always have the column (migration is in startup.ts). */
+    hasTargetRepoColumn;
+    hasSummaryColumn;
+    hasEvidenceRefColumn;
+    hasMintingGenColumn;
+    hasClaimedGenColumn;
+    /** OPR.0.4.6.WF3 FR-6 — injected by startup (never imported): the
+     *  workflow domain's is-live-frontier-packet predicate. */
+    workflowFrontierPredicate;
+    constructor(db, eventBus, opts) {
+        this.db = db;
+        this.eventBus = eventBus;
+        this.transitionLog = new QueueTransitionLog(db);
+        this.validateRig = opts?.validateRig ?? (() => true);
+        this.transport = opts?.transport;
+        this.workflowFrontierPredicate = opts?.workflowFrontierPredicate;
+        this.resolveOccupantGeneration = opts?.resolveOccupantGeneration;
+        this.hasTargetRepoColumn = detectQueueColumn(db, "target_repo");
+        this.hasSummaryColumn = detectQueueColumn(db, "summary");
+        this.hasEvidenceRefColumn = detectQueueColumn(db, "evidence_ref");
+        // GHOST-STAGE (e/Class-B): generation stamps (migration 063). Defensive detect so a pre-063
+        // harness degrades (writers skip the columns; the release predicate never matches unstamped rows).
+        this.hasMintingGenColumn = detectQueueColumn(db, "minting_generation_uuid");
+        this.hasClaimedGenColumn = detectQueueColumn(db, "claimed_by_generation_uuid");
+        // OPR.0.3.2.20 — register the EXACT human-seat regex predicate as
+        // a SQLite function so the attention query can apply the strict
+        // check BEFORE LIMIT. LIKE / GLOB patterns are supersets that
+        // would let malformed rows (e.g., 'human-@kernel' — empty name
+        // segment) occupy the LIMIT window and hide valid attention items
+        // behind them (guard re-verify-3 qitem-20260518193005 BLOCKER 1).
+        // better-sqlite3 db.function is idempotent; safe to call once at
+        // construction.
+        // OPR.0.4.4.19: single-source regex — the SQL function delegates to the
+        // human-route-enforcer's exported predicate so SQL-side and TS-side
+        // checks cannot drift.
+        db.function("is_human_seat_session", { deterministic: true }, (value) => isHumanSeatSession(value) ? 1 : 0);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Attach the wake-path transport AFTER construction. Used by daemon
+     * startup, where SessionTransport is constructed later in the dep graph
+     * than QueueRepository (because SessionTransport needs agentActivityStore
+     * which itself needs eventBus). Calling this is safe at any time; create /
+     * handoff / handoff-and-complete will start nudging on the next call.
+     */
+    attachTransport(transport) {
+        this.transport = transport;
+    }
+    /**
+     * W1 (transactional closure): attach the durable wake-intent store AFTER
+     * construction (same dep-graph reason as {@link attachTransport}). Once
+     * attached, handoff / handoff-and-complete stage an outbox intent row inside
+     * their terminal transaction, so the close and its wake intent are one commit.
+     */
+    attachOutbox(outbox) {
+        // MF2: the wake intent must commit INSIDE the terminal transaction, which is
+        // only true when the outbox writes on the SAME connection. An outbox backed by
+        // a different DB would let the intent survive a rolled-back close (or vice
+        // versa) — "neither one act nor none". Reject a split-DB outbox at wire time.
+        if (outbox.db !== this.db) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("outbox_db_mismatch", "attachOutbox requires an OutboxHandler bound to the SAME database connection as the queue repository — a split DB breaks the atomic close+intent seam");
+        }
+        this.outbox = outbox;
+    }
+    /**
+     * W1 (transactional closure) — the PUBLIC composable primitive (stage half).
+     * Stage the durable WAKE INTENT for a successor qitem from INSIDE a terminal
+     * act's `db.transaction` (the queue's own connection), so the intent commits
+     * atomically with the close + transition. Public + composable so any
+     * close+successor writer — handoff / handoff-and-complete today, Mission Control
+     * / Workflow via the P34 follow-on — can call it within its own transaction (the
+     * `createWithinTransaction` precedent), making that wiring pure EXTENSION, not
+     * rework. Pair with {@link assertTerminalClosureHasIntent}, run as the LAST
+     * statement of the same transaction.
+     *
+     * The pane nudge itself is a post-commit side effect (reversed-never — a pane
+     * write inside the txn would make the transaction lie); what is durable is this
+     * intent row, which the delivery drains afterward. Freezes the emitting envelope
+     * (MF4); idempotent by a deterministic outbox id keyed on the successor.
+     * `nudge:false` intends no wake ⇒ no intent. A missing outbox is enforced by the
+     * guard (fail-closed, MF2), not silently skipped here.
+     */
+    stageWakeIntent(successorQitemId, fromSession, toSession, identityProvenance, nudge) {
+        // No wake intended (nudge:false) ⇒ no durable intent to make durable. The
+        // W1-c guard is nudge-aware for the same reason: absence of an intent is a
+        // defect only when a wake WAS intended.
+        if (nudge === false)
+            return;
+        if (!this.outbox)
+            return;
+        // MF4: FREEZE the emitting envelope at stage time. Resolve the source occupant
+        // generation and build the full pane envelope NOW, and store it verbatim as the
+        // intent body. Delivery (immediate or crash-recovery) replays this exact text,
+        // so a recovery after a tenure swap can never relabel the wake with the CURRENT
+        // occupant's generation — it carries the generation that actually emitted it.
+        const bareBody = `Queue handoff: ${successorQitemId} - check your queue.`;
+        const stampISO = new Date().toISOString();
+        const genUuid = this.resolveOccupantGeneration?.(fromSession) ?? undefined;
+        const frozenEnvelope = wrapPaneEnvelope(fromSession, toSession, bareBody, getSelfHostId(), { stampISO, genUuid });
+        this.outbox.record({
+            outboxId: `${WAKE_INTENT_PREFIX}${successorQitemId}`,
+            senderSession: fromSession,
+            destinationSession: toSession,
+            body: frozenEnvelope,
+            auditPointer: successorQitemId,
+            identityProvenance: identityProvenance ?? null,
+        });
+    }
+    /**
+     * W1-c (transactional closure): the runtime SEAM GUARD. Called as the LAST
+     * statement inside a terminal act's db.transaction, it makes an
+     * executed-but-unwoken close UNWRITABLE: if this transaction wrote a terminal
+     * close AND a wake was intended, a durable wake intent for the successor MUST
+     * exist in the same transaction. If it does not, throw — the whole act rolls
+     * back at the seam, not at review.
+     *
+     * Nudge-aware: nudge:false intends no wake, so no intent is required. MF2:
+     * fail-closed when a wake IS intended but no intent store is attached (the
+     * guarantee is then impossible). PUBLIC composable primitive (guard half): any
+     * close+successor writer runs this as the LAST statement of its own transaction
+     * — handoff / handoff-and-complete today, Mission Control / Workflow via P34.
+     */
+    assertTerminalClosureHasIntent(sourceQitemId, successorQitemId, nudge) {
+        if (nudge === false)
+            return; // no wake intended ⇒ no intent required
+        // MF2: fail CLOSED. A nudge-intended terminal act with no intent store cannot
+        // make its wake durable, so the guarantee is impossible — refuse the close
+        // rather than silently produce an executed-but-unwoken item (the exact class
+        // W1 makes unwritable). Production always attaches an outbox at startup.
+        if (!this.outbox) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("wake_intent_store_unavailable", "a nudge-intended terminal act requires an attached wake-intent store to make its wake durable — none attached (pass nudge:false for a wake-less close, or attach an outbox)");
+        }
+        // Reads the txn-visible (uncommitted) state on this connection.
+        const src = this.getById(sourceQitemId);
+        if (!src || !isTerminalState(src.state))
+            return; // not a terminal close
+        const intent = this.outbox.getById(`${WAKE_INTENT_PREFIX}${successorQitemId}`);
+        if (!intent) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("terminal_close_without_wake_intent", `terminal closure of ${sourceQitemId} committed without staging its wake intent for ${successorQitemId} — one act or none is violated`);
+        }
+    }
+    /**
+     * W1-b: deliver ONE committed wake intent. MF3: CLAIM (pending→sending) before
+     * the external send, then finalize (sending→outcome) after — so overlapping
+     * drains send the wake exactly ONCE (the effect, not just the state), and a
+     * second drain of an already-claimed/resolved intent skips. Returns what
+     * happened for the drain's tally.
+     *
+     *   verified          → delivered
+     *   ok, unverified    → indeterminate   (ambiguous; never silently delivered/failed)
+     *   timeout (MF6)     → indeterminate   (may have landed — not a hard failure)
+     *   other not-ok/throw→ failed          (visible terminal state)
+     */
+    async deliverWakeIntent(outboxId) {
+        if (!this.outbox)
+            return "skipped";
+        if (!this.transport)
+            return "skipped"; // no transport → stays pending for a later drain
+        // MF3: CLAIM (pending→sending) BEFORE the external send so overlapping drains
+        // cannot both send. A losing claim — the row is no longer `pending` (already
+        // resolved, in-flight under another drainer, or claimed) — simply skips: no
+        // send, no tally. This makes the external effect once, not merely the state.
+        if (!this.outbox.claimForDelivery(outboxId))
+            return "skipped";
+        const intent = this.outbox.getById(outboxId);
+        if (!intent)
+            return "skipped"; // unreachable post-claim; defensive
+        // Only deliver a wake for a qitem that actually exists. A wake intent whose
+        // target qitem is missing — a caller-recorded id under this prefix (the route
+        // no longer refuses those), or a successor already swept — is finalized
+        // `failed`, never sent as a real wake.
+        if (!intent.auditPointer || !this.getById(intent.auditPointer)) {
+            this.outbox.finalizeDelivery(outboxId, "failed");
+            return "failed";
+        }
+        const qitemId = intent.auditPointer ?? outboxId;
+        // MF4: send the FROZEN envelope stored on the intent verbatim (no re-resolution).
+        const outcome = await this.performWakeSend(qitemId, intent.destinationSession, intent.senderSession, undefined, intent.body);
+        this.recordNudgeAttempt(qitemId, outcome.nudgeResult);
+        const finalState = outcome.classified === "verified" ? "delivered" : outcome.classified;
+        this.outbox.finalizeDelivery(outboxId, finalState);
+        return finalState;
+    }
+    /**
+     * W1-b: the post-commit delivery for a successor's wake, and the ONE shared
+     * staged-intent delivery path. When the durable intent store is present
+     * (production), deliver the just-committed intent — which CLAIMS and FINALIZES
+     * the row, so a later recovery sweep cannot send it a second time. When it is
+     * absent (test/bootstrap), fall back to the pre-W1 best-effort nudge so behavior
+     * is unchanged where there is no intent to make durable. Called AFTER the
+     * terminal transaction commits (reversed-never: a pane write must not join the
+     * db transaction).
+     *
+     * PUBLIC as of P34: every terminal-closing writer that stages an intent must
+     * deliver through THIS path rather than {@link maybeNudge}. `maybeNudge` sends
+     * WITHOUT claiming or finalizing, so a staged intent would remain `pending` and
+     * the startup recovery sweep would deliver the same wake AGAIN. One staged
+     * intent, one delivery, one finalized row.
+     *
+     * P34 correction: the no-outbox fallback above was documented here but never
+     * implemented — `deliverWakeIntent` simply returns "skipped" with no outbox
+     * attached, so the nudge vanished SILENTLY (a skip is not an error, so nothing
+     * surfaced it). The pre-W1 callers reached this path only after the MF2 guard
+     * had already proven an outbox was attached, which is why it never showed. P34
+     * routes writers here whose harnesses attach no outbox, so the fallback is now
+     * real code rather than a promise in a comment.
+     */
+    async deliverWakeForSuccessor(successorQitemId, destinationSession, nudge, sourceSession) {
+        if (nudge === false)
+            return;
+        // No durable intent store ⇒ there is no intent to claim/finalize. Fall back to
+        // the pre-W1 best-effort nudge so the wake still happens (the documented
+        // contract), rather than silently skipping it.
+        if (!this.outbox) {
+            await this.maybeNudge(successorQitemId, destinationSession, nudge, sourceSession);
+            return;
+        }
+        await this.deliverWakeIntent(`${WAKE_INTENT_PREFIX}${successorQitemId}`);
+    }
+    /**
+     * W1-b: the startup-recovery sweep. Delivers wake intents a crash left
+     * committed-but-undelivered (the terminal txn committed, the process died
+     * before the post-commit deliver). Pages in bounded batches and TERMINATES on
+     * a served short batch or on a no-progress round (a flapping transport marks
+     * rows failed = visible, so it still progresses) — never a silent cap, never a
+     * spin.
+     *
+     * MF6 (honest retry policy): the sweep retries ONLY `pending` rows — i.e. wake
+     * intents a crash left committed-but-undelivered. Terminal `failed` and
+     * `indeterminate` rows are NOT re-driven: a failed row would risk resurrecting
+     * a dead wake and an indeterminate one may already have landed (double-send).
+     * Both are left in a VISIBLE terminal state for out-of-band reconciliation. No
+     * periodic timer (out of scope, ruled); a bounded retry of failed rows is the
+     * NAMED residue, not a silent guarantee.
+     */
+    /**
+     * BLOCKING 1 (guard re-seal): the recovery-boundary reconciliation, called ONCE
+     * at startup (NOT inside the drain, which can be invoked concurrently). Moves any
+     * abandoned `sending` wake intents — a prior crashed process's claims — to
+     * `indeterminate`, WITHOUT re-sending: a claim left `sending` is ambiguous (the
+     * send may or may not have landed). Kept SEPARATE from drainPendingWakeIntents so
+     * an overlapping drain can never reconcile another drain's in-flight claim.
+     * Returns the count reconciled.
+     */
+    reconcileAbandonedWakeIntents() {
+        if (!this.outbox)
+            return 0;
+        return this.outbox.reconcileAbandonedSending(WAKE_INTENT_PREFIX);
+    }
+    async drainPendingWakeIntents() {
+        const tally = { delivered: 0, indeterminate: 0, failed: 0 };
+        if (!this.outbox || !this.transport)
+            return tally;
+        const BATCH = 200;
+        for (;;) {
+            const pending = this.outbox.listPending(WAKE_INTENT_PREFIX, BATCH);
+            if (pending.length === 0)
+                break;
+            let progressed = 0;
+            for (const intent of pending) {
+                const outcome = await this.deliverWakeIntent(intent.outboxId);
+                if (outcome === "delivered") {
+                    tally.delivered++;
+                    progressed++;
+                }
+                else if (outcome === "indeterminate") {
+                    tally.indeterminate++;
+                    progressed++;
+                }
+                else if (outcome === "failed") {
+                    tally.failed++;
+                    progressed++;
+                }
+            }
+            // Nothing left pending changed state this round (e.g. transport gone
+            // mid-sweep) — stop rather than spin; the next daemon start retries.
+            if (progressed === 0)
+                break;
+            if (pending.length < BATCH)
+                break; // served short batch ⇒ drained
+        }
+        return tally;
+    }
+    /**
+     * Issue a default nudge to the destination after a create / handoff /
+     * handoff-and-complete commit. Records the result via recordNudgeAttempt.
+     * Errors are caught and surfaced as nudge_result strings — they do not
+     * unwind the underlying queue mutation.
+     *
+     * Phase D extension point (orch-ratified): public so workflow-projector
+     * can invoke after its outer transaction commits, completing the
+     * createWithinTransaction()'s deferred post-commit side effects.
+     *
+     * V0.3.1 slice 23 queue-handoff-envelope: the nudge body
+     * is now wrapped with the same From/To/---/body/---/↩ Reply envelope
+     * that `rig send` uses. `sourceSession` is the seat that triggered
+     * the create/handoff so the recipient pane shows where the nudge
+     * came from + a reply hint. A queue nudge is the ONE non-refusable
+     * sender — it has no seat to send an error back to — so when
+     * `sourceSession` is undefined `wrapPaneEnvelope` applies its own
+     * `<unknown sender>` fallback internally (`pane-envelope.ts`). After
+     * A1 that is the SOLE definition of the marker in the tree (the CLI
+     * copies were deleted, refused at the seat boundary instead); this
+     * site holds no copy of its own.
+     */
+    async maybeNudge(qitemId, destinationSession, nudgeOpt, sourceSession, bodyOverride) {
+        if (nudgeOpt === false)
+            return;
+        if (!this.transport)
+            return;
+        const outcome = await this.performWakeSend(qitemId, destinationSession, sourceSession, bodyOverride);
+        this.recordNudgeAttempt(qitemId, outcome.nudgeResult);
+    }
+    /**
+     * W1 (transactional closure): the shared wake-send CORE. Builds the pane
+     * envelope, sends with verify, and CLASSIFIES the transport result into the W1
+     * delivery vocabulary (verified | indeterminate | failed). It touches NO
+     * persistence — callers decide what to record: {@link maybeNudge} records the
+     * nudge attempt; {@link deliverWakeIntent} additionally CAS-marks the durable
+     * intent row. Only ever called when `this.transport` is set (callers guard).
+     *
+     * The `indeterminate` classification is the ambiguous face: `res.ok && !res.verified`
+     * — the delivery LANDED on the wire but its render could not be confirmed
+     * (the "delivered-ack-pending" nudge literal). It is never promoted to
+     * delivered nor demoted to failed.
+     */
+    async performWakeSend(qitemId, destinationSession, sourceSession, bodyOverride, prebuiltText) {
+        const stampISO = new Date().toISOString();
+        let text;
+        if (prebuiltText !== undefined) {
+            // MF4: a durable wake intent carries its FROZEN envelope (generation resolved
+            // at STAGE time). Deliver it verbatim — never rebuild — so a crash-recovery
+            // after a tenure swap replays the emitting generation, not the current one.
+            text = prebuiltText;
+        }
+        else {
+            // OPR.0.4.4.19 FR-7: bodyOverride lets the resolve verb carry the
+            // decision text to the parked owner; default stays the handoff nudge.
+            const bareBody = bodyOverride ?? `Queue handoff: ${qitemId} - check your queue.`;
+            // GHOST-STAGE (h): the single HG-5 baseline change deferred from g — the handoff nudge now carries
+            // a Sent: stamp (so it renders byte-parically with a rig send) plus the SOURCE seat's occupant
+            // generation (g's already-wired render, resolved here; absent=UNKNOWN=omit, never forged). The
+            // stampISO also feeds the transport's delivered-latency flag so a nudge that waited on a busy /
+            // mid-handover successor shows ' · delivered +Ns' for free.
+            const genUuid = sourceSession
+                ? (this.resolveOccupantGeneration?.(sourceSession) ?? undefined)
+                : undefined;
+            text = wrapPaneEnvelope(sourceSession, destinationSession, bareBody, getSelfHostId(), { stampISO, genUuid });
+        }
+        try {
+            const res = await this.transport.send(destinationSession, text, { verify: true, stampISO });
+            // OPR.0.3.2.21.FR-4(c) — wording rename: the prior literal
+            // "sent-unverified" read as a failure even in the common case
+            // (delivery confirmed but the synchronous ack window expired,
+            // which is normal for codex seats mid-task). The new literal
+            // "delivered-ack-pending" reads as healthy. The old "verified"
+            // case is unchanged for backward-compat with any tooling that
+            // already consumed the positive literal.
+            if (res.ok) {
+                return res.verified
+                    ? { classified: "verified", nudgeResult: "verified" }
+                    : { classified: "indeterminate", nudgeResult: "delivered-ack-pending" };
+            }
+            // MF6: a TIMEOUT is ambiguous — the send may have landed but the ack window
+            // expired — so it records `indeterminate` (never silently delivered, never a
+            // hard `failed`). A definite non-timeout failure (unreachable, unknown
+            // session) stays `failed`.
+            const detail = res.error ?? res.reason ?? "unknown";
+            if (isWakeTimeoutSignal(res.reason) || isWakeTimeoutSignal(res.error)) {
+                return { classified: "indeterminate", nudgeResult: `indeterminate:${detail}` };
+            }
+            return { classified: "failed", nudgeResult: `failed:${detail}` };
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            const msg = err instanceof Error ? err.message : String(err);
+            // A thrown timeout is equally ambiguous (see above).
+            if (isWakeTimeoutSignal(msg)) {
+                return { classified: "indeterminate", nudgeResult: `indeterminate:${msg}` };
+            }
+            return { classified: "failed", nudgeResult: `failed:${msg}` };
+        }
+    }
+    async create(input) {
+        // 51-09 incr 4 — stamp the origin host onto the STORED sender identity once,
+        // before validation/insert/idempotency, so the row's source_session IS the
+        // triple (fail-open to 2-part when no self-id / not a bare member@rig).
+        input = { ...input, sourceSession: stampSelfHostSuffix(input.sourceSession) };
+        if (!this.validateRig(input.destinationSession)) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("unknown_destination_rig", `destination_session ${input.destinationSession} references an unknown rig`, destinationRefusalTeaching(input.destinationSession));
+        }
+        const txn = this.db.transaction(() => this.createInTransactionalContext(input));
+        let id;
+        let persistedEvent;
+        try {
+            ({ qitemId: id, persistedEvent } = txn());
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            // OPR.0.4.6.MH3 Q-a (FR-5): at-least-once cross-host forwards retry with
+            // the SAME minted qitemId, so a PK conflict on an EXISTING row is an
+            // idempotent RE-DELIVERY when the identity fields match — return the
+            // stored row (no second insert, no second event/nudge). A conflict whose
+            // identity fields DIFFER (same id, different destination/source) is a
+            // caller id-reuse bug — a structured error, never a silent overwrite.
+            // Local (non-forwarded) creates that pass an explicit --id keep the same
+            // safety for free.
+            if (input.qitemId && isQitemPrimaryKeyConflict(err)) {
+                const existing = this.getById(input.qitemId);
+                if (existing) {
+                    if (existing.destinationSession === input.destinationSession &&
+                        existing.sourceSession === input.sourceSession) {
+                        return existing;
+                    }
+                    throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_id_reuse", `qitem ${input.qitemId} already exists with a different destination/source — id reuse is a caller bug, not an idempotent retry`, {
+                        qitemId: input.qitemId,
+                        existingDestination: existing.destinationSession,
+                        existingSource: existing.sourceSession,
+                    });
+                }
+            }
+            throw err;
+        }
+        this.eventBus.notifySubscribers(persistedEvent);
+        await this.maybeNudge(id, input.destinationSession, input.nudge, input.sourceSession);
+        return this.getByIdOrThrow(id);
+    }
+    /**
+     * PL-004 Phase D extension point (orch-ratified per slice IMPL §
+     * Driver Handoff Contract). Creates a queue item using the SAME
+     * caller-managed db.transaction for transactional-scribe semantics
+     * (workflow-projector folds step closure + next-qitem creation into
+     * one atomic unit). Returns the persisted event AND qitem id so the
+     * caller can defer notifySubscribers/maybeNudge until AFTER its
+     * outer transaction commits.
+     *
+     * Caller MUST:
+     *   1. Invoke this from inside a `db.transaction(() => {...})` block.
+     *   2. After the outer txn commits, call:
+     *        - eventBus.notifySubscribers(persistedEvent)
+     *        - this.maybeNudge(qitemId, destinationSession, input.nudge)
+     *   3. NOT call this from outside a transaction (will produce a
+     *      half-state if the caller errors before committing).
+     *
+     * The split exists ONLY because notifySubscribers + maybeNudge are
+     * post-commit side effects (subscribers should not see events for
+     * data that may roll back; nudges should not fire for handoffs that
+     * may roll back). For independent create()s that don't need to
+     * compose with an outer transaction, use create() instead.
+     */
+    createWithinTransaction(input) {
+        if (!this.validateRig(input.destinationSession)) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("unknown_destination_rig", `destination_session ${input.destinationSession} references an unknown rig`, destinationRefusalTeaching(input.destinationSession));
+        }
+        const result = this.createInTransactionalContext(input);
+        return {
+            qitemId: result.qitemId,
+            persistedEvent: result.persistedEvent,
+            destinationSession: input.destinationSession,
+            nudge: input.nudge,
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Internal: insert + transition + emit event. Caller is responsible
+     * for transaction wrapping (the public create() wraps; the public
+     * createWithinTransaction() does not — caller's outer transaction
+     * provides the atomic boundary).
+     */
+    createInTransactionalContext(input) {
+        // OPR.0.4.4.19 FR-4/FR-5 — human-routed items require summary +
+        // evidence_ref at the domain write path (the validateClosure pattern).
+        // The validator is a no-op for non-human-routed items (BR-1).
+        const humanRoute = validateHumanRoute({
+            tier: input.tier ?? null,
+            destinationSession: input.destinationSession,
+            summary: input.summary ?? null,
+            evidenceRef: input.evidenceRef ?? null,
+        });
+        if (!humanRoute.ok) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError(humanRoute.code, humanRoute.message, {
+                missingFields: humanRoute.missingFields,
+            });
+        }
+        const id = input.qitemId ?? newQitemId();
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        const priority = input.priority ?? "routine";
+        const tier = input.tier ?? null;
+        const tags = input.tags ? JSON.stringify(input.tags) : null;
+        const chain = input.chainOfRecord ? JSON.stringify(input.chainOfRecord) : null;
+        const expiresAt = input.expiresAt ?? null;
+        const targetRepo = input.targetRepo ?? null;
+        // 0.5.1-53 Atom 2b — supersession back-link (successor -> the row it replaced). Absent for a normal create.
+        const handedOffFrom = input.handedOffFrom ?? null;
+        if (this.hasTargetRepoColumn) {
+            this.db
+                .prepare(`INSERT INTO queue_items (
+            qitem_id, ts_created, ts_updated, source_session, destination_session,
+            state, priority, tier, tags, expires_at, chain_of_record, handed_off_from, body, target_repo
+          ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`)
+                .run(id, ts, ts, input.sourceSession, input.destinationSession, priority, tier, tags, expiresAt, chain, handedOffFrom, input.body, targetRepo);
+        }
+        else {
+            this.db
+                .prepare(`INSERT INTO queue_items (
+            qitem_id, ts_created, ts_updated, source_session, destination_session,
+            state, priority, tier, tags, expires_at, chain_of_record, handed_off_from, body
+          ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`)
+                .run(id, ts, ts, input.sourceSession, input.destinationSession, priority, tier, tags, expiresAt, chain, handedOffFrom, input.body);
+        }
+        this.persistSummary(id, input.summary ?? null);
+        this.persistEvidenceRef(id, input.evidenceRef ?? null);
+        this.persistMintingGeneration(id, input.sourceSession);
+        this.transitionLog.append({
+            qitemId: id,
+            state: "pending",
+            actorSession: input.sourceSession,
+            transitionNote: "created",
+            identityProvenance: input.identityProvenance ?? null, // P21 §4 era-stamp
+        });
+        const persistedEvent = this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+            type: "queue.created",
+            qitemId: id,
+            sourceSession: input.sourceSession,
+            destinationSession: input.destinationSession,
+            priority,
+            tier,
+            summary: input.summary ?? null,
+        });
+        return { qitemId: id, persistedEvent };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Transactional handoff: close the source qitem (state=done,
+     * closure_reason=handed_off_to) and create a new qitem owned by `toSession`,
+     * with `handed_off_from` recording the chain. One atomic transaction.
+     */
+    async handoff(input) {
+        const source = this.getById(input.qitemId);
+        if (!source) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_not_found", `qitem ${input.qitemId} not found`);
+        }
+        if (isTerminalState(source.state)) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_already_terminal", `qitem ${input.qitemId} is already in terminal state ${source.state}`);
+        }
+        if (!this.validateRig(input.toSession)) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("unknown_destination_rig", `to_session ${input.toSession} references an unknown rig`, destinationRefusalTeaching(input.toSession));
+        }
+        const newId = newQitemId();
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        const body = input.body ?? source.body;
+        const priority = input.priority ?? source.priority;
+        const tier = input.tier ?? source.tier;
+        const tags = input.tags ? JSON.stringify(input.tags) : (source.tags ? JSON.stringify(source.tags) : null);
+        const chain = JSON.stringify([...(source.chainOfRecord ?? []), source.qitemId]);
+        const targetRepo = input.targetRepo === undefined ? source.targetRepo : input.targetRepo;
+        // OPR.0.4.4.19 FR-4/FR-5 — the handoff authors a NEW qitem; when that
+        // new item is human-routed it requires its OWN summary + evidence_ref
+        // (neither is inherited from the source — 044 semantics preserved).
+        const humanRoute = validateHumanRoute({
+            tier,
+            destinationSession: input.toSession,
+            summary: input.summary ?? null,
+            evidenceRef: input.evidenceRef ?? null,
+        });
+        if (!humanRoute.ok) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError(humanRoute.code, humanRoute.message, {
+                missingFields: humanRoute.missingFields,
+            });
+        }
+        const events = [];
+        const txn = this.db.transaction(() => {
+            this.db
+                .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items
+             SET state = 'handed-off',
+                 ts_updated = ?,
+                 handed_off_to = ?,
+                 closure_reason = 'handed_off_to',
+                 closure_target = ?
+           WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+                .run(ts, input.toSession, input.toSession, source.qitemId);
+            this.transitionLog.append({
+                qitemId: source.qitemId,
+                state: "handed-off",
+                actorSession: input.fromSession,
+                transitionNote: input.transitionNote ?? `handed off to ${input.toSession}`,
+                closureReason: "handed_off_to",
+                closureTarget: input.toSession,
+                identityProvenance: input.identityProvenance ?? null, // P21 §4 era-stamp
+            });
+            if (this.hasTargetRepoColumn) {
+                this.db
+                    .prepare(`INSERT INTO queue_items (
+              qitem_id, ts_created, ts_updated, source_session, destination_session,
+              state, priority, tier, tags, handed_off_from, chain_of_record, body, target_repo
+            ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`)
+                    .run(newId, ts, ts, input.fromSession, input.toSession, priority, tier, tags, source.qitemId, chain, body, targetRepo);
+            }
+            else {
+                this.db
+                    .prepare(`INSERT INTO queue_items (
+              qitem_id, ts_created, ts_updated, source_session, destination_session,
+              state, priority, tier, tags, handed_off_from, chain_of_record, body
+            ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`)
+                    .run(newId, ts, ts, input.fromSession, input.toSession, priority, tier, tags, source.qitemId, chain, body);
+            }
+            this.persistSummary(newId, input.summary ?? null);
+            this.persistEvidenceRef(newId, input.evidenceRef ?? null);
+            this.persistMintingGeneration(newId, input.fromSession);
+            this.transitionLog.append({
+                qitemId: newId,
+                state: "pending",
+                actorSession: input.fromSession,
+                transitionNote: `handoff from ${source.qitemId}`,
+                identityProvenance: input.identityProvenance ?? null, // P21 §4 era-stamp
+            });
+            // W1-a: the durable wake intent joins the SAME transaction as the close +
+            // successor create. If this (or anything above) throws, the whole act rolls
+            // back — one act or none.
+            this.stageWakeIntent(newId, input.fromSession, input.toSession, input.identityProvenance ?? null, input.nudge);
+            const handoffEvent = this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+                type: "queue.handed_off",
+                qitemId: source.qitemId,
+                fromSession: input.fromSession,
+                toSession: input.toSession,
+                closureReason: "handed_off_to",
+                summary: source.summary ?? null,
+            });
+            events.push({ name: "queue.handed_off", payload: handoffEvent });
+            const createdEvent = this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+                type: "queue.created",
+                qitemId: newId,
+                sourceSession: input.fromSession,
+                destinationSession: input.toSession,
+                priority,
+                tier,
+                summary: input.summary ?? null,
+            });
+            events.push({ name: "queue.created", payload: createdEvent });
+            // W1-c: the seam guard — the LAST statement in the terminal txn. A close
+            // that intended a wake cannot commit without its durable intent; a throw
+            // here rolls the whole act back at the seam.
+            this.assertTerminalClosureHasIntent(source.qitemId, newId, input.nudge);
+        });
+        txn();
+        for (const e of events) {
+            this.eventBus.notifySubscribers(e.payload);
+        }
+        // W1-b: deliver the just-committed wake intent (marking it), or the pre-W1
+        // best-effort nudge when no intent store is attached. Post-commit only.
+        await this.deliverWakeForSuccessor(newId, input.toSession, input.nudge, input.fromSession);
+        return {
+            closed: this.getByIdOrThrow(source.qitemId),
+            created: this.getByIdOrThrow(newId),
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Variant of {@link handoff} that closes the source qitem as `done`
+     * (terminal closure) instead of `handed-off` (intermediate). Same atomic
+     * close+create, same chain_of_record semantics, same default-nudge behavior.
+     * Use when the source seat is fully complete with the work — no follow-up
+     * tracking needed against the source qitem.
+     */
+    async handoffAndComplete(input) {
+        const source = this.getById(input.qitemId);
+        if (!source) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_not_found", `qitem ${input.qitemId} not found`);
+        }
+        if (isTerminalState(source.state)) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_already_terminal", `qitem ${input.qitemId} is already in terminal state ${source.state}`);
+        }
+        if (!this.validateRig(input.toSession)) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("unknown_destination_rig", `to_session ${input.toSession} references an unknown rig`, destinationRefusalTeaching(input.toSession));
+        }
+        const newId = newQitemId();
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        const body = input.body ?? source.body;
+        const priority = input.priority ?? source.priority;
+        const tier = input.tier ?? source.tier;
+        const tags = input.tags ? JSON.stringify(input.tags) : (source.tags ? JSON.stringify(source.tags) : null);
+        const chain = JSON.stringify([...(source.chainOfRecord ?? []), source.qitemId]);
+        const targetRepo = input.targetRepo === undefined ? source.targetRepo : input.targetRepo;
+        // OPR.0.4.4.19 FR-4/FR-5 — same new-item enforcement as handoff().
+        const humanRoute = validateHumanRoute({
+            tier,
+            destinationSession: input.toSession,
+            summary: input.summary ?? null,
+            evidenceRef: input.evidenceRef ?? null,
+        });
+        if (!humanRoute.ok) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError(humanRoute.code, humanRoute.message, {
+                missingFields: humanRoute.missingFields,
+            });
+        }
+        const events = [];
+        const txn = this.db.transaction(() => {
+            this.db
+                .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items
+             SET state = 'done',
+                 ts_updated = ?,
+                 handed_off_to = ?,
+                 closure_reason = 'handed_off_to',
+                 closure_target = ?
+           WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+                .run(ts, input.toSession, input.toSession, source.qitemId);
+            this.transitionLog.append({
+                qitemId: source.qitemId,
+                state: "done",
+                actorSession: input.fromSession,
+                transitionNote: input.transitionNote ?? `handoff-and-complete to ${input.toSession}`,
+                closureReason: "handed_off_to",
+                closureTarget: input.toSession,
+                identityProvenance: input.identityProvenance ?? null, // P21 §4 era-stamp
+            });
+            if (this.hasTargetRepoColumn) {
+                this.db
+                    .prepare(`INSERT INTO queue_items (
+              qitem_id, ts_created, ts_updated, source_session, destination_session,
+              state, priority, tier, tags, handed_off_from, chain_of_record, body, target_repo
+            ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`)
+                    .run(newId, ts, ts, input.fromSession, input.toSession, priority, tier, tags, source.qitemId, chain, body, targetRepo);
+            }
+            else {
+                this.db
+                    .prepare(`INSERT INTO queue_items (
+              qitem_id, ts_created, ts_updated, source_session, destination_session,
+              state, priority, tier, tags, handed_off_from, chain_of_record, body
+            ) VALUES (?, ?, ?, ?, ?, 'pending', ?, ?, ?, ?, ?, ?)`)
+                    .run(newId, ts, ts, input.fromSession, input.toSession, priority, tier, tags, source.qitemId, chain, body);
+            }
+            this.persistSummary(newId, input.summary ?? null);
+            this.persistEvidenceRef(newId, input.evidenceRef ?? null);
+            this.persistMintingGeneration(newId, input.fromSession);
+            this.transitionLog.append({
+                qitemId: newId,
+                state: "pending",
+                actorSession: input.fromSession,
+                transitionNote: `handoff-and-complete from ${source.qitemId}`,
+            });
+            // W1-a: the durable wake intent joins the SAME transaction as the close +
+            // successor create — one act or none (symmetric with handoff()).
+            this.stageWakeIntent(newId, input.fromSession, input.toSession, input.identityProvenance ?? null, input.nudge);
+            const handoffEvent = this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+                type: "queue.handed_off",
+                qitemId: source.qitemId,
+                fromSession: input.fromSession,
+                toSession: input.toSession,
+                closureReason: "handed_off_to",
+                summary: source.summary ?? null,
+            });
+            events.push({ name: "queue.handed_off", payload: handoffEvent });
+            const createdEvent = this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+                type: "queue.created",
+                qitemId: newId,
+                sourceSession: input.fromSession,
+                destinationSession: input.toSession,
+                priority,
+                tier,
+                summary: input.summary ?? null,
+            });
+            events.push({ name: "queue.created", payload: createdEvent });
+            // W1-c: the seam guard — the LAST statement in the terminal txn. A close
+            // that intended a wake cannot commit without its durable intent; a throw
+            // here rolls the whole act back at the seam.
+            this.assertTerminalClosureHasIntent(source.qitemId, newId, input.nudge);
+        });
+        txn();
+        for (const e of events) {
+            this.eventBus.notifySubscribers(e.payload);
+        }
+        // W1-b: deliver the just-committed wake intent (marking it), or the pre-W1
+        // best-effort nudge when no intent store is attached. Post-commit only.
+        await this.deliverWakeForSuccessor(newId, input.toSession, input.nudge, input.fromSession);
+        return {
+            closed: this.getByIdOrThrow(source.qitemId),
+            created: this.getByIdOrThrow(newId),
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * OPR.0.4.6.MH3 FR-4 (C2, arch Q-c): the LOCAL half of a cross-host
+     * handoff — close the source row AFTER the successor-create was forwarded
+     * to (and accepted by) the target host. The two sides live in two DBs, so
+     * this is deliberately NOT the atomic close+create of {@link handoff}: the
+     * boundary is bridged by message-passing (successor-create FIRST on the
+     * origin host, this source-close SECOND — never the reverse, so a crash
+     * between the two leaves a live duplicate the idempotent re-drive
+     * converges, never a dropped potato).
+     *
+     * Re-drive semantics (FR-4/FR-5, the interrupted-close case):
+     *   - source already terminal WITH a MATCHING closureTarget → idempotent
+     *     absorb: return the stored row unchanged (`absorbed: true`) — no
+     *     second close, no second event.
+     *   - source already terminal with a MISMATCHED closureTarget → structured
+     *     `cross_host_close_conflict` (someone else closed it meanwhile —
+     *     surface, never overwrite).
+     *   - otherwise → close exactly like the local handoff's close leg:
+     *     `closure_reason=handed_off_to`; `closure_target` carries the OPAQUE
+     *     three-part `<member@rig>@<host>` form (arch R1 — presence-checked
+     *     display/audit metadata, NEVER parsed for routing); `handed_off_to`
+     *     stays the two-part `member@rig` (BR-1 — session-string carriers
+     *     never gain `@host`).
+     */
+    closeCrossHostHandoffSource(input) {
+        const source = this.getById(input.qitemId);
+        if (!source) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_not_found", `qitem ${input.qitemId} not found`);
+        }
+        if (isTerminalState(source.state)) {
+            if (source.closureTarget === input.closureTarget) {
+                return { item: source, absorbed: true };
+            }
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("cross_host_close_conflict", `qitem ${input.qitemId} is already closed toward ${source.closureTarget ?? "<no closure_target>"} — this re-drive names ${input.closureTarget}; surfacing the conflict, never overwriting`, {
+                qitemId: input.qitemId,
+                existingClosureTarget: source.closureTarget,
+                attemptedClosureTarget: input.closureTarget,
+            });
+        }
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        const events = [];
+        const txn = this.db.transaction(() => {
+            this.db
+                .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items
+             SET state = ?,
+                 ts_updated = ?,
+                 handed_off_to = ?,
+                 closure_reason = 'handed_off_to',
+                 closure_target = ?
+           WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+                .run(input.terminalState, ts, input.toSession, input.closureTarget, input.qitemId);
+            this.transitionLog.append({
+                qitemId: input.qitemId,
+                state: input.terminalState,
+                actorSession: input.fromSession,
+                // BR-1: the minted note carries the TWO-PART toSession only — the
+                // host-qualified 3-part form is allowed in closure_target and nowhere
+                // else, and transition_note is a durable carrier.
+                transitionNote: input.transitionNote ?? `cross-host handoff to ${input.toSession}`,
+                closureReason: "handed_off_to",
+                closureTarget: input.closureTarget,
+            });
+            const handoffEvent = this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+                type: "queue.handed_off",
+                qitemId: input.qitemId,
+                fromSession: input.fromSession,
+                // The event body is a session-string carrier — two-part only (BR-1).
+                toSession: input.toSession,
+                closureReason: "handed_off_to",
+                summary: source.summary ?? null,
+            });
+            events.push(handoffEvent);
+        });
+        txn();
+        for (const e of events) {
+            this.eventBus.notifySubscribers(e);
+        }
+        return { item: this.getByIdOrThrow(input.qitemId), absorbed: false };
+    }
+    /**
+     * `whoami` — return the seat's queue position from the daemon's perspective.
+     * Counts active qitems (pending + in-progress + blocked) destined for the
+     * caller, lists the most recent active qitems, and reports counts for the
+     * caller's outgoing source role too. Read-only; no mutations.
+     *
+     * Per PL-004 Phase A § Routes: GET /api/queue/whoami.
+     */
+    whoami(session, opts) {
+        const limit = Math.max(1, Math.min(opts?.recentLimit ?? 25, 200));
+        const countByState = (state) => {
+            const row = this.db
+                .prepare(`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM queue_items WHERE destination_session = ? AND state = ?`)
+                .get(session, state);
+            return row.n;
+        };
+        const recent = this.db
+            .prepare(`SELECT * FROM queue_items
+          WHERE destination_session = ?
+            AND state IN ('pending','in-progress','blocked')
+          ORDER BY ts_updated DESC
+          LIMIT ?`)
+            .all(session, limit);
+        const sourceTotalRow = this.db
+            .prepare(`SELECT COUNT(*) AS n FROM queue_items WHERE source_session = ?`)
+            .get(session);
+        return {
+            session,
+            asDestination: {
+                pending: countByState("pending"),
+                inProgress: countByState("in-progress"),
+                blocked: countByState("blocked"),
+                recent: recent.map((r) => this.rowToItem(r)),
+            },
+            asSource: { total: sourceTotalRow.n },
+        };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Mark a qitem `in-progress` (claim). Computes closure_required_at from tier.
+     */
+    claim(input) {
+        const qitem = this.getById(input.qitemId);
+        if (!qitem) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_not_found", `qitem ${input.qitemId} not found`);
+        }
+        if (qitem.destinationSession !== input.destinationSession) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("claim_destination_mismatch", `qitem ${input.qitemId} destination is ${qitem.destinationSession}, not ${input.destinationSession}`);
+        }
+        if (qitem.state !== "pending" && qitem.state !== "blocked") {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_not_claimable", `qitem ${input.qitemId} is in state ${qitem.state}; only pending/blocked are claimable`);
+        }
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        const closureRequiredAt = computeClosureRequiredAt(ts, qitem.tier);
+        // GHOST-STAGE (e/Class-B): stamp the CLAIMANT's occupant generation. THIS is the ghost
+        // discriminator — under a handover the successor reuses the seat name, so a name-scoped release
+        // would neutralize the successor's own claims; the retiring generation's claims are released by gen.
+        const claimedByGeneration = this.hasClaimedGenColumn
+            ? (this.resolveOccupantGeneration?.(input.destinationSession) ?? null)
+            : null;
+        const txn = this.db.transaction(() => {
+            if (this.hasClaimedGenColumn) {
+                this.db
+                    .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items
+               SET state = 'in-progress', ts_updated = ?, claimed_at = ?, closure_required_at = ?,
+                   claimed_by_generation_uuid = ?
+             WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+                    .run(ts, ts, closureRequiredAt, claimedByGeneration, input.qitemId);
+            }
+            else {
+                this.db
+                    .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items
+               SET state = 'in-progress', ts_updated = ?, claimed_at = ?, closure_required_at = ?
+             WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+                    .run(ts, ts, closureRequiredAt, input.qitemId);
+            }
+            this.transitionLog.append({
+                qitemId: input.qitemId,
+                state: "in-progress",
+                actorSession: input.destinationSession,
+                transitionNote: "claimed",
+                identityProvenance: input.identityProvenance ?? null, // P21 §4 era-stamp
+            });
+            return this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+                type: "queue.claimed",
+                qitemId: input.qitemId,
+                destinationSession: input.destinationSession,
+                claimedAt: ts,
+                closureRequiredAt,
+                summary: qitem.summary ?? null,
+            });
+        });
+        const persistedEvent = txn();
+        this.eventBus.notifySubscribers(persistedEvent);
+        return this.getByIdOrThrow(input.qitemId);
+    }
+    unclaim(qitemId, destinationSession, reason, identityProvenance) {
+        const qitem = this.getById(qitemId);
+        if (!qitem) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_not_found", `qitem ${qitemId} not found`);
+        }
+        if (qitem.state !== "in-progress") {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_not_in_progress", `qitem ${qitemId} is in state ${qitem.state}; only in-progress can be unclaimed`);
+        }
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        const txn = this.db.transaction(() => {
+            // (e/Class-B): returning to pending releases the claim, so clear the claimant-generation stamp
+            // (the item is now unclaimed; a fresh claimant will re-stamp its own generation).
+            const clearGen = this.hasClaimedGenColumn ? ", claimed_by_generation_uuid = NULL" : "";
+            this.db
+                .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items
+             SET state = 'pending',
+                 ts_updated = ?,
+                 claimed_at = NULL,
+                 closure_required_at = NULL${clearGen}
+           WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+                .run(ts, qitemId);
+            this.transitionLog.append({
+                qitemId,
+                state: "pending",
+                actorSession: destinationSession,
+                transitionNote: `unclaimed: ${reason}`,
+                identityProvenance: identityProvenance ?? null, // P21 §4 era-stamp
+            });
+            return this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+                type: "queue.unclaimed",
+                qitemId,
+                destinationSession,
+                reason,
+                summary: qitem.summary ?? null,
+            });
+        });
+        const persistedEvent = txn();
+        this.eventBus.notifySubscribers(persistedEvent);
+        return this.getByIdOrThrow(qitemId);
+    }
+    /**
+     * General state mutator. Routes through hot-potato strict-rejection on
+     * `done` transitions. All transitions append to the log.
+     *
+     * Phase B R2: emits queue.updated event atomically with the UPDATE +
+     * transition log append, so the view-event-bridge can wake SSE consumers
+     * on /api/views/:name/sse for normal state transitions (pending → blocked,
+     * in-progress → done, closure, escalation). Phase A write semantics are
+     * UNCHANGED — only an additional event emission inside the existing
+     * transaction. This is an explicit narrow event-only extension to a
+     * Phase A write surface so update-path mutations are visible to the
+     * view bridge.
+     */
+    update(input) {
+        const txn = this.db.transaction(() => this.updateInTransactionalContext(input));
+        const persistedEvent = txn();
+        this.eventBus.notifySubscribers(persistedEvent);
+        return this.getByIdOrThrow(input.qitemId);
+    }
+    /**
+     * PL-004 Phase D extension point (orch-ratified per slice IMPL Driver
+     * Handoff Contract / Guard R1 repair). Same closure validation +
+     * UPDATE + transition log + queue.updated event as update(), but
+     * runs inside the caller's outer db.transaction so it composes with
+     * workflow-projector's transactional-scribe contract.
+     *
+     * Caller MUST:
+     *   1. Invoke from inside a `db.transaction(() => {...})` block.
+     *   2. After the outer txn commits, call:
+     *        eventBus.notifySubscribers(persistedEvent)
+     *   3. NOT call this from outside a transaction (will produce a
+     *      half-state if the caller errors before committing).
+     *
+     * Closure validation runs at call time (before the UPDATE) so a
+     * Phase A invariant violation (e.g., state=done without closure_reason)
+     * throws before the workflow projector's outer transaction can commit
+     * any partial state. The Phase A hot-potato strict-rejection rule
+     * therefore applies to workflow projection unchanged.
+     */
+    updateWithinTransaction(input) {
+        const persistedEvent = this.updateInTransactionalContext(input);
+        return { qitemId: input.qitemId, persistedEvent };
+    }
+    /**
+     * Internal: closure validation + UPDATE + transition log + emit
+     * queue.updated event. Caller is responsible for transaction wrapping
+     * (the public update() wraps; the public updateWithinTransaction()
+     * composes inside the caller's outer transaction).
+     */
+    updateInTransactionalContext(input) {
+        const qitem = this.getById(input.qitemId);
+        if (!qitem) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_not_found", `qitem ${input.qitemId} not found`);
+        }
+        if (!isQueueState(input.state)) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("invalid_state", `state=${input.state} not valid; valid: ${QUEUE_STATES.join(", ")}`);
+        }
+        const validation = validateClosure({
+            state: input.state,
+            closureReason: input.closureReason ?? null,
+            closureTarget: input.closureTarget ?? null,
+        });
+        if (!validation.ok) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError(validation.code, validation.message, {
+                validReasons: "validReasons" in validation ? validation.validReasons : undefined,
+            });
+        }
+        // OPR.0.4.6.WF3 FR-6 — the frontier close-path guard (pm ruling:
+        // PREVENTION over detection). A TERMINAL closure (done/handed-off)
+        // of a LIVE workflow-frontier packet from a NON-workflow verb
+        // would strand the instance: the frontier would reference a
+        // closed packet and the workflow's own bookkeeping (trail,
+        // rebind, events) would never happen. Reject LOUD with
+        // what/why/fix naming the workflow verbs. The workflow domain's
+        // own writers pass viaWorkflowVerb (they hold the invariant);
+        // non-workflow qitems return null from the predicate — closure
+        // behavior byte-identical (the zero-friction negative).
+        const isTerminalClosure = isTerminalState(input.state);
+        if (isTerminalClosure && !input.viaWorkflowVerb && this.workflowFrontierPredicate) {
+            const binding = this.workflowFrontierPredicate(input.qitemId);
+            if (binding) {
+                throw new QueueRepositoryError("workflow_frontier_packet", `qitem ${input.qitemId} is the LIVE frontier packet of workflow instance ${binding.instanceId} (${binding.workflowName}). Closing it out-of-band would strand the workflow. Use the workflow verbs instead: rig workflow project (advance) | rig workflow route (re-target the owner).`, { instanceId: binding.instanceId, workflowName: binding.workflowName, qitemId: input.qitemId });
+            }
+        }
+        // OPR.0.4.4.19 FR-6 — leg-1 park (state=blocked on a HUMAN-seat blocker):
+        // enforce summary + evidence_ref at the park moment, evaluated on the
+        // EFFECTIVE values (provided on this call, else already on the item) so
+        // an item that carried them from create parks without re-entry. The
+        // enforcement is here at the write path — the `rig queue block` verb and
+        // raw `update --state blocked` hit the same validator (no verb-only
+        // enforcement). Blocking on another qitem requires nothing new (BR-1).
+        const effectiveBlockedOn = input.blockedOn ?? qitem.blockedOn;
+        const isHumanPark = input.state === "blocked" && isHumanSeatSession(effectiveBlockedOn);
+        // OPR.0.5.1 slice-51-06 D2 — summary/evidence_ref are persist-able ONLY at a human-seat park
+        // (see the FR-6 note below). Silently ignoring them on any other transition is a data-loss trap
+        // (the operator believes the metadata was saved). HARD-REJECT before ANY UPDATE/log/event so the
+        // caller learns immediately and nothing is half-applied. null/undefined = absent (allowed);
+        // empty string = present (a deliberate value → rejected on a non-park transition).
+        if (!isHumanPark) {
+            const invalidFields = [];
+            if (input.summary != null)
+                invalidFields.push("summary");
+            if (input.evidenceRef != null)
+                invalidFields.push("evidenceRef");
+            if (invalidFields.length > 0) {
+                const flags = invalidFields.map((f) => (f === "summary" ? "--summary" : "--evidence-ref")).join(" / ");
+                throw new QueueRepositoryError("summary_evidence_not_persistable", `${invalidFields.join(" + ")} persist only on a human-seat park (state=blocked on a human seat); the '${input.state}' transition cannot store them. Remove ${flags}, or park the item (rig queue block --on <human-seat> --summary … --evidence-ref …).`, { invalidFields });
+            }
+        }
+        // SWEEP-a (shape f2576102) — closure/blocked-field COHERENCE, beside the reference
+        // reject above: an incoherent field must never silently persist (worse than a drop —
+        // the COALESCE below would write it). Admits-map, derived from LIVE schema use:
+        //   closure_reason/closure_target → state "done", OR the PARK-RECORD form
+        //     (state "blocked" with closureReason "blocked_on" — the workflow gate/park
+        //     writers' established shape, workflow-runtime.ts:587/1013);
+        //   blocked_on → state "blocked" only.
+        const isParkRecord = input.state === "blocked" && input.closureReason === "blocked_on";
+        // Third live form (found by the neighborhood suites): the transactional handoff
+        // closes its source as state "handed-off" with closureReason "handed_off_to".
+        const isHandoffClose = input.state === "handed-off" && input.closureReason === "handed_off_to";
+        // 0.5.1-53 Atom 2a — FOURTH admitted form: the supersession-cancel. A row corrected by
+        // cancel-and-replace records state=canceled + closureReason=superseded + closureTarget=<successor>,
+        // so superseded is distinguishable from abandoned (a plain cancel keeps closureReason=null).
+        const isSupersedeCancel = input.state === "canceled" && input.closureReason === "superseded";
+        if (input.state !== "done" && !isParkRecord && !isHandoffClose && !isSupersedeCancel && (input.closureReason != null || input.closureTarget != null)) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("closure_fields_not_admitted", `closure_reason/closure_target persist only on state=done, the blocked park-record form, the handoff close, or the superseded cancel; the '${input.state}' transition cannot store them. Close the item (--state done --closure-reason …) or drop the flags.`, {});
+        }
+        // A supersession must name WHAT replaced this row — fail LOUD before any write (never a silent
+        // no-op leaving a stale row, the dead-signal class), symmetric with handed_off_to's target rule.
+        if (isSupersedeCancel && !input.closureTarget) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("missing_closure_target", `closure_reason=superseded requires closure_target (the successor qitem that replaced this row).`, {});
+        }
+        if (input.blockedOn != null && input.state !== "blocked") {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("blocked_on_not_admitted", `blocked_on persists only on state=blocked; the '${input.state}' transition cannot store it. Park the item (rig queue block --on …) or drop --blocked-on.`, {});
+        }
+        // 0.5.1-53 Atom 1b(ii) + 1a — blocker validation at the park moment. Non-human blocker kinds:
+        //   qitem-ref ("qitem-…")        → must EXIST and be LIVE (1b-ii); a ghost or dead blocker never lifts.
+        //   typed gate (fold:/auth:/…)   → first-class (1a), but a bare prefix with no gate body is malformed
+        //                                   (a typo must not masquerade as a gate).
+        //   anything else (legacy gate-name) → left as-is; out of this slice.
+        // Human-seat parks (isHumanPark) enforce their own FR-6 contract above.
+        if (input.state === "blocked" && !isHumanPark && typeof effectiveBlockedOn === "string") {
+            if (effectiveBlockedOn.startsWith("qitem-")) {
+                const blocker = this.getById(effectiveBlockedOn);
+                if (!blocker) {
+                    throw new QueueRepositoryError("blocker_not_found", `blocked_on names a qitem that does not exist: ${effectiveBlockedOn}. A park must name a real, live blocker — a nonexistent blocker can never complete, so the row could never unpark.`, { blockedOn: effectiveBlockedOn });
+                }
+                if (!isBlockerLive(blocker.state)) {
+                    throw new QueueRepositoryError("blocker_not_live", `blocked_on names a resolved qitem: ${effectiveBlockedOn} is '${blocker.state}'. A park must name a LIVE blocker — parking on a completed/closed row is a dead-blocker park that never self-clears.`, { blockedOn: effectiveBlockedOn, blockerState: blocker.state });
+                }
+            }
+            else {
+                const typedPrefix = typedGateBlockerPrefix(effectiveBlockedOn);
+                if (typedPrefix && !isTypedGateBlocker(effectiveBlockedOn)) {
+                    throw new QueueRepositoryError("blocker_malformed", `blocked_on '${effectiveBlockedOn}' is a bare '${typedPrefix}' prefix with no gate body. A typed gate blocker must name its gate (e.g. fold:one-home+attestation).`, { blockedOn: effectiveBlockedOn });
+                }
+            }
+        }
+        let effectiveSummary = qitem.summary;
+        let effectiveEvidenceRef = qitem.evidenceRef;
+        if (isHumanPark) {
+            effectiveSummary = input.summary ?? qitem.summary;
+            effectiveEvidenceRef = input.evidenceRef ?? qitem.evidenceRef;
+            const park = validateHumanPark({
+                blockedOn: effectiveBlockedOn,
+                summary: effectiveSummary,
+                evidenceRef: effectiveEvidenceRef,
+            });
+            if (!park.ok) {
+                throw new QueueRepositoryError(park.code, park.message, {
+                    missingFields: park.missingFields,
+                });
+            }
+        }
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        const fromState = qitem.state;
+        // 0.5.1-53 Atom 1b(i) — clear-on-exit. blocked_on is set EXPLICITLY, not COALESCE'd:
+        // a row keeps its blocker ONLY while `state=blocked` (effectiveBlockedOn = the new
+        // blocker, else the one it already carried), and any exit from blocked CLEARS it to
+        // NULL. The prior `COALESCE(?, blocked_on)` preserved the blocker on every non-blocked
+        // transition, leaving dead blockers that nothing audits (the root-cause strand).
+        const nextBlockedOn = input.state === "blocked" ? effectiveBlockedOn : null;
+        this.db
+            .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items
+           SET state = ?,
+               ts_updated = ?,
+               closure_reason = COALESCE(?, closure_reason),
+               closure_target = COALESCE(?, closure_target),
+               handed_off_to = COALESCE(?, handed_off_to),
+               blocked_on = ?
+         WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+            .run(input.state, ts, validation.closureReason, validation.closureTarget, input.handedOffTo ?? null, nextBlockedOn, input.qitemId);
+        // FR-6: park-time summary/evidence_ref are PERSISTED onto the existing
+        // item (not merely validated-then-dropped) — visible to the attention
+        // query and to Packet 2. Only the park path writes them.
+        if (isHumanPark) {
+            this.persistSummary(input.qitemId, input.summary ?? null);
+            this.persistEvidenceRef(input.qitemId, input.evidenceRef ?? null);
+        }
+        this.transitionLog.append({
+            qitemId: input.qitemId,
+            state: input.state,
+            actorSession: input.actorSession,
+            transitionNote: input.transitionNote,
+            closureReason: validation.closureReason ?? undefined,
+            closureTarget: validation.closureTarget ?? undefined,
+            identityProvenance: input.identityProvenance ?? null, // P21 §4 era-stamp
+        });
+        // 0.5.1-53 Atom 1b(iii) — propagate-completion. blocked_on PROMISES "A waits until B completes";
+        // that promise never fired on this runtime (rows sat blocked on done/canceled blockers for days).
+        // When THIS qitem reaches a terminal state, auto-unpark every row parked on it (blocked_on = this,
+        // state='blocked') to pending, clear its (now-resolved) blocker, log the transition, and emit an
+        // event so watchers/sweeps see the unblock without a fetch.
+        if (!isBlockerLive(input.state)) {
+            const blockedRows = this.db
+                .prepare("SELECT qitem_id FROM queue_items WHERE blocked_on = ? AND state = 'blocked'")
+                .all(input.qitemId);
+            for (const r of blockedRows) {
+                this.db
+                    .prepare("UPDATE queue_items SET state = 'pending', blocked_on = NULL, ts_updated = ? WHERE qitem_id = ?")
+                    .run(ts, r.qitem_id);
+                this.transitionLog.append({
+                    qitemId: r.qitem_id,
+                    state: "pending",
+                    actorSession: input.actorSession,
+                    transitionNote: `auto-unparked: blocker ${input.qitemId} reached terminal state '${input.state}'`,
+                });
+                this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+                    type: "queue.updated",
+                    qitemId: r.qitem_id,
+                    fromState: "blocked",
+                    toState: "pending",
+                    closureReason: null,
+                    closureTarget: null,
+                    actorSession: input.actorSession,
+                    summary: null,
+                });
+            }
+        }
+        return this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+            type: "queue.updated",
+            qitemId: input.qitemId,
+            fromState,
+            toState: input.state,
+            closureReason: validation.closureReason ?? null,
+            closureTarget: validation.closureTarget ?? null,
+            actorSession: input.actorSession,
+            // FR-1 × FR-6: the event carries the summary as of THIS mutation
+            // (park-time summary included) so surfaces refresh without a fetch.
+            summary: effectiveSummary ?? null,
+        });
+    }
+    getById(qitemId) {
+        const row = this.db
+            .prepare("SELECT * FROM queue_items WHERE qitem_id = ?")
+            .get(qitemId);
+        return row ? this.rowToItem(row) : null;
+    }
+    list(opts) {
+        const limit = opts?.limit ?? 100;
+        const conditions = [];
+        const params = [];
+        if (opts?.rig) {
+            const escaped = opts.rig.replace(/%/g, "\\%").replace(/_/g, "\\_");
+            conditions.push("(destination_session LIKE ? ESCAPE '\\' OR source_session LIKE ? ESCAPE '\\')");
+            params.push(`%@${escaped}`, `%@${escaped}`);
+        }
+        if (opts?.asSession) {
+            conditions.push("(destination_session = ? OR source_session = ?)");
+            params.push(opts.asSession, opts.asSession);
+        }
+        if (opts?.activeOnly && !opts?.state) {
+            conditions.push("state IN ('pending', 'in-progress', 'blocked')");
+        }
+        if (opts?.destinationSession) {
+            conditions.push("destination_session = ?");
+            params.push(opts.destinationSession);
+        }
+        if (opts?.sourceSession) {
+            conditions.push("source_session = ?");
+            params.push(opts.sourceSession);
+        }
+        if (opts?.state) {
+            const states = Array.isArray(opts.state) ? opts.state : [opts.state];
+            const placeholders = states.map(() => "?").join(", ");
+            conditions.push(`state IN (${placeholders})`);
+            params.push(...states);
+        }
+        if (opts?.targetRepo && this.hasTargetRepoColumn) {
+            conditions.push("target_repo = ?");
+            params.push(opts.targetRepo);
+        }
+        const where = conditions.length > 0 ? `WHERE ${conditions.join(" AND ")}` : "";
+        const columns = opts?.compact ? COMPACT_QUEUE_COLUMNS : "*";
+        const useActiveFirst = !!(opts?.rig || opts?.asSession || opts?.activeOnly);
+        const orderBy = useActiveFirst
+            ? "CASE WHEN state IN ('pending', 'in-progress', 'blocked') THEN 0 ELSE 1 END, ts_created DESC"
+            : "ts_created DESC";
+        params.push(limit);
+        const rows = this.db
+            .prepare(`SELECT ${columns} FROM queue_items ${where} ORDER BY ${orderBy} LIMIT ?`)
+            .all(...params);
+        const items = rows.map((r) => this.rowToItem(r));
+        return opts?.compact
+            ? items.map((item) => ({
+                ...item,
+                fieldsElided: ["body", "summary", "evidenceRef"],
+            }))
+            : items;
+    }
+    /**
+     * OPR.0.3.2.20 — durable attention-class query.
+     *
+     * Returns OPEN attention-class qitems (the source of truth for the
+     * For You Action-required + Approval lenses) by pushing the
+     * attention predicate INTO the SQL WHERE clause so the LIMIT
+     * applies AFTER attention filtering. This makes the result
+     * window-INDEPENDENT by construction: an old human-gate item
+     * cannot be evicted past LIMIT by routine open qitems even when
+     * there are >>LIMIT of them. (Guard verdict qitem-20260518190827
+     * BLOCKER 1 — the prior fetch-then-filter approach in the route
+     * could still hide attention items behind ATTENTION_FETCH_BOUND
+     * newer routine open qitems.)
+     *
+     * Attention predicate in SQL (mirror of mission-control read
+     * layer + the route-level `isAttentionItem`):
+     *   tier = 'human-gate'                              (approval)
+     *   OR destination_session matches human-seat regex  (action-required)
+     *
+     * SQLite has no native regex; LIKE patterns are used as a
+     * SUPER-SET (every regex match also matches one of the LIKE
+     * patterns). Callers can refine in JS with isAttentionItem if
+     * they need strict regex semantics — but for the LIMIT-pushdown
+     * guarantee, the SQL superset is what matters: NO attention item
+     * is filtered out by the SQL stage.
+     *
+     * Default open state set: pending|in-progress|blocked. Caller may
+     * override via `state`.
+     */
+    listAttention(opts) {
+        const limit = opts?.limit ?? 100;
+        const states = opts?.state
+            ? Array.isArray(opts.state) ? opts.state : [opts.state]
+            : ["pending", "in-progress", "blocked"];
+        // Compose the WHERE clause: state-set + attention predicate +
+        // optional scope filters (mirrors list() composition so
+        // `attention=1` query params remain composable with
+        // destinationSession/sourceSession/targetRepo — guard re-verify
+        // qitem-20260518192210 BLOCKER 1).
+        const statePlaceholders = states.map(() => "?").join(", ");
+        // The attention predicate is EXACT in SQL (guard re-verify-3
+        // qitem-20260518193005 BLOCKER 1): is_human_seat_session evaluates
+        // the strict regex registered in the QueueRepository constructor.
+        // Malformed rows that would have slipped through a LIKE superset
+        // (e.g., 'human-@kernel' — empty name segment) are rejected at
+        // the SQL stage, BEFORE LIMIT, so they cannot saturate the LIMIT
+        // window and hide valid attention items.
+        // OPR.0.4.4.19 FR-6 — the attention predicate gains the leg-1 park
+        // clause: a qitem parked as state=blocked on a HUMAN-seat blocker is a
+        // decision the human owes. Blocking on another qitem (today's shipped
+        // usage) does NOT match — is_human_seat_session rejects qitem ids.
+        const conditions = [
+            `state IN (${statePlaceholders})`,
+            `(
+        tier = 'human-gate'
+        OR is_human_seat_session(destination_session) = 1
+        OR (state = 'blocked' AND is_human_seat_session(blocked_on) = 1)
+      )`,
+        ];
+        const params = [...states];
+        if (opts?.destinationSession) {
+            conditions.push("destination_session = ?");
+            params.push(opts.destinationSession);
+        }
+        if (opts?.sourceSession) {
+            conditions.push("source_session = ?");
+            params.push(opts.sourceSession);
+        }
+        if (opts?.targetRepo && this.hasTargetRepoColumn) {
+            conditions.push("target_repo = ?");
+            params.push(opts.targetRepo);
+        }
+        params.push(limit);
+        const sql = `
+      SELECT * FROM queue_items
+      WHERE ${conditions.join(" AND ")}
+      ORDER BY ts_created DESC
+      LIMIT ?
+    `;
+        const rows = this.db.prepare(sql).all(...params);
+        return rows.map((r) => this.rowToItem(r));
+    }
+    /**
+     * Find qitems whose `closure_required_at` is past now. Used by watchdog;
+     * does NOT itself emit events — callers decide whether to nudge or escalate.
+     *
+     * Slice 15 (finding 2): optionally rig-scoped, limited, and compact — mirroring
+     * `list` — so `rig queue overdue` is bounded and body-free by default instead of
+     * dumping every rig's full qitem bodies to a single caller. No args = the prior
+     * behavior (all overdue, full rows) for the watchdog.
+     */
+    findOverdue(opts) {
+        const cutoff = opts?.now ?? new Date().toISOString();
+        const conditions = ["state = 'in-progress'", "closure_required_at IS NOT NULL", "closure_required_at <= ?"];
+        const params = [cutoff];
+        if (opts?.rig) {
+            const escaped = opts.rig.replace(/%/g, "\\%").replace(/_/g, "\\_");
+            conditions.push("(destination_session LIKE ? ESCAPE '\\' OR source_session LIKE ? ESCAPE '\\')");
+            params.push(`%@${escaped}`, `%@${escaped}`);
+        }
+        const columns = opts?.compact ? COMPACT_QUEUE_COLUMNS : "*";
+        let sql = `SELECT ${columns} FROM queue_items WHERE ${conditions.join(" AND ")} ORDER BY closure_required_at ASC`;
+        if (opts?.limit !== undefined) {
+            sql += " LIMIT ?";
+            params.push(opts.limit);
+        }
+        const rows = this.db.prepare(sql).all(...params);
+        return rows.map((r) => this.rowToItem(r));
+    }
+    /**
+     * 0.5.1-54 DR-1 — surface the create-path failed-nudge strands. `last_nudge_result` is written by
+     * `recordNudgeAttempt` (from `maybeNudge`) but nothing ever queries it, so a create whose nudge FAILED
+     * (`failed:<msg>`) is invisible: the sender records a successful create while the destination was never
+     * woken. This is the `/overdue` analogue for pending-undelivered create-path work — a READ only (no
+     * retry, no unwind; DR-2 retry is PM-gated on DR-1's live measurement).
+     *
+     * V1-ONLY predicate, NO false-positive mode: `state='pending' AND last_nudge_result LIKE 'failed:%'`.
+     *   - A delivered row (`verified` / `delivered-ack-pending`) is excluded — it was woken.
+     *   - A NEVER-ATTEMPTED row (`last_nudge_result IS NULL` — a deliberate cold-park or a no-transport create)
+     *     is excluded. That class is FP-dominated (a legitimate cold-park is indistinguishable from a real
+     *     never-reached strand at the row) and stays DEFERRED behind a forward create-time intent bit; surfacing
+     *     it here would train the reader to ignore the signal. The reason it is excluded lives in this comment
+     *     AND the PRD, not in chat — it must outlive the excluder.
+     */
+    findUndelivered(opts) {
+        const conditions = ["state = 'pending'", "last_nudge_result LIKE 'failed:%'"];
+        const params = [];
+        if (opts?.rig) {
+            const escaped = opts.rig.replace(/%/g, "\\%").replace(/_/g, "\\_");
+            conditions.push("(destination_session LIKE ? ESCAPE '\\' OR source_session LIKE ? ESCAPE '\\')");
+            params.push(`%@${escaped}`, `%@${escaped}`);
+        }
+        const columns = opts?.compact ? COMPACT_QUEUE_COLUMNS : "*";
+        let sql = `SELECT ${columns} FROM queue_items WHERE ${conditions.join(" AND ")} ORDER BY ts_created ASC`;
+        if (opts?.limit !== undefined) {
+            sql += " LIMIT ?";
+            params.push(opts.limit);
+        }
+        const rows = this.db.prepare(sql).all(...params);
+        return rows.map((r) => this.rowToItem(r));
+    }
+    recordNudgeAttempt(qitemId, result) {
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        this.db
+            .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items
+           SET last_nudge_attempt = ?, last_nudge_result = ?
+         WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+            .run(ts, result, qitemId);
+    }
+    recordHeartbeat(qitemId) {
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        this.db
+            .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items SET last_heartbeat = ? WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+            .run(ts, qitemId);
+    }
+    /**
+     * Pod-fallback: redirect qitem to a fallback destination (e.g., when a seat
+     * is unreachable). Emits qitem.fallback_routed; preserves chain_of_record.
+     */
+    routeToFallback(qitemId, fallbackDestination, reason) {
+        const qitem = this.getById(qitemId);
+        if (!qitem) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_not_found", `qitem ${qitemId} not found`);
+        }
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        const originalDestination = qitem.destinationSession;
+        const newChain = JSON.stringify([...(qitem.chainOfRecord ?? []), `fallback-from:${originalDestination}`]);
+        const txn = this.db.transaction(() => {
+            this.db
+                .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items
+             SET destination_session = ?,
+                 ts_updated = ?,
+                 chain_of_record = ?,
+                 resolution = ?
+           WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+                .run(fallbackDestination, ts, newChain, `fallback: ${reason}`, qitemId);
+            this.transitionLog.append({
+                qitemId,
+                state: qitem.state,
+                actorSession: "system:queue-fallback",
+                transitionNote: `fallback-routed: ${originalDestination} → ${fallbackDestination} (${reason})`,
+            });
+            return this.eventBus.persistWithinTransaction({
+                type: "qitem.fallback_routed",
+                qitemId,
+                originalDestination,
+                rerouteDestination: fallbackDestination,
+                reason,
+            });
+        });
+        const persistedEvent = txn();
+        this.eventBus.notifySubscribers(persistedEvent);
+        return this.getByIdOrThrow(qitemId);
+    }
+    getByIdOrThrow(qitemId) {
+        const item = this.getById(qitemId);
+        if (!item) {
+            throw new QueueRepositoryError("qitem_not_found", `qitem ${qitemId} not found after write`);
+        }
+        return item;
+    }
+    /** OPR.0.4.1.18 — persist the optional human-readable summary additively.
+     *  Guarded by detectQueueColumn so fixtures on a pre-044 schema (no summary
+     *  column) are unaffected; only writes when a value is present (NULL is the
+     *  default and degrades in the Story consumer). Runs inside the caller's
+     *  transaction (create / handoff / handoff-and-complete). */
+    persistSummary(qitemId, summary) {
+        if (this.hasSummaryColumn && summary !== null) {
+            this.db.prepare("UPDATE queue_items SET summary = ? WHERE qitem_id = ?").run(summary, qitemId);
+        }
+    }
+    /** OPR.0.4.4.19 FR-5 — persist the optional evidence_ref additively, same
+     *  contract as persistSummary (pre-048 fixtures degrade; NULL default). */
+    persistEvidenceRef(qitemId, evidenceRef) {
+        if (this.hasEvidenceRefColumn && evidenceRef !== null) {
+            this.db.prepare("UPDATE queue_items SET evidence_ref = ? WHERE qitem_id = ?").run(evidenceRef, qitemId);
+        }
+    }
+    /** GHOST-STAGE (e/Class-B) — persist the MINTING occupant-generation additively (same degrade
+     *  contract as persistSummary; NULL when unresolved/pre-063). Forensic provenance of the creator;
+     *  the RELEASE discriminator is claimed_by_generation_uuid (stamped at claim), not this. */
+    persistMintingGeneration(qitemId, sourceSession) {
+        if (!this.hasMintingGenColumn)
+            return;
+        const gen = this.resolveOccupantGeneration?.(sourceSession) ?? null;
+        if (gen === null)
+            return;
+        this.db.prepare("UPDATE queue_items SET minting_generation_uuid = ? WHERE qitem_id = ?").run(gen, qitemId);
+    }
+    /**
+     * GHOST-STAGE (e/Class-B) — at a seat swap, RELEASE (never hard-drop) every in-progress item CLAIMED
+     * by the RETIRING generation back to pending: the role work is durable and the successor re-claims it;
+     * only the retiree's stale claim is the ghost. Gen-scoped via claimed_by_generation_uuid (NOT the seat
+     * name — the successor shares it, so a name-scoped release would steal the successor's own claims). A
+     * NULL/empty generation never matches (UNKNOWN != retired). Clears the claim stamp + claimed_at and
+     * appends an audit transition per item. Returns the count released. Pre-063 dbs no-op.
+     */
+    releaseClaimsByGeneration(retiringGeneration) {
+        if (!this.hasClaimedGenColumn || !retiringGeneration)
+            return 0;
+        const rows = this.db
+            .prepare(`SELECT qitem_id FROM queue_items WHERE state = 'in-progress' AND claimed_by_generation_uuid = ?`)
+            .all(retiringGeneration);
+        if (rows.length === 0)
+            return 0;
+        const ts = new Date().toISOString();
+        const txn = this.db.transaction(() => {
+            for (const { qitem_id } of rows) {
+                this.db
+                    .prepare(`UPDATE queue_items
+               SET state = 'pending', ts_updated = ?, claimed_at = NULL, closure_required_at = NULL,
+                   claimed_by_generation_uuid = NULL
+             WHERE qitem_id = ?`)
+                    .run(ts, qitem_id);
+                this.transitionLog.append({
+                    qitemId: qitem_id,
+                    state: "pending",
+                    actorSession: "system",
+                    transitionNote: "released: claimant generation retired (seat handover)",
+                });
+            }
+        });
+        txn();
+        return rows.length;
+    }
+    rowToItem(row) {
+        return {
+            qitemId: row.qitem_id,
+            tsCreated: row.ts_created,
+            tsUpdated: row.ts_updated,
+            sourceSession: row.source_session,
+            destinationSession: row.destination_session,
+            state: row.state,
+            priority: row.priority,
+            tier: row.tier,
+            tags: row.tags ? JSON.parse(row.tags) : null,
+            blockedOn: row.blocked_on,
+            handedOffTo: row.handed_off_to,
+            handedOffFrom: row.handed_off_from,
+            expiresAt: row.expires_at,
+            chainOfRecord: row.chain_of_record ? JSON.parse(row.chain_of_record) : null,
+            body: row.body ?? "",
+            // OPR.0.4.1.18: summary present only when migration 044 has applied;
+            // legacy/minimal fixtures supply rows where summary is undefined → null.
+            summary: row.summary ?? null,
+            // OPR.0.4.4.19 FR-5: evidence_ref present only when migration 048 has
+            // applied; legacy fixtures degrade to null.
+            evidenceRef: row.evidence_ref ?? null,
+            closureReason: row.closure_reason,
+            closureTarget: row.closure_target,
+            closureRequiredAt: row.closure_required_at,
+            claimedAt: row.claimed_at,
+            lastNudgeAttempt: row.last_nudge_attempt,
+            lastNudgeResult: row.last_nudge_result,
+            lastHeartbeat: row.last_heartbeat,
+            resolution: row.resolution,
+            // PL-007: target_repo present only when migration 038 has applied;
+            // older test fixtures supply legacy rows where target_repo is undefined.
+            targetRepo: row.target_repo ?? null,
+        };
+    }
+}
+function isQueueState(value) {
+    return QUEUE_STATES.includes(value);
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=queue-repository.js.map