@openllmsh/sdk 2.10.12-alpha.1 → 2.10.12
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +27 -7
- package/dist/client/chat.d.ts +38 -0
- package/dist/client/chat.js +77 -0
- package/dist/client/devices.d.ts +70 -0
- package/dist/client/devices.js +172 -0
- package/dist/client/http.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/client/http.js +34 -0
- package/dist/client/index.d.ts +43 -0
- package/dist/client/index.js +57 -0
- package/dist/client/relay-mux.d.ts +71 -0
- package/dist/client/relay-mux.js +394 -0
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts +47 -0
- package/dist/client/types.js +5 -0
- package/dist/client/vault.d.ts +68 -0
- package/dist/client/vault.js +113 -0
- package/dist/connect/chat.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/connect/chat.js +25 -0
- package/dist/connect/client.d.ts +50 -0
- package/dist/connect/client.js +141 -0
- package/dist/connect/config.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/connect/config.js +22 -0
- package/dist/connect/errors.d.ts +32 -0
- package/dist/connect/errors.js +85 -0
- package/{connect/index.ts → dist/connect/index.d.ts} +7 -7
- package/dist/connect/index.js +23 -0
- package/dist/connect/oauth.d.ts +51 -0
- package/dist/connect/oauth.js +150 -0
- package/dist/connect/routes.d.ts +38 -0
- package/dist/connect/routes.js +175 -0
- package/dist/connect/store.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/connect/store.js +65 -0
- package/dist/mcp/handle.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/mcp/handle.js +6 -0
- package/dist/mcp/index.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/mcp/index.js +10 -0
- package/dist/mcp/server.d.ts +84 -0
- package/dist/mcp/server.js +168 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/marketplace.d.ts +94 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/marketplace.js +303 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/memory-client.d.ts +109 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/memory-client.js +200 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/memory-config.d.ts +29 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/memory-config.js +12 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/memory.d.ts +92 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/memory.js +312 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/model-priority.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/model-priority.js +87 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/openllm.d.ts +75 -0
- package/dist/mcp/tools/openllm.js +715 -0
- package/dist/mcp/types.d.ts +25 -0
- package/dist/mcp/types.js +7 -0
- package/dist/openapi/call.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/openapi/call.js +56 -0
- package/dist/openapi/index.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/openapi/index.js +2 -0
- package/dist/openapi/openapi.json +80213 -0
- package/dist/openapi/operations.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/openapi/operations.js +2060 -0
- package/dist/protocol/access.d.ts +81 -0
- package/dist/protocol/access.js +125 -0
- package/dist/protocol/agent-prompt-text.d.ts +15 -0
- package/{protocol/agent-prompt-text.ts → dist/protocol/agent-prompt-text.js} +9 -14
- package/dist/protocol/agent.d.ts +1487 -0
- package/dist/protocol/agent.js +787 -0
- package/dist/protocol/api-key-syntax.d.ts +58 -0
- package/dist/protocol/api-key-syntax.js +73 -0
- package/dist/protocol/audio.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/protocol/audio.js +21 -0
- package/dist/protocol/auth.d.ts +126 -0
- package/dist/protocol/auth.js +119 -0
- package/dist/protocol/changelog.d.ts +69 -0
- package/dist/protocol/changelog.js +107 -0
- package/dist/protocol/chat.d.ts +789 -0
- package/dist/protocol/chat.js +394 -0
- package/dist/protocol/client-registry.d.ts +151 -0
- package/dist/protocol/client-registry.js +238 -0
- package/dist/protocol/config.d.ts +508 -0
- package/dist/protocol/config.js +289 -0
- package/dist/protocol/control-channel.d.ts +102 -0
- package/{protocol/control-channel.ts → dist/protocol/control-channel.js} +33 -61
- package/dist/protocol/cooldown-reason.d.ts +30 -0
- package/dist/protocol/cooldown-reason.js +44 -0
- package/dist/protocol/cost.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/protocol/cost.js +8 -0
- package/dist/protocol/daemon-port.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/protocol/daemon-port.js +28 -0
- package/dist/protocol/daemon.d.ts +2034 -0
- package/dist/protocol/daemon.js +1286 -0
- package/dist/protocol/default-chains.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/protocol/default-chains.js +21 -0
- package/dist/protocol/device-state.d.ts +223 -0
- package/dist/protocol/device-state.js +52 -0
- package/dist/protocol/doctor-report-local.d.ts +105 -0
- package/{protocol/doctor-report-local.ts → dist/protocol/doctor-report-local.js} +92 -196
- package/dist/protocol/doctor-report-policy.d.ts +62 -0
- package/{protocol/doctor-report-policy.ts → dist/protocol/doctor-report-policy.js} +23 -76
- package/dist/protocol/doctor-report.d.ts +406 -0
- package/dist/protocol/doctor-report.js +645 -0
- package/dist/protocol/errors.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/protocol/errors.js +10 -0
- package/dist/protocol/execution-selection.d.ts +92 -0
- package/{protocol/execution-selection.ts → dist/protocol/execution-selection.js} +38 -63
- package/dist/protocol/hop-grant.d.ts +28 -0
- package/{protocol/hop-grant.ts → dist/protocol/hop-grant.js} +7 -13
- package/dist/protocol/image-edit-parse.d.ts +25 -0
- package/dist/protocol/image-edit-parse.js +196 -0
- package/dist/protocol/images.d.ts +288 -0
- package/dist/protocol/images.js +229 -0
- package/dist/protocol/index.d.ts +69 -0
- package/dist/protocol/index.js +74 -0
- package/dist/protocol/inference-headers.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/protocol/keepalive.d.ts +36 -0
- package/dist/protocol/keepalive.js +51 -0
- package/dist/protocol/local-auth.d.ts +125 -0
- package/dist/protocol/local-auth.js +227 -0
- package/dist/protocol/local-device-control.d.ts +108 -0
- package/{protocol/local-device-control.ts → dist/protocol/local-device-control.js} +40 -70
- package/dist/protocol/local-provider.d.ts +105 -0
- package/dist/protocol/local-provider.js +213 -0
- package/dist/protocol/local-session.d.ts +70 -0
- package/dist/protocol/local-session.js +87 -0
- package/dist/protocol/marketplace.d.ts +190 -0
- package/dist/protocol/marketplace.js +140 -0
- package/{protocol/media-attempt.ts → dist/protocol/media-attempt.d.ts} +11 -50
- package/dist/protocol/media-attempt.js +50 -0
- package/dist/protocol/media-bytes.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/protocol/media-bytes.js +21 -0
- package/dist/protocol/media-default.d.ts +56 -0
- package/dist/protocol/media-default.js +302 -0
- package/{protocol/media-dimensions.ts → dist/protocol/media-dimensions.d.ts} +11 -78
- package/dist/protocol/media-dimensions.js +90 -0
- package/dist/protocol/media-input.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/protocol/media-input.js +29 -0
- package/dist/protocol/media-model.d.ts +77 -0
- package/dist/protocol/media-model.js +89 -0
- package/{protocol/media-option-issue.ts → dist/protocol/media-option-issue.d.ts} +25 -53
- package/dist/protocol/media-option-issue.js +50 -0
- package/dist/protocol/media-types.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/protocol/media-types.js +61 -0
- package/dist/protocol/model-match.d.ts +254 -0
- package/dist/protocol/model-match.js +760 -0
- package/dist/protocol/model-settings.d.ts +153 -0
- package/dist/protocol/model-settings.js +246 -0
- package/dist/protocol/models.d.ts +1065 -0
- package/dist/protocol/models.js +638 -0
- package/dist/protocol/mux.d.ts +350 -0
- package/dist/protocol/mux.js +595 -0
- package/{protocol/plan-surface.ts → dist/protocol/plan-surface.d.ts} +12 -26
- package/dist/protocol/plan-surface.js +39 -0
- package/dist/protocol/provider-models.d.ts +8 -0
- package/{protocol/provider-models.ts → dist/protocol/provider-models.js} +7 -9
- package/dist/protocol/provider-status.d.ts +59 -0
- package/dist/protocol/provider-status.js +142 -0
- package/dist/protocol/provider-tier.d.ts +34 -0
- package/{protocol/provider-tier.ts → dist/protocol/provider-tier.js} +9 -34
- package/dist/protocol/provider-usage.d.ts +230 -0
- package/dist/protocol/provider-usage.js +214 -0
- package/dist/protocol/providers.d.ts +2496 -0
- package/dist/protocol/providers.js +723 -0
- package/dist/protocol/public-usage-index.d.ts +449 -0
- package/dist/protocol/public-usage-index.js +279 -0
- package/dist/protocol/realtime-generated.d.ts +29 -0
- package/{protocol/realtime-generated.ts → dist/protocol/realtime-generated.js} +3 -5
- package/dist/protocol/realtime.d.ts +241 -0
- package/{protocol/realtime.ts → dist/protocol/realtime.js} +88 -155
- package/dist/protocol/registry-pointer.d.ts +24 -0
- package/dist/protocol/registry-pointer.js +78 -0
- package/dist/protocol/relay.d.ts +1152 -0
- package/{protocol/relay.ts → dist/protocol/relay.js} +237 -370
- package/dist/protocol/replay-session.d.ts +4 -0
- package/{protocol/replay-session.ts → dist/protocol/replay-session.js} +1 -8
- package/dist/protocol/responses.d.ts +303 -0
- package/dist/protocol/responses.js +240 -0
- package/dist/protocol/semver.d.ts +59 -0
- package/dist/protocol/semver.js +171 -0
- package/{protocol/setup-mode.ts → dist/protocol/setup-mode.d.ts} +4 -12
- package/dist/protocol/setup-mode.js +18 -0
- package/dist/protocol/sha256-hex.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/protocol/sha256-hex.js +93 -0
- package/dist/protocol/stats.d.ts +711 -0
- package/dist/protocol/stats.js +353 -0
- package/dist/protocol/streaming.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/protocol/streaming.js +15 -0
- package/{protocol/subscription-daemon-floors.ts → dist/protocol/subscription-daemon-floors.d.ts} +8 -14
- package/dist/protocol/subscription-daemon-floors.js +4 -0
- package/dist/protocol/subscription-provider-compat.d.ts +44 -0
- package/dist/protocol/subscription-provider-compat.js +67 -0
- package/dist/protocol/subscription-provider.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/protocol/subscription-provider.js +17 -0
- package/dist/protocol/team-grant.d.ts +14 -0
- package/{protocol/team-grant.ts → dist/protocol/team-grant.js} +0 -3
- package/dist/protocol/team-shareable.d.ts +6 -0
- package/{protocol/team-shareable.ts → dist/protocol/team-shareable.js} +29 -33
- package/dist/protocol/transcription-encoding.d.ts +25 -0
- package/dist/protocol/transcription-encoding.js +47 -0
- package/{protocol/url-locality-dns.ts → dist/protocol/url-locality-dns.d.ts} +1 -23
- package/dist/protocol/url-locality-dns.js +33 -0
- package/dist/protocol/url-locality.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/protocol/url-locality.js +288 -0
- package/dist/protocol/usage-snapshots.d.ts +8 -0
- package/{protocol/usage-snapshots.ts → dist/protocol/usage-snapshots.js} +1 -2
- package/dist/protocol/vendor-cli-install.d.ts +20 -0
- package/{protocol/vendor-cli-install.ts → dist/protocol/vendor-cli-install.js} +10 -15
- package/dist/protocol/video-job-plan.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/protocol/video-job-plan.js +44 -0
- package/dist/protocol/videos.d.ts +107 -0
- package/dist/protocol/videos.js +154 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/channel-envelope.d.ts +53 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/channel-envelope.js +100 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/codec.d.ts +71 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/codec.js +151 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/device-anchor.d.ts +62 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/device-anchor.js +168 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/device-control.d.ts +50 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/device-control.js +88 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/device-grant.d.ts +91 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/device-grant.js +105 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/fleet.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/fleet.js +41 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/index.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/index.js +22 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/mux.d.ts +64 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/mux.js +449 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/peer-link.d.ts +88 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/peer-link.js +271 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/rtc-auth.d.ts +159 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/rtc-auth.js +340 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/rtc-duplex.d.ts +52 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/rtc-duplex.js +148 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/rtc-ice.d.ts +55 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/rtc-ice.js +100 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/secure.d.ts +179 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/secure.js +936 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/stream-reset-error.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/stream-reset-error.js +9 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/streams.d.ts +244 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/streams.js +1071 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/team-grant.d.ts +90 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/team-grant.js +226 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/wire-bytes.d.ts +32 -0
- package/dist/tunnel/wire-bytes.js +90 -0
- package/dist/vault/api-key.d.ts +71 -0
- package/dist/vault/api-key.js +130 -0
- package/{vault/argon2.ts → dist/vault/argon2.d.ts} +18 -53
- package/dist/vault/argon2.js +82 -0
- package/dist/vault/cli-auth-seal.d.ts +35 -0
- package/dist/vault/cli-auth-seal.js +78 -0
- package/dist/vault/cred-seal.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/vault/cred-seal.js +86 -0
- package/dist/vault/credential.d.ts +21 -0
- package/dist/vault/credential.js +26 -0
- package/dist/vault/crypto.d.ts +51 -0
- package/dist/vault/crypto.js +156 -0
- package/dist/vault/daemon-attest.d.ts +68 -0
- package/dist/vault/daemon-attest.js +147 -0
- package/dist/vault/derive.d.ts +34 -0
- package/dist/vault/derive.js +84 -0
- package/dist/vault/device-access.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/vault/device-access.js +77 -0
- package/dist/vault/device-anchor.d.ts +42 -0
- package/dist/vault/device-anchor.js +90 -0
- package/dist/vault/device-control.d.ts +80 -0
- package/{vault/device-control.ts → dist/vault/device-control.js} +46 -104
- package/dist/vault/handoff.d.ts +102 -0
- package/dist/vault/handoff.js +236 -0
- package/dist/vault/index.d.ts +21 -0
- package/dist/vault/index.js +21 -0
- package/dist/vault/passkey.d.ts +82 -0
- package/{vault/passkey.ts → dist/vault/passkey.js} +63 -153
- package/dist/vault/phrase.d.ts +40 -0
- package/{vault/phrase.ts → dist/vault/phrase.js} +17 -23
- package/dist/vault/pin.d.ts +46 -0
- package/dist/vault/pin.js +92 -0
- package/dist/vault/public-key-seal.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/vault/public-key-seal.js +59 -0
- package/dist/vault/seed.d.ts +96 -0
- package/dist/vault/seed.js +179 -0
- package/dist/vault/team.d.ts +134 -0
- package/dist/vault/team.js +217 -0
- package/dist/vault/vault-item.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/vault/vault-item.js +62 -0
- package/dist/vault/vault-migrate-digest.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/vault/vault-migrate-digest.js +22 -0
- package/dist/vault/wrapped.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/vault/wrapped.js +52 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/anthropic-map.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/anthropic-map.js +32 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/index.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/index.js +7 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/reasoning-from-items.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/reasoning-from-items.js +39 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/reasoning-signature.d.ts +81 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/reasoning-signature.js +180 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/request.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/request.js +490 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/response.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/response.js +177 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/streaming.d.ts +134 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/streaming.js +791 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/usage.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/messages/usage.js +10 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/responses/index.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/responses/index.js +3 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/responses/request.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/responses/request.js +287 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/responses/response.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/responses/response.js +69 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/responses/streaming.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/wire/adapters/responses/streaming.js +267 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/account-rank.d.ts +61 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/account-rank.js +109 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/compaction/compact-request.d.ts +69 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/compaction/compact-request.js +667 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/compaction/compaction-text.d.ts +17 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/compaction/compaction-text.js +29 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/context-demote.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/context-demote.js +45 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/context-overflow-strategy.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/context-overflow-strategy.js +8 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/context-skip.d.ts +120 -0
- package/{wire/features/context-skip.ts → dist/wire/features/context-skip.js} +23 -57
- package/dist/wire/features/conversation-affinity.d.ts +49 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/conversation-affinity.js +121 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/max-tokens-backfill.d.ts +50 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/max-tokens-backfill.js +118 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/model-caps.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/model-caps.js +40 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/model-settings.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/model-settings.js +13 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/output-limit-clamp.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/output-limit-clamp.js +36 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/quota-gate.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/wire/features/quota-gate.js +48 -0
- package/dist/wire/index.d.ts +44 -0
- package/dist/wire/index.js +44 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/attempt-outcome.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/attempt-outcome.js +18 -0
- package/{wire/lib/canonical/content-part.ts → dist/wire/lib/canonical/content-part.d.ts} +12 -18
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/content-part.js +11 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/count-tokens-capability.d.ts +52 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/count-tokens-capability.js +109 -0
- package/{wire/lib/canonical/encoding-select.ts → dist/wire/lib/canonical/encoding-select.d.ts} +7 -24
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/encoding-select.js +26 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/image-signature.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/image-signature.js +184 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/image-sse.d.ts +88 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/image-sse.js +173 -0
- package/{wire/lib/canonical/message.ts → dist/wire/lib/canonical/message.d.ts} +2 -20
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/message.js +31 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/token-estimate.d.ts +98 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/canonical/token-estimate.js +230 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/encrypted-content.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/encrypted-content.js +55 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/error-class.d.ts +57 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/error-class.js +97 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/error-envelope.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/error-envelope.js +53 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/forwarded-headers.d.ts +16 -0
- package/{wire/lib/forwarded-headers.ts → dist/wire/lib/forwarded-headers.js} +62 -72
- package/dist/wire/lib/provider-error-rules.d.ts +21 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/provider-error-rules.js +20 -0
- package/{wire/lib/refusal.ts → dist/wire/lib/refusal.d.ts} +3 -13
- package/dist/wire/lib/refusal.js +27 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/responses-apply-patch.d.ts +57 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/responses-apply-patch.js +81 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/responses-namespace.d.ts +27 -0
- package/{wire/lib/responses-namespace.ts → dist/wire/lib/responses-namespace.js} +16 -32
- package/dist/wire/lib/secret-scrub.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/secret-scrub.js +72 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/accumulate.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/accumulate.js +187 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/finish-reason.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/finish-reason.js +15 -0
- package/{wire/lib/streaming/peek.ts → dist/wire/lib/streaming/peek.d.ts} +13 -82
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/peek.js +100 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/provider-decode.d.ts +57 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/provider-decode.js +210 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/response-stream.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/response-stream.js +64 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/sse.d.ts +130 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/sse.js +600 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/strip-tool-calls.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/strip-tool-calls.js +75 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/upstream-error.d.ts +32 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/streaming/upstream-error.js +45 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/strip-subagent-isolation.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/strip-subagent-isolation.js +240 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/thinking-signature.d.ts +56 -0
- package/{wire/lib/thinking-signature.ts → dist/wire/lib/thinking-signature.js} +77 -84
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/bpe-core.d.ts +105 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/bpe-core.js +398 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/index.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/index.js +2 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/ruler.d.ts +36 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/ruler.js +50 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/claude-ranks.d.ts +14 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/claude-ranks.js +16 -0
- package/{wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/claude.ts → dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/claude.d.ts} +2 -12
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/claude.js +8 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/o200k-ranks.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/o200k-ranks.js +18 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/o200k.d.ts +11 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/o200k.js +6 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/tool-name-map.d.ts +44 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/tool-name-map.js +186 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/tool-schema.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/tool-schema.js +307 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/usage-observer.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/wire/lib/usage-observer.js +108 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/adaptive-thinking.d.ts +125 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/adaptive-thinking.js +221 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/beta-headers.d.ts +44 -0
- package/{wire/providers/anthropic/beta-headers.ts → dist/wire/providers/anthropic/beta-headers.js} +57 -79
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/index.d.ts +6 -0
- package/{wire/providers/anthropic/index.ts → dist/wire/providers/anthropic/index.js} +6 -6
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/request.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/request.js +456 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/response.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/response.js +126 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/streaming.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/streaming.js +268 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/web-search-domains.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/anthropic/web-search-domains.js +36 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/chatgpt/common.d.ts +27 -0
- package/{wire/providers/chatgpt/common.ts → dist/wire/providers/chatgpt/common.js} +69 -89
- package/dist/wire/providers/chatgpt/index.d.ts +4 -0
- package/{wire/providers/chatgpt/index.ts → dist/wire/providers/chatgpt/index.js} +4 -4
- package/dist/wire/providers/chatgpt/request.d.ts +132 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/chatgpt/request.js +696 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/chatgpt/streaming.d.ts +69 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/chatgpt/streaming.js +761 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/chatgpt/web-search.d.ts +19 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/chatgpt/web-search.js +55 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/grok/web-search.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/grok/web-search.js +74 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/kimi/web-search.d.ts +48 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/kimi/web-search.js +106 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/upstream-deny.d.ts +61 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/upstream-deny.js +293 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/upstream-request.d.ts +104 -0
- package/dist/wire/providers/upstream-request.js +411 -0
- package/package.json +105 -23
- package/ARCHITECTURE.md +0 -43
- package/client/chat.ts +0 -140
- package/client/devices.ts +0 -269
- package/client/http.ts +0 -72
- package/client/index.ts +0 -129
- package/client/relay-mux.ts +0 -547
- package/client/types.ts +0 -51
- package/client/vault.ts +0 -239
- package/connect/chat.ts +0 -58
- package/connect/client.ts +0 -240
- package/connect/config.ts +0 -47
- package/connect/errors.ts +0 -121
- package/connect/oauth.ts +0 -265
- package/connect/routes.ts +0 -234
- package/connect/store.ts +0 -107
- package/mcp/handle.ts +0 -24
- package/mcp/index.ts +0 -76
- package/mcp/server.ts +0 -319
- package/mcp/tools/marketplace.ts +0 -439
- package/mcp/tools/memory-client.ts +0 -297
- package/mcp/tools/memory-config.ts +0 -32
- package/mcp/tools/memory.ts +0 -369
- package/mcp/tools/model-priority.ts +0 -88
- package/mcp/tools/openllm.ts +0 -883
- package/mcp/types.ts +0 -28
- package/openapi/call.ts +0 -90
- package/openapi/index.ts +0 -8
- package/openapi/openapi.json +0 -80213
- package/openapi/operations.ts +0 -2075
- package/protocol/CONTRIBUTING.md +0 -21
- package/protocol/README.md +0 -134
- package/protocol/access.ts +0 -186
- package/protocol/agent.ts +0 -991
- package/protocol/api-key-syntax.ts +0 -105
- package/protocol/assets/openllm-light.svg +0 -18
- package/protocol/assets/openllm.svg +0 -18
- package/protocol/audio.ts +0 -29
- package/protocol/auth.ts +0 -142
- package/protocol/changelog.ts +0 -155
- package/protocol/chat.ts +0 -458
- package/protocol/client-registry.ts +0 -356
- package/protocol/config.ts +0 -345
- package/protocol/cooldown-reason.ts +0 -78
- package/protocol/cost.ts +0 -10
- package/protocol/daemon-port.ts +0 -31
- package/protocol/daemon.ts +0 -1524
- package/protocol/default-chains.ts +0 -66
- package/protocol/device-state.ts +0 -85
- package/protocol/doctor-report.ts +0 -947
- package/protocol/errors.ts +0 -14
- package/protocol/image-edit-parse.ts +0 -263
- package/protocol/images.ts +0 -298
- package/protocol/index.ts +0 -74
- package/protocol/keepalive.ts +0 -69
- package/protocol/local-auth.ts +0 -300
- package/protocol/local-provider.ts +0 -288
- package/protocol/local-session.ts +0 -118
- package/protocol/marketplace.ts +0 -187
- package/protocol/media-bytes.ts +0 -28
- package/protocol/media-default.ts +0 -357
- package/protocol/media-input.ts +0 -61
- package/protocol/media-model.ts +0 -142
- package/protocol/media-types.ts +0 -70
- package/protocol/model-match.ts +0 -1051
- package/protocol/model-settings.ts +0 -327
- package/protocol/models.ts +0 -767
- package/protocol/mux.ts +0 -722
- package/protocol/provider-status.ts +0 -206
- package/protocol/provider-usage.ts +0 -263
- package/protocol/providers.ts +0 -901
- package/protocol/public-usage-index.ts +0 -354
- package/protocol/registry-pointer.ts +0 -118
- package/protocol/responses.ts +0 -280
- package/protocol/semver.ts +0 -182
- package/protocol/sha256-hex.ts +0 -98
- package/protocol/stats.ts +0 -406
- package/protocol/streaming.ts +0 -19
- package/protocol/subscription-provider-compat.ts +0 -104
- package/protocol/subscription-provider.ts +0 -32
- package/protocol/transcription-encoding.ts +0 -76
- package/protocol/url-locality.ts +0 -288
- package/protocol/video-job-plan.ts +0 -50
- package/protocol/videos.ts +0 -227
- package/tsconfig.json +0 -14
- package/tunnel/ARCHITECTURE.md +0 -111
- package/tunnel/assets/openllm-light.svg +0 -18
- package/tunnel/assets/openllm.svg +0 -18
- package/tunnel/channel-envelope.ts +0 -139
- package/tunnel/codec.ts +0 -191
- package/tunnel/device-anchor.ts +0 -229
- package/tunnel/device-control.ts +0 -118
- package/tunnel/device-grant.ts +0 -173
- package/tunnel/fleet.ts +0 -77
- package/tunnel/index.ts +0 -22
- package/tunnel/mux.ts +0 -580
- package/tunnel/peer-link.ts +0 -390
- package/tunnel/rtc-auth.ts +0 -415
- package/tunnel/rtc-duplex.ts +0 -187
- package/tunnel/rtc-ice.ts +0 -136
- package/tunnel/secure.ts +0 -1298
- package/tunnel/stream-reset-error.ts +0 -14
- package/tunnel/streams.ts +0 -1430
- package/tunnel/team-grant.ts +0 -302
- package/tunnel/wire-bytes.ts +0 -102
- package/vault/ARCHITECTURE.md +0 -470
- package/vault/api-key.ts +0 -190
- package/vault/cli-auth-seal.ts +0 -157
- package/vault/cred-seal.ts +0 -146
- package/vault/credential.ts +0 -55
- package/vault/crypto.ts +0 -210
- package/vault/daemon-attest.ts +0 -229
- package/vault/derive.ts +0 -113
- package/vault/device-access.ts +0 -87
- package/vault/device-anchor.ts +0 -185
- package/vault/handoff.ts +0 -396
- package/vault/index.ts +0 -21
- package/vault/pin.ts +0 -153
- package/vault/public-key-seal.ts +0 -131
- package/vault/seed.ts +0 -272
- package/vault/team.ts +0 -355
- package/vault/vault-item.ts +0 -131
- package/vault/vault-migrate-digest.ts +0 -29
- package/vault/wrapped.ts +0 -77
- package/wire/ARCHITECTURE.md +0 -90
- package/wire/CONTRIBUTING.md +0 -19
- package/wire/adapters/messages/anthropic-map.ts +0 -37
- package/wire/adapters/messages/index.ts +0 -7
- package/wire/adapters/messages/reasoning-from-items.ts +0 -38
- package/wire/adapters/messages/reasoning-signature.ts +0 -243
- package/wire/adapters/messages/request.ts +0 -574
- package/wire/adapters/messages/response.ts +0 -215
- package/wire/adapters/messages/streaming.ts +0 -1027
- package/wire/adapters/messages/usage.ts +0 -43
- package/wire/adapters/responses/index.ts +0 -3
- package/wire/adapters/responses/request.ts +0 -395
- package/wire/adapters/responses/response.ts +0 -88
- package/wire/adapters/responses/streaming.ts +0 -344
- package/wire/assets/openllm-light.svg +0 -18
- package/wire/assets/openllm.svg +0 -18
- package/wire/features/account-rank.ts +0 -166
- package/wire/features/compaction/compact-request.ts +0 -862
- package/wire/features/compaction/compaction-text.ts +0 -43
- package/wire/features/context-demote.ts +0 -47
- package/wire/features/context-overflow-strategy.ts +0 -26
- package/wire/features/conversation-affinity.ts +0 -144
- package/wire/features/max-tokens-backfill.ts +0 -141
- package/wire/features/model-caps.ts +0 -53
- package/wire/features/model-settings.ts +0 -24
- package/wire/features/output-limit-clamp.ts +0 -64
- package/wire/features/quota-gate.ts +0 -85
- package/wire/index.ts +0 -44
- package/wire/lib/attempt-outcome.ts +0 -43
- package/wire/lib/canonical/count-tokens-capability.ts +0 -138
- package/wire/lib/canonical/image-signature.ts +0 -202
- package/wire/lib/canonical/image-sse.ts +0 -216
- package/wire/lib/canonical/token-estimate.ts +0 -266
- package/wire/lib/encrypted-content.ts +0 -66
- package/wire/lib/error-class.ts +0 -154
- package/wire/lib/error-envelope.ts +0 -56
- package/wire/lib/provider-error-rules.ts +0 -48
- package/wire/lib/responses-apply-patch.ts +0 -104
- package/wire/lib/secret-scrub.ts +0 -101
- package/wire/lib/streaming/accumulate.ts +0 -221
- package/wire/lib/streaming/finish-reason.ts +0 -33
- package/wire/lib/streaming/provider-decode.ts +0 -259
- package/wire/lib/streaming/response-stream.ts +0 -71
- package/wire/lib/streaming/sse.ts +0 -699
- package/wire/lib/streaming/strip-tool-calls.ts +0 -95
- package/wire/lib/streaming/upstream-error.ts +0 -58
- package/wire/lib/strip-subagent-isolation.ts +0 -284
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/bpe-core.ts +0 -426
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/index.ts +0 -2
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/ruler.ts +0 -79
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/claude-ranks.ts +0 -16
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/o200k-ranks.ts +0 -18
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/o200k.ts +0 -19
- package/wire/lib/tool-name-map.ts +0 -271
- package/wire/lib/tool-schema.ts +0 -353
- package/wire/lib/usage-observer.ts +0 -125
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/adaptive-thinking.ts +0 -291
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/request.ts +0 -607
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/response.ts +0 -155
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/streaming.ts +0 -315
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/web-search-domains.ts +0 -49
- package/wire/providers/chatgpt/request.ts +0 -959
- package/wire/providers/chatgpt/streaming.ts +0 -1007
- package/wire/providers/chatgpt/web-search.ts +0 -63
- package/wire/providers/grok/web-search.ts +0 -87
- package/wire/providers/kimi/web-search.ts +0 -145
- package/wire/providers/upstream-deny.ts +0 -355
- package/wire/providers/upstream-request.ts +0 -619
- /package/{protocol/inference-headers.ts → dist/protocol/inference-headers.js} +0 -0
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# `packages/sdk/vault` Architecture
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> Zero-knowledge crypto — pure bytes-in/bytes-out primitives that run
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> identically in the browser and on the proxy. Depends on nothing
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> app-specific. Provider credentials are client-encrypted at rest; the proxy
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> decrypts them only transiently for an authenticated upstream request.
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Referenced from the root [`ARCHITECTURE.md`](../../ARCHITECTURE.md).
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---
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## Modules
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```
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vault/
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crypto.ts — WebCrypto AES-256-GCM + HKDF-SHA256 + b64/b64url + zero()
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argon2.ts — Argon2id wrap-key derivation, params registry keyed by version
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wrapped.ts — sealed-blob layout: IV||ct, plus the `v<n>:` KDF stamp
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seed.ts — THE vault secret: seed ↔ phrase, seed → DEK / vault_key_id
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(HKDF), key-tree branch/leaf keys, passkey seed seal
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vault-item.ts— seal/open an item under its branch (and leaf) of the tree;
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`k1:` nonce tag, untagged = legacy root (until the sunset)
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vault-migrate-digest.ts — row digest shared by browser and server for the
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one-time update and rotation
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derive.ts — LEGACY: buildVault / unlockDek (phrase → DEK via wrapped_dek)
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credential.ts— encrypt/decrypt a credential row under the DEK
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api-key.ts — sk-llm parse + HKDF api-wrap-key + dek_for_key un/wrap + mint
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device-access.ts — Ed25519 SPKI encoding + device-grant sign / verify
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device-control.ts— the account device-control key (phrase → Ed25519, never
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from the DEK), rotation sign/verify, control-keep outer key
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daemon-attest.ts — control-signed attestation of a daemon X25519 key (dpk)
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handoff.ts — device handoff: X25519 seal of the SEED to a new device, its
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binding, the anchor check (`vault_key_id`), the 6-digit code
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cli-auth-seal.ts — seal an ordinary sk-llm API key to a CLI caller's ephemeral
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X25519 pubkey (CLI OpenLLM OAuth handover; distinct domain/AAD
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from the connector seal so ciphertexts are not interchangeable)
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passkey.ts — LEGACY WebAuthn-PRF DEK wrap (seed vaults seal the seed: seed.ts)
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phrase.ts · pin.ts (deriveVaultState lives in lib/vault/state.ts)
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team.ts — user-held team key T: seal under DEK, invite wrap, K_mem, memory seal
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index.ts
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```
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## Seed-only vault (current)
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Design and decisions: [`docs/plans/seed-only-vault.md`](../../docs/plans/seed-only-vault.md).
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The sections after this one describe the LEGACY vault, which stays readable
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only until the sunset (`docs/todo/remove-legacy-vault-migration.md`).
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- **One secret.** The seed is the 12-word phrase's 16-byte BIP39 entropy
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(`seed.ts`). Everything is derived from it with HKDF, nothing derived is
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stored: the vault root key (DEK), the public `users.vault_key_id` (the
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server's check that a phrase or a handed-off seed is this vault's), and the
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device-control key (`device-control.ts`, unchanged from legacy for the same
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phrase).
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- **Stored only sealed, only under a method.** A PIN (`seed_pin_v1:`, Argon2id,
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this browser) or a passkey (`user_passkeys.sealed_seed`, PRF output → HKDF,
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AAD-bound to the credential and `vault_key_id`, plus a local cache
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`seed_passkey_v1:`). `session.openSeed(seed, method)` is the only way in and
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requires a method; the unlocked session is `session_v4:` under a
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non-extractable IndexedDB key. The phrase is shown again by opening the seed
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with the PIN or passkey (Settings → Vault, `/get-started`), never from a
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stored copy.
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- **Key tree.** Items are sealed under a branch of the root (`credentials`,
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`memory/<integration>`, `chats/<session id>`, `apps`, `teams`, `keys`) with a
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`k1:` nonce tag (`vault-item.ts`). Every API key's `dek_for_key` wraps the
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whole root, so by default every key reads what any other wrote; narrowing
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is opt-in and never changes leaf ids.
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- **One-time update / rotation** (`/api/vault/migrate/*`,
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`lib/vault/migrate.ts`). A legacy vault is re-sealed once from its random
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root to the seed's root (seed = the phrase the user already has) on a
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blocking screen; a seed vault rotates the same way to a NEW seed. Rows are
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paged, re-sealed, verified and staged with the digest of the row they
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replace; the commit swaps all of them in one transaction or refuses
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(`migration_incomplete`). API keys keep their strings (re-wrapped, not
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revoked). The control key is re-published at the new version with its
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device attestations re-signed (rotation also signs `old → new`).
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- **Handoff** carries the seed; the new device checks it against
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`vault_key_id`, then chooses a PIN or passkey before `openSeed`.
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## Zero-knowledge vault (legacy)
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Provider credentials are never persisted in plaintext or sent plaintext
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when saved from the browser. The proxy receives plaintext only after it
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transiently decrypts an authenticated request's credential. The crypto is
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in `packages/sdk/vault` (browser- and proxy-compatible, pure bytes-in/bytes-out):
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- A **recovery phrase** → `wrap_key` via **Argon2id** (`argon2.ts`,
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salt = `wrap_salt`). The Argon2id parameters are an **append-only
|
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registry keyed by version**, and every wrapped blob is stamped with the
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90
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version that produced it (`wrapped.ts`, `v<n>:<base64>`). Editing a
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parameter in place would change every derived `wrap_key` and, with no
|
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92
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server-side escape hatch, permanently lock out every existing vault —
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so re-tuning means adding a version, never changing one. An unstamped
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blob is v1.
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- A random 32-byte **DEK** is AES-GCM-wrapped under `wrap_key` →
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|
96
|
-
`wrapped_dek`. Only `wrap_salt` + `wrapped_dek` are stored on
|
|
97
|
-
`users`; the phrase and DEK never touch the DB in the clear (the
|
|
98
|
-
phrase is stored only sealed under a passkey's PRF output, see
|
|
99
|
-
"Passkey wraps" below).
|
|
100
|
-
- Credentials are AES-256-GCM encrypted under the DEK in the browser
|
|
101
|
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before `POST /api/credentials`; the row stores `{ ciphertext, nonce,
|
|
102
|
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vault_version }`.
|
|
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|
-
|
|
104
|
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**API keys carry the DEK, not a hash.** `mintApiKey` (client-side)
|
|
105
|
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picks `(id, secret)`, derives `api_wrap_key = HKDF(secret, salt=id,
|
|
106
|
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info="api-key-v1")`, wraps the DEK → `dek_for_key`, and also wraps the
|
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|
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full `sk-llm-{id}.{secret}` string under the DEK (`secret_ciphertext`)
|
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|
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so an unlocked dashboard can re-display it. At mint time the server
|
|
109
|
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receives the public key id and metadata plus only wrapped secret material;
|
|
110
|
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the token itself is sent in an authenticated request header. On each `/v1/*` request,
|
|
111
|
-
`validateApiKey` looks up the row by id, checks
|
|
112
|
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`key.vault_version === user.vault_version`, re-derives `api_wrap_key`,
|
|
113
|
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and AES-GCM-unwraps `dek_for_key` to recover the DEK — an auth-tag
|
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|
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failure (wrong secret) returns 401. The proxy decrypts the provider
|
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|
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credential with that DEK, then `zero()`s it in `finally`.
|
|
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|
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|
|
117
|
-
### Device-control key (seedgate trust root)
|
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|
-
|
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119
|
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Device grants, daemon attestations and their rotations are signed by ONE
|
|
120
|
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account **device-control key**, Ed25519, derived in the browser from the
|
|
121
|
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recovery phrase:
|
|
122
|
-
|
|
123
|
-
```
|
|
124
|
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entropy = BIP39 entropy(normalizePhrase(phrase)) // checksum-checked
|
|
125
|
-
seed = HKDF-SHA256(entropy, salt="openllm-device-control-salt-v1",
|
|
126
|
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info="openllm-device-control-v1", 32)
|
|
127
|
-
```
|
|
128
|
-
|
|
129
|
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It is never derived from the DEK and never wrapped for an API key, because the
|
|
130
|
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server unwraps the DEK from `dek_for_key` on every `sk-llm` request: a key the
|
|
131
|
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DEK can produce is a key a compromised cloud can sign with. (The previous
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|
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per-key `HKDF(DEK, key_id)` seed was deleted for exactly that reason.) HKDF,
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|
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not Argon2id: the phrase already carries 128 bits, and HKDF keeps every
|
|
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|
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server-supplied input (`wrap_salt`, KDF version) out of the key. Callers derive
|
|
135
|
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only from a phrase they have proven (`unlockDek`, an accepted handoff).
|
|
136
|
-
|
|
137
|
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The server stores only public material: `users.device_control_pubkey`
|
|
138
|
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(+ `device_control_version`, the signed `device_control_rotations` chain), each
|
|
139
|
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provisioned `api_keys.device_access_pubkey` (= the control key; the column
|
|
140
|
-
name is historical), and `daemon_attestations` rows. Each signed message is
|
|
141
|
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`label || 0x00 || json`:
|
|
142
|
-
|
|
143
|
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- grant — `openllm-device-grant-v1` (`@openllmsh/sdk/tunnel` `device-grant.ts`);
|
|
144
|
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- attestation — `openllm-daemon-attest-v1`, `{v, user_id, key_id, dpk, cv, ts}`
|
|
145
|
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(`daemon-attest.ts`): key_id-bound cache of a proof-verified daemon X25519
|
|
146
|
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key; any browser verifies it with its OWN derived key before using
|
|
147
|
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that `dpk` for grants, Noise and the RTC seal;
|
|
148
|
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- rotation — `openllm-device-control-rotate-v2`, `{v:2, old, new, cv}`, signed
|
|
149
|
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by `old`, no timestamp (`@openllmsh/sdk/tunnel` `device-control.ts`): stored and
|
|
150
|
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replayed to daemons that were offline when the phrase rotated.
|
|
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|
-
|
|
152
|
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In a browser the seed lives at rest only under the same local unlock as the
|
|
153
|
-
DEK session — the "control keep" (`controlKeepOuterKey(dek, userId)` outside a
|
|
154
|
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non-extractable per-browser IndexedDB key; `lib/vault/control-keep.ts`). A
|
|
155
|
-
passkey is only an alternative to the PIN for unlocking the vault DEK; it does
|
|
156
|
-
not wrap the control seed. Opening the DEK (PIN or passkey) restores the seed
|
|
157
|
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from the control keep. The server cannot open the keep. Daemons pin the public
|
|
158
|
-
key from the install-time trust anchor, a signed rotation, or the desktop app
|
|
159
|
-
over loopback — never trust-on-first-use for agent sessions
|
|
160
|
-
(`packages/cli/daemon/src/device-access-verify.ts`).
|
|
161
|
-
|
|
162
|
-
`device-anchor.ts` is the browser half of that anchor: `buildDeviceAnchor` /
|
|
163
|
-
`buildAnchoredApiKey` (`base64url(control raw || HKDF(seed, utf8(key_id),
|
|
164
|
-
"openllm-pair-v1"))`, appended to the key in the command the user copies),
|
|
165
|
-
`verifyDpkProof` (the daemon's `HMAC(pair_secret, "openllm-dpk-proof-v1" ||
|
|
166
|
-
key_id || dpk)` — checked before any `dpk` is trusted), and
|
|
167
|
-
`signDeviceSessionsDisable` (the control-signed remote DISABLE only —
|
|
168
|
-
re-enable writes the anchor again via install / update / login / desktop).
|
|
169
|
-
|
|
170
|
-
## Vault state machine (legacy)
|
|
171
|
-
|
|
172
|
-
`vault_state` (derived by `deriveVaultState` in `lib/vault/state.ts`) is one of
|
|
173
|
-
`uninitialized → pending_phrase → ready`, plus `reset_pending`. The
|
|
174
|
-
transitions are driven by the `/api/vault/*` handlers (see
|
|
175
|
-
[`packages/api`](../api/ARCHITECTURE.md)), operating on the vault columns
|
|
176
|
-
of `public.users`:
|
|
177
|
-
|
|
178
|
-
- `begin` (uninitialized→pending_phrase): stage `wrap_salt`.
|
|
179
|
-
- `commit` (pending_phrase→ready): save `wrapped_dek`, bump
|
|
180
|
-
`vault_version` 0→1. TOCTOU-guarded (`WHERE wrapped_dek IS NULL`).
|
|
181
|
-
- `abandon` (pending_phrase→uninitialized): clear staging if the phrase
|
|
182
|
-
was lost between steps.
|
|
183
|
-
- `reset/begin` (ready→reset_pending): stage `*_next` columns + optional
|
|
184
|
-
re-encrypted credentials at `vault_version+1`, in one txn. Proxy keeps
|
|
185
|
-
reading the current generation until commit. From `reset_pending` it
|
|
186
|
-
REPLACES the stale staging (dropping that staging's `vault_version+1`
|
|
187
|
-
credentials): a staged phrase only lives in the dialog that made it, so a
|
|
188
|
-
staging found later is one nobody can finish.
|
|
189
|
-
- `reset/commit`: optionally names the staging it means
|
|
190
|
-
(`staged_wrapped_dek`); a mismatch — another tab's `begin` replaced it —
|
|
191
|
-
is a 409 `reset_conflict` that promotes nothing. Otherwise: promote `*_next`, drop old-generation credentials,
|
|
192
|
-
bump `vault_version`, **hard-delete all API keys** (their
|
|
193
|
-
`dek_for_key` wraps the now-stale DEK), and **hard-delete all saved
|
|
194
|
-
memories** (`public.embeddings` rows with `integration = 'memory'` —
|
|
195
|
-
encrypted under the old DEK and never staged/re-encrypted across a
|
|
196
|
-
rotation; see "DEK-encrypted memories" below). It also best-effort
|
|
197
|
-
deletes input-media blobs and their ledger rows because their encrypted
|
|
198
|
-
chat transcripts are now orphaned; generated/library media remains.
|
|
199
|
-
- `reset/abort`: drop `*_next` + the staged `vault_version+1`
|
|
200
|
-
credentials, return to `ready`.
|
|
201
|
-
- `reset/commit` also deletes every passkey wrap (`user_passkeys`) — each
|
|
202
|
-
seals the old DEK. See "Passkey wraps" below.
|
|
203
|
-
|
|
204
|
-
The browser-side DEK session lives in `lib/vault/session.tsx`, over the
|
|
205
|
-
persistence layer in `lib/vault/session-store.ts`. **The DEK is never at
|
|
206
|
-
rest in a readable form.** `localStorage` holds three blobs and no key
|
|
207
|
-
material: the PIN-wrapped DEK (Argon2id), a time-limited unlock
|
|
208
|
-
session wrapped under a **non-extractable `CryptoKey`** kept in
|
|
209
|
-
IndexedDB — the browser will not export those bytes to any caller, so a
|
|
210
|
-
profile-directory dump recovers nothing — and the **phrase keep**
|
|
211
|
-
(`lib/vault/phrase-keep.ts`): the recovery phrase AES-GCM-sealed under
|
|
212
|
-
the DEK, written by `unlock(dek, { phrase })` at the three moments the
|
|
213
|
-
phrase is in memory (creation, a phrase unlock, a rotation commit) and
|
|
214
|
-
read only by Settings → Vault, which unwraps the DEK from the PIN blob
|
|
215
|
-
with the PIN just typed and opens the keep with that — never with the
|
|
216
|
-
live session DEK. The keep grants exactly what the DEK already grants,
|
|
217
|
-
lives on the device alone (the server never sees the ciphertext), and
|
|
218
|
-
follows the PIN blob's lifecycle: it survives `lock()` and dies with
|
|
219
|
-
`forgetDevice()`. It is what let the setup flow drop its three-words-back
|
|
220
|
-
backup quiz. Every failure to open the session wrap (no IndexedDB, no
|
|
221
|
-
WebCrypto, key destroyed) degrades to "no session", i.e. the PIN prompt.
|
|
222
|
-
|
|
223
|
-
The session auto-locks at expiry, zeroes its in-memory DEK on lock,
|
|
224
|
-
forget-device and unmount, and **propagates across tabs**: each teardown
|
|
225
|
-
clears a `localStorage` key and a `storage` listener mirrors the lock,
|
|
226
|
-
the forget, the stale-DEK flag and a fresh unlock into every other open
|
|
227
|
-
tab. `lib/vault/device-access-cache.ts` holds the device-control seed for
|
|
228
|
-
grant signing, cleared on those same lifecycle events. `components/vault/{pin-flow,
|
|
229
|
-
require-unlocked,vault-lock-pill}` gate UI that needs an unlocked vault.
|
|
230
|
-
|
|
231
|
-
## CLI OpenLLM OAuth seal
|
|
232
|
-
|
|
233
|
-
`cli-auth-seal.ts` seals a plaintext `sk-llm-…` API key to the waiting CLI's
|
|
234
|
-
ephemeral X25519 public key during browser approve
|
|
235
|
-
([`docs/plan/2026-11-01-cli-install-onboarding.md`](../../docs/plan/2026-11-01-cli-install-onboarding.md)
|
|
236
|
-
§2). Envelope shape matches the connector seal (ephemeral X25519 →
|
|
237
|
-
HKDF-SHA256 → AES-256-GCM), but the HKDF domain and AAD bind
|
|
238
|
-
`openllm-cli-auth-seal-v1` + `userId` + `authorizationId` + recipient pubkey, so
|
|
239
|
-
connector and CLI ciphertext are not interchangeable. The server stores only
|
|
240
|
-
the JSON envelope in `cli_authorizations.sealed_key` and cannot open it. The
|
|
241
|
-
CLI unwraps on claim with its private key; claim retries return the same
|
|
242
|
-
envelope until the original authorization expiry. No OAuth access/refresh
|
|
243
|
-
tokens are sealed or retained — only the ordinary user-owned API key.
|
|
244
|
-
|
|
245
|
-
## Device handoff (legacy payload)
|
|
246
|
-
|
|
247
|
-
A device with no PIN blob (the desktop app, another browser) can get the vault
|
|
248
|
-
from one of the account's unlocked devices instead of the recovery phrase
|
|
249
|
-
(`handoff.ts`; design, protocol and threat model in
|
|
250
|
-
[`docs/plans/vault-device-handoff.md`](../../docs/plans/vault-device-handoff.md)).
|
|
251
|
-
The new device mints an ephemeral X25519 key and posts its public half; the
|
|
252
|
-
unlocked device, after the user compares a six-digit code derived from the
|
|
253
|
-
server-chosen request id and that key, and pays its own unlock method (PIN or
|
|
254
|
-
passkey), seals `{ dek, phrase }` with `X25519 → HKDF-SHA256(salt = request
|
|
255
|
-
id, info = [user, request, vault_version, both public keys]) → AES-256-GCM`.
|
|
256
|
-
The new device re-derives the DEK from the phrase against `users.wrapped_dek`
|
|
257
|
-
before accepting it (`acceptHandoff`), which is what stops a session-cookie
|
|
258
|
-
holder from handing it a DEK of its own; a payload without a phrase is
|
|
259
|
-
refused, so only devices that keep the phrase are asked to approve. The server
|
|
260
|
-
(`/api/vault/handoff/*`, browser-session only) stores public keys, a token
|
|
261
|
-
hash and ciphertext — nothing that opens.
|
|
262
|
-
|
|
263
|
-
## Passkey wraps (WebAuthn PRF) (legacy DEK wrap)
|
|
264
|
-
|
|
265
|
-
The third DEK wrapper, beside the phrase and the PIN
|
|
266
|
-
(`docs/plans/passkey-vault-unlock.md`):
|
|
267
|
-
|
|
268
|
-
| Wrapper | Input | KDF | Stored | Unlocks |
|
|
269
|
-
| --- | --- | --- | --- | --- |
|
|
270
|
-
| Phrase | 12 words (~128 bits) | Argon2id | `users.wrapped_dek` | any device |
|
|
271
|
-
| PIN | 4/6 digits | Argon2id | this browser only | the device that set it |
|
|
272
|
-
| Passkey | PRF output (256 bits) | HKDF-SHA256 | `user_passkeys.wrapped_dek` (+ the phrase in `sealed_phrase`) | any device the passkey syncs to |
|
|
273
|
-
|
|
274
|
-
- Per credential a random 32-byte `prf_salt` is evaluated as
|
|
275
|
-
`prf.eval.first`; `wrap_key = HKDF-SHA256(prfOutput, salt = prf_salt,
|
|
276
|
-
info = "openllm-vault-passkey-v1", 32)`; the DEK is AES-256-GCM sealed as
|
|
277
|
-
base64 `IV || ct+tag`, with **AAD = info | credential id | vault_version**
|
|
278
|
-
so a relabelled or swapped row fails its tag instead of yielding a DEK the
|
|
279
|
-
session would stamp with the wrong generation. No Argon2: the input is
|
|
280
|
-
256 bits from the authenticator, so unlock is instant.
|
|
281
|
-
- **Server-side is safe here, unlike a PIN** (`docs/plans/vault-pin-unlock.md`
|
|
282
|
-
§2): without the authenticator there is no PRF output to guess, so a
|
|
283
|
-
database leak yields ciphertext plus a public salt. The server never
|
|
284
|
-
verifies an assertion and stores no public key — possession of a row grants
|
|
285
|
-
nothing.
|
|
286
|
-
- **A passkey is a full local unlock method.** The session keeps a per-account
|
|
287
|
-
*passkey link* (`lib/vault/passkey-link.ts`: credential id + generation, no
|
|
288
|
-
key material) with the PIN blob's lifecycle (survives `lock()`, dies with
|
|
289
|
-
`forgetDevice()`). The single readiness predicate is `needsLocalUnlock =
|
|
290
|
-
DEK in memory ∧ ¬(PIN blob ∨ passkey link)`, read by `<RequireUnlocked>`,
|
|
291
|
-
the unlock / setup / rotate dialogs, `useVaultReadiness` and the onboarding
|
|
292
|
-
wizard. A passkey-only device therefore needs no PIN: within the
|
|
293
|
-
keep-unlocked window the DEK rehydrates from the non-extractable IndexedDB
|
|
294
|
-
wrap exactly as before; after it, one passkey ceremony re-enters. The link is
|
|
295
|
-
a pointer, not a local copy of the wrap, so revoking a passkey in Settings
|
|
296
|
-
revokes it on every device at once (the cost: a passkey unlock needs the
|
|
297
|
-
network, which reading `vault_state` already does).
|
|
298
|
-
- **Onboarding commits on arrival; the unlock method comes after.** The
|
|
299
|
-
getting-ready screen (`<StepGettingReady>`) commits the staged vault with NO
|
|
300
|
-
local unlock method (`useCreateVault.commit`) and lets the user in
|
|
301
|
-
(`docs/plans/onboarding-deferred-unlock.md`). The commit files a *secure
|
|
302
|
-
deferral* record on that device (`lib/vault/secure-deferral.ts`, timestamps
|
|
303
|
-
only), and `isSecureDeferred` (the record ∧ no method) decides three things:
|
|
304
|
-
the session holds it OPEN (`HELD_OPEN_UNTIL_TS`: no auto-lock, survives
|
|
305
|
-
reloads), so the DEK never lapses into "only the phrase gets you back in";
|
|
306
|
-
`<RequireUnlocked>` and `useVaultReadiness` serve it; and the UI's Lock asks
|
|
307
|
-
for a method first (`useLockVault`), then locks once one is set. The first
|
|
308
|
-
method clears the record and re-stamps the chosen window; so do `lock()`,
|
|
309
|
-
`forgetDevice()` and any unlock under another vault generation (a reset or
|
|
310
|
-
rotation elsewhere), and a record that cannot be stored grants nothing. The
|
|
311
|
-
three gates read one predicate, `canServeVault`. Any other device with no method (a phrase or
|
|
312
|
-
handoff unlock) keeps its normal window, locks normally, and still meets
|
|
313
|
-
`set` mode at the gate. `<UnlockMethodPrompt>` (app shell) asks — banner, then a
|
|
314
|
-
modal that cannot be dismissed on a second visit or after three days. The
|
|
315
|
-
dashboard's `<VaultSetupDialog>` still commits on the PIN or passkey
|
|
316
|
-
(`save` / `savePasskey`), ceremony BEFORE `/api/vault/commit`.
|
|
317
|
-
- **Phrase reveal** (Settings → Vault) pays the device's own method: the PIN
|
|
318
|
-
unwraps the PIN blob, or a passkey ceremony unwraps a private DEK from the
|
|
319
|
-
passkey wrap (or opens the passkey's own sealed copy, below); the reveal
|
|
320
|
-
never reads the live session DEK.
|
|
321
|
-
- **The phrase rides on the passkey too** (`user_passkeys.sealed_phrase`,
|
|
322
|
-
`docs/plans/vault-phrase-sync.md`): `sealPhraseWithPrf` seals it under
|
|
323
|
-
`HKDF(prfOutput, salt = prf_salt, info = "openllm-vault-passkey-phrase-v1")`
|
|
324
|
-
with the same AAD shape, so any device the passkey syncs to can show the
|
|
325
|
-
words after a ceremony, without a local keep. **Never under the DEK**: the
|
|
326
|
-
server holds the DEK transiently on every `sk-llm` request
|
|
327
|
-
(`dek_for_key`), and the phrase is more than the DEK — it derives the
|
|
328
|
-
device-control seed the server must never reach.
|
|
329
|
-
- **Filed only where the flow proved the person:** vault creation and the
|
|
330
|
-
rotation re-file (the phrase was just minted; rotation's confirm step pays
|
|
331
|
-
the method); adding a passkey on a PIN device, which now REQUIRES the PIN
|
|
332
|
-
(`TPasskeyEnrollProof` — the keep is opened with the DEK unwrapped from
|
|
333
|
-
the PIN blob, not the session's); adding a first method on a device with
|
|
334
|
-
none; and a passkey unlock backfilling an empty row **through the passkey
|
|
335
|
-
this device is already linked to**. Never on `link()`, never through
|
|
336
|
-
another passkey of the account, never on a second passkey added to a
|
|
337
|
-
passkey-only device. The add/link paths open the local keep with a DEK
|
|
338
|
-
the session already holds (`withDek`), which is why each is gated above.
|
|
339
|
-
- The backfill PATCH is fill-only and generation-fenced (`sealed_phrase IS
|
|
340
|
-
NULL AND vault_version = :v`), so a tab with a stale list can't replace a
|
|
341
|
-
fresher copy. A re-enroll without the field clears the old copy.
|
|
342
|
-
- **A passkey can reach the device-control seed.** Reading the copy never
|
|
343
|
-
installs the phrase locally, but whoever can open it can read the words and
|
|
344
|
-
type them into "Verify this browser". So every passkey that holds a copy
|
|
345
|
-
is as strong as the phrase itself; the gates above exist for that reason.
|
|
346
|
-
Not a backup: losing every device and the passkey loses this copy too.
|
|
347
|
-
- Rotation: `reset/commit` deletes every `user_passkeys` row. The rotate
|
|
348
|
-
flow (`lib/hooks/use-vault-rotation.ts`) keeps THIS device's method across
|
|
349
|
-
the switch without asking for a new one: it mints the new DEK when the
|
|
350
|
-
dialog opens, and its confirm step — the device's PIN or passkey — proves
|
|
351
|
-
the method AND seals the new DEK under it (`wrapDekWithPin`, or
|
|
352
|
-
`usePasskeyRewrap`: one assertion, wrap bound to `vault_version+1`). After
|
|
353
|
-
the commit the PIN blob is installed with `unlock`, or the passkey wrap is
|
|
354
|
-
re-filed (an upsert by credential id) and linked. Passkeys on other devices
|
|
355
|
-
need turning on again. A device with neither is let in and asked later
|
|
356
|
-
(`deferLocalUnlock`). `rp.id` is the production apex (`openllm.sh`, shared by `www` and
|
|
357
|
-
`dev`); `localhost` and preview hosts mint their own credentials.
|
|
358
|
-
- Residual risk, accepted: onboarding defers the phrase backup, so a user
|
|
359
|
-
who deletes their only passkey from the OS keychain before saving the
|
|
360
|
-
phrase (or adding a PIN) must reset the vault — the same class of risk as a
|
|
361
|
-
forgotten PIN today, and narrower, because the passkey syncs. Deferring the
|
|
362
|
-
unlock method adds one more: an unsecured device that loses its browser
|
|
363
|
-
data (or is forgotten) before a method is chosen has only the phrase,
|
|
364
|
-
which the user has not saved yet — a reset. The held-open session means a
|
|
365
|
-
lapse never causes it, and the forced prompt bounds how long it can last.
|
|
366
|
-
Separately, an unsecured device stays unlocked with no time bound until a
|
|
367
|
-
method exists; at rest the DEK is still ciphertext under the
|
|
368
|
-
non-extractable IndexedDB key, so this widens who can use an unattended
|
|
369
|
-
browser, not what is on disk.
|
|
370
|
-
|
|
371
|
-
## DEK-encrypted memories
|
|
372
|
-
|
|
373
|
-
Saved memories (OpenLLM Memory rows in `public.embeddings`)
|
|
374
|
-
are AES-256-GCM encrypted **at rest** under the same DEK, reusing
|
|
375
|
-
`encryptCredential` / `decryptCredential`: `content` holds base64
|
|
376
|
-
ciphertext, `content_nonce` the base64 nonce, `vault_version` the DEK
|
|
377
|
-
generation (`content_nonce IS NULL` ⇒ legacy plaintext row, lazily
|
|
378
|
-
encrypted by a background sweep on the next DEK-bearing request).
|
|
379
|
-
Because every `sk-llm` key from the same phrase wraps the same DEK, a
|
|
380
|
-
memory saved through key A is readable through key B for free.
|
|
381
|
-
|
|
382
|
-
**This is at-rest encryption, not zero-knowledge** — weaker than the
|
|
383
|
-
credential story above, equal to the `/v1/*` trust level:
|
|
384
|
-
|
|
385
|
-
- Memory plaintext transits the server (and Bedrock, for embedding)
|
|
386
|
-
inside a request window opened by a valid key; the DEK is `zero()`d
|
|
387
|
-
in the dispatcher's `finally`.
|
|
388
|
-
- **The embedding vector stays plaintext** — pgvector similarity search
|
|
389
|
-
cannot run over ciphertext. A 1024-d vector leaks semantic content
|
|
390
|
-
(embedding-inversion attacks reconstruct approximate text): anyone
|
|
391
|
-
with DB access learns *what a memory is about*, not its wording.
|
|
392
|
-
- Session-cookie reads (the dashboard) carry no DEK server-side; the
|
|
393
|
-
API returns ciphertext + `encrypted: true` and the browser decrypts
|
|
394
|
-
with the unlocked vault session.
|
|
395
|
-
- Rotation wipes memories rather than re-encrypting them: re-encrypt
|
|
396
|
-
would need old and new DEK live server-side simultaneously (or an
|
|
397
|
-
unbounded browser round-trip). Wipe matches the rotation's existing
|
|
398
|
-
blast radius ("all API keys revoked").
|
|
399
|
-
|
|
400
|
-
## Team key graph
|
|
401
|
-
|
|
402
|
-
User-held team encryption (`team.ts`; `docs/plan/2026-10-26-teams.md` §9).
|
|
403
|
-
OpenLLM never sees T in plaintext. The graph is one-way: team material cannot
|
|
404
|
-
open personal rows.
|
|
405
|
-
|
|
406
|
-
```
|
|
407
|
-
personal DEK ──seal──► team_members.sealed_team_key (T)
|
|
408
|
-
invite secret ─HKDF(auth info)──► auth (base64url) ──sha256──► token_hash
|
|
409
|
-
invite secret ─HKDF(wrap info)──► wrap key ──seal──► team_invites.wrapped_team_key (T)
|
|
410
|
-
T ─HKDF──► K_mem ──seal──► embeddings.content (team rows)
|
|
411
|
-
T ─HKDF──► K_cred ──seal──► team share credential (inner layer)
|
|
412
|
-
▲
|
|
413
|
-
server K_srv wraps that as outer layer
|
|
414
|
-
(HMAC-SHA256 of host signing secret;
|
|
415
|
-
packages/api/lib/team-cred-wrap.ts)
|
|
416
|
-
```
|
|
417
|
-
|
|
418
|
-
- **Create (browser, vault unlocked):** `generateTeamKey()` → seal T under the
|
|
419
|
-
owner's DEK (`sealTeamKey`) → persist `sealed_team_key`. Invite links carry
|
|
420
|
-
a fragment secret that **never leaves the browser**. From it the browser
|
|
421
|
-
derives two independent HKDF outputs with distinct info labels:
|
|
422
|
-
`auth = deriveTeamInviteAuth(secret, invite_id)` (info
|
|
423
|
-
`openllm-team-invite-auth-v1`, posted as the request `auth` field; server
|
|
424
|
-
stores only `sha256(auth)` as `token_hash`) and
|
|
425
|
-
`wrap = deriveTeamInviteWrapKey(secret, invite_id)` (info
|
|
426
|
-
`openllm-team-invite-v1`, used only to build
|
|
427
|
-
`wrapped_team_key = wrapTeamKeyForInvite(secret, invite_id, T)`). The create
|
|
428
|
-
response is id-only — the client builds `/join#<id>.<secret>` itself.
|
|
429
|
-
- **Join (vault unlocked):** browser derives `auth` again for preview/join
|
|
430
|
-
POSTs, then `unwrapTeamKeyFromInvite` (wrap key stays local) →
|
|
431
|
-
`sealTeamKey` under the joiner's DEK. Joining without an unlocked vault
|
|
432
|
-
cannot seal a copy. From everything the server sees or stores
|
|
433
|
-
(`invite_id`, `auth`, `token_hash`, `wrapped_team_key`, `key_version`)
|
|
434
|
-
unwrapping T fails.
|
|
435
|
-
- **Request / memory path:** DEK → `openTeamKey` → T → `deriveTeamMemKey` →
|
|
436
|
-
`K_mem`. Team-row encrypt/decrypt (`encryptTeamMemory` /
|
|
437
|
-
`decryptTeamMemory`) accept **only** `K_mem`, never the personal DEK.
|
|
438
|
-
- **API-key share path (inner layer):** DEK → `openTeamKey` → T →
|
|
439
|
-
`deriveTeamCredKey` → `K_cred`. The supplier's browser decrypts its own
|
|
440
|
-
credential blob under the personal DEK, then re-encrypts under `K_cred`
|
|
441
|
-
with AAD binding `(team_id, share_id, provider, key_version)` via
|
|
442
|
-
`encryptTeamCredential`. The server wraps that packed inner ciphertext
|
|
443
|
-
under per-share `K_srv` before storage (`team_shares.payload_ciphertext`).
|
|
444
|
-
At request time the member opens T the same way; the server removes the
|
|
445
|
-
outer layer; `K_cred` removes the inner. Neither layer alone opens the
|
|
446
|
-
credential. `NEON_AUTH_COOKIE_SECRET` absent → sharing fails closed
|
|
447
|
-
(`team_credential_unavailable`).
|
|
448
|
-
- **Domain separation:** invite auth info `openllm-team-invite-auth-v1`;
|
|
449
|
-
invite wrap info `openllm-team-invite-v1`; memory info
|
|
450
|
-
`openllm-team-mem-v1`; credential info `openllm-team-cred-v1`. Auth ≠ wrap
|
|
451
|
-
key ≠ `K_mem` ≠ `K_cred` ≠ DEK ≠ `K_srv`. Personal credentials, personal
|
|
452
|
-
memory, and `api_keys.dek_for_key` / `secret_ciphertext` stay under the
|
|
453
|
-
personal DEK (or the API-key wrap key); T / `K_mem` / `K_cred` / invite
|
|
454
|
-
wrap fail GCM auth on them. Each team's T is independent — T₁ cannot open
|
|
455
|
-
T₂'s sealed copy, memories, or credential shares. A former member with T
|
|
456
|
-
but without the server outer layer gets nothing.
|
|
457
|
-
- **Vault reset:** clears this account's `sealed_team_key` copies only. Team
|
|
458
|
-
ciphertext and other members' seals remain. Re-join (or re-seal from an
|
|
459
|
-
unlocked device that still holds T) restores access.
|
|
460
|
-
- **Zeroing:** callers `zero()` T, `K_mem`, and `K_cred` after use (same
|
|
461
|
-
hygiene as the personal DEK).
|
|
462
|
-
|
|
463
|
-
Isolation is enforced by `tests/vault/team-key-isolation.test.ts` and
|
|
464
|
-
`tests/vault/team-invite-auth-wrap.test.ts` against the real primitives (no
|
|
465
|
-
crypto stubs).
|
|
466
|
-
|
|
467
|
-
## Layering rules
|
|
468
|
-
|
|
469
|
-
- `packages/sdk/vault` depends on nothing app-specific. Pure bytes-in/bytes-out
|
|
470
|
-
primitives run identically in the browser and on the proxy.
|
package/vault/api-key.ts
DELETED
|
@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
import {
|
|
2
|
-
isOpenllmApiKeySyntax,
|
|
3
|
-
OPENLLM_API_KEY_ID_BYTES,
|
|
4
|
-
OPENLLM_API_KEY_PREFIX,
|
|
5
|
-
OPENLLM_API_KEY_SECRET_BYTES,
|
|
6
|
-
} from "@openllmsh/sdk/protocol";
|
|
7
|
-
import {
|
|
8
|
-
aesGcmDecrypt,
|
|
9
|
-
aesGcmEncrypt,
|
|
10
|
-
fromB64,
|
|
11
|
-
fromB64Url,
|
|
12
|
-
hkdfSha256,
|
|
13
|
-
randomBytes,
|
|
14
|
-
toB64,
|
|
15
|
-
toB64Url,
|
|
16
|
-
} from "./crypto";
|
|
17
|
-
import { sealVaultText } from "./vault-item";
|
|
18
|
-
import { joinSealed, splitSealed } from "./wrapped";
|
|
19
|
-
|
|
20
|
-
const DEK_BYTES = 32;
|
|
21
|
-
const HKDF_INFO = "api-key-v1";
|
|
22
|
-
const NONCE_BYTES = 12;
|
|
23
|
-
|
|
24
|
-
export { OPENLLM_API_KEY_PREFIX as API_KEY_PREFIX };
|
|
25
|
-
|
|
26
|
-
/**
|
|
27
|
-
* `sk-llm-{id}.{secret}` parser. The id is the api_keys row primary
|
|
28
|
-
* key (base64url, no padding); the secret is 32 random bytes
|
|
29
|
-
* base64url-encoded. Returns null on any shape mismatch — the proxy
|
|
30
|
-
* auth path treats null as "no key supplied".
|
|
31
|
-
*/
|
|
32
|
-
export const parseApiKey = (
|
|
33
|
-
raw: string,
|
|
34
|
-
): { readonly id: string; readonly secret: Uint8Array } | null => {
|
|
35
|
-
if (!isOpenllmApiKeySyntax(raw)) return null;
|
|
36
|
-
const rest = raw.slice(OPENLLM_API_KEY_PREFIX.length);
|
|
37
|
-
const dot = rest.indexOf(".");
|
|
38
|
-
if (dot <= 0 || dot === rest.length - 1) return null;
|
|
39
|
-
const id = rest.slice(0, dot);
|
|
40
|
-
try {
|
|
41
|
-
const secret = fromB64Url(rest.slice(dot + 1));
|
|
42
|
-
if (secret.length !== OPENLLM_API_KEY_SECRET_BYTES) return null;
|
|
43
|
-
return { id, secret };
|
|
44
|
-
} catch {
|
|
45
|
-
return null;
|
|
46
|
-
}
|
|
47
|
-
};
|
|
48
|
-
|
|
49
|
-
/**
|
|
50
|
-
* Derive the per-key AES wrap key from the secret half of the
|
|
51
|
-
* `sk-llm-...` token. Same on both sides of the handshake — the
|
|
52
|
-
* browser uses it to wrap the DEK at mint time, the server uses it
|
|
53
|
-
* to unwrap on every request.
|
|
54
|
-
*/
|
|
55
|
-
export const deriveApiWrapKey = (
|
|
56
|
-
apiKeySecret: Uint8Array,
|
|
57
|
-
apiKeyId: string,
|
|
58
|
-
): Promise<Uint8Array> => {
|
|
59
|
-
return hkdfSha256(apiKeySecret, fromB64Url(apiKeyId), HKDF_INFO, 32);
|
|
60
|
-
};
|
|
61
|
-
|
|
62
|
-
/**
|
|
63
|
-
* Unwrap a `dek_for_key` row column. The stored layout is
|
|
64
|
-
* `IV (12) || ciphertext+tag`, base64-encoded.
|
|
65
|
-
*
|
|
66
|
-
* Unversioned on purpose, unlike the phrase and PIN wraps: this key comes from
|
|
67
|
-
* HKDF over the API-key secret, which has no cost parameters to re-tune, so
|
|
68
|
-
* there is nothing a stamp could ever select between.
|
|
69
|
-
*/
|
|
70
|
-
export const unwrapDekForKey = async (
|
|
71
|
-
dekForKeyB64: string,
|
|
72
|
-
apiWrapKey: Uint8Array,
|
|
73
|
-
): Promise<Uint8Array> => {
|
|
74
|
-
const { nonce, ciphertext } = splitSealed(
|
|
75
|
-
fromB64(dekForKeyB64),
|
|
76
|
-
"dek_for_key blob",
|
|
77
|
-
);
|
|
78
|
-
const dek = await aesGcmDecrypt(apiWrapKey, nonce, ciphertext);
|
|
79
|
-
// This runs on the proxy hot path for every `/v1/*` request. A DEK of the
|
|
80
|
-
// wrong size would otherwise surface several frames later as an opaque
|
|
81
|
-
// WebCrypto key-length error on whichever credential happened to decrypt first.
|
|
82
|
-
if (dek.length !== DEK_BYTES) {
|
|
83
|
-
dek.fill(0);
|
|
84
|
-
throw new Error("dek_for_key did not contain a 32-byte key");
|
|
85
|
-
}
|
|
86
|
-
return dek;
|
|
87
|
-
};
|
|
88
|
-
|
|
89
|
-
export type TMintedApiKey = {
|
|
90
|
-
/** Body for `POST /api/keys` — server persists row keyed by id. */
|
|
91
|
-
readonly row: {
|
|
92
|
-
readonly id: string;
|
|
93
|
-
readonly dek_for_key: string;
|
|
94
|
-
readonly secret_ciphertext: string;
|
|
95
|
-
readonly secret_nonce: string;
|
|
96
|
-
readonly vault_version: number;
|
|
97
|
-
};
|
|
98
|
-
/**
|
|
99
|
-
* The `sk-llm-{id}.{secret}` string shown ONCE. The server never
|
|
100
|
-
* sees this in plaintext; an AES-GCM(sk-llm, DEK) copy ships with
|
|
101
|
-
* the row so the dashboard can re-display it when the vault is
|
|
102
|
-
* unlocked.
|
|
103
|
-
*/
|
|
104
|
-
readonly sk_llm: string;
|
|
105
|
-
};
|
|
106
|
-
|
|
107
|
-
const newApiKeyId = (): string =>
|
|
108
|
-
toB64Url(randomBytes(OPENLLM_API_KEY_ID_BYTES));
|
|
109
|
-
|
|
110
|
-
/**
|
|
111
|
-
* Mint a new API key client-side. The browser:
|
|
112
|
-
* 1. picks `(api_key_id, api_key_secret)`,
|
|
113
|
-
* 2. derives `api_wrap_key = HKDF(secret, id)`,
|
|
114
|
-
* 3. wraps the user's DEK under it,
|
|
115
|
-
* 4. ALSO encrypts the full sk-llm string under the user's DEK so
|
|
116
|
-
* the dashboard can re-display it when unlocked,
|
|
117
|
-
* 5. POSTs `{ id, dek_for_key, secret_ciphertext, secret_nonce,
|
|
118
|
-
* vault_version }` to `/api/keys`,
|
|
119
|
-
* 6. shows `sk-llm-{id}.{secret_b64url}` once.
|
|
120
|
-
*/
|
|
121
|
-
export const mintApiKey = async (
|
|
122
|
-
dek: Uint8Array,
|
|
123
|
-
vaultVersion: number,
|
|
124
|
-
): Promise<TMintedApiKey> => {
|
|
125
|
-
const apiKeyId = newApiKeyId();
|
|
126
|
-
const apiKeySecret = randomBytes(OPENLLM_API_KEY_SECRET_BYTES);
|
|
127
|
-
const wrapKey = await deriveApiWrapKey(apiKeySecret, apiKeyId);
|
|
128
|
-
try {
|
|
129
|
-
const nonce = randomBytes(NONCE_BYTES);
|
|
130
|
-
const ct = await aesGcmEncrypt(wrapKey, nonce, dek);
|
|
131
|
-
const dekForKey = joinSealed(nonce, ct);
|
|
132
|
-
const skLlm = `${OPENLLM_API_KEY_PREFIX}${apiKeyId}.${toB64Url(apiKeySecret)}`;
|
|
133
|
-
// Wrap the full token under the `keys` branch so the dashboard can
|
|
134
|
-
// re-display it later. Distinct from `dek_for_key` (still under the
|
|
135
|
-
// API-key wrap key — the server needs the root).
|
|
136
|
-
const sealedSecret = await sealVaultText(dek, { branch: "keys" }, skLlm);
|
|
137
|
-
return {
|
|
138
|
-
row: {
|
|
139
|
-
id: apiKeyId,
|
|
140
|
-
dek_for_key: toB64(dekForKey),
|
|
141
|
-
secret_ciphertext: sealedSecret.ciphertext,
|
|
142
|
-
secret_nonce: sealedSecret.nonce,
|
|
143
|
-
vault_version: vaultVersion,
|
|
144
|
-
},
|
|
145
|
-
sk_llm: skLlm,
|
|
146
|
-
};
|
|
147
|
-
} finally {
|
|
148
|
-
wrapKey.fill(0);
|
|
149
|
-
}
|
|
150
|
-
};
|
|
151
|
-
|
|
152
|
-
/** The secret columns of an `api_keys` row re-wrapped under a new DEK. */
|
|
153
|
-
export type TRewrappedApiKey = {
|
|
154
|
-
readonly dek_for_key: string;
|
|
155
|
-
readonly secret_ciphertext: string;
|
|
156
|
-
readonly secret_nonce: string;
|
|
157
|
-
};
|
|
158
|
-
|
|
159
|
-
/**
|
|
160
|
-
* Re-wrap an existing API key for a new DEK (the seed-only vault's one-time
|
|
161
|
-
* migration, docs/plans/seed-only-vault.md). The browser opens the key's
|
|
162
|
-
* `secret_ciphertext` with the OLD DEK to get the `sk-llm` token, then calls
|
|
163
|
-
* this with the NEW DEK: the token itself is unchanged, so every daemon and
|
|
164
|
-
* client holding it keeps working. Never zeroes its inputs.
|
|
165
|
-
*/
|
|
166
|
-
export const rewrapApiKey = async (
|
|
167
|
-
skLlm: string,
|
|
168
|
-
newDek: Uint8Array,
|
|
169
|
-
): Promise<TRewrappedApiKey> => {
|
|
170
|
-
if (newDek.length !== DEK_BYTES) throw new Error("DEK must be 32 bytes");
|
|
171
|
-
const parsed = parseApiKey(skLlm);
|
|
172
|
-
if (parsed === null) throw new Error("not an OpenLLM API key");
|
|
173
|
-
const wrapKey = await deriveApiWrapKey(parsed.secret, parsed.id);
|
|
174
|
-
try {
|
|
175
|
-
const nonce = randomBytes(NONCE_BYTES);
|
|
176
|
-
const dekForKey = joinSealed(
|
|
177
|
-
nonce,
|
|
178
|
-
await aesGcmEncrypt(wrapKey, nonce, newDek),
|
|
179
|
-
);
|
|
180
|
-
const sealedSecret = await sealVaultText(newDek, { branch: "keys" }, skLlm);
|
|
181
|
-
return {
|
|
182
|
-
dek_for_key: toB64(dekForKey),
|
|
183
|
-
secret_ciphertext: sealedSecret.ciphertext,
|
|
184
|
-
secret_nonce: sealedSecret.nonce,
|
|
185
|
-
};
|
|
186
|
-
} finally {
|
|
187
|
-
wrapKey.fill(0);
|
|
188
|
-
parsed.secret.fill(0);
|
|
189
|
-
}
|
|
190
|
-
};
|