@openllmsh/sdk 0.0.0-stage → 2.10.12-alpha.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/ARCHITECTURE.md +43 -0
- package/LICENSE +202 -0
- package/README.md +142 -2
- package/assets/openllm-light.svg +18 -0
- package/assets/openllm.svg +18 -0
- package/client/chat.ts +140 -0
- package/client/devices.ts +269 -0
- package/client/http.ts +72 -0
- package/client/index.ts +129 -0
- package/client/relay-mux.ts +547 -0
- package/client/types.ts +51 -0
- package/client/vault.ts +239 -0
- package/connect/chat.ts +58 -0
- package/connect/client.ts +240 -0
- package/connect/config.ts +47 -0
- package/connect/errors.ts +121 -0
- package/connect/index.ts +23 -0
- package/connect/oauth.ts +265 -0
- package/connect/routes.ts +234 -0
- package/connect/store.ts +107 -0
- package/mcp/handle.ts +24 -0
- package/mcp/index.ts +76 -0
- package/mcp/server.ts +319 -0
- package/mcp/tools/marketplace.ts +439 -0
- package/mcp/tools/memory-client.ts +297 -0
- package/mcp/tools/memory-config.ts +32 -0
- package/mcp/tools/memory.ts +369 -0
- package/mcp/tools/model-priority.ts +88 -0
- package/mcp/tools/openllm.ts +883 -0
- package/mcp/types.ts +28 -0
- package/openapi/call.ts +90 -0
- package/openapi/index.ts +8 -0
- package/openapi/openapi.json +80213 -0
- package/openapi/operations.ts +2075 -0
- package/package.json +39 -4
- package/protocol/CONTRIBUTING.md +21 -0
- package/protocol/README.md +134 -0
- package/protocol/access.ts +186 -0
- package/protocol/agent-prompt-text.ts +32 -0
- package/protocol/agent.ts +991 -0
- package/protocol/api-key-syntax.ts +105 -0
- package/protocol/assets/openllm-light.svg +18 -0
- package/protocol/assets/openllm.svg +18 -0
- package/protocol/audio.ts +29 -0
- package/protocol/auth.ts +142 -0
- package/protocol/changelog.ts +155 -0
- package/protocol/chat.ts +458 -0
- package/protocol/client-registry.ts +356 -0
- package/protocol/config.ts +345 -0
- package/protocol/control-channel.ts +115 -0
- package/protocol/cooldown-reason.ts +78 -0
- package/protocol/cost.ts +10 -0
- package/protocol/daemon-port.ts +31 -0
- package/protocol/daemon.ts +1524 -0
- package/protocol/default-chains.ts +66 -0
- package/protocol/device-state.ts +85 -0
- package/protocol/doctor-report-local.ts +443 -0
- package/protocol/doctor-report-policy.ts +119 -0
- package/protocol/doctor-report.ts +947 -0
- package/protocol/errors.ts +14 -0
- package/protocol/execution-selection.ts +141 -0
- package/protocol/hop-grant.ts +33 -0
- package/protocol/image-edit-parse.ts +263 -0
- package/protocol/images.ts +298 -0
- package/protocol/index.ts +74 -0
- package/protocol/inference-headers.ts +3 -0
- package/protocol/keepalive.ts +69 -0
- package/protocol/local-auth.ts +300 -0
- package/protocol/local-device-control.ts +133 -0
- package/protocol/local-provider.ts +288 -0
- package/protocol/local-session.ts +118 -0
- package/protocol/marketplace.ts +187 -0
- package/protocol/media-attempt.ts +81 -0
- package/protocol/media-bytes.ts +28 -0
- package/protocol/media-default.ts +357 -0
- package/protocol/media-dimensions.ts +132 -0
- package/protocol/media-input.ts +61 -0
- package/protocol/media-model.ts +142 -0
- package/protocol/media-option-issue.ts +90 -0
- package/protocol/media-types.ts +70 -0
- package/protocol/model-match.ts +1051 -0
- package/protocol/model-settings.ts +327 -0
- package/protocol/models.ts +767 -0
- package/protocol/mux.ts +722 -0
- package/protocol/plan-surface.ts +59 -0
- package/protocol/provider-models.ts +16 -0
- package/protocol/provider-status.ts +206 -0
- package/protocol/provider-tier.ts +67 -0
- package/protocol/provider-usage.ts +263 -0
- package/protocol/providers.ts +901 -0
- package/protocol/public-usage-index.ts +354 -0
- package/protocol/realtime-generated.ts +31 -0
- package/protocol/realtime.ts +324 -0
- package/protocol/registry-pointer.ts +118 -0
- package/protocol/relay.ts +702 -0
- package/protocol/replay-session.ts +11 -0
- package/protocol/responses.ts +280 -0
- package/protocol/semver.ts +182 -0
- package/protocol/setup-mode.ts +22 -0
- package/protocol/sha256-hex.ts +98 -0
- package/protocol/stats.ts +406 -0
- package/protocol/streaming.ts +19 -0
- package/protocol/subscription-daemon-floors.ts +33 -0
- package/protocol/subscription-provider-compat.ts +104 -0
- package/protocol/subscription-provider.ts +32 -0
- package/protocol/team-grant.ts +17 -0
- package/protocol/team-shareable.ts +61 -0
- package/protocol/transcription-encoding.ts +76 -0
- package/protocol/url-locality-dns.ts +37 -0
- package/protocol/url-locality.ts +288 -0
- package/protocol/usage-snapshots.ts +9 -0
- package/protocol/vendor-cli-install.ts +29 -0
- package/protocol/video-job-plan.ts +50 -0
- package/protocol/videos.ts +227 -0
- package/tsconfig.json +14 -0
- package/tunnel/ARCHITECTURE.md +111 -0
- package/tunnel/LICENSE +33 -0
- package/tunnel/README.md +45 -0
- package/tunnel/assets/openllm-light.svg +18 -0
- package/tunnel/assets/openllm.svg +18 -0
- package/tunnel/channel-envelope.ts +139 -0
- package/tunnel/codec.ts +191 -0
- package/tunnel/device-anchor.ts +229 -0
- package/tunnel/device-control.ts +118 -0
- package/tunnel/device-grant.ts +173 -0
- package/tunnel/fleet.ts +77 -0
- package/tunnel/index.ts +22 -0
- package/tunnel/mux.ts +580 -0
- package/tunnel/peer-link.ts +390 -0
- package/tunnel/rtc-auth.ts +415 -0
- package/tunnel/rtc-duplex.ts +187 -0
- package/tunnel/rtc-ice.ts +136 -0
- package/tunnel/secure.ts +1298 -0
- package/tunnel/stream-reset-error.ts +14 -0
- package/tunnel/streams.ts +1430 -0
- package/tunnel/team-grant.ts +302 -0
- package/tunnel/wire-bytes.ts +102 -0
- package/vault/ARCHITECTURE.md +470 -0
- package/vault/LICENSE +33 -0
- package/vault/api-key.ts +190 -0
- package/vault/argon2.ts +106 -0
- package/vault/cli-auth-seal.ts +157 -0
- package/vault/cred-seal.ts +146 -0
- package/vault/credential.ts +55 -0
- package/vault/crypto.ts +210 -0
- package/vault/daemon-attest.ts +229 -0
- package/vault/derive.ts +113 -0
- package/vault/device-access.ts +87 -0
- package/vault/device-anchor.ts +185 -0
- package/vault/device-control.ts +174 -0
- package/vault/handoff.ts +396 -0
- package/vault/index.ts +21 -0
- package/vault/passkey.ts +243 -0
- package/vault/phrase.ts +65 -0
- package/vault/pin.ts +153 -0
- package/vault/public-key-seal.ts +131 -0
- package/vault/seed.ts +272 -0
- package/vault/team.ts +355 -0
- package/vault/vault-item.ts +131 -0
- package/vault/vault-migrate-digest.ts +29 -0
- package/vault/wrapped.ts +77 -0
- package/wire/ARCHITECTURE.md +90 -0
- package/wire/CONTRIBUTING.md +19 -0
- package/wire/LICENSE +33 -0
- package/wire/README.md +51 -0
- package/wire/adapters/messages/anthropic-map.ts +37 -0
- package/wire/adapters/messages/index.ts +7 -0
- package/wire/adapters/messages/reasoning-from-items.ts +38 -0
- package/wire/adapters/messages/reasoning-signature.ts +243 -0
- package/wire/adapters/messages/request.ts +574 -0
- package/wire/adapters/messages/response.ts +215 -0
- package/wire/adapters/messages/streaming.ts +1027 -0
- package/wire/adapters/messages/usage.ts +43 -0
- package/wire/adapters/responses/index.ts +3 -0
- package/wire/adapters/responses/request.ts +395 -0
- package/wire/adapters/responses/response.ts +88 -0
- package/wire/adapters/responses/streaming.ts +344 -0
- package/wire/assets/openllm-light.svg +18 -0
- package/wire/assets/openllm.svg +18 -0
- package/wire/features/account-rank.ts +166 -0
- package/wire/features/compaction/compact-request.ts +862 -0
- package/wire/features/compaction/compaction-text.ts +43 -0
- package/wire/features/context-demote.ts +47 -0
- package/wire/features/context-overflow-strategy.ts +26 -0
- package/wire/features/context-skip.ts +170 -0
- package/wire/features/conversation-affinity.ts +144 -0
- package/wire/features/max-tokens-backfill.ts +141 -0
- package/wire/features/model-caps.ts +53 -0
- package/wire/features/model-settings.ts +24 -0
- package/wire/features/output-limit-clamp.ts +64 -0
- package/wire/features/quota-gate.ts +85 -0
- package/wire/index.ts +44 -0
- package/wire/lib/attempt-outcome.ts +43 -0
- package/wire/lib/canonical/content-part.ts +38 -0
- package/wire/lib/canonical/count-tokens-capability.ts +138 -0
- package/wire/lib/canonical/encoding-select.ts +82 -0
- package/wire/lib/canonical/image-signature.ts +202 -0
- package/wire/lib/canonical/image-sse.ts +216 -0
- package/wire/lib/canonical/message.ts +43 -0
- package/wire/lib/canonical/token-estimate.ts +266 -0
- package/wire/lib/encrypted-content.ts +66 -0
- package/wire/lib/error-class.ts +154 -0
- package/wire/lib/error-envelope.ts +56 -0
- package/wire/lib/forwarded-headers.ts +180 -0
- package/wire/lib/provider-error-rules.ts +48 -0
- package/wire/lib/refusal.ts +38 -0
- package/wire/lib/responses-apply-patch.ts +104 -0
- package/wire/lib/responses-namespace.ts +53 -0
- package/wire/lib/secret-scrub.ts +101 -0
- package/wire/lib/streaming/accumulate.ts +221 -0
- package/wire/lib/streaming/finish-reason.ts +33 -0
- package/wire/lib/streaming/peek.ts +154 -0
- package/wire/lib/streaming/provider-decode.ts +259 -0
- package/wire/lib/streaming/response-stream.ts +71 -0
- package/wire/lib/streaming/sse.ts +699 -0
- package/wire/lib/streaming/strip-tool-calls.ts +95 -0
- package/wire/lib/streaming/upstream-error.ts +58 -0
- package/wire/lib/strip-subagent-isolation.ts +284 -0
- package/wire/lib/thinking-signature.ts +156 -0
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/bpe-core.ts +426 -0
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/index.ts +2 -0
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/ruler.ts +79 -0
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/claude-ranks.ts +16 -0
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/claude.ts +22 -0
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/o200k-ranks.ts +18 -0
- package/wire/lib/token-ruler/vocab/o200k.ts +19 -0
- package/wire/lib/tool-name-map.ts +271 -0
- package/wire/lib/tool-schema.ts +353 -0
- package/wire/lib/usage-observer.ts +125 -0
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/adaptive-thinking.ts +291 -0
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/beta-headers.ts +165 -0
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/index.ts +10 -0
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/request.ts +607 -0
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/response.ts +155 -0
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/streaming.ts +315 -0
- package/wire/providers/anthropic/web-search-domains.ts +49 -0
- package/wire/providers/chatgpt/common.ts +136 -0
- package/wire/providers/chatgpt/index.ts +9 -0
- package/wire/providers/chatgpt/request.ts +959 -0
- package/wire/providers/chatgpt/streaming.ts +1007 -0
- package/wire/providers/chatgpt/web-search.ts +63 -0
- package/wire/providers/grok/web-search.ts +87 -0
- package/wire/providers/kimi/web-search.ts +145 -0
- package/wire/providers/upstream-deny.ts +355 -0
- package/wire/providers/upstream-request.ts +619 -0
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/**
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* Browser side of the device trust anchor (`@openllmsh/sdk/tunnel`
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* `device-anchor.ts` holds the wire formats; the daemon computes the same
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* values with node:crypto).
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*
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* Everything here starts from the account control SEED
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* (`./device-control.ts`, phrase-derived — never the DEK), so a compromised
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* cloud can compute none of it:
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*
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* - {@link deriveDevicePairSecret} — `HKDF-SHA256(seed, utf8(key_id),
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* "openllm-pair-v1", 32)`; one secret per API key.
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* - {@link buildDeviceAnchor} / {@link buildAnchoredApiKey} — the
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* `sk-llm-<id>.<secret>.<anchor>` string the install / setup command
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* carries. The anchor never leaves the device it is pasted on.
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* - {@link verifyDpkProof} — check the `device_sessions.dpk_proof` a daemon
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* publishes before trusting its `pubkey` (`dpk`) for grants, Noise or RTC.
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* - {@link signDeviceSessionsDisable} — the control-signed remote DISABLE
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* (`set_device_sessions`). There is no remote enable; re-enable writes the
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* anchor again via install / update / login / desktop.
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*/
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import type { TDeviceSessionsDisableFields } from "@openllmsh/sdk/tunnel";
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import {
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buildDeviceSessionsDisableMessage,
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buildDpkProofMessage,
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DEVICE_PAIR_HKDF_INFO,
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DEVICE_SESSIONS_DISABLE_VERSION,
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encodeDeviceAnchor,
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encodeDeviceSessionsDisable,
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isDpkProofSyntax,
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} from "@openllmsh/sdk/tunnel";
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import { parseApiKey } from "./api-key";
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import { fromB64Url, hkdfSha256, randomBytes, toB64Url, zero } from "./crypto";
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import {
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deviceAccessPublicKeySpkiB64,
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rawFromSpkiB64,
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signDeviceGrant,
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} from "./device-access";
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const PAIR_SECRET_BYTES = 32;
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const COMMAND_NONCE_BYTES = 16;
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const subtle = (): SubtleCrypto => globalThis.crypto.subtle;
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const requireKeyId = (keyId: string): void => {
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if (keyId.length === 0) throw new Error("device anchor requires a key_id");
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};
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/**
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* The per-key pair secret: `HKDF-SHA256(ikm = control seed, salt =
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*/
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export const deriveDevicePairSecret = (
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seed: Uint8Array,
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keyId: string,
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): Promise<Uint8Array> => {
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requireKeyId(keyId);
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return hkdfSha256(
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seed,
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new TextEncoder().encode(keyId),
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DEVICE_PAIR_HKDF_INFO,
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PAIR_SECRET_BYTES,
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);
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};
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/** The anchor for `keyId`: base64url(control pubkey raw || pair secret). */
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export const buildDeviceAnchor = async (
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seed: Uint8Array,
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keyId: string,
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): Promise<string> => {
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const raw = rawFromSpkiB64(await deviceAccessPublicKeySpkiB64(seed));
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if (raw === null) throw new Error("control public key is malformed");
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const pairSecret = await deriveDevicePairSecret(seed, keyId);
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try {
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return encodeDeviceAnchor(raw, pairSecret);
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} finally {
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zero(pairSecret);
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}
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};
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/**
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* `sk-llm-<id>.<secret>.<anchor>` for a full plaintext key. Build it locally
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* and put it ONLY in a command the user copies (install / `openllm login`);
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* never send it to the cloud, store it, or show it in a key listing.
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*/
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export const buildAnchoredApiKey = async (
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apiKey: string,
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seed: Uint8Array,
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): Promise<string> => {
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const parsed = parseApiKey(apiKey);
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if (parsed === null) throw new Error("not a full sk-llm API key");
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zero(parsed.secret);
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return `${apiKey}.${await buildDeviceAnchor(seed, parsed.id)}`;
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};
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const hmacKey = (secret: Uint8Array): Promise<CryptoKey> =>
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subtle().importKey(
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"raw",
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secret.slice() as BufferSource,
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{ name: "HMAC", hash: "SHA-256" },
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false,
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["sign", "verify"],
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);
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/** `HMAC-SHA256(pairSecret, buildDpkProofMessage(keyId, dpk))`, base64url. */
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export const computeDpkProof = async (
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pairSecret: Uint8Array,
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keyId: string,
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dpk: string,
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): Promise<string> => {
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const key = await hmacKey(pairSecret);
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const mac = await subtle().sign(
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"HMAC",
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key,
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buildDpkProofMessage(keyId, dpk) as BufferSource,
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);
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return toB64Url(new Uint8Array(mac));
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};
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export type TVerifyDpkProofParams = {
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/** This browser's control seed. */
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readonly seed: Uint8Array;
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/** The api key row the daemon runs on (the grant `key_id`). */
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readonly keyId: string;
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/** `DaemonStatus.pubkey` as received. */
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readonly dpk: string;
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/** `DaemonStatus.device_sessions.dpk_proof` as received. */
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readonly proof: string;
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};
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/**
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* True only when the daemon holding the anchor for `keyId` vouched for `dpk`.
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* Constant-time (WebCrypto HMAC verify). Never throws.
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*/
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export const verifyDpkProof = async (
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params: TVerifyDpkProofParams,
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): Promise<boolean> => {
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if (params.keyId.length === 0 || params.dpk.length === 0) return false;
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if (!isDpkProofSyntax(params.proof)) return false;
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let pairSecret: Uint8Array | null = null;
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try {
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pairSecret = await deriveDevicePairSecret(params.seed, params.keyId);
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const key = await hmacKey(pairSecret);
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+
const mac = fromB64Url(params.proof);
|
|
144
|
+
return await subtle().verify(
|
|
145
|
+
"HMAC",
|
|
146
|
+
key,
|
|
147
|
+
mac as BufferSource,
|
|
148
|
+
buildDpkProofMessage(params.keyId, params.dpk) as BufferSource,
|
|
149
|
+
);
|
|
150
|
+
} catch {
|
|
151
|
+
return false;
|
|
152
|
+
} finally {
|
|
153
|
+
if (pairSecret !== null) zero(pairSecret);
|
|
154
|
+
}
|
|
155
|
+
};
|
|
156
|
+
|
|
157
|
+
export type TSignDeviceSessionsDisableParams = {
|
|
158
|
+
readonly keyId: string;
|
|
159
|
+
/** Defaults to `Date.now()`. */
|
|
160
|
+
readonly ts?: number;
|
|
161
|
+
/** Defaults to 16 random bytes, base64url. */
|
|
162
|
+
readonly nonce?: string;
|
|
163
|
+
};
|
|
164
|
+
|
|
165
|
+
/**
|
|
166
|
+
* Sign `{ v: 1, key_id, ts, nonce }` with the control seed. Returns the base64
|
|
167
|
+
* envelope for the `set_device_sessions` command payload (disable-only).
|
|
168
|
+
*/
|
|
169
|
+
export const signDeviceSessionsDisable = async (
|
|
170
|
+
seed: Uint8Array,
|
|
171
|
+
params: TSignDeviceSessionsDisableParams,
|
|
172
|
+
): Promise<string> => {
|
|
173
|
+
requireKeyId(params.keyId);
|
|
174
|
+
const fields: TDeviceSessionsDisableFields = {
|
|
175
|
+
v: DEVICE_SESSIONS_DISABLE_VERSION,
|
|
176
|
+
key_id: params.keyId,
|
|
177
|
+
ts: params.ts ?? Date.now(),
|
|
178
|
+
nonce: params.nonce ?? toB64Url(randomBytes(COMMAND_NONCE_BYTES)),
|
|
179
|
+
};
|
|
180
|
+
const sig = await signDeviceGrant(
|
|
181
|
+
seed,
|
|
182
|
+
buildDeviceSessionsDisableMessage(fields),
|
|
183
|
+
);
|
|
184
|
+
return encodeDeviceSessionsDisable({ ...fields, sig });
|
|
185
|
+
};
|
|
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
|
|
|
1
|
+
/**
|
|
2
|
+
* The account DEVICE-CONTROL key: one Ed25519 key per recovery phrase.
|
|
3
|
+
*
|
|
4
|
+
* It signs device grants (`./device-access.ts` sign/verify), daemon-key
|
|
5
|
+
* attestations (`./daemon-attest.ts`) and control-key rotation statements
|
|
6
|
+
* (`@openllmsh/sdk/tunnel` `device-control.ts`). Daemons pin its PUBLIC key.
|
|
7
|
+
*
|
|
8
|
+
* Why the phrase and not the DEK: the server unwraps the DEK from
|
|
9
|
+
* `dek_for_key` on every `sk-llm` request, so anything derived from the DEK is
|
|
10
|
+
* something a compromised cloud can compute. The phrase never reaches the
|
|
11
|
+
* server, and this key is never wrapped for an API key — the cloud only ever
|
|
12
|
+
* sees its public half.
|
|
13
|
+
*
|
|
14
|
+
* Why HKDF and not Argon2id: the phrase carries 128 bits of BIP39 entropy, so
|
|
15
|
+
* a slow KDF buys nothing against a search that cannot be mounted. HKDF also
|
|
16
|
+
* keeps the derivation free of any server-supplied input (`wrap_salt` comes
|
|
17
|
+
* from the cloud) and of the KDF version stamp — the same phrase always yields
|
|
18
|
+
* the same key, on every browser.
|
|
19
|
+
*
|
|
20
|
+
* Callers derive ONLY from a phrase they have already proven (a successful
|
|
21
|
+
* `unlockDek`, or an accepted handoff), so a typo can never mint a plausible
|
|
22
|
+
* foreign key. `mnemonicToEntropy` additionally rejects a bad checksum.
|
|
23
|
+
*/
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
import type { TDeviceControlRotationFields } from "@openllmsh/sdk/tunnel";
|
|
26
|
+
import {
|
|
27
|
+
buildDeviceControlRotationMessage,
|
|
28
|
+
DEVICE_CONTROL_ROTATION_VERSION,
|
|
29
|
+
decodeDeviceControlRotation,
|
|
30
|
+
encodeDeviceControlRotation,
|
|
31
|
+
} from "@openllmsh/sdk/tunnel";
|
|
32
|
+
import { mnemonicToEntropy } from "@scure/bip39";
|
|
33
|
+
import { wordlist } from "@scure/bip39/wordlists/english.js";
|
|
34
|
+
import { hkdfSha256, zero } from "./crypto";
|
|
35
|
+
import {
|
|
36
|
+
deviceAccessPublicKeySpkiB64,
|
|
37
|
+
signDeviceGrant,
|
|
38
|
+
verifyDeviceGrant,
|
|
39
|
+
} from "./device-access";
|
|
40
|
+
import { normalizePhrase } from "./phrase";
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
/** HKDF info for the control seed. Distinct from every DEK-side label. */
|
|
43
|
+
export const DEVICE_CONTROL_HKDF_INFO = "openllm-device-control-v1";
|
|
44
|
+
/** Fixed public HKDF salt — a constant, so no server input touches the key. */
|
|
45
|
+
export const DEVICE_CONTROL_HKDF_SALT = "openllm-device-control-salt-v1";
|
|
46
|
+
/** HKDF info for the at-rest "control keep" outer wrap (under the DEK). */
|
|
47
|
+
export const DEVICE_CONTROL_KEEP_HKDF_INFO = "openllm-device-control-keep-v1";
|
|
48
|
+
|
|
49
|
+
const SEED_BYTES = 32;
|
|
50
|
+
|
|
51
|
+
/**
|
|
52
|
+
* `HKDF-SHA256(ikm = BIP39 entropy(phrase), salt = DEVICE_CONTROL_HKDF_SALT,
|
|
53
|
+
* info = DEVICE_CONTROL_HKDF_INFO, 32)` — the Ed25519 private seed.
|
|
54
|
+
*
|
|
55
|
+
* Takes the phrase and nothing else: there is deliberately no DEK parameter
|
|
56
|
+
* and no overload that accepts one. Throws on an invalid mnemonic.
|
|
57
|
+
*/
|
|
58
|
+
export const deriveDeviceControlSeed = async (
|
|
59
|
+
phrase: string,
|
|
60
|
+
): Promise<Uint8Array> => {
|
|
61
|
+
const entropy = mnemonicToEntropy(normalizePhrase(phrase), wordlist);
|
|
62
|
+
try {
|
|
63
|
+
return await deriveDeviceControlSeedFromVaultSeed(entropy);
|
|
64
|
+
} finally {
|
|
65
|
+
zero(entropy);
|
|
66
|
+
}
|
|
67
|
+
};
|
|
68
|
+
|
|
69
|
+
/**
|
|
70
|
+
* {@link deriveDeviceControlSeed} from the vault seed itself (the phrase's
|
|
71
|
+
* BIP39 entropy, `./seed.ts`) — the same key, for callers that hold the seed
|
|
72
|
+
* bytes rather than the words. Never zeroes its input.
|
|
73
|
+
*/
|
|
74
|
+
export const deriveDeviceControlSeedFromVaultSeed = (
|
|
75
|
+
vaultSeed: Uint8Array,
|
|
76
|
+
): Promise<Uint8Array> =>
|
|
77
|
+
hkdfSha256(
|
|
78
|
+
vaultSeed,
|
|
79
|
+
new TextEncoder().encode(DEVICE_CONTROL_HKDF_SALT),
|
|
80
|
+
DEVICE_CONTROL_HKDF_INFO,
|
|
81
|
+
SEED_BYTES,
|
|
82
|
+
);
|
|
83
|
+
|
|
84
|
+
/** The control public key as base64(SPKI DER) — the value daemons pin. */
|
|
85
|
+
export const deviceControlPublicKeySpkiB64 = (
|
|
86
|
+
seed: Uint8Array,
|
|
87
|
+
): Promise<string> => deviceAccessPublicKeySpkiB64(seed);
|
|
88
|
+
|
|
89
|
+
/**
|
|
90
|
+
* Outer wrap key for the browser-local control keep:
|
|
91
|
+
* `HKDF(dek, salt = utf8(userId), info = DEVICE_CONTROL_KEEP_HKDF_INFO, 32)`.
|
|
92
|
+
*
|
|
93
|
+
* This is the ONLY place the DEK meets the control key, and it runs one way:
|
|
94
|
+
* the DEK helps LOCK an already-derived seed at rest (alongside a
|
|
95
|
+
* non-extractable per-browser key the server cannot reach), it never produces
|
|
96
|
+
* one. A server holding the DEK but not that browser key still cannot open
|
|
97
|
+
* the keep.
|
|
98
|
+
*/
|
|
99
|
+
export const controlKeepOuterKey = (
|
|
100
|
+
dek: Uint8Array,
|
|
101
|
+
userId: string,
|
|
102
|
+
): Promise<Uint8Array> => {
|
|
103
|
+
if (userId.length === 0) {
|
|
104
|
+
throw new Error("control keep requires a non-empty userId");
|
|
105
|
+
}
|
|
106
|
+
return hkdfSha256(
|
|
107
|
+
dek,
|
|
108
|
+
new TextEncoder().encode(userId),
|
|
109
|
+
DEVICE_CONTROL_KEEP_HKDF_INFO,
|
|
110
|
+
SEED_BYTES,
|
|
111
|
+
);
|
|
112
|
+
};
|
|
113
|
+
|
|
114
|
+
/** Inputs of a rotation: `old` / `new` control pubkeys, `cv` = new generation. */
|
|
115
|
+
export type TDeviceControlRotationInput = Omit<
|
|
116
|
+
TDeviceControlRotationFields,
|
|
117
|
+
"v"
|
|
118
|
+
>;
|
|
119
|
+
|
|
120
|
+
/**
|
|
121
|
+
* Sign a rotation statement with the OLD control seed, vouching for `new`.
|
|
122
|
+
* Returns the base64 wire encoding the daemon walks
|
|
123
|
+
* (`bootstrap.device_access_rotations`). Throws when `oldSeed` does not
|
|
124
|
+
* belong to `input.old` — a statement that cannot verify is a bug, not data.
|
|
125
|
+
*/
|
|
126
|
+
export const signDeviceControlRotation = async (
|
|
127
|
+
oldSeed: Uint8Array,
|
|
128
|
+
input: TDeviceControlRotationInput,
|
|
129
|
+
): Promise<string> => {
|
|
130
|
+
if (!Number.isInteger(input.cv) || input.cv < 1) {
|
|
131
|
+
throw new Error("rotation requires cv >= 1");
|
|
132
|
+
}
|
|
133
|
+
if (input.old === input.new) {
|
|
134
|
+
throw new Error("rotation requires distinct old and new keys");
|
|
135
|
+
}
|
|
136
|
+
if ((await deviceControlPublicKeySpkiB64(oldSeed)) !== input.old) {
|
|
137
|
+
throw new Error("rotation signer does not match the old control key");
|
|
138
|
+
}
|
|
139
|
+
const fields: TDeviceControlRotationFields = {
|
|
140
|
+
v: DEVICE_CONTROL_ROTATION_VERSION,
|
|
141
|
+
old: input.old,
|
|
142
|
+
new: input.new,
|
|
143
|
+
cv: input.cv,
|
|
144
|
+
};
|
|
145
|
+
const sig = await signDeviceGrant(
|
|
146
|
+
oldSeed,
|
|
147
|
+
buildDeviceControlRotationMessage(fields),
|
|
148
|
+
);
|
|
149
|
+
return encodeDeviceControlRotation({ ...fields, sig });
|
|
150
|
+
};
|
|
151
|
+
|
|
152
|
+
/**
|
|
153
|
+
* Verify one encoded rotation statement: well-formed, `old` / `new` equal to
|
|
154
|
+
* what the caller expects, signed by `old`. Never throws. `cv` is returned so
|
|
155
|
+
* the caller can enforce monotonicity against its own state.
|
|
156
|
+
*/
|
|
157
|
+
export const verifyDeviceControlRotation = async (
|
|
158
|
+
encoded: string,
|
|
159
|
+
expect: { readonly old: string; readonly new: string },
|
|
160
|
+
): Promise<
|
|
161
|
+
{ readonly ok: true; readonly cv: number } | { readonly ok: false }
|
|
162
|
+
> => {
|
|
163
|
+
const statement = decodeDeviceControlRotation(encoded);
|
|
164
|
+
if (statement === null) return { ok: false };
|
|
165
|
+
if (statement.old !== expect.old || statement.new !== expect.new) {
|
|
166
|
+
return { ok: false };
|
|
167
|
+
}
|
|
168
|
+
const ok = await verifyDeviceGrant(
|
|
169
|
+
statement.old,
|
|
170
|
+
buildDeviceControlRotationMessage(statement),
|
|
171
|
+
statement.sig,
|
|
172
|
+
);
|
|
173
|
+
return ok ? { ok: true, cv: statement.cv } : { ok: false };
|
|
174
|
+
};
|