@openeudi/openid4vp 0.9.3 → 0.10.1

package/README.md

@@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ Mismatches return `valid: false` — they do not throw. Only crypto/structural f
 
 > **Privacy — diagnostics are verifier-internal.** `match.unmatched[].reason` and `detail` (including `value_mismatch`) are intended for verifier-side logging, debugging, and admin UIs. OpenID4VP §11 warns that per-claim verification outcomes can reveal wallet contents to observers. Do NOT echo these diagnostics into the OpenID4VP wire response sent back to the wallet, into end-user-visible error messages that another party could correlate, or into public analytics/third-party logs. The protocol's own error codes are the public interface; these fields are your internal instrumentation.
 
-## Signed authorization requests (x509_san_dns)
+## Signed authorization requests (x509_san_dns, x509_hash)
 
 For flows that require a signed request object (JAR) per OpenID4VP 1.0 §5.10, use `createSignedAuthorizationRequest`:
 
@@ -132,12 +132,13 @@ For flows that require a signed request object (JAR) per OpenID4VP 1.0 §5.10, u
 import { createSignedAuthorizationRequest } from "@openeudi/openid4vp";
 
 const req = await createSignedAuthorizationRequest({
-  hostname: "verifier.example.com",
+  clientIdPrefix: "x509_san_dns",   // or "x509_hash"; defaults to "x509_san_dns"
+  hostname: "verifier.example.com", // required for x509_san_dns; optional for x509_hash
   requestUri: "https://verifier.example.com/request.jwt",
   responseUri: "https://verifier.example.com/response",
   nonce,
   signer: verifierKeyPair,          // CryptoKeyPair with public+private
-  certificateChain: [leafCertDer],  // DER-encoded, leaf SAN DNSName must equal hostname
+  certificateChain: [leafCertDer],  // DER-encoded, leaf SAN DNSName must include hostname when one is given
   encryptionKey: {
     publicJwk: encryptionPublicJwk, // must include alg, e.g. "ECDH-ES"
   },
@@ -151,14 +152,11 @@ const req = await createSignedAuthorizationRequest({
 //                     (Content-Type: application/oauth-authz-req+jwt)
 ```
 
-The caller hosts `req.requestObject` at `requestUri` (the library does not host HTTP). The library verifies that the signing key's public SPKI matches the leaf certificate's public key — an attempt to sign with a mismatched key fails with `SignedRequestBuildError: signing_key_cert_mismatch`.
-
-The emitted `client_metadata` carries both shapes for compatibility:
+`clientIdPrefix: "x509_hash"` sets `client_id` to `x509_hash:` followed by the base64url-encoded SHA-256 hash of the DER-encoded leaf certificate, per OpenID4VP 1.0 §5.9.3 (referenced by HAIP 1.0 Final for its mandated Client Identifier Prefix). `hostname` is not required in this mode, since the `client_id` is derived from the certificate rather than the host. If you do supply one it is still checked against the leaf SAN DNSName values — a supplied hostname that the certificate does not cover is treated as a misconfiguration (`hostname_cert_mismatch`) rather than silently ignored.
 
-- 1.0 Final plural — `encrypted_response_enc_values_supported: ["A128GCM", ...]`
-- ID3 singular — `authorization_encrypted_response_alg: "ECDH-ES"`, `authorization_encrypted_response_enc: "A128GCM"`
+The caller hosts `req.requestObject` at `requestUri` (the library does not host HTTP). The library verifies that the signing key's public SPKI matches the leaf certificate's public key — an attempt to sign with a mismatched key fails with `SignedRequestBuildError: signing_key_cert_mismatch`.
 
-Verifiers reading either shape (e.g. the OIDF conformance suite reads ID3 directly) work without bespoke configuration.
+The emitted `client_metadata` carries the 1.0 Final shape: `encrypted_response_enc_values_supported: ["A128GCM", ...]`.
 
 ## Authorization responses (direct_post and direct_post.jwt)
 
@@ -395,7 +393,7 @@ This library implements the **verifier side** of OpenID4VP for SD-JWT VC and mDO
 - **mDOC / ISO 18013-5** `mso_mdoc` format — CBOR decoding, claim extraction, COSE_Sign1 signature verification, MobileSecurityObject validity enforcement, IssuerSignedItem digest verification. Device authentication (ISO 18013-5 §9.1.3) is **mandatory and fails closed**: the `DeviceSignature` (COSE_Sign1) over `DeviceAuthentication`/`SessionTranscript` is verified against the MSO-committed device key. `DeviceMac` (COSE_Mac0) is **not supported and is rejected**.
 - **DCQL** — authorization request builder with DCQL query, matching via [@openeudi/dcql](https://www.npmjs.com/package/@openeudi/dcql), `verifyPresentation` for combined crypto + match.
 - **HAIP** — `buildHaipQuery` / `validateHaipQuery` helpers for the High Assurance Interoperability Profile.
-- **Signed authorization requests (JAR)** — `createSignedAuthorizationRequest` per RFC 9101 / OpenID4VP 1.0 §5.10 with `x509_san_dns` client-id binding. Emits both 1.0 Final and ID3 `client_metadata` shapes for verifier interop.
+- **Signed authorization requests (JAR)** — `createSignedAuthorizationRequest` per RFC 9101 / OpenID4VP 1.0 §5.10 with `x509_san_dns` or `x509_hash` client-id binding. Emits the OpenID4VP 1.0 Final `client_metadata` shape.
 - **Encrypted responses** — `decryptAuthorizationResponse` for `direct_post.jwt` (ECDH-ES + A128GCM/A256GCM), `verifyAuthorizationResponse` for the 1.0 §8.1 object-keyed `vp_token` envelope.
 - **X.509 chain validation** — RFC 5280 chain building including `nameConstraints`, `StaticTrustStore`, `CompositeTrustStore`.
 - **Revocation checking** — OCSP-first with CRL fallback (`revocationPolicy: 'skip' | 'prefer' | 'require'`).
@@ -406,7 +404,6 @@ This library implements the **verifier side** of OpenID4VP for SD-JWT VC and mDO
 **What is NOT yet implemented** (planned for follow-up releases):
 
 - Multi-credential DCQL queries (multiple query ids) and multi-presentation arrays per query id — currently rejected with `MultipleCredentialsNotSupportedError`.
-- `client_id_scheme: x509_hash` (HAIP 1.0 final's mandated scheme) — only `x509_san_dns` is supported today.
 - Self-signed-leaf rejection per HAIP 1.0 final's strict constraint (current behaviour accepts self-signed leaves for the verifier's own identity).
 - SIOPv2 (Self-Issued OpenID Provider) identity flows.
 
@@ -439,6 +436,8 @@ See [CHANGELOG.md](./CHANGELOG.md) for per-release changes. Key migration moment
 - **0.6.0** — DCQL surfaces specific `UnmatchedReason` values via `@openeudi/dcql@0.2.0` (BREAKING for callers reading `match.unmatched[].reason`).
 - **0.7.0** — `createSignedAuthorizationRequest`, `decryptAuthorizationResponse`, `verifyAuthorizationResponse` for HAIP / 1.0 §8.1 envelopes.
 - **0.8.0** — additive: ID3 `client_metadata` bridge, `trustedIssuerJwks` opt-in, transitive SD-JWT disclosure check.
+- **0.9.3** — `reflect-metadata` is loaded by the package itself in both ESM and CJS builds. If you added a manual `import "reflect-metadata"` before importing this library to work around the 0.9.2 bug, you can drop it.
+- **0.10.0** — `createSignedAuthorizationRequest` gains `clientIdPrefix` (`x509_san_dns` default, or `x509_hash`), and `hostname` becomes optional — required only for `x509_san_dns`, but still validated against the leaf SAN whenever supplied. **Wire change for existing callers:** the emitted `client_metadata` no longer carries the singular ID3 `authorization_encrypted_response_alg` / `authorization_encrypted_response_enc` fields added in 0.8.0. Verifiers that read the 1.0 Final `encrypted_response_enc_values_supported` array (and `alg` from `client_metadata.jwks`) are unaffected; anything still reading the singular fields needs updating.
 
 ## License
 

package/dist/index.cjs

@@ -8268,14 +8268,23 @@ async function createSignedAuthorizationRequest(input, query) {
       "vpFormatsSupported is required and must be non-empty"
     );
   }
+  const clientIdPrefix = input.clientIdPrefix ?? "x509_san_dns";
   const leafCert = new x509.X509Certificate(toArrayBuffer(input.certificateChain[0]));
-  const sanDnsNames = extractDnsNames(leafCert);
-  if (!sanDnsNames.includes(input.hostname)) {
+  if (clientIdPrefix === "x509_san_dns" && !input.hostname) {
     throw new exports.SignedRequestBuildError(
-      "hostname_cert_mismatch",
-      `leaf cert SAN DNSName values [${sanDnsNames.join(", ")}] do not include hostname "${input.hostname}"`
+      "missing_hostname",
+      'hostname is required for clientIdPrefix "x509_san_dns"'
     );
   }
+  if (input.hostname) {
+    const sanDnsNames = extractDnsNames(leafCert);
+    if (!sanDnsNames.includes(input.hostname)) {
+      throw new exports.SignedRequestBuildError(
+        "hostname_cert_mismatch",
+        `leaf cert SAN DNSName values [${sanDnsNames.join(", ")}] do not include hostname "${input.hostname}"`
+      );
+    }
+  }
   const signerPublicSpki = new Uint8Array(
     await crypto.subtle.exportKey("spki", input.signer.publicKey)
   );
@@ -8302,7 +8311,7 @@ async function createSignedAuthorizationRequest(input, query) {
     }
   }
   const state = input.state ?? uuid.v4();
-  const clientId = `x509_san_dns:${input.hostname}`;
+  const clientId = clientIdPrefix === "x509_hash" ? `x509_hash:${await sha256Base64Url(input.certificateChain[0])}` : `x509_san_dns:${input.hostname}`;
   const now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3);
   const clientMetadata = {
     vp_formats_supported: input.vpFormatsSupported
@@ -8319,8 +8328,6 @@ async function createSignedAuthorizationRequest(input, query) {
     clientMetadata.jwks = { keys: [jwk] };
     const encValues = enc3 ?? [...DEFAULT_SUPPORTED_ENC_VALUES];
     clientMetadata.encrypted_response_enc_values_supported = encValues;
-    clientMetadata.authorization_encrypted_response_alg = "ECDH-ES";
-    clientMetadata.authorization_encrypted_response_enc = encValues[0];
   }
   const payload = {
     iss: clientId,
@@ -8365,6 +8372,10 @@ function bytesEqual(a, b) {
   }
   return true;
 }
+async function sha256Base64Url(derCert) {
+  const digest = new Uint8Array(await crypto.subtle.digest("SHA-256", toArrayBuffer(derCert)));
+  return bytesToBase64(digest).replace(/\+/g, "-").replace(/\//g, "_").replace(/=+$/, "");
+}
 function bytesToBase64(bytes) {
   let s = "";
   for (let i = 0; i < bytes.length; i++) s += String.fromCharCode(bytes[i]);
@@ -9684,8 +9695,9 @@ async function verifyPresentation(vpToken, query, options) {
   const parsed = await parsePresentation(vpToken, options);
   const dcqlFormat = INTERNAL_TO_DCQL_FORMAT[parsed.format] ?? parsed.format;
   const decodedClaims = parsed.format === "mdoc" && parsed.namespacedClaims !== void 0 ? parsed.namespacedClaims : parsed.claims;
+  const presentedCredentialQuery = query.credentials.find((c) => c.format === dcqlFormat) ?? query.credentials[0];
   const decoded = {
-    id: query.credentials[0]?.id ?? "presented",
+    id: presentedCredentialQuery?.id ?? "presented",
     format: dcqlFormat,
     claims: decodedClaims
   };
@@ -9806,8 +9818,12 @@ async function verifyAuthorizationResponse(envelope, query, options) {
   if (queryIds.length > 1 || presentationCount > 1) {
     throw new exports.MultipleCredentialsNotSupportedError(queryIds.length, presentationCount);
   }
-  const presentation = vpToken[queryIds[0]][0];
-  const decodedPresentation = query.credentials[0]?.format === "mso_mdoc" && typeof presentation === "string" ? base64UrlToBytes(presentation) : presentation;
+  const presentedQueryId = queryIds[0];
+  const presentation = vpToken[presentedQueryId][0];
+  const presentedCredentialQuery = query.credentials.find(
+    (c) => c.id === presentedQueryId
+  );
+  const decodedPresentation = presentedCredentialQuery?.format === "mso_mdoc" && typeof presentation === "string" ? base64UrlToBytes(presentation) : presentation;
   return verifyPresentation(decodedPresentation, query, options);
 }
 
@@ -10440,7 +10456,7 @@ function equalBytes(a, b) {
 
 // src/index.ts
 init_errors();
-var VERSION = "0.9.3";
+var VERSION = "0.10.1";
 /*! Bundled license information:
 
 pvtsutils/build/index.es.js: