@openclaw/signal 2026.9.5 → 2026.9.7

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/windows-path-alias.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+import { FsSafeError } from "./errors.js";
+export type WindowsPathAliasKind = "filesystem" | "relative";
+/**
+ * Capture an ordinary Windows drive-relative path without normalizing its raw
+ * suffix. This is only for public APIs whose existing contract accepts such
+ * paths; callers must still run namespace-alias admission on the result.
+ */
+export declare function anchorWindowsDriveRelativePath(value: string): string;
+/**
+ * Resolve a path without letting Node erase the separator from an exact
+ * extended-length drive root such as `\\?\C:\`. Bare `\\?\C:` input remains
+ * unchanged so the surrounding alias admission rejects it.
+ */
+export declare function resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot(value: string): string;
+/**
+ * Preserve a namespaced drive root after a caller has already resolved the
+ * input. This lets admission fast paths keep exactly one live path.resolve
+ * call while retaining the same root-repair behavior as the general helper.
+ */
+export declare function repairResolvedWindowsRoot(value: string, resolved: string): string;
+/**
+ * Resolve path segments against a base while preserving a namespaced drive
+ * root when Node normalizes a legitimate rooted input back to that root.
+ * Raw bare namespace drives stay bare so admission checks still reject them.
+ */
+export declare function resolvePathFromBasePreservingWindowsRoot(base: string, ...segments: string[]): string;
+/**
+ * Adapt an admitted namespaced drive root for Node's Windows filesystem layer.
+ * Node removes the root separator from these paths during filesystem dispatch,
+ * so use the equivalent ordinary drive root for the operation. This is not an
+ * admission check: callers must validate attacker-controlled input first.
+ */
+export declare function pathForWindowsFilesystem(value: string): string;
+/** Returns true when a Windows pathname can address an alternate filesystem namespace. */
+export declare function hasWindowsPathAlias(value: string, kind: WindowsPathAliasKind, platform?: NodeJS.Platform | string): boolean;
+export declare function assertNoWindowsPathAliasForPlatform(value: string, kind: WindowsPathAliasKind, message: string, platform: NodeJS.Platform | string | undefined): void;
+export declare function assertNoWindowsPathAlias(value: string, kind?: WindowsPathAliasKind, message?: string, platform?: NodeJS.Platform | string): void;
+export declare function isWindowsPathAliasError(error: unknown): error is FsSafeError;
+export declare function admitStandalonePublicationPath(value: string, message?: string): string;

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/windows-path-alias.js

@@ -0,0 +1,122 @@
+import path from "node:path";
+import { FsSafeError } from "./errors.js";
+import { hasWindowsDrivePrefix, rootedWindowsDriveColonIndex, windowsNamespaceMarker, } from "./windows-path-syntax.js";
+function isBareWindowsNamespaceDrive(value) {
+    return value.length === 6 && windowsNamespaceMarker(value) !== undefined &&
+        hasWindowsDrivePrefix(value, 4);
+}
+/**
+ * Capture an ordinary Windows drive-relative path without normalizing its raw
+ * suffix. This is only for public APIs whose existing contract accepts such
+ * paths; callers must still run namespace-alias admission on the result.
+ */
+export function anchorWindowsDriveRelativePath(value) {
+    if (process.platform !== "win32" || path.isAbsolute(value))
+        return value;
+    if (!hasWindowsDrivePrefix(value)) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    const drive = value.slice(0, 2);
+    const base = path.resolve(drive);
+    return `${base}${path.sep}${value.slice(2)}`;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve a path without letting Node erase the separator from an exact
+ * extended-length drive root such as `\\?\C:\`. Bare `\\?\C:` input remains
+ * unchanged so the surrounding alias admission rejects it.
+ */
+export function resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot(value) {
+    if (value.length === 7 &&
+        process.platform === "win32" &&
+        rootedWindowsDriveColonIndex(value) === 5) {
+        return value.includes("/") ? value.replaceAll("/", "\\") : value;
+    }
+    const resolved = path.resolve(value);
+    return repairResolvedWindowsRoot(value, resolved);
+}
+/**
+ * Preserve a namespaced drive root after a caller has already resolved the
+ * input. This lets admission fast paths keep exactly one live path.resolve
+ * call while retaining the same root-repair behavior as the general helper.
+ */
+export function repairResolvedWindowsRoot(value, resolved) {
+    if (resolved.length === 6 &&
+        process.platform === "win32" &&
+        isBareWindowsNamespaceDrive(resolved) &&
+        !hasWindowsPathAlias(value, "filesystem")) {
+        return `${resolved}\\`;
+    }
+    return resolved;
+}
+/**
+ * Resolve path segments against a base while preserving a namespaced drive
+ * root when Node normalizes a legitimate rooted input back to that root.
+ * Raw bare namespace drives stay bare so admission checks still reject them.
+ */
+export function resolvePathFromBasePreservingWindowsRoot(base, ...segments) {
+    const resolved = path.resolve(base, ...segments);
+    if (resolved.length !== 6 ||
+        process.platform !== "win32" ||
+        !isBareWindowsNamespaceDrive(resolved)) {
+        return resolved;
+    }
+    if (hasWindowsPathAlias(base, "filesystem") ||
+        segments.some((segment) => hasWindowsPathAlias(segment, "filesystem"))) {
+        return resolved;
+    }
+    return `${resolved}\\`;
+}
+/**
+ * Adapt an admitted namespaced drive root for Node's Windows filesystem layer.
+ * Node removes the root separator from these paths during filesystem dispatch,
+ * so use the equivalent ordinary drive root for the operation. This is not an
+ * admission check: callers must validate attacker-controlled input first.
+ */
+export function pathForWindowsFilesystem(value) {
+    if (process.platform !== "win32" ||
+        rootedWindowsDriveColonIndex(value) !== 5) {
+        return value;
+    }
+    if (value.length === 7) {
+        return `${value[4]}:\\`;
+    }
+    const resolved = path.resolve(value);
+    if (isBareWindowsNamespaceDrive(resolved) &&
+        !hasWindowsPathAlias(value, "filesystem")) {
+        return `${resolved[4]}:\\`;
+    }
+    return value;
+}
+/** Returns true when a Windows pathname can address an alternate filesystem namespace. */
+export function hasWindowsPathAlias(value, kind, platform = process.platform) {
+    if (platform !== "win32")
+        return false;
+    const firstColon = value.indexOf(":");
+    if (firstColon === -1)
+        return false;
+    if (kind === "relative")
+        return true;
+    return firstColon !== rootedWindowsDriveColonIndex(value) || value.indexOf(":", firstColon + 1) !== -1;
+}
+export function assertNoWindowsPathAliasForPlatform(value, kind, message, platform) {
+    if (hasWindowsPathAlias(value, kind, platform)) {
+        throw new FsSafeError("invalid-path", message, {
+            details: { reason: "windows-path-alias" },
+        });
+    }
+}
+export function assertNoWindowsPathAlias(value, kind = "filesystem", message = "path uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias", platform = process.platform) {
+    if (hasWindowsPathAlias(value, kind, platform)) {
+        throw new FsSafeError("invalid-path", message, {
+            details: { reason: "windows-path-alias" },
+        });
+    }
+}
+export function isWindowsPathAliasError(error) {
+    return error instanceof FsSafeError && error.details?.reason === "windows-path-alias";
+}
+export function admitStandalonePublicationPath(value, message) {
+    const admittedPath = anchorWindowsDriveRelativePath(value);
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(admittedPath, "filesystem", message);
+    return admittedPath;
+}

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/windows-path-syntax.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+export declare function isWindowsSeparator(value: string, offset: number): boolean;
+export declare function hasWindowsDrivePrefix(value: string, offset?: number): boolean;
+/** Classify a raw prefix without normalizing any path components. */
+export declare function windowsNamespaceMarker(value: string): "." | "?" | undefined;
+export declare function rootedWindowsDriveColonIndex(value: string): number;

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/windows-path-syntax.js

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+export function isWindowsSeparator(value, offset) {
+    const code = value.charCodeAt(offset);
+    return code === 0x2f || code === 0x5c;
+}
+export function hasWindowsDrivePrefix(value, offset = 0) {
+    const letter = value.charCodeAt(offset) | 0x20;
+    return letter >= 0x61 && letter <= 0x7a && value.charCodeAt(offset + 1) === 0x3a;
+}
+/** Classify a raw prefix without normalizing any path components. */
+export function windowsNamespaceMarker(value) {
+    const marker = value[2];
+    return (marker === "." || marker === "?") &&
+        isWindowsSeparator(value, 0) && isWindowsSeparator(value, 1) &&
+        isWindowsSeparator(value, 3) ? marker : undefined;
+}
+export function rootedWindowsDriveColonIndex(value) {
+    const colon = hasWindowsDrivePrefix(value)
+        ? 1
+        : windowsNamespaceMarker(value) !== undefined && hasWindowsDrivePrefix(value, 4) ? 5 : -1;
+    return colon >= 0 && isWindowsSeparator(value, colon + 1) ? colon : -1;
+}

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/windows-security-bridge.cs

@@ -0,0 +1,336 @@
+// Executed only by the built-in Windows PowerShell/.NET host. The raw security
+// descriptor never passes through CommonSecurityDescriptor's ACE normalization.
+using System;
+using System.Collections.Generic;
+using System.Runtime.InteropServices;
+using System.Security.AccessControl;
+using System.Security.Principal;
+using System.Text;
+using Microsoft.Win32.SafeHandles;
+
+public static partial class FsSafeWindowsBridge {
+  [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)] struct IoStatus { public IntPtr Status; public UIntPtr Information; }
+  [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)] struct UnicodeString { public ushort Length, MaximumLength; public IntPtr Buffer; }
+  [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)] struct ObjectAttributes {
+    public uint Length; public IntPtr RootDirectory, ObjectName; public uint Attributes;
+    public IntPtr SecurityDescriptor, SecurityQualityOfService;
+  }
+  [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)] struct FileInfo {
+    public uint Attributes, CreationLow, CreationHigh, AccessLow, AccessHigh, WriteLow, WriteHigh;
+    public uint Volume, SizeHigh, SizeLow, Links, IndexHigh, IndexLow;
+  }
+  [StructLayout(LayoutKind.Sequential)] struct FileId {
+    public ulong Volume; [MarshalAs(UnmanagedType.ByValArray, SizeConst=16)] public byte[] Id;
+  }
+  [DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true, CharSet=CharSet.Unicode, ExactSpelling=true)] static extern SafeFileHandle CreateFileW(string path, uint access, uint share, IntPtr security, uint disposition, uint flags, IntPtr template);
+  [DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)] static extern IntPtr GetStdHandle(int standard);
+  [DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)] static extern uint GetFileType(SafeFileHandle handle);
+  [DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)] static extern bool GetFileInformationByHandle(SafeFileHandle handle, out FileInfo information);
+  [DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)] static extern bool GetFileInformationByHandleEx(SafeFileHandle handle, int kind, out FileId information, uint size);
+  [DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true)] static extern bool SetFileInformationByHandle(SafeFileHandle handle, int kind, ref uint information, uint size);
+  [DllImport("kernel32.dll", SetLastError=true, CharSet=CharSet.Unicode, ExactSpelling=true)] static extern uint GetFinalPathNameByHandleW(SafeFileHandle handle, StringBuilder path, uint capacity, uint flags);
+  [DllImport("kernel32.dll")] static extern IntPtr LocalFree(IntPtr memory);
+  [DllImport("advapi32.dll")] static extern uint GetSecurityInfo(SafeFileHandle handle, int kind, uint sections, out IntPtr owner, out IntPtr group, out IntPtr dacl, out IntPtr sacl, out IntPtr descriptor);
+  [DllImport("advapi32.dll")] static extern uint GetSecurityDescriptorLength(IntPtr descriptor);
+  [DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true)] static extern bool GetSecurityDescriptorDacl(IntPtr descriptor, out bool present, out IntPtr dacl, out bool defaulted);
+  [DllImport("advapi32.dll", SetLastError=true)] static extern bool GetSecurityDescriptorOwner(IntPtr descriptor, out IntPtr owner, out bool defaulted);
+  [DllImport("advapi32.dll")] static extern uint SetSecurityInfo(SafeFileHandle handle, int kind, uint sections, IntPtr owner, IntPtr group, IntPtr dacl, IntPtr sacl);
+  [DllImport("ntdll.dll")] static extern int NtQueryInformationFile(SafeFileHandle handle, out IoStatus io, [Out] byte[] information, uint length, int kind);
+  [DllImport("ntdll.dll")] static extern int NtCreateFile(out SafeFileHandle handle, uint access, ref ObjectAttributes attributes, out IoStatus io, IntPtr allocation, uint flags, uint share, uint disposition, uint options, IntPtr ea, uint eaLength);
+  [DllImport("ntdll.dll")] static extern uint RtlNtStatusToDosError(int status);
+
+  sealed class Failure : Exception {
+    public readonly string Code;
+    public Failure(string code, string message) : base(message) { Code=code; }
+  }
+  static Failure OsFailure(uint error, string operation, bool identity=false, bool fullIdentity=false) {
+    // Native security calls retain EACCES; shared handle identity calls use EPERM.
+    string code=error==5 ? (identity ? "EPERM" : "EACCES") : error==80 || error==183 ? "EEXIST" : error==2 || error==3 ? "ENOENT" :
+      identity && (error==112 || error==39) ? "ENOSPC" : identity && (error==32 || error==33) ? "EBUSY" :
+      fullIdentity && (error==1 || error==50 || error==87) ? "ENOTSUP" : "EIO";
+    return new Failure(code, operation+" failed with Windows error "+error);
+  }
+  static Failure CreateFailure(uint error) {
+    var failure=OsFailure(error,"create private directory",true);
+    return failure.Code=="EPERM" ? new Failure("EACCES",failure.Message) : failure;
+  }
+  static void Require(bool condition, string code, string message) {
+    if (!condition) throw new Failure(code,message);
+  }
+  static Dictionary<string,object> Row(params object[] fields) {
+    var result=new Dictionary<string,object>();
+    for(int i=0;i<fields.Length;i+=2) result.Add((string)fields[i],fields[i+1]);
+    return result;
+  }
+  static SafeFileHandle Open(string path, uint access, bool noFollow) {
+    var handle=CreateFileW(path,access,7,IntPtr.Zero,3,0x02000000u | (noFollow ? 0x00200000u : 0),IntPtr.Zero);
+    if(handle.IsInvalid) { uint error=(uint)Marshal.GetLastWin32Error(); handle.Dispose(); throw OsFailure(error,"open security handle"); }
+    return handle;
+  }
+  static FileInfo Information(SafeFileHandle handle) {
+    FileInfo info;
+    if(!GetFileInformationByHandle(handle,out info)) throw OsFailure((uint)Marshal.GetLastWin32Error(),"inspect handle identity",true);
+    return info;
+  }
+  static string Identity(SafeFileHandle handle) {
+    var info=Information(handle);
+    return info.Volume.ToString("x8")+":"+(((ulong)info.IndexHigh<<32)|info.IndexLow).ToString("x16");
+  }
+  static string DirectoryIdentity(SafeFileHandle handle, bool requireLocal=false) {
+    var info=Information(handle);
+    Require((info.Attributes&0x400)==0,"ELOOP","private directory must not be a reparse point");
+    Require((info.Attributes&0x10)!=0,"ENOTDIR","private directory handle must name a directory");
+    if(requireLocal) Require(IsLocal(handle),"ENOTSUP","private directories require a local filesystem");
+    return FullIdentity(handle);
+  }
+  static string FullIdentity(SafeFileHandle handle) {
+    FileId id;
+    if(!GetFileInformationByHandleEx(handle,18,out id,24)) throw OsFailure((uint)Marshal.GetLastWin32Error(),"inspect 128-bit file identity",true,true);
+    Require(id.Id!=null && id.Id.Length==16,"EIO","file identity is incomplete");
+    return id.Volume.ToString("x16")+":"+BitConverter.ToString(id.Id).Replace("-","").ToLowerInvariant();
+  }
+  static string FileIdentity(SafeFileHandle handle, uint expectedLinks) {
+    var info=Information(handle);
+    Require((info.Attributes&0x400)==0,"ELOOP","private file must not be a reparse point");
+    Require((info.Attributes&0x10)==0 && GetFileType(handle)==1,"EINVAL","private file must be a regular disk file");
+    Require(info.Links==expectedLinks,"EIO","private file link count changed");
+    return FullIdentity(handle);
+  }
+  static string FinalPath(SafeFileHandle handle, uint flags) {
+    int capacity=512;
+    for(int attempt=0;attempt<4;attempt++) {
+      var path=new StringBuilder(capacity);
+      uint length=GetFinalPathNameByHandleW(handle,path,(uint)capacity,flags);
+      if(length==0) throw OsFailure((uint)Marshal.GetLastWin32Error(),"inspect handle locality");
+      if(length<capacity) return path.ToString();
+      Require(length<32768,"EIO","final handle path exceeds the inspection budget");
+      capacity=(int)length+1;
+    }
+    throw new Failure("EIO","final handle path changed during inspection");
+  }
+  static bool IsVolumeGuidPath(string path) {
+    return path.Length>=49 && path.StartsWith(@"\\?\Volume{",StringComparison.OrdinalIgnoreCase) &&
+      path[47]=='}' && path[48]=='\\' &&
+      System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.IsMatch(path.Substring(11,36),@"^[0-9a-fA-F]{8}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{4}-[0-9a-fA-F]{12}$");
+  }
+  static bool IsLocalFinalPath(string path) {
+    return !path.StartsWith(@"\\?\UNC\",StringComparison.Ordinal) &&
+      (!path.StartsWith(@"\\",StringComparison.Ordinal) || path.StartsWith(@"\\?\",StringComparison.Ordinal));
+  }
+  static bool IsLocal(SafeFileHandle handle) {
+    IoStatus io; var remote=new byte[]{255};
+    int status=NtQueryInformationFile(handle,out io,remote,1,51);
+    if(status==0 && io.Information.ToUInt64()==1 && remote[0]<=1) return remote[0]==0;
+    try {
+      if(IsVolumeGuidPath(FinalPath(handle,9))) return true;
+    } catch(Failure) { }
+    return IsLocalFinalPath(FinalPath(handle,0));
+  }
+  static string Sid(SecurityIdentifier sid) {
+    Require(sid!=null,"EIO","security descriptor SID is missing");
+    return sid.Value.ToLowerInvariant();
+  }
+  static Dictionary<string,object> Security(SafeFileHandle handle, bool requireLocality=true) {
+    IntPtr owner,group,dacl,sacl,descriptor;
+    uint error=GetSecurityInfo(handle,1,5,out owner,out group,out dacl,out sacl,out descriptor);
+    if(error!=0) throw OsFailure(error,"read owner and DACL");
+    try {
+      Require(descriptor!=IntPtr.Zero && owner!=IntPtr.Zero,"EIO","security descriptor is incomplete");
+      uint length=GetSecurityDescriptorLength(descriptor);
+      Require(length>=20 && length<=1024*1024,"EIO","security descriptor exceeds the inspection budget");
+      var bytes=new byte[length]; Marshal.Copy(descriptor,bytes,0,(int)length);
+      var raw=new RawSecurityDescriptor(bytes,0);
+      string ownerSid=Sid(raw.Owner), currentSid;
+      using(var current=WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent()) currentSid=Sid(current.User);
+      var aces=new List<object>(); var unsupported=new List<int>();
+      if(raw.DiscretionaryAcl!=null) foreach(GenericAce ace in raw.DiscretionaryAcl) {
+        var basic=ace as CommonAce;
+        if(basic==null || basic.IsCallback || (ace.AceType!=AceType.AccessAllowed && ace.AceType!=AceType.AccessDenied)) {
+          unsupported.Add((int)ace.AceType); continue;
+        }
+        byte flags=(byte)ace.AceFlags;
+        aces.Add(Row("sid",Sid(basic.SecurityIdentifier),"mask",unchecked((uint)basic.AccessMask),
+          "aceType",ace.AceType==AceType.AccessAllowed ? "allow" : "deny",
+          "flags",Row("raw",flags,"objectInherit",(flags&1)!=0,"containerInherit",(flags&2)!=0,
+            "noPropagateInherit",(flags&4)!=0,"inheritOnly",(flags&8)!=0,"inherited",(flags&16)!=0,
+            "successfulAccess",(flags&64)!=0,"failedAccess",(flags&128)!=0)));
+      }
+      bool isLocal;
+      try { isLocal=IsLocal(handle); }
+      catch(Failure) { if(requireLocality) throw; isLocal=false; }
+      return Row("ownerSid",ownerSid,"currentUserSid",currentSid,"daclPresent",raw.DiscretionaryAcl!=null,
+        "daclProtected",(raw.ControlFlags&ControlFlags.DiscretionaryAclProtected)!=0,
+        "isLocal",isLocal,"aceListComplete",unsupported.Count==0,"unsupportedAceTypes",unsupported.ToArray(),"aces",aces.ToArray());
+    } finally { if(descriptor!=IntPtr.Zero) LocalFree(descriptor); }
+  }
+  static byte[] PrivateSecurity(bool inherit=true) {
+    SecurityIdentifier current;
+    using(var identity=WindowsIdentity.GetCurrent()) current=identity.User;
+    var acl=new RawAcl(2,3);
+    var principals=new[]{current,new SecurityIdentifier("S-1-5-18"),new SecurityIdentifier("S-1-5-32-544")};
+    var flags=inherit ? AceFlags.ObjectInherit|AceFlags.ContainerInherit : AceFlags.None;
+    foreach(var principal in principals) acl.InsertAce(acl.Count,new CommonAce(flags,AceQualifier.AccessAllowed,0x1f01ff,principal,false,null));
+    var descriptor=new RawSecurityDescriptor(ControlFlags.DiscretionaryAclPresent|ControlFlags.DiscretionaryAclProtected|ControlFlags.SelfRelative,current,null,null,acl);
+    var bytes=new byte[descriptor.BinaryLength]; descriptor.GetBinaryForm(bytes,0); return bytes;
+  }
+  static SafeFileHandle CreateRelative(SafeFileHandle parent,string name) {
+    byte[] security=PrivateSecurity();
+    var pin=GCHandle.Alloc(security,GCHandleType.Pinned);
+    IntPtr nameBuffer=Marshal.StringToHGlobalUni(name), unicodeBuffer=IntPtr.Zero;
+    try {
+      int byteLength=checked(name.Length*2);
+      Require(byteLength>0 && byteLength<=65532,"EINVAL","private directory name is invalid");
+      var unicode=new UnicodeString { Length=(ushort)byteLength, MaximumLength=(ushort)(byteLength+2), Buffer=nameBuffer };
+      unicodeBuffer=Marshal.AllocHGlobal(Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(UnicodeString))); Marshal.StructureToPtr(unicode,unicodeBuffer,false);
+      var attributes=new ObjectAttributes { Length=(uint)Marshal.SizeOf(typeof(ObjectAttributes)),RootDirectory=parent.DangerousGetHandle(),
+        ObjectName=unicodeBuffer,Attributes=0x40|0x1000,SecurityDescriptor=pin.AddrOfPinnedObject() };
+      IoStatus io; SafeFileHandle created;
+      int status=NtCreateFile(out created,0x00130180,ref attributes,out io,IntPtr.Zero,0,7,2,0x00200021,IntPtr.Zero,0);
+      if(status<0) { if(created!=null) created.Dispose(); throw CreateFailure(RtlNtStatusToDosError(status)); }
+      return created;
+    } finally { if(unicodeBuffer!=IntPtr.Zero) Marshal.FreeHGlobal(unicodeBuffer); Marshal.FreeHGlobal(nameBuffer); pin.Free(); }
+  }
+  static void RequirePrivate(Dictionary<string,object> facts, bool requireProtected=true, bool requirePrivateChildren=false, bool allowAdministratorsOwner=false) {
+    string current=(string)facts["currentUserSid"], owner=(string)facts["ownerSid"];
+    Require((bool)facts["isLocal"] && (bool)facts["daclPresent"] && (!requireProtected || (bool)facts["daclProtected"]) &&
+      (bool)facts["aceListComplete"] && (owner==current || (allowAdministratorsOwner && owner=="s-1-5-32-544")),
+      "EACCES","private object security was not enforced");
+    foreach(Dictionary<string,object> ace in (object[])facts["aces"]) {
+      var flags=(Dictionary<string,object>)ace["flags"];
+      string sid=(string)ace["sid"];
+      if((string)ace["aceType"]=="deny" || sid==current || sid=="s-1-5-18" || sid=="s-1-5-32-544") continue;
+      if((bool)flags["inheritOnly"] && (!requirePrivateChildren || (!(bool)flags["objectInherit"] && !(bool)flags["containerInherit"]))) continue;
+      uint mask=(uint)ace["mask"];
+      Require((mask&0xd00d01dfu)==0,"EACCES","private object permits untrusted access");
+    }
+  }
+  static void SplitParent(string path, out string parentPath, out string name) {
+    // JavaScript has already admitted and resolved this spelling. Keep extended
+    // Win32 paths out of .NET Framework's separate pathname normalization.
+    int separator=path.LastIndexOf('\\');
+    Require(separator>0 && separator<path.Length-1,"EINVAL","private object must name a child");
+    parentPath=path.Substring(0,separator); name=path.Substring(separator+1);
+    if(parentPath.EndsWith(":")) parentPath+="\\";
+  }
+  static string ExpectedIdentity(string variable, bool required=true) {
+    string identity=Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable(variable) ?? "";
+    Require((!required && identity.Length==0) || System.Text.RegularExpressions.Regex.IsMatch(identity,@"\A[0-9a-f]{16}:[0-9a-f]{32}\z"),
+      "EINVAL","complete expected Windows identity is required");
+    return identity;
+  }
+  static void CheckParent(SafeFileHandle parent, string path, string identity) {
+    Require(DirectoryIdentity(parent,true)==identity,"EIO","retained private parent changed");
+    using(var named=Open(path,0x80,true)) Require(DirectoryIdentity(named,true)==identity,"EIO","private parent pathname changed");
+  }
+  static object InspectDirectory(string path) {
+    bool requirePrivate=Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("FS_SAFE_WINDOWS_SECURITY_REQUIRE_PRIVATE")=="1";
+    using(var handle=Open(path,requirePrivate ? 0x00020080u : 0x80u,true)) {
+      string identity=DirectoryIdentity(handle,true);
+      if(requirePrivate) RequirePrivate(Security(handle),true,true);
+      return Row("identity",identity);
+    }
+  }
+  static void ProtectFileSecurity(SafeFileHandle handle) {
+    byte[] security=PrivateSecurity(false);
+    var pin=GCHandle.Alloc(security,GCHandleType.Pinned);
+    try {
+      bool present,defaulted; IntPtr dacl,owner;
+      if(!GetSecurityDescriptorDacl(pin.AddrOfPinnedObject(),out present,out dacl,out defaulted)) {
+        throw OsFailure((uint)Marshal.GetLastWin32Error(),"inspect private file DACL");
+      }
+      Require(present && dacl!=IntPtr.Zero,"EIO","private file DACL is incomplete");
+      if(!GetSecurityDescriptorOwner(pin.AddrOfPinnedObject(),out owner,out defaulted)) {
+        throw OsFailure((uint)Marshal.GetLastWin32Error(),"inspect private file owner");
+      }
+      Require(owner!=IntPtr.Zero,"EIO","private file owner is incomplete");
+      uint error=SetSecurityInfo(handle,1,0x80000005u,owner,IntPtr.Zero,dacl,IntPtr.Zero);
+      if(error!=0) throw OsFailure(error,"protect private file owner and DACL");
+    } finally { pin.Free(); }
+  }
+  static void CheckFileAssociation(SafeFileHandle held, string path, string identity, uint links, SafeFileHandle parent, string parentPath, string parentIdentity) {
+    Require(FileIdentity(held,links)==identity,"EIO","retained private file changed");
+    using(var named=Open(path,0x80,true)) Require(FileIdentity(named,links)==identity,"EIO","private file pathname changed");
+    CheckParent(parent,parentPath,parentIdentity);
+  }
+  static object PrivateFile(string path, bool protect) {
+    string expectedParent=ExpectedIdentity("FS_SAFE_WINDOWS_SECURITY_PARENT_IDENTITY");
+    string expectedFile=protect ? "" : ExpectedIdentity("FS_SAFE_WINDOWS_SECURITY_FILE_IDENTITY");
+    uint links=1;
+    if(!protect) Require(uint.TryParse(Environment.GetEnvironmentVariable("FS_SAFE_WINDOWS_SECURITY_EXPECTED_LINKS"),
+      System.Globalization.NumberStyles.None,System.Globalization.CultureInfo.InvariantCulture,out links) && links>0,
+      "EINVAL","private file expected link count is invalid");
+    string parentPath,name; SplitParent(path,out parentPath,out name);
+    using(var held=new SafeFileHandle(GetStdHandle(-10),false)) {
+      Require(!held.IsInvalid,"EBADF","inherited file handle is unavailable");
+      string identity=FileIdentity(held,links);
+      if(!protect) Require(identity==expectedFile,"EIO","private file identity changed");
+      // Windows can use Administrators as the creating token's default owner.
+      // The inherited ACL must already be private: later changes cannot revoke
+      // an earlier reader handle.
+      RequirePrivate(Security(held),requireProtected:!protect,allowAdministratorsOwner:protect);
+      using(var parent=Open(parentPath,0x80,true)) {
+        CheckFileAssociation(held,path,identity,links,parent,parentPath,expectedParent);
+        if(protect) using(var writable=Open(path,0x000e0080,true)) {
+          Require(FileIdentity(writable,links)==identity,"EIO","private file changed before owner and DACL protection");
+          RequirePrivate(Security(writable),requireProtected:false,allowAdministratorsOwner:true);
+          CheckParent(parent,parentPath,expectedParent);
+          ProtectFileSecurity(writable);
+          RequirePrivate(Security(writable));
+        }
+        RequirePrivate(Security(held));
+        CheckFileAssociation(held,path,identity,links,parent,parentPath,expectedParent);
+        return Row("identity",identity);
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  static object CreatePrivate(string path) {
+    string parentPath,name; SplitParent(path,out parentPath,out name);
+    string expectedParent=ExpectedIdentity("FS_SAFE_WINDOWS_SECURITY_PARENT_IDENTITY",false);
+    using(var parent=Open(parentPath,0xa4,true)) {
+      string parentId=DirectoryIdentity(parent,true);
+      if(expectedParent.Length!=0) Require(parentId==expectedParent,"EIO","private parent changed before creation");
+      using(var created=CreateRelative(parent,name)) {
+        try {
+          string createdId=DirectoryIdentity(created);
+          RequirePrivate(Security(created));
+          Require(DirectoryIdentity(parent)==parentId,"EIO","retained private parent changed");
+          using(var namedParent=Open(parentPath,0x80,true)) Require(DirectoryIdentity(namedParent,true)==parentId,"EIO","private parent pathname changed");
+          using(var named=Open(path,0x80,true)) {
+            Require(DirectoryIdentity(named,true)==createdId,"EIO","private directory pathname changed");
+          }
+          return Row("created",true,"identity",createdId);
+        } catch(Exception primary) {
+          uint flags=0x13;
+          if(!SetFileInformationByHandle(created,21,ref flags,4)) {
+            var failure=primary as Failure;
+            throw new Failure(failure==null ? "EIO" : failure.Code,
+              (failure==null ? "private directory validation failed" : failure.Message)+
+              "; owned-handle cleanup failed with Windows error "+Marshal.GetLastWin32Error());
+          }
+          throw;
+        }
+      }
+    }
+  }
+  static object InspectPath(string path) {
+    // Raw reporting retains ACL facts when locality is unknown; admission remains strict.
+    using(var handle=Open(path,0x00020080,false)) return Security(handle,false);
+  }
+  public static object Execute(string operation,string path) {
+    try {
+      object result;
+      if(operation=="create") result=CreatePrivate(path);
+      else if(operation=="directory") result=InspectDirectory(path);
+      else if(operation=="protect-file" || operation=="verify-file") result=PrivateFile(path,operation=="protect-file");
+      else if(operation=="descriptor") {
+        using(var handle=new SafeFileHandle(GetStdHandle(-10),false)) {
+          Require(!handle.IsInvalid,"EBADF","inherited file handle is unavailable");
+          result=Row("identity",Identity(handle),"security",Security(handle));
+        }
+      } else if(operation=="path") result=InspectPath(path);
+      else throw new Failure("EINVAL","unknown Windows security operation");
+      return Row("ok",true,"result",result);
+    } catch(Failure error) { return Row("ok",false,"code",error.Code,"message",error.Message); }
+      catch(Exception) { return Row("ok",false,"code","EIO","message","Windows security descriptor processing failed"); }
+  }
+}

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/windows-security-bridge.ps1

@@ -0,0 +1,90 @@
+param(
+  [Parameter(Mandatory = $true)]
+  [ValidateSet('path', 'paths', 'descriptor', 'create', 'directory', 'protect-file', 'verify-file')]
+  [string] $Operation
+)
+
+$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'
+$ProgressPreference = 'SilentlyContinue'
+# Avoid scanning unrelated installed modules before loading system cmdlets.
+$env:PSModulePath = [IO.Path]::Combine($PSHOME, 'Modules')
+[Console]::OutputEncoding = [Text.UTF8Encoding]::new($false)
+
+Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\Add-Type -LiteralPath ([IO.Path]::Combine($PSScriptRoot, 'windows-security-bridge.cs'))
+if ($Operation -eq 'paths') {
+  $reply = $null
+  $limit = 16 * 1024 * 1024
+  try {
+    $inputStream = [Console]::OpenStandardInput()
+    $inputBytes = [IO.MemoryStream]::new()
+    try {
+      $buffer = [byte[]]::new(8192)
+      while (($read = $inputStream.Read($buffer, 0, $buffer.Length)) -gt 0) {
+        if ($inputBytes.Length + $read -gt $limit) {
+          throw 'Windows security path batch exceeds the input budget'
+        }
+        $inputBytes.Write($buffer, 0, $read)
+      }
+      $inputJson = [Text.UTF8Encoding]::new($false, $true).GetString($inputBytes.ToArray())
+    } finally {
+      $inputBytes.Dispose()
+      $inputStream.Dispose()
+    }
+    if (-not $inputJson.TrimStart().StartsWith('[')) {
+      throw 'Windows security paths must be a JSON array'
+    }
+    # Validate the whole document before wrapping it; the wrapper keeps empty,
+    # singleton, and nested arrays intact on Windows PowerShell 5.1.
+    $null = Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\ConvertFrom-Json -InputObject $inputJson
+    $request = Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\ConvertFrom-Json -InputObject ('{"paths":' + $inputJson + '}')
+    if ($request.paths -isnot [array]) {
+      throw 'Windows security paths must be a JSON array'
+    }
+    for ($index = 0; $index -lt $request.paths.Length; $index++) {
+      $value = $request.paths[$index]
+      if ($value -isnot [string] -or $value.Length -eq 0 -or $value.IndexOf([char]0) -ge 0) {
+        throw 'Windows security paths must be nonempty strings without NUL bytes'
+      }
+    }
+  } catch {
+    $reply = @{ ok = $false; code = 'EINVAL'; message = 'Invalid Windows security path batch' }
+  }
+  if ($null -eq $reply) {
+    $utf8 = [Console]::OutputEncoding
+    $prefix = '{"ok":true,"result":['
+    $suffix = ']}'
+    $bytes = $utf8.GetByteCount($prefix) + $utf8.GetByteCount($suffix)
+    $encoded = [Text.StringBuilder]::new($prefix)
+    $separator = ''
+    foreach ($pathname in $request.paths) {
+      try {
+        $reply = [FsSafeWindowsBridge]::Execute('path', $pathname)
+      } catch {
+        $reply = @{ ok = $false; code = 'EINVAL'; message = 'Invalid Windows security path batch' }
+      }
+      if (-not $reply.ok) { break }
+      $rowJson = Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\ConvertTo-Json -InputObject ([ordered]@{ path = $pathname; security = $reply.result }) -Depth 8 -Compress
+      $reply = $null
+      $nextBytes = $bytes + $separator.Length + $utf8.GetByteCount($rowJson)
+      if ($nextBytes -gt $limit) {
+        $rowJson = $null
+        $reply = @{ ok = $false; code = 'too-large'; message = 'Windows security batch exceeded its output budget' }
+        break
+      }
+      [void]$encoded.Append($separator).Append($rowJson)
+      $bytes = $nextBytes
+      $separator = ','
+      $rowJson = $null
+    }
+    if ($null -eq $reply) {
+      [void]$encoded.Append($suffix)
+      [Console]::Write($encoded.ToString())
+      return
+    }
+    $encoded = $null
+  }
+} else {
+  $targetPath = [Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable('FS_SAFE_WINDOWS_SECURITY_PATH')
+  $reply = [FsSafeWindowsBridge]::Execute($Operation, $targetPath)
+}
+$reply | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\ConvertTo-Json -Depth 8 -Compress

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/windows-security-command.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,33 @@
+import type { NativeWindowsDescriptorSecurityFacts, NativeWindowsSecurityFacts } from "./native-binding.js";
+import type { FsSafeNativeMode } from "./native-config.js";
+import { type DescriptorFacts } from "./windows-security-facts.js";
+export declare const WINDOWS_SECURITY_BATCH_MAX_BYTES: number;
+/** Cleanup must preserve stages still reachable by an unsettled command. */
+export declare function hasUnsettledWindowsSecurityCommand(error: unknown): boolean;
+export declare function readWindowsSecurityFactsBatch(paths: readonly string[], options: {
+    timeoutMs: number;
+    native: boolean;
+    mode: FsSafeNativeMode;
+}): Promise<DescriptorFacts[]>;
+export declare function readWindowsSecurityFactsCommand(targetPath: string): NativeWindowsSecurityFacts;
+export declare function inspectWindowsDescriptorCommand(fd: number): Promise<NativeWindowsDescriptorSecurityFacts>;
+export declare function createPrivateWindowsDirectoryCommand(targetPath: string, expectedParentIdentity?: string): Promise<{
+    identity: string;
+}>;
+export declare function createPrivateWindowsDirectoryCommandSync(targetPath: string, expectedParentIdentity?: string): {
+    identity: string;
+};
+export declare function inspectWindowsDirectoryCommandSync(targetPath: string, requirePrivate: boolean): {
+    identity: string;
+};
+export declare function inspectWindowsDirectoryCommand(targetPath: string, requirePrivate: boolean): Promise<{
+    identity: string;
+}>;
+export declare function protectPrivateWindowsFileCommandSync(fd: number, targetPath: string, expectedParentIdentity: string): {
+    identity: string;
+};
+export declare function protectPrivateWindowsFileCommand(fd: number, targetPath: string, expectedParentIdentity: string): Promise<{
+    identity: string;
+}>;
+export declare function verifyPrivateWindowsFileCommandSync(fd: number, targetPath: string, expectedFileIdentity: string, expectedParentIdentity: string, expectedLinks?: number): void;
+export declare function verifyPrivateWindowsFileCommand(fd: number, targetPath: string, expectedFileIdentity: string, expectedParentIdentity: string, expectedLinks?: number): Promise<void>;