@openparachute/hub 0.7.3 → 0.7.4-rc.10

package/src/hub-server.ts

@@ -69,9 +69,11 @@
  *   # "CSRF-belted" = strict same-origin Origin check on cookie-authed
  *   # mutations (hub#632, boundary C1) — origin-check.ts
  *   # `assertSameOriginForCookieMutation` carries the canonical enumeration.
- *   /api/me                       (GET)        → who-am-I (session+CSRF or hasSession:false)
+ *   /api/me                       (GET)        → who-am-I (session+CSRF+two_factor_enabled or hasSession:false)
  *   /api/admin-lock               (GET)        → screen-lock status (cookie-gated; first-admin)
  *   /api/admin-lock/{set,change,remove,unlock,lock,heartbeat} (POST) → manage the optional admin idle PIN lock (cookie-gated; CSRF)
+ *   /api/account/2fa/{start,confirm,disable} (POST) → self-service 2FA for the SPA (cookie-gated; CSRF; self-only) — hub#85
+ *   /api/account/password         (POST)       → self-service password change for the SPA (cookie-gated; CSRF; self-only) — hub#85
  *   /api/hub                      (GET)        → hub version + uptime + install-source (host:admin)
  *   /api/hub/upgrade              (POST)       → SPA-driven hub self-upgrade → 202 + detached helper (host:admin, §5.3/D4)
  *   /api/hub/upgrade/status       (GET)        → poll the on-disk hub-upgrade status (host:admin)
@@ -186,6 +188,7 @@ import { handleHostAdminToken } from "./admin-host-admin-token.ts";
 import { handleModuleToken } from "./admin-module-token.ts";
 import { handleVaultAdminToken } from "./admin-vault-admin-token.ts";
 import { handleCreateVault, handleDeleteVault } from "./admin-vaults.ts";
+import { handleApiAccount } from "./api-account-2fa.ts";
 import {
   handleAccountChangePasswordGet,
   handleAccountChangePasswordPost,
@@ -3044,6 +3047,24 @@ export function hubFetch(
         return handleAdminLock(req, subpath, { db: getDb() });
       }
 
+      // JSON self-service account surfaces for the admin SPA "My account" page
+      // (hub#85): password change + 2FA enroll/confirm/disable. Self-only
+      // (acts on `session.userId`, never a client-supplied id) — ANY signed-in
+      // user, not just the first admin. Same cookie + CSRF + same-origin
+      // posture as /api/admin-lock above (NOT the host-admin Bearer posture —
+      // a user managing their own credentials needs no admin scope). The
+      // server-rendered /account/2fa + /account/change-password pages stay for
+      // the no-JS / friend-facing path; these are the JSON twins.
+      if (pathname.startsWith("/api/account/")) {
+        if (!getDb) return dbNotConfigured();
+        {
+          const rejected = assertSameOriginForCookieMutation(req, oauthDeps(req).hubBoundOrigins());
+          if (rejected) return rejected;
+        }
+        const subpath = pathname.slice("/api/account".length);
+        return handleApiAccount(req, subpath, { db: getDb() });
+      }
+
       // SPA-driven hub self-upgrade (design 2026-06-01 §5.3 / D4). Dedicated
       // endpoint — the hub is NOT a supervised module (no /api/modules/hub/*),
       // so it gets its own route. Checked BEFORE the `/api/hub` exact match
@@ -3824,13 +3845,57 @@ async function decorateWithChrome(
   if (setCookie && out !== res) {
     const headers = new Headers(out.headers);
     headers.append("set-cookie", setCookie);
-    return new Response(out.body, {
-      status: out.status,
-      statusText: out.statusText,
-      headers,
-    });
+    return withProxySecurityHeaders(
+      new Response(out.body, {
+        status: out.status,
+        statusText: out.statusText,
+        headers,
+      }),
+    );
   }
-  return out;
+  // hub#643: every exit runs through the security-header step, which self-
+  // gates on content-type — so a non-HTML pass-through (`out === res`, e.g. a
+  // 502 proxy error or a JSON/asset body) is returned unchanged, preserving
+  // the pre-existing behavior for those responses.
+  return withProxySecurityHeaders(out);
+}
+
+/**
+ * hub#643 (Tier-1): stamp non-script security headers on proxied `text/html`
+ * pages — the per-vault `/vault/<name>/*` proxy and the generic
+ * services-mount `/<mount>/*` proxy both flow through `decorateWithChrome`,
+ * so this is the single chokepoint that covers a module / surface page.
+ *
+ *   - `X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff` — stops content-type sniffing.
+ *   - `Content-Security-Policy: frame-ancestors 'self'; object-src 'none';
+ *     base-uri 'self'` — clickjacking (external framing) + plugin + base-tag
+ *     hardening.
+ *
+ * Deliberately NO `script-src`: a strict script-src would white-screen
+ * self-built GitHub-hosted surfaces (the primary surface story) and
+ * inline-script module pages. The opt-in strict script-src CSP is Tier-2,
+ * explicitly deferred (hub#643 stays open).
+ *
+ * Header-only: we never buffer the body. Only `text/html` responses are
+ * decorated, so JSON / `.js` / CSS / image assets proxied through the same
+ * path are left untouched. Existing headers are preserved (a fresh Headers
+ * copy is mutated); we set (not append) so a re-decorated response can't
+ * accumulate duplicates.
+ */
+function withProxySecurityHeaders(res: Response): Response {
+  const contentType = res.headers.get("content-type") ?? "";
+  if (!contentType.toLowerCase().includes("text/html")) return res;
+  const headers = new Headers(res.headers);
+  headers.set("x-content-type-options", "nosniff");
+  headers.set(
+    "content-security-policy",
+    "frame-ancestors 'self'; object-src 'none'; base-uri 'self'",
+  );
+  return new Response(res.body, {
+    status: res.status,
+    statusText: res.statusText,
+    headers,
+  });
 }
 
 if (import.meta.main) {

package/src/managed-unit.ts

@@ -454,6 +454,25 @@ function installLaunchdUnit(opts: InstallManagedUnitOpts): ManagedUnitInstallRes
   };
 }
 
+/**
+ * #528: is `loginctl` linger already enabled for `userName`? Best-effort probe:
+ * `loginctl show-user <user> --property=Linger` prints `Linger=yes` / `Linger=no`.
+ * Returns true ONLY on a clear `Linger=yes`; ANY ambiguity (non-zero exit, a
+ * throw, or unparseable output) returns false so the caller falls through to the
+ * enable attempt — we never SKIP enabling on a guess, only when linger is
+ * provably already on. (`show-user` of a user with no session can itself exit
+ * non-zero; treat that as "unknown → try to enable".)
+ */
+function lingerAlreadyOn(deps: ManagedUnitDeps, userName: string): boolean {
+  try {
+    const probe = deps.run(["loginctl", "show-user", userName, "--property=Linger"]);
+    if (probe.code !== 0) return false;
+    return /(^|\n)\s*Linger=yes\s*(\n|$)/i.test(probe.stdout);
+  } catch {
+    return false;
+  }
+}
+
 function installSystemdUnit(opts: InstallManagedUnitOpts): ManagedUnitInstallResult {
   const { unit, deps, messages } = opts;
   const start = opts.start ?? true;
@@ -490,10 +509,20 @@ function installSystemdUnit(opts: InstallManagedUnitOpts): ManagedUnitInstallRes
   // systemctl but not loginctl would propagate the spawn error out and hard-fail
   // the calling command. (Run on both start + install-without-start: linger is a
   // boot-survival nicety independent of whether we start the unit now.)
+  //
+  // #528: pre-check the CURRENT linger state before trying to enable it. When
+  // linger is ALREADY on (the common re-install / re-migrate case on a box
+  // whose owner already enabled it), `enable-linger` is a no-op we don't need —
+  // and on some systemd builds it can return non-zero even though linger is
+  // genuinely on, raising a scary "couldn't enable lingering, your hub won't
+  // survive reboot" warning that is a FALSE ALARM. So: probe first; if linger
+  // is on, skip both the enable AND the warning. Only when linger is genuinely
+  // OFF and the enable attempt then fails do we warn. This is the single-owner
+  // self-host reboot-survival happy path — keep it quiet when it's already good.
   if (!root && userName) {
     if (deps.which("loginctl") === null) {
       outMessages.push(messages.lingerWarning);
-    } else {
+    } else if (!lingerAlreadyOn(deps, userName)) {
       try {
         const linger = deps.run(["loginctl", "enable-linger", userName]);
         if (linger.code !== 0) outMessages.push(messages.lingerWarning);

package/src/oauth-handlers.ts

@@ -294,8 +294,11 @@ export function buildServicesCatalog(
   if (audiences.has("vault")) {
     for (const entry of manifest.services) {
       if (!isVaultEntry(entry)) continue;
-      const paths = entry.paths.length > 0 ? entry.paths : ["/"];
-      for (const path of paths) {
+      // #478: an empty-paths vault row is "installed but no servable instance"
+      // — skip it so it never counts toward (or, below, fabricates) a phantom
+      // vault. Mirrors the continue in well-known.ts / admin-vaults.ts.
+      if (entry.paths.length === 0) continue;
+      for (const path of entry.paths) {
         const instance = vaultInstanceNameFor(entry.name, path);
         if (broadVaultScope || namedVaults.has(instance)) admittedVaultPathCount++;
       }
@@ -308,12 +311,16 @@ export function buildServicesCatalog(
   for (const entry of manifest.services) {
     if (isVaultEntry(entry)) {
       if (!audiences.has("vault")) continue;
+      // #478: an empty-paths vault row is "installed but no servable instance"
+      // — skip it so the catalog never offers a phantom `vault` / `vault:default`
+      // entry pointing at root before any vault exists. Mirrors well-known.ts /
+      // admin-vaults.ts / vault-names.ts.
+      if (entry.paths.length === 0) continue;
       // Walk every path the row exposes. Real multi-vault on the hub is a
       // single `parachute-vault` row with N paths (one per vault instance);
       // legacy per-vault rows (`parachute-vault-<name>`) are handled by the
       // same loop because each contributes one path.
-      const paths = entry.paths.length > 0 ? entry.paths : ["/"];
-      for (const path of paths) {
+      for (const path of entry.paths) {
         const instance = vaultInstanceNameFor(entry.name, path);
         const admit = broadVaultScope || namedVaults.has(instance);
         if (!admit) continue;
@@ -1209,9 +1216,31 @@ export function handleAuthorizeGet(db: Database, req: Request, deps: OAuthDeps):
     return issueAuthCodeRedirect(db, parsed, requestedScopes, session.userId, deps);
   }
 
+  // hub#689 — does the user hold ADMIN on every vault they could pick? Admin
+  // (isFirstAdmin) owns the whole hub. A non-admin owns a vault only if their
+  // `user_vaults` role grants admin there (today role=write does; a role=read
+  // assignment would NOT). Re-derived from the DB so the owner-verb-selector
+  // is offered only to a genuine owner — the submit path re-checks the PICKED
+  // vault and the cap is the backstop, but rendering it precisely avoids
+  // promising an admin upgrade the cap would silently demote.
+  const userHoldsAdminOnPickable =
+    userIsAdmin ||
+    (assignedVaults.length > 0 &&
+      assignedVaults.every((v) =>
+        (vaultVerbsForUserVault(db, session.userId, v) ?? []).includes("admin"),
+      ));
+
   return htmlResponse(
     renderConsent(
-      consentProps(client, parsed, vaultNames, csrf.token, assignedVaults, userIsAdmin),
+      consentProps(
+        client,
+        parsed,
+        vaultNames,
+        csrf.token,
+        assignedVaults,
+        userIsAdmin,
+        userHoldsAdminOnPickable,
+      ),
     ),
     200,
     extra,
@@ -1270,7 +1299,8 @@ function capScopesToUserAuthority(
     if (name === undefined || verb === undefined || !VAULT_VERBS.has(verb)) return true;
     // Named vault verb requested by a non-owner: admit only if the user holds
     // it. `vaultVerbsForUserVault` returns null for an unassigned vault (drop)
-    // or the held verb list (today read/write only — never admin).
+    // or the held verb list — a `write` role holds [read, write, admin], a
+    // `read` role holds [read] (see `vaultVerbsForRole`).
     const held = vaultVerbsForUserVault(db, userId, name);
     return held !== null && (held as readonly string[]).includes(verb);
   });
@@ -1682,6 +1712,44 @@ async function handleConsentSubmit(
         400,
       );
     }
+    // hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb widening. The consent screen offers
+    // owners a read/write/admin selector (pre-selected to admin) for an
+    // unnamed `vault:read`/`vault:write` request, so an owner whose AI client
+    // asked for read-only can grant the level it actually needs in-flow. The
+    // submitted `verb_select` is an UNTRUSTED hint — we re-derive ownership of
+    // the PICKED vault server-side here, and `capScopesToUserAuthority` (inside
+    // issueAuthCodeRedirect) is the backstop that drops any verb the user
+    // doesn't actually hold. This only ever rewrites the unnamed read/write
+    // verb(s) to the selected level on the picked vault; named scopes and every
+    // other scope are untouched. A forged `verb_select=admin` from a user who
+    // doesn't own the picked vault gets capped back to what they hold (or, for
+    // a vault outside a pinned user's assignment, never reaches here — the
+    // mismatch checks above already 400'd it).
+    const selectedVerb = String(form.get("verb_select") ?? "").trim();
+    if (selectedVerb === "read" || selectedVerb === "write" || selectedVerb === "admin") {
+      // Re-derive, server-side, whether THIS user owns (holds admin on) the
+      // PICKED vault. Owner === first admin (holds admin everywhere) OR an
+      // assigned user whose role grants admin on this vault. Never trust the
+      // client-submitted selector to establish authority.
+      const heldOnPicked = vaultVerbsForUserVault(db, session.userId, pickedVault);
+      const ownsPicked = userIsAdmin || (heldOnPicked?.includes("admin") ?? false);
+      if (ownsPicked) {
+        scopes = scopes.map((s) => {
+          const parts = s.split(":");
+          // Only widen the unnamed read/write verbs the selector was offered
+          // for — leave an unnamed `vault:admin`, named scopes, and non-vault
+          // scopes exactly as requested.
+          if (
+            parts.length === 2 &&
+            parts[0] === "vault" &&
+            (parts[1] === "read" || parts[1] === "write")
+          ) {
+            return `vault:${selectedVerb}`;
+          }
+          return s;
+        });
+      }
+    }
     scopes = narrowVaultScopes(scopes, pickedVault);
   }
 
@@ -2746,6 +2814,10 @@ function consentProps(
   csrfToken: string,
   assignedVaults: readonly string[],
   userIsAdmin: boolean,
+  // hub#689 — true when the user holds admin on every vault they could pick
+  // (admin owns the hub; an assigned non-admin only if their role grants admin
+  // on each assigned vault). Gates whether the owner-verb-selector renders.
+  userHoldsAdminOnPickable = userIsAdmin,
 ) {
   const scopes = params.scope.split(" ").filter((s) => s.length > 0);
   const unnamedVerbs = unnamedVaultVerbs(scopes);
@@ -2875,6 +2947,25 @@ function consentProps(
     const only = vaultNames[0];
     if (only) displayVault = only;
   }
+  // hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb selector. The client requested an
+  // unnamed `vault:read`/`vault:write` verb, and the consenting user owns
+  // (holds admin on) every vault they could pick — first admin owns the whole
+  // hub; an assigned non-admin holds admin on each of their assigned vaults
+  // (vaultVerbsForRole('write') → [read,write,admin]). Offer the selector so
+  // they can grant the level their client actually needs (or downgrade), with
+  // admin pre-selected. Suppressed when the request can't be authorized (zero-
+  // vault non-admin) or the assignment is stale (no valid vault to own).
+  //
+  // SECURITY: this only DECIDES WHETHER TO RENDER. The actual widening is
+  // re-derived server-side in `handleConsentSubmit` against the *picked* vault
+  // and capped by `capScopesToUserAuthority`. The selector value is a hint.
+  const upgradeableUnnamedVerbs = unnamedVerbs.filter((v) => v === "read" || v === "write");
+  const userOwnsEveryPickableVault =
+    !hasStaleAssignment && userCanAuthorizeRequest && userHoldsAdminOnPickable;
+  const ownerVerbSelector =
+    upgradeableUnnamedVerbs.length > 0 && userOwnsEveryPickableVault
+      ? { requestedVerbs: upgradeableUnnamedVerbs }
+      : undefined;
   return {
     params,
     clientId: client.clientId,
@@ -2883,6 +2974,7 @@ function consentProps(
     csrfToken,
     vaultPicker,
     displayVault,
+    ownerVerbSelector,
     staleAssignedVault,
     // Approve stays enabled for non-vault scopes even when assigned_vault
     // is stale — the user can still consent to e.g. `scribe:transcribe`

package/src/oauth-ui.ts

@@ -147,6 +147,31 @@ export interface ConsentViewProps {
    * the user on an error page. Defaults to authorizable when omitted.
    */
   userCanAuthorizeRequest?: boolean;
+  /**
+   * hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb selector. Set when the consenting user
+   * OWNS (holds admin on) every vault they could pick AND the client requested
+   * an unnamed `vault:read`/`vault:write` verb. Renders a read/write/admin
+   * radio group, pre-selected to admin, so the owner can grant the level their
+   * AI client actually needs in-flow (the requested-scope shape was the
+   * blocker, not the user's authority) — or transparently downgrade.
+   *
+   * The submitted `verb_select` is an UNTRUSTED hint: the consent-submit
+   * handler re-derives, server-side, whether the user actually owns the picked
+   * vault before widening, and `capScopesToUserAuthority` remains the backstop
+   * that drops any verb the user doesn't hold. The selector only ever WIDENS
+   * the unnamed verb(s) on the picked vault; it never touches any other scope.
+   */
+  ownerVerbSelector?: OwnerVerbSelector;
+}
+
+export interface OwnerVerbSelector {
+  /**
+   * The unnamed read/write verb(s) the client requested. Only `read`/`write`
+   * are upgradeable here — an unnamed `vault:admin` request already renders
+   * with the admin badge and needs no selector. Used to word the selector
+   * help text ("the app asked for write access").
+   */
+  requestedVerbs: string[];
 }
 
 export interface VaultPicker {
@@ -328,6 +353,7 @@ export function renderConsent(props: ConsentViewProps): string {
     staleAssignedVault,
     blockApproveForStaleAssignment,
     userCanAuthorizeRequest,
+    ownerVerbSelector,
   } = props;
   // Substitute unnamed `vault:<verb>` rows with the resolved named form so
   // the operator sees the scope shape that will appear in the token. Raw
@@ -339,6 +365,7 @@ export function renderConsent(props: ConsentViewProps): string {
       ? `<li class="scope scope-empty">No scopes requested — the app gets a session token only.</li>`
       : displayedScopes.map(renderScopeRow).join("\n");
   const pickerSection = vaultPicker ? renderVaultPicker(vaultPicker) : "";
+  const verbSelectorSection = ownerVerbSelector ? renderOwnerVerbSelector(ownerVerbSelector) : "";
   // Approve is disabled when the picker can't yield a valid vault. The
   // empty-vault branch (no vaults registered) is the original case. A
   // locked-vault picker (multi-user Phase 1) always has a valid value via
@@ -418,6 +445,7 @@ export function renderConsent(props: ConsentViewProps): string {
         ${renderCsrfHiddenInput(csrfToken)}
         ${renderHiddenInputs(params)}
         ${pickerSection}
+        ${verbSelectorSection}
         <div class="button-row">
           <button type="submit" name="approve" value="yes" class="btn btn-primary"${approveDisabled}>Approve</button>
           <button type="submit" name="approve" value="no" class="btn btn-secondary">Deny</button>
@@ -492,6 +520,60 @@ function renderVaultPicker(picker: VaultPicker): string {
         </section>`;
 }
 
+/**
+ * hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb selector. Rendered only when the
+ * consenting user owns (holds admin on) every vault they could pick and the
+ * client requested an unnamed `vault:read`/`vault:write` verb. Three radios
+ * (read / write / admin), pre-selected to **admin** so the common case (the
+ * owner's own AI client that needs full access) is one click — but the owner
+ * sees and submits the choice, and can downgrade.
+ *
+ * The `admin` option keeps the `.scope-admin` red border + admin badge so an
+ * admin grant stays visibly flagged even when pre-selected. The submitted
+ * `verb_select` is an untrusted hint re-checked server-side (ownership
+ * re-derivation in `handleConsentSubmit` + `capScopesToUserAuthority` backstop);
+ * this template only renders the choice.
+ */
+function renderOwnerVerbSelector(selector: OwnerVerbSelector): string {
+  const requested = selector.requestedVerbs.map((v) => `<code>vault:${escapeHtml(v)}</code>`);
+  const requestedList =
+    requested.length === 1
+      ? requested[0]
+      : `${requested.slice(0, -1).join(", ")} and ${requested.at(-1)}`;
+  const option = (
+    verb: "read" | "write" | "admin",
+    title: string,
+    desc: string,
+    checked: boolean,
+  ): string => {
+    const isAdmin = verb === "admin";
+    const cls = `verb-option${isAdmin ? " verb-option-admin scope-admin" : ""}`;
+    const badge = isAdmin ? `<span class="badge badge-admin">admin</span>` : "";
+    return `
+            <label class="${cls}">
+              <input type="radio" name="verb_select" value="${verb}"${checked ? " checked" : ""} />
+              <span class="verb-option-body">
+                <span class="verb-option-head">
+                  <span class="verb-option-title">${escapeHtml(title)}</span>
+                  ${badge}
+                </span>
+                <span class="verb-option-desc">${escapeHtml(desc)}</span>
+              </span>
+            </label>`;
+  };
+  return `
+        <section class="verb-selector">
+          <h2 class="scopes-title">Access level</h2>
+          <p class="picker-help">
+            This app asked for ${requestedList} access to your vault. Because you own
+            this vault, you can grant a different level — admin is selected so your app
+            can do everything it might need; lower it if you'd rather not.
+          </p>
+          <div class="verb-options">${option("read", "Read only", "View notes, tags, attachments, and config.", false)}${option("write", "Read & write", "Create, edit, and delete notes, tags, and attachments.", false)}${option("admin", "Admin", "Full access plus config, triggers/automation, GitHub backup, and minting tokens.", true)}
+          </div>
+        </section>`;
+}
+
 /**
  * "App not yet approved" page (#74). Two branches:
  *
@@ -1282,6 +1364,47 @@ const STYLES = `
     font-size: 0.88rem;
     color: ${PALETTE.fg};
   }
+  /* hub#689 — owner-on-own-vault verb selector. Same card shell as the
+     vault picker; the admin option carries the .scope-admin red border so an
+     admin grant stays visibly flagged even when pre-selected. */
+  .verb-selector {
+    margin: 0 0 1.25rem;
+    padding: 0.75rem 0.85rem;
+    border: 1px solid ${PALETTE.borderLight};
+    border-radius: 6px;
+    background: ${PALETTE.bgSoft};
+  }
+  .verb-selector .scopes-title { margin-bottom: 0.4rem; }
+  .verb-options {
+    display: flex;
+    flex-direction: column;
+    gap: 0.4rem;
+  }
+  .verb-option {
+    display: flex;
+    align-items: flex-start;
+    gap: 0.5rem;
+    padding: 0.5rem 0.65rem;
+    border: 1px solid ${PALETTE.border};
+    border-radius: 6px;
+    background: ${PALETTE.cardBg};
+    cursor: pointer;
+    transition: border-color 0.15s ease, background 0.15s ease;
+  }
+  .verb-option:hover { border-color: ${PALETTE.accent}; }
+  .verb-option input[type=radio] { margin-top: 0.25rem; }
+  .verb-option input[type=radio]:focus { outline: 2px solid ${PALETTE.accent}; outline-offset: 2px; }
+  .verb-option-body { display: flex; flex-direction: column; gap: 0.1rem; }
+  .verb-option-head {
+    display: flex;
+    align-items: center;
+    gap: 0.4rem;
+    flex-wrap: wrap;
+  }
+  .verb-option-title { font-weight: 500; color: ${PALETTE.fg}; font-size: 0.9rem; }
+  .verb-option-desc { font-size: 0.82rem; color: ${PALETTE.fgMuted}; }
+  .verb-option-admin .verb-option-title { color: ${PALETTE.danger}; }
+
   .vault-picker-empty .picker-help { color: ${PALETTE.danger}; }
   .vault-picker-empty .picker-help code { color: ${PALETTE.fg}; }
   .vault-picker-locked .picker-help { color: ${PALETTE.fgMuted}; }

package/src/scope-explanations.ts

@@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ export const SCOPE_EXPLANATIONS: Record<string, ScopeExplanation> = {
     level: "write",
   },
   "vault:admin": {
-    label: "Full vault access plus configuration changes (rotate tokens, change settings).",
+    label:
+      "Read and write everything, plus admin: config & settings, triggers & automation, GitHub backup, and minting access tokens.",
     level: "admin",
   },
   // Optional-module scopes (scribe / agent). These are in FIRST_PARTY_SCOPES

package/src/setup-wizard.ts

@@ -1592,14 +1592,33 @@ export function handleSetupGet(req: Request, deps: SetupWizardDeps): Response {
     // poll on the auth the wizard already carries.
     const opId = url.searchParams.get("op");
     if (opId) {
-      const op = deps.registry?.get(opId);
-      if (op) {
-        envelope.operation = {
-          id: op.id,
-          status: op.status,
-          log: op.log,
-          ...(op.error !== undefined ? { error: op.error } : {}),
-        };
+      // hub#618: post-setup this JSON `?op=` surface is unauth-reachable —
+      // `/admin/setup` is always lockout-exempt (the dispatcher's
+      // `shouldGateForSetup` lets it through so a stale bookmark resolves), and
+      // the snapshot is read BEFORE any session check. The leak is small (an
+      // in-memory op's status + install-progress log lines, behind an
+      // unguessable UUID), but it's still a post-setup admin surface, so gate
+      // it once setup is COMPLETE. During setup (no admin yet) the surface
+      // stays OPEN: the unauth CLI wizard (`parachute init`) AND the brand-new-
+      // operator browser both poll this `?op=` snapshot mid-setup before any
+      // session exists — gating then would break first-boot vault
+      // provisioning. Loopback always passes (same on-box trust as the
+      // `bootstrapToken` branch below); a valid session also passes.
+      const setupComplete = state.hasAdmin && state.hasVault && state.hasExposeMode;
+      const opSnapshotAllowed =
+        !setupComplete ||
+        deps.requestIsLoopback === true ||
+        findActiveSession(deps.db, req) !== null;
+      if (opSnapshotAllowed) {
+        const op = deps.registry?.get(opId);
+        if (op) {
+          envelope.operation = {
+            id: op.id,
+            status: op.status,
+            log: op.log,
+            ...(op.error !== undefined ? { error: op.error } : {}),
+          };
+        }
       }
     }
     // hub#576: hand the actual token to a LOOPBACK caller only. The on-box
@@ -2325,19 +2344,19 @@ export async function handleSetupVaultPost(req: Request, deps: SetupWizardDeps):
   if (registry) {
     // hub#267: thread the typed name through `PARACHUTE_VAULT_NAME` so
     // vault's first-boot path (vault#342) names the created vault
-    // accordingly. Skip the env override when the operator left the
-    // field blank — vault's `resolveFirstBootVaultName` defaults to
-    // `default` on absent env vars, so this preserves the prior
-    // behaviour for the empty-input case.
+    // accordingly.
     //
-    // If the operator typed "default" explicitly, treat the same as
-    // blank — vault's first-boot defaults to "default" anyway, so
-    // skipping the env override is correct (the comparison below
-    // catches both blank-trimmed-to-DEFAULT and typed-"default").
-    const spawnEnv: Record<string, string> = {};
-    if (vaultName !== DEFAULT_VAULT_NAME) {
-      spawnEnv.PARACHUTE_VAULT_NAME = vaultName;
-    }
+    // #478 Part 2: ALWAYS set `PARACHUTE_VAULT_NAME`, even when the name
+    // is "default". Once vault removes its silent auto-create-on-missing-env
+    // behavior, vault's first-boot will require the env var to know which
+    // vault to create — a missing `PARACHUTE_VAULT_NAME` will mean "no vault
+    // to create" rather than "create one named default". Passing it
+    // explicitly for every path (including the default) is correct and safe:
+    // vault's `resolveFirstBootVaultName` accepts "default" as a valid name
+    // and behaves identically to the prior implicit default.
+    const spawnEnv: Record<string, string> = {
+      PARACHUTE_VAULT_NAME: vaultName,
+    };
     // Capture importParams + deps in the runInstall promise chain — when
     // mode === "import", run the vault-side `/.parachute/mirror/import`
     // POST as a follow-up step once the supervised vault has come up
@@ -2358,7 +2377,7 @@ export async function handleSetupVaultPost(req: Request, deps: SetupWizardDeps):
       registry,
       ...(deps.run ? { run: deps.run } : {}),
       ...(deps.isLinked ? { isLinked: deps.isLinked } : {}),
-      ...(Object.keys(spawnEnv).length > 0 ? { spawnEnv } : {}),
+      spawnEnv,
     })
       .then(async () => {
         if (!importToRun) return;