@openora/core 0.4.1-canary.13 → 0.4.1-canary.131

package/dist/contracts/schemas/events.js

@@ -1,97 +1,330 @@
 import * as z from 'zod';
-import { MoneyAmountSchema, TimestampSchema, UuidSchema } from './common.js';
-import { GeoRuleActionSchema, LimitTypeSchema, LimitPeriodSchema, ExclusionKindSchema, } from './compliance.js';
+import { ClientMetaSchema, CurrencyTickerSchema, MoneyAmountSchema, TimestampSchema, UuidSchema, } from './common.js';
+import { GeoRuleActionSchema, LimitTypeSchema, LimitPeriodSchema, LimitChangeKindSchema, RgInitiatorSchema, ExclusionKindSchema, } from './compliance.js';
 import { TagKeySchema } from './tag.js';
-import { CurrencyCodeSchema, CountryCodeSchema } from './igaming-config.js';
+import { CountryCodeSchema } from './igaming-config.js';
 import { PermissionLevelSchema } from './iam.js';
-import { KycStatusSchema } from './player.js';
-const iamRoleEventBase = z.object({ roleId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema });
-const cmsPageEventBase = z.object({ pageId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema });
-const cmsBannerEventBase = z.object({ bannerId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema });
+import { RegistrationFailureReasonSchema, UsernameSchema } from './identity.js';
+import { KycStatusSchema, KycStatusSourceSchema, KycTierSchema, PlayerStatusSchema, } from './player.js';
+// Optional request-origin metadata shared by HTTP-triggered events; both fields may be absent.
+const authContextBase = ClientMetaSchema.partial();
+const iamRoleEventBase = z
+    .object({ roleId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema })
+    .extend(authContextBase.shape);
+const cmsPageEventBase = z
+    .object({ pageId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema })
+    .extend(authContextBase.shape);
+const cmsBannerConfigurationEventBase = z
+    .object({ bannerConfigurationId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema })
+    .extend(authContextBase.shape);
+const cmsBannerImageEventBase = z
+    .object({ bannerImageId: UuidSchema, bannerConfigurationId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema })
+    .extend(authContextBase.shape);
+const cmsBannerScheduleEventBase = z
+    .object({
+    bannerScheduleId: UuidSchema,
+    bannerConfigurationId: UuidSchema,
+    placement: z.string(),
+    startsAt: TimestampSchema,
+    endsAt: TimestampSchema,
+    actorId: UuidSchema,
+})
+    .extend(authContextBase.shape);
+const cmsBannerScheduleUpdatedEvent = cmsBannerScheduleEventBase.extend({
+    before: z.object({ endsAt: TimestampSchema }),
+});
 const actorReasonBase = z.object({ actorId: UuidSchema, reason: z.string() });
-const tagPlayerEventBase = actorReasonBase.extend({ playerId: UuidSchema, tagKey: TagKeySchema });
+const tagPlayerEventBase = actorReasonBase
+    .extend({ playerId: UuidSchema, tagKey: TagKeySchema })
+    .extend(authContextBase.shape);
 const permissionLevelEntries = z.array(z.object({ resource: z.string(), level: PermissionLevelSchema }));
-// Optional request-origin metadata shared by auth events; both fields may be absent.
-const authContextBase = z.object({
-    ip: z.string().nullable().optional(),
-    userAgent: z.string().nullable().optional(),
-});
 // Shared shape for every wallet money-movement event. Exact decimal string + currency.
 const walletTxnBase = z.object({
     userId: UuidSchema,
     amount: MoneyAmountSchema,
-    currency: CurrencyCodeSchema,
+    currency: CurrencyTickerSchema,
     transactionId: UuidSchema,
 });
+const limitChangeBase = authContextBase.extend({
+    userId: UuidSchema,
+    playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    limitId: UuidSchema,
+    type: LimitTypeSchema,
+    period: LimitPeriodSchema,
+    kind: LimitChangeKindSchema,
+    previousAmount: MoneyAmountSchema.nullable(),
+    previousMinutes: z.number().int().nullable(),
+    requestedAmount: MoneyAmountSchema.nullable(),
+    requestedMinutes: z.number().int().nullable(),
+});
+export const KycStatusUpdatedSchema = z.object({
+    userId: UuidSchema,
+    playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    actorId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    status: KycStatusSchema,
+    previousStatus: KycStatusSchema,
+    reason: z.string().nullable(),
+    source: KycStatusSourceSchema,
+    // Forward-compatible (ADR-0016): every deployment binds RedisStreamsBroker (ADR-0030/
+    // 0032), so a durable backlog survives a restart. A pre-tiering (v4) payload in that
+    // backlog at rollout has no `tier` at all - everything WAS basic-only before tiering,
+    // so default it rather than let safeParse silently drop the event.
+    tier: KycTierSchema.default('basic'),
+});
+export const TWO_FACTOR_METHODS = ['totp', 'otp', 'backup_code', 'webauthn'];
+export const TwoFactorMethodSchema = z.enum(TWO_FACTOR_METHODS);
+// A session is only authenticated after a credential-bearing flow completes. This is
+// deliberately narrower than session refresh and distinct from 2FA enrolment, which
+// changes account configuration but does not create a new authenticated session.
+export const AUTHENTICATION_METHODS = [
+    'password',
+    'email_verification',
+    'phone',
+    'totp',
+    'backup_code',
+];
+export const AuthenticationMethodSchema = z.enum(AUTHENTICATION_METHODS);
 export const domainEventSchemas = {
-    'identity.user.registered': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema }),
-    'identity.user.login': authContextBase.extend({ userId: UuidSchema }),
+    'identity.user.registered': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        // The consent the player actually gave, carried so the audit trail holds it too -
+        // the `player` row alone is current state, not a record of the act. Absent when the
+        // consent write was discarded because a player row already existed.
+        termsVersion: z.string().optional(),
+        acceptedTerms: z.literal(true).optional(),
+        acceptedAge: z.literal(true).optional(),
+    }),
+    // No `userId`: registration is unauthenticated, so the address is the only subject
+    // there is - the same shape `identity.user.login.failed` settled on below.
+    'identity.user.registration.failed': authContextBase.extend({
+        email: z.email(),
+        username: UsernameSchema.optional(),
+        reason: RegistrationFailureReasonSchema,
+    }),
+    'identity.user.login': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'identity.authentication.succeeded': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        method: AuthenticationMethodSchema,
+    }),
     'identity.user.login.failed': authContextBase.extend({
         email: z.email(),
         reason: z.string().nullable().optional(),
+        attemptsRemaining: z.number().int().optional(),
+    }),
+    'identity.user.logout': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'identity.user.phone_login': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        method: z.literal('phone'),
+    }),
+    'identity.phone_otp.requested': authContextBase.extend({ userId: UuidSchema }),
+    'identity.phone_otp.cancelled': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        reason: z.enum(['max_attempts', 'new_otp_requested']),
     }),
-    'identity.user.logout': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema }),
     'identity.user.lockout.triggered': authContextBase.extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
         email: z.email(),
+        tier: z.number().int().positive().optional(),
         lockoutUntil: TimestampSchema,
     }),
-    'identity.user.unlocked': z.object({
+    'identity.user.unlocked': authContextBase.extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
         email: z.email(),
         actorId: UuidSchema,
         previousFailedAttempts: z.number().int().optional(),
         previousLockoutUntil: TimestampSchema.nullable().optional(),
     }),
-    'identity.2fa.enabled': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema }),
-    'identity.2fa.disabled': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema }),
-    'identity.password.reset': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema }),
-    'identity.email.verified': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema }),
-    'identity.profile.updated': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema }),
+    'identity.2fa.enabled': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        method: TwoFactorMethodSchema,
+    }),
+    'identity.2fa.disabled': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        method: TwoFactorMethodSchema,
+    }),
+    'identity.2fa.verified': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        method: TwoFactorMethodSchema,
+        trustedDevice: z.boolean(),
+    }),
+    'identity.2fa.failed': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        method: TwoFactorMethodSchema,
+        attemptsRemaining: z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+    }),
+    // The account's recovery credentials were replaced; every previously issued code is
+    // dead from here on.
+    'identity.2fa.backup_codes_regenerated': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    // A Super Admin cleared someone else's second factor; the account is back to the
+    // unenrolled state and must set one up before it reaches any admin route again.
+    'identity.2fa.reset': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        actorId: UuidSchema,
+        // Free-text justification the Super Admin gave when clearing the second factor.
+        reason: z.string(),
+    }),
+    'identity.2fa.lockout.triggered': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        lockoutUntil: TimestampSchema,
+    }),
+    // An admin account reached an admin route without a second factor configured.
+    'identity.2fa.enrollment_blocked': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+    }),
+    // A session was used from a device or network that no longer matches the one it
+    // was issued to; the session is revoked before this is emitted.
+    'identity.session.fingerprint_mismatch': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        sessionId: UuidSchema,
+        mismatch: z.enum(['user_agent', 'ip']),
+    }),
+    'identity.trusted_device.added': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        deviceId: UuidSchema,
+        label: z.string(),
+        expiresAt: TimestampSchema,
+    }),
+    'identity.trusted_device.revoked': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        deviceId: UuidSchema,
+        // Absent when the guard itself forces the revoke (fingerprint mismatch) rather
+        // than an admin or the device owner acting.
+        actorId: UuidSchema.optional(),
+    }),
+    'identity.password.reset': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'identity.email.verified': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'identity.phone.verified': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        // Re-binding a different number is the same topic, so the audit record needs the
+        // state it replaced rather than assuming every verification starts from unverified.
+        previousPhoneVerified: z.boolean(),
+    }),
+    'identity.security.login_withdrawal_alerts.updated': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        previousEnabled: z.boolean(),
+        enabled: z.boolean(),
+    }),
+    'identity.profile.updated': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
     // An admin toggled a user's active status (the only user-lifecycle flow today;
     // users are deactivated, never hard-deleted). userId = subject, actorId = the
     // admin who acted (for a complete audit trail).
-    'identity.user.deactivated': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema }),
-    'identity.user.reactivated': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema }),
-    'identity.session.revoked': z.object({
+    'identity.user.deactivated': authContextBase.extend({ userId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema }),
+    'identity.user.reactivated': authContextBase.extend({ userId: UuidSchema, actorId: UuidSchema }),
+    'identity.session.revoked': authContextBase.extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
         sessionId: UuidSchema,
         actorId: UuidSchema.optional(),
     }),
-    'identity.sessions.revoked_all': z.object({
+    'identity.sessions.revoked_all': authContextBase.extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
         actorId: UuidSchema.optional(),
     }),
     'identity.user.unauthorized_access': authContextBase.extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
         resource: z.string(),
         action: z.string(),
         role: z.string().optional(),
     }),
-    'wallet.deposit.completed': walletTxnBase,
-    'wallet.withdrawal.completed': walletTxnBase,
+    // An admin triggered a password-reset OTP send on a player's behalf (backoffice
+    // "send reset link" action). userId = subject player, actorId = the admin.
+    'identity.password.admin_reset_requested': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        email: z.email(),
+        actorId: UuidSchema,
+    }),
+    'wallet.deposit.completed': walletTxnBase.extend({ playerId: UuidSchema.nullable() }),
+    'wallet.withdrawal.completed': walletTxnBase.extend({ playerId: UuidSchema.nullable() }),
     // A player requested a withdrawal; funds are held (balance debited) and the
     // request enters the back-office approval queue as `pending`.
-    'wallet.withdrawal.requested': walletTxnBase,
+    'wallet.withdrawal.requested': walletTxnBase
+        .extend({ playerId: UuidSchema.nullable() })
+        .extend(authContextBase.shape),
     // A payments admin approved a pending withdrawal; it moves to `processing` and
-    // is sent to the PSP/Fireblocks rail. `adminId` is the acting reviewer.
-    'wallet.withdrawal.approved': walletTxnBase.extend({ adminId: UuidSchema }),
+    // is sent to the PSP/custody rail. `adminId` is the acting reviewer.
+    'wallet.withdrawal.approved': walletTxnBase
+        .extend({ adminId: UuidSchema })
+        .extend(authContextBase.shape),
     // A payments admin rejected a pending withdrawal; held funds are returned to the
     // player balance. `adminId` is the acting reviewer; `reason` is mandatory.
-    'wallet.withdrawal.rejected': walletTxnBase.extend({
+    'wallet.withdrawal.rejected': walletTxnBase
+        .extend({ adminId: UuidSchema, reason: z.string() })
+        .extend(authContextBase.shape),
+    // An approved withdrawal failed at the PSP/custody rail; the held funds were
+    // returned to the player balance and the transaction moved to `failed`.
+    'wallet.withdrawal.failed': walletTxnBase.extend({ adminId: UuidSchema }),
+    // A super admin credited or debited a balance directly, outside the deposit and
+    // withdrawal rails. Its own topic rather than a reuse of `wallet.deposit.completed`:
+    // a correction is not a deposit, and reporting it as one would overstate deposits and
+    // GGR. Subscribers that track balance movement must handle it or they see a balance
+    // change with no event behind it.
+    'wallet.manual_adjustment.created': walletTxnBase
+        .extend({
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
         adminId: UuidSchema,
+        direction: z.enum(['credit', 'debit']),
         reason: z.string(),
+    })
+        .extend(authContextBase.shape),
+    // A reconciliation run's open-findings count exceeded the operator's configured
+    // threshold. System-driven (no player/admin actor) - the resource is the run itself,
+    // never a finding's payload (an address or tx hash must never reach the audit log
+    // through this event - see docs/standards/audit.md).
+    'wallet.reconciliation.alert': z.object({
+        runId: UuidSchema,
+        openFindings: z.number().int().nonnegative(),
+        threshold: z.number().int().nonnegative(),
     }),
-    // An approved withdrawal failed at the PSP/Fireblocks rail; the held funds were
-    // returned to the player balance and the transaction moved to `failed`.
-    'wallet.withdrawal.failed': walletTxnBase.extend({ adminId: UuidSchema }),
     'gaming.round.started': z.object({
         roundId: UuidSchema,
         gameId: UuidSchema,
         userId: UuidSchema,
-        currency: CurrencyCodeSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        currency: CurrencyTickerSchema,
+    }),
+    'gaming.round.ended': z.object({
+        roundId: UuidSchema,
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'wallet.bonus_rollover.completed': z.object({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        creditId: UuidSchema,
+        currency: CurrencyTickerSchema,
+        creditedAmount: MoneyAmountSchema,
     }),
-    'gaming.round.ended': z.object({ roundId: UuidSchema, userId: UuidSchema }),
     'chat.message.sent': z.object({
         messageId: UuidSchema,
         // null for global-chat messages (no room); a room id otherwise.
@@ -99,17 +332,144 @@ export const domainEventSchemas = {
         userId: UuidSchema,
     }),
     // A player muted/unmuted another player's messages for themselves (ABC-45 AC11).
-    'chat.user.blocked': z.object({ blockerId: UuidSchema, blockedId: UuidSchema }),
-    'chat.user.unblocked': z.object({ blockerId: UuidSchema, blockedId: UuidSchema }),
+    // actorPlayerId = the blocker/ignorer; playerId = the blocked/ignored subject (resourceId).
+    'chat.user.blocked': authContextBase.extend({
+        blockerId: UuidSchema,
+        actorPlayerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        blockedId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'chat.user.unblocked': authContextBase.extend({
+        blockerId: UuidSchema,
+        actorPlayerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        blockedId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'chat.user.ignored': authContextBase.extend({
+        ignorerId: UuidSchema,
+        actorPlayerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        ignoredId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'chat.user.unignored': authContextBase.extend({
+        ignorerId: UuidSchema,
+        actorPlayerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        ignoredId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    // Admin room CRUD (actorId = acting admin UUID).
+    'chat.room.created': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        name: z.string(),
+        slug: z.string(),
+        category: z.string().nullable(),
+        actorId: UuidSchema.optional(),
+    }),
+    'chat.room.deleted': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        actorId: UuidSchema.optional(),
+        before: z.object({ name: z.string(), slug: z.string(), category: z.string().nullable() }),
+    }),
+    'chat.room.updated': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        actorId: UuidSchema.optional(),
+        before: z.object({ name: z.string(), slug: z.string(), category: z.string().nullable() }),
+        after: z.object({ name: z.string(), slug: z.string(), category: z.string().nullable() }),
+    }),
+    // Private room lifecycle: creation and member membership changes.
+    'chat.private_room.created': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        creatorId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'chat.private_room.deleted': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        creatorId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        before: z.object({ name: z.string(), slug: z.string(), category: z.string().nullable() }),
+        after: z.object({ deletedAt: z.string() }),
+    }),
+    'chat.room.member.joined': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'chat.room.member.left': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'chat.room.member.kicked': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        kickedBy: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'chat.room.member.removed': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        removedBy: UuidSchema,
+    }),
+    // A room owner granted or revoked the moderator role. `role` is the member's new role and
+    // `previousRole` the one it replaced - a permission change is only auditable with both.
+    // `owner` never appears in either - ownership transfer is a separate flow. `playerId` is the
+    // acting owner's, null when no player record backs them; `changedBy` always carries the raw
+    // acting user id so the actor survives that case.
+    'chat.room.member.role-changed': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        changedBy: UuidSchema,
+        role: z.enum(['member', 'moderator']),
+        previousRole: z.enum(['member', 'moderator']),
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'chat.room.member.banned': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        bannedBy: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+    }),
+    'chat.room.ownership.transferred': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        roomName: z.string(),
+        previousOwnerId: UuidSchema,
+        newOwnerId: UuidSchema,
+        reason: z.literal('account-closed'),
+    }),
+    'chat.room.scheduled_for_deletion': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        roomName: z.string(),
+        previousOwnerId: UuidSchema,
+        memberIds: z.array(UuidSchema),
+        scheduledDeletionAt: TimestampSchema,
+    }),
+    'chat.room.deletion.cancelled': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        roomName: z.string(),
+        ownerId: UuidSchema,
+        memberIds: z.array(UuidSchema),
+    }),
+    'chat.private_room.purged': authContextBase.extend({
+        roomId: UuidSchema,
+        messageCount: z.number().int(),
+    }),
     // An admin added or changed a geo (country) rule (regulatory). `actorId` is the
     // acting admin so the audit log can attribute the mutation.
-    'compliance.geo-rule.added': z.object({
+    'compliance.geo-rule.added': authContextBase.extend({
         countryCode: CountryCodeSchema,
         action: GeoRuleActionSchema,
         actorId: UuidSchema.optional(),
     }),
-    'compliance.limit.upserted': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema, limitId: UuidSchema }),
-    'compliance.limit.removed': z.object({ userId: UuidSchema, limitId: UuidSchema }),
+    'compliance.limit.upserted': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        limitId: UuidSchema,
+    }),
+    'compliance.limit.removed': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        limitId: UuidSchema,
+    }),
     // Responsible-Gambling admin actions. `userId` = the subject player, `actorId` =
     // the acting admin (the envelope carries no caller, so it is explicit for the audit
     // trail). login_blocked is system-driven (no actor) and a failure outcome.
@@ -117,8 +477,9 @@ export const domainEventSchemas = {
     // money-type limits carry amount (minutes null), the session-type limit
     // carries minutes (amount null). previous* mirrors the prior row's value, null
     // when this is the first limit of that (type, period).
-    'rg.limit.set': z.object({
+    'rg.limit.set': authContextBase.extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
         actorId: UuidSchema,
         limitId: UuidSchema,
         type: LimitTypeSchema,
@@ -127,62 +488,124 @@ export const domainEventSchemas = {
         minutes: z.number().int().nullable(),
         previousAmount: MoneyAmountSchema.nullable(),
         previousMinutes: z.number().int().nullable(),
+        initiatedBy: RgInitiatorSchema,
+        reason: z.string().nullable(),
     }),
-    'rg.cooling_off.activated': actorReasonBase.extend({
+    'rg.limit.change_requested': limitChangeBase.extend({
+        actorId: UuidSchema,
+        effectiveAt: TimestampSchema,
+        expiresAt: TimestampSchema,
+        initiatedBy: RgInitiatorSchema,
+    }),
+    'rg.limit.change_confirmed': limitChangeBase.extend({
+        actorId: UuidSchema,
+        initiatedBy: RgInitiatorSchema,
+    }),
+    'rg.limit.change_cancelled': limitChangeBase.extend({
+        actorId: UuidSchema,
+        initiatedBy: RgInitiatorSchema,
+    }),
+    'rg.limit.change_expired': limitChangeBase.extend({ expiresAt: TimestampSchema }),
+    'rg.cooling_off.activated': actorReasonBase
+        .extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
         exclusionId: UuidSchema,
         expiresAt: TimestampSchema,
-    }),
-    'rg.self_exclusion.activated': actorReasonBase.extend({
+        initiatedBy: RgInitiatorSchema,
+    })
+        .extend(authContextBase.shape),
+    // durationMonths is the admin's chosen term, null when permanent - the regulatory
+    // export reads the decision as made rather than re-deriving it from expiresAt.
+    'rg.self_exclusion.activated': actorReasonBase
+        .extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
         exclusionId: UuidSchema,
         isPermanent: z.boolean(),
+        durationMonths: z.number().int().nullable(),
         expiresAt: TimestampSchema.nullable(),
-    }),
-    'rg.self_exclusion.lifted': actorReasonBase.extend({
+        initiatedBy: RgInitiatorSchema,
+    })
+        .extend(authContextBase.shape),
+    'rg.self_exclusion.lifted': actorReasonBase
+        .extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
         exclusionId: UuidSchema,
         kind: ExclusionKindSchema,
+    })
+        .extend(authContextBase.shape),
+    'rg.cooling_off.lifted': actorReasonBase
+        .extend({ userId: UuidSchema, playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(), exclusionId: UuidSchema })
+        .extend(authContextBase.shape),
+    'rg.cooling_off.expired': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        exclusionId: UuidSchema,
+        expiresAt: TimestampSchema,
     }),
-    'rg.exclusion.login_blocked': z.object({
+    'rg.exclusion.login_blocked': authContextBase.extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
-        ip: z.string().nullable().optional(),
-        userAgent: z.string().nullable().optional(),
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
     }),
     // A player's KYC status changed. userId = subject player; actorId = the admin who
     // acted, or null for system-driven changes (vendor decision, webhook, threshold
     // re-KYC). before/after status records the transition for the audit log.
-    'compliance.kyc.updated': z.object({
-        userId: UuidSchema,
-        actorId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
-        status: KycStatusSchema,
-        previousStatus: KycStatusSchema,
-    }),
+    'compliance.kyc.updated': KycStatusUpdatedSchema,
     // A player submitted KYC documents; a verification record was created and sent to
     // the provider. userId = the submitting player; referenceId = the provider reference.
-    'compliance.kyc.submitted': z.object({
+    'compliance.kyc.submitted': authContextBase.extend({
         userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
         referenceId: z.string(),
         provider: z.string(),
+        // Forward-compatible (ADR-0016): see KycStatusUpdatedSchema's tier field comment.
+        tier: KycTierSchema.default('basic'),
     }),
     // A threshold-triggered re-KYC flipped a verified player to resubmission_requested.
     // System-driven (no admin actor); reason records the metric that crossed.
     'compliance.kyc.reverify_required': z.object({
         userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
         reason: z.string(),
+        // Forward-compatible (ADR-0016): see KycStatusUpdatedSchema's tier field comment.
+        tier: KycTierSchema.default('basic'),
+    }),
+    'compliance.kyc.high_risk_signal_detected': z.object({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        referenceId: z.string(),
+        vpnOrTorDetected: z.boolean(),
+        dataCenterIpDetected: z.boolean(),
+        duplicateDeviceDetected: z.boolean(),
+        highRiskCountryDetected: z.boolean(),
+        // Forward-compatible (ADR-0016): see KycStatusUpdatedSchema's tier field comment.
+        tier: KycTierSchema.default('basic'),
     }),
     'notifications.created': z.object({ notificationId: UuidSchema, userId: UuidSchema }),
-    'cms.page.published': z.object({ pageId: UuidSchema, slug: z.string() }),
+    'cms.page.published': authContextBase.extend({ pageId: UuidSchema, slug: z.string() }),
     'cms.page.created': cmsPageEventBase,
     'cms.page.updated': cmsPageEventBase,
     'cms.page.deleted': cmsPageEventBase,
-    'cms.banner.created': cmsBannerEventBase,
-    'cms.banner.updated': cmsBannerEventBase,
-    'cms.banner.deleted': cmsBannerEventBase,
+    'cms.banner.configuration.created': cmsBannerConfigurationEventBase,
+    'cms.banner.configuration.deleted': cmsBannerConfigurationEventBase,
+    'cms.banner.configuration.set_default': cmsBannerConfigurationEventBase,
+    'cms.banner.configuration.unset_default': z
+        .object({
+        placement: z.string(),
+        previousBannerConfigurationId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        actorId: UuidSchema,
+    })
+        .extend(authContextBase.shape),
+    'cms.banner.image.set': cmsBannerImageEventBase,
+    'cms.banner.image.deleted': cmsBannerImageEventBase,
+    'cms.banner.schedule.created': cmsBannerScheduleEventBase,
+    'cms.banner.schedule.updated': cmsBannerScheduleUpdatedEvent,
     // Emitted when an admin invitation token is accepted. The consumer (identity
     // module or an overlay) provisions the user account and completes the role
     // assignment by resolving the userId from the email.
-    'iam.invitation.accepted': z.object({
+    'iam.invitation.accepted': authContextBase.extend({
         email: z.email(),
         roleId: UuidSchema,
         invitationId: UuidSchema,
@@ -204,26 +627,94 @@ export const domainEventSchemas = {
     }),
     'iam.role.assigned': iamRoleEventBase.extend({ userId: UuidSchema }),
     'iam.role.revoked': iamRoleEventBase.extend({ userId: UuidSchema }),
+    // Emitted after an admin creates or deletes a tag catalog definition (the tag
+    // itself, not a player assignment - see tag.player.assigned/removed for that).
+    'tag.created': z.object({ key: TagKeySchema, isSticky: z.boolean(), actorId: UuidSchema }),
+    'tag.deleted': z.object({ key: TagKeySchema, actorId: UuidSchema }),
     // Emitted after any tag is assigned to or removed from a player (both automated and manual).
     // actorId is the user performing the action (SYSTEM_ACTOR_ID for automated ops).
     'tag.player.assigned': tagPlayerEventBase,
     'tag.player.removed': tagPlayerEventBase,
     // Emitted after an admin creates or updates a tag rule configuration.
-    'tag.rule.upserted': z.object({
+    'tag.rule.upserted': authContextBase.extend({
         tagKey: TagKeySchema,
         actorId: UuidSchema,
         after: z.record(z.string(), z.unknown()),
     }),
+    'chat.user.mentioned': z.object({
+        mentionedUserId: UuidSchema,
+        byUserId: UuidSchema,
+        roomId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        messageId: z.string(),
+    }),
+    'player.level.changed': z.object({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        previousLevel: z.number().int(),
+        newLevel: z.number().int(),
+        actorId: UuidSchema,
+    }),
+    'player.login_blocked': authContextBase.extend({
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        playerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        status: PlayerStatusSchema,
+    }),
+    'player.account.closed': authContextBase.extend({
+        playerId: UuidSchema,
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        actorId: UuidSchema,
+    }),
+    'player.account.reopened': authContextBase.extend({
+        playerId: UuidSchema,
+        userId: UuidSchema,
+        actorId: UuidSchema,
+    }),
+    'social.friend_request.sent': authContextBase.extend({
+        friendshipId: UuidSchema,
+        requesterId: UuidSchema,
+        addresseeId: UuidSchema,
+        requesterUsername: z.string(),
+    }),
+    'social.friend_request.accepted': authContextBase.extend({
+        friendshipId: UuidSchema,
+        requesterId: UuidSchema,
+        addresseeId: UuidSchema,
+        accepterId: UuidSchema,
+        accepterUsername: z.string(),
+    }),
+    'social.friendship.removed': authContextBase.extend({
+        friendshipId: UuidSchema,
+        actorId: UuidSchema,
+        actorPlayerId: UuidSchema.nullable(),
+        otherUserId: UuidSchema,
+        reason: z.enum(['removed_by_player', 'blocked']),
+    }),
+    'social.friend_request.declined': authContextBase.extend({
+        friendshipId: UuidSchema,
+        requesterId: UuidSchema,
+        addresseeId: UuidSchema,
+    }),
+    'social.friend_request.cancelled': authContextBase.extend({
+        friendshipId: UuidSchema,
+        requesterId: UuidSchema,
+        addresseeId: UuidSchema,
+    }),
 };
 // Bump an entry only when its payload shape changes in a non-additive way, in the SAME commit
 // that edits the schema above. Events not listed default to version 1.
 export const domainEventVersions = {
     // v3: actorId is nullable - null marks a system-driven flip (vendor/webhook/reverify),
     // which the audit writer records as actorType 'system'.
-    'compliance.kyc.updated': 3,
+    'compliance.kyc.updated': 5,
+    'compliance.kyc.submitted': 2,
+    'compliance.kyc.reverify_required': 2,
+    'compliance.kyc.high_risk_signal_detected': 2,
     // v2: sessionToken (the raw bearer credential) replaced with sessionId - the token
     // must never be persisted to the audit log or handed back to any caller.
     'identity.session.revoked': 2,
+    // v2: `method` records which factor was used, required by the audit trail.
+    'identity.2fa.enabled': 2,
+    'identity.2fa.disabled': 2,
     // v2: exact decimal-string amount (+ currency), never a JS number.
     'wallet.deposit.completed': 2,
     'wallet.withdrawal.completed': 2,
@@ -231,18 +722,22 @@ export const domainEventVersions = {
     'wallet.withdrawal.approved': 2,
     'wallet.withdrawal.rejected': 2,
     'wallet.withdrawal.failed': 2,
+    'wallet.manual_adjustment.created': 2,
     // v2: amount/previousAmount (decimal string) + minutes/previousMinutes polymorphic
     // pair (money limit vs session-time limit), never a JS number.
-    'rg.limit.set': 2,
+    'rg.limit.set': 4,
+    'rg.cooling_off.activated': 2,
     // v2: permanent renamed to isPermanent (non-predicate boolean naming rule).
-    'rg.self_exclusion.activated': 2,
+    // v3: durationMonths added - the chosen term, explicit for the regulatory export.
+    'rg.self_exclusion.activated': 4,
 };
 export function getEventVersion(event) {
     return domainEventVersions[event] ?? 1;
 }
+export const DOMAIN_EVENT_CATALOG = Object.keys(domainEventSchemas);
 /** Returns every cross-module topic and its current schema version for broker provisioning and producer/consumer agreement checks. */
 export function eventCatalog() {
-    return Object.keys(domainEventSchemas).map((topic) => ({
+    return DOMAIN_EVENT_CATALOG.map((topic) => ({
         topic,
         version: getEventVersion(topic),
     }));