@openparachute/hub 0.7.4-rc.1 → 0.7.4-rc.3

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@openparachute/hub",
-  "version": "0.7.4-rc.1",
+  "version": "0.7.4-rc.3",
   "description": "parachute — the local hub for the Parachute ecosystem (discovery, ports, lifecycle, soon OAuth).",
   "license": "AGPL-3.0",
   "publishConfig": {

package/src/__tests__/oauth-handlers.test.ts

@@ -9899,3 +9899,422 @@ describe("single OAuth consent + grantable vault admin + delegate-only cap (2026
     }
   });
 });
+
+// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+// hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault VERB SELECTOR. The consent screen offers an
+// owner of the picked vault a read/write/admin selector (pre-selected to
+// admin) when the client requested an UNNAMED `vault:read`/`vault:write`. On
+// submit, the owner's selection widens the unnamed verb to the chosen level
+// on the picked vault — BEFORE `capScopesToUserAuthority`, which remains the
+// backstop. The selector value is an UNTRUSTED hint: the handler re-derives
+// ownership of the picked vault server-side, and the cap drops any verb the
+// user doesn't actually hold.
+// ───────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
+describe("hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb selector + widening", () => {
+  const TTL_S = Math.floor(SESSION_TTL_MS / 1000);
+  const SEL_MANIFEST: ServicesManifest = {
+    services: [
+      {
+        name: "parachute-vault",
+        port: 1940,
+        paths: ["/vault/work", "/vault/other"],
+        health: "/health",
+        version: "0.7.0",
+      },
+    ],
+  };
+  const selDeps = {
+    issuer: ISSUER,
+    loadServicesManifest: () => SEL_MANIFEST,
+    hubBoundOrigins: () => [ISSUER],
+  };
+
+  async function submitConsent(
+    db: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof makeDb>>["db"],
+    sessionId: string,
+    clientId: string,
+    scope: string,
+    challenge: string,
+    extra: Record<string, string> = {},
+  ): Promise<Response> {
+    const form = new URLSearchParams({
+      __action: "consent",
+      __csrf: TEST_CSRF,
+      approve: "yes",
+      client_id: clientId,
+      redirect_uri: "https://app.example/cb",
+      response_type: "code",
+      scope,
+      code_challenge: challenge,
+      code_challenge_method: "S256",
+      ...extra,
+    });
+    return handleAuthorizePost(
+      db,
+      new Request(`${ISSUER}/oauth/authorize`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        body: form,
+        headers: {
+          "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+          cookie: `${CSRF_COOKIE}; ${buildSessionCookie(sessionId, TTL_S)}`,
+        },
+      }),
+      selDeps,
+    );
+  }
+
+  async function redeemScope(
+    db: Awaited<ReturnType<typeof makeDb>>["db"],
+    code: string,
+    clientId: string,
+    verifier: string,
+  ): Promise<string> {
+    const tokenRes = await handleToken(
+      db,
+      new Request(`${ISSUER}/oauth/token`, {
+        method: "POST",
+        body: new URLSearchParams({
+          grant_type: "authorization_code",
+          code,
+          client_id: clientId,
+          redirect_uri: "https://app.example/cb",
+          code_verifier: verifier,
+        }),
+        headers: { "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded" },
+      }),
+      selDeps,
+    );
+    expect(tokenRes.status).toBe(200);
+    const body = (await tokenRes.json()) as { scope: string };
+    return body.scope;
+  }
+
+  // GET render: owner of the picked vault sees the selector. A non-admin
+  // assigned to exactly one vault gets the locked picker → the selector is
+  // offered (they hold admin on their assigned vault).
+  test("selector RENDERED for an owner (assigned user) of the picked vault", async () => {
+    const { db, cleanup } = await makeDb();
+    try {
+      await createUser(db, "owner", "pw"); // consumes the admin slot
+      const friend = await createUser(db, "friend", "pw", { allowMulti: true });
+      setUserVaults(db, friend.id, ["work"]); // role=write → holds admin on "work"
+      const session = createSession(db, { userId: friend.id });
+      const reg = registerClient(db, {
+        redirectUris: ["https://app.example/cb"],
+        status: "approved",
+      });
+      const { challenge } = makePkce();
+      const res = handleAuthorizeGet(
+        db,
+        new Request(
+          authorizeUrl({
+            client_id: reg.client.clientId,
+            redirect_uri: "https://app.example/cb",
+            response_type: "code",
+            code_challenge: challenge,
+            code_challenge_method: "S256",
+            scope: "vault:read",
+          }),
+          { headers: { cookie: `${CSRF_COOKIE}; ${buildSessionCookie(session.id, TTL_S)}` } },
+        ),
+        selDeps,
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const html = await res.text();
+      expect(html).toContain("Access level");
+      expect(html).toContain('name="verb_select"');
+      // Admin pre-selected, still visibly flagged.
+      expect(html).toMatch(/name="verb_select" value="admin"[^>]*checked/);
+      expect(html).toContain("badge-admin");
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // GET render: a read-only-assigned user (role=read → holds read, NOT admin)
+  // does NOT see the selector — offering admin pre-selected would promise an
+  // upgrade the cap silently demotes. They hold the vault but not admin on it.
+  test("selector NOT rendered for a read-only-assigned user (holds read, not admin)", async () => {
+    const { db, cleanup } = await makeDb();
+    try {
+      await createUser(db, "owner", "pw");
+      const reader = await createUser(db, "reader", "pw", { allowMulti: true });
+      // role=read directly (setUserVaults hardcodes write) → holds read only.
+      db.prepare(
+        "INSERT INTO user_vaults (user_id, vault_name, role, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, 'read', ?)",
+      ).run(reader.id, "work", new Date().toISOString());
+      const session = createSession(db, { userId: reader.id });
+      const reg = registerClient(db, {
+        redirectUris: ["https://app.example/cb"],
+        status: "approved",
+      });
+      const { challenge } = makePkce();
+      const res = handleAuthorizeGet(
+        db,
+        new Request(
+          authorizeUrl({
+            client_id: reg.client.clientId,
+            redirect_uri: "https://app.example/cb",
+            response_type: "code",
+            code_challenge: challenge,
+            code_challenge_method: "S256",
+            scope: "vault:read",
+          }),
+          { headers: { cookie: `${CSRF_COOKIE}; ${buildSessionCookie(session.id, TTL_S)}` } },
+        ),
+        selDeps,
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const html = await res.text();
+      expect(html).not.toContain("Access level");
+      expect(html).not.toContain('name="verb_select"');
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // GET render: a non-owner (non-admin with ZERO assigned vaults) does NOT
+  // see the selector — they can't authorize a vault scope at all.
+  test("selector NOT rendered for a non-owner (zero-vault non-admin)", async () => {
+    const { db, cleanup } = await makeDb();
+    try {
+      await createUser(db, "owner", "pw");
+      const stranger = await createUser(db, "stranger", "pw", { allowMulti: true });
+      // No setUserVaults → zero assignments → not an owner of anything.
+      const session = createSession(db, { userId: stranger.id });
+      const reg = registerClient(db, {
+        redirectUris: ["https://app.example/cb"],
+        status: "approved",
+      });
+      const { challenge } = makePkce();
+      const res = handleAuthorizeGet(
+        db,
+        new Request(
+          authorizeUrl({
+            client_id: reg.client.clientId,
+            redirect_uri: "https://app.example/cb",
+            response_type: "code",
+            code_challenge: challenge,
+            code_challenge_method: "S256",
+            scope: "vault:read",
+          }),
+          { headers: { cookie: `${CSRF_COOKIE}; ${buildSessionCookie(session.id, TTL_S)}` } },
+        ),
+        selDeps,
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(200);
+      const html = await res.text();
+      expect(html).not.toContain("Access level");
+      expect(html).not.toContain('name="verb_select"');
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Submit: owner (first admin) + client requested unnamed vault:read + selects
+  // admin → minted vault:<picked>:admin. THE core bug fix.
+  test("owner selects admin on an unnamed vault:read → minted vault:work:admin", async () => {
+    const { db, cleanup } = await makeDb();
+    try {
+      const owner = await createUser(db, "owner", "pw"); // first admin
+      const session = createSession(db, { userId: owner.id });
+      const reg = registerClient(db, {
+        redirectUris: ["https://app.example/cb"],
+        status: "approved",
+      });
+      const { verifier, challenge } = makePkce();
+      const res = await submitConsent(
+        db,
+        session.id,
+        reg.client.clientId,
+        "vault:read",
+        challenge,
+        {
+          vault_pick: "work",
+          verb_select: "admin",
+        },
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(302);
+      const code = new URL(res.headers.get("location") ?? "").searchParams.get("code");
+      expect(code).toBeTruthy();
+      const scope = await redeemScope(db, code ?? "", reg.client.clientId, verifier);
+      expect(scope).toBe("vault:work:admin");
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Submit: owner selects write → vault:<picked>:write.
+  test("owner selects write on an unnamed vault:read → minted vault:work:write", async () => {
+    const { db, cleanup } = await makeDb();
+    try {
+      const owner = await createUser(db, "owner", "pw");
+      const session = createSession(db, { userId: owner.id });
+      const reg = registerClient(db, {
+        redirectUris: ["https://app.example/cb"],
+        status: "approved",
+      });
+      const { verifier, challenge } = makePkce();
+      const res = await submitConsent(
+        db,
+        session.id,
+        reg.client.clientId,
+        "vault:read",
+        challenge,
+        {
+          vault_pick: "work",
+          verb_select: "write",
+        },
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(302);
+      const code = new URL(res.headers.get("location") ?? "").searchParams.get("code");
+      const scope = await redeemScope(db, code ?? "", reg.client.clientId, verifier);
+      expect(scope).toBe("vault:work:write");
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Submit: owner DOWNGRADES — selects read on an unnamed vault:write → read.
+  test("owner selects read on an unnamed vault:write → minted vault:work:read (downgrade)", async () => {
+    const { db, cleanup } = await makeDb();
+    try {
+      const owner = await createUser(db, "owner", "pw");
+      const session = createSession(db, { userId: owner.id });
+      const reg = registerClient(db, {
+        redirectUris: ["https://app.example/cb"],
+        status: "approved",
+      });
+      const { verifier, challenge } = makePkce();
+      const res = await submitConsent(
+        db,
+        session.id,
+        reg.client.clientId,
+        "vault:write",
+        challenge,
+        {
+          vault_pick: "work",
+          verb_select: "read",
+        },
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(302);
+      const code = new URL(res.headers.get("location") ?? "").searchParams.get("code");
+      const scope = await redeemScope(db, code ?? "", reg.client.clientId, verifier);
+      expect(scope).toBe("vault:work:read");
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // SECURITY: a non-owner who holds only READ on the picked vault forges
+  // verb_select=admin → the server re-derives ownership (no admin held) and
+  // refuses to widen; the cap is the backstop. Minted scope is capped to
+  // their actual authority (read), NOT elevated to admin.
+  test("SECURITY: read-only-assigned non-owner forges verb_select=admin → minted vault:work:read, NOT admin", async () => {
+    const { db, cleanup } = await makeDb();
+    try {
+      await createUser(db, "owner", "pw"); // first admin = owner
+      const reader = await createUser(db, "reader", "pw", { allowMulti: true });
+      // Assign "work" with role=read directly → holds read only (NOT admin).
+      // setUserVaults hardcodes role=write, so insert the read row by hand to
+      // construct the read-only-authority case the cap must defend.
+      db.prepare(
+        "INSERT INTO user_vaults (user_id, vault_name, role, created_at) VALUES (?, ?, 'read', ?)",
+      ).run(reader.id, "work", new Date().toISOString());
+      const session = createSession(db, { userId: reader.id });
+      const reg = registerClient(db, {
+        redirectUris: ["https://app.example/cb"],
+        status: "approved",
+      });
+      const { verifier, challenge } = makePkce();
+      const res = await submitConsent(
+        db,
+        session.id,
+        reg.client.clientId,
+        "vault:read",
+        challenge,
+        {
+          vault_pick: "work",
+          verb_select: "admin", // FORGED — reader holds read only
+        },
+      );
+      // Read survives (held); admin never rides along.
+      expect(res.status).toBe(302);
+      const code = new URL(res.headers.get("location") ?? "").searchParams.get("code");
+      expect(code).toBeTruthy();
+      const scope = await redeemScope(db, code ?? "", reg.client.clientId, verifier);
+      expect(scope).toBe("vault:work:read");
+      expect(scope).not.toContain("admin");
+      // And the recorded grant carries no admin verb either.
+      const grant = findGrant(db, reader.id, reg.client.clientId);
+      expect(grant?.scopes ?? []).not.toContain("vault:work:admin");
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // SECURITY: a non-admin assigned to "work" picks/forges admin on "other"
+  // (a vault outside their assignment) — the assignment-mismatch gate refuses
+  // before widening ever runs. No token minted.
+  test("SECURITY: forged verb_select=admin against an UNASSIGNED vault → 400 (mismatch gate, no mint)", async () => {
+    const { db, cleanup } = await makeDb();
+    try {
+      await createUser(db, "owner", "pw");
+      const friend = await createUser(db, "friend", "pw", { allowMulti: true });
+      setUserVaults(db, friend.id, ["work"]); // assigned "work" only
+      const session = createSession(db, { userId: friend.id });
+      const reg = registerClient(db, {
+        redirectUris: ["https://app.example/cb"],
+        status: "approved",
+      });
+      const { challenge } = makePkce();
+      const res = await submitConsent(
+        db,
+        session.id,
+        reg.client.clientId,
+        "vault:read",
+        challenge,
+        {
+          vault_pick: "other", // NOT in friend's assignment
+          verb_select: "admin",
+        },
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(findGrant(db, friend.id, reg.client.clientId)).toBeNull();
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  // Owner without a verb_select field (older form / JS-off) → unchanged
+  // behavior: the unnamed verb narrows as-requested (vault:read → work:read).
+  test("owner with NO verb_select → unchanged narrowing (vault:read → vault:work:read)", async () => {
+    const { db, cleanup } = await makeDb();
+    try {
+      const owner = await createUser(db, "owner", "pw");
+      const session = createSession(db, { userId: owner.id });
+      const reg = registerClient(db, {
+        redirectUris: ["https://app.example/cb"],
+        status: "approved",
+      });
+      const { verifier, challenge } = makePkce();
+      const res = await submitConsent(
+        db,
+        session.id,
+        reg.client.clientId,
+        "vault:read",
+        challenge,
+        {
+          vault_pick: "work",
+          // no verb_select
+        },
+      );
+      expect(res.status).toBe(302);
+      const code = new URL(res.headers.get("location") ?? "").searchParams.get("code");
+      const scope = await redeemScope(db, code ?? "", reg.client.clientId, verifier);
+      expect(scope).toBe("vault:work:read");
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+});

package/src/__tests__/oauth-ui.test.ts

@@ -116,7 +116,8 @@ describe("renderConsent", () => {
     expect(html).toContain("vault:admin");
     // Scope explanations from the registry
     expect(html).toContain("Read your notes");
-    expect(html).toContain("Full vault access");
+    // hub#689 Leg 1: the admin label now enumerates the concrete grants.
+    expect(html).toContain("Read and write everything, plus admin");
   });
 
   test("highlights admin scopes with a danger color and badge", () => {
@@ -252,6 +253,59 @@ describe("renderConsent", () => {
     expect(html).not.toContain("You have no assigned vaults");
     expect(html).not.toContain('value="yes" class="btn btn-primary" disabled');
   });
+
+  // hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb selector rendering.
+  test("renders the owner verb selector (read/write/admin), pre-selected to admin", () => {
+    const html = renderConsent({
+      params: { ...PARAMS, scope: "vault:read" },
+      csrfToken: CSRF,
+      clientId: "c",
+      clientName: "App",
+      scopes: ["vault:read"],
+      vaultPicker: { unnamedVerbs: ["read"], availableVaults: ["work"], lockedVault: "work" },
+      ownerVerbSelector: { requestedVerbs: ["read"] },
+    });
+    expect(html).toContain("Access level");
+    expect(html).toContain('name="verb_select" value="read"');
+    expect(html).toContain('name="verb_select" value="write"');
+    expect(html).toContain('name="verb_select" value="admin"');
+    // Admin is the pre-selected (checked) option.
+    expect(html).toMatch(/name="verb_select" value="admin"[^>]*checked/);
+    // read/write are NOT pre-checked.
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/name="verb_select" value="read"[^>]*checked/);
+    expect(html).not.toMatch(/name="verb_select" value="write"[^>]*checked/);
+  });
+
+  test("owner verb selector keeps the admin option visibly flagged (admin badge + red border)", () => {
+    const html = renderConsent({
+      params: { ...PARAMS, scope: "vault:read" },
+      csrfToken: CSRF,
+      clientId: "c",
+      clientName: "App",
+      scopes: ["vault:read"],
+      vaultPicker: { unnamedVerbs: ["read"], availableVaults: ["work"], lockedVault: "work" },
+      ownerVerbSelector: { requestedVerbs: ["read"] },
+    });
+    // The .scope-admin red-border class + the admin badge ride on the admin
+    // radio option so a pre-selected admin grant stays transparent.
+    expect(html).toContain("verb-option-admin");
+    expect(html).toContain("scope-admin");
+    expect(html).toContain("badge-admin");
+  });
+
+  test("does NOT render the verb selector when ownerVerbSelector is absent (non-owner)", () => {
+    const html = renderConsent({
+      params: { ...PARAMS, scope: "vault:read" },
+      csrfToken: CSRF,
+      clientId: "c",
+      clientName: "App",
+      scopes: ["vault:read"],
+      vaultPicker: { unnamedVerbs: ["read"], availableVaults: ["work"], lockedVault: "work" },
+      // ownerVerbSelector omitted → no selector
+    });
+    expect(html).not.toContain("Access level");
+    expect(html).not.toContain('name="verb_select"');
+  });
 });
 
 describe("renderError", () => {

package/src/__tests__/scope-explanations.test.ts

@@ -29,6 +29,25 @@ describe("SCOPE_EXPLANATIONS", () => {
     }
   });
 
+  // hub#689 Leg 1: the vault:admin consent copy must enumerate what
+  // admin actually grants (config/settings, triggers/automation, GitHub
+  // backup, token minting) on top of read/write — so the consent screen
+  // is honest about the admin blast radius, not a vague "configuration
+  // changes" hand-wave.
+  test("vault:admin label enumerates the concrete admin grants (hub#689 Leg 1)", () => {
+    const label = SCOPE_EXPLANATIONS["vault:admin"]?.label ?? "";
+    const lower = label.toLowerCase();
+    expect(SCOPE_EXPLANATIONS["vault:admin"]?.level).toBe("admin");
+    // Read + write are still part of what admin grants.
+    expect(lower).toContain("read");
+    expect(lower).toContain("write");
+    // The four enumerated admin powers.
+    expect(lower).toContain("config");
+    expect(lower).toContain("trigger");
+    expect(lower).toContain("github");
+    expect(lower).toContain("token");
+  });
+
   test("FIRST_PARTY_SCOPES is sorted and matches the keys of SCOPE_EXPLANATIONS", () => {
     expect(FIRST_PARTY_SCOPES).toEqual([...FIRST_PARTY_SCOPES].sort());
     expect(new Set(FIRST_PARTY_SCOPES)).toEqual(new Set(Object.keys(SCOPE_EXPLANATIONS)));

package/src/__tests__/status-supervisor.test.ts

@@ -80,6 +80,12 @@ interface SupervisorArmOpts {
   hubHealthy: boolean;
   moduleStates?: ModuleStatesResult;
   fetchModuleStatesImpl?: () => Promise<ModuleStatesResult>;
+  /**
+   * Inject the unauthenticated module-liveness probe (#700). Defaults to "every
+   * module is down" so the degraded-read tests don't accidentally hit the
+   * network; specific tests override to mark a module live.
+   */
+  probeModuleHealth?: (port: number, health: string) => Promise<boolean>;
 }
 
 /** Drive `status` through the supervisor arm with fully stubbed seams. */
@@ -96,6 +102,7 @@ function supervisorOpts(configDir: string, path: string, o: SupervisorArmOpts) {
       fetchModuleStates:
         o.fetchModuleStatesImpl ??
         (async () => o.moduleStates ?? { supervisorAvailable: true, modules: [] }),
+      probeModuleHealth: o.probeModuleHealth ?? (async () => false),
       openDb: fakeOpenDb as unknown as (configDir: string) => import("bun:sqlite").Database,
     },
   };
@@ -377,7 +384,7 @@ describe("status — Phase 3c supervisor arm: module rows", () => {
     }
   });
 
-  test("no operator token → graceful degrade (manifest rows + actionable hint), no 401 crash", async () => {
+  test("no operator token (fresh box, no admin) → note targets set-password, NOT rotate-operator (#700)", async () => {
     const { path, configDir, cleanup } = makeTempPath();
     try {
       upsertService(
@@ -392,15 +399,121 @@ describe("status — Phase 3c supervisor arm: module rows", () => {
           fetchModuleStatesImpl: async () => {
             throw new NoOperatorTokenError();
           },
+          // No probe-live module here → row stays inactive (exit 0).
+          probeModuleHealth: async () => false,
         }),
         print: (l) => lines.push(l),
       });
       // We could not read run-state, but didn't crash. The module row falls back
-      // to `inactive` (no supervisor snapshot) — a stopped row is exit 0.
+      // to `inactive` (no supervisor snapshot, probe down) — a stopped row is exit 0.
       expect(code).toBe(0);
       const out = lines.join("\n");
       expect(out).toMatch(/parachute-vault/);
-      expect(out).toMatch(/run `parachute auth rotate-operator`/);
+      // #700: a fresh box has no admin, so rotate-operator would itself error.
+      // The note must point at set-password and must NOT be the bare
+      // rotate-operator guidance.
+      expect(out).toMatch(/parachute auth set-password/);
+      expect(out).not.toMatch(/run `parachute auth rotate-operator` to mint an operator token/);
+      const vaultLine = lines.find((l) => l.includes("parachute-vault"));
+      expect(vaultLine).toMatch(/\binactive\b/);
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("no operator token + module answers /health probe → LIVE (active), not inactive (#700)", async () => {
+    const { path, configDir, cleanup } = makeTempPath();
+    try {
+      upsertService(
+        { name: "parachute-vault", port: 1940, paths: ["/"], health: "/health", version: "0.6.2" },
+        path,
+      );
+      const probed: Array<{ port: number; health: string }> = [];
+      const lines: string[] = [];
+      const code = await status({
+        ...supervisorOpts(configDir, path, {
+          managerState: { state: "active" },
+          hubHealthy: true,
+          fetchModuleStatesImpl: async () => {
+            throw new NoOperatorTokenError();
+          },
+          // vault is genuinely up — its /health answers (2xx or 401 → live).
+          probeModuleHealth: async (port, health) => {
+            probed.push({ port, health });
+            return true;
+          },
+        }),
+        print: (l) => lines.push(l),
+      });
+      expect(code).toBe(0);
+      // The probe targeted the module's own port + health path from the manifest.
+      expect(probed).toEqual([{ port: 1940, health: "/health" }]);
+      const vaultLine = lines.find((l) => l.includes("parachute-vault"));
+      expect(vaultLine).toMatch(/\bactive\b/);
+      expect(vaultLine).not.toMatch(/\binactive\b/);
+      const out = lines.join("\n");
+      // The row is labelled as probe-derived so the operator knows it's thin.
+      expect(out).toMatch(/live via unauthenticated health probe/);
+      // The degraded-read hint still appears (why PID/uptime are absent).
+      expect(out).toMatch(/parachute auth set-password/);
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("degraded read + module probe FAILS → row stays inactive (#700)", async () => {
+    const { path, configDir, cleanup } = makeTempPath();
+    try {
+      upsertService(
+        { name: "parachute-vault", port: 1940, paths: ["/"], health: "/health", version: "0.6.2" },
+        path,
+      );
+      const lines: string[] = [];
+      const code = await status({
+        ...supervisorOpts(configDir, path, {
+          managerState: { state: "active" },
+          hubHealthy: true,
+          fetchModuleStatesImpl: async () => {
+            throw new NoOperatorTokenError();
+          },
+          probeModuleHealth: async () => false,
+        }),
+        print: (l) => lines.push(l),
+      });
+      expect(code).toBe(0);
+      const vaultLine = lines.find((l) => l.includes("parachute-vault"));
+      expect(vaultLine).toMatch(/\binactive\b/);
+      const out = lines.join("\n");
+      expect(out).not.toMatch(/live via unauthenticated health probe/);
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
+  test("a throwing module probe never crashes status — row degrades to inactive (#700)", async () => {
+    const { path, configDir, cleanup } = makeTempPath();
+    try {
+      upsertService(
+        { name: "parachute-vault", port: 1940, paths: ["/"], health: "/health", version: "0.6.2" },
+        path,
+      );
+      const lines: string[] = [];
+      const code = await status({
+        ...supervisorOpts(configDir, path, {
+          managerState: { state: "active" },
+          hubHealthy: true,
+          fetchModuleStatesImpl: async () => {
+            throw new NoOperatorTokenError();
+          },
+          probeModuleHealth: async () => {
+            throw new Error("probe exploded");
+          },
+        }),
+        print: (l) => lines.push(l),
+      });
+      expect(code).toBe(0);
+      const vaultLine = lines.find((l) => l.includes("parachute-vault"));
+      expect(vaultLine).toMatch(/\binactive\b/);
     } finally {
       cleanup();
     }
@@ -433,6 +546,42 @@ describe("status — Phase 3c supervisor arm: module rows", () => {
     }
   });
 
+  test("expired operator token + module answers /health probe → LIVE (active) (#700)", async () => {
+    // Symmetry with the no-token case: the unauthenticated probe fallback fires
+    // on ANY degraded read where the hub is up + run-state is missing, so an
+    // expired-token box still shows a genuinely-serving module as `active`.
+    const { path, configDir, cleanup } = makeTempPath();
+    try {
+      upsertService(
+        { name: "parachute-vault", port: 1940, paths: ["/"], health: "/health", version: "0.6.2" },
+        path,
+      );
+      const lines: string[] = [];
+      const code = await status({
+        ...supervisorOpts(configDir, path, {
+          managerState: { state: "active" },
+          hubHealthy: true,
+          fetchModuleStatesImpl: async () => {
+            throw new OperatorTokenExpiredError(
+              "token expired — run `parachute auth rotate-operator`",
+            );
+          },
+          probeModuleHealth: async () => true,
+        }),
+        print: (l) => lines.push(l),
+      });
+      expect(code).toBe(0);
+      const vaultLine = lines.find((l) => l.includes("parachute-vault"));
+      expect(vaultLine).toMatch(/\bactive\b/);
+      const out = lines.join("\n");
+      expect(out).toMatch(/live via unauthenticated health probe/);
+      // The expired-token degraded-read hint still points at rotate-operator.
+      expect(out).toMatch(/rotate-operator/);
+    } finally {
+      cleanup();
+    }
+  });
+
   test("API error reading module states → degrade with the message, no crash", async () => {
     const { path, configDir, cleanup } = makeTempPath();
     try {

package/src/commands/status.ts

@@ -19,8 +19,8 @@ import {
 } from "../install-source.ts";
 import {
   type DriveModuleOpDeps,
-  type ModuleStatesResult,
   type ModuleStateSnapshot,
+  type ModuleStatesResult,
   NoOperatorTokenError,
   OperatorTokenExpiredError,
   fetchModuleStates as fetchModuleStatesImpl,
@@ -71,6 +71,17 @@ export interface StatusOpts {
     probeHubHealth?: (port: number) => Promise<boolean>;
     /** Read the running supervisor's module states (§6.4 module rows). */
     fetchModuleStates?: (deps: DriveModuleOpDeps) => Promise<ModuleStatesResult>;
+    /**
+     * Unauthenticated module-liveness probe (#700). Used ONLY on the degraded
+     * path where the supervisor run-state read couldn't run (no/expired/invalid
+     * operator token, or any API error) but the hub itself is up: probes a
+     * module's own `/health` directly on its loopback port. Treats 2xx AND 401
+     * as live (mirrors the "auth-gated health = healthy" rule, #423: a module
+     * that answers 401 is authenticated-but-alive, not down). Bounded; never
+     * throws. Production reuses the same bounded fetch shape as the hub probe;
+     * tests inject so they don't hit the network.
+     */
+    probeModuleHealth?: (port: number, health: string) => Promise<boolean>;
     /**
      * Open the hub DB used to validate/auto-rotate the operator token in
      * `fetchModuleStates`. Production opens `<configDir>/hub.db`; tests inject a
@@ -162,6 +173,15 @@ interface StatusRow {
    * Printed on a continuation line like the other notes.
    */
   managerNote?: string;
+  /**
+   * Set on a module row whose STATE was derived from an unauthenticated
+   * `/health` probe rather than the supervisor's run-state (#700) — the
+   * degraded-read fallback (no/expired operator token, or an API error) where
+   * the module is genuinely serving. Tells the operator the row is live-but-
+   * thin: no PID/uptime/structured run-state until they sign in. Printed on a
+   * continuation line like the other notes.
+   */
+  probeNote?: string;
 }
 
 /**
@@ -319,6 +339,7 @@ function renderRows(rows: StatusRow[], print: (line: string) => void): void {
       print(`  ! probe: ${row.healthDetail}`);
     }
     if (row.managerNote) print(`  ! ${row.managerNote}`);
+    if (row.probeNote) print(`  → ${row.probeNote}`);
     if (row.driftWarning) print(`  ! ${row.driftWarning}`);
     if (row.staleNote) print(`  ! ${row.staleNote}`);
     if (row.startErrorNote) print(`  ! ${row.startErrorNote}`);
@@ -336,12 +357,33 @@ function renderRows(rows: StatusRow[], print: (line: string) => void): void {
 // in Phase 5b.
 // ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
 
+/**
+ * Default unauthenticated module-liveness probe (#700). A bounded `fetch` to the
+ * module's own `http://127.0.0.1:<port><health>`. Treats 2xx AND 401 as live —
+ * an auth-gated `/health` that answers 401 is authenticated-but-alive, not down
+ * (the "auth-gated health = healthy" rule, #423). Any other status / network
+ * error / timeout → false. 1.5s timeout, mirroring hub-unit's `defaultProbeHealth`.
+ */
+async function defaultProbeModuleHealth(port: number, health: string): Promise<boolean> {
+  try {
+    const res = await fetch(`http://127.0.0.1:${port}${health}`, {
+      signal: AbortSignal.timeout(1500),
+      // Loopback-only target, but never chase a redirect off-box (defensive).
+      redirect: "manual",
+    });
+    return res.ok || res.status === 401;
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
 /** Resolved supervisor-path seams (see `StatusOpts.supervisor`). */
 interface ResolvedStatusSupervisor {
   hubUnitDeps: HubUnitDeps;
   queryHubUnitState: (deps: HubUnitDeps) => HubUnitStateResult;
   probeHubHealth: (port: number) => Promise<boolean>;
   fetchModuleStates: (deps: DriveModuleOpDeps) => Promise<ModuleStatesResult>;
+  probeModuleHealth: (port: number, health: string) => Promise<boolean>;
   openDb: (configDir: string) => Database;
   baseUrl: string | undefined;
 }
@@ -357,6 +399,7 @@ function resolveStatusSupervisor(opts: StatusOpts["supervisor"]): ResolvedStatus
     queryHubUnitState: opts?.queryHubUnitState ?? queryHubUnitStateImpl,
     probeHubHealth: opts?.probeHubHealth ?? hubUnitDeps.probeHealth,
     fetchModuleStates: opts?.fetchModuleStates ?? fetchModuleStatesImpl,
+    probeModuleHealth: opts?.probeModuleHealth ?? defaultProbeModuleHealth,
     openDb: opts?.openDb ?? ((configDir) => openHubDb(hubDbPath(configDir))),
     baseUrl: opts?.baseUrl,
   };
@@ -471,10 +514,17 @@ async function buildSupervisorRows(args: BuildSupervisorRowsArgs): Promise<Statu
         ...(sup.baseUrl !== undefined ? { baseUrl: sup.baseUrl } : {}),
       });
     } catch (err) {
-      if (err instanceof NoOperatorTokenError || err instanceof OperatorTokenExpiredError) {
-        // No / expired operator token: we can't read module run-state, but the
-        // hub is up. Show the manifest-derived rows with an actionable note —
-        // do NOT 401-crash status (§6.4 graceful degradation).
+      if (err instanceof NoOperatorTokenError) {
+        // No operator token AND none can be minted yet — on a fresh box the
+        // first admin doesn't exist, so `rotate-operator` would itself hard-error
+        // ("no hub users yet"). Point at `set-password` (create the first admin),
+        // the actual unblocking step. We still can't read run-state, but the hub
+        // is up — degrade gracefully (§6.4), do NOT 401-crash status (#700).
+        moduleReadNote =
+          "couldn't read live module state — run `parachute auth set-password` to create the first admin (then `parachute auth rotate-operator`)";
+      } else if (err instanceof OperatorTokenExpiredError) {
+        // Token exists but is stale: an admin already exists, so re-minting works.
+        // Keep the rotate-operator guidance.
         moduleReadNote =
           "couldn't read live module state — run `parachute auth rotate-operator` to mint an operator token";
       } else {
@@ -500,6 +550,26 @@ async function buildSupervisorRows(args: BuildSupervisorRowsArgs): Promise<Statu
     if (m.short && !stateByShort.has(m.short)) stateByShort.set(m.short, m);
   }
 
+  // Unauthenticated-liveness fallback (#700). On the degraded path — the hub is
+  // up but we couldn't read supervisor run-state (no/expired operator token, or
+  // an API error) — probe each module's own `/health` directly so a module that
+  // is genuinely serving reads LIVE instead of being mapped null→`inactive`
+  // (which falsely told fresh-box operators a working install was broken). Keyed
+  // by the unique `entry.name`; probed concurrently, bounded, never throws.
+  const probeAlive = new Map<string, boolean>();
+  if (hubHealthy && !states) {
+    await Promise.all(
+      manifest.services.map(async (entry) => {
+        try {
+          const alive = await sup.probeModuleHealth(entry.port, entry.health);
+          if (alive) probeAlive.set(entry.name, true);
+        } catch {
+          // Probe must never crash status — absent from the map = treated as down.
+        }
+      }),
+    );
+  }
+
   const rows: StatusRow[] = manifest.services.map((entry) => {
     const base = manifestRowBase(entry, installSourceDeps);
     const snap = base.short ? stateByShort.get(base.short) : undefined;
@@ -526,6 +596,39 @@ async function buildSupervisorRows(args: BuildSupervisorRowsArgs): Promise<Statu
       };
     }
 
+    // Degraded read, but the module answered an unauthenticated `/health` probe
+    // (#700): show it LIVE instead of null→`inactive`. We can't surface PID/
+    // uptime/structured run-state (those need the operator token), so keep the
+    // degraded `moduleReadNote` AND add a probe-derived continuation note so the
+    // operator understands the row is from a liveness probe, not full supervisor
+    // state. `skipped: true` keeps a working install at exit 0.
+    if (!snap && probeAlive.get(entry.name)) {
+      const row: StatusRow = {
+        service: entry.name,
+        port: String(entry.port),
+        version: entry.version,
+        stateLabel: "active",
+        pidLabel: "-",
+        uptimeLabel: "-",
+        healthDetail: "-",
+        latencyLabel: "-",
+        sourceLabel: base.sourceLabel,
+        url: base.url,
+        healthy: true,
+        skipped: true,
+      };
+      row.probeNote = "live via unauthenticated health probe — sign in for full supervisor state";
+      if (base.driftWarning) row.driftWarning = base.driftWarning;
+      if (base.staleNote) row.staleNote = base.staleNote;
+      if (base.manifestStartErrorNote) row.startErrorNote = base.manifestStartErrorNote;
+      // Surface the degraded-read note ONCE (first module row), same as below.
+      if (moduleReadNote) {
+        row.managerNote = moduleReadNote;
+        moduleReadNote = undefined;
+      }
+      return row;
+    }
+
     const { stateLabel, healthy, skipped } = mapSupervisorStatus(snap?.supervisor_status ?? null);
     // Prefer the supervisor's structured start-error (live), else the persisted
     // services.json note — same friendly surface either way (#188).

package/src/oauth-handlers.ts

@@ -1209,9 +1209,31 @@ export function handleAuthorizeGet(db: Database, req: Request, deps: OAuthDeps):
     return issueAuthCodeRedirect(db, parsed, requestedScopes, session.userId, deps);
   }
 
+  // hub#689 — does the user hold ADMIN on every vault they could pick? Admin
+  // (isFirstAdmin) owns the whole hub. A non-admin owns a vault only if their
+  // `user_vaults` role grants admin there (today role=write does; a role=read
+  // assignment would NOT). Re-derived from the DB so the owner-verb-selector
+  // is offered only to a genuine owner — the submit path re-checks the PICKED
+  // vault and the cap is the backstop, but rendering it precisely avoids
+  // promising an admin upgrade the cap would silently demote.
+  const userHoldsAdminOnPickable =
+    userIsAdmin ||
+    (assignedVaults.length > 0 &&
+      assignedVaults.every((v) =>
+        (vaultVerbsForUserVault(db, session.userId, v) ?? []).includes("admin"),
+      ));
+
   return htmlResponse(
     renderConsent(
-      consentProps(client, parsed, vaultNames, csrf.token, assignedVaults, userIsAdmin),
+      consentProps(
+        client,
+        parsed,
+        vaultNames,
+        csrf.token,
+        assignedVaults,
+        userIsAdmin,
+        userHoldsAdminOnPickable,
+      ),
     ),
     200,
     extra,
@@ -1270,7 +1292,8 @@ function capScopesToUserAuthority(
     if (name === undefined || verb === undefined || !VAULT_VERBS.has(verb)) return true;
     // Named vault verb requested by a non-owner: admit only if the user holds
     // it. `vaultVerbsForUserVault` returns null for an unassigned vault (drop)
-    // or the held verb list (today read/write only — never admin).
+    // or the held verb list — a `write` role holds [read, write, admin], a
+    // `read` role holds [read] (see `vaultVerbsForRole`).
     const held = vaultVerbsForUserVault(db, userId, name);
     return held !== null && (held as readonly string[]).includes(verb);
   });
@@ -1682,6 +1705,44 @@ async function handleConsentSubmit(
         400,
       );
     }
+    // hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb widening. The consent screen offers
+    // owners a read/write/admin selector (pre-selected to admin) for an
+    // unnamed `vault:read`/`vault:write` request, so an owner whose AI client
+    // asked for read-only can grant the level it actually needs in-flow. The
+    // submitted `verb_select` is an UNTRUSTED hint — we re-derive ownership of
+    // the PICKED vault server-side here, and `capScopesToUserAuthority` (inside
+    // issueAuthCodeRedirect) is the backstop that drops any verb the user
+    // doesn't actually hold. This only ever rewrites the unnamed read/write
+    // verb(s) to the selected level on the picked vault; named scopes and every
+    // other scope are untouched. A forged `verb_select=admin` from a user who
+    // doesn't own the picked vault gets capped back to what they hold (or, for
+    // a vault outside a pinned user's assignment, never reaches here — the
+    // mismatch checks above already 400'd it).
+    const selectedVerb = String(form.get("verb_select") ?? "").trim();
+    if (selectedVerb === "read" || selectedVerb === "write" || selectedVerb === "admin") {
+      // Re-derive, server-side, whether THIS user owns (holds admin on) the
+      // PICKED vault. Owner === first admin (holds admin everywhere) OR an
+      // assigned user whose role grants admin on this vault. Never trust the
+      // client-submitted selector to establish authority.
+      const heldOnPicked = vaultVerbsForUserVault(db, session.userId, pickedVault);
+      const ownsPicked = userIsAdmin || (heldOnPicked?.includes("admin") ?? false);
+      if (ownsPicked) {
+        scopes = scopes.map((s) => {
+          const parts = s.split(":");
+          // Only widen the unnamed read/write verbs the selector was offered
+          // for — leave an unnamed `vault:admin`, named scopes, and non-vault
+          // scopes exactly as requested.
+          if (
+            parts.length === 2 &&
+            parts[0] === "vault" &&
+            (parts[1] === "read" || parts[1] === "write")
+          ) {
+            return `vault:${selectedVerb}`;
+          }
+          return s;
+        });
+      }
+    }
     scopes = narrowVaultScopes(scopes, pickedVault);
   }
 
@@ -2746,6 +2807,10 @@ function consentProps(
   csrfToken: string,
   assignedVaults: readonly string[],
   userIsAdmin: boolean,
+  // hub#689 — true when the user holds admin on every vault they could pick
+  // (admin owns the hub; an assigned non-admin only if their role grants admin
+  // on each assigned vault). Gates whether the owner-verb-selector renders.
+  userHoldsAdminOnPickable = userIsAdmin,
 ) {
   const scopes = params.scope.split(" ").filter((s) => s.length > 0);
   const unnamedVerbs = unnamedVaultVerbs(scopes);
@@ -2875,6 +2940,25 @@ function consentProps(
     const only = vaultNames[0];
     if (only) displayVault = only;
   }
+  // hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb selector. The client requested an
+  // unnamed `vault:read`/`vault:write` verb, and the consenting user owns
+  // (holds admin on) every vault they could pick — first admin owns the whole
+  // hub; an assigned non-admin holds admin on each of their assigned vaults
+  // (vaultVerbsForRole('write') → [read,write,admin]). Offer the selector so
+  // they can grant the level their client actually needs (or downgrade), with
+  // admin pre-selected. Suppressed when the request can't be authorized (zero-
+  // vault non-admin) or the assignment is stale (no valid vault to own).
+  //
+  // SECURITY: this only DECIDES WHETHER TO RENDER. The actual widening is
+  // re-derived server-side in `handleConsentSubmit` against the *picked* vault
+  // and capped by `capScopesToUserAuthority`. The selector value is a hint.
+  const upgradeableUnnamedVerbs = unnamedVerbs.filter((v) => v === "read" || v === "write");
+  const userOwnsEveryPickableVault =
+    !hasStaleAssignment && userCanAuthorizeRequest && userHoldsAdminOnPickable;
+  const ownerVerbSelector =
+    upgradeableUnnamedVerbs.length > 0 && userOwnsEveryPickableVault
+      ? { requestedVerbs: upgradeableUnnamedVerbs }
+      : undefined;
   return {
     params,
     clientId: client.clientId,
@@ -2883,6 +2967,7 @@ function consentProps(
     csrfToken,
     vaultPicker,
     displayVault,
+    ownerVerbSelector,
     staleAssignedVault,
     // Approve stays enabled for non-vault scopes even when assigned_vault
     // is stale — the user can still consent to e.g. `scribe:transcribe`

package/src/oauth-ui.ts

@@ -147,6 +147,31 @@ export interface ConsentViewProps {
    * the user on an error page. Defaults to authorizable when omitted.
    */
   userCanAuthorizeRequest?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb selector. Set when the consenting user
+   * OWNS (holds admin on) every vault they could pick AND the client requested
+   * an unnamed `vault:read`/`vault:write` verb. Renders a read/write/admin
+   * radio group, pre-selected to admin, so the owner can grant the level their
+   * AI client actually needs in-flow (the requested-scope shape was the
+   * blocker, not the user's authority) — or transparently downgrade.
+   *
+   * The submitted `verb_select` is an UNTRUSTED hint: the consent-submit
+   * handler re-derives, server-side, whether the user actually owns the picked
+   * vault before widening, and `capScopesToUserAuthority` remains the backstop
+   * that drops any verb the user doesn't hold. The selector only ever WIDENS
+   * the unnamed verb(s) on the picked vault; it never touches any other scope.
+   */
+  ownerVerbSelector?: OwnerVerbSelector;
+}
+
+export interface OwnerVerbSelector {
+  /**
+   * The unnamed read/write verb(s) the client requested. Only `read`/`write`
+   * are upgradeable here — an unnamed `vault:admin` request already renders
+   * with the admin badge and needs no selector. Used to word the selector
+   * help text ("the app asked for write access").
+   */
+  requestedVerbs: string[];
 }
 
 export interface VaultPicker {
@@ -328,6 +353,7 @@ export function renderConsent(props: ConsentViewProps): string {
     staleAssignedVault,
     blockApproveForStaleAssignment,
     userCanAuthorizeRequest,
+    ownerVerbSelector,
   } = props;
   // Substitute unnamed `vault:<verb>` rows with the resolved named form so
   // the operator sees the scope shape that will appear in the token. Raw
@@ -339,6 +365,7 @@ export function renderConsent(props: ConsentViewProps): string {
       ? `<li class="scope scope-empty">No scopes requested — the app gets a session token only.</li>`
       : displayedScopes.map(renderScopeRow).join("\n");
   const pickerSection = vaultPicker ? renderVaultPicker(vaultPicker) : "";
+  const verbSelectorSection = ownerVerbSelector ? renderOwnerVerbSelector(ownerVerbSelector) : "";
   // Approve is disabled when the picker can't yield a valid vault. The
   // empty-vault branch (no vaults registered) is the original case. A
   // locked-vault picker (multi-user Phase 1) always has a valid value via
@@ -418,6 +445,7 @@ export function renderConsent(props: ConsentViewProps): string {
         ${renderCsrfHiddenInput(csrfToken)}
         ${renderHiddenInputs(params)}
         ${pickerSection}
+        ${verbSelectorSection}
         <div class="button-row">
           <button type="submit" name="approve" value="yes" class="btn btn-primary"${approveDisabled}>Approve</button>
           <button type="submit" name="approve" value="no" class="btn btn-secondary">Deny</button>
@@ -492,6 +520,60 @@ function renderVaultPicker(picker: VaultPicker): string {
         </section>`;
 }
 
+/**
+ * hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb selector. Rendered only when the
+ * consenting user owns (holds admin on) every vault they could pick and the
+ * client requested an unnamed `vault:read`/`vault:write` verb. Three radios
+ * (read / write / admin), pre-selected to **admin** so the common case (the
+ * owner's own AI client that needs full access) is one click — but the owner
+ * sees and submits the choice, and can downgrade.
+ *
+ * The `admin` option keeps the `.scope-admin` red border + admin badge so an
+ * admin grant stays visibly flagged even when pre-selected. The submitted
+ * `verb_select` is an untrusted hint re-checked server-side (ownership
+ * re-derivation in `handleConsentSubmit` + `capScopesToUserAuthority` backstop);
+ * this template only renders the choice.
+ */
+function renderOwnerVerbSelector(selector: OwnerVerbSelector): string {
+  const requested = selector.requestedVerbs.map((v) => `<code>vault:${escapeHtml(v)}</code>`);
+  const requestedList =
+    requested.length === 1
+      ? requested[0]
+      : `${requested.slice(0, -1).join(", ")} and ${requested.at(-1)}`;
+  const option = (
+    verb: "read" | "write" | "admin",
+    title: string,
+    desc: string,
+    checked: boolean,
+  ): string => {
+    const isAdmin = verb === "admin";
+    const cls = `verb-option${isAdmin ? " verb-option-admin scope-admin" : ""}`;
+    const badge = isAdmin ? `<span class="badge badge-admin">admin</span>` : "";
+    return `
+            <label class="${cls}">
+              <input type="radio" name="verb_select" value="${verb}"${checked ? " checked" : ""} />
+              <span class="verb-option-body">
+                <span class="verb-option-head">
+                  <span class="verb-option-title">${escapeHtml(title)}</span>
+                  ${badge}
+                </span>
+                <span class="verb-option-desc">${escapeHtml(desc)}</span>
+              </span>
+            </label>`;
+  };
+  return `
+        <section class="verb-selector">
+          <h2 class="scopes-title">Access level</h2>
+          <p class="picker-help">
+            This app asked for ${requestedList} access to your vault. Because you own
+            this vault, you can grant a different level — admin is selected so your app
+            can do everything it might need; lower it if you'd rather not.
+          </p>
+          <div class="verb-options">${option("read", "Read only", "View notes, tags, attachments, and config.", false)}${option("write", "Read & write", "Create, edit, and delete notes, tags, and attachments.", false)}${option("admin", "Admin", "Full access plus config, triggers/automation, GitHub backup, and minting tokens.", true)}
+          </div>
+        </section>`;
+}
+
 /**
  * "App not yet approved" page (#74). Two branches:
  *
@@ -1282,6 +1364,47 @@ const STYLES = `
     font-size: 0.88rem;
     color: ${PALETTE.fg};
   }
+  /* hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb selector. Same card shell as the
+     vault picker; the admin option carries the .scope-admin red border so an
+     admin grant stays visibly flagged even when pre-selected. */
+  .verb-selector {
+    margin: 0 0 1.25rem;
+    padding: 0.75rem 0.85rem;
+    border: 1px solid ${PALETTE.borderLight};
+    border-radius: 6px;
+    background: ${PALETTE.bgSoft};
+  }
+  .verb-selector .scopes-title { margin-bottom: 0.4rem; }
+  .verb-options {
+    display: flex;
+    flex-direction: column;
+    gap: 0.4rem;
+  }
+  .verb-option {
+    display: flex;
+    align-items: flex-start;
+    gap: 0.5rem;
+    padding: 0.5rem 0.65rem;
+    border: 1px solid ${PALETTE.border};
+    border-radius: 6px;
+    background: ${PALETTE.cardBg};
+    cursor: pointer;
+    transition: border-color 0.15s ease, background 0.15s ease;
+  }
+  .verb-option:hover { border-color: ${PALETTE.accent}; }
+  .verb-option input[type=radio] { margin-top: 0.25rem; }
+  .verb-option input[type=radio]:focus { outline: 2px solid ${PALETTE.accent}; outline-offset: 2px; }
+  .verb-option-body { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 0.1rem; }
+  .verb-option-head {
+    display: flex;
+    align-items: center;
+    gap: 0.4rem;
+    flex-wrap: wrap;
+  }
+  .verb-option-title { font-weight: 500; color: ${PALETTE.fg}; font-size: 0.9rem; }
+  .verb-option-desc { font-size: 0.82rem; color: ${PALETTE.fgMuted}; }
+  .verb-option-admin .verb-option-title { color: ${PALETTE.danger}; }
+
   .vault-picker-empty .picker-help { color: ${PALETTE.danger}; }
   .vault-picker-empty .picker-help code { color: ${PALETTE.fg}; }
   .vault-picker-locked .picker-help { color: ${PALETTE.fgMuted}; }

package/src/scope-explanations.ts

@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ export const SCOPE_EXPLANATIONS: Record<string, ScopeExplanation> = {
     level: "write",
   },
   "vault:admin": {
-    label: "Full vault access plus configuration changes (rotate tokens, change settings).",
+    label:
+      "Read and write everything, plus admin: config & settings, triggers & automation, GitHub backup, and minting access tokens.",
     level: "admin",
   },
   // Optional-module scopes (scribe / agent). These are in FIRST_PARTY_SCOPES