@openeudi/openid4vp 0.7.0 → 0.8.0

package/dist/index.d.cts

@@ -317,6 +317,27 @@ interface ParseOptions {
     cache?: Cache;
     /** Clock-skew tolerance in seconds for certificate validity checks. Default 60. */
     clockSkewTolerance?: number;
+    /**
+     * An explicit set of trusted issuer JWKs used as an alternate trust path when the
+     * SD-JWT VC's issuer JWT lacks an `x5c` header. When the header has no `x5c`:
+     *   - If this array is provided, the parser looks up the issuer key by `kid`
+     *     (or by exact `kty`/`crv`/`x`/`y` match when no `kid` is present). The
+     *     matched JWK is the trust anchor — cert-chain validation is skipped.
+     *   - If this array is absent (or empty), the parser falls back to the existing
+     *     behaviour and throws `MalformedCredentialError('Missing or invalid x5c in JWT header')`.
+     *
+     * **When the JWT header DOES include `x5c`** this option is ignored — the existing
+     * x5c/`trustedCertificates` / `trustStore` path runs unchanged.
+     *
+     * **Security notice**: opting in to this path skips certificate-chain trust
+     * evaluation entirely. The caller is explicitly asserting that they trust the
+     * supplied JWK(s) out-of-band. This is appropriate for CI harness setups (e.g.
+     * OIDF conformance suite, where the wallet signs without x5c and the verifier
+     * knows the signing key from the test-plan config). It is **not recommended for
+     * production verifiers** — cert-chain trust evaluation via `trustStore` is the
+     * secure path.
+     */
+    trustedIssuerJwks?: JsonWebKey[];
 }
 interface ICredentialParser {
     readonly format: CredentialFormat;
@@ -555,6 +576,6 @@ declare class LotlTrustStore implements TrustStore {
     private refresh;
 }
 
-declare const VERSION = "0.7.0";
+declare const VERSION = "0.8.0";
 
 export { type AuthorizationRequest, type AuthorizationRequestInput, type AuthorizationResponse, type Cache, CertificateChainError, type ChainErrorReason, CompositeTrustStore, type CredentialClaims, type CredentialFormat, DecryptionFailedError, type EncryptedResponse, ExpiredCredentialError, type Fetcher, HAIP_DOCTYPE_NAMESPACES, type HaipQueryInput, type HaipValidationCode, HaipValidationError, type ICredentialParser, InMemoryCache, InvalidSignatureError, type IssuerInfo, type LotlAnchorMetadata, LotlFetchError, LotlSignatureError, LotlTrustStore, type LotlTrustStoreOptions, MalformedCredentialError, MdocParser, MissingDecryptionKeyError, MultipleCredentialsNotSupportedError, NonceValidationError, OpenID4VPError, type ParseOptions, type PresentationResult, RevocationCheckFailedError, RevokedCertificateError, SdJwtParser, type SignedAuthorizationRequest, type SignedAuthorizationRequestInput, SignedRequestBuildError, type SignedRequestBuildErrorCode, StaticTrustStore, type TrustAnchor, TrustAnchorNotFoundError, type TrustStore, type TrustStoreHint, type TrustStoreInput, UnsupportedFormatError, UnsupportedJweError, VERSION, type VerifyAuthorizationResponseOptions, type VerifyOptions, type VerifyResult, buildHaipQuery, createAuthorizationRequest, createSignedAuthorizationRequest, decryptAuthorizationResponse, isHaipQuery, parsePresentation, validateHaipQuery, verifyAuthorizationResponse, verifyPresentation };

package/dist/index.d.ts

@@ -317,6 +317,27 @@ interface ParseOptions {
     cache?: Cache;
     /** Clock-skew tolerance in seconds for certificate validity checks. Default 60. */
     clockSkewTolerance?: number;
+    /**
+     * An explicit set of trusted issuer JWKs used as an alternate trust path when the
+     * SD-JWT VC's issuer JWT lacks an `x5c` header. When the header has no `x5c`:
+     *   - If this array is provided, the parser looks up the issuer key by `kid`
+     *     (or by exact `kty`/`crv`/`x`/`y` match when no `kid` is present). The
+     *     matched JWK is the trust anchor — cert-chain validation is skipped.
+     *   - If this array is absent (or empty), the parser falls back to the existing
+     *     behaviour and throws `MalformedCredentialError('Missing or invalid x5c in JWT header')`.
+     *
+     * **When the JWT header DOES include `x5c`** this option is ignored — the existing
+     * x5c/`trustedCertificates` / `trustStore` path runs unchanged.
+     *
+     * **Security notice**: opting in to this path skips certificate-chain trust
+     * evaluation entirely. The caller is explicitly asserting that they trust the
+     * supplied JWK(s) out-of-band. This is appropriate for CI harness setups (e.g.
+     * OIDF conformance suite, where the wallet signs without x5c and the verifier
+     * knows the signing key from the test-plan config). It is **not recommended for
+     * production verifiers** — cert-chain trust evaluation via `trustStore` is the
+     * secure path.
+     */
+    trustedIssuerJwks?: JsonWebKey[];
 }
 interface ICredentialParser {
     readonly format: CredentialFormat;
@@ -555,6 +576,6 @@ declare class LotlTrustStore implements TrustStore {
     private refresh;
 }
 
-declare const VERSION = "0.7.0";
+declare const VERSION = "0.8.0";
 
 export { type AuthorizationRequest, type AuthorizationRequestInput, type AuthorizationResponse, type Cache, CertificateChainError, type ChainErrorReason, CompositeTrustStore, type CredentialClaims, type CredentialFormat, DecryptionFailedError, type EncryptedResponse, ExpiredCredentialError, type Fetcher, HAIP_DOCTYPE_NAMESPACES, type HaipQueryInput, type HaipValidationCode, HaipValidationError, type ICredentialParser, InMemoryCache, InvalidSignatureError, type IssuerInfo, type LotlAnchorMetadata, LotlFetchError, LotlSignatureError, LotlTrustStore, type LotlTrustStoreOptions, MalformedCredentialError, MdocParser, MissingDecryptionKeyError, MultipleCredentialsNotSupportedError, NonceValidationError, OpenID4VPError, type ParseOptions, type PresentationResult, RevocationCheckFailedError, RevokedCertificateError, SdJwtParser, type SignedAuthorizationRequest, type SignedAuthorizationRequestInput, SignedRequestBuildError, type SignedRequestBuildErrorCode, StaticTrustStore, type TrustAnchor, TrustAnchorNotFoundError, type TrustStore, type TrustStoreHint, type TrustStoreInput, UnsupportedFormatError, UnsupportedJweError, VERSION, type VerifyAuthorizationResponseOptions, type VerifyOptions, type VerifyResult, buildHaipQuery, createAuthorizationRequest, createSignedAuthorizationRequest, decryptAuthorizationResponse, isHaipQuery, parsePresentation, validateHaipQuery, verifyAuthorizationResponse, verifyPresentation };

package/dist/index.js

@@ -8138,7 +8138,10 @@ async function createSignedAuthorizationRequest(input, query) {
     }
     const jwk = { ...input.encryptionKey.publicJwk, use: "enc" };
     clientMetadata.jwks = { keys: [jwk] };
-    clientMetadata.encrypted_response_enc_values_supported = enc ?? [...DEFAULT_SUPPORTED_ENC_VALUES];
+    const encValues = enc ?? [...DEFAULT_SUPPORTED_ENC_VALUES];
+    clientMetadata.encrypted_response_enc_values_supported = encValues;
+    clientMetadata.authorization_encrypted_response_alg = "ECDH-ES";
+    clientMetadata.authorization_encrypted_response_enc = encValues[0];
   }
   const payload = {
     iss: clientId,
@@ -8397,7 +8400,7 @@ async function verifyCoseSign1(coseSign1, publicKey, allowedAlgorithms) {
     throw new MalformedCredentialError(`no hash mapping for alg ${coseSign1.alg}`);
   }
   const sigStructure = ["Signature1", coseSign1.protectedHeaderBytes, new Uint8Array(0), coseSign1.payload];
-  const sigInput = decoder.encode(sigStructure);
+  const sigInput = new Uint8Array(decoder.encode(sigStructure));
   const ok = await crypto.subtle.verify(
     { name: "ECDSA", hash: hashAlg },
     publicKey,
@@ -8936,32 +8939,74 @@ var SdJwtParser = class {
       return invalidResult(`Unsupported algorithm: ${alg}`);
     }
     const x5cArray = header.x5c;
-    if (!Array.isArray(x5cArray) || x5cArray.length === 0 || typeof x5cArray[0] !== "string") {
-      throw new MalformedCredentialError("Missing or invalid x5c in JWT header");
-    }
+    const hasX5c = Array.isArray(x5cArray) && x5cArray.length > 0 && typeof x5cArray[0] === "string";
     let issuerKey;
     let issuerCertBytes;
-    try {
-      issuerKey = await importX509(derToPem2(x5cArray[0]), alg);
-      issuerCertBytes = base64ToBytes(x5cArray[0]);
-    } catch (err) {
-      if (err instanceof MalformedCredentialError) throw err;
-      throw new MalformedCredentialError("Failed to import issuer certificate");
+    if (hasX5c) {
+      try {
+        issuerKey = await importX509(derToPem2(x5cArray[0]), alg);
+        issuerCertBytes = base64ToBytes(x5cArray[0]);
+      } catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof MalformedCredentialError) throw err;
+        throw new MalformedCredentialError("Failed to import issuer certificate");
+      }
+    } else if (options.trustedIssuerJwks && options.trustedIssuerJwks.length > 0) {
+      issuerKey = void 0;
+    } else {
+      throw new MalformedCredentialError("Missing or invalid x5c in JWT header");
     }
     let payload;
-    try {
-      const result2 = await jwtVerify(parts.jwt, issuerKey, { algorithms: allowedAlgorithms });
-      payload = result2.payload;
-    } catch {
-      return invalidResult("Issuer JWT signature verification failed");
+    if (issuerKey) {
+      try {
+        const result2 = await jwtVerify(parts.jwt, issuerKey, { algorithms: allowedAlgorithms });
+        payload = result2.payload;
+      } catch {
+        return invalidResult("Issuer JWT signature verification failed");
+      }
+    } else {
+      const jwks = options.trustedIssuerJwks;
+      const headerKid = header["kid"];
+      let candidates;
+      if (typeof headerKid === "string") {
+        const matched = jwks.find((k) => k["kid"] === headerKid);
+        if (!matched) {
+          return invalidResult(
+            `No matching JWK found in trustedIssuerJwks for kid=${headerKid}`
+          );
+        }
+        candidates = [matched];
+      } else {
+        candidates = jwks;
+      }
+      let verifiedPayload;
+      for (const jwk of candidates) {
+        let candidateKey;
+        try {
+          candidateKey = await importJWK(jwk, alg);
+        } catch {
+          continue;
+        }
+        try {
+          const result2 = await jwtVerify(parts.jwt, candidateKey, {
+            algorithms: allowedAlgorithms
+          });
+          verifiedPayload = result2.payload;
+          break;
+        } catch {
+        }
+      }
+      if (!verifiedPayload) {
+        return invalidResult("Issuer JWT signature verification failed");
+      }
+      payload = verifiedPayload;
     }
     const issuerString = typeof payload["iss"] === "string" ? payload["iss"] : "";
     const issuerInfo = {
-      certificate: issuerCertBytes,
+      certificate: issuerCertBytes ?? new Uint8Array(),
       country: extractCountryHint(issuerString)
     };
     let trustResult;
-    if (options.trustStore) {
+    if (issuerCertBytes === void 0) ; else if (options.trustStore) {
       const { TrustEvaluator: TrustEvaluator2 } = await Promise.resolve().then(() => (init_TrustEvaluator(), TrustEvaluator_exports));
       const evaluator = new TrustEvaluator2({
         trustStore: options.trustStore,
@@ -8981,24 +9026,56 @@ var SdJwtParser = class {
           );
         }
       } else {
-        const isTrusted = options.trustedCertificates.some((trusted) => bytesEqual4(trusted, issuerCertBytes));
+        const isTrusted = options.trustedCertificates.some(
+          (trusted) => bytesEqual4(trusted, issuerCertBytes)
+        );
         if (!isTrusted) {
           return invalidResult("Issuer certificate is not trusted");
         }
       }
     }
-    const sdArray = payload["_sd"];
     if (parts.disclosures.length > 0) {
-      if (!Array.isArray(sdArray) || sdArray.length === 0) {
-        return invalidResult("Disclosures present but no _sd array in issuer JWT");
-      }
+      const decodedDisclosures = [];
       for (const disclosure of parts.disclosures) {
+        let parsed;
+        try {
+          parsed = JSON.parse(new TextDecoder().decode(base64ToBytes(disclosure)));
+        } catch {
+          return invalidResult("Disclosure is not valid base64url-encoded JSON");
+        }
+        if (!Array.isArray(parsed) || parsed.length !== 2 && parsed.length !== 3) {
+          return invalidResult("Disclosure must be a 2- or 3-element array");
+        }
         const hashBytes = await sha256Hasher(disclosure);
-        const hashB64url = bytesToBase64url(hashBytes);
-        if (!sdArray.includes(hashB64url)) {
-          return invalidResult("Disclosure hash mismatch");
+        decodedDisclosures.push({
+          raw: disclosure,
+          hash: bytesToBase64url(hashBytes),
+          length: parsed.length,
+          value: parsed.length === 3 ? parsed[2] : parsed[1]
+        });
+      }
+      const seed = collectAnchorHashes(payload);
+      const kvHashes = seed.kvHashes;
+      const arrayElemHashes = seed.arrayElemHashes;
+      const remaining = [...decodedDisclosures];
+      for (; ; ) {
+        const anchored = [];
+        for (const d of remaining) {
+          const valid = d.length === 3 ? kvHashes.has(d.hash) : arrayElemHashes.has(d.hash);
+          if (valid) anchored.push(d);
+        }
+        if (anchored.length === 0) break;
+        for (const a of anchored) {
+          const sub = collectAnchorHashes(a.value);
+          for (const h of sub.kvHashes) kvHashes.add(h);
+          for (const h of sub.arrayElemHashes) arrayElemHashes.add(h);
+          const idx = remaining.indexOf(a);
+          if (idx >= 0) remaining.splice(idx, 1);
         }
       }
+      if (remaining.length > 0) {
+        return invalidResult("Disclosure hash mismatch");
+      }
     }
     if (parts.kbJwt) {
       const cnf = payload["cnf"];
@@ -9061,6 +9138,35 @@ var SdJwtParser = class {
     return result;
   }
 };
+function collectAnchorHashes(node) {
+  const kvHashes = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  const arrayElemHashes = /* @__PURE__ */ new Set();
+  const visit = (value) => {
+    if (Array.isArray(value)) {
+      for (const item of value) {
+        if (item && typeof item === "object" && !Array.isArray(item)) {
+          const obj = item;
+          const keys = Object.keys(obj);
+          if (keys.length === 1 && keys[0] === "..." && typeof obj["..."] === "string") {
+            arrayElemHashes.add(obj["..."]);
+            continue;
+          }
+        }
+        visit(item);
+      }
+    } else if (value && typeof value === "object") {
+      for (const [k, v] of Object.entries(value)) {
+        if (k === "_sd" && Array.isArray(v)) {
+          for (const h of v) if (typeof h === "string") kvHashes.add(h);
+          continue;
+        }
+        visit(v);
+      }
+    }
+  };
+  visit(node);
+  return { kvHashes, arrayElemHashes };
+}
 
 // src/presentation.ts
 var parsers = [new SdJwtParser(), new MdocParser()];
@@ -9800,7 +9906,7 @@ function equalBytes(a, b) {
 
 // src/index.ts
 init_errors();
-var VERSION = "0.7.0";
+var VERSION = "0.8.0";
 /*! Bundled license information:
 
 pvtsutils/build/index.es.js: