@openpalm/ui 0.11.3-rc.7 → 0.11.3-rc.8

package/build/server/chunks/helpers--0A5yqid.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"helpers--0A5yqid.js","sources":["../../../.svelte-kit/adapter-node/chunks/helpers.js"],"sourcesContent":["import { It as resolveStackDir, Tt as readSecret, nt as createOpenCodeClient } from \"./src.js\";\nimport { r as getActiveEndpoint } from \"./endpoints.js\";\nimport { createHash, createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from \"node:crypto\";\n//#region src/lib/server/session-store.ts\n/**\n* Stateless signed session tokens.\n*\n* Token format: `<expiresAt>.<hmac-sha256-hex>`\n*   expiresAt — unix ms timestamp when the session expires\n*   signature — HMAC-SHA256(expiresAt, OP_UI_LOGIN_PASSWORD)\n*\n* Tokens are self-validating: the server holds no state and sessions survive\n* UI server restarts without any disk I/O. Signing with the login password\n* means a password change invalidates all existing sessions — correct behaviour.\n*\n* Logout adds the token to a small in-memory revocation list. That list is\n* cleared on server restart, which is acceptable: nobody holds a just-logged-out\n* token across a restart.\n*/\n/** Session lifetime for both the token expiry and the cookie Max-Age. 14 days. */\nvar SESSION_TTL_MS = 12096e5;\n/** Cookie Max-Age in seconds (Set-Cookie uses seconds, not ms). */\nvar SESSION_TTL_SECONDS = SESSION_TTL_MS / 1e3;\nvar _revoked = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();\nvar _testOverrides = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();\nfunction getSecret() {\n\treturn process.env.OP_UI_LOGIN_PASSWORD ?? \"no-secret-set\";\n}\nfunction signToken(expiresAt) {\n\treturn createHmac(\"sha256\", getSecret()).update(String(expiresAt)).digest(\"hex\");\n}\n/**\n* Mint a new signed session token with a 14-day TTL.\n* Place the result in the `op_session` cookie.\n*/\nfunction createSession() {\n\tconst expiresAt = Date.now() + SESSION_TTL_MS;\n\treturn `${expiresAt}.${signToken(expiresAt)}`;\n}\n/**\n* Return true iff `token` is a valid, non-expired, non-revoked session.\n*/\nfunction validateSession(token) {\n\tif (!token) return false;\n\tif (_testOverrides.has(token)) return true;\n\tif (_revoked.has(token)) return false;\n\tconst dot = token.lastIndexOf(\".\");\n\tif (dot < 0) return false;\n\tconst expiresAt = Number(token.slice(0, dot));\n\tif (!Number.isFinite(expiresAt) || Date.now() >= expiresAt) return false;\n\tconst sig = token.slice(dot + 1);\n\tconst expected = signToken(expiresAt);\n\tif (sig.length !== expected.length) return false;\n\treturn timingSafeEqual(Buffer.from(sig), Buffer.from(expected));\n}\n/**\n* Sliding renewal: validate the old token, return a new one with a fresh\n* 14-day TTL, or return false if the old token is invalid/expired.\n* The caller must place the returned token in the `op_session` cookie.\n*/\nfunction touchSession(token) {\n\tif (!validateSession(token)) return false;\n\treturn createSession();\n}\n/**\n* Revoke a token (logout). The browser cookie must also be cleared by the caller.\n* The revocation list survives until the next server restart.\n*/\nfunction invalidateSession(token) {\n\t_revoked.add(token);\n}\n//#endregion\n//#region src/lib/server/helpers.ts\n/**\n* Lazy OpenCode client bound to the currently active endpoint. The client is\n* recreated whenever the active endpoint URL changes so user switches in the\n* UI take effect on the next call.\n*/\nvar _openCodeClient;\nvar _openCodeClientUrl;\nfunction getOpenCodeClient() {\n\tconst { url } = getActiveEndpoint();\n\tif (!_openCodeClient || url !== _openCodeClientUrl) {\n\t\t_openCodeClient = createOpenCodeClient({ baseUrl: url });\n\t\t_openCodeClientUrl = url;\n\t}\n\treturn _openCodeClient;\n}\nfunction safeTokenCompare(a, b) {\n\tif (typeof a !== \"string\" || typeof b !== \"string\") return false;\n\tif (!a || !b) return false;\n\treturn timingSafeEqual(createHash(\"sha256\").update(a).digest(), createHash(\"sha256\").update(b).digest());\n}\n/** Standard JSON response with request ID header */\nfunction jsonResponse(status, body, requestId = \"\") {\n\treturn new Response(JSON.stringify(body), {\n\t\tstatus,\n\t\theaders: {\n\t\t\t\"content-type\": \"application/json\",\n\t\t\t...requestId ? { \"x-request-id\": requestId } : {}\n\t\t}\n\t});\n}\n/** Standard error envelope */\nfunction errorResponse(status, error, message, details = {}, requestId = \"\") {\n\treturn jsonResponse(status, {\n\t\terror,\n\t\tmessage,\n\t\tdetails,\n\t\trequestId\n\t}, requestId);\n}\n/** Extract or generate request ID */\nfunction getRequestId(event) {\n\treturn event.request.headers.get(\"x-request-id\") || crypto.randomUUID();\n}\n/**\n* Read the operator UI login password from the host environment or the\n* file-based stack secret.\n*\n* Phase 4 of the auth/proxy refactor collapsed\n* `ControlPlaneState.adminToken` (and the assistant token alongside it).\n* Runtime persistence lives in `knowledge/secrets/op_ui_login_password`.\n* `process.env.OP_UI_LOGIN_PASSWORD` is still accepted for tests and explicit\n* host-process overrides.\n*\n* Returns the empty string when the env var is unset — `requireNonEmptyUiLoginPassword()`\n* surfaces that case as a 503 so all authenticated routes fail loudly\n* rather than silently accepting any cookie.\n*/\nfunction getUiLoginPassword() {\n\tconst envValue = process.env.OP_UI_LOGIN_PASSWORD;\n\tif (envValue) return envValue;\n\treturn readSecret(resolveStackDir(), \"op_ui_login_password\")?.trimEnd() ?? \"\";\n}\n/**\n* Extract raw session token from the `op_session` cookie.\n*\n* Phase 2 of the auth/proxy refactor (docs/technical/auth-and-proxy-refactor-plan.md)\n* removed the legacy `x-admin-token` / `Authorization: Bearer` header fallbacks.\n* The cookie is HttpOnly + SameSite=Strict and is the ONLY credential the browser\n* holds; XSS cannot read it and out-of-process callers must obtain a session via\n* `POST /admin/auth/login` (or `/session`) and present the cookie on subsequent\n* requests.\n*/\nfunction extractToken(event) {\n\tconst match = (event.request.headers.get(\"cookie\") ?? \"\").match(/(?:^|;\\s*)op_session=([^;]+)/);\n\tif (match) return match[1];\n\treturn \"\";\n}\n/** Check admin auth — returns error Response or null if OK */\nfunction requireAdmin(event, requestId) {\n\tif (!getUiLoginPassword()) return errorResponse(503, \"admin_not_configured\", \"OP_UI_LOGIN_PASSWORD has not been set. Complete setup first.\", {}, requestId);\n\tif (!validateSession(extractToken(event))) return errorResponse(401, \"unauthorized\", \"Missing or invalid credentials\", {}, requestId);\n\treturn null;\n}\n/**\n* Identify caller by the presented `op_session` cookie.\n*\n* Returns \"admin\" when the cookie holds a valid session token.\n*/\nfunction identifyCallerByToken(event) {\n\tif (!getUiLoginPassword()) return null;\n\tif (validateSession(extractToken(event))) return \"admin\";\n\treturn null;\n}\n/** Parse JSON body safely — returns discriminated result with error type */\nasync function parseJsonBody(request, maxBytes = 1048576) {\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst contentLength = request.headers.get(\"content-length\");\n\t\tif (contentLength && parseInt(contentLength, 10) > maxBytes) return { error: \"too_large\" };\n\t\treturn { data: await request.json() };\n\t} catch (e) {\n\t\tconsole.warn(\"[helpers] Failed to parse JSON request body\", e);\n\t\treturn { error: \"invalid_json\" };\n\t}\n}\n/** Convert a ParseJsonBodyError to an appropriate HTTP error response */\nfunction jsonBodyError(err, requestId) {\n\tif (err.error === \"too_large\") return errorResponse(413, \"too_large\", \"Request body too large\", {}, requestId);\n\treturn errorResponse(400, \"invalid_json\", \"Request body must be valid JSON\", {}, requestId);\n}\n/**\n* Auth + JSON body wrapper for admin POST/DELETE handlers.\n*\n* Replaces the 4-line boilerplate copy-pasted across 30+ routes:\n*   const requestId = getRequestId(event);\n*   const authError = requireAdmin(event, requestId);\n*   if (authError) return authError;\n*   const result = await parseJsonBody(event.request);\n*   if ('error' in result) return jsonBodyError(result, requestId);\n*\n* Use for routes that need both auth and a JSON body. For auth-only or\n* GET routes, call `requireAdmin` directly.\n*/\nasync function withAdminBody(event, handler) {\n\tconst requestId = getRequestId(event);\n\tconst originError = checkOriginHeader(event.request, UI_PORT);\n\tif (originError) return originError;\n\tconst authError = requireAdmin(event, requestId);\n\tif (authError) return authError;\n\tconst result = await parseJsonBody(event.request);\n\tif (\"error\" in result) return jsonBodyError(result, requestId);\n\treturn handler({\n\t\trequestId,\n\t\tbody: result.data\n\t});\n}\n/**\n* Reject requests whose Host header does not match localhost or 127.0.0.1\n* on the configured admin port.\n*\n* @param request  Incoming Request (or SvelteKit RequestEvent.request)\n* @param port     The port this server is bound to (e.g. 3880 or 8100)\n* @returns        A 400 Response if the host is rejected; null if allowed\n*/\nfunction checkHostHeader(request, port) {\n\tconst normalized = (request.headers.get(\"host\") ?? \"\").trim().replace(/\\.$/, \"\");\n\tif ([`localhost:${port}`, `127.0.0.1:${port}`].includes(normalized)) return null;\n\treturn new Response(JSON.stringify({\n\t\terror: \"invalid_host\",\n\t\thost: normalized,\n\t\tmessage: \"Request rejected: Host header does not match allowed hosts. The admin UI binds to loopback (127.0.0.1) only; reach it via localhost or front it with a reverse proxy/tunnel for remote access.\"\n\t}), {\n\t\tstatus: 400,\n\t\theaders: { \"content-type\": \"application/json\" }\n\t});\n}\n/**\n* Reject POST/PUT/DELETE requests whose Origin header does not match\n* localhost or 127.0.0.1. Requests with no Origin (non-browser clients)\n* are always allowed.\n*\n* @param request  Incoming Request\n* @param port     The port this server is bound to\n* @returns        A 403 Response if the origin is rejected; null if allowed\n*/\nfunction checkOriginHeader(request, port) {\n\tconst method = request.method.toUpperCase();\n\tif (method === \"GET\" || method === \"HEAD\" || method === \"OPTIONS\") return null;\n\tconst origin = request.headers.get(\"origin\");\n\tif (!origin) return null;\n\ttry {\n\t\tconst u = new URL(origin);\n\t\tif ([`localhost:${port}`, `127.0.0.1:${port}`].includes(u.host)) return null;\n\t} catch {}\n\treturn new Response(JSON.stringify({\n\t\terror: \"forbidden_origin\",\n\t\torigin\n\t}), {\n\t\tstatus: 403,\n\t\theaders: { \"content-type\": \"application/json\" }\n\t});\n}\nvar UI_PORT = Number(process.env.PORT ?? 3880);\n//#endregion\nexport { invalidateSession as _, getOpenCodeClient as a, identifyCallerByToken as c, parseJsonBody as d, requireAdmin as f, createSession as g, SESSION_TTL_SECONDS as h, errorResponse as i, jsonBodyError as l, withAdminBody as m, checkHostHeader as n, getRequestId as o, safeTokenCompare as p, checkOriginHeader as r, getUiLoginPassword as s, UI_PORT as t, jsonResponse as u, touchSession as v 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package/build/server/chunks/session-cookie-CF02T7RX.js.map

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"session-cookie-CF02T7RX.js","sources":["../../../.svelte-kit/adapter-node/chunks/session-cookie.js"],"sourcesContent":["import { h as SESSION_TTL_SECONDS } from \"./helpers.js\";\n//#region src/lib/server/session-cookie.ts\n/**\n* Single source of truth for the `op_session` cookie's Set-Cookie attributes.\n*\n* Every issuer (login, session, setup/complete) and the sliding-renewal path in\n* hooks.server.ts builds the cookie through these helpers so the attributes can\n* never drift apart. Logout uses `clearSessionCookie()` with the SAME path so\n* the browser actually drops the cookie.\n*\n* Attribute rationale:\n*  - HttpOnly       — the cookie is the only credential the browser holds; XSS\n*                     must not be able to read it.\n*  - SameSite=Lax   — the cookie must ride along on top-level GET navigations\n*                     (typing the admin URL, following a bookmark) so a valid\n*                     session loads admin with no prompt. SameSite=Strict drops\n*                     the cookie on cross-site top-level GETs (e.g. opening the\n*                     console from a link in another app on the LAN), which\n*                     would force a needless re-prompt. State-mutating requests\n*                     are independently CSRF-guarded by the Origin check\n*                     (SEC-2) in hooks.server.ts, so Lax is safe here.\n*  - Secure         — set ONLY when the request arrived over HTTPS. LAN installs\n*                     are commonly plain HTTP; hardcoding Secure would make the\n*                     browser refuse to send the cookie and break login entirely\n*                     on those deployments. We honour `x-forwarded-proto` first\n*                     (reverse-proxy TLS termination) then the request URL.\n*  - Path=/         — valid for the whole app; matched by the clear on logout.\n*  - Max-Age        — 7 days, in lockstep with the in-store session TTL.\n*/\nvar SESSION_COOKIE_NAME = \"op_session\";\n/** True when the request reached us over HTTPS (direct or via TLS-terminating proxy). */\nfunction isSecureRequest(request) {\n\tconst forwarded = request.headers.get(\"x-forwarded-proto\");\n\tif (forwarded) return forwarded.split(\",\")[0].trim().toLowerCase() === \"https\";\n\ttry {\n\t\treturn new URL(request.url).protocol === \"https:\";\n\t} catch {\n\t\treturn false;\n\t}\n}\n/**\n* Build the `Set-Cookie` value that issues/renews the session cookie.\n* `secure` is derived from the request so LAN-over-HTTP installs still work.\n*/\nfunction sessionCookieHeader(token, request) {\n\tconst parts = [\n\t\t`${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=${token}`,\n\t\t\"HttpOnly\",\n\t\t\"SameSite=Lax\",\n\t\t\"Path=/\",\n\t\t`Max-Age=${SESSION_TTL_SECONDS}`\n\t];\n\tif (isSecureRequest(request)) parts.push(\"Secure\");\n\treturn parts.join(\"; \");\n}\n/**\n* Build the `Set-Cookie` value that clears the session cookie (logout).\n* Must mirror name/path/attributes of the issued cookie so the browser deletes it.\n*/\nfunction clearSessionCookieHeader(request) {\n\tconst parts = [\n\t\t`${SESSION_COOKIE_NAME}=`,\n\t\t\"HttpOnly\",\n\t\t\"SameSite=Lax\",\n\t\t\"Path=/\",\n\t\t\"Max-Age=0\"\n\t];\n\tif (isSecureRequest(request)) parts.push(\"Secure\");\n\treturn parts.join(\"; \");\n}\n//#endregion\nexport { clearSessionCookieHeader as n, sessionCookieHeader as r, SESSION_COOKIE_NAME as t };\n"],"names":[],"mappings":";;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACG,IAAC,mBAAmB,GAAG;AAC1B;AACA,SAAS,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;AAClC,CAAC,MAAM,SAAS,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAC3D,CAAC,IAAI,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,SAAS,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,IAAI,EAAE,CAAC,WAAW,EAAE,KAAK,OAAO;AAC/E,CAAC,IAAI;AACL,EAAE,OAAO,IAAI,GAAG,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,GAAG,CAAC,CAAC,QAAQ,KAAK,QAAQ;AACnD,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM;AACT,EAAE,OAAO,KAAK;AACd,CAAC;AACD;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA,SAAS,mBAAmB,CAAC,KAAK,EAAE,OAAO,EAAE;AAC7C,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;AACf,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,CAAC;AACnC,EAAE,UAAU;AACZ,EAAE,cAAc;AAChB,EAAE,QAAQ;AACV,EAAE,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC;AACjC,EAAE;AACF,CAAC,IAAI,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;AACnD,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;AACxB;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA;AACA,SAAS,wBAAwB,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE;AAC3C,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,GAAG;AACf,EAAE,CAAC,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,CAAC,CAAC;AAC3B,EAAE,UAAU;AACZ,EAAE,cAAc;AAChB,EAAE,QAAQ;AACV,EAAE;AACF,EAAE;AACF,CAAC,IAAI,eAAe,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;AACnD,CAAC,OAAO,KAAK,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC;AACxB;;;;"}