@opengeni/db 1.0.1 → 3.2.0-canary.0

package/drizzle/0297_session_ownership_classification_and_backfill.sql

@@ -0,0 +1,752 @@
+-- deployment-mode: rolling
+-- Migration 0297: session ownership classification plus the one deterministic
+-- backfill (organization-tenancy phase D, slice 6).
+--
+-- THE PREMISE THIS SLICE WAS SCOPED ON WAS WRONG
+-- ----------------------------------------------
+-- Slice 6 was planned as "sessions are 100% owner-NULL; nothing writes session
+-- ownership". That is false. Migration 0225's `guard_session_authority_write`
+-- trigger DERIVES session ownership on every INSERT, and 0225's
+-- `session_visibility_isolation` policies are live on `sessions` and on every
+-- table that references it. A session created today through the ordinary
+-- `createSession` path by a managed human who holds a `workspace_memberships`
+-- row comes out with `owner_organization_membership_id` and `owner_subject_id`
+-- populated. There is therefore no undifferentiated ownerless backlog to drain
+-- - there is a live derivation rule, and a precisely shaped set of rows it
+-- cannot reach.
+--
+-- THE ACTUAL POPULATION (measured against the live trigger, not assumed)
+-- ---------------------------------------------------------------------
+-- 0225's derivation has exactly two branches, both INSERT-only and both taken
+-- only when BOTH owner columns arrive NULL:
+--
+--   1. `parent_session_id IS NOT NULL` - inherit the parent's owner pair
+--      verbatim from the same (account, workspace). The parent branch WINS
+--      even when it resolves NULL, so a child of an ownerless parent is
+--      ownerless no matter who created it.
+--   2. otherwise, `created_by_kind = 'subject'` - the active
+--      `organization_memberships` row for `created_by_subject_id`, but ONLY
+--      when that subject also holds a `workspace_memberships` row in the
+--      session's workspace.
+--
+-- Everything else silently keeps a NULL owner pair. Enumerated:
+--
+--   * `created_by_kind = 'service'` - the scheduler, site-auth maintenance,
+--     delegated embedding-host service initiators, and the pre-0096
+--     `unattributed-legacy` default. No human is named at all.
+--   * `created_by_kind = 'subject'` with a non-`user:` subject - `api_key:*`
+--     and `configured:*`. Both 0219 (`p_subject_id NOT LIKE 'user:%'` rejects
+--     provisioning) and 0263 (invitations, role backfill, self-membership
+--     listing) are gated to `user:%`, so these subjects can NEVER acquire an
+--     organization anchor. These rows are permanently unrepairable, and API
+--     keys keep minting new ones, so this is a GROWING population and not a
+--     drainable backlog.
+--   * a `user:` subject with no active organization membership.
+--   * A MANAGED HUMAN IN THEIR OWN PERSONAL WORKSPACE. Slice B provisions the
+--     personal workspace as a pointer on the membership row WITHOUT a durable
+--     `workspace_memberships` row (docs/organization-tenancy.md). Branch 2's
+--     `EXISTS (workspace_memberships ...)` guard therefore fails, and the
+--     human's own personal-workspace sessions come out ownerless. This is the
+--     one population where the organization's own durable lifecycle data
+--     already names exactly one subject.
+--
+-- WHAT IS REPAIRABLE, AND WHAT IS NOT
+-- -----------------------------------
+-- REPAIRABLE (this migration's backfill, and nothing else):
+--
+--   A. Personal-workspace convergence. `sessions.workspace_id` is exactly the
+--      `personal_workspace_id` of one ACTIVE `organization_memberships` row -
+--      a 1:1 lifecycle anchor enforced by 0218's unique
+--      `organization_memberships_personal_workspace_idx` on
+--      (account_id, personal_workspace_id) - AND the session's
+--      `created_by_subject_id` is that same membership's `subject_id`. Two
+--      independent durable facts converge on one subject, and the workspace
+--      anchor alone already identifies the owner; `created_by` is used only as
+--      a veto, never as the evidence. This is the same convergence the
+--      activated 0264 runtime exception uses to derive an owner-only
+--      personal-workspace grant. When the two facts DISAGREE the row is
+--      recorded `ambiguous_candidate_authority` and left alone.
+--   B. Parent inheritance closure. An ownerless session whose same-workspace
+--      parent now HAS an owner pair. This is branch 1 of the live trigger
+--      replayed against durable parent data - not a new rule - and it is what
+--      makes (A) leave the tree in exactly the state 0225 would have produced
+--      had the root been attributable in the first place. It is also what
+--      makes the driver resumable across a crash between the root write and
+--      the closure.
+--
+-- NOT REPAIRABLE, deliberately:
+--
+--   * A managed human's session in an ORDINARY SHARED workspace that predates
+--     0225 (or that was created while the human lacked a workspace-membership
+--     row). Branch 2 could be replayed, but its `workspace_memberships`
+--     predicate is evaluated against TODAY's grants, and phase D says in as
+--     many words: never infer user authority from `created_by`, connection
+--     attribution, a default workspace, a resource name, or CURRENT ACCESS. A
+--     workspace membership granted after the session was created, or revoked
+--     and re-granted since, would silently manufacture authority. Recorded
+--     `no_deterministic_evidence`.
+--   * Every `service`-created session (`legacy_shape_unrecognized`) and every
+--     non-`user:` subject session (`external_lane_owns_row`). No amount of
+--     later lifecycle work can attribute these; they are permanently
+--     ownerless by construction.
+--
+-- WHY A SECURITY DEFINER SEAM AND NOT A MIGRATION-TIME `UPDATE`
+-- -------------------------------------------------------------
+-- `sessions` is FORCE ROW LEVEL SECURITY and its ordinary policy is
+-- workspace-scoped, which is false while the `opengeni.workspace_id` GUC is
+-- unset - as it is during migration. FORCE RLS applies to the table owner, and
+-- OpenGeni's documented deployment posture is a NON-superuser migration
+-- principal without BYPASSRLS. A bare `UPDATE sessions ... WHERE ...` in a
+-- migration body therefore matches ZERO rows and reports success on such a
+-- deployment; it only appears to work in a harness that migrates as superuser.
+-- Both routines below consequently run behind a transaction-scoped
+-- capability-claiming policy, exactly like 0254, 0262, 0285, and the sibling
+-- classification seam.
+--
+-- WRITE FENCES THIS SEAM HONOURS
+-- ------------------------------
+--   * 0225 block C: any UPDATE touching the owner pair needs a matching
+--     `session_visibility_write_capabilities` row plus the
+--     `opengeni.session_visibility_write_capability` GUC. The backfill mints
+--     one for the duration of its own write and deletes it afterwards, on both
+--     the success and the exception path.
+--   * 0225 block B: the owner pair must move together, and the backfill never
+--     touches `visibility` or `authority_epoch`. Every candidate row is
+--     necessarily `workspace_shared` (0218's `sessions_private_owner_check`
+--     forbids `user_private` without an owner), and
+--     `session_visibility_isolation` short-circuits on `workspace_shared`, so
+--     attributing an owner changes NO read for anybody. It is classification,
+--     not a grant.
+--   * 0214's commit gate fires only `BEFORE INSERT OR UPDATE OF updated_at,
+--     activity_revision, activity_revision_pending_xid`. The backfill writes
+--     only the two owner columns, so it neither needs nor forges a session
+--     activity gate, and it does not bump `updated_at` - an operator
+--     classification pass is not session activity.
+--   * No `session_events` row is appended. The timeline is exact human/audit
+--     truth for accepted payloads; the evidence for this run is the tenancy
+--     backfill ledger receipt, which is what phase D actually asks for.
+--
+-- Receipt recording is guarded by `to_regprocedure` so this migration is
+-- order-independent with respect to the ledger migration and reports
+-- `ledgerAvailable` honestly rather than failing or silently skipping.
+
+SET LOCAL lock_timeout = '5s';
+SET LOCAL statement_timeout = '5min';
+
+-- Freeze the active data schema into the SECURITY DEFINER routines below.
+-- Standalone installs resolve to public; embedded installs resolve to their
+-- dedicated schema. pg_temp remains explicitly last.
+SELECT pg_catalog.set_config(
+  'search_path',
+  pg_catalog.format('%I, pg_catalog, pg_temp', pg_catalog.current_schema()),
+  true
+);
+
+-- A transaction-scoped, migration-owner-only capability. Deliberately NOT a
+-- reuse of 0285's inventory capability or the sibling classification one: each
+-- of those policies pins the literal `current_user` observed while its own
+-- migration ran, and neither grants the UPDATE this seam needs on `sessions`.
+CREATE TABLE opengeni_private.session_ownership_capabilities (
+  "backend_pid" integer NOT NULL,
+  "transaction_id" xid8 NOT NULL,
+  CONSTRAINT "session_ownership_capabilities_pk" PRIMARY KEY (
+    "backend_pid", "transaction_id"
+  )
+);
+REVOKE ALL ON TABLE opengeni_private.session_ownership_capabilities FROM PUBLIC;
+
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION opengeni_private.session_ownership_capability_active()
+RETURNS boolean
+LANGUAGE sql
+STABLE
+SECURITY DEFINER
+SET search_path = pg_catalog
+AS $capability_active$
+  SELECT EXISTS (
+    SELECT 1
+    FROM opengeni_private.session_ownership_capabilities capability
+    WHERE capability.backend_pid = pg_catalog.pg_backend_pid()
+      AND capability.transaction_id = pg_catalog.pg_current_xact_id_if_assigned()
+  )
+$capability_active$;
+REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION
+  opengeni_private.session_ownership_capability_active() FROM PUBLIC;
+
+DO $session_ownership_capability_policies$
+DECLARE
+  data_schema text := current_schema();
+  migration_owner text := current_user;
+BEGIN
+  -- `sessions` needs FOR ALL because the backfill both reads and writes it;
+  -- the WITH CHECK half is the same predicate, so the capability can never
+  -- move a row out of the organization it was claimed for. The membership
+  -- table stays read-only here - this seam never mints or mutates authority.
+  EXECUTE format(
+    'CREATE POLICY session_ownership_capability_write ON %I.sessions '
+      || 'FOR ALL USING (current_user = %L AND '
+      || 'opengeni_private.session_ownership_capability_active()) '
+      || 'WITH CHECK (current_user = %L AND '
+      || 'opengeni_private.session_ownership_capability_active())',
+    data_schema,
+    migration_owner,
+    migration_owner
+  );
+  EXECUTE format(
+    'CREATE POLICY session_ownership_capability_read ON %I.organization_memberships '
+      || 'FOR SELECT USING (current_user = %L AND '
+      || 'opengeni_private.session_ownership_capability_active())',
+    data_schema,
+    migration_owner
+  );
+END
+$session_ownership_capability_policies$;
+
+-- Shared preconditions for both routines. The subject check is load-bearing:
+-- `session_visibility_isolation` is RESTRICTIVE and short-circuits only when
+-- no `opengeni.subject_id` GUC is set. Running this seam inside an actor scope
+-- would silently hide another owner's `user_private` sessions and UNDERCOUNT
+-- rather than fail, so it is refused outright.
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION opengeni_private.assert_session_ownership_scope(
+  p_organization_id uuid,
+  p_run_key text
+) RETURNS void
+LANGUAGE plpgsql
+STABLE
+SET search_path FROM CURRENT
+AS $$
+BEGIN
+  IF p_organization_id IS NULL THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'session ownership classification requires an organization id'
+      USING ERRCODE = '22004';
+  END IF;
+  IF p_organization_id IS DISTINCT FROM nullif(
+      pg_catalog.current_setting('opengeni.account_id', true), ''
+    )::uuid
+  THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'session ownership classification scope mismatch'
+      USING ERRCODE = '42501';
+  END IF;
+  IF nullif(pg_catalog.current_setting('opengeni.subject_id', true), '') IS NOT NULL THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'session ownership classification must run outside an actor subject scope'
+      USING ERRCODE = '42501';
+  END IF;
+  IF p_run_key IS NOT NULL AND length(btrim(p_run_key)) = 0 THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'session ownership run key must not be blank'
+      USING ERRCODE = '22023';
+  END IF;
+END;
+$$;
+REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION
+  opengeni_private.assert_session_ownership_scope(uuid, text) FROM PUBLIC;
+
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION opengeni_private.tenancy_backfill_ledger_available()
+RETURNS boolean
+LANGUAGE sql
+STABLE
+SET search_path FROM CURRENT
+AS $$
+  SELECT to_regprocedure('open_tenancy_backfill_receipt(uuid, text, text)') IS NOT NULL
+    AND to_regprocedure('record_tenancy_backfill_unresolved(uuid, uuid, text)') IS NOT NULL
+    AND to_regprocedure(
+      'complete_tenancy_backfill_receipt(uuid, bigint, bigint, text)'
+    ) IS NOT NULL
+$$;
+REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION
+  opengeni_private.tenancy_backfill_ledger_available() FROM PUBLIC;
+
+-- One verdict per session in one organization.
+--
+-- `p_run_key` is the durability switch. Omitted (NULL) the call is a pure
+-- read. Supplied, the same verdicts are additionally recorded through the
+-- tenancy backfill ledger as one `sessions` receipt plus one append-only
+-- unresolved row per session that could not be attributed - which is also why
+-- the run key must be fresh per run: the ledger refuses to re-open a settled
+-- receipt.
+--
+-- This routine NEVER writes a session row. `rewroteSessionRows` is reported
+-- literally false so a reader cannot mistake it for the backfill.
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION classify_organization_session_ownership(
+  p_organization_id uuid,
+  p_run_key text DEFAULT NULL
+) RETURNS jsonb
+LANGUAGE plpgsql
+SECURITY DEFINER
+SET search_path FROM CURRENT
+SET statement_timeout = '5min'
+AS $$
+DECLARE
+  claimed_rows integer := 0;
+  claimed boolean := false;
+  ledger_available boolean;
+  summary jsonb;
+  receipt_id uuid;
+  -- One verdict per session row. Re-executed for the ledger statement rather
+  -- than staged in a temp table: a temp relation outlives the call inside the
+  -- caller's transaction and would collide on a second call in that same
+  -- transaction. $1 is the organization id.
+  classification_sql constant text := $classification$
+    SELECT session_row.id AS session_id,
+      CASE
+        -- Already attributed. The two 0225/0218 FKs prove the membership id
+        -- and the (account, subject) pair each EXIST, but nothing proves they
+        -- are the SAME row, that it is live, or that the pair is internally
+        -- consistent. Those are the only unenforced parts of an attributed
+        -- session, so they are exactly what this branch proves.
+        WHEN session_row.owner_organization_membership_id IS NOT NULL
+          OR session_row.owner_subject_id IS NOT NULL THEN
+          CASE
+            WHEN session_row.owner_organization_membership_id IS NULL
+              OR session_row.owner_subject_id IS NULL
+              OR owner_membership.id IS NULL
+              OR owner_membership.subject_id IS DISTINCT FROM session_row.owner_subject_id
+              THEN 'conflicting_authority_rows'
+            WHEN owner_membership.status <> 'active'
+              OR owner_membership.revoked_at IS NOT NULL
+              THEN 'missing_organization_membership'
+            ELSE 'owner_attributed'
+          END
+        -- Ownerless from here down. Parent inheritance first, mirroring the
+        -- live trigger's own branch order.
+        WHEN owned_parent.id IS NOT NULL THEN 'repairable_parent_inheritance'
+        WHEN session_row.created_by_kind <> 'subject' THEN 'legacy_shape_unrecognized'
+        WHEN session_row.created_by_subject_id NOT LIKE 'user:%'
+          THEN 'external_lane_owns_row'
+        WHEN personal_anchor.id IS NOT NULL
+          AND personal_anchor.subject_id = session_row.created_by_subject_id
+          THEN 'repairable_personal_workspace'
+        -- The workspace anchor names a DIFFERENT subject than the creator.
+        -- Two durable facts disagree; refusing is the only correct answer.
+        WHEN personal_anchor.id IS NOT NULL THEN 'ambiguous_candidate_authority'
+        WHEN creator_membership.id IS NULL THEN 'missing_organization_membership'
+        -- An active managed human in an ordinary shared workspace. Replaying
+        -- the trigger's second branch here would evaluate TODAY's workspace
+        -- grants against a historical session; phase D forbids exactly that.
+        ELSE 'no_deterministic_evidence'
+      END AS verdict
+    FROM sessions session_row
+    LEFT JOIN organization_memberships owner_membership
+      ON owner_membership.id = session_row.owner_organization_membership_id
+     AND owner_membership.account_id = session_row.account_id
+    LEFT JOIN sessions owned_parent
+      ON owned_parent.id = session_row.parent_session_id
+     AND owned_parent.account_id = session_row.account_id
+     AND owned_parent.workspace_id = session_row.workspace_id
+     AND owned_parent.owner_organization_membership_id IS NOT NULL
+     AND owned_parent.owner_subject_id IS NOT NULL
+    LEFT JOIN organization_memberships personal_anchor
+      ON personal_anchor.account_id = session_row.account_id
+     AND personal_anchor.personal_workspace_id = session_row.workspace_id
+     AND personal_anchor.status = 'active'
+     AND personal_anchor.revoked_at IS NULL
+    LEFT JOIN organization_memberships creator_membership
+      ON creator_membership.account_id = session_row.account_id
+     AND creator_membership.subject_id = session_row.created_by_subject_id
+     AND creator_membership.status = 'active'
+     AND creator_membership.revoked_at IS NULL
+    WHERE session_row.account_id = $1
+  $classification$;
+  -- The three terminal/repairable verdicts. Everything else is an explicit
+  -- refusal carrying a fixed ledger reason code and never a proposed owner.
+  resolved_verdicts constant text :=
+    '(''owner_attributed'', ''repairable_personal_workspace'',
+      ''repairable_parent_inheritance'')';
+BEGIN
+  PERFORM opengeni_private.assert_session_ownership_scope(p_organization_id, p_run_key);
+  ledger_available := p_run_key IS NOT NULL
+    AND opengeni_private.tenancy_backfill_ledger_available();
+
+  INSERT INTO opengeni_private.session_ownership_capabilities (
+    backend_pid, transaction_id
+  ) VALUES (pg_catalog.pg_backend_pid(), pg_catalog.pg_current_xact_id())
+  ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING;
+  -- Only release what this call claimed, so a nested or enclosing holder of
+  -- the same transaction-scoped capability is never revoked underneath.
+  GET DIAGNOSTICS claimed_rows = ROW_COUNT;
+  claimed := claimed_rows > 0;
+
+  EXECUTE format($summary$
+    WITH classified AS (%1$s)
+    SELECT pg_catalog.jsonb_build_object(
+      'total', count(*)::int,
+      'ownerAttributed', count(*) FILTER (WHERE verdict = 'owner_attributed')::int,
+      'repairablePersonalWorkspace', count(*) FILTER (
+        WHERE verdict = 'repairable_personal_workspace'
+      )::int,
+      'repairableParentInheritance', count(*) FILTER (
+        WHERE verdict = 'repairable_parent_inheritance'
+      )::int,
+      'unresolved', count(*) FILTER (WHERE verdict NOT IN %2$s)::int,
+      'unresolvedByReason', coalesce((
+        SELECT pg_catalog.jsonb_object_agg(reason, reason_count)
+        FROM (
+          SELECT verdict AS reason, count(*)::int AS reason_count
+          FROM classified
+          WHERE verdict NOT IN %2$s
+          GROUP BY verdict
+        ) grouped
+      ), '{}'::jsonb),
+      'unresolvedRows', coalesce((
+        SELECT pg_catalog.jsonb_agg(
+          pg_catalog.jsonb_build_object(
+            'sessionId', bounded.session_id, 'reasonCode', bounded.verdict
+          ) ORDER BY bounded.session_id
+        )
+        FROM (
+          SELECT session_id, verdict FROM classified
+          WHERE verdict NOT IN %2$s
+          ORDER BY session_id LIMIT 1000
+        ) bounded
+      ), '[]'::jsonb),
+      'unresolvedTruncated', count(*) FILTER (WHERE verdict NOT IN %2$s) > 1000
+    )
+    FROM classified
+  $summary$, classification_sql, resolved_verdicts)
+  USING p_organization_id
+  INTO summary;
+
+  IF ledger_available THEN
+    EXECUTE 'SELECT open_tenancy_backfill_receipt($1, $2, $3)'
+      USING p_organization_id, 'sessions', p_run_key
+      INTO receipt_id;
+    -- One set-based statement, not one round trip per unresolved session. The
+    -- recorded set is identical; only the plpgsql loop is gone. `receipt_id` is
+    -- inlined as a literal because `classification_sql` already owns `$1`.
+    --
+    -- The ledger is recorded in full on purpose: this routine summarizes an
+    -- entire organization and the receipt is its evidence, so truncating it
+    -- would make the receipt a sample. The cost is therefore proportional to
+    -- the unresolved population, and the classification query is evaluated
+    -- once for the summary and once here - the deliberate trade against
+    -- materializing an unbounded row set in memory. `--classify` is opt-in and
+    -- writes no session row.
+    EXECUTE format(
+      'SELECT record_tenancy_backfill_unresolved(%3$L::uuid, unresolved.session_id, '
+        || 'unresolved.verdict) FROM ('
+        || 'SELECT session_id, verdict FROM (%1$s) classified '
+        || 'WHERE verdict NOT IN %2$s ORDER BY session_id) unresolved',
+      classification_sql,
+      resolved_verdicts,
+      receipt_id
+    ) USING p_organization_id;
+    -- `classified_count` is the population this run PROVED already carries a
+    -- live, internally consistent owner; `skipped_count` is the deterministically
+    -- repairable population this classification run deliberately did NOT touch.
+    -- Neither reflects a rewrite: this routine changes no session row.
+    EXECUTE 'SELECT complete_tenancy_backfill_receipt($1, $2, $3, $4)'
+      USING receipt_id,
+        (summary ->> 'ownerAttributed')::bigint,
+        (summary ->> 'repairablePersonalWorkspace')::bigint
+          + (summary ->> 'repairableParentInheritance')::bigint,
+        'completed';
+    summary := summary || pg_catalog.jsonb_build_object('receiptId', receipt_id);
+  END IF;
+
+  IF claimed THEN
+    DELETE FROM opengeni_private.session_ownership_capabilities
+    WHERE backend_pid = pg_catalog.pg_backend_pid()
+      AND transaction_id = pg_catalog.pg_current_xact_id_if_assigned();
+  END IF;
+
+  RETURN pg_catalog.jsonb_build_object(
+    'schemaVersion', 1,
+    'organizationId', p_organization_id,
+    'runKey', p_run_key,
+    'ledgerAvailable', ledger_available,
+    'rewroteSessionRows', false,
+    'sessions', summary
+  );
+EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN
+  IF claimed THEN
+    DELETE FROM opengeni_private.session_ownership_capabilities
+    WHERE backend_pid = pg_catalog.pg_backend_pid()
+      AND transaction_id = pg_catalog.pg_current_xact_id_if_assigned();
+  END IF;
+  RAISE;
+END
+$$;
+REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION
+  classify_organization_session_ownership(uuid, text) FROM PUBLIC;
+
+-- One bounded, resumable, idempotent batch of the ONLY deterministic repair.
+--
+-- `p_dry_run` defaults TRUE: an operator who forgets the flag gets a report,
+-- not a write. `p_limit` bounds the root candidates claimed with
+-- `FOR UPDATE ... SKIP LOCKED`, so concurrent drivers never contend and a
+-- killed driver leaves no half-claimed state. Re-running is a no-op once a row
+-- is attributed, because an attributed row no longer matches either candidate
+-- predicate.
+CREATE OR REPLACE FUNCTION backfill_organization_session_ownership(
+  p_organization_id uuid,
+  p_limit integer DEFAULT 500,
+  p_dry_run boolean DEFAULT true,
+  p_run_key text DEFAULT NULL
+) RETURNS jsonb
+LANGUAGE plpgsql
+SECURITY DEFINER
+SET search_path FROM CURRENT
+SET statement_timeout = '5min'
+AS $$
+DECLARE
+  claimed_rows integer := 0;
+  claimed boolean := false;
+  ledger_available boolean;
+  visibility_capability_id uuid := pg_catalog.gen_random_uuid();
+  previous_visibility_capability text;
+  personal_candidates integer := 0;
+  inherited_candidates integer := 0;
+  personal_attributed integer := 0;
+  inherited_attributed integer := 0;
+  inheritance_passes integer := 0;
+  closure_incomplete boolean := false;
+  pass_rows integer;
+  receipt_id uuid;
+BEGIN
+  PERFORM opengeni_private.assert_session_ownership_scope(p_organization_id, p_run_key);
+  IF p_limit IS NULL OR p_limit < 1 OR p_limit > 5000 THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'session ownership backfill limit must be between 1 and 5000'
+      USING ERRCODE = '22023';
+  END IF;
+  IF p_dry_run IS NULL THEN
+    RAISE EXCEPTION 'session ownership backfill requires an explicit dry-run flag'
+      USING ERRCODE = '22004';
+  END IF;
+  ledger_available := p_run_key IS NOT NULL
+    AND opengeni_private.tenancy_backfill_ledger_available();
+
+  INSERT INTO opengeni_private.session_ownership_capabilities (
+    backend_pid, transaction_id
+  ) VALUES (pg_catalog.pg_backend_pid(), pg_catalog.pg_current_xact_id())
+  ON CONFLICT DO NOTHING;
+  GET DIAGNOSTICS claimed_rows = ROW_COUNT;
+  claimed := claimed_rows > 0;
+
+  IF p_dry_run THEN
+    -- No locking clause on a dry run: a report must not block a live writer.
+    SELECT count(*)::integer INTO personal_candidates
+    FROM sessions session_row
+    JOIN organization_memberships anchor
+      ON anchor.account_id = session_row.account_id
+     AND anchor.personal_workspace_id = session_row.workspace_id
+     AND anchor.status = 'active'
+     AND anchor.revoked_at IS NULL
+     AND anchor.subject_id = session_row.created_by_subject_id
+    WHERE session_row.account_id = p_organization_id
+      AND session_row.owner_organization_membership_id IS NULL
+      AND session_row.owner_subject_id IS NULL
+      AND session_row.created_by_kind = 'subject'
+      -- Same fence the classifier applies before it ever reaches
+      -- 'repairable_personal_workspace': a non-`user:` creator is
+      -- 'external_lane_owns_row', which this migration calls permanently
+      -- unrepairable. Without this line the write path would be more
+      -- permissive than the classifier that authorizes it, and a dry run
+      -- would promise an attribution the classifier refuses.
+      AND session_row.created_by_subject_id LIKE 'user:%';
+
+    -- Only the inheritance backlog that exists RIGHT NOW. It deliberately
+    -- does not model the closure a real run's root writes would create, so a
+    -- dry run never over-promises.
+    SELECT count(*)::integer INTO inherited_candidates
+    FROM sessions session_row
+    JOIN sessions parent_row
+      ON parent_row.id = session_row.parent_session_id
+     AND parent_row.account_id = session_row.account_id
+     AND parent_row.workspace_id = session_row.workspace_id
+     AND parent_row.owner_organization_membership_id IS NOT NULL
+     AND parent_row.owner_subject_id IS NOT NULL
+    WHERE session_row.account_id = p_organization_id
+      AND session_row.owner_organization_membership_id IS NULL
+      AND session_row.owner_subject_id IS NULL;
+  ELSE
+    -- 0225 block C fences every owner-pair UPDATE behind this capability.
+    previous_visibility_capability := pg_catalog.current_setting(
+      'opengeni.session_visibility_write_capability', true
+    );
+    INSERT INTO session_visibility_write_capabilities (
+      backend_pid, transaction_id, capability_id
+    ) VALUES (
+      pg_catalog.pg_backend_pid(),
+      pg_catalog.pg_current_xact_id(),
+      visibility_capability_id
+    );
+    PERFORM pg_catalog.set_config(
+      'opengeni.session_visibility_write_capability',
+      visibility_capability_id::text,
+      true
+    );
+
+    WITH candidates AS (
+      SELECT session_row.id AS session_id,
+        anchor.id AS owner_membership_id,
+        anchor.subject_id AS owner_subject_id
+      FROM sessions session_row
+      JOIN organization_memberships anchor
+        ON anchor.account_id = session_row.account_id
+       AND anchor.personal_workspace_id = session_row.workspace_id
+       AND anchor.status = 'active'
+       AND anchor.revoked_at IS NULL
+       AND anchor.subject_id = session_row.created_by_subject_id
+      WHERE session_row.account_id = p_organization_id
+        AND session_row.owner_organization_membership_id IS NULL
+        AND session_row.owner_subject_id IS NULL
+        AND session_row.created_by_kind = 'subject'
+        -- See the dry-run branch: `external_lane_owns_row` is unrepairable by
+        -- construction here, not merely by the absence of a matching anchor.
+        AND session_row.created_by_subject_id LIKE 'user:%'
+      ORDER BY session_row.id
+      LIMIT p_limit
+      FOR UPDATE OF session_row SKIP LOCKED
+    )
+    UPDATE sessions target
+    SET owner_organization_membership_id = candidates.owner_membership_id,
+        owner_subject_id = candidates.owner_subject_id
+    FROM candidates
+    WHERE target.id = candidates.session_id
+      AND target.account_id = p_organization_id;
+    GET DIAGNOSTICS personal_attributed = ROW_COUNT;
+    personal_candidates := personal_attributed;
+    inherited_candidates := 0;
+
+    -- Parent-inheritance closure: branch 1 of the live trigger replayed
+    -- against durable parent data. Bounded by tree depth and terminated by a
+    -- pass that changes nothing, so it is finite even on a malformed graph.
+    LOOP
+      inheritance_passes := inheritance_passes + 1;
+      IF inheritance_passes > 64 THEN
+        -- A tree deeper than 64 (or wider than p_limit at some level) is left
+        -- for the next batch rather than run unbounded; `moreLikely` says so.
+        closure_incomplete := true;
+        EXIT;
+      END IF;
+      WITH candidates AS (
+        SELECT session_row.id AS session_id,
+          parent_row.owner_organization_membership_id AS owner_membership_id,
+          parent_row.owner_subject_id AS owner_subject_id
+        FROM sessions session_row
+        JOIN sessions parent_row
+          ON parent_row.id = session_row.parent_session_id
+         AND parent_row.account_id = session_row.account_id
+         AND parent_row.workspace_id = session_row.workspace_id
+         AND parent_row.owner_organization_membership_id IS NOT NULL
+         AND parent_row.owner_subject_id IS NOT NULL
+        WHERE session_row.account_id = p_organization_id
+          AND session_row.owner_organization_membership_id IS NULL
+          AND session_row.owner_subject_id IS NULL
+        ORDER BY session_row.id
+        LIMIT p_limit
+        FOR UPDATE OF session_row SKIP LOCKED
+      )
+      UPDATE sessions target
+      SET owner_organization_membership_id = candidates.owner_membership_id,
+          owner_subject_id = candidates.owner_subject_id
+      FROM candidates
+      WHERE target.id = candidates.session_id
+        AND target.account_id = p_organization_id;
+      GET DIAGNOSTICS pass_rows = ROW_COUNT;
+      inherited_attributed := inherited_attributed + pass_rows;
+      IF pass_rows >= p_limit THEN
+        closure_incomplete := true;
+      END IF;
+      EXIT WHEN pass_rows = 0;
+    END LOOP;
+
+    DELETE FROM session_visibility_write_capabilities
+    WHERE backend_pid = pg_catalog.pg_backend_pid()
+      AND transaction_id = pg_catalog.pg_current_xact_id()
+      AND capability_id = visibility_capability_id;
+    PERFORM pg_catalog.set_config(
+      'opengeni.session_visibility_write_capability',
+      coalesce(previous_visibility_capability, ''),
+      true
+    );
+  END IF;
+
+  IF ledger_available THEN
+    EXECUTE 'SELECT open_tenancy_backfill_receipt($1, $2, $3)'
+      USING p_organization_id, 'sessions', p_run_key
+      INTO receipt_id;
+    -- `classified_count` is what this batch actually attributed (0 on a dry
+    -- run); `skipped_count` is what it left for the next batch or for another
+    -- concurrent driver. The unresolved obligations belong to the classifier,
+    -- which is the routine that can name a reason for every row.
+    EXECUTE 'SELECT complete_tenancy_backfill_receipt($1, $2, $3, $4)'
+      USING receipt_id,
+        (personal_attributed + inherited_attributed)::bigint,
+        CASE WHEN p_dry_run
+          THEN (personal_candidates + inherited_candidates)::bigint
+          ELSE 0::bigint
+        END,
+        'completed';
+  END IF;
+
+  IF claimed THEN
+    DELETE FROM opengeni_private.session_ownership_capabilities
+    WHERE backend_pid = pg_catalog.pg_backend_pid()
+      AND transaction_id = pg_catalog.pg_current_xact_id_if_assigned();
+  END IF;
+
+  RETURN pg_catalog.jsonb_build_object(
+    'schemaVersion', 1,
+    'organizationId', p_organization_id,
+    'runKey', p_run_key,
+    'ledgerAvailable', ledger_available,
+    'dryRun', p_dry_run,
+    'limit', p_limit,
+    'receiptId', receipt_id,
+    'personalWorkspaceCandidates', personal_candidates,
+    'parentInheritanceCandidates', inherited_candidates,
+    'personalWorkspaceAttributed', personal_attributed,
+    'parentInheritanceAttributed', inherited_attributed,
+    'attributed', personal_attributed + inherited_attributed,
+    -- The driver keeps calling while this is true. It is deliberately derived
+    -- from THIS batch's own result rather than from a fresh count, so a row
+    -- another driver holds cannot spin this loop forever.
+    'moreLikely',
+      NOT p_dry_run AND (personal_attributed >= p_limit OR closure_incomplete)
+  );
+EXCEPTION WHEN OTHERS THEN
+  IF NOT p_dry_run THEN
+    DELETE FROM session_visibility_write_capabilities
+    WHERE backend_pid = pg_catalog.pg_backend_pid()
+      AND transaction_id = pg_catalog.pg_current_xact_id_if_assigned()
+      AND capability_id = visibility_capability_id;
+    PERFORM pg_catalog.set_config(
+      'opengeni.session_visibility_write_capability',
+      coalesce(previous_visibility_capability, ''),
+      true
+    );
+  END IF;
+  IF claimed THEN
+    DELETE FROM opengeni_private.session_ownership_capabilities
+    WHERE backend_pid = pg_catalog.pg_backend_pid()
+      AND transaction_id = pg_catalog.pg_current_xact_id_if_assigned();
+  END IF;
+  RAISE;
+END
+$$;
+
+REVOKE ALL ON FUNCTION
+  backfill_organization_session_ownership(uuid, integer, boolean, text) FROM PUBLIC;
+
+DO $session_ownership_grants$
+BEGIN
+  IF EXISTS (SELECT 1 FROM pg_roles WHERE rolname = 'opengeni_app') THEN
+    GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION
+      classify_organization_session_ownership(uuid, text) TO opengeni_app;
+    GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION
+      backfill_organization_session_ownership(uuid, integer, boolean, text) TO opengeni_app;
+    -- The predicate must be independently EXECUTE-granted (0254's, 0285's, and
+    -- the sibling classification seam's exact lesson): an ordinary opengeni_app
+    -- read of ANY table this capability protects evaluates every PERMISSIVE
+    -- policy on it, so without this grant an unrelated read of `sessions` or
+    -- `organization_memberships` fails closed with a permission error instead
+    -- of the policy branch simply evaluating false.
+    GRANT EXECUTE ON FUNCTION
+      opengeni_private.session_ownership_capability_active() TO opengeni_app;
+  END IF;
+END
+$session_ownership_grants$;
+
+COMMENT ON FUNCTION classify_organization_session_ownership(uuid, text) IS
+  'Organization-tenancy phase D session ownership classification. Read-only over sessions: it proves every attributed session points at one live, internally consistent organization membership and names a fixed reason for every session it refuses to attribute, recording those refusals through the tenancy backfill ledger. It never writes a session row and never infers user authority from created_by, a default workspace, or current workspace access.';
+COMMENT ON FUNCTION backfill_organization_session_ownership(uuid, integer, boolean, text) IS
+  'Organization-tenancy phase D session ownership backfill. Attributes ONLY the two deterministic populations: a session in exactly one active membership''s personal workspace whose creator subject is that same membership, and the parent-inheritance closure that migration 0225''s own trigger would have produced. Bounded, resumable (FOR UPDATE SKIP LOCKED), idempotent, dry-run by default; it never changes visibility, authority epoch, or any read.';