@opengsd/gsd-core 1.13.0 → 1.14.0

package/gsd-core/bin/lib/runtime-hooks-surface.cjs

@@ -459,9 +459,18 @@ function normalizeNodePath(execPath, opts) {
     // survives the upgrade. Derive <prefix> from the path itself (more reliable
     // than HOMEBREW_PREFIX env — the path IS the install location) so every layout
     // is covered by one branch instead of one per known prefix (#2185).
+    //
+    // #4137: rewrite only when the symlink exists; otherwise fall through to the
+    // raw execPath, exactly like the mise and volta branches. A keg-only/versioned
+    // formula (node@24 installed but never `brew link`ed) has no <prefix>/bin/node
+    // at all, so the unconditional rewrite handed every managed hook a path that
+    // fails at invocation — a rewrite must never turn a working keg path into an
+    // immediately broken one.
     const homebrewMatch = normalizedForMatch.match(/^(.+)\/Cellar\/node(@\d+)?\/[^/]+\/bin\/node(\.exe)?$/i);
     if (homebrewMatch) {
-        return `${homebrewMatch[1]}/bin/node${homebrewMatch[3] || ''}`;
+        const homebrewStable = `${homebrewMatch[1]}/bin/node${homebrewMatch[3] || ''}`;
+        if (existsSync(homebrewStable))
+            return homebrewStable;
     }
     // mise pins a concrete node version at <data>/installs/node/<ver>/bin/node
     // (Windows: <data>/installs/node/<ver>/node.exe). Node realpaths
@@ -802,16 +811,52 @@ function rewriteLegacyCodexHookBlock(content, absoluteRunner, opts) {
     });
     return { content: updated, changed };
 }
+function _installEngineSymlinkGuard() {
+    // eslint-disable-next-line @typescript-eslint/no-require-imports, @typescript-eslint/no-unsafe-assignment
+    const mod = require('./install-engine.cjs');
+    return mod;
+}
 function reconcileCodexHooksJsonEvent(targetDir, eventName, opts = {}) {
     const hooksJsonPath = node_path_1.default.join(targetDir, 'hooks.json');
     const managedCommand = typeof opts.managedCommand === 'string' ? opts.managedCommand : null;
     const commandWindows = typeof opts.commandWindows === 'string' ? opts.commandWindows : null;
     const matcher = typeof opts.matcher === 'string' ? opts.matcher : undefined;
     const timeout = typeof opts.timeout === 'number' ? opts.timeout : undefined;
+    // #2586 Major 2: every Codex hooks.json writer funnels through this one
+    // function, and atomicWriteFileSync's final step is a rename(2) onto
+    // `hooksJsonPath` — which, when that path is a symlink, REPLACES the
+    // symlink with a plain file rather than writing through it. Refuse (with
+    // the same GSD_ALLOW_SYMLINKED_DEST opt-in every other install call site
+    // honors) before reading or writing, so a symlinked hooks.json is neither
+    // silently destroyed nor left the caller no escape hatch.
+    const symlinkGuard = _installEngineSymlinkGuard();
+    // The path this function actually reads/writes. Defaults to the nominal
+    // hooks.json path; reassigned below to the symlink's real target when the
+    // opt-in is active, so the write lands on the file the user's symlink
+    // points at instead of clobbering the symlink itself (see note below).
+    let effectiveHooksJsonPath = hooksJsonPath;
+    if (node_fs_1.default.existsSync(hooksJsonPath) && node_fs_1.default.lstatSync(hooksJsonPath).isSymbolicLink()) {
+        if (symlinkGuard.hasExistingSymlinkBetween(targetDir, hooksJsonPath, {
+            allowOptInFollow: symlinkGuard.isSymlinkedDestOptIn(),
+        })) {
+            throw new Error(`hooks.json at "${hooksJsonPath}" contains a symlink the install root "${targetDir}" does not trust — ` +
+                'refusing to read or write it. If this is an intentional user-owned symlink layout, re-run with ' +
+                'GSD_ALLOW_SYMLINKED_DEST=1.');
+        }
+        // hasExistingSymlinkBetween returned false only because the opt-in is
+        // active (a symlinked leaf always trips it otherwise) — so this IS a
+        // symlink and we are cleared to follow it. atomicWriteFileSync's final
+        // step is a rename(2) onto its target, which REPLACES an existing
+        // symlink at that path rather than writing through it; resolving to the
+        // real path here makes the read AND the write operate on the symlink's
+        // target, leaving the symlink itself untouched, matching what "follow"
+        // is supposed to mean.
+        effectiveHooksJsonPath = node_fs_1.default.realpathSync(hooksJsonPath);
+    }
     let parsed = {};
     let currentContent = null;
-    if (node_fs_1.default.existsSync(hooksJsonPath)) {
-        const raw = node_fs_1.default.readFileSync(hooksJsonPath, 'utf8');
+    if (node_fs_1.default.existsSync(effectiveHooksJsonPath)) {
+        const raw = node_fs_1.default.readFileSync(effectiveHooksJsonPath, 'utf8');
         currentContent = raw;
         if (raw.trim()) {
             try {
@@ -845,6 +890,12 @@ function reconcileCodexHooksJsonEvent(targetDir, eventName, opts = {}) {
     }
     parsed['hooks'] = hookTable;
     const eventEntries = Array.isArray(hookTable[eventName]) ? hookTable[eventName] : [];
+    // Minor 5 (#2586 review): an event key the user already had, already
+    // holding an empty array, must survive removal as an empty array — not be
+    // deleted outright. Deleting is only correct when OUR removal is what
+    // emptied a previously non-empty array. Tracked before the loop below can
+    // mutate anything.
+    const wasArrayEmpty = Array.isArray(hookTable[eventName]) && eventEntries.length === 0;
     let removedLegacy = false;
     const sanitizedEntries = [];
     for (const entry of eventEntries) {
@@ -886,6 +937,11 @@ function reconcileCodexHooksJsonEvent(targetDir, eventName, opts = {}) {
     if (sanitizedEntries.length > 0) {
         hookTable[eventName] = sanitizedEntries;
     }
+    else if (wasArrayEmpty) {
+        // Nothing of ours was ever here to remove — preserve the user's own
+        // empty array exactly as found (Minor 5).
+        hookTable[eventName] = [];
+    }
     else {
         delete hookTable[eventName];
     }
@@ -898,7 +954,7 @@ function reconcileCodexHooksJsonEvent(targetDir, eventName, opts = {}) {
     const changed = currentContent !== nextContent;
     const shouldWrite = changed && (currentContent !== null || Object.keys(parsed).length > 0);
     if (shouldWrite) {
-        atomicWriteFileSync(hooksJsonPath, nextContent, 'utf8');
+        atomicWriteFileSync(effectiveHooksJsonPath, nextContent, 'utf8');
     }
     return { changed: changed || removedLegacy, wrote: shouldWrite, path: hooksJsonPath };
 }
@@ -1015,6 +1071,136 @@ function removeCodexHooksJsonEvent(targetDir, eventName) {
 function removeCodexHooksJsonSessionStart(targetDir) {
     return reconcileCodexHooksJsonSessionStart(targetDir, { managedCommand: null });
 }
+// Literal, version-stable markers every shipped gsd-context-monitor.js
+// carries. Stable across the {{GSD_VERSION}} and runtime-path substitutions
+// the Codex copy step applies (#2586 design doc "Ownership check" — a raw
+// content hash would differ per runtime/version by construction, so a marker
+// check is used instead of manifest-membership, which has a bootstrap gap on
+// the exact case that matters most: a pre-#2586 install's manifest never
+// recorded this file at all).
+const CODEX_CONTEXT_MONITOR_OWNERSHIP_MARKERS = [
+    '#!/usr/bin/env node',
+    '// gsd-hook-version:',
+    '// Context Monitor - PostToolUse/AfterTool hook',
+];
+function isGsdOwnedCodexContextMonitorScript(filePath) {
+    let content;
+    try {
+        content = node_fs_1.default.readFileSync(filePath, 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return false;
+    }
+    // The .cmd shim (buildCodexHookWindowsShimIR) is a tiny generated batch
+    // wrapper, not the JS file itself — it never carries the JS markers above,
+    // so it gets its own narrower, still-specific signature: the exact
+    // "@ECHO OFF" / "@SETLOCAL" preamble the shim generator emits, invoking a
+    // script path that ends in gsd-context-monitor.js.
+    if (filePath.endsWith('.cmd')) {
+        return content.startsWith('@ECHO OFF') && content.includes('@SETLOCAL')
+            && /gsd-context-monitor\.js/.test(content);
+    }
+    return CODEX_CONTEXT_MONITOR_OWNERSHIP_MARKERS.every((marker) => content.includes(marker));
+}
+/**
+ * Scan every event in hooks.json for a surviving reference to the
+ * context-monitor script or its Windows .cmd shim, by basename — not scoped
+ * to CODEX_EXTENDED_HOOK_EVENTS, so a user who hand-registered it under an
+ * unrelated event key is still detected as "referenced" and the script is
+ * preserved.
+ */
+function hooksJsonReferencesCodexContextMonitor(targetDir) {
+    const hooksJsonPath = node_path_1.default.join(targetDir, 'hooks.json');
+    if (!node_fs_1.default.existsSync(hooksJsonPath))
+        return false;
+    let raw;
+    try {
+        raw = node_fs_1.default.readFileSync(hooksJsonPath, 'utf8');
+    }
+    catch {
+        return true; // unreadable — conservatively assume referenced, never delete
+    }
+    if (!raw.trim())
+        return false;
+    let parsed;
+    try {
+        parsed = JSON.parse(raw);
+    }
+    catch {
+        return true; // unparseable — conservatively assume referenced
+    }
+    if (!parsed || typeof parsed !== 'object')
+        return false;
+    const hooks = parsed['hooks'];
+    const table = hooks && typeof hooks === 'object' && !Array.isArray(hooks)
+        ? hooks
+        : parsed;
+    for (const key of Object.keys(table)) {
+        const entries = table[key];
+        if (!Array.isArray(entries))
+            continue;
+        for (const entry of entries) {
+            if (!entry || typeof entry !== 'object')
+                continue;
+            const entryHooks = entry['hooks'];
+            const hookList = Array.isArray(entryHooks) ? entryHooks : [entry];
+            for (const hook of hookList) {
+                if (!hook || typeof hook !== 'object')
+                    continue;
+                const values = [
+                    hook['command'],
+                    hook['commandWindows'],
+                ];
+                for (const value of values) {
+                    if (typeof value === 'string' && /gsd-context-monitor(\.js|\.cmd)?/.test(value)) {
+                        return true;
+                    }
+                }
+            }
+        }
+    }
+    return false;
+}
+/**
+ * #2586 must-have #4/#8: after hooks.json registrations for
+ * CODEX_EXTENDED_HOOK_EVENTS have been reconciled away (by the caller, via
+ * removeCodexHooksJsonEvent), delete `hooks/gsd-context-monitor.js` and its
+ * `.cmd` shim ONLY when (a) no surviving hooks.json registration under ANY
+ * event still references either basename, and (b) the on-disk file carries
+ * GSD's own ownership markers (a user's hand-edited or unrelated file at that
+ * path is left alone). Each file is deleted independently — a failure
+ * deleting one is reported as a warning and never rolls back the (already
+ * safe, already-written) hooks.json deregistration the caller performed
+ * first.
+ */
+function cleanupOrphanedCodexContextMonitorScript(targetDir) {
+    const result = { deleted: [], warnings: [], stillReferenced: false };
+    if (hooksJsonReferencesCodexContextMonitor(targetDir)) {
+        result.stillReferenced = true;
+        return result;
+    }
+    const candidates = [
+        node_path_1.default.join(targetDir, 'hooks', 'gsd-context-monitor.js'),
+        node_path_1.default.join(targetDir, 'hooks', 'gsd-context-monitor.cmd'),
+    ];
+    for (const candidate of candidates) {
+        if (!node_fs_1.default.existsSync(candidate))
+            continue;
+        if (!isGsdOwnedCodexContextMonitorScript(candidate))
+            continue;
+        try {
+            node_fs_1.default.unlinkSync(candidate);
+            result.deleted.push(candidate);
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            result.warnings.push({
+                path: candidate,
+                reason: err && err.message ? err.message : String(err),
+            });
+        }
+    }
+    return result;
+}
 function buildHookCommand(configDir, hookName, opts) {
     if (!opts)
         opts = {};
@@ -2692,6 +2878,9 @@ module.exports = {
     removeCodexHooksJsonEvent,
     removeCodexHooksJsonSessionStart,
     buildCodexHookWindowsShimIR,
+    cleanupOrphanedCodexContextMonitorScript,
+    isGsdOwnedCodexContextMonitorScript,
+    hooksJsonReferencesCodexContextMonitor,
     // Codex TOML
     buildCodexHookBlock,
     rewriteLegacyCodexHookBlock,

package/gsd-core/bin/lib/security.cjs

@@ -22,10 +22,14 @@ var __importDefault = (this && this.__importDefault) || function (mod) {
     return (mod && mod.__esModule) ? mod : { "default": mod };
 };
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS = exports.INJECTION_PATTERNS = void 0;
-exports.validatePath = validatePath;
+exports.MARKDOWN_LINK_PATTERNS = exports.INJECTION_PATTERNS = exports.PathAcceptance = void 0;
+exports.isContainedIn = isContainedIn;
 exports.loadTrustedGlobalRoots = loadTrustedGlobalRoots;
+exports.assertWithinRoot = assertWithinRoot;
+exports.tryWithinRoot = tryWithinRoot;
 exports.requireSafePath = requireSafePath;
+exports.tryWithinRootLexical = tryWithinRootLexical;
+exports.assertWithinRootLexical = assertWithinRootLexical;
 exports.scanForInjection = scanForInjection;
 exports.sanitizeForPrompt = sanitizeForPrompt;
 exports.sanitizeForDisplay = sanitizeForDisplay;
@@ -39,6 +43,31 @@ const node_fs_1 = __importDefault(require("node:fs"));
 const node_os_1 = __importDefault(require("node:os"));
 const node_path_1 = __importDefault(require("node:path"));
 // ─── Path Traversal Prevention ──────────────────────────────────────────────
+/**
+ * THE containment comparison — the single place this repo decides whether an
+ * already-resolved path lies inside an already-resolved root (ADR-4650).
+ *
+ * Separator-aware on purpose: comparing the bare strings would accept a
+ * sibling that merely shares a prefix (`<root>-evil` against `<root>`), so both
+ * sides get a trailing separator before the prefix test. `target === root` is
+ * contained.
+ *
+ * `pathImpl` lets a caller supply `path.win32` / `path.posix` instead of the
+ * ambient module, so win32 separator semantics are testable off Windows.
+ *
+ * Exported for callers that have ALREADY resolved both operands themselves
+ * and need only this comparison step (e.g. a caller that owns its own
+ * `fs.realpathSync` calls to preserve an exists-vs-escaped tri-state). A
+ * caller that has NOT resolved its operands must NOT reach for this function
+ * directly — the comparison alone is not a containment check — and should use
+ * `assertWithinRoot` / `tryWithinRoot` (or the `assertWithinRootLexical` /
+ * `tryWithinRootLexical` pair) instead.
+ */
+function isContainedIn(resolvedTarget, resolvedRoot, pathImpl = node_path_1.default) {
+    if (resolvedTarget === resolvedRoot)
+        return true;
+    return (resolvedTarget + pathImpl.sep).startsWith(resolvedRoot + pathImpl.sep); // allow-handrolled-containment: this IS the canonical comparison every other site routes through
+}
 /**
  * Validate that a file path resolves within an allowed base directory.
  * Prevents path traversal attacks via ../ sequences, symlinks, or absolute paths.
@@ -122,9 +151,7 @@ function validatePath(filePath, baseDir, opts = {}) {
             }
         }
     }
-    const normalizedBase = resolvedBase + node_path_1.default.sep;
-    const normalizedPath = resolvedPath + node_path_1.default.sep;
-    if (resolvedPath !== resolvedBase && !normalizedPath.startsWith(normalizedBase)) {
+    if (!isContainedIn(resolvedPath, resolvedBase)) {
         return {
             safe: false,
             resolved: resolvedPath,
@@ -204,17 +231,109 @@ function loadTrustedGlobalRoots(config) {
     }
     return result;
 }
+/**
+ * Named acceptance policy for what kind of candidate path is even considered.
+ *
+ * This replaces the old per-call-site `{ allowAbsolute: true }` boolean flag.
+ * At a call site, `{ allowAbsolute: true }` reads as "containment is relaxed
+ * here" — which is FALSE. An absolute path that resolves OUTSIDE the root is
+ * still rejected; the flag only ever controlled whether an absolute candidate
+ * was considered at all. `AbsoluteInsideRoot` states the real contract: an
+ * absolute candidate is accepted for consideration, but containment is
+ * enforced exactly as it is for a relative one.
+ */
+exports.PathAcceptance = {
+    /** Relative candidates only; an absolute candidate is rejected outright. */
+    RelativeOnly: 'relative-only',
+    /**
+     * An absolute candidate is accepted — but ONLY if it still resolves inside the
+     * root. Containment is NOT relaxed by this policy; an absolute path outside the
+     * root is rejected exactly as a traversal is. This is the distinction the old
+     * `{ allowAbsolute: true }` flag failed to make at its call sites.
+     */
+    AbsoluteInsideRoot: 'absolute-inside-root',
+};
 /**
  * Validate a file path and throw on traversal attempt.
  * Convenience wrapper around validatePath for use in CLI commands.
  */
-function requireSafePath(filePath, baseDir, label, opts = {}) {
-    const result = validatePath(filePath, baseDir, opts);
+function assertWithinRoot(candidate, root, label, policy = exports.PathAcceptance.RelativeOnly) {
+    const result = validatePath(candidate, root, { allowAbsolute: policy === exports.PathAcceptance.AbsoluteInsideRoot });
     if (!result.safe) {
         throw new Error(`${label || 'Path'} validation failed: ${result.error}`);
     }
     return result.resolved;
 }
+/**
+ * Validate a file path and return null on traversal attempt (no throw).
+ *
+ * Returns exactly `null` when unsafe — never `''`, never `result.resolved`.
+ * `validatePath` populates `resolved` with the ESCAPING path on the
+ * traversal branch, so returning it here would reproduce the defect this
+ * narrowing exists to remove.
+ */
+function tryWithinRoot(candidate, root, policy = exports.PathAcceptance.RelativeOnly) {
+    const result = validatePath(candidate, root, { allowAbsolute: policy === exports.PathAcceptance.AbsoluteInsideRoot });
+    if (!result.safe) {
+        return null;
+    }
+    return result.resolved;
+}
+/**
+ * Validate a file path and throw on traversal attempt.
+ * Convenience wrapper around validatePath for use in CLI commands.
+ *
+ * Delegates to assertWithinRoot so there is one implementation beneath both
+ * names; its declared return type is ContainedPath (a branded string, still
+ * assignable to string) so existing callers keep compiling untouched.
+ */
+function requireSafePath(filePath, baseDir, label, policy = exports.PathAcceptance.RelativeOnly) {
+    return assertWithinRoot(filePath, baseDir, label, policy);
+}
+/**
+ * LEXICAL containment — `path.resolve` only, never any filesystem access.
+ *
+ * Shares `isContainedIn` with the realpath-based predicate, so there is ONE
+ * containment decision in this repo; these differ only in how a path is
+ * RESOLVED before that decision, never in the decision itself (ADR-4650
+ * decisions 1 and 6).
+ *
+ * Use this — and say why at the call site — only where a symlink must be
+ * PRESERVED rather than resolved, or where the target legitimately does not
+ * exist yet. Three such cases exist: a destination validated before the
+ * `mkdirSync` that creates it, a migration that snapshots and restores a
+ * symlinked path AS A LINK, and a restore gate that refuses links outright.
+ * Everywhere else the realpath-based `assertWithinRoot` / `tryWithinRoot` is
+ * the correct predicate, because a lexical check CANNOT SEE A SYMLINK: a
+ * caller relying on one for a write-confinement guarantee must pair it with
+ * its own symlink refusal.
+ *
+ * `candidate` is resolved RELATIVE TO `root` (so an absolute candidate is
+ * taken as-is, matching `path.resolve` semantics). `target === root` is
+ * contained.
+ *
+ * DELIBERATELY ABSENT: no NUL-byte rejection here. The existing lexical
+ * callers do not reject NUL at this layer (one of them checks NUL itself,
+ * separately), and adding it here would change their behavior. Callers that
+ * need it keep their own check.
+ */
+function tryWithinRootLexical(candidate, root, opts = {}) {
+    const p = opts.pathImpl || node_path_1.default;
+    if (typeof candidate !== 'string' || candidate === '')
+        return null;
+    if (typeof root !== 'string' || root === '')
+        return null;
+    const rootResolved = p.resolve(root);
+    const targetResolved = p.resolve(root, candidate);
+    return isContainedIn(targetResolved, rootResolved, p) ? targetResolved : null;
+}
+function assertWithinRootLexical(candidate, root, label, opts = {}) {
+    const contained = tryWithinRootLexical(candidate, root, opts);
+    if (contained === null) {
+        throw new Error(`${label || 'Path'} validation failed: lexical containment check failed`);
+    }
+    return contained;
+}
 // ─── Prompt Injection Detection ────────────────────────────────────────────────────
 /**
  * Patterns that indicate prompt injection attempts in user-supplied text.

package/gsd-core/bin/lib/state-document.cjs

@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@
  * from the prior hand-written .cjs; only types are added.
  */
 Object.defineProperty(exports, "__esModule", { value: true });
-exports.KNOWN_STATUS_PATTERNS = exports.KNOWN_TEMPLATE_DEFAULTS = void 0;
+exports.KNOWN_STATUS_PATTERNS = exports.KNOWN_TEMPLATE_DEFAULTS = exports.STATUS_ANCHORED_PATTERNS = exports.STATUS_EXACT_TOKENS = void 0;
 exports.toFiniteNumber = toFiniteNumber;
 exports.isUnfilledFieldValue = isUnfilledFieldValue;
 exports.leadingCalendarDate = leadingCalendarDate;
@@ -364,7 +364,7 @@ function stateFieldContinuation(content, fieldName) {
     // this locates exactly the line whose value it returned. The pipe-table rung
     // is deliberately absent: a `| Field | value |` row is bounded by its closing
     // pipe and cannot wrap.
-    const match = new RegExp(`\\*\\*${escaped}:\\*\\*[ \\t]*(.+)`, 'i').exec(content) ??
+    const match = new RegExp(`^[ \\t]*\\*\\*${escaped}:\\*\\*[ \\t]*(.+)`, 'im').exec(content) ??
         new RegExp(`^${escaped}:[ \\t]*(.+)`, 'im').exec(content);
     if (!match)
         return null;
@@ -396,8 +396,9 @@ function stateFieldContinuation(content, fieldName) {
 }
 function stateExtractField(content, fieldName) {
     const escaped = (0, pattern_cjs_1.escapeRegex)(fieldName);
-    // Bold inline format: **FieldName:** value
-    const boldPattern = new RegExp(`\\*\\*${escaped}:\\*\\*[ \\t]*(.+)`, 'i');
+    // Bold line-start format: **FieldName:** value. Leading same-line whitespace
+    // matches the writer's established indented-field tolerance.
+    const boldPattern = new RegExp(`^[ \\t]*\\*\\*${escaped}:\\*\\*[ \\t]*(.+)`, 'im');
     const boldMatch = content.match(boldPattern);
     if (boldMatch)
         return boldMatch[1].trim();
@@ -540,7 +541,22 @@ function stateReplaceField(content, fieldName, newValue) {
     // `(.*)` captured the following line and the rebuild discarded it — the #4010
     // data-loss. ADR-3180 §7.7 makes stateExtractField the same-line-confined owner;
     // this aligns the writer to it.
-    const boldPattern = new RegExp(`(\\*\\*${escaped}:\\*\\*[ \\t]*)(.*)`, 'i');
+    //
+    // #4243: the bold form is also ANCHORED to line start, with same-line leading
+    // whitespace only. The pre-fix pattern carried no `^` and no `m` flag, so a
+    // bold label quoted MID-SENTENCE inside prose — an Accumulated Context bullet
+    // mentioning `**Status:**` — captured the rewrite and destroyed the rest of
+    // its line, silently, whenever a whole-body caller fed this function every
+    // section (beginPhaseCore's tryField, advancePlanCore's Status/Current Plan
+    // writes). The plain branch below was always line-anchored; only the bold
+    // branch lagged. Anchoring reuses #4010's same-line confinement idiom (the
+    // leading class is `[ \t]*`, deliberately NOT the `\s*` the issue suggested —
+    // `^\s*\*\*` can consume the newlines before the label into the match and
+    // drop them on rebuild) and #4186's recognition-by-anchoring discipline: a
+    // write target must BE the whole declared line shape, never a substring
+    // guess inside prose. `$` is explicit-and-inert (`.` never crosses line
+    // terminators) and documents that the match ends at end-of-line.
+    const boldPattern = new RegExp(`^([ \\t]*\\*\\*${escaped}:\\*\\*[ \\t]*)(.*)$`, 'im');
     if (boldPattern.test(content)) {
         return content.replace(boldPattern, (_match, prefix) => joinFieldReplacement(prefix, newValue));
     }
@@ -595,31 +611,117 @@ function stateReplaceFieldInSession(content, primary, fallback, value) {
     const target = hasCanonicalSession ? isSession : isSessionContinuity;
     return (0, markdown_sectionizer_cjs_1.withSection)(content, target, (sectionBody) => stateReplaceFieldWithFallback(sectionBody, primary, fallback, value));
 }
+/**
+ * #4186: the DECLARED raw-status vocabulary `normalizeStateStatus` recognizes.
+ * Keys are whole-field values, compared against the caller's input after
+ * lowercasing, trimming, and collapsing internal whitespace runs to single
+ * spaces — so case and whitespace variants the vocabulary documents
+ * (`EXECUTING PHASE 5`, `  Paused  `, `In   progress`) keep normalizing.
+ * Values are members of `STATUS_LIFECYCLE_ENUM` (`src/state-md-schema.cts`)
+ * — the set the normalizer maps recognized input ONTO.
+ *
+ * The mapping preserves the PRE-#4186 branch ORDER's observable artifacts for
+ * every value the old substring chain recognized: `Planning complete` →
+ * `planning` (the `planning` branch outranked `complete`) and
+ * `Phase complete — ready for verification` → `verifying` (`verif` outranked
+ * `complete`; pinned by tests/state.test.cjs's advance-plan case-5 comment).
+ *
+ * Everything else — prose that merely CONTAINS a status word — falls through
+ * to the caller's raw value (the recorded lenient fallback, #3873 phase-3
+ * row 26). A token guessed from a substring inside a sentence is worse than
+ * a visible paragraph: the paragraph is visibly prose, the wrong token is
+ * not (a `.planning/` path in Italian prose silently produced
+ * `status: planning`; `verificata` produced `verifying`; `completezza`
+ * produced `completed`).
+ */
+exports.STATUS_EXACT_TOKENS = Object.freeze({
+    paused: 'paused',
+    stopped: 'paused',
+    executing: 'executing',
+    'in progress': 'executing',
+    'ready to execute': 'executing',
+    planning: 'planning',
+    'ready to plan': 'planning',
+    'planning complete': 'planning',
+    discussing: 'discussing',
+    verifying: 'verifying',
+    completed: 'completed',
+    done: 'completed',
+    complete: 'completed',
+    'phase complete': 'completed',
+    // advance-plan's phase-complete write (state-transition.cts:1812) — maps
+    // to `verifying`, preserving the pre-#4186 branch order where `verif`
+    // outranked `complete`.
+    'phase complete — ready for verification': 'verifying',
+    'all phases complete': 'completed',
+    // Legacy bare terminal form. ADR-2207/#2204 removed it from every WRITER
+    // (phase verbs write `All phases complete`; milestone close writes
+    // `<version> milestone complete`) — kept here as READER recognition so a
+    // legacy STATE.md still normalizes, exactly the way KNOWN_TEMPLATE_DEFAULTS
+    // keeps the other legacy Status strings.
+    'milestone complete': 'completed',
+    unknown: 'unknown',
+});
+/**
+ * #4186: ANCHORED patterns for handler-written raw statuses whose text
+ * carries a variable component (a phase number, a milestone version, a
+ * #1070 completion glyph). Each pattern is matched against the same
+ * normalized key as `STATUS_EXACT_TOKENS` (lowercased, trimmed,
+ * whitespace-collapsed) and must match the WHOLE value — never a substring —
+ * mirroring how `KNOWN_STATUS_PATTERNS` anchors its template-default checks.
+ * `Executing Phase 5 — final stretch` (executor-appended prose) matches
+ * NOTHING and passes through verbatim, the same discipline #1070 applies to
+ * "Complete but needs manual QA".
+ */
+exports.STATUS_ANCHORED_PATTERNS = Object.freeze([
+    // begin-phase / planned transitions write `Executing Phase ${N}`.
+    [/^executing phase\s+\S+$/, 'executing'],
+    [/^planning phase\s+\S+$/, 'planning'],
+    [/^verifying phase\s+\S+$/, 'verifying'],
+    // phase-complete verbs write `Phase ${N} complete` (state.cts) — the exact
+    // shape the #3578 demote guard then re-checks against the disk counters.
+    [/^phase\s+\S+\s+complete$/, 'completed'],
+    // milestoneCompleteCore writes `${version} milestone complete` (terminal,
+    // ADR-2207); the version label is a single token (milestone.cts's charset
+    // validation admits letters, digits, '.', '-', '_').
+    [/^\S+\s+milestone complete$/, 'completed'],
+    // #1070: LLM executors may write "Complete ✓" or bare "Complete" when
+    // finishing a phase.
+    [/^complete\s*[✓✔✅☑]?$/, 'completed'],
+]);
+/**
+ * Normalize a raw `Status` body-field value to the canonical status token.
+ *
+ * #4186: recognition is ANCHORED — the whole field value (lowercased,
+ * trimmed, whitespace-collapsed) must be a member of the declared vocabulary
+ * (`STATUS_EXACT_TOKENS` / `STATUS_ANCHORED_PATTERNS` above). The pre-#4186
+ * implementation ran a first-match-wins chain of SUBSTRING tests over the
+ * free-prose field, so any prose merely CONTAINING a trigger word was
+ * silently rewritten to a credible wrong token: a `.planning/...` path
+ * mentioned in a non-English status line landed on `planning` (the trigger
+ * word lives in the directory name and outranked the `verif`/`complete`
+ * branches), Italian `verifica*` landed on `verifying`, `completezza` and
+ * `fasi complete` landed on `completed`. The lenient FALLBACK is unchanged
+ * and recorded (#3873 phase-3 row 26): an unrecognized value passes through
+ * verbatim — visible prose, never a guessed token.
+ *
+ * `pausedAt` keeps its documented force (issue #4186: intended behavior): a
+ * truthy value yields `paused` regardless of the prose.
+ */
 function normalizeStateStatus(status, pausedAt) {
-    let normalizedStatus = status || 'unknown';
-    const statusLower = (status || '').toLowerCase();
-    if (statusLower.includes('paused') || statusLower.includes('stopped') || pausedAt) {
-        normalizedStatus = 'paused';
-    }
-    else if (statusLower.includes('executing') || statusLower.includes('in progress')) {
-        normalizedStatus = 'executing';
-    }
-    else if (statusLower.includes('planning') || statusLower.includes('ready to plan')) {
-        normalizedStatus = 'planning';
-    }
-    else if (statusLower.includes('discussing')) {
-        normalizedStatus = 'discussing';
-    }
-    else if (statusLower.includes('verif')) {
-        normalizedStatus = 'verifying';
-    }
-    else if (statusLower.includes('complete') || statusLower.includes('done')) {
-        normalizedStatus = 'completed';
-    }
-    else if (statusLower.includes('ready to execute')) {
-        normalizedStatus = 'executing';
+    if (pausedAt)
+        return 'paused';
+    if (!status)
+        return 'unknown';
+    const key = status.trim().toLowerCase().replace(/\s+/g, ' ');
+    const exact = exports.STATUS_EXACT_TOKENS[key];
+    if (exact)
+        return exact;
+    for (const [pattern, token] of exports.STATUS_ANCHORED_PATTERNS) {
+        if (pattern.test(key))
+            return token;
     }
-    return normalizedStatus;
+    return status;
 }
 /**
  * ADR-3180 §7.6 rule 4 (#3217): `scope` is the `listMilestonePhaseDirs`-owner