@opendatalabs/personal-server-ts-server 1.33.7 → 1.34.0

package/dist/pdpp/bootstrap.js

@@ -0,0 +1,270 @@
+/**
+ * Boot the PDPP Authorization Server for a real Personal Server.
+ *
+ * This is the seam between "the AS exists as a library" and "this running
+ * server is a PDPP authorization server". It opens the persistent store,
+ * derives the declaration trust policy from what the deployment actually
+ * serves, and hands the route module the owner-proof wiring so consent
+ * decisions authenticate against the same wallet signature every other owner
+ * route uses.
+ *
+ * Returns undefined when PDPP is disabled and no connection registry is
+ * configured. It also returns undefined when no declarations or connection
+ * methods remain, so `/pdpp/v1` is mounted only when it can issue tokens.
+ */
+import { createHash } from "node:crypto";
+import { readFile } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { join, resolve } from "node:path";
+import { AuthorizationSessionStore, declaredSourceId, openPdppAuthStore, PdppTokenService, resolveUrlHostedClientIdentity, UnsupportedAuthStateError, } from "@opendatalabs/personal-server-ts-core/pdpp";
+import { boundedClientDocumentFetcher } from "./client-document-fetch.js";
+import { resolveRetainedSourceId } from "./source-id-compat.js";
+import { deriveSupportedConnectors, } from "./deployment.js";
+import { openDeclarationRegistry, } from "./declaration-registry.js";
+export async function createPdppAuthDeps(options) {
+    const { config, logger } = options;
+    const hasConnectionRegistry = (config.pdpp.connectionMethods?.length ?? 0) > 0;
+    if (!config.pdpp.enabled && !hasConnectionRegistry)
+        return undefined;
+    // The AS binds grants to a subject and authenticates decisions against the
+    // server owner. Without a known owner there is no subject to bind to and no
+    // signature to check, so refuse to mount rather than invent either.
+    if (!options.serverOwner) {
+        logger.warn("PDPP enabled but no server owner is configured — authorization server not mounted");
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    // The connector inventory is what this PS holds. It gates runtime
+    // submissions only. A configured declaration is admitted without it: the
+    // operator (Desktop, after verifying the signed artifact) chose it, and a
+    // fresh server that holds no legacy data yet must still mount it.
+    const { scopes } = options.indexManager.listDistinctScopes();
+    const supportedConnectors = deriveSupportedConnectors(scopes.map((s) => s.scope));
+    const declarations = await readDeclarations(config.pdpp.enabled ? config.pdpp.declarationPaths : [], logger);
+    const declarationSourceByPath = new Map(declarations
+        .filter((declaration) => declaration.path)
+        .map((declaration) => [resolve(declaration.path), declaration.sourceId]));
+    const configuredMethods = (config.pdpp.enabled ? config.pdpp.methods : []).flatMap((method) => {
+        const sourceId = declarationSourceByPath.get(resolve(method.declaration_path));
+        if (!sourceId) {
+            logger.warn({
+                declarationPath: method.declaration_path,
+                methodId: method.method_id,
+            }, "PDPP method does not reference a retained declaration — method is inactive");
+            return [];
+        }
+        return [{ sourceId, methodId: method.method_id }];
+    });
+    const connectionMethods = new Map();
+    for (const method of config.pdpp.connectionMethods ?? []) {
+        const methods = connectionMethods.get(method.source_id) ?? [];
+        methods.push(method.method_id);
+        connectionMethods.set(method.source_id, methods);
+    }
+    const connectionSourceIds = new Set(connectionMethods.keys());
+    // The durable registry the submission route writes to, seeded from the
+    // configured paths. Seeds and submissions share one validator; only
+    // submissions are held to the connector gate. A submitted declaration
+    // becomes resolvable in this lifetime and survives the next restart.
+    const declarationRegistry = openDeclarationRegistry({
+        path: join(options.storageRoot, "pdpp-declarations.db"),
+        supportedConnectors,
+        logger,
+        seed: declarations.map((d) => ({
+            sourceId: d.sourceId,
+            document: d.document,
+        })),
+    });
+    const registry = {
+        resolve: declarationRegistry.resolve,
+        retained: config.pdpp.enabled ? declarationRegistry.list() : [],
+        retainedDocuments: new Map(declarationRegistry
+            .list()
+            .map((snapshot) => [
+            snapshot.source_id,
+            declarationRegistry.documentFor(snapshot.source_id) ?? "",
+        ])),
+    };
+    const retainedSourceIds = new Set(registry.retained.map((declaration) => declaration.source_id));
+    const activeConfiguredMethods = configuredMethods.filter((method) => retainedSourceIds.has(method.sourceId));
+    for (const method of activeConfiguredMethods) {
+        const methods = connectionMethods.get(method.sourceId) ?? [];
+        if (!methods.includes(method.methodId))
+            methods.push(method.methodId);
+        connectionMethods.set(method.sourceId, methods);
+    }
+    for (const sourceId of connectionMethods.keys()) {
+        connectionSourceIds.add(sourceId);
+    }
+    if (registry.retained.length === 0 && connectionSourceIds.size === 0) {
+        logger.warn({ supportedConnectors, configured: config.pdpp.declarationPaths.length }, "PDPP enabled but no declarations were retained — authorization server not mounted");
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    let store;
+    try {
+        store = openPdppAuthStore(join(options.storageRoot, "pdpp-auth.db"));
+    }
+    catch (err) {
+        if (err instanceof UnsupportedAuthStateError) {
+            // §9 AS item 21: persisted authorization state whose contract this build
+            // cannot validate must not be reinterpreted. Refusing to mount is the
+            // conservative half of "migrate or require fresh consent" — the server
+            // keeps running, but it issues nothing against state it cannot read.
+            logger.error({ err: err.message }, "PDPP authorization state is unsupported — authorization server not mounted");
+            return undefined;
+        }
+        throw err;
+    }
+    const tokens = new PdppTokenService(store);
+    const sessions = new AuthorizationSessionStore();
+    const subjectId = options.serverOwner.toLowerCase();
+    logger.info({
+        declarations: registry.retained.map((d) => d.source_id),
+        supportedConnectors,
+        requirePkce: config.pdpp.requirePkce,
+    }, "PDPP Authorization Server mounted at /pdpp/v1");
+    return {
+        logger,
+        store,
+        tokens,
+        sessions,
+        retainedDeclarations: registry.retained,
+        retainedDocuments: registry.retainedDocuments,
+        configuredMethods: activeConfiguredMethods,
+        connectionMethods,
+        resolveConnectionSourceId: (requested) => resolveRetainedSourceId(requested, connectionSourceIds),
+        resolveDeclaration: config.pdpp.enabled ? registry.resolve : () => null,
+        declarationRegistry,
+        supportedConnectors,
+        // The AS's own issuer identity, for its metadata document. Carried as the
+        // same thunk-or-string `serverOrigin` already is, so a deployment that
+        // resolves its origin late still advertises the live one.
+        issuer: options.serverOrigin,
+        // The records bootstrap replaces this with a live registry lookup once
+        // the shared SQLite store is available. Until then, no connection is
+        // eligible for consent.
+        inventoryFor: () => ({ eligibleFor: () => [] }),
+        /**
+         * Bind the session's subject to an *authenticated* owner.
+         *
+         * This PS is single-owner, so there is only ever one subject — but "there
+         * is one subject" and "any caller may open a session bound to it" are
+         * different claims, and the second is the one that was wrong. Previously
+         * this ignored the request entirely and returned the configured owner, so
+         * an unauthenticated caller could create sessions against the owner's
+         * subject: consent-screen spam and unbounded session allocation, even
+         * though approval still required a real owner token.
+         *
+         * Now the caller must present an active PDPP owner token, and the subject
+         * it resolves to must be the configured owner. Single-owner stays a
+         * deployment property; it stops being an authentication bypass.
+         */
+        currentSubjectId: (c) => {
+            const header = c.req.header("authorization");
+            if (!header?.toLowerCase().startsWith("bearer "))
+                return null;
+            const presented = header.slice(7).trim();
+            if (presented.length === 0)
+                return null;
+            const context = tokens.resolveToken(presented);
+            if (!context.active || context.tokenKind !== "owner")
+                return null;
+            // A token for some other subject is not authority here, even though a
+            // single-owner deployment should never mint one.
+            if (context.subjectId !== subjectId)
+                return null;
+            return subjectId;
+        },
+        // Redirect targets are validated by exact match against this. A client
+        // absent from the config gets null, which fails the request closed — an
+        // unregistered client cannot receive an authorization code.
+        registeredClient: (clientId) => {
+            const registered = config.pdpp.clients.find((candidate) => candidate.clientId === clientId);
+            return registered
+                ? {
+                    client_id: registered.clientId,
+                    redirect_uris: registered.redirectUris,
+                }
+                : null;
+        },
+        // Operator grant-lifetime policy, per registered client. Only a client
+        // with a `grantLifetimeSeconds` in config gets a computed expiry; every
+        // other client (including one resolved via `resolveClientIdentity`) gets
+        // `undefined` here, which preserves the existing no-expiry behavior
+        // exactly. This is deployment policy read from static config, never from
+        // the request — there is no client-supplied expiry field to honor.
+        grantExpiryFor: (_request, clientId) => {
+            const registered = config.pdpp.clients.find((candidate) => candidate.clientId === clientId);
+            const lifetimeSeconds = registered?.grantLifetimeSeconds;
+            if (!lifetimeSeconds)
+                return undefined;
+            return new Date(Date.now() + lifetimeSeconds * 1000).toISOString();
+        },
+        // §6 URL-hosted identity for a client NOT in `clients` above. Left
+        // unset (undefined, not a function that always fails) when the
+        // allowlist is empty, so this deployment performs no outbound fetch and
+        // the route's registration-only fallback runs exactly as it did before
+        // this path existed.
+        resolveClientIdentity: config.pdpp.urlHostedClientHosts.length > 0
+            ? (clientId) => resolveUrlHostedClientIdentity({
+                clientId,
+                fetcher: boundedClientDocumentFetcher,
+                policy: { trustedHosts: config.pdpp.urlHostedClientHosts },
+            })
+            : undefined,
+        requirePkce: config.pdpp.requirePkce,
+        ownerAuth: {
+            serverOrigin: options.serverOrigin,
+            serverOwner: options.serverOwner,
+            devToken: options.devToken,
+            accessToken: options.accessToken,
+            tokenStore: options.tokenStore,
+        },
+        // The verified signer is the owner; normalize to the same subject the
+        // grants use so a token minted here resolves sessions created above.
+        ownerSubjectId: () => subjectId,
+    };
+}
+/**
+ * Read each configured declaration document.
+ *
+ * A path that cannot be read is logged and skipped rather than fatal: one
+ * bad declaration should not stop a server booting, and the registry will
+ * refuse to mount if nothing survives.
+ */
+async function readDeclarations(entries, logger) {
+    const out = [];
+    for (const entry of entries) {
+        const path = typeof entry === "string" ? entry : entry.path;
+        try {
+            const document = await readFile(path, "utf-8");
+            if (typeof entry !== "string") {
+                const actual = createHash("sha256")
+                    .update(document, "utf8")
+                    .digest("hex");
+                if (actual !== entry.sha256) {
+                    logger.warn({ path, expected: entry.sha256, actual }, "PDPP declaration does not match its pinned digest — skipped");
+                    continue;
+                }
+            }
+            // The source id is the declaration's own claim; `parseDeclaration`
+            // cross-checks it, so read it here only to key the retention.
+            //
+            // Asking Core for the id rather than picking a field keeps the boot path
+            // shape-agnostic. Reading `source_id` directly meant a normative §5
+            // document -- which nests it under `source.id` -- was skipped here before
+            // the parser (which handles both) ever saw it, so the AS never mounted
+            // and the only evidence was a warning about a missing field the document
+            // was never supposed to have.
+            const sourceId = declaredSourceId(document);
+            if (sourceId === null) {
+                logger.warn({ path }, "PDPP declaration declares no source id — skipped");
+                continue;
+            }
+            out.push({ sourceId, document, path });
+        }
+        catch (err) {
+            logger.warn({ path, err: err.message }, "PDPP declaration could not be read — skipped");
+        }
+    }
+    return out;
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=bootstrap.js.map

package/dist/pdpp/bootstrap.js.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/pdpp/chain-enforcement.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+/**
+ * Enforcing the Vana chain permission on PDPP client reads.
+ *
+ * ## The gap this closes
+ *
+ * A PDPP access token proves the owner consented. It does not prove the Vana
+ * permission that authorizes the read is still live. Those are two authorities
+ * over two different objects, and the bearer read path checked only the first:
+ * it resolved a locally-issued token in-process and served records. So a
+ * permission revoked on chain kept reading fine through PDPP, and the ledger's
+ * authority was silently not enforced for any PDPP client.
+ *
+ * This adapter is the join. It looks up the retained binding for the presented
+ * PDPP grant, reads the chain grant live, and hands both to
+ * `verifyPdppGrantBinding`, which checks every axis at once: the record, the
+ * deployment, the owner, the grantee app, and revocation.
+ *
+ * ## Why the verification is not re-implemented here
+ *
+ * `packages/core/src/grants/pdpp-binding.ts` already does it, and correctly:
+ * bindings are keyed by the chain's own identity tuple rather than a derived
+ * hash, the record is append-only, and revocation is read live instead of
+ * mirrored into storage. Re-deriving any of that here would create a second
+ * opinion about what a valid binding is, and the two would drift. This file
+ * only supplies inputs and translates the outcome.
+ *
+ * `verifyPdppGrantBinding` checks revocation but NOT expiry — that axis is
+ * added here, immediately after it passes, using the same
+ * `parseGrantExpiresAtSeconds` the legacy chain-grant read path
+ * (`verifyDataReadPolicy`) uses. Without it, this bearer path would silently
+ * keep serving an expired-but-not-revoked grant that the legacy path already
+ * denies — a gap, not a design choice.
+ *
+ * ## Fail closed, and the retryable distinction
+ *
+ * Every denial path answers "no". The only judgment this file makes is whether
+ * a "no" is *definite* or merely *unknown*:
+ *
+ *   - No binding, wrong owner, wrong grantee, revoked, expired → definite.
+ *     Asking again changes nothing.
+ *   - Gateway unreachable, RPC timeout, malformed response → unknown.
+ *
+ * Unknown must still deny. Not knowing is not permission, and an outage that
+ * opened reads would be an authorization bypass that nobody notices, because
+ * the reads all look successful. What unknown gets is a *retryable* answer, so
+ * the route can say "try again" rather than "your grant is dead" to a client
+ * whose grant is probably fine.
+ *
+ * A missing binding is deliberately in the definite-denial bucket, not the
+ * unknown one. "Not bound yet" and "never bound" are indistinguishable from
+ * here, so treating absence as a temporary condition would let an unbound
+ * grant read for as long as a caller kept retrying.
+ */
+import { type PdppGrantBindingStore } from "@opendatalabs/personal-server-ts-core/grants";
+import type { GatewayGrantResponse } from "@opendatalabs/vana-sdk/browser";
+import type { Logger } from "pino";
+import type { PdppChainEnforcementPort } from "../routes/pdpp-records.js";
+export interface ChainEnforcementOptions {
+    /** Retained bindings, written at grant creation. */
+    bindings: PdppGrantBindingStore;
+    /**
+     * Reads the chain grant as it stands NOW. Returning null means "this
+     * permission does not exist", which `verifyPdppGrantBinding` treats as
+     * revoked; THROWING means "I could not find out", which is retryable.
+     *
+     * The two are different answers and must not be collapsed: a gateway that
+     * returns null on a network error would turn every outage into a permanent
+     * revocation for every client.
+     */
+    readChainGrant(permissionId: string): Promise<GatewayGrantResponse | null>;
+    /** The owner this server is configured for, at read time. */
+    serverOwner: `0x${string}`;
+    /** The deployment the PS is configured against. */
+    deployment: {
+        chainId: number;
+        contractAddress: `0x${string}`;
+    };
+    /**
+     * The app's grantee wallet address for a given PDPP `client_id`.
+     *
+     * Resolved per request rather than taken from the binding, because this is
+     * the half that proves the CALLER is the bound app rather than merely
+     * knowing its grant id. Returning null denies.
+     */
+    granteeAddressFor(clientId: string): `0x${string}` | null;
+    logger: Logger;
+    /**
+     * Deterministic clock for expiry comparisons. Defaults to the real clock;
+     * tests inject a fixed value so expiry assertions aren't a race against
+     * wall time.
+     */
+    now?: () => Date;
+}
+export declare function chainPermissionEnforcement(options: ChainEnforcementOptions): PdppChainEnforcementPort;
+//# sourceMappingURL=chain-enforcement.d.ts.map

package/dist/pdpp/chain-enforcement.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/pdpp/chain-enforcement.js

@@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+/**
+ * Enforcing the Vana chain permission on PDPP client reads.
+ *
+ * ## The gap this closes
+ *
+ * A PDPP access token proves the owner consented. It does not prove the Vana
+ * permission that authorizes the read is still live. Those are two authorities
+ * over two different objects, and the bearer read path checked only the first:
+ * it resolved a locally-issued token in-process and served records. So a
+ * permission revoked on chain kept reading fine through PDPP, and the ledger's
+ * authority was silently not enforced for any PDPP client.
+ *
+ * This adapter is the join. It looks up the retained binding for the presented
+ * PDPP grant, reads the chain grant live, and hands both to
+ * `verifyPdppGrantBinding`, which checks every axis at once: the record, the
+ * deployment, the owner, the grantee app, and revocation.
+ *
+ * ## Why the verification is not re-implemented here
+ *
+ * `packages/core/src/grants/pdpp-binding.ts` already does it, and correctly:
+ * bindings are keyed by the chain's own identity tuple rather than a derived
+ * hash, the record is append-only, and revocation is read live instead of
+ * mirrored into storage. Re-deriving any of that here would create a second
+ * opinion about what a valid binding is, and the two would drift. This file
+ * only supplies inputs and translates the outcome.
+ *
+ * `verifyPdppGrantBinding` checks revocation but NOT expiry — that axis is
+ * added here, immediately after it passes, using the same
+ * `parseGrantExpiresAtSeconds` the legacy chain-grant read path
+ * (`verifyDataReadPolicy`) uses. Without it, this bearer path would silently
+ * keep serving an expired-but-not-revoked grant that the legacy path already
+ * denies — a gap, not a design choice.
+ *
+ * ## Fail closed, and the retryable distinction
+ *
+ * Every denial path answers "no". The only judgment this file makes is whether
+ * a "no" is *definite* or merely *unknown*:
+ *
+ *   - No binding, wrong owner, wrong grantee, revoked, expired → definite.
+ *     Asking again changes nothing.
+ *   - Gateway unreachable, RPC timeout, malformed response → unknown.
+ *
+ * Unknown must still deny. Not knowing is not permission, and an outage that
+ * opened reads would be an authorization bypass that nobody notices, because
+ * the reads all look successful. What unknown gets is a *retryable* answer, so
+ * the route can say "try again" rather than "your grant is dead" to a client
+ * whose grant is probably fine.
+ *
+ * A missing binding is deliberately in the definite-denial bucket, not the
+ * unknown one. "Not bound yet" and "never bound" are indistinguishable from
+ * here, so treating absence as a temporary condition would let an unbound
+ * grant read for as long as a caller kept retrying.
+ */
+import { verifyPdppGrantBinding, } from "@opendatalabs/personal-server-ts-core/grants";
+import { parseGrantExpiresAtSeconds } from "@opendatalabs/personal-server-ts-core/policy";
+export function chainPermissionEnforcement(options) {
+    const { bindings, deployment, logger, serverOwner } = options;
+    return {
+        async authorize({ clientId, pdppGrantId }) {
+            const binding = bindings.getByPdppGrantId(pdppGrantId);
+            if (!binding) {
+                // Definite: absence of a binding is not a pending state.
+                return {
+                    ok: false,
+                    reason: "No chain binding for this grant",
+                    retryable: false,
+                };
+            }
+            const granteeAddress = options.granteeAddressFor(clientId);
+            if (!granteeAddress) {
+                return {
+                    ok: false,
+                    reason: "No grantee address for this client",
+                    retryable: false,
+                };
+            }
+            let chainGrant;
+            try {
+                chainGrant = await options.readChainGrant(binding.permission.permissionId);
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                // Unknown, not denied. Logged at warn because a persistent unknown is
+                // an outage worth paging on, and it is invisible in the response.
+                logger.warn({
+                    err: err.message,
+                    permissionId: binding.permission.permissionId,
+                    pdppGrantId,
+                }, "PDPP chain enforcement: could not read chain grant");
+                return {
+                    ok: false,
+                    reason: "Chain grant could not be read",
+                    retryable: true,
+                };
+            }
+            try {
+                verifyPdppGrantBinding({
+                    binding,
+                    chainGrant,
+                    deployment,
+                    pdppGrantId,
+                    // The caller proves it is the app by being the bound grantee. On the
+                    // bearer path the token IS the proof of which client is calling, so
+                    // the resolved address for that client_id stands in for a signature.
+                    requestSigner: granteeAddress,
+                    serverOwner,
+                });
+            }
+            catch (err) {
+                // Every failure here is definite: owner mismatch, grantee mismatch,
+                // wrong deployment, or revocation. None improve on retry.
+                return {
+                    ok: false,
+                    reason: err.message,
+                    retryable: false,
+                };
+            }
+            // `verifyPdppGrantBinding` does not check expiry — it only checks
+            // revocation. The legacy `/v1/data/:scope` chain-grant read path
+            // (`verifyDataReadPolicy`) enforces `grant.expiresAt`; this bearer path
+            // must not silently skip a check that path already makes. `chainGrant`
+            // is non-null here (a null grant already returned above via
+            // `verifyPdppGrantBinding`'s "not found = revoked" check).
+            const expiresAtSec = parseGrantExpiresAtSeconds(chainGrant.expiresAt);
+            if (expiresAtSec === null) {
+                return {
+                    ok: false,
+                    reason: "Grant expiry is invalid",
+                    retryable: false,
+                };
+            }
+            if (expiresAtSec > 0) {
+                const nowSec = Math.floor((options.now?.() ?? new Date()).getTime() / 1000);
+                if (expiresAtSec < nowSec) {
+                    return {
+                        ok: false,
+                        reason: "Grant has expired",
+                        retryable: false,
+                    };
+                }
+            }
+            return { ok: true };
+        },
+    };
+}
+//# sourceMappingURL=chain-enforcement.js.map

package/dist/pdpp/chain-enforcement.js.map

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package/dist/pdpp/client-document-fetch.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+/**
+ * Bounded production fetcher for a URL-hosted client identity document
+ * (Core §6). Implements `ClientDocumentFetcher` from
+ * `@opendatalabs/personal-server-ts-core/pdpp`.
+ *
+ * Invariants:
+ *   - HTTPS only.
+ *   - Every address actually dialed is checked: a hostname's DNS answers via
+ *     a custom `lookup` on the `undici` dispatcher (defends DNS rebinding —
+ *     `net`/`tls`/`undici` dial exactly the address `lookup` returns, so
+ *     there is no separate resolution to race), and a literal-IP URL
+ *     hostname separately, since that never reaches `dns.lookup` at all.
+ *   - No redirect is followed; a redirect or an oversized/rejected body is
+ *     drained (`discardBody`), never left dangling on the socket.
+ *   - One `AbortSignal`/timeout spans connect + headers + body + cleanup.
+ *   - The body is read incrementally and dropped past the byte cap.
+ *   - No credentials are forwarded.
+ */
+import { Agent } from "undici";
+import type { ClientDocumentFetcher } from "@opendatalabs/personal-server-ts-core/pdpp";
+export declare const FETCH_TIMEOUT_MS = 5000;
+export declare const MAX_RESPONSE_BYTES: number;
+/** Thrown by the connect-time guard; surfaces as a `fetch_failed` result. */
+export declare class BlockedAddressError extends Error {
+}
+export declare function isBlockedAddress(address: string): boolean;
+/**
+ * Build a dispatcher that only ever connects to an address that passes the
+ * guard, bundled with the exact predicate it was built with so a caller
+ * can't pass a mismatched one to the pre-dial literal-IP check in
+ * {@link createBoundedFetcher}. `tlsOpts` is exposed solely so tests can
+ * trust a local self-signed certificate; `isBlocked` lets tests run against
+ * loopback without disabling the guard mechanism itself. Production code
+ * must call {@link boundedClientDocumentFetcher}, which passes neither.
+ */
+declare function buildGuardedAgent(tlsOpts?: {
+    ca?: string | Buffer;
+    isBlocked?: (address: string) => boolean;
+}): {
+    dispatcher: Agent;
+    isBlocked: (address: string) => boolean;
+};
+/**
+ * Build a bounded `ClientDocumentFetcher`. HTTPS-only, no redirects, one
+ * connect+headers+body timeout, a streamed byte cap, and address validation
+ * on every DNS answer *and* on a literal-IP hostname (which never reaches
+ * `dns.lookup`, so the dispatcher's guarded `lookup` alone would miss it).
+ *
+ * Takes {@link buildGuardedAgent}'s return value as a whole (not just its
+ * `dispatcher`) so the pre-dial literal-IP check always uses the exact same
+ * predicate the dispatcher's `lookup` guard was built with — there is no
+ * call shape that lets the two diverge.
+ */
+declare function createBoundedFetcher({ dispatcher, isBlocked, }: ReturnType<typeof buildGuardedAgent>): ClientDocumentFetcher;
+/** The production fetcher: no test-only overrides reach this path. */
+export declare const boundedClientDocumentFetcher: ClientDocumentFetcher;
+/** Test-only seam: same bounds, with a dispatcher that trusts a test CA. */
+export declare const __testing: {
+    createBoundedFetcher: typeof createBoundedFetcher;
+    buildGuardedAgent: typeof buildGuardedAgent;
+};
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=client-document-fetch.d.ts.map

package/dist/pdpp/client-document-fetch.d.ts.map

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