@opengsd/gsd-core 1.11.0 → 1.13.0

package/hooks/dist/lib/git-cmd.js

@@ -180,4 +180,213 @@ function isGitSubcommand(cmd, sub) {
   return tokens[subIdx] === sub;
 }
 
-module.exports = { isGitSubcommand, tokenize, extractBranchArgument, skipToSubcommand };
+/**
+ * Resolve a `-m` message argument to its SUBJECT — the first line of the commit
+ * message — resolving the command-substituted heredoc form to the heredoc
+ * BODY's first line.
+ *
+ * PURE STRING FUNCTION. It deliberately does NOT tokenize or walk the command
+ * line: selecting *which* argument is the message stays with the caller, exactly
+ * as before, so this cannot change which commands are validated. An earlier
+ * revision of this fix did walk tokens and regressed four separate cases —
+ * `git commit -- -m WIP` (a pathspec), `git commit --amend && echo -m WIP` (a
+ * later command's flag), `-m "" --allow-empty-message` (the scanner drops empty
+ * tokens, so the following flag became the subject), and unquoted
+ * `git commit -m WIP`. All were allowed upstream and would have started being
+ * blocked. Reported in review of #3802.
+ *
+ * The defect this DOES fix: `gsd-validate-commit.sh` captured the message with
+ * `-m[[:space:]]+"([^"]+)"`, and bash `[^"]` matches newlines, so the widely
+ * used agent-authored commit idiom
+ *
+ *     git commit -m "$(cat <<'EOF'
+ *     feat(auth): add login flow
+ *     EOF
+ *     )"
+ *
+ * captured the whole span up to the final quote at `)"`. Taking its first line
+ * yielded the literal `$(cat <<'EOF'`, which can never satisfy Conventional
+ * Commits, so every heredoc-form commit was blocked regardless of its message.
+ *
+ * Recognition is anchored at BOTH ends and requires a command substitution, so
+ * an ordinary message merely CONTAINING — or ending in — `<<WORD` is not
+ * mistaken for an opener. Without the `^\$\(` anchor,
+ * `-m "WIP notes <<EOF\nfix: smuggled subject"` resolved to the second line and
+ * ALLOWED a non-conforming commit: an enforcement bypass, not just a
+ * misclassification (review of #3802).
+ *
+ * NOT resolved, by design: an UNQUOTED delimiter (`<<EOF`). bash expands `$var`
+ * and `$(...)` in that body, so the literal text here is not what git receives.
+ * An earlier revision resolved it anyway and called the gap "the same
+ * pre-existing limit as expansions in a plain `-m` argument" — that framing was
+ * wrong on both halves: on base the whole heredoc form was blocked, so this fix
+ * CREATED the path, and it dodged the length gate as well as the format gate.
+ * See the expansion guard in the body (review of #3816, round 4).
+ *
+ * KNOWN LIMIT: the DOUBLE-QUOTED delimiter spelling (`<<"EOF"`) is resolvable
+ * here but unreachable through the caller — `gsd-validate-commit.sh`'s
+ * double-quoted `-m` capture stops at the first `"`, which in that spelling is
+ * the delimiter's own quote, so the resolver only ever sees a truncated opener
+ * and the commit stays blocked. Its single-quoted `-m` capture DOES deliver the
+ * spelling intact, which is why an earlier revision's claim of unreachability
+ * was false; the caller now gates the resolver on the double-quoted arm alone
+ * (review of #3816, round 4), so the claim holds again — for that reason, not
+ * by luck. That is the pre-fix behaviour for the whole form (fail closed, a
+ * false positive on one rare spelling), and widening the bash capture to span
+ * inner quotes would change what is captured for EVERY message containing one —
+ * a regression class this fix deliberately does not touch (Codex review of
+ * #3816). The same capture truncation blocks a `"` in the SUBJECT LINE itself,
+ * where it lands inside the line being measured. It does NOT block a `"` on a
+ * later body line: the subject is already complete before the truncation point,
+ * so that message resolves and is allowed (measured; an earlier revision of this
+ * comment and of the changeset claimed a `"` ANYWHERE blocked, which is false —
+ * Codex review of #3816, round 4). The truncation guard below is what keeps the
+ * unmeasurable half fail-closed. Two more legal-but-unrecognized spellings
+ * stay blocked the same fail-closed way: an env-prefixed cat
+ * (`$(A=1 cat <<'EOF'`) and an option-terminated cat (`$(cat -- <<'EOF'`) —
+ * recognizing either would mean modelling bash prefix words here, cost with
+ * no reported user (review of #3816, round 3).
+ *
+ * @param {string} messageArg - the raw `-m` argument, already selected by the caller
+ * @returns {string} the subject to validate
+ */
+function resolveCommitSubject(messageArg) {
+  // CRLF-tolerant split. With a bare split('\n') every body line kept its \r,
+  // so `body.indexOf(delimiter)` never matched on CRLF input: the truncation
+  // guard was inert, an empty CRLF message resolved to 'EOF\r' instead of '',
+  // and a real 72-char subject measured 73 (review of #3816). Splitting on
+  // /\r?\n/ is the repo-wide remedy for this recurring defect class.
+  const lines = String(messageArg == null ? '' : messageArg).split(/\r?\n/);
+  // The path prefix is a PATH-CHARACTER class, not \S*: `\S*` accepted
+  // `id;/bin/cat`, so `$(id;/bin/cat <<'EOF' ...` was resolved to its heredoc
+  // body while bash actually runs `id` first and git's real subject is `id`'s
+  // OUTPUT — an enforcement bypass (Codex review of #3816). A prefix carrying
+  // any shell metacharacter now fails recognition, which falls back to the
+  // opener line and the format gate: fail closed, exactly the pre-fix
+  // behaviour for the whole form.
+  //
+  // Whitespace inside the recognition is ASCII space/tab — [ \t], never \s —
+  // because JavaScript \s includes Unicode whitespace bash does NOT split on:
+  // `$(<NBSP>/bin/cat <<'EOF'` was recognized here while bash reads
+  // `<NBSP>/bin/cat` as the executable NAME, so recognition claimed a
+  // substitution that does not run cat (Codex review of #3816, round 2). The
+  // same ASCII rule as the blank-line skip below, for the same reason.
+  // `cat[ \t]*<<`, not `+`: bash accepts `cat<<'EOF'` with no space (review of
+  // #3816, round 3), and recognizing it costs nothing — the token before `<<`
+  // is still literally `cat`.
+  //
+  // The path prefix must be ABSOLUTE (Codex review of #3816, round 4). The old
+  // `[\w./-]*\/` also accepted `./cat` and `../evil/cat`, so a relative
+  // executable that merely ENDS in `cat` was trusted to echo its stdin: with a
+  // planted `../evil/cat` printing `WIP injected`, the resolver validated the
+  // heredoc body while git's real subject was `WIP injected` (measured
+  // base=2 -> head=0 against a real commit). Requiring `/` up front costs
+  // nothing real — `/bin/cat` and a bare `cat` both still resolve.
+  //
+  // AN ABSOLUTE PATH IS NOT AN IDENTITY EITHER (independent review of #3816,
+  // round 8). Round 4 stopped at "must be absolute", so any absolute path
+  // ENDING in `/cat` was still trusted to echo its stdin — the very thing the
+  // round-4 reasoning rejected one spelling earlier. With an executable at
+  // `/some/scratch/dir/cat` printing `WIP injected`, the resolver validated
+  // the conforming heredoc body while git's real subject was `WIP injected`
+  // (measured on bash 3.2.57 and 5.3.15 against a real commit: hook exit 0,
+  // `git cat-file -p` subject `WIP injected`, while the same command through
+  // `./cat` was already refused). The prefix is now the canonical system
+  // locations, which is the only claim a string can support. `/usr/local/bin`
+  // is deliberately excluded: it is user-writable on ordinary machines, which
+  // is the plantable case this guard exists for.
+  //
+  // RESIDUAL, not fixable from a string: a bare `cat` shadowed earlier on PATH
+  // has the same effect and is indistinguishable here. It is also not a
+  // meaningful boundary — anyone who can plant an executable on PATH can run
+  // `git commit` directly — so this hook stays an authoring guard, not a
+  // security control.
+  //
+  // The delimiter alternatives are split so the BARE spelling is its own group:
+  // `\\(...)` (backslash-quoted) and `(...)` (bare) were one `\\?(...)` branch,
+  // which conflated the only two spellings that differ in bash. See the
+  // expansion guard below.
+  const opener = /^\$\([ \t]*(?:\/(?:usr\/)?bin\/)?cat[ \t]*<<(-?)[ \t]*(?:'([^']+)'|"([^"]+)"|\\([^\s'"();|&<>\\]+)|([^\s'"();|&<>\\]+))[ \t]*$/
+    .exec(lines[0]);
+  if (!opener) return lines[0];
+
+  // EXPANSION GUARD (review of #3816, round 4 — BLOCKER). Only `<<'D'`, `<<"D"`
+  // and `<<\D` suppress expansion. A BARE `<<D` is expanded by bash, so the body
+  // captured here is NOT the text git receives, and measuring it is an
+  // enforcement bypass in both gates at once:
+  //
+  //     -m "$(cat <<EOF\nfeat: $UNSET_VAR\nEOF\n)"   git gets `feat:`  -> format gate dodged
+  //     -m "$(cat <<EOF\nfeat: ${LONG}\nEOF\n)"      git gets any length -> length gate dodged
+  //
+  // Both measured base=2 -> head=0 against the real hook. This is NOT the
+  // pre-existing plain-`-m` expansion limit an earlier revision claimed it was:
+  // on base the whole heredoc form was blocked, so no expansion inside a body
+  // ever reached an allow — this fix created the path, and closes it here.
+  // Same rule every other guard in this function follows: when the real subject
+  // cannot be known, fall back to the opener line, which fails the format gate.
+  if (opener[5]) return lines[0];
+
+  // `<<-` strips leading TABS from every body line, including the terminator.
+  const stripTabs = opener[1] === '-';
+  const delimiter = opener[2] || opener[3] || opener[4];
+  const body = lines.slice(1).map((l) => (stripTabs ? l.replace(/^\t+/, '') : l));
+
+  // TRUNCATION GUARD. The capture that produced this argument stops at the first
+  // `"`, so a message containing one arrives here missing its tail — and its
+  // terminator. Resolving anyway would hand the length gate a PREFIX of the real
+  // subject and let an over-long message through, an enforcement hole that did
+  // not exist before this fix (review of #3802). A body with no terminator is
+  // therefore not resolved at all: returning the opener line fails the format
+  // gate, which is exactly what this whole form did before the fix. The fix
+  // applies where the capture is complete and changes nothing where it is not.
+  const end = body.indexOf(delimiter);
+
+  // POST-TERMINATOR GUARD (review of #3816, round 3 — BLOCKER). Everything
+  // after the terminator is still part of the real message once bash
+  // substitutes: `-m "$(cat <<'EOF'\nfeat: ok\nEOF\n) <200 a's>"` expands to a
+  // single 200+ char subject, but discarding the tail measured 8 and DODGED
+  // COMMIT_SUBJECT_TOO_LONG — the same prefix-measurement class the truncation
+  // guard below exists for, missed on the other side of the terminator. The
+  // canonical idiom's tail is exactly one closing-paren line; anything else
+  // means the substitution is composed with more text, so fall back to the
+  // opener line — blocked, the pre-fix behaviour for the whole form.
+  if (end !== -1) {
+    const tail = body.slice(end + 1);
+    if (tail.length !== 1 || !/^[ \t]*\)[ \t]*$/.test(tail[0])) return lines[0];
+  }
+
+  // git's default `cleanup=whitespace` strips leading blank lines, so the subject
+  // is the first NON-EMPTY body line, not blindly the first one. Taking lines[1]
+  // returned '' for a body that starts blank and falsely blocked a conforming
+  // commit — the very defect class #3802 reports (review of #3802).
+  const scan = end === -1 ? body : body.slice(0, end);
+  // "Blank" is git's ASCII definition — space and tab — never JavaScript's
+  // trim(), whose Unicode whitespace class skips lines git KEEPS: a body whose
+  // first line is a NBSP resolved to the SECOND line while git's real subject
+  // is the NBSP line — an enforcement bypass (Codex review of #3816, verified
+  // against `git stripspace`, which preserves the c2a0 bytes). A Unicode-blank
+  // first line is now returned as the subject and fails the format gate: the
+  // same fail-closed direction git itself takes.
+  const idx = scan.findIndex((l) => !/^[ \t]*$/.test(l));
+  if (idx === -1) return end === -1 ? lines[0] : '';
+
+  // Truncation is only fatal to the line it lands IN. A captured line is complete
+  // exactly when another line follows it, because the capture kept its newline.
+  // So an unterminated body whose subject line is followed by more text is still
+  // measurable; only a subject line that runs to the end of a truncated capture
+  // is not, and that one falls back to the opener — which fails the format gate,
+  // exactly as this whole form did before the fix. Without this, the length gate
+  // measured a PREFIX of the real subject and let an over-long message through
+  // (review of #3802).
+  if (end === -1 && idx >= body.length - 1) return lines[0];
+
+  // git's `cleanup=whitespace` strips whitespace at BOTH ends of the line, not
+  // just leading blanks. Measuring the raw line rejected `feat: <66 x's>` plus
+  // three trailing spaces as 75 chars when git's actual subject is a conforming
+  // 72 — a still-blocked conforming commit, the very defect #3802 reports
+  // (review of #3816). Trailing only, here: leading blank-LINE handling is the
+  // findIndex above, and `<<-` leading-tab stripping already happened.
+  return scan[idx].replace(/[ \t]+$/, '');
+}
+
+module.exports = { isGitSubcommand, tokenize, extractBranchArgument, skipToSubcommand, resolveCommitSubject };

package/hooks/dist/lib/git-probe.js

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+'use strict';
+// hooks/lib/git-probe.js — classify a bounded spawnSync(git, ...) result,
+// distinguishing a GENUINE negative answer (git ran and said "no") from
+// "could not determine" (timeout / spawn failure / signal kill) — #3911.
+//
+// Proven defect: hooks/gsd-worktree-path-guard.js, hooks/gsd-workflow-guard.js,
+// and hooks/gsd-windsurf-pre-write.js each treat spawnSync(git, ..., {timeout})
+// returning a non-zero/empty result as "not applicable" and allow silently.
+// A macOS CI run showed three deny cases land at 2084ms/2112ms/2177ms — just
+// past the 2000ms budget — each returning exit 0 with EMPTY stdout AND EMPTY
+// stderr: a timeout is INDISTINGUISHABLE, at the call site, from git cleanly
+// answering "not a repo" / "not this worktree" unless the spawnSync() result
+// itself is inspected for `error`/`signal`, not just `status`/`stdout`.
+//
+// This module does not change any hook's decision or exit code — it only
+// answers "was this probe's answer real?" so a caller can emit a diagnostic
+// on the undetermined branch while keeping the existing fail-open behavior.
+//
+// Classification mirrors tests/helpers/process-seam.cjs's OUTCOME vocabulary
+// (EXITED vs TIMED_OUT/SPAWN_FAILED/KILLED) — same evidence-over-classification
+// ordering (a populated `status` outranks an attached `error`, since Node can
+// report `error.code === 'ETIMEDOUT'` on a result that also carried a real
+// exit that beat the timer) — so a probe here and a subprocess outcome in the
+// test suite never disagree on the same raw spawnSync() shape.
+
+/**
+ * @param {{error?: (Error & {code?: string})|null, status: number|null, signal: string|null}} result
+ *   the raw return value of `spawnSync('git', ...)`.
+ * @returns {{determined: true} | {determined: false, reason: string}}
+ */
+function classifyGitProbe(result) {
+  const error = result && result.error;
+  const status = result ? result.status : null;
+  const signal = result ? result.signal : null;
+
+  if (!error && signal === null) {
+    // A real exit — status 0 or non-zero is a genuine, trustworthy answer.
+    return { determined: true };
+  }
+  if (status !== null) {
+    // `status` is only ever populated by a real exit; it outranks an attached
+    // `error` even at the exact timeout boundary (process-seam.cjs's own
+    // "evidence over classification" rule).
+    return { determined: true };
+  }
+
+  const code = error ? (error.code ?? null) : null;
+  let reason;
+  if (code === 'ETIMEDOUT' || signal !== null) {
+    reason = signal ? `timed out (signal ${signal})` : 'timed out';
+  } else if (code) {
+    reason = `spawn failed (${code})`;
+  } else {
+    reason = 'could not run (unknown reason)';
+  }
+  return { determined: false, reason };
+}
+
+/**
+ * If `result` could not be determined (timeout / spawn failure / signal
+ * kill), write a stderr diagnostic naming the probe and why — never changes
+ * any exit code, never throws. A no-op when the probe genuinely ran and
+ * answered (status 0 or non-zero with no error/signal).
+ *
+ * @param {string} hookName - e.g. 'gsd-worktree-path-guard'
+ * @param {string} probeLabel - e.g. "git rev-parse --show-toplevel"
+ * @param {*} result - the raw spawnSync() return value
+ */
+function reportIfUndetermined(hookName, probeLabel, result) {
+  const classification = classifyGitProbe(result);
+  if (classification.determined) return;
+  try {
+    process.stderr.write(
+      `${hookName}: git probe '${probeLabel}' ${classification.reason} — ` +
+      `allowing this call because the probe's answer is unknown, not because ` +
+      `git answered "no" (#3911).\n`
+    );
+  } catch {
+    // A stderr write failing (EPIPE, closed fd) must never itself change the
+    // hook's fail-open outcome.
+  }
+}
+
+module.exports = { classifyGitProbe, reportIfUndetermined };

package/hooks/dist/lib/hook-exit.js

@@ -0,0 +1,81 @@
+'use strict';
+// hooks/lib/hook-exit.js — hand-written, NOT generated. A tiny hook-facing
+// vocabulary layered over hooks/lib/cli-exit.js's terminateNow (ADR-3889 §3),
+// for the 19 enforcement hooks P7/#3911 is migrating off raw process.exit().
+//
+// WHY onCrash is a REQUIRED argument, with no default (this is the entire
+// point of this module): every hook audited for #3911 ended its outer
+// try/catch in ONE of two ways — some `process.exit(0)` (fail open: a hook
+// error must never block a legitimate tool call), others `process.exit(2)`
+// (fail closed: a hook whose whole job is a security/safety denial must not
+// let its own bug wave the denial through). Both are legitimate policies for
+// DIFFERENT hooks — but neither is the "obviously correct" one, and a shared
+// helper that silently defaulted to either would let a future hook inherit
+// the wrong policy by omission, which is exactly the "nothing fails with
+// success" defect ADR-3889 exists to close. Requiring the caller to name its
+// policy at every call site — not just once at module load — makes "I forgot
+// to decide" a load-time/call-time crash instead of a silent behavior. A
+// caller that truly wants "allow on crash" must still write ALLOW; there is
+// no path that reaches terminateNow without a declared choice.
+//
+// crash() itself is total: it does not throw on a bad `onCrash`, because
+// throwing would unwind into the CALLER's own outer catch — the exact
+// fail-open-by-accident hazard this module removes. Instead an unrecognized
+// policy terminates via terminateNow('INTERNAL', ...) with a diagnostic
+// payload naming the offending value, so a typo'd/misspelled policy is
+// debuggable on stderr rather than silently reinterpreted as ALLOW or DENY.
+const { terminateNow } = require('./cli-exit.js');
+
+/** Frozen enum of the two declarable crash policies. No third option. */
+const HOOK_ON_CRASH = Object.freeze({
+  ALLOW: 'allow',
+  DENY: 'deny',
+});
+
+/** Terminate with the hook-protocol PASS outcome (exit 0). */
+function allow(payload) {
+  terminateNow('PASS', payload);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Terminate with the hook-protocol deny outcome (exit 2, stdout+stderr).
+ *
+ * @param {*} payload - JSON-serializable value written to fd 1 (and, when
+ *   `stderrPayload` is omitted, fd 2 too).
+ * @param {*} [stderrPayload] - optional distinct value for fd 2, forwarded
+ *   verbatim to terminateNow's own `stderrPayload` param — a string is
+ *   written raw, anything else is JSON-stringified.
+ */
+function deny(payload, stderrPayload) {
+  terminateNow('HOOK_DENY', payload, stderrPayload);
+}
+
+/**
+ * Dispatch to allow()/deny() per a DECLARED crash policy. `onCrash` is
+ * required — see the module header for why there is no default.
+ *
+ * @param {'allow'|'deny'} onCrash - one of HOOK_ON_CRASH's two values.
+ * @param {*} payload - JSON-serializable value forwarded to terminateNow.
+ */
+function crash(onCrash, payload) {
+  if (onCrash === HOOK_ON_CRASH.ALLOW) {
+    allow(payload);
+    return;
+  }
+  if (onCrash === HOOK_ON_CRASH.DENY) {
+    deny(payload);
+    return;
+  }
+  // Never guess a policy and never throw (a throw would unwind into the
+  // caller's own outer catch — the fail-open-by-accident defect this module
+  // exists to remove). Terminate deterministically with INTERNAL, naming the
+  // offending value so a misspelled/omitted policy is diagnosable.
+  terminateNow('INTERNAL', {
+    error: 'hook-exit: crash() called with an unrecognized onCrash policy',
+    receivedOnCrash: onCrash,
+    expectedOneOf: [HOOK_ON_CRASH.ALLOW, HOOK_ON_CRASH.DENY],
+    originalPayload: payload,
+  });
+}
+
+module.exports = { HOOK_ON_CRASH, allow, deny, crash };

package/hooks/dist/lib/injection-patterns.js

@@ -26,11 +26,29 @@
  */
 
 const INJECTION_PATTERNS = Object.freeze([
-  /ignore\s+(all\s+)?previous\s+instructions/i,
-  /ignore\s+(all\s+)?above\s+instructions/i,
-  /disregard\s+(all\s+)?previous/i,
-  /forget\s+(all\s+)?(your\s+)?instructions/i,
-  /override\s+(system|previous)\s+(prompt|instructions)/i,
+  // #4016: ONE filler-tolerant imperative-override pattern. It REPLACES the
+  // five narrow verb patterns (ignore x2 / disregard / forget / override) that
+  // used to sit here: they tolerated no filler between verb and noun, so a
+  // planted "forget all of your ..." phrasing (measured in the wild) matched
+  // nothing. A single pattern rather than narrow-plus-combined because both
+  // consumers count one finding PER PATTERN toward the severity threshold
+  // (3 = HIGH, blockable under security.injection_blocking): overlapping
+  // patterns made one sentence count twice and pushed a two-phrasing LOW
+  // payload to HIGH (PR #4061 review).
+  //   verbs    ignore|disregard|forget|discard|override. `override` carries
+  //            the old `override system|previous prompt|instructions` family;
+  //            `discard` is the synonym seen in the same planted phrasings.
+  //   fillers  at least ONE of all|of|the|your|my|<qualifier> must sit between
+  //            verb and noun (a lookahead, no repetition). Bare "override
+  //            rules" / "ignore instructions" are ordinary repo prose
+  //            (measured: 6 hits across docs and source) and stay unmatched.
+  //   tails    `disregard (all) previous` with no noun, and bare `forget` +
+  //            `instructions`, are kept verbatim because the old narrow
+  //            patterns accepted them; the superset is pinned by
+  //            tests/injection-patterns-parity.security.test.cjs.
+  //   known FP determined linter-doc prose such as "ignore (the) rules" trips
+  //            a single-pattern LOW advisory; one pattern can never block.
+  /(?:ignore|disregard|forget|discard|override)\s+(?=(?:all|of|the|your|my|system|previous|prior|above|earlier)\s)(?:all\s+)?(?:of\s+)?(?:the\s+|your\s+|my\s+)?(?:(?:system|previous|prior|above|earlier)\s+)?(?:instructions|directives|prompts?|rules)|disregard\s+(?:all\s+)?previous|forget\s+instructions/i,
   /you\s+are\s+now\s+(?:a|an|the)\s+/i,
   /act\s+as\s+(?:a|an|the)\s+(?!plan|phase|wave)/i,
   /pretend\s+(?:you(?:'re| are)\s+|to\s+be\s+)/i,
@@ -42,4 +60,16 @@ const INJECTION_PATTERNS = Object.freeze([
   /<<\s*SYS\s*>>/i,
 ]);
 
-module.exports = { INJECTION_PATTERNS };
+// Short single-line label for a matched pattern, used for both the rendered
+// advisory prose and the typed `findings[].match` field in BOTH consumer
+// hooks. The raw regex source is not user-facing: the #4016 superset pattern
+// is ~280 characters, and gsd-prompt-guard.js echoed it verbatim into its
+// advisory (PR #4061 review nit). Byte-identical to the transform
+// gsd-read-injection-scanner.js carried inline since #3523, hoisted here so
+// one finding renders the same way in both hooks. Both hooks already require
+// this module, so this adds no new staging dependency.
+function describePattern(pattern) {
+  return pattern.source.replace(/\\s\+/g, '-').replace(/[()\\]/g, '').substring(0, 50);
+}
+
+module.exports = { INJECTION_PATTERNS, describePattern };

package/hooks/dist/managed-hooks-registry.cjs

@@ -29,10 +29,14 @@ const MANAGED_HOOKS = [
   'gsd-cursor-subagent-stop.js',
   'gsd-ensure-canonical-path.js',
   'gsd-graphify-update.sh',
+  // #3662: portable node resolver (helper staged in hooks/; managed JS hook
+  // commands route through it under --portable-hooks).
+  'gsd-node-runner.sh',
   'gsd-phase-boundary.sh',
   'gsd-prompt-guard.js',
   'gsd-read-guard.js',
   'gsd-read-injection-scanner.js',
+  'gsd-secret-read-guard.js',
   'gsd-session-state.sh',
   'gsd-statusline.js',
   'gsd-update-banner.js',

package/hooks/gsd-agent-isolation-guard.js

@@ -65,6 +65,23 @@ const path = require('path');
 const os = require('os');
 const { readSentinel, VALID_ISOLATION, extractDispatchIdentifiers, sentinelAppliesToDispatch } = require('./lib/isolation-sentinel.js');
 const { REASON_CODE } = require('./lib/isolation-deny-reason.js');
+const { HOOK_ON_CRASH, allow, deny, crash } = require('./lib/hook-exit.js');
+
+// Required at module top, alongside the other ./lib requires — NOT behind
+// ensureRuntimeBuild() below. Terminating on a parse/timeout failure must
+// never depend on the gitignored build artifacts this hook self-heals for
+// its own registry lookups (#3911).
+//
+// This guard's outer catch (main(), below) has always exited 0 (fail open):
+// that outer catch only covers payload PARSING failing before applicability
+// could even be determined (malformed stdin JSON, etc.) — the guard's real
+// fail-closed logic (a GSD project whose dispatch-isolation configuration
+// cannot be verified) is handled separately, inside evaluateDispatch/
+// resolveIsolationState, and already returns a 'block' decision through the
+// normal exit-2 path rather than through this catch. So an unparseable
+// payload has nothing to enforce; allowing it preserves today's behavior
+// exactly.
+const ON_CRASH = HOOK_ON_CRASH.ALLOW;
 // #3582: gsd-core/bin/lib/*.cjs (runtime-name-policy.cjs, capability-registry.cjs
 // below) are tsc build artifacts (ADR-457), gitignored and absent on a raw
 // plugin-marketplace / git-clone install that never ran `npm run build:lib`.
@@ -95,40 +112,40 @@ function parseHarnessFlag(flag) {
   return { param: m[1], value: m[2] };
 }
 
-// ─── #3566: per-install runtime marker ────────────────────────────────────────
+// ─── #3897 rung 2: per-install runtime marker, single canonical owner ────────
 // bin/install.js writes `<install>/gsd-core/.gsd-runtime` for EVERY runtime
 // install (#2297), co-located with VERSION. Unlike `~/.gsd/defaults.json` —
 // which is host-wide and names whichever runtime's install ran LAST, the exact
 // leakage #2840's config.cjs change exists to prevent — the marker describes
 // THIS install, which is the property runtime identity needs on a machine
-// with 2+ runtimes. Mirrors readInstallRuntimeMarker in src/model-resolver.cts
-// (same cache + test-seam shape); this hook cannot import that module without
-// dragging the whole model-resolution stack into a PreToolUse hot path, so the
-// 5-line read lives here against the same sibling-layout assumption the hook's
-// own require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/…') already makes. Epic #3473 B3 owns
-// consolidating every marker reader into one shared seam.
-let _installMarkerCache; // undefined = unread; null = known absent; string = value
-
+// with 2+ runtimes. Previously this hook held its own private reader/cache
+// (one of four #3897 found); it now delegates to the single canonical owner,
+// `src/runtime-slash.cts` (compiled to gsd-core/bin/lib/runtime-slash.cjs),
+// reached through `ensureRuntimeBuild()` like every other compiled-lib require
+// in this file (`scripts/lint-hooks-runtime-build-seam.cjs`).
 function readInstallRuntimeMarker() {
-  if (_installMarkerCache !== undefined) return _installMarkerCache;
   try {
-    const markerPath = path.join(__dirname, '..', 'gsd-core', '.gsd-runtime');
-    const raw = fs.readFileSync(markerPath, 'utf-8').trim();
-    _installMarkerCache = raw || null;
+    ensureRuntimeBuild();
+    const runtimeSlash = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/runtime-slash.cjs');
+    return runtimeSlash.readInstallRuntimeMarker();
   } catch {
-    // No marker: dev/source tree, or an install predating #2297 — "no signal
-    // from this rung", never a resolution failure. Falls through to the
-    // defaults rung below.
-    _installMarkerCache = null;
+    // Unbuilt runtime library, or any other failure reaching the canonical
+    // owner — "no signal from this rung" (N4), never a resolution failure.
+    return null;
   }
-  return _installMarkerCache;
 }
 
-// Test seam for the marker rung (the dev/source tree has no marker file, so
-// the read always bottoms out at null there — same seam contract as
-// model-resolver.cts's _setInstallRuntimeMarkerForTests, #2297).
+// Test seam for the marker rung — forwards to the canonical owner's seam so
+// this hook and runtime-slash.cjs always share one cache (#3897 rung 2).
 function _setInstallRuntimeMarkerForTests(value) {
-  _installMarkerCache = value;
+  try {
+    ensureRuntimeBuild();
+    const runtimeSlash = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/runtime-slash.cjs');
+    runtimeSlash._setInstallRuntimeMarkerForTests(value);
+  } catch {
+    // Test-only seam; an unbuilt library here means the test itself will fail
+    // downstream, which is a louder and more actionable signal than throwing here.
+  }
 }
 
 /**
@@ -282,18 +299,40 @@ function resolveRegistryIsolation(cwd, configPath) {
 
   if (isolation === 'harness-worktree') {
     let useWorktrees = true;
+    // #3972: the opt-out read shares the ONE owner every other
+    // isolation-deciding surface uses — planning-workspace's
+    // worktreesOptedOut ladder (scoped own-key wins; root inherited under
+    // the GSD_WORKSTREAM gate; strict === false). A flat single-file read
+    // here made a workstream-LOCAL opt-out invisible, so the sentinel-absent
+    // fallback denied a sequential dispatch the config explicitly allowed.
+    // Reached through ensureRuntimeBuild() like every other compiled-lib
+    // require in this file (scripts/lint-hooks-runtime-build-seam.cjs); if
+    // the library is unreachable the flat-root read below remains as the
+    // degraded fallback — today's behavior, never worse.
+    let ladderAnswered = false;
     try {
-      const raw = fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8');
-      const parsedCfg = JSON.parse(raw);
-      if (parsedCfg && typeof parsedCfg === 'object' && parsedCfg.workflow &&
-          typeof parsedCfg.workflow === 'object' && parsedCfg.workflow.use_worktrees === false) {
-        useWorktrees = false;
-      }
+      ensureRuntimeBuild();
+      const { worktreesOptedOut } = require('../gsd-core/bin/lib/planning-workspace.cjs');
+      useWorktrees = !worktreesOptedOut(cwd);
+      ladderAnswered = true;
     } catch {
-      // Unreadable config already propagated to the outer caller's catch
-      // before this point in practice (resolveRuntimeIdentity reads it
-      // first); tolerate defensively and keep the conservative (enforce)
-      // default rather than silently disabling the guard.
+      // Unbuilt runtime library or a ladder failure — fall through to the
+      // legacy flat-root read (conservative: keep enforcing).
+    }
+    if (!ladderAnswered) {
+      try {
+        const raw = fs.readFileSync(configPath, 'utf-8');
+        const parsedCfg = JSON.parse(raw);
+        if (parsedCfg && typeof parsedCfg === 'object' && parsedCfg.workflow &&
+            typeof parsedCfg.workflow === 'object' && parsedCfg.workflow.use_worktrees === false) {
+          useWorktrees = false;
+        }
+      } catch {
+        // Unreadable config already propagated to the outer caller's catch
+        // before this point in practice (resolveRuntimeIdentity reads it
+        // first); tolerate defensively and keep the conservative (enforce)
+        // default rather than silently disabling the guard.
+      }
     }
     if (!useWorktrees) isolation = 'none';
   }
@@ -476,7 +515,7 @@ function evaluateDispatch(data, { clock = Date } = {}) {
 /* istanbul ignore next -- stdin adapter, exercised via spawnSync in tests */
 function main() {
   let input = '';
-  const stdinTimeout = setTimeout(() => process.exit(0), 3000);
+  const stdinTimeout = setTimeout(() => allow(undefined), 3000);
   process.stdin.setEncoding('utf8');
   process.stdin.on('data', (chunk) => { input += chunk; });
   process.stdin.on('end', () => {
@@ -486,18 +525,18 @@ function main() {
       const decision = evaluateDispatch(data);
       if (decision.action === 'block') {
         const out = { decision: 'block', reason: decision.reason, reason_code: decision.reasonCode };
-        process.stdout.write(JSON.stringify(out));
         // Kimi feeds stderr (not stdout) back to the model on exit 2.
-        process.stderr.write(decision.reason);
-        process.exit(2);
+        deny(out, decision.reason);
       }
-      process.exit(0);
+      allow(undefined);
     } catch {
       // Silent fail — never block valid tool calls due to hook errors
       // (malformed payload, etc.). This is distinct from resolveIsolationState's
       // internal error handling, which DOES deny — this outer catch only
       // covers payload parsing before applicability could even be determined.
-      process.exit(0);
+      // ON_CRASH is declared ALLOW at module top: this preserves today's
+      // exit(0) fail-open behavior exactly (#3911).
+      crash(ON_CRASH, undefined);
     }
   });
 }

package/hooks/gsd-check-update-worker.js

@@ -156,5 +156,22 @@ const result = {
 };
 
 if (cacheFile) {
-  try { fs.writeFileSync(cacheFile, JSON.stringify(result)); } catch (e) {}
-}
+  // #4091: the cache file is shared per-PACKAGE across every runtime's worker
+  // (#607/#1421), so concurrent statusline/banner readers parse it while this
+  // worker writes it. A direct writeFileSync truncates before writing — a
+  // reader landing mid-write sees a torn/empty record (its JSON.parse catch
+  // swallows it, so the symptom is an intermittently blank update segment).
+  // Publish atomically instead: stage under a unique same-directory temp
+  // (same filesystem, so rename(2) is atomic — readers see the old or the new
+  // record, never a partial one), then renameSync into place. Failure policy
+  // is unchanged (#3582 degrade): any error is swallowed and the temp, if
+  // left behind, is best-effort removed.
+  const tmp = cacheFile + '.tmp-' + process.pid;
+  try {
+    fs.writeFileSync(tmp, JSON.stringify(result));
+    fs.renameSync(tmp, cacheFile);
+  } catch (e) {
+    try {
+      fs.rmSync(tmp, { force: true });
+    } catch (e2) {}
+  }}