@opendatalabs/vana-sdk 3.22.0 → 3.23.0-pr.211.341f55d

package/dist/protocol/identity.cjs

@@ -0,0 +1,219 @@
+"use strict";
+var __create = Object.create;
+var __defProp = Object.defineProperty;
+var __getOwnPropDesc = Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor;
+var __getOwnPropNames = Object.getOwnPropertyNames;
+var __getProtoOf = Object.getPrototypeOf;
+var __hasOwnProp = Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty;
+var __export = (target, all) => {
+  for (var name in all)
+    __defProp(target, name, { get: all[name], enumerable: true });
+};
+var __copyProps = (to, from, except, desc) => {
+  if (from && typeof from === "object" || typeof from === "function") {
+    for (let key of __getOwnPropNames(from))
+      if (!__hasOwnProp.call(to, key) && key !== except)
+        __defProp(to, key, { get: () => from[key], enumerable: !(desc = __getOwnPropDesc(from, key)) || desc.enumerable });
+  }
+  return to;
+};
+var __toESM = (mod, isNodeMode, target) => (target = mod != null ? __create(__getProtoOf(mod)) : {}, __copyProps(
+  // If the importer is in node compatibility mode or this is not an ESM
+  // file that has been converted to a CommonJS file using a Babel-
+  // compatible transform (i.e. "__esModule" has not been set), then set
+  // "default" to the CommonJS "module.exports" for node compatibility.
+  isNodeMode || !mod || !mod.__esModule ? __defProp(target, "default", { value: mod, enumerable: true }) : target,
+  mod
+));
+var __toCommonJS = (mod) => __copyProps(__defProp({}, "__esModule", { value: true }), mod);
+var identity_exports = {};
+__export(identity_exports, {
+  ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION: () => ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION,
+  ENCLAVE_TRUST_ANCHORS: () => ENCLAVE_TRUST_ANCHORS,
+  ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE: () => ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE,
+  MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS: () => MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+  MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION: () => MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION,
+  SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION: () => SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION,
+  USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN: () => USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN,
+  appRootPreimage: () => appRootPreimage,
+  buildMasterSignatureDelivery: () => buildMasterSignatureDelivery,
+  encryptMasterSignatureDelivery: () => encryptMasterSignatureDelivery,
+  kmsIssuedPreimage: () => kmsIssuedPreimage,
+  userPsId: () => userPsId,
+  verifyEnclaveIdentityEvidence: () => verifyEnclaveIdentityEvidence
+});
+module.exports = __toCommonJS(identity_exports);
+var secp256k1 = __toESM(require("@noble/secp256k1"), 1);
+var import_viem = require("viem");
+var import_accounts = require("viem/accounts");
+var import_interface = require("../crypto/ecies/interface");
+var import_derive = require("../crypto/keys/derive");
+const ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION = 1;
+const USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN = "vana.ps-enclave.v1";
+const ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE = "vana.ps-enclave.wallet.v1";
+const MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION = "vana.ps-enclave.delivery.v1";
+const MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 600;
+const SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1;
+const VANA_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID = 1480;
+const MOKSHA_CHAIN_ID = 14800;
+const KMS_ISSUED_PREFIX = "dstack-kms-issued";
+const PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR = ":";
+const UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES = 65;
+const UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_PREFIX = "04";
+const EMPTY_HEX = "0x";
+function emptyAnchor() {
+  return Object.freeze({
+    kmsRootPubkey: EMPTY_HEX,
+    appIds: Object.freeze([])
+  });
+}
+const ENCLAVE_TRUST_ANCHORS = Object.freeze({
+  // filled at fleet provisioning; verify fails closed while empty
+  [VANA_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID]: emptyAnchor(),
+  // filled at fleet provisioning; verify fails closed while empty
+  [MOKSHA_CHAIN_ID]: emptyAnchor()
+});
+function userPsId(chainId, ownerAddress) {
+  const packed = (0, import_viem.encodePacked)(
+    ["string", "uint256", "address"],
+    [USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN, BigInt(chainId), (0, import_viem.getAddress)(ownerAddress)]
+  );
+  return (0, import_viem.keccak256)(packed);
+}
+function compressPublicKey(publicKey) {
+  return secp256k1.ProjectivePoint.fromHex(
+    (0, import_viem.fromHex)(publicKey, "bytes")
+  ).toRawBytes(true);
+}
+function sameKey(a, b) {
+  return (0, import_viem.toHex)(compressPublicKey(a)) === (0, import_viem.toHex)(compressPublicKey(b));
+}
+function assertUncompressedKey(publicKey) {
+  const hex = publicKey.slice(2);
+  if (hex.length !== UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES * 2 || !hex.startsWith(UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_PREFIX) || !/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(hex)) {
+    throw new Error("Public key must be a 65-byte uncompressed secp256k1 key");
+  }
+}
+function appRootPreimage(purpose, publicKey) {
+  const keyHex = (0, import_viem.toHex)(compressPublicKey(publicKey)).slice(2);
+  return (0, import_viem.keccak256)((0, import_viem.toBytes)(`${purpose}${PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR}${keyHex}`));
+}
+function kmsIssuedPreimage(appId, appRootPublicKey) {
+  const prefix = (0, import_viem.concat)([
+    (0, import_viem.toBytes)(`${KMS_ISSUED_PREFIX}${PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR}`),
+    (0, import_viem.fromHex)(appId, "bytes")
+  ]);
+  const compressed = compressPublicKey(appRootPublicKey);
+  return (0, import_viem.keccak256)((0, import_viem.concat)([prefix, compressed]));
+}
+async function recoverChainKey(hash, signature, link) {
+  try {
+    return (await (0, import_viem.recoverPublicKey)({ hash, signature })).toLowerCase();
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error(`Invalid enclave signature chain link ${link}`);
+  }
+}
+async function verifyEnclaveIdentityEvidence(evidence, anchors, expected) {
+  if (evidence.v !== ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION) {
+    throw new Error("Unsupported enclave identity evidence version");
+  }
+  if (!Number.isInteger(evidence.epoch) || evidence.epoch < 1) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid enclave identity epoch");
+  }
+  if (evidence.chainId !== expected.chainId) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "Enclave identity chain ID does not match expected chain ID"
+    );
+  }
+  if (!(0, import_viem.isAddressEqual)(evidence.ownerAddress, expected.ownerAddress)) {
+    throw new Error("Enclave identity owner does not match expected owner");
+  }
+  if (evidence.epoch !== expected.epoch) {
+    throw new Error("Enclave identity epoch does not match expected epoch");
+  }
+  const expectedUserPsId = userPsId(expected.chainId, expected.ownerAddress);
+  if (evidence.userPsId.toLowerCase() !== expectedUserPsId.toLowerCase()) {
+    throw new Error("Enclave userPsId does not match expected identity");
+  }
+  if (evidence.purpose !== ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE) {
+    throw new Error("Unexpected enclave wallet purpose");
+  }
+  if (anchors.kmsRootPubkey === EMPTY_HEX) {
+    throw new Error("KMS root trust anchor is not provisioned");
+  }
+  assertUncompressedKey(evidence.publicKey);
+  const derivedAddress = (0, import_accounts.publicKeyToAddress)(evidence.publicKey);
+  if ((0, import_viem.getAddress)(derivedAddress) !== (0, import_viem.getAddress)(evidence.address)) {
+    throw new Error("Enclave public key does not match its address");
+  }
+  const appRootPublicKey = await recoverChainKey(
+    appRootPreimage(evidence.purpose, evidence.publicKey),
+    evidence.signatureChain[0],
+    0
+  );
+  const kmsRootPublicKey = await recoverChainKey(
+    kmsIssuedPreimage(evidence.appId, appRootPublicKey),
+    evidence.signatureChain[1],
+    1
+  );
+  let matchesAnchor;
+  try {
+    matchesAnchor = sameKey(kmsRootPublicKey, anchors.kmsRootPubkey);
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error("KMS root trust anchor is malformed");
+  }
+  if (!matchesAnchor) {
+    throw new Error("KMS root public key does not match the trust anchor");
+  }
+  if ((0, import_viem.keccak256)(kmsRootPublicKey) !== evidence.kmsRootFingerprint.toLowerCase()) {
+    throw new Error("KMS root fingerprint does not match the evidence");
+  }
+  const appId = evidence.appId.toLowerCase();
+  if (!anchors.appIds.some((allowedAppId) => allowedAppId.toLowerCase() === appId)) {
+    throw new Error("Enclave app ID is not trusted");
+  }
+}
+async function buildMasterSignatureDelivery(evidence, masterSignature, now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) {
+  (0, import_derive.deriveMasterKey)(masterSignature);
+  const signerAddress = await (0, import_derive.recoverServerOwner)(masterSignature);
+  if (!(0, import_viem.isAddressEqual)(signerAddress, evidence.ownerAddress)) {
+    throw new Error("Master signature signer does not match evidence owner");
+  }
+  return {
+    v: MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION,
+    userPsId: evidence.userPsId,
+    epoch: evidence.epoch,
+    enclaveAddress: evidence.address,
+    ownerAddress: evidence.ownerAddress,
+    masterSignature,
+    issuedAt: now
+  };
+}
+async function encryptMasterSignatureDelivery(delivery, publicKey, ecies) {
+  assertUncompressedKey(publicKey);
+  if (!(0, import_viem.isAddressEqual)((0, import_accounts.publicKeyToAddress)(publicKey), delivery.enclaveAddress)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "Public key does not belong to the delivery's enclave address"
+    );
+  }
+  const plaintext = (0, import_viem.toBytes)(JSON.stringify(delivery));
+  const encrypted = await ecies.encrypt((0, import_viem.fromHex)(publicKey, "bytes"), plaintext);
+  return `0x${(0, import_interface.serializeECIES)(encrypted)}`;
+}
+// Annotate the CommonJS export names for ESM import in node:
+0 && (module.exports = {
+  ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION,
+  ENCLAVE_TRUST_ANCHORS,
+  ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE,
+  MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+  MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION,
+  SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION,
+  USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN,
+  appRootPreimage,
+  buildMasterSignatureDelivery,
+  encryptMasterSignatureDelivery,
+  kmsIssuedPreimage,
+  userPsId,
+  verifyEnclaveIdentityEvidence
+});
+//# sourceMappingURL=identity.cjs.map

package/dist/protocol/identity.cjs.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"sources":["../../src/protocol/identity.ts"],"sourcesContent":["/**\n * Enclave identity and consent primitives for Personal Servers.\n *\n * Owner/Web -> Gateway -> Agent(CVM): derive wallet and quote\n * Web verifies evidence; Account authenticates and encrypts the EIP-191 master\n * signature to the enclave key; Gateway relays it blind; Agent decrypts/seals.\n *\n * @category Protocol\n */\n\nimport * as secp256k1 from \"@noble/secp256k1\";\nimport {\n  concat,\n  encodePacked,\n  fromHex,\n  getAddress,\n  isAddressEqual,\n  keccak256,\n  recoverPublicKey,\n  toBytes,\n  toHex,\n  type Address,\n  type Hex,\n} from \"viem\";\nimport { publicKeyToAddress } from \"viem/accounts\";\nimport { serializeECIES, type ECIESProvider } from \"../crypto/ecies/interface\";\nimport { deriveMasterKey, recoverServerOwner } from \"../crypto/keys/derive\";\nimport type { ServerRegistrationMessage } from \"./eip712\";\n\nexport const ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION = 1;\nexport const USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN = \"vana.ps-enclave.v1\";\nexport const ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE = \"vana.ps-enclave.wallet.v1\";\nexport const MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION = \"vana.ps-enclave.delivery.v1\";\n/** Agent rejects deliveries when `|now - issuedAt|` exceeds this value. */\nexport const MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 600;\nexport const SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1;\n\nconst VANA_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID = 1480;\nconst MOKSHA_CHAIN_ID = 14800;\nconst KMS_ISSUED_PREFIX = \"dstack-kms-issued\";\nconst PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR = \":\";\nconst UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES = 65;\nconst UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_PREFIX = \"04\";\nconst EMPTY_HEX = \"0x\";\n\n/** `keccak256(encodePacked([string,uint256,address], [USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN,chainId,owner]))`. */\nexport type UserPsId = Hex;\n\n/** Attested identity evidence returned by the enclave agent. */\nexport interface EnclaveIdentityEvidence {\n  v: typeof ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION;\n  userPsId: UserPsId;\n  chainId: number;\n  ownerAddress: Address;\n  /** Path suffix `users/{id}/wallet/ethereum/secp256k1/v{epoch}`. */\n  epoch: number;\n  address: Address;\n  /** 65-byte uncompressed `0x04..`; `publicKeyToAddress(publicKey) == address`. */\n  publicKey: Hex;\n  /** 20-byte dstack `app_id`. */\n  appId: Hex;\n  /** 32-byte compose hash. */\n  composeHash: Hex;\n  /** Omitted when the OS does not expose its image hash. */\n  osImageHash?: Hex;\n  /** Must equal `ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE`. */\n  purpose: string;\n  /** `[appRoot over link 0, kmsRoot over link 1]`; see `appRootPreimage` and `kmsIssuedPreimage`. */\n  signatureChain: [Hex, Hex];\n  /** Raw TDX quote with report_data `keccak256(userPsId || address)`; not parsed. */\n  quote: Hex;\n  eventLog?: string;\n  /** `keccak256` of the uncompressed KMS root public key. */\n  kmsRootFingerprint: Hex;\n}\n\n/** Identity values the caller expects the evidence to bind. */\nexport interface ExpectedIdentity {\n  ownerAddress: Address;\n  chainId: number;\n  epoch: number;\n}\n\n/** Request for an owner-scoped enclave identity. */\nexport interface IdentityRequest {\n  ownerAddress: Address;\n  chainId: number;\n}\n\n/** Lifecycle state of an enclave identity. */\nexport type IdentityState = \"prepared\" | \"registered\" | \"sealed\" | \"retired\";\n\n/** Gateway response containing enclave identity state and registration data. */\nexport interface IdentityResponse {\n  identity: EnclaveIdentityEvidence;\n  state: IdentityState;\n  created: boolean;\n  /** Exact `ServerRegistration.serverUrl` the owner signs. */\n  serverUrl: string;\n  serverId?: Hex;\n  serverStatus?:\n    | \"pending\"\n    | \"submitting\"\n    | \"confirmed\"\n    | \"finalized\"\n    | \"failed\";\n  sealed: boolean;\n}\n\n/** Versioned server-registration request for an enclave identity. */\nexport type IdentityRegistrationRequest =\n  | { version: \"v2\"; message: ServerRegistrationMessage }\n  | {\n      version: \"v3\";\n      message: ServerRegistrationMessage & { nonce: string; deadline: string };\n    };\n\n/** Accepted identity-registration response. */\nexport interface IdentityRegistrationResponse {\n  serverId: Hex;\n  state: \"registered\";\n  serverStatus: \"pending\";\n}\n\n/** Inner plaintext of the ECIES box. */\nexport interface MasterSignatureDelivery {\n  v: typeof MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION;\n  userPsId: UserPsId;\n  epoch: number;\n  enclaveAddress: Address;\n  ownerAddress: Address;\n  /** 65-byte EIP-191 signature over `MASTER_KEY_MESSAGE`. */\n  masterSignature: Hex;\n  /** Unix seconds; see `MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS`. */\n  issuedAt: number;\n}\n\n/** Enclave-bound ciphertext submitted for sealing. */\nexport interface SealedSecretSubmission {\n  userPsId: UserPsId;\n  epoch: number;\n  enclaveAddress: Address;\n  /** `iv(16) || ephemPub(65) || ct || mac(32)` to `evidence.publicKey`. */\n  ciphertext: Hex;\n}\n\n/** Confirmation that the enclave sealed a submitted secret. */\nexport interface SealedSecretResponse {\n  sealed: true;\n  /** `sha256(ciphertext)`. */\n  secretHash: Hex;\n  sealedAt: string;\n}\n\n/** AES-GCM fields encoded as base64 strings. */\nexport interface AesGcmBox {\n  /** Base64 initialization vector. */\n  iv: string;\n  /** Base64 ciphertext. */\n  ciphertext: string;\n  /** Base64 authentication tag. */\n  tag: string;\n}\n\n/** Persisted enclave envelope; the Gateway treats it as opaque text. */\nexport interface SealedEnvelope extends AesGcmBox {\n  v: typeof SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION;\n  wrappedContentKey: AesGcmBox;\n}\n\n/** Fleet-pinned KMS root and allowed dstack application IDs. */\nexport interface EnclaveTrustAnchors {\n  kmsRootPubkey: Hex;\n  appIds: readonly Hex[];\n}\n\nfunction emptyAnchor(): Readonly<EnclaveTrustAnchors> {\n  return Object.freeze({\n    kmsRootPubkey: EMPTY_HEX,\n    appIds: Object.freeze([] as Hex[]),\n  });\n}\n\n/** Fleet-provisioned trust anchors keyed by Vana chain ID. */\nexport const ENCLAVE_TRUST_ANCHORS: Readonly<\n  Record<number, Readonly<EnclaveTrustAnchors>>\n> = Object.freeze({\n  // filled at fleet provisioning; verify fails closed while empty\n  [VANA_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID]: emptyAnchor(),\n  // filled at fleet provisioning; verify fails closed while empty\n  [MOKSHA_CHAIN_ID]: emptyAnchor(),\n});\n\n/**\n * Derives the deterministic Personal Server ID used by enclave paths.\n *\n * @param chainId - Vana chain ID.\n * @param ownerAddress - Checksummed owner address.\n * @returns The path-compatible keccak256 digest.\n */\nexport function userPsId(chainId: number, ownerAddress: Address): UserPsId {\n  const packed = encodePacked(\n    [\"string\", \"uint256\", \"address\"],\n    [USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN, BigInt(chainId), getAddress(ownerAddress)],\n  );\n\n  return keccak256(packed);\n}\n\nfunction compressPublicKey(publicKey: Hex): Uint8Array {\n  return secp256k1.ProjectivePoint.fromHex(\n    fromHex(publicKey, \"bytes\"),\n  ).toRawBytes(true);\n}\n\nfunction sameKey(a: Hex, b: Hex): boolean {\n  return toHex(compressPublicKey(a)) === toHex(compressPublicKey(b));\n}\n\nfunction assertUncompressedKey(publicKey: Hex): void {\n  const hex = publicKey.slice(2);\n  if (\n    hex.length !== UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES * 2 ||\n    !hex.startsWith(UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_PREFIX) ||\n    !/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(hex)\n  ) {\n    throw new Error(\"Public key must be a 65-byte uncompressed secp256k1 key\");\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds keccak256(utf8(purpose || \":\" || lowercase hex(compressed pubkey))).\n *\n * Matches `dstack/guest-agent/src/rpc_service.rs:612-628`.\n */\nexport function appRootPreimage(purpose: string, publicKey: Hex): Hex {\n  const keyHex = toHex(compressPublicKey(publicKey)).slice(2);\n  return keccak256(toBytes(`${purpose}${PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR}${keyHex}`));\n}\n\n/**\n * Hashes the KMS prefix, raw app ID bytes, and compressed app-root public key.\n *\n * Matches `dstack/kms/src/crypto.rs:23-40`; there is no separator between the\n * raw 20-byte app ID and the compressed key.\n */\nexport function kmsIssuedPreimage(appId: Hex, appRootPublicKey: Hex): Hex {\n  const prefix = concat([\n    toBytes(`${KMS_ISSUED_PREFIX}${PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR}`),\n    fromHex(appId, \"bytes\"),\n  ]);\n  const compressed = compressPublicKey(appRootPublicKey);\n\n  return keccak256(concat([prefix, compressed]));\n}\n\nasync function recoverChainKey(\n  hash: Hex,\n  signature: Hex,\n  link: number,\n): Promise<Hex> {\n  try {\n    return (await recoverPublicKey({ hash, signature })).toLowerCase() as Hex;\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(`Invalid enclave signature chain link ${link}`);\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Verifies the enclave wallet binding against fleet-provisioned trust anchors.\n *\n * @param evidence - Identity evidence returned by the enclave agent.\n * @param anchors - Pinned KMS root and allowed dstack app IDs.\n * @param expected - Owner, chain, and epoch requested by the caller.\n *\n * @remarks\n * The dstack chain signs only `purpose || publicKey` and `appId || appRootPub`;\n * owner, chain and epoch are bound to the key by the TDX quote report_data\n * (`keccak256(userPsId || address)`), which v1 stores but does not verify\n * (DCAP is step 4). Until then the agent's derivation check is the backstop.\n * @throws When any identity binding or trust check fails.\n */\nexport async function verifyEnclaveIdentityEvidence(\n  evidence: EnclaveIdentityEvidence,\n  anchors: EnclaveTrustAnchors,\n  expected: ExpectedIdentity,\n): Promise<void> {\n  if (evidence.v !== ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION) {\n    throw new Error(\"Unsupported enclave identity evidence version\");\n  }\n\n  if (!Number.isInteger(evidence.epoch) || evidence.epoch < 1) {\n    throw new Error(\"Invalid enclave identity epoch\");\n  }\n\n  if (evidence.chainId !== expected.chainId) {\n    throw new Error(\n      \"Enclave identity chain ID does not match expected chain ID\",\n    );\n  }\n\n  if (!isAddressEqual(evidence.ownerAddress, expected.ownerAddress)) {\n    throw new Error(\"Enclave identity owner does not match expected owner\");\n  }\n\n  if (evidence.epoch !== expected.epoch) {\n    throw new Error(\"Enclave identity epoch does not match expected epoch\");\n  }\n\n  const expectedUserPsId = userPsId(expected.chainId, expected.ownerAddress);\n  if (evidence.userPsId.toLowerCase() !== expectedUserPsId.toLowerCase()) {\n    throw new Error(\"Enclave userPsId does not match expected identity\");\n  }\n\n  if (evidence.purpose !== ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE) {\n    throw new Error(\"Unexpected enclave wallet purpose\");\n  }\n\n  if (anchors.kmsRootPubkey === EMPTY_HEX) {\n    throw new Error(\"KMS root trust anchor is not provisioned\");\n  }\n\n  assertUncompressedKey(evidence.publicKey);\n  const derivedAddress = publicKeyToAddress(evidence.publicKey);\n\n  if (getAddress(derivedAddress) !== getAddress(evidence.address)) {\n    throw new Error(\"Enclave public key does not match its address\");\n  }\n\n  const appRootPublicKey = await recoverChainKey(\n    appRootPreimage(evidence.purpose, evidence.publicKey),\n    evidence.signatureChain[0],\n    0,\n  );\n  const kmsRootPublicKey = await recoverChainKey(\n    kmsIssuedPreimage(evidence.appId, appRootPublicKey),\n    evidence.signatureChain[1],\n    1,\n  );\n\n  let matchesAnchor: boolean;\n  try {\n    matchesAnchor = sameKey(kmsRootPublicKey, anchors.kmsRootPubkey);\n  } catch {\n    throw new Error(\"KMS root trust anchor is malformed\");\n  }\n\n  if (!matchesAnchor) {\n    throw new Error(\"KMS root public key does not match the trust anchor\");\n  }\n\n  if (\n    keccak256(kmsRootPublicKey) !== evidence.kmsRootFingerprint.toLowerCase()\n  ) {\n    throw new Error(\"KMS root fingerprint does not match the evidence\");\n  }\n\n  const appId = evidence.appId.toLowerCase();\n  if (\n    !anchors.appIds.some((allowedAppId) => allowedAppId.toLowerCase() === appId)\n  ) {\n    throw new Error(\"Enclave app ID is not trusted\");\n  }\n}\n\n/**\n * Builds the authenticated master-signature plaintext delivered to an enclave.\n *\n * @param evidence - Verified enclave identity evidence.\n * @param masterSignature - EIP-191 signature over the master-key message.\n * @param now - Issuance time in Unix seconds.\n * @returns The authenticated plaintext delivery object.\n * @throws When the signature is malformed or does not belong to the owner.\n */\nexport async function buildMasterSignatureDelivery(\n  evidence: EnclaveIdentityEvidence,\n  masterSignature: Hex,\n  now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000),\n): Promise<MasterSignatureDelivery> {\n  // Validate signature length and hex encoding before recovery.\n  deriveMasterKey(masterSignature);\n  const signerAddress = await recoverServerOwner(masterSignature);\n\n  if (!isAddressEqual(signerAddress, evidence.ownerAddress)) {\n    throw new Error(\"Master signature signer does not match evidence owner\");\n  }\n\n  return {\n    v: MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION,\n    userPsId: evidence.userPsId,\n    epoch: evidence.epoch,\n    enclaveAddress: evidence.address,\n    ownerAddress: evidence.ownerAddress,\n    masterSignature,\n    issuedAt: now,\n  };\n}\n\n/**\n * Encrypts a master-signature delivery in the SDK's ECIES wire format.\n *\n * @param delivery - 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package/dist/protocol/identity.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,193 @@
+/**
+ * Enclave identity and consent primitives for Personal Servers.
+ *
+ * Owner/Web -> Gateway -> Agent(CVM): derive wallet and quote
+ * Web verifies evidence; Account authenticates and encrypts the EIP-191 master
+ * signature to the enclave key; Gateway relays it blind; Agent decrypts/seals.
+ *
+ * @category Protocol
+ */
+import { type Address, type Hex } from "viem";
+import { type ECIESProvider } from "../crypto/ecies/interface.js";
+import type { ServerRegistrationMessage } from "./eip712.js";
+export declare const ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION = 1;
+export declare const USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN = "vana.ps-enclave.v1";
+export declare const ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE = "vana.ps-enclave.wallet.v1";
+export declare const MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION = "vana.ps-enclave.delivery.v1";
+/** Agent rejects deliveries when `|now - issuedAt|` exceeds this value. */
+export declare const MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 600;
+export declare const SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1;
+/** `keccak256(encodePacked([string,uint256,address], [USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN,chainId,owner]))`. */
+export type UserPsId = Hex;
+/** Attested identity evidence returned by the enclave agent. */
+export interface EnclaveIdentityEvidence {
+    v: typeof ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION;
+    userPsId: UserPsId;
+    chainId: number;
+    ownerAddress: Address;
+    /** Path suffix `users/{id}/wallet/ethereum/secp256k1/v{epoch}`. */
+    epoch: number;
+    address: Address;
+    /** 65-byte uncompressed `0x04..`; `publicKeyToAddress(publicKey) == address`. */
+    publicKey: Hex;
+    /** 20-byte dstack `app_id`. */
+    appId: Hex;
+    /** 32-byte compose hash. */
+    composeHash: Hex;
+    /** Omitted when the OS does not expose its image hash. */
+    osImageHash?: Hex;
+    /** Must equal `ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE`. */
+    purpose: string;
+    /** `[appRoot over link 0, kmsRoot over link 1]`; see `appRootPreimage` and `kmsIssuedPreimage`. */
+    signatureChain: [Hex, Hex];
+    /** Raw TDX quote with report_data `keccak256(userPsId || address)`; not parsed. */
+    quote: Hex;
+    eventLog?: string;
+    /** `keccak256` of the uncompressed KMS root public key. */
+    kmsRootFingerprint: Hex;
+}
+/** Identity values the caller expects the evidence to bind. */
+export interface ExpectedIdentity {
+    ownerAddress: Address;
+    chainId: number;
+    epoch: number;
+}
+/** Request for an owner-scoped enclave identity. */
+export interface IdentityRequest {
+    ownerAddress: Address;
+    chainId: number;
+}
+/** Lifecycle state of an enclave identity. */
+export type IdentityState = "prepared" | "registered" | "sealed" | "retired";
+/** Gateway response containing enclave identity state and registration data. */
+export interface IdentityResponse {
+    identity: EnclaveIdentityEvidence;
+    state: IdentityState;
+    created: boolean;
+    /** Exact `ServerRegistration.serverUrl` the owner signs. */
+    serverUrl: string;
+    serverId?: Hex;
+    serverStatus?: "pending" | "submitting" | "confirmed" | "finalized" | "failed";
+    sealed: boolean;
+}
+/** Versioned server-registration request for an enclave identity. */
+export type IdentityRegistrationRequest = {
+    version: "v2";
+    message: ServerRegistrationMessage;
+} | {
+    version: "v3";
+    message: ServerRegistrationMessage & {
+        nonce: string;
+        deadline: string;
+    };
+};
+/** Accepted identity-registration response. */
+export interface IdentityRegistrationResponse {
+    serverId: Hex;
+    state: "registered";
+    serverStatus: "pending";
+}
+/** Inner plaintext of the ECIES box. */
+export interface MasterSignatureDelivery {
+    v: typeof MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION;
+    userPsId: UserPsId;
+    epoch: number;
+    enclaveAddress: Address;
+    ownerAddress: Address;
+    /** 65-byte EIP-191 signature over `MASTER_KEY_MESSAGE`. */
+    masterSignature: Hex;
+    /** Unix seconds; see `MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS`. */
+    issuedAt: number;
+}
+/** Enclave-bound ciphertext submitted for sealing. */
+export interface SealedSecretSubmission {
+    userPsId: UserPsId;
+    epoch: number;
+    enclaveAddress: Address;
+    /** `iv(16) || ephemPub(65) || ct || mac(32)` to `evidence.publicKey`. */
+    ciphertext: Hex;
+}
+/** Confirmation that the enclave sealed a submitted secret. */
+export interface SealedSecretResponse {
+    sealed: true;
+    /** `sha256(ciphertext)`. */
+    secretHash: Hex;
+    sealedAt: string;
+}
+/** AES-GCM fields encoded as base64 strings. */
+export interface AesGcmBox {
+    /** Base64 initialization vector. */
+    iv: string;
+    /** Base64 ciphertext. */
+    ciphertext: string;
+    /** Base64 authentication tag. */
+    tag: string;
+}
+/** Persisted enclave envelope; the Gateway treats it as opaque text. */
+export interface SealedEnvelope extends AesGcmBox {
+    v: typeof SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION;
+    wrappedContentKey: AesGcmBox;
+}
+/** Fleet-pinned KMS root and allowed dstack application IDs. */
+export interface EnclaveTrustAnchors {
+    kmsRootPubkey: Hex;
+    appIds: readonly Hex[];
+}
+/** Fleet-provisioned trust anchors keyed by Vana chain ID. */
+export declare const ENCLAVE_TRUST_ANCHORS: Readonly<Record<number, Readonly<EnclaveTrustAnchors>>>;
+/**
+ * Derives the deterministic Personal Server ID used by enclave paths.
+ *
+ * @param chainId - Vana chain ID.
+ * @param ownerAddress - Checksummed owner address.
+ * @returns The path-compatible keccak256 digest.
+ */
+export declare function userPsId(chainId: number, ownerAddress: Address): UserPsId;
+/**
+ * Builds keccak256(utf8(purpose || ":" || lowercase hex(compressed pubkey))).
+ *
+ * Matches `dstack/guest-agent/src/rpc_service.rs:612-628`.
+ */
+export declare function appRootPreimage(purpose: string, publicKey: Hex): Hex;
+/**
+ * Hashes the KMS prefix, raw app ID bytes, and compressed app-root public key.
+ *
+ * Matches `dstack/kms/src/crypto.rs:23-40`; there is no separator between the
+ * raw 20-byte app ID and the compressed key.
+ */
+export declare function kmsIssuedPreimage(appId: Hex, appRootPublicKey: Hex): Hex;
+/**
+ * Verifies the enclave wallet binding against fleet-provisioned trust anchors.
+ *
+ * @param evidence - Identity evidence returned by the enclave agent.
+ * @param anchors - Pinned KMS root and allowed dstack app IDs.
+ * @param expected - Owner, chain, and epoch requested by the caller.
+ *
+ * @remarks
+ * The dstack chain signs only `purpose || publicKey` and `appId || appRootPub`;
+ * owner, chain and epoch are bound to the key by the TDX quote report_data
+ * (`keccak256(userPsId || address)`), which v1 stores but does not verify
+ * (DCAP is step 4). Until then the agent's derivation check is the backstop.
+ * @throws When any identity binding or trust check fails.
+ */
+export declare function verifyEnclaveIdentityEvidence(evidence: EnclaveIdentityEvidence, anchors: EnclaveTrustAnchors, expected: ExpectedIdentity): Promise<void>;
+/**
+ * Builds the authenticated master-signature plaintext delivered to an enclave.
+ *
+ * @param evidence - Verified enclave identity evidence.
+ * @param masterSignature - EIP-191 signature over the master-key message.
+ * @param now - Issuance time in Unix seconds.
+ * @returns The authenticated plaintext delivery object.
+ * @throws When the signature is malformed or does not belong to the owner.
+ */
+export declare function buildMasterSignatureDelivery(evidence: EnclaveIdentityEvidence, masterSignature: Hex, now?: number): Promise<MasterSignatureDelivery>;
+/**
+ * Encrypts a master-signature delivery in the SDK's ECIES wire format.
+ *
+ * @param delivery - Plaintext delivery object.
+ * @param publicKey - Enclave 65-byte uncompressed public key.
+ * @param ecies - Platform-specific ECIES provider.
+ * @returns The 0x-prefixed serialized ciphertext.
+ * @throws When the public key is malformed or belongs to another enclave.
+ */
+export declare function encryptMasterSignatureDelivery(delivery: MasterSignatureDelivery, publicKey: Hex, ecies: ECIESProvider): Promise<Hex>;

package/dist/protocol/identity.js

@@ -0,0 +1,183 @@
+import * as secp256k1 from "@noble/secp256k1";
+import {
+  concat,
+  encodePacked,
+  fromHex,
+  getAddress,
+  isAddressEqual,
+  keccak256,
+  recoverPublicKey,
+  toBytes,
+  toHex
+} from "viem";
+import { publicKeyToAddress } from "viem/accounts";
+import { serializeECIES } from "../crypto/ecies/interface.js";
+import { deriveMasterKey, recoverServerOwner } from "../crypto/keys/derive.js";
+const ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION = 1;
+const USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN = "vana.ps-enclave.v1";
+const ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE = "vana.ps-enclave.wallet.v1";
+const MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION = "vana.ps-enclave.delivery.v1";
+const MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS = 600;
+const SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION = 1;
+const VANA_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID = 1480;
+const MOKSHA_CHAIN_ID = 14800;
+const KMS_ISSUED_PREFIX = "dstack-kms-issued";
+const PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR = ":";
+const UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES = 65;
+const UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_PREFIX = "04";
+const EMPTY_HEX = "0x";
+function emptyAnchor() {
+  return Object.freeze({
+    kmsRootPubkey: EMPTY_HEX,
+    appIds: Object.freeze([])
+  });
+}
+const ENCLAVE_TRUST_ANCHORS = Object.freeze({
+  // filled at fleet provisioning; verify fails closed while empty
+  [VANA_MAINNET_CHAIN_ID]: emptyAnchor(),
+  // filled at fleet provisioning; verify fails closed while empty
+  [MOKSHA_CHAIN_ID]: emptyAnchor()
+});
+function userPsId(chainId, ownerAddress) {
+  const packed = encodePacked(
+    ["string", "uint256", "address"],
+    [USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN, BigInt(chainId), getAddress(ownerAddress)]
+  );
+  return keccak256(packed);
+}
+function compressPublicKey(publicKey) {
+  return secp256k1.ProjectivePoint.fromHex(
+    fromHex(publicKey, "bytes")
+  ).toRawBytes(true);
+}
+function sameKey(a, b) {
+  return toHex(compressPublicKey(a)) === toHex(compressPublicKey(b));
+}
+function assertUncompressedKey(publicKey) {
+  const hex = publicKey.slice(2);
+  if (hex.length !== UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_BYTES * 2 || !hex.startsWith(UNCOMPRESSED_PUBLIC_KEY_PREFIX) || !/^[0-9a-fA-F]+$/.test(hex)) {
+    throw new Error("Public key must be a 65-byte uncompressed secp256k1 key");
+  }
+}
+function appRootPreimage(purpose, publicKey) {
+  const keyHex = toHex(compressPublicKey(publicKey)).slice(2);
+  return keccak256(toBytes(`${purpose}${PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR}${keyHex}`));
+}
+function kmsIssuedPreimage(appId, appRootPublicKey) {
+  const prefix = concat([
+    toBytes(`${KMS_ISSUED_PREFIX}${PREIMAGE_SEPARATOR}`),
+    fromHex(appId, "bytes")
+  ]);
+  const compressed = compressPublicKey(appRootPublicKey);
+  return keccak256(concat([prefix, compressed]));
+}
+async function recoverChainKey(hash, signature, link) {
+  try {
+    return (await recoverPublicKey({ hash, signature })).toLowerCase();
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error(`Invalid enclave signature chain link ${link}`);
+  }
+}
+async function verifyEnclaveIdentityEvidence(evidence, anchors, expected) {
+  if (evidence.v !== ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION) {
+    throw new Error("Unsupported enclave identity evidence version");
+  }
+  if (!Number.isInteger(evidence.epoch) || evidence.epoch < 1) {
+    throw new Error("Invalid enclave identity epoch");
+  }
+  if (evidence.chainId !== expected.chainId) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "Enclave identity chain ID does not match expected chain ID"
+    );
+  }
+  if (!isAddressEqual(evidence.ownerAddress, expected.ownerAddress)) {
+    throw new Error("Enclave identity owner does not match expected owner");
+  }
+  if (evidence.epoch !== expected.epoch) {
+    throw new Error("Enclave identity epoch does not match expected epoch");
+  }
+  const expectedUserPsId = userPsId(expected.chainId, expected.ownerAddress);
+  if (evidence.userPsId.toLowerCase() !== expectedUserPsId.toLowerCase()) {
+    throw new Error("Enclave userPsId does not match expected identity");
+  }
+  if (evidence.purpose !== ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE) {
+    throw new Error("Unexpected enclave wallet purpose");
+  }
+  if (anchors.kmsRootPubkey === EMPTY_HEX) {
+    throw new Error("KMS root trust anchor is not provisioned");
+  }
+  assertUncompressedKey(evidence.publicKey);
+  const derivedAddress = publicKeyToAddress(evidence.publicKey);
+  if (getAddress(derivedAddress) !== getAddress(evidence.address)) {
+    throw new Error("Enclave public key does not match its address");
+  }
+  const appRootPublicKey = await recoverChainKey(
+    appRootPreimage(evidence.purpose, evidence.publicKey),
+    evidence.signatureChain[0],
+    0
+  );
+  const kmsRootPublicKey = await recoverChainKey(
+    kmsIssuedPreimage(evidence.appId, appRootPublicKey),
+    evidence.signatureChain[1],
+    1
+  );
+  let matchesAnchor;
+  try {
+    matchesAnchor = sameKey(kmsRootPublicKey, anchors.kmsRootPubkey);
+  } catch {
+    throw new Error("KMS root trust anchor is malformed");
+  }
+  if (!matchesAnchor) {
+    throw new Error("KMS root public key does not match the trust anchor");
+  }
+  if (keccak256(kmsRootPublicKey) !== evidence.kmsRootFingerprint.toLowerCase()) {
+    throw new Error("KMS root fingerprint does not match the evidence");
+  }
+  const appId = evidence.appId.toLowerCase();
+  if (!anchors.appIds.some((allowedAppId) => allowedAppId.toLowerCase() === appId)) {
+    throw new Error("Enclave app ID is not trusted");
+  }
+}
+async function buildMasterSignatureDelivery(evidence, masterSignature, now = Math.floor(Date.now() / 1e3)) {
+  deriveMasterKey(masterSignature);
+  const signerAddress = await recoverServerOwner(masterSignature);
+  if (!isAddressEqual(signerAddress, evidence.ownerAddress)) {
+    throw new Error("Master signature signer does not match evidence owner");
+  }
+  return {
+    v: MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION,
+    userPsId: evidence.userPsId,
+    epoch: evidence.epoch,
+    enclaveAddress: evidence.address,
+    ownerAddress: evidence.ownerAddress,
+    masterSignature,
+    issuedAt: now
+  };
+}
+async function encryptMasterSignatureDelivery(delivery, publicKey, ecies) {
+  assertUncompressedKey(publicKey);
+  if (!isAddressEqual(publicKeyToAddress(publicKey), delivery.enclaveAddress)) {
+    throw new Error(
+      "Public key does not belong to the delivery's enclave address"
+    );
+  }
+  const plaintext = toBytes(JSON.stringify(delivery));
+  const encrypted = await ecies.encrypt(fromHex(publicKey, "bytes"), plaintext);
+  return `0x${serializeECIES(encrypted)}`;
+}
+export {
+  ENCLAVE_IDENTITY_EVIDENCE_VERSION,
+  ENCLAVE_TRUST_ANCHORS,
+  ENCLAVE_WALLET_PURPOSE,
+  MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_MAX_AGE_SECONDS,
+  MASTER_SIGNATURE_DELIVERY_VERSION,
+  SEALED_ENVELOPE_VERSION,
+  USER_PS_ID_DOMAIN,
+  appRootPreimage,
+  buildMasterSignatureDelivery,
+  encryptMasterSignatureDelivery,
+  kmsIssuedPreimage,
+  userPsId,
+  verifyEnclaveIdentityEvidence
+};
+//# sourceMappingURL=identity.js.map