@openclaw/openshell-sandbox 2026.9.3 → 2026.9.5

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/pinned-write.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import fsSync, {} from "node:fs";
 import fs from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { normalizeMaxBytes } from "./byte-budget.js";
-import { createAsyncDirectoryGuard, createNearestExistingDirectoryGuard, inspectDirectoryIdentity } from "./directory-guard.js";
+import { assertAsyncDirectoryGuard, createAsyncDirectoryGuard, createNearestExistingDirectoryGuard, inspectDirectoryIdentity } from "./directory-guard.js";
 import { FsSafeError } from "./errors.js";
 import { syncDirectoryBestEffort } from "./directory-durability.js";
 import { sameFileIdentity, sha256Hex } from "./file-identity.js";
@@ -17,6 +17,11 @@ import { resolveReadOpenFlags } from "./read-open-flags.js";
 import { cleanupPinnedFilePath } from "./replace-file-temp-owner.js";
 import { withSidecarLock } from "./sidecar-lock.js";
 import { getFsSafeTestHooks } from "./test-hooks.js";
+import { writeAllToFile } from "./write-file-handle.js";
+import { assertFinalSymlinkRejected } from "./root-symlink-policy.js";
+import { writeCopyFileToFd } from "./copy-file-input.js";
+import { publishCopyStage } from "./publish-copy-stage.js";
+import { assertNoWindowsPathAlias } from "./windows-path-alias.js";
 function byteLength(input, encoding) {
     return typeof input === "string"
         ? Buffer.byteLength(input, encoding ?? "utf8")
@@ -27,6 +32,7 @@ function assertSafeBasename(basename) {
         basename === "." ||
         basename === ".." ||
         basename.includes("/") ||
+        (process.platform === "win32" && basename.includes("\\")) ||
         basename.includes("\0")) {
         throw new FsSafeError("invalid-path", "invalid target path");
     }
@@ -36,28 +42,67 @@ function assertWithinMaxBytes(bytes, maxBytes) {
         throw new FsSafeError("too-large", `file exceeds limit of ${maxBytes} bytes (got at least ${bytes})`);
     }
 }
-async function writeStreamToHandle(stream, handle, maxBytes) {
+function fastParentGuardDeopt(error) {
+    return error instanceof FsSafeError &&
+        (error.code === "path-mismatch" || error.code === "not-file");
+}
+async function writeStreamToHandle(stream, handle, maxBytes, assertBeforeMutation) {
     let bytes = 0;
     for await (const chunk of stream) {
         const buffer = Buffer.isBuffer(chunk) ? chunk : Buffer.from(chunk);
         bytes += buffer.byteLength;
         assertWithinMaxBytes(bytes, maxBytes);
-        let offset = 0;
-        while (offset < buffer.byteLength) {
-            const { bytesWritten } = await handle.write(buffer, offset, buffer.byteLength - offset);
-            if (bytesWritten <= 0) {
-                throw new FsSafeError("helper-failed", "fallback stream write made no progress");
-            }
-            offset += bytesWritten;
-        }
+        await writeAllToFile(handle, buffer, { assertBeforeMutation });
+    }
+}
+const PINNED_WRITE_SNAPSHOT_KEYS = [
+    "rootPath", "relativeParentPath", "basename", "maxBytes", "rootIdentity",
+];
+const RENAME_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_KEYS = ["targetPath", "renameIdentity"];
+function copyOwnEnumerableExcept(source, excluded) {
+    const owned = {};
+    for (const key of Reflect.ownKeys(source)) {
+        // Node 22's object-rest fast path can read excluded accessors eagerly.
+        // Exclude before even inspecting the descriptor so named authority and
+        // pathname fields remain single-read snapshots on every supported Node.
+        if (excluded.includes(key))
+            continue;
+        if (!Object.getOwnPropertyDescriptor(source, key)?.enumerable)
+            continue;
+        Object.defineProperty(owned, key, {
+            value: Reflect.get(source, key),
+            enumerable: true,
+            writable: true,
+            configurable: true,
+        });
     }
+    return owned;
 }
 export async function runPinnedWriteHelper(params) {
-    const normalizedParams = { ...params, maxBytes: normalizeMaxBytes(params.maxBytes) };
-    assertSafeBasename(params.basename);
+    const { rootPath, relativeParentPath, basename, maxBytes, rootIdentity } = params;
+    const ownedParams = copyOwnEnumerableExcept(params, PINNED_WRITE_SNAPSHOT_KEYS);
+    const normalizedParams = {
+        ...ownedParams,
+        rootPath,
+        relativeParentPath,
+        basename,
+        maxBytes: normalizeMaxBytes(maxBytes),
+        rootIdentity,
+    };
+    assertSafeBasename(normalizedParams.basename);
     validatePinnedOperationPayload({
-        relativeParentPath: params.relativeParentPath,
+        relativeParentPath: normalizedParams.relativeParentPath,
     });
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(normalizedParams.rootPath, "filesystem", "pinned write root uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(normalizedParams.relativeParentPath, "relative", "pinned write parent uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(normalizedParams.basename, "relative", "pinned write basename uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+    if (rootIdentity !== undefined) {
+        normalizedParams.rootIdentity = { dev: rootIdentity.dev, ino: rootIdentity.ino };
+    }
+    if (normalizedParams.mutationAdmission) {
+        const targetPath = path.join(normalizedParams.rootPath, ...normalizedParams.relativeParentPath.split("/").filter(Boolean), normalizedParams.basename);
+        await getFsSafeTestHooks()?.beforePinnedWriteParentAdmission?.(targetPath);
+    }
     // The explicit compatibility policy uses the guarded Node fallback, where
     // content verification can replace the strict post-rename inode check.
     if (normalizedParams.onRenameIdentityMismatch === "verify-content") {
@@ -70,52 +115,147 @@ export async function runPinnedWriteHelper(params) {
     return await runPinnedWriteFallback(normalizedParams);
 }
 export async function runPinnedWriteWithRenamePolicy(params) {
-    const { targetPath, renameIdentity, ...writeParams } = params;
+    const { targetPath, renameIdentity } = params;
+    const writeParams = copyOwnEnumerableExcept(params, RENAME_POLICY_SNAPSHOT_KEYS);
     if (renameIdentity !== "verify-content-with-lock") {
         return await runPinnedWriteHelper(writeParams);
     }
     const relativeTargetPath = writeParams.relativeParentPath
         ? `${writeParams.relativeParentPath}/${writeParams.basename}`
         : writeParams.basename;
-    const lockPath = path.join(writeParams.rootPath, `.fs-safe-write-${sha256Hex(relativeTargetPath)}.lock`);
-    return await withSidecarLock(writeParams.rootPath, {
-        managerKey: `fs-safe.write:${targetPath}`,
+    return await withPinnedWriteRenameIdentityLock({
+        rootPath: writeParams.rootPath, targetPath, relativeTargetPath,
+    }, async () => await runPinnedWriteHelper({
+        ...writeParams,
+        onRenameIdentityMismatch: "verify-content",
+    }));
+}
+export async function withPinnedWriteRenameIdentityLock(params, run) {
+    const lockPath = path.join(params.rootPath, `.fs-safe-write-${sha256Hex(params.relativeTargetPath)}.lock`);
+    return await withSidecarLock(params.rootPath, {
+        managerKey: `fs-safe.write:${params.targetPath}`,
         lockPath,
         staleMs: 30_000,
         timeoutMs: 5_000,
         payload: () => ({ pid: process.pid, createdAt: new Date().toISOString() }),
         retry: { retries: 5, minTimeout: 100, maxTimeout: 2_000, factor: 2 },
-    }, async () => await runPinnedWriteHelper({
-        ...writeParams,
-        onRenameIdentityMismatch: "verify-content",
-    }));
+    }, run);
 }
 async function runPinnedWriteFallback(params) {
     const exactRoot = typeof params.rootIdentity?.dev === "bigint" && typeof params.rootIdentity.ino === "bigint"
         ? { dev: params.rootIdentity.dev, ino: params.rootIdentity.ino } : undefined;
+    const mutationAdmission = params.mutationAdmission;
     if (exactRoot)
         await inspectDirectoryIdentity(params.rootPath, exactRoot);
-    const guardOptions = { bigint: exactRoot !== undefined };
     let parentPath = params.relativeParentPath
         ? path.join(params.rootPath, ...params.relativeParentPath.split("/"))
         : params.rootPath;
-    if (params.mkdir) {
+    let parentGuard;
+    let parentAdmitted = false;
+    const initialTargetPath = path.join(parentPath, params.basename);
+    const retainedTargetPath = mutationAdmission?.beginParentWalk?.();
+    const ordinaryRetainedTarget = retainedTargetPath !== undefined &&
+        path.relative(path.resolve(retainedTargetPath), path.resolve(initialTargetPath)) === "";
+    let fastGuardClassifierFailure;
+    if (ordinaryRetainedTarget) {
+        try {
+            parentGuard = await createAsyncDirectoryGuard(parentPath, { bigint: true });
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            // Only a genuinely missing complete parent may enter the component
+            // creator. ENOTDIR, permission, identity, and canonicalization failures
+            // retain their original fail-closed result.
+            if (error?.code !== "ENOENT") {
+                if (!fastParentGuardDeopt(error))
+                    throw error;
+                fastGuardClassifierFailure = error;
+            }
+        }
+        if (parentGuard) {
+            await mutationAdmission.authorize(Object.freeze({
+                targetPath: initialTargetPath,
+                mutationPath: initialTargetPath,
+                phase: "parent",
+            }));
+            await assertAsyncDirectoryGuard(parentGuard);
+            parentAdmitted = true;
+        }
+    }
+    if (fastGuardClassifierFailure) {
+        // The optimized exact-guard classifier runs before policy admission. Let
+        // the established resolver restore deny/symlink precedence before using
+        // the guarded walker or reporting the classifier failure. Because this
+        // was not an ENOENT probe, it may never authorize a newly missing parent.
+        await mutationAdmission.authorize(Object.freeze({
+            targetPath: initialTargetPath,
+            mutationPath: initialTargetPath,
+            phase: "parent",
+        }));
+    }
+    if (params.mkdir && !parentGuard) {
         // mkdirPathComponentsWithGuards may resolve the final component through
         // an in-root symlink (e.g. a skill-bank layout). Use its returned real
         // path for the subsequent guard and target path so we don't re-check the
         // original, possibly-symlinked, lexical path and reject it outright.
-        parentPath = await mkdirPathComponentsWithGuards({
+        const mkdirParams = {
             rootReal: params.rootPath,
             targetPath: parentPath,
-            beforeComponent: async (componentPath) => await getFsSafeTestHooks()?.beforeRootFallbackMutation?.("mkdir", componentPath),
-        });
+            rootIdentity: params.rootIdentity,
+            assertBeforeMutation: params.assertBeforeMutation,
+            beforeComponent: async (componentPath) => {
+                await getFsSafeTestHooks()?.beforeRootFallbackMutation?.("mkdir", componentPath);
+            },
+        };
+        parentPath = await mkdirPathComponentsWithGuards(mutationAdmission ? {
+            ...mkdirParams,
+            rejectSymlinks: mutationAdmission.rejectParentSymlinks,
+            revalidateParentAfterBeforeComponent: true,
+            synchronousAuthorizationIncludesFence: true,
+            retainedTargetPath,
+            afterCreateComponent: mutationAdmission.advanceCreatedDirectory,
+            beforeCreateComponent: (componentPath, prospectiveParentPath, retainedTarget, parent) => {
+                if (fastGuardClassifierFailure)
+                    throw fastGuardClassifierFailure;
+                const request = Object.freeze({
+                    targetPath: retainedTarget ?? path.join(prospectiveParentPath, params.basename),
+                    mutationPath: componentPath,
+                    phase: "parent-create",
+                });
+                return mutationAdmission.tryAuthorizeAtParent?.(request, parent) ??
+                    mutationAdmission.authorize(request);
+            },
+            beforeUseComponent: async (_componentPath, prospectiveParentPath, retainedTarget) => {
+                const targetPath = retainedTarget ?? path.join(prospectiveParentPath, params.basename);
+                await mutationAdmission.authorize(Object.freeze({
+                    targetPath,
+                    mutationPath: targetPath,
+                    phase: "parent",
+                }));
+            },
+        } : mkdirParams);
     }
-    const parentGuard = params.mkdir
-        ? await createAsyncDirectoryGuard(parentPath, guardOptions)
-        : await createNearestExistingDirectoryGuard(params.rootPath, parentPath, guardOptions);
+    parentGuard ??= params.mkdir
+        ? await createAsyncDirectoryGuard(parentPath, { bigint: true })
+        : await createNearestExistingDirectoryGuard(params.rootPath, parentPath, { bigint: true });
     const targetPath = path.join(parentPath, params.basename);
-    if (params.overwrite === false) {
-        const handle = await withAsyncDirectoryGuards([parentGuard], async () => await fs.open(targetPath, fsSync.constants.O_WRONLY | fsSync.constants.O_CREAT | fsSync.constants.O_EXCL, params.mode), {
+    if (mutationAdmission && !parentAdmitted) {
+        await mutationAdmission.authorize(Object.freeze({
+            targetPath,
+            mutationPath: targetPath,
+            phase: "parent",
+        }));
+        await assertAsyncDirectoryGuard(parentGuard);
+    }
+    if (params.overwrite === false && (params.input.kind === "buffer" ||
+        (params.input.kind === "stream" && !params.input.stageBeforePublish))) {
+        const assertBeforeMutation = () => {
+            assertFinalSymlinkRejected(targetPath, params.rejectFinalSymlink);
+            params.assertBeforeMutation?.();
+        };
+        const handle = await withAsyncDirectoryGuards([parentGuard], async () => {
+            assertBeforeMutation();
+            return await fs.open(targetPath, fsSync.constants.O_WRONLY | fsSync.constants.O_CREAT | fsSync.constants.O_EXCL, params.mode);
+        }, {
             onPostGuardFailure: async (openedHandle) => {
                 // The parent failed verification, so targetPath may now resolve
                 // somewhere else. Close the fd, but do not clean up by path.
@@ -129,15 +269,12 @@ async function runPinnedWriteFallback(params) {
             createdIdentity = verificationIdentity;
             if (params.input.kind === "buffer") {
                 assertWithinMaxBytes(byteLength(params.input.data, params.input.encoding), params.maxBytes);
-                if (typeof params.input.data === "string") {
-                    await handle.writeFile(params.input.data, params.input.encoding ?? "utf8");
-                }
-                else {
-                    await handle.writeFile(params.input.data);
-                }
+                await writeAllToFile(handle, params.input.data, {
+                    encoding: params.input.encoding, assertBeforeMutation,
+                });
             }
             else {
-                await writeStreamToHandle(params.input.stream, handle, params.maxBytes);
+                await writeStreamToHandle(params.input.stream, handle, params.maxBytes, assertBeforeMutation);
             }
             // Content writes may clear set-ID bits; finalize them through the owned fd.
             await handle.chmod(params.mode);
@@ -176,20 +313,21 @@ async function runPinnedWriteFallback(params) {
     let readHandle;
     let renamed = false;
     try {
+        params.assertBeforeMutation?.();
         handle = await fs.open(tempPath, tempFlags, params.mode);
         let verificationIdentity = fsSync.fstatSync(handle.fd, { bigint: true });
         tempIdentity = verificationIdentity;
         if (params.input.kind === "buffer") {
             assertWithinMaxBytes(byteLength(params.input.data, params.input.encoding), params.maxBytes);
-            if (typeof params.input.data === "string") {
-                await handle.writeFile(params.input.data, params.input.encoding ?? "utf8");
-            }
-            else {
-                await handle.writeFile(params.input.data);
-            }
+            await writeAllToFile(handle, params.input.data, {
+                encoding: params.input.encoding, assertBeforeMutation: params.assertBeforeMutation,
+            });
+        }
+        else if (params.input.kind === "file") {
+            await writeCopyFileToFd(handle.fd, params.input, params.maxBytes, params.assertBeforeMutation);
         }
         else {
-            await writeStreamToHandle(params.input.stream, handle, params.maxBytes);
+            await writeStreamToHandle(params.input.stream, handle, params.maxBytes, params.assertBeforeMutation);
         }
         tempStat = fsSync.fstatSync(handle.fd);
         const tempPathStat = fsSync.lstatSync(tempPath);
@@ -200,10 +338,28 @@ async function runPinnedWriteFallback(params) {
         await handle.chmod(params.mode);
         if (params.sync !== false)
             await syncFileBestEffort(handle);
+        if (params.input.kind === "file")
+            await params.input.verifySource();
         let verifiedIdentity = expectedTempStat;
         await withAsyncDirectoryGuards([parentGuard], async () => {
-            await fs.rename(tempPath, targetPath);
-            renamed = true;
+            assertFinalSymlinkRejected(targetPath, params.rejectFinalSymlink);
+            if (params.overwrite === false) {
+                publishCopyStage({
+                    temporaryPath: tempPath, targetPath, fd: handle.fd,
+                    identity: tempIdentity, parentGuard,
+                    assertBeforeMutation: params.assertBeforeMutation,
+                    onPublished: (identity) => {
+                        renamed = true;
+                        params.onPublished?.(identity);
+                    },
+                });
+            }
+            else {
+                params.assertBeforeMutation?.();
+                await fs.rename(tempPath, targetPath);
+                renamed = true;
+                params.onPublished?.(verificationIdentity);
+            }
             await getFsSafeTestHooks()?.afterPinnedWriteFallbackRename?.(targetPath);
             if (params.sync !== false)
                 await syncDirectoryBestEffort(parentPath);

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/positional-read.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+import type { FileHandle } from "node:fs/promises";
+export type ReadFileWindowOptions = {
+    signal?: AbortSignal;
+};
+/** Fills a caller-owned buffer from an explicit position, stopping at EOF. */
+export declare function readFileWindowFully(handle: FileHandle, buffer: Buffer, position: number, { signal }?: ReadFileWindowOptions): Promise<number>;
+/** Synchronous positional read; neither variant advances or closes its descriptor. */
+export declare function readFileWindowFullySync(fd: number, buffer: Buffer, position: number): number;
+//# sourceMappingURL=positional-read.d.ts.map

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/positional-read.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"positional-read.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/positional-read.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AACA,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAKnD,MAAM,MAAM,qBAAqB,GAAG;IAClC,MAAM,CAAC,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;CACtB,CAAC;AASF,8EAA8E;AAC9E,wBAAsB,mBAAmB,CACvC,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,EAClB,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EACd,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAChB,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,GAAE,qBAA0B,GACrC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CAcjB;AAED,sFAAsF;AACtF,wBAAgB,uBAAuB,CAAC,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAW5F"}

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/positional-read.js

@@ -0,0 +1,36 @@
+import fs from "node:fs";
+// Node's synchronous read length is a signed 32-bit value on supported runtimes.
+const MAX_READ_BYTES = 0x7fffffff;
+function validateWindow(buffer, position) {
+    if (!Number.isSafeInteger(position) || position < 0 ||
+        !Number.isSafeInteger(position + buffer.length)) {
+        throw new RangeError("read position and window end must be non-negative safe integers");
+    }
+}
+/** Fills a caller-owned buffer from an explicit position, stopping at EOF. */
+export async function readFileWindowFully(handle, buffer, position, { signal } = {}) {
+    validateWindow(buffer, position);
+    signal?.throwIfAborted();
+    let total = 0;
+    while (total < buffer.length) {
+        const { bytesRead } = await handle.read(buffer, total, Math.min(buffer.length - total, MAX_READ_BYTES), position + total);
+        // Settle the pending read before cancellation lets the caller reuse its buffer or handle.
+        signal?.throwIfAborted();
+        if (bytesRead === 0)
+            break;
+        total += bytesRead;
+    }
+    return total;
+}
+/** Synchronous positional read; neither variant advances or closes its descriptor. */
+export function readFileWindowFullySync(fd, buffer, position) {
+    validateWindow(buffer, position);
+    let total = 0;
+    while (total < buffer.length) {
+        const bytesRead = fs.readSync(fd, buffer, total, Math.min(buffer.length - total, MAX_READ_BYTES), position + total);
+        if (bytesRead === 0)
+            break;
+        total += bytesRead;
+    }
+    return total;
+}

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/private-directory.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
-{"version":3,"file":"private-directory.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/private-directory.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAGA,MAAM,MAAM,6BAA6B,GAAG;IAC1C,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;CAC5B,CAAC;AAEF,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAC1C,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,EAClB,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,6BAA6B,GACtC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAkBf"}
+{"version":3,"file":"private-directory.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/private-directory.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAIA,MAAM,MAAM,6BAA6B,GAAG;IAC1C,QAAQ,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;CAC5B,CAAC;AAEF,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAC1C,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,EAClB,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,6BAA6B,GACtC,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAyBf"}

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/private-directory.js

@@ -1,10 +1,12 @@
 import { FsSafeError } from "./errors.js";
 import { getNativeBinding } from "./native.js";
+import { assertNoWindowsPathAlias } from "./windows-path-alias.js";
 export async function createPrivateDirectory(targetPath, options) {
     const platform = options?.platform ?? process.platform;
     if (platform !== "win32") {
         throw new FsSafeError("helper-unavailable", "private-directory creation is supported only on Windows");
     }
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(targetPath, "filesystem", "private directory path uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias", platform);
     const native = getNativeBinding();
     if (!native) {
         throw new FsSafeError("helper-unavailable", "private Windows directory creation requires the matching optional native platform package; " +

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/private-producer-handoff.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,16 @@
+import { type BigIntStats } from "node:fs";
+import { type FileHandle } from "node:fs/promises";
+import { type TempPathRegistration } from "./temp-cleanup.js";
+export type PrivateProducerHandoff = {
+    handle: FileHandle;
+    identity: BigIntStats;
+    unregister: TempPathRegistration;
+};
+export declare function handoffPrivateProducerFile(params: {
+    sourcePath: string;
+    targetPath: string;
+    assertSourceParent: () => void;
+    assertTargetParent: () => void;
+    readWrite: boolean;
+}): Promise<PrivateProducerHandoff>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=private-producer-handoff.d.ts.map

package/node_modules/@openclaw/fs-safe/dist/private-producer-handoff.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+{"version":3,"file":"private-producer-handoff.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/private-producer-handoff.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAe,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AACnD,OAAW,EAAE,KAAK,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAKvD,OAAO,EAEL,KAAK,oBAAoB,EAC1B,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAE3B,MAAM,MAAM,sBAAsB,GAAG;IACnC,MAAM,EAAE,UAAU,CAAC;IACnB,QAAQ,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;IACtB,UAAU,EAAE,oBAAoB,CAAC;CAClC,CAAC;AA2OF,wBAAsB,0BAA0B,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IACvD,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;IAC/B,kBAAkB,EAAE,MAAM,IAAI,CAAC;IAC/B,SAAS,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACpB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,sBAAsB,CAAC,CA6HlC"}