@openclaw/openshell-sandbox 2026.9.5 → 2026.9.6

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/docs/sidecar-lock.md

@@ -9,6 +9,13 @@ normal meaning, and ordinary colon-bearing POSIX paths remain valid.
 
 JavaScript raw-sidecar creation passes mode `0o600` to that exclusive open. On POSIX, the process umask may further restrict the new file but cannot add group or other access. No pathname `chmod` fallback is used.
 
+Root-backed lock records and reclaim guards also claim their final name
+exclusively, including with the native backend. The native path retains the
+admitted parent descriptor and removes incomplete claims only while their exact
+identity remains owned. Ordinary Root creates still stage privately; lock records
+use this internal exclusive-create path so racing contenders can retry without
+an ambiguous rename outcome.
+
 ```ts
 import { acquireFileLock } from "@openclaw/fs-safe/file-lock";
 
@@ -28,17 +35,37 @@ try {
 
 The lock file sits next to the protected resource. If a process crashes mid-lock, the next acquirer notices the held entry, inspects its payload (PID, host, acquired-at timestamp), and decides — via `shouldReclaim` (defaulting to "is the lock older than `staleMs`?") — whether it should keep waiting or fail.
 
-On natural event-loop shutdown, a globally deduplicated `process.on("beforeExit")` handler attempts asynchronous cleanup of held Root-backed locks through their retained Root capability and ownership receipt. The synchronous `process.on("exit")` handler provides last-chance cleanup for raw locks and reclaim guards. Changed sidecars and failed Root cleanup remain in place; cleanup does not keep retrying during shutdown unless another acquisition re-arms it. Locks acquired with `retainOnExit: true` are exempt from both handlers: their sidecar stays in place after exit and is governed only by the caller's own stale policy. Because exit handlers are globally deduplicated across package copies, `retainOnExit` fails closed with `helper-unavailable` if an older copy that cannot honor it registered the handlers first.
+On natural event-loop shutdown, a globally deduplicated `process.on("beforeExit")` handler attempts asynchronous cleanup of held Root-backed locks through their retained Root capability and ownership receipt. The synchronous `process.on("exit")` handler provides last-chance cleanup for raw locks and raw-path reclaim guards. Changed sidecars and failed Root cleanup remain in place; cleanup does not keep retrying during shutdown unless another acquisition re-arms it. Locks acquired with `retainOnExit: true` are exempt from both handlers: their sidecar stays in place after exit and is governed only by the caller's own stale policy. Because exit handlers are globally deduplicated across package copies, `retainOnExit` fails closed with `helper-unavailable` if an older copy that cannot honor it registered the handlers first.
+
+Asynchronous Root-backed stale recovery uses a regular file at the
+`.reclaim` name, created, verified, and removed through that Root. Its ownership
+token and exact bytes are checked after awaited decisions and before stale
+removal; Root mutation policies also apply to the guard. Raw and synchronous
+Root reclaimers use directories and recognize these files as occupied guards.
+Each asynchronous attempt owns its guard directly, outside process-exit cleanup,
+so `beforeExit` cannot release an exclusion still needed by an unsettled attempt.
+Normal completion removes it through the Root. Interrupted creation, revoked
+cleanup authority, identity changes, or process exit can leave the guard in
+place; recover it only after an application-owned liveness check proves the
+attempt has ended. There is no raw-path cleanup fallback. These token/byte
+checks retain the sidecar protocol's cooperative, non-atomic removal boundary.
+The final guard check follows the last sidecar snapshot and parser call, before
+removal. Parsers can run before guard ownership is established or verified;
+invocation is not mutation authority. A failing final parser keeps its error
+even if guard ownership has also changed.
+`manager.reset()` invalidates admission bookkeeping but preserves a pending
+Root guard; let its original attempt settle before retrying that guarded path.
+It stops compromise monitoring for forgotten holders, including callbacks from checks already in flight.
 
 Always release locks in a `finally` block. Application-managed graceful shutdown can await `release()` or `manager.drain()` before terminating. Explicit `process.exit()`, uncaught failures, crashes, default signal handling, and fatal termination (including `SIGKILL`) do not reliably run asynchronous Root cleanup and may leave sidecars. Recover only after an application-owned liveness policy proves the holder cannot still be writing.
 
-Exit cleanup tolerates shared managers created by older package copies that lack reclaim-guard state, and continues through later manager domains. Handler ownership remains first-registration-wins: loading an updated copy does not replace an older copy's registered handler. Restart with the updated copy registering first to obtain the fix. After building, `node scripts/legacy-lock-exit-proof.mjs` checks clean exit, removal of legacy and modern raw locks, and preservation of a retained lock using synthetic temporary files.
+Exit cleanup tolerates shared managers created by older package copies that lack reclaim-guard state, and continues through later manager domains. Handler ownership remains first-registration-wins: loading an updated copy does not replace an older copy's registered handler. First registration is committed only after Node accepts the listener; synchronous `newListener` reentry fails closed and a thrown registration rolls back so a later acquisition can retry. Restart with the updated copy registering first to obtain the fix. After building, `node scripts/legacy-lock-exit-proof.mjs` checks clean exit, removal of legacy and modern raw locks, and preservation of a retained lock using synthetic temporary files.
 
-Each new sidecar also carries an internal random ownership token encoded as JSON trailing whitespace. `JSON.parse()` and every payload callback still see exactly the caller-provided object. Only the process that successfully created the sidecar keeps that token as release authority; merely reading token-shaped bytes from disk does not enable this mode. Release compares the in-memory token and exact serialized bytes, and requires the pathname to remain a regular file, instead of requiring an opened descriptor and pathname lookup to report the same inode identity. This preserves ownership checks on filesystems such as Docker Desktop VirtioFS where those two views can legitimately differ. Sidecars created by older releases have no token and retain the legacy identity-plus-content check.
+Each new sidecar also carries an internal random ownership token encoded as JSON trailing whitespace. `JSON.parse()` and every payload callback still see exactly the caller-provided object. Only the process that successfully created the sidecar keeps that token as release authority; merely reading token-shaped bytes from disk does not enable this mode. Release compares the in-memory token and exact serialized bytes, and requires the pathname to remain a regular file, instead of requiring an opened descriptor and pathname lookup to report the same inode identity. This preserves ownership checks on filesystems such as Docker Desktop VirtioFS where those two views can legitimately differ. Sidecars created by older releases have no token and retain the legacy identity-plus-content check. If Windows reports a zero device or inode for either identity observation, that check is inconclusive and removal is skipped.
 
 The raw sidecar bytes are not a canonical JSON representation: tools that trim or rewrite the trailing whitespace invalidate the ownership token, so release leaves the changed sidecar in place and fails closed. The token distinguishes cooperating acquisitions; it is not a secret and does not make pathname compare-and-remove atomic against a hostile process that can replace files outside the lock protocol.
 
-`release()` propagates an I/O failure that prevents deletion of an unchanged, owned sidecar; it never reports successful cleanup while leaving that lock behind. The handle and manager retain the exact cleanup receipt after a failure, so the same handle can retry `release()` and `manager.drain()` can retry retained cleanup. A changed sidecar remains an ownership mismatch rather than a deletion failure and is left untouched. If both a `withFileLock()` callback and release fail, the release error is the primary `SuppressedError.error` and the callback failure remains available as `SuppressedError.suppressed`. Failed asynchronous acquisition cleanup uses the same shape, with the cleanup error primary and the acquisition failure suppressed. On Node runtimes without the global `SuppressedError` constructor, fs-safe returns the equivalent `Error` shape with the same name and properties.
+`release()` propagates an I/O failure that prevents deletion of an unchanged, owned sidecar; it never reports successful cleanup while leaving that lock behind. The handle and manager retain the exact cleanup receipt after a failure, so the same handle can retry `release()` and `manager.drain()` can retry retained cleanup. A changed sidecar remains an ownership mismatch rather than a deletion failure and is left untouched. If both a `withFileLock()` or `withFileLockSync()` callback and release fail, the release error is the primary `SuppressedError.error` and the callback failure remains available as `SuppressedError.suppressed`. Failed asynchronous acquisition cleanup uses the same shape, with the cleanup error primary and the acquisition failure suppressed. On Node runtimes without the global `SuppressedError` constructor, fs-safe returns the equivalent `Error` shape with the same name and properties.
 
 ## API
 
@@ -62,6 +89,41 @@ function withFileLockSync<T, TPayload>(targetPath: string, options: FileLockSync
 
 `managerKey` is an optional identifier used to keep state isolated across multiple lock domains in the same process. Use distinct keys for distinct domains (`"snapshot"`, `"compact"`, `"build"`). If omitted, fs-safe derives one from the target path.
 
+Within one manager domain, the canonical target path is the in-process
+arbitration key even when callers supply different explicit `lockPath` values.
+Admission remains pending while payload serialization and stale-policy callbacks
+run, and becomes reentrant only after a matching owner is fully published.
+Foreign owners wait or reach the configured timeout without opening their
+alternate sidecar. Each unguarded attempt still invokes and serializes `payload`
+before a completed foreign holder consumes retry budget, preserving callback and
+retry compatibility; the holder is rechecked before delayed option accessors or
+sidecar I/O. When the candidate resolves to the holder's actual sidecar (the
+default path or an explicitly identical path), asynchronous retries also preserve
+the existing parser observation: bytes are observed first, then its accessor is
+read and the current holder bytes are parsed once per unguarded attempt.
+Distinct alternate sidecars do not trigger that observation. Async acquisition releases
+pending admission before retry backoff;
+synchronous callback reentry cannot let the active stack progress, so it fails
+closed with the normal `file_lock_timeout` fields. Async payload, serialization,
+delayed-option, and stale-policy callbacks carry a process-shared ancestry scope:
+a nested acquisition of the same canonical target in the same manager domain
+fails before waiting on its ancestor, while independent tasks, different targets,
+and different manager domains retain their normal retry behavior. The synchronous
+API uses one process-wide domain. An ancestry snapshot keeps each ancestor that
+is active when the child acquisition starts, even if the current callback's own
+scope already became inactive; later deactivation cannot reclassify that child.
+Detached work started only after every matching ancestor has finished is not
+retained as a descendant. Promise-like callback results are assimilated inside
+that ancestry scope, and the resolved payload crosses the internal return
+boundary in a non-thenable envelope. The helper therefore does not observe a
+stateful payload `then` accessor again outside the reservation.
+
+The pending-admission registry coordinates package copies that implement this
+protocol without placing incomplete state in the legacy held-lock map. An older
+already-loaded executable copy does not consult that registry, so a mixed-version
+process cannot rely on the new in-process arbitration until every copy is updated
+and the process is restarted.
+
 ## Acquire options
 
 ```ts
@@ -105,7 +167,11 @@ type FileLockRetryOptions = {
 };
 ```
 
-`payload` is a function so you can re-evaluate it on each retry (e.g. timestamp, PID).
+`payload` is a function so you can re-evaluate it on each retry (e.g. timestamp,
+PID). Callback-valued option accessors are otherwise captured once for an
+acquisition; the asynchronous same-sidecar parser observation above reads
+`parsePayload` once per unguarded attempt. Callback invocation keeps its
+established receiver behavior.
 
 Asynchronous acquisition snapshots `targetPath`, an explicit `lockPath`, and
 `lockRoot` before its first asynchronous operation. Cwd-dependent path spellings
@@ -133,6 +199,10 @@ explicit `retry.retries` still applies with `timeoutMs: Infinity`, and zero allo
 only the initial attempt. After process defaults are applied, an omitted retry
 count means unlimited retries, and an omitted or infinite timeout means no
 deadline. With neither budget bounded, contention can wait indefinitely.
+Finite deadlines use monotonic elapsed time, so system clock corrections do not
+extend or shorten the retry budget. Payload timestamps, `heldEntries().acquiredAt`,
+and stale-policy `nowMs` remain wall-clock based. Deadlines are checked at retry
+boundaries; they do not interrupt callbacks or filesystem operations.
 `parsePayload` replaces JSON parsing for legacy or custom sidecars. Its `unknown`
 result is passed to `shouldReclaim` and `shouldRemoveStaleLock`, allowing PID,
 process-start, argv, or role schemas to remain application-owned.
@@ -230,10 +300,11 @@ Discarding an acquisition observation is not proof that the pathname is absent:
 another owner may already have created the next record. Every discarded
 observation consumes the normal retry/deadline budget and requires fresh
 exclusive creation. It supplies no release, reclaim, or held-lock authority.
-If that successor disappears during the recovery metadata probe, the waiter
-may discard the probe only with an operation-local receipt for an admitted
-regular file with one link, followed by current Root and canonical ancestor
-checks. A generic metadata error does not permit this retry, and public
+If that successor disappears or is replaced during the recovery metadata probe,
+the waiter may discard the probe only with an operation-local receipt for an
+admitted regular file with one link. Replacement also requires a single exact
+observation of a different regular file with one link. Current Root and canonical
+ancestor checks must still pass. A generic metadata error does not permit this retry, and public
 `Root.stat()` still rejects a file that changes during observation.
 Generic `Root.open()` and held-owner/reclaim reads still reject failed opens.
 Moving an already-matched pinned descriptor without unlinking it, unknown or
@@ -270,6 +341,12 @@ sidecar no longer matches or after a verification I/O failure. This is
 detection, not revocation of work already in progress. Asynchronous checks are
 serialized, so a slow verification never overlaps the next timer tick.
 
+Ownership-only checks compare serialized bytes, tokens, and file identities
+without decoding an unused default JSON payload. Stale-policy reads still
+decode the payload. Explicit `parsePayload` callbacks keep their existing
+verification and asynchronous-cleanup calls, receivers, and errors;
+synchronous release continues without invoking a custom parser.
+
 The compromise-check interval is validated before payload evaluation or
 filesystem acquisition. Omit it or pass `0` to disable monitoring; enabled
 intervals must be finite and between 1 and 2,147,483,647 milliseconds. Values
@@ -295,6 +372,46 @@ deadline budget. Errors from descriptor reads/stats or parsing are not treated
 as missing snapshots, even when their code is `ENOENT`. Held verification,
 release, and reclaim do not retry open denials.
 
+Synchronous `lockRoot` is an authority boundary, not only a containment hint.
+It requires a genuine `Root` returned by the same loaded package copy; a
+structural/custom Root lookalike or a handle constructed by another installed
+copy fails with `helper-unavailable` before any remaining acquisition option or
+nested retry getter, payload evaluation, or filesystem effects. After reading
+`lockRoot` once, the genuine Root and its policies are snapshotted before those
+getters run. Construct `lockRoot` through the same import instance that provides
+the synchronous lock function. The acquirer retains the original Root context,
+exact root, parent, and file identities, and the Root's entry-time read, hardlink,
+mutation-symlink, `denyMutations`, and `assertBeforeMutation` policies. Those
+receipts remain authoritative through same-owner reuse, compromise checks,
+reclaim, explicit release, and process-exit cleanup. If the Root, an admitted
+parent, or the owned entry changes, cleanup leaves the ambiguous path in place.
+Root-backed synchronous records and their exit handler use a separate versioned
+global domain; legacy raw-lock handlers and legacy package copies cannot adopt or
+pathname-delete those records. Root and raw acquisitions never share a
+reentrant reference, even when their owner strings match.
+
+As with asynchronous Root-backed acquisition, synchronous target normalization
+does not create the target's parent. An explicit in-root `lockPath` can therefore
+guard an external or not-yet-created target key without creating anything next
+to that target. Missing directories for the sidecar itself are created one
+component at a time through the retained Root policy; the returned `lockPath`
+uses the admitted canonical spelling. This strengthens earlier synchronous
+behavior that treated `lockRoot` as a one-time lexical/canonical bound and used
+raw pathname operations afterward.
+
+Windows Root-backed target keys use native existing-ancestor canonicalization,
+so long and short spellings of the same target parent share an arbitration key.
+Sidecar admission applies both the retained mutation policy and read/final-link
+policy before payload evaluation; a dangling final sidecar link is rejected
+without creating its target.
+
+Exact Root, parent, and file receipts narrow replacement races but do not make a
+pathname check and the following `open`, `mkdir`, `unlink`, or `rmdir` one atomic
+filesystem operation. A hostile peer with direct write access can still race the
+final syscall. An observed mismatch fails closed and ambiguous entries remain;
+use OS-enforced directory permissions or a native descriptor-relative primitive
+when that attacker model must be excluded.
+
 Both synchronous helpers consume the [process-wide lock defaults](config.md#configurefssafelocks-config).
 A synchronous retry sleep is clamped to the remaining finite deadline, so a long or jittered backoff cannot extend the configured timeout or block forever.
 Per-call options take precedence, including zero values; a per-call `retry`
@@ -332,6 +449,7 @@ error.
 The sync payload, reclaim, and parsing callbacks must also be synchronous. This
 shape is appropriate for a short boot migration; it is a poor fit for a server
 request because retry backoff uses a blocking wait.
+Synchronous `shouldReclaim` and `shouldRemoveStaleLock` reject Promise or thenable results with `TypeError` before deleting the observed sidecar; an asynchronous result is never approval.
 
 If termination skips the relevant cleanup handler or cleanup fails, the sidecar remains. In particular, `process.exit()` skips asynchronous Root cleanup; await explicit release or drain during application-managed graceful shutdown. Once `staleMs` elapses (or your `shouldReclaim` returns true), acquisition fails closed by default instead of deleting by path.
 

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/docs/staged-file.md

@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ remain with the caller.
 
 ```ts
 function stageFileInDirectory(options: {
-  directory: string | DirectoryReceipt;
+  directory: string | DirectoryReceipt<Stats | BigIntStats>;
   content: string | Uint8Array;
   mode?: number;
 }): Promise<StagedFile>;
@@ -65,6 +65,11 @@ interface StagedFile extends AsyncDisposable {
 Strings are UTF-8. `mode` is the requested **published** mode and defaults to
 `0600`; exact final modes, including `000`, are supported. The unpublished file
 stays at `0600` throughout preparation and any awaited application checks.
+The retained descriptor's actual mode is checked before writing payload bytes,
+by `assertCurrent()`, and before publication; a successful but ineffective
+`chmod` fails with `insecure-permissions`. Final mode verification after
+publication can fail with a `published` receipt while preserving the completed
+file. These are POSIX mode checks, not ACL or ownership admission.
 After rename succeeds and the published entry passes identity validation, the
 owner applies the requested mode through its retained file descriptor. Content
 was synchronized during preparation; publication always synchronizes the parent.
@@ -76,8 +81,9 @@ Creation uses an exclusive, no-follow, close-on-exec open of a generated direct
 child name. Writes use that descriptor. Inspection uses non-following metadata
 operations, never a potentially blocking reopen of the leaf.
 
-A supplied directory receipt must still match at admission. Its numeric
-identity must be exactly representable; ambiguous identity fails closed.
+A supplied directory receipt must still match at admission. Caller receipts can
+carry numeric `Stats` or exact `BigIntStats`; untracked numeric identities must
+be exactly representable. Ambiguous identity fails closed.
 Returned receipts are frozen descriptive snapshots, not mutable authority.
 Changing a supplied receipt after admission cannot retarget the lifecycle.
 
@@ -105,9 +111,13 @@ touching descriptors.
 basename. Empty, dot, dotdot, separators, absolute paths, NUL, control characters,
 drive-relative spellings, and the stage's own name are rejected.
 
-With `overwrite: false`, publication is genuine kernel no-replace rename; a
-collision leaves both names unchanged and raises `FsSafeError("already-exists")`.
-The stage may then be cleaned or published under another name. With
+With `overwrite: false`, publication is genuine kernel no-replace rename.
+A native collision raises `FsSafeError("already-exists")`, but ordinary errno
+does not prove that a remote rename never committed. Native rename failures
+without explicit pre-dispatch provenance therefore report `indeterminate`:
+cleanup preserves names and closes descriptors, and further publication rejects.
+Only rejection before rename dispatch leaves the stage eligible for cleanup or
+publication under another name. With
 `overwrite: true`, publication is plain atomic replacement. Neither route
 copies. Both source and destination resolve through the retained original
 parent, with checks immediately before rename and after publication.

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/docs/store.md

@@ -89,7 +89,15 @@ claim before publication. If another consumer acknowledged, quarantined, or
 replaced that claim, the migration rejects with `FsSafeError("path-mismatch")`
 and leaves the newer generation or failed evidence intact. A stale migration
 rejects both single and batch loads; ordinary callback failures retain their
-existing single-load rejection and batch-skip behavior.
+existing single-load rejection and batch-skip behavior. A caller or migration
+error with code `ENOENT` is still a failure, not a missing queue entry; only a
+claim that is absent or disappears before reading returns `null` from a single load.
+
+If closing the read descriptor also fails, the original read, validation,
+callback, or migration failure keeps precedence, including non-Error rejection
+values. A close failure without an earlier failure is reported through the same
+loader policy: direct reads and single loads reject, while batch loads skip it
+unless migration has started.
 
 On Windows, migration releases its read pin once at this publication boundary
 because an open target can block replacement. It rechecks the exact pathname

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/docs/temp.md

@@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ rejects with `permission-unverified`. Existing supplied directories keep their
 permissions. Missing root components are created at `0o700` and initialized
 from their first exact security snapshot; if a restrictive umask changes that
 mode, correction uses a verified directory descriptor.
+An initial mode-descriptor admission error is preserved if closing that rejected
+descriptor also fails; close failures after successful admission remain reportable.
 
 For an already existing canonical root, discovery retains only its immutable
 exact identity. Cleanup-parent retention is provisional: after any native
@@ -155,12 +157,15 @@ uses guarded pathname-recursive removal. This fallback never recursively
 removes the public workspace name, but it is not atomic conditional deletion: a
 same-privilege peer that discovers and replaces the private quarantine after
 verification can still redirect the final pathname removal.
+If admitting a cleanup parent fails and closing its descriptor also fails,
+creation rejects with both failures in an `AggregateError`. This does not select
+compatible fallback or retry the indeterminate descriptor close.
 
 Set `cleanupSafety: "require-bounded"` when that concurrent attacker is in scope.
 Creation then requires native no-replace directory rename, native owned-tree
 removal, and a readable retained parent descriptor **before** child creation.
 On POSIX, the final requested `dirMode` must also include owner read
-and search (`(dirMode & 0o500) === 0o500`). Preflight failure throws
+and search (`(dirMode & 0o500) === 0o500`). An unavailable capability throws
 `FsSafeError("helper-unavailable")` without creating a child or calling a scoped
 callback. The child descriptor is opened
 while the new directory still has its private creation mode, before an explicit
@@ -221,9 +226,15 @@ A missing workspace returns `"missing"`. A replacement observed at the public
 name before quarantine returns `"identity-mismatch"` when the parent is stable;
 an ambiguous parent returns `"indeterminate"`. After successful removal,
 repeated cleanup returns `"missing"` without touching a recreated public name.
-Other statuses remain stable. Operational removal errors propagate and later
-cleanup returns `"indeterminate"` without retrying. Disposal and scoped helpers
-ignore returned statuses, while manual cleanup exposes the result.
+Other statuses remain stable. Compatible recursive-removal failures propagate
+the exact thrown value, including `undefined`, `null`, `false`, positive or
+negative numeric zero, bigint zero, an empty string, and `NaN`; they are never
+inferred from value identity or truthiness. Uncertain quarantine and
+retained-parent checks instead return
+`"indeterminate"`. After a propagated removal failure, later cleanup returns
+`"indeterminate"` without retrying. Disposal and scoped helpers ignore returned
+statuses, while manual cleanup exposes the result. A terminal descriptor-close
+failure retains its existing precedence if it also fails during settlement.
 
 When cleanup is part of a retention or audit decision, inspect the receipt
 instead of treating cleanup as fire-and-forget:
@@ -410,6 +421,12 @@ files, hardlinks, and changes between the pre-open pathname, opened descriptor,
 and current pathname are rejected. The callback must finish and close its
 writer before returning. Its return value is preserved as `result`.
 
+Each option is read once before directory creation starts, including both
+callbacks, the temp prefix, isolation, directory and file modes, and sync flags.
+Later changes to the options object do not change the in-flight operation.
+`writeTemp` and `resolveFinalPath` retain their shared internal staging object
+as the callback receiver.
+
 Generated temp filenames suffix Windows reserved-device basenames on every
 platform. Before either an ordinary or isolated producer runs, the completed staging
 name must be a nonempty, non-dot path component with no POSIX or Windows
@@ -536,6 +553,11 @@ await writeViaSiblingTempPath({
 If `replaceFileAtomic` does what you need, prefer that. Use
 `writeViaSiblingTempPath` when the producer needs a concrete temp pathname but
 the final destination still needs root-boundary checks.
+
+The root, target, callback, fallback filename, and temp prefix are read once
+before setup. Later changes to the parameters do not affect the in-flight
+operation; `writeTemp` retains the original parameters object as its receiver.
+
 Its private workspace uses `tempFile()`'s compatible identity-aware cleanup.
 It preserves replacements observed before removal, but retains the final
 pathname-recursive-removal gap described above; this helper does not expose
@@ -625,7 +647,12 @@ recursive-`mkdir` winner is inspected as an untrusted existing directory.
 Broad-mode repair also uses a pinned descriptor; there is no pathname chmod.
 
 Repair and finalization require a known nonnegative safe-integer UID and exact
-bigint device, inode, owner, mode, and directory-type facts. They open with
+bigint device, inode, owner, mode, and directory-type facts. Device and inode
+identities accept Node's signed 64-bit stat representation, including negative
+values down to `-(1n << 63n)`; inode zero remains invalid. Previously supported
+nonnegative device and positive inode adapter values remain supported without
+an upper cap. Values are compared exactly as received: signed and unsigned
+encodings of the same bits are not treated as equal. They open with
 `O_RDONLY | O_DIRECTORY | O_NOFOLLOW | O_NONBLOCK`, verify the descriptor and
 current directory entry against the initial receipt before `fchmod`, then
 verify identity, permissions, and write/search access again before closing.

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/docs/types.md

@@ -128,6 +128,8 @@ type RootOptions = {
 ## `RootReadOptions` / `RootWriteOptions` / `RootCopyOptions`
 
 ```ts
+import type { CopyCloneMode, RootCopyPublicationReceipt } from "@openclaw/fs-safe";
+
 type RootReadOptions = Pick<RootDefaults, "hardlinks" | "maxBytes" | "nonBlockingRead" | "symlinks">;
 type RootWriteOptions = Pick<RootDefaults, "assertBeforeMutation" | "denyMutations" | "durable" | "mkdir" | "mode" | "renameIdentity" | "mutationSymlinks"> & {
   encoding?: BufferEncoding;
@@ -135,6 +137,11 @@ type RootWriteOptions = Pick<RootDefaults, "assertBeforeMutation" | "denyMutatio
 };
 type RootCopyOptions = Pick<RootDefaults, "assertBeforeMutation" | "denyMutations" | "durable" | "maxBytes" | "mkdir" | "mode" | "mutationSymlinks"> & {
   sourceHardlinks?: "reject" | "allow";
+  overwrite?: boolean;
+  clone?: CopyCloneMode;
+  signal?: AbortSignal;
+  preserveSourceMode?: boolean;
+  onDestinationPublished?: (receipt: RootCopyPublicationReceipt) => void;
 };
 type RootOpenWritableOptions = Pick<RootDefaults, "assertBeforeMutation" | "denyMutations" | "mkdir" | "mode" | "mutationSymlinks"> & {
   writeMode?: "replace" | "append" | "update";
@@ -150,8 +157,17 @@ type RootAppendOptions = RootWriteOptions & {
 type RootMoveOptions = Pick<RootDefaults, "assertBeforeMutation" | "denyMutations" | "mutationSymlinks"> & {
   overwrite?: boolean;
 };
-type RootRemoveOptions = Pick<RootDefaults, "assertBeforeMutation" | "denyMutations" | "mutationSymlinks">;
-type RootMkdirOptions = Pick<RootDefaults, "assertBeforeMutation" | "denyMutations" | "mutationSymlinks">;
+type RootRemoveOptions = Pick<RootDefaults, "assertBeforeMutation" | "denyMutations" | "mutationSymlinks"> & {
+  recursive?: boolean;
+  force?: boolean;
+  order?: "filesystem" | "sorted";
+  maxEntries?: number;
+  maxDepth?: number;
+  signal?: AbortSignal;
+};
+type RootMkdirOptions = Pick<RootDefaults, "assertBeforeMutation" | "denyMutations" | "mutationSymlinks"> & {
+  private?: boolean;
+};
 ```
 
 Per-method option shapes. Each picks the `RootDefaults` keys that apply, plus method-specific extras.

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/docs/walk.md

@@ -47,6 +47,10 @@ type WalkDirectoryFailure = {
 
 `depth` starts at `1` for direct children of `rootDir`. `relativePath` is always relative to the supplied root. `scannedEntryCount` counts directory entries examined, including entries filtered out by `include`.
 
+Each entry's `path` is absolute and retains the normalized spelling of the
+supplied root, including followed directory aliases. Paths do not switch to
+the canonical symlink target during descent.
+
 `walkDirectory()` and `walkDirectorySync()` always return `failedDirs`; the property remains optional on the exported `WalkDirectoryResult` type so existing callers that manually construct the legacy result shape remain source-compatible. It lists every directory whose `realpath`/`readdir` threw, so its contents are absent from `entries`. `error` is the thrown value (a `NodeJS.ErrnoException` at runtime), so callers can distinguish a benign missing-directory race (`ENOENT`) from a real read failure (`EACCES`, `EIO`, `ESTALE`, …). The walk-root failure has an empty `relativePath` and `depth: 0`. Failures resolving a symlink's target kind are not reported here.
 
 ## Options
@@ -59,12 +63,43 @@ type WalkDirectoryOptions = {
   include?: (entry: WalkDirectoryEntry) => boolean;
   descend?: (entry: WalkDirectoryEntry) => boolean;
 };
+
+type AsyncWalkDirectoryOptions = Omit<WalkDirectoryOptions, "include" | "descend"> & {
+  include?: (entry: WalkDirectoryEntry) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
+  descend?: (entry: WalkDirectoryEntry) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
+};
 ```
 
 `symlinks` defaults to `"skip"`. `"include"` returns symlink entries without following them. `"follow"` resolves symlinks with `stat()` and may descend into linked directories, so use it only when that is intentional. Already-visited real directories are skipped so symlink cycles do not recurse forever.
 
+Before descending into a child directory, `skip` and `include` recheck whether
+that entry has become a symlink, including changes made while a filter waits.
+The explicitly supplied walk root may still be a symlink. This best-effort
+child check does not turn the standalone walker into a confinement boundary;
+use `Root.walk()` when root confinement is required.
+
 `include` controls which entries are returned. `descend` controls which directory entries are traversed. A skipped directory can still be returned if `include` accepts it.
 
+The asynchronous `walkDirectory()` accepts `AsyncWalkDirectoryOptions`. It resolves each `include` decision before calling `descend`, and resolves descent before reading the directory's children. Decisions run serially in the existing filesystem-order depth-first traversal. Both callbacks retain the supplied options object as their `this` receiver.
+
+Absent callbacks and primitive results keep the synchronous selection path. Object and function results are awaited directly, including promises and thenables. For JavaScript callers, nullish results retain the default `true`; other resolved values use their existing truthiness. Return booleans or promises of booleans for the typed API.
+
+```ts
+import fs from "node:fs/promises";
+import path from "node:path";
+
+const scan = await walkDirectory("/safe/workspace", {
+  include: (entry) => entry.kind === "file",
+  descend: async (entry) => {
+    const marked = await fs.access(path.join(entry.path, "SKILL.md"))
+      .then(() => true, () => false);
+    return !marked;
+  },
+});
+```
+
+This prunes a directory after finding its marker without listing that directory's children. Callback throws and promise rejections reject the walk; they are not directory failures in `failedDirs`. Filtering still consumes the examined-entry budget. `WalkDirectoryOptions` and `walkDirectorySync()` remain synchronous; the async options do not add confinement or cancellation to the standalone walker.
+
 Unreadable directories are skipped rather than throwing, but every skipped directory is recorded in `failedDirs`. This keeps the helper suitable for best-effort inventories while letting pruning jobs tell an incomplete scan from an empty one: a destructive reconcile that deletes state for paths missing from `entries` must first confirm `failedDirs` holds no real read failures, or a transient `EIO`/`EACCES` blip would be mistaken for mass deletion. Use a stricter root-bounded operation when every entry must be accounted for.
 
 ## Root-bounded async iteration
@@ -123,7 +158,9 @@ If a thrown walk failure and directory close both fail, disposal throws a
 `SuppressedError` with the close failure in `error` and the original failure in
 `suppressed`, preserving both causes.
 
-`entryFilter` is evaluated for each resolved file, directory, or other entry:
+`entryFilter` is evaluated for each resolved file, directory, or other entry.
+The `RootWalkEntryFilter` callback returns a `RootWalkEntryFilterResult`
+or a `Promise<RootWalkEntryFilterResult>`:
 
 ```ts
 for await (const entry of capability.walk("", {
@@ -147,10 +184,43 @@ The result values are `"include"`, `"skip"`, and `"skip-subtree"`. Plain
 `"skip-subtree"` omits that directory and prunes its descendants. Returning
 `"skip-subtree"` for a non-directory is equivalent to `"skip"`.
 
+An asynchronous filter can inspect a marker before deciding whether to prune:
+
+```ts
+for await (const entry of capability.walk("", {
+  symlinkPolicy: "skip",
+  entryFilter: async (entry) => {
+    if (
+      entry.kind === "directory" &&
+      await capability.exists(`${entry.relativePath}/SKILL.md`)
+    ) {
+      return "skip-subtree";
+    }
+    return "include";
+  },
+})) {
+  consume(entry);
+}
+```
+
+Filters run serially outside metadata batches and retain the supplied options
+object as their `this` receiver. When an awaited filter resolves, the walk
+checks cancellation and revalidates the current listing directory and Root
+identities before using the decision. These checks do not refresh the entry's
+captured metadata or pin a later operation.
+
+Cancellation and iterator disposal wait for a pending filter to settle. The
+walk does not race the callback against the abort signal or close its directory
+while the callback is running; callbacks must settle their own work for
+cancellation to finish. Callback throws and promise rejections reject the walk
+through its normal cleanup path, even with `onDirectoryError: "skip-and-report"`.
+
 `onDirectoryError` defaults to `"throw"`, preserving the original fail-fast
 contract. `"skip-and-report"` yields a discriminated
 `{ kind: "directory-error", relativePath, size: 0, error }` marker for a
 directory that cannot be resolved or listed, then continues with its siblings.
+This policy also applies when the directory or Root identity recheck after an
+awaited filter fails; callback failures themselves are not directory errors.
 Every examined directory entry consumes `maxEntries` before filtering, so
 `"skip"` cannot turn the iterator into an unbounded traversal. Reporting and
 `"truncated"` markers describe already-reached state and do not authorize
@@ -161,6 +231,9 @@ its exact identity, and rechecks it and the Root identity around each metadata
 batch or individual filesystem-order observation. Sorted batches contain no
 await or caller code between their before/after checks. It tracks canonical
 directories to stop symlink cycles.
+Directory rechecks retain exact identities while using ordinary numeric metadata
+when it represents those identities without rounding. Large identities and
+Windows unknown-identity retries keep the bigint inspection path.
 Neither mode holds a descriptor for every path component, so it is not a process sandbox against a hostile peer that
 can continuously swap and restore directories. Each individual lookup retains
 the documented Node `Root` boundary checks.