@opengeni/core 0.14.4 → 0.16.1

package/dist/session-authorization.d.ts

@@ -24,8 +24,10 @@ export type ResolvedSessionAuthorization = {
  * an immediate target id and signed attempt claims, but can never nominate a
  * lineage root or frozen initiator.
  *
- * Returns null when no host port is bound so standalone behavior stays byte-
- * for-byte unchanged and pays no additional lineage lookup.
+ * Slack-owned private sessions are enforced here even when no embedding-host
+ * authorization port is bound. That durable ownership fence covers every
+ * session surface which uses this shared seam, rather than relying on list/UI
+ * filtering or caller-controlled session metadata.
  */
 export declare function requireSessionAuthorization(deps: SessionAuthorizationDependencies, grant: AccessGrant, input: {
     sessionId: string;

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@opengeni/core",
-  "version": "0.14.4",
+  "version": "0.16.1",
   "description": "OpenGeni framework-agnostic core: the domain, access, and billing layers (neutral access, off-HTTP V2 surface). Behavior-preserving extraction from apps/api — keeps Hono's HTTPException for error throwing (typed-errors cleanup deferred).",
   "license": "Apache-2.0",
   "repository": {
@@ -35,14 +35,14 @@
   "dependencies": {
     "@modelcontextprotocol/sdk": "^1.29.0",
     "@opengeni/codex": "^0.2.9",
-    "@opengeni/config": "^0.7.22",
-    "@opengeni/contracts": "^0.26.1",
-    "@opengeni/db": "^0.16.2",
-    "@opengeni/documents": "^0.2.59",
-    "@opengeni/events": "^0.3.50",
+    "@opengeni/config": "^0.9.1",
+    "@opengeni/contracts": "^0.28.1",
+    "@opengeni/db": "^0.18.1",
+    "@opengeni/documents": "^0.2.63",
+    "@opengeni/events": "^0.3.54",
     "@opengeni/observability": "^0.3.0",
-    "@opengeni/runtime": "^0.14.16",
-    "@opengeni/storage": "^0.2.46",
+    "@opengeni/runtime": "^0.15.3",
+    "@opengeni/storage": "^0.2.50",
     "hono": "^4.12.18"
   },
   "engines": {

package/src/access/index.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-import type { Settings } from "@opengeni/config";
+import { resolveFirstPartyDelegationSecret, type Settings } from "@opengeni/config";
 import {
   verifyDelegatedAccessToken,
   type AccountGrant,
@@ -137,7 +137,9 @@ export function requirePermission(grant: AccessGrant, permission: Permission): v
         message: "missing permission: variable-sets:manage (deprecated alias: environments:manage)",
       });
     }
-    throw new HTTPException(403, { message: `missing permission: ${permission}` });
+    throw new HTTPException(403, {
+      message: `missing permission: ${permission}`,
+    });
   }
 }
 
@@ -208,7 +210,9 @@ async function resolveAccessContext(c: Context, deps: AccessDeps): Promise<Acces
   }
 
   if (deps.managedAuth) {
-    const session = await deps.managedAuth.api.getSession({ headers: c.req.raw.headers });
+    const session = await deps.managedAuth.api.getSession({
+      headers: c.req.raw.headers,
+    });
     if (session?.user) {
       return await ensureManagedAccessForUser(deps.db, {
         userId: session.user.id,
@@ -275,10 +279,11 @@ async function delegatedAccessContext(
   mode: "local" | "configured" | "managed",
   token = bearerToken(c),
 ): Promise<AccessContext | null> {
-  if (!token || !deps.settings.delegationSecret) {
+  const delegationSecret = resolveFirstPartyDelegationSecret(deps.settings);
+  if (!token || !delegationSecret) {
     return null;
   }
-  const payload = await verifyDelegatedAccessToken(deps.settings.delegationSecret, token);
+  const payload = await verifyDelegatedAccessToken(delegationSecret, token);
   if (!payload) {
     return null;
   }

package/src/domain/packs.ts

@@ -36,10 +36,26 @@ const marketingSocialPack: CapabilityPack = {
       category: "social-media",
       authModel: "oauth2_authorization_code_pkce",
       providers: ["x"],
-      scopes: ["tweet.read", "users.read", "offline.access"],
+      scopes: ["tweet.read", "tweet.write", "users.read", "offline.access"],
       required: false,
       metadata: {
         docs: "https://docs.x.com/fundamentals/authentication/oauth-2-0/authorization-code",
+        firstParty: true,
+        oauthStartPath: "/social/oauth/start",
+      },
+    },
+    {
+      id: "reddit",
+      name: "Reddit",
+      category: "social-media",
+      authModel: "oauth2_authorization_code",
+      providers: ["reddit"],
+      scopes: ["identity", "read", "submit", "privatemessages", "history"],
+      required: false,
+      metadata: {
+        docs: "https://github.com/reddit-archive/reddit/wiki/OAuth2",
+        firstParty: true,
+        oauthStartPath: "/social/oauth/start",
       },
     },
     {
@@ -130,6 +146,11 @@ const marketingSocialPack: CapabilityPack = {
       "social_connections_list",
       "social_posts_recent",
       "social_daily_analysis_context",
+      "social_search_live",
+      "social_mentions_live",
+      "social_thread_fetch",
+      "social_posts_sync",
+      "social_post_reply",
     ],
   },
 };

package/src/domain/sessions.ts

@@ -1350,7 +1350,7 @@ export async function createSessionForRequest(
   }
   // Tool visibility is independent from permission authority. A child that
   // omits the field inherits the parent's exact effective selection; a
-  // top-level omission selects the complete catalog.
+  // top-level omission selects the safe non-connector default catalog.
   const firstPartyMcpTools = resolveFirstPartyMcpToolsForCreate(
     payload.firstPartyMcpTools,
     parentSession ? parentSession.firstPartyMcpTools : undefined,

package/src/session-authorization.ts

@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ import {
   getSession,
   getSessionRootId,
   getSessionTurnForAttempt,
+  getSlackInteractionSessionAccessForSession,
   type Database,
 } from "@opengeni/db";
 import type { AppDependencies } from "./dependencies";
@@ -51,8 +52,10 @@ export type ResolvedSessionAuthorization = {
  * an immediate target id and signed attempt claims, but can never nominate a
  * lineage root or frozen initiator.
  *
- * Returns null when no host port is bound so standalone behavior stays byte-
- * for-byte unchanged and pays no additional lineage lookup.
+ * Slack-owned private sessions are enforced here even when no embedding-host
+ * authorization port is bound. That durable ownership fence covers every
+ * session surface which uses this shared seam, rather than relying on list/UI
+ * filtering or caller-controlled session metadata.
  */
 export async function requireSessionAuthorization(
   deps: SessionAuthorizationDependencies,
@@ -64,12 +67,26 @@ export async function requireSessionAuthorization(
   },
 ): Promise<ResolvedSessionAuthorization | null> {
   const port = deps.sessionAuthorization;
+  const slackAccess = await getSlackInteractionSessionAccessForSession(deps.db, {
+    accountId: grant.accountId,
+    workspaceId: grant.workspaceId,
+    sessionId: input.sessionId,
+  });
+  if (!port && slackAccess?.visibility !== "private") return null;
+
+  const actor = await resolveSessionAuthorizationActor(deps.db, grant);
+  const target = slackAccess
+    ? { sessionId: input.sessionId, rootSessionId: slackAccess.rootSessionId }
+    : await resolveSessionAuthorizationTarget(deps.db, grant, input.sessionId);
+  if (slackAccess?.visibility === "private") {
+    const allowed =
+      actor.kind === "subject"
+        ? actor.subjectId === slackAccess.owningSubjectId
+        : actor.callerRootSessionId === target.rootSessionId;
+    if (!allowed) throw new SessionAuthorizationDeniedError("forbidden");
+  }
   if (!port) return null;
 
-  const [actor, target] = await Promise.all([
-    resolveSessionAuthorizationActor(deps.db, grant),
-    resolveSessionAuthorizationTarget(deps.db, grant, input.sessionId),
-  ]);
   let rawDecision: unknown;
   try {
     rawDecision = await port.authorizeSession({