@openclaw/matrix 2026.5.20-beta.2 → 2026.5.22

package/node_modules/matrix-js-sdk/src/crypto-api/index.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1379 @@
+/*
+Copyright 2023 The Matrix.org Foundation C.I.C.
+
+Licensed under the Apache License, Version 2.0 (the "License");
+you may not use this file except in compliance with the License.
+You may obtain a copy of the License at
+
+    http://www.apache.org/licenses/LICENSE-2.0
+
+Unless required by applicable law or agreed to in writing, software
+distributed under the License is distributed on an "AS IS" BASIS,
+WITHOUT WARRANTIES OR CONDITIONS OF ANY KIND, either express or implied.
+See the License for the specific language governing permissions and
+limitations under the License.
+*/
+
+import type { SecretsBundle } from "@matrix-org/matrix-sdk-crypto-wasm";
+import type { IMegolmSessionData } from "../@types/crypto.ts";
+import type { ToDeviceBatch, ToDevicePayload } from "../models/ToDeviceMessage.ts";
+import { type Room } from "../models/room.ts";
+import { type DeviceMap } from "../models/device.ts";
+import { type UIAuthCallback } from "../interactive-auth.ts";
+import { type PassphraseInfo, type SecretStorageKey, type SecretStorageKeyDescription } from "../secret-storage.ts";
+import { type VerificationRequest } from "./verification.ts";
+import {
+    type BackupTrustInfo,
+    type KeyBackupCheck,
+    type KeyBackupInfo,
+    type KeyBackupRestoreOpts,
+    type KeyBackupRestoreResult,
+} from "./keybackup.ts";
+import { type ISignatures } from "../@types/signed.ts";
+import { type MatrixEvent } from "../models/event.ts";
+
+/**
+ * `matrix-js-sdk/lib/crypto-api`: End-to-end encryption support.
+ *
+ * The most important type is {@link CryptoApi}, an instance of which can be retrieved via
+ * {@link MatrixClient.getCrypto}.
+ *
+ * @packageDocumentation
+ */
+
+/**
+ * The options to start device dehydration.
+ */
+export interface StartDehydrationOpts {
+    /**
+     * Force creation of a new dehydration key, even if there is already an
+     * existing dehydration key. If `false`, and `onlyIfKeyCached` is `false`, a
+     * new key will be created if there is no existing dehydration key, whether
+     * already cached in our local storage or stored in Secret Storage.
+     *
+     * Checking for the presence of the key in Secret Storage may result in the
+     * `getSecretStorageKey` callback being called.
+     *
+     * Defaults to `false`.
+     */
+    createNewKey?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Only start dehydration if we have a dehydration key cached in our local
+     * storage. If `true`, Secret Storage will not be checked. Defaults to
+     * `false`.
+     */
+    onlyIfKeyCached?: boolean;
+    /**
+     * Try to rehydrate a device before creating a new dehydrated device.
+     * Setting this to `false` may be useful for situations where the client is
+     * known to pre-date the dehydrated device, and so rehydration is
+     * unnecessary. Defaults to `true`.
+     */
+    rehydrate?: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Public interface to the cryptography parts of the js-sdk
+ *
+ * @remarks Currently, this is a work-in-progress. In time, more methods will be added here.
+ */
+export interface CryptoApi {
+    /**
+     * Global override for whether the client should ever send encrypted
+     * messages to unverified devices. This provides the default for rooms which
+     * do not specify a value.
+     *
+     * If true, all unverified devices will be blacklisted by default
+     */
+    globalBlacklistUnverifiedDevices: boolean;
+
+    /**
+     * The {@link DeviceIsolationMode} mode to use.
+     */
+    setDeviceIsolationMode(isolationMode: DeviceIsolationMode): void;
+
+    /**
+     * Return the current version of the crypto module.
+     * For example: `Rust SDK ${versions.matrix_sdk_crypto} (${versions.git_sha}), Vodozemac ${versions.vodozemac}`.
+     * @returns the formatted version
+     */
+    getVersion(): string;
+
+    /**
+     * Get the public part of the device keys for the current device.
+     *
+     * @returns The public device keys.
+     */
+    getOwnDeviceKeys(): Promise<OwnDeviceKeys>;
+
+    /**
+     * Check if we believe the given room to be encrypted.
+     *
+     * This method returns true if the room has been configured with encryption. The setting is persistent, so that
+     * even if the encryption event is removed from the room state, it still returns true. This helps to guard against
+     * a downgrade attack wherein a server admin attempts to remove encryption.
+     *
+     * @returns `true` if the room with the supplied ID is encrypted. `false` if the room is not encrypted, or is unknown to
+     * us.
+     */
+    isEncryptionEnabledInRoom(roomId: string): Promise<boolean>;
+
+    /**
+     * Check if we believe the given room supports encrypted state events.
+     */
+    isStateEncryptionEnabledInRoom(roomId: string): Promise<boolean>;
+
+    /**
+     * Perform any background tasks that can be done before a message is ready to
+     * send, in order to speed up sending of the message.
+     *
+     * @param room - the room the event is in
+     */
+    prepareToEncrypt(room: Room): void;
+
+    /**
+     * Discard any existing megolm session for the given room.
+     *
+     * This will ensure that a new session is created on the next call to {@link prepareToEncrypt},
+     * or the next time a message is sent.
+     *
+     * This should not normally be necessary: it should only be used as a debugging tool if there has been a
+     * problem with encryption.
+     *
+     * @param roomId - the room to discard sessions for
+     */
+    forceDiscardSession(roomId: string): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Get a list containing all of the room keys
+     *
+     * This should be encrypted before returning it to the user.
+     *
+     * @returns a promise which resolves to a list of
+     *    session export objects
+     */
+    exportRoomKeys(): Promise<IMegolmSessionData[]>;
+
+    /**
+     * Get a JSON list containing all of the room keys
+     *
+     * This should be encrypted before returning it to the user.
+     *
+     * @returns a promise which resolves to a JSON string
+     *    encoding a list of session export objects,
+     *    each of which is an IMegolmSessionData
+     */
+    exportRoomKeysAsJson(): Promise<string>;
+
+    /**
+     * Import a list of room keys previously exported by exportRoomKeys
+     *
+     * @param keys - a list of session export objects
+     * @param opts - options object
+     * @returns a promise which resolves once the keys have been imported
+     */
+    importRoomKeys(keys: IMegolmSessionData[], opts?: ImportRoomKeysOpts): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Import a JSON string encoding a list of room keys previously
+     * exported by exportRoomKeysAsJson
+     *
+     * @param keys - a JSON string encoding a list of session export
+     *    objects, each of which is an IMegolmSessionData
+     * @param opts - options object
+     * @returns a promise which resolves once the keys have been imported
+     */
+    importRoomKeysAsJson(keys: string, opts?: ImportRoomKeysOpts): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Check if the given user has published cross-signing keys.
+     *
+     * - If the user is this user, a `/keys/query` request is made to update locally the cross signing keys.
+     * - If the user is tracked, any current `/keys/query` requests are awaited (with a timeout) and then
+     *   the locally cached information is used.
+     * - If the user is not tracked locally and downloadUncached is set to true,
+     *   a `/keys/query` request is made to the server to retrieve the cross signing keys.
+     * - Otherwise, return false
+     *
+     * @param userId - the user ID to check. Defaults to the local user.
+     * @param downloadUncached - If true, download the device list for users whose device list we are not
+     *    currently tracking. Defaults to false, in which case `false` will be returned for such users.
+     *
+     * @returns true if the cross signing keys are available.
+     */
+    userHasCrossSigningKeys(userId?: string, downloadUncached?: boolean): Promise<boolean>;
+
+    /**
+     * Get the device information for the given list of users.
+     *
+     * For any users whose device lists are cached (due to sharing an encrypted room with the user), the
+     * cached device data is returned, unless it is stale.
+     *
+     * If there are users with stale cached entries, wait (with some timeout) for any in-progress
+     * `/keys/query` request to complete.
+     *
+     * If there are uncached users, and the `downloadUncached` parameter is set to `true`,
+     * a `/keys/query` request is made to the server to retrieve these devices.
+     *
+     * @param userIds - The users to fetch.
+     * @param downloadUncached - If true, download the device list for users whose device list we are not
+     *    currently tracking. Defaults to false, in which case such users will not appear at all in the result map.
+     *
+     * @returns A map `{@link DeviceMap}`.
+     */
+    getUserDeviceInfo(userIds: string[], downloadUncached?: boolean): Promise<DeviceMap>;
+
+    /**
+     * Set whether to trust other user's signatures of their devices.
+     *
+     * If false, devices will only be considered 'verified' if we have
+     * verified that device individually (effectively disabling cross-signing).
+     *
+     * `true` by default.
+     *
+     * @param val - the new value
+     */
+    setTrustCrossSignedDevices(val: boolean): void;
+
+    /**
+     * Return whether we trust other user's signatures of their devices.
+     *
+     * @see {@link CryptoApi.setTrustCrossSignedDevices}
+     *
+     * @returns `true` if we trust cross-signed devices, otherwise `false`.
+     */
+    getTrustCrossSignedDevices(): boolean;
+
+    /**
+     * Get the verification status of a given user.
+     *
+     * @param userId - The ID of the user to check.
+     *
+     */
+    getUserVerificationStatus(userId: string): Promise<UserVerificationStatus>;
+
+    /**
+     * "Pin" the current identity of the given user, accepting it as genuine.
+     *
+     * This is useful if the user has changed identity since we first saw them (leading to
+     * {@link UserVerificationStatus.needsUserApproval}), and we are now accepting their new identity.
+     *
+     * Throws an error if called on our own user ID, or on a user ID that we don't have an identity for.
+     */
+    pinCurrentUserIdentity(userId: string): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Remove the requirement for this identity to be verified, and pin it.
+     *
+     * This is useful if the user was previously verified but is not anymore
+     * ({@link UserVerificationStatus.wasCrossSigningVerified}) and it is not possible to verify him again now.
+     *
+     */
+    withdrawVerificationRequirement(userId: string): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Get the verification status of a given device.
+     *
+     * @param userId - The ID of the user whose device is to be checked.
+     * @param deviceId - The ID of the device to check
+     *
+     * @returns `null` if the device is unknown, or has not published any encryption keys (implying it does not support
+     *     encryption); otherwise the verification status of the device.
+     */
+    getDeviceVerificationStatus(userId: string, deviceId: string): Promise<DeviceVerificationStatus | null>;
+
+    /**
+     * Mark the given device as locally verified.
+     *
+     * Marking a device as locally verified has much the same effect as completing the verification dance, or receiving
+     * a cross-signing signature for it.
+     *
+     * @param userId - owner of the device
+     * @param deviceId - unique identifier for the device.
+     * @param verified - whether to mark the device as verified. Defaults to 'true'.
+     *
+     * @throws an error if the device is unknown, or has not published any encryption keys.
+     */
+    setDeviceVerified(userId: string, deviceId: string, verified?: boolean): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Cross-sign one of our own devices.
+     *
+     * This will create a signature for the device using our self-signing key, and publish that signature.
+     * Cross-signing a device indicates, to our other devices and to other users, that we have verified that it really
+     * belongs to us.
+     *
+     * Requires that cross-signing has been set up on this device (normally by calling {@link bootstrapCrossSigning}).
+     *
+     * *Note*: Do not call this unless you have verified, somehow, that the device is genuine!
+     *
+     * @param deviceId - ID of the device to be signed.
+     */
+    crossSignDevice(deviceId: string): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Checks whether cross signing:
+     * - is enabled on this account and trusted by this device
+     * - has private keys either cached locally or stored in secret storage
+     *
+     * If this function returns false, {@link bootstrapCrossSigning()} can be used
+     * to fix things such that it returns true. That is to say, after
+     * `bootstrapCrossSigning()` completes successfully, this function should
+     * return true.
+     *
+     * @returns True if cross-signing is ready to be used on this device
+     *
+     * @throws May throw {@link matrix.ClientStoppedError} if the `MatrixClient` is stopped before or during the call.
+     */
+    isCrossSigningReady(): Promise<boolean>;
+
+    /**
+     * Get the ID of one of the user's cross-signing keys, if both private and matching
+     * public parts of that key are available (ie. cached in the local crypto store).
+     *
+     * The public part may not be available if a `/keys/query` request has not yet been
+     * performed, or if the device that created the keys failed to publish them.
+     *
+     * If either part of the keypair is not available, this will return `null`.
+     *
+     * @param type - The type of key to get the ID of.  One of `CrossSigningKey.Master`, `CrossSigningKey.SelfSigning`,
+     *     or `CrossSigningKey.UserSigning`.  Defaults to `CrossSigningKey.Master`.
+     *
+     * @returns If cross-signing has been initialised on this device, the ID of the given key. Otherwise, null
+     */
+    getCrossSigningKeyId(type?: CrossSigningKey): Promise<string | null>;
+
+    /**
+     * Bootstrap cross-signing by creating keys if needed.
+     *
+     * If everything is already set up, then no changes are made, so this is safe to run to ensure
+     * cross-signing is ready for use.
+     *
+     * This function:
+     * - creates new cross-signing keys if they are not found locally cached nor in
+     *   secret storage (if it has been set up)
+     * - publishes the public keys to the server if they are not already published
+     * - stores the private keys in secret storage if secret storage is set up.
+     *
+     * @param opts - options object
+     */
+    bootstrapCrossSigning(opts: BootstrapCrossSigningOpts): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Checks whether secret storage:
+     * - is enabled on this account
+     * - is storing cross-signing private keys
+     * - is storing session backup key (if enabled)
+     *
+     * If this function returns false, {@link bootstrapSecretStorage()} can be used
+     * to fix things such that it returns true. That is to say, after
+     * `bootstrapSecretStorage()` completes successfully, this function should
+     * return true.
+     *
+     * @returns True if secret storage is ready to be used on this device
+     */
+    isSecretStorageReady(): Promise<boolean>;
+
+    /**
+     * Inspect the status of secret storage, in more detail than {@link isSecretStorageReady}.
+     */
+    getSecretStorageStatus(): Promise<SecretStorageStatus>;
+
+    /**
+     * Bootstrap [secret storage](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#storage).
+     *
+     * - If secret storage is not already set up, or {@link CreateSecretStorageOpts.setupNewSecretStorage} is set:
+     *   * Calls {@link CreateSecretStorageOpts.createSecretStorageKey} to generate a new key.
+     *   * Stores the metadata of the new key in account data and sets it as the default secret storage key.
+     *   * Calls {@link CryptoCallbacks.cacheSecretStorageKey} if provided.
+     * - Stores the private cross signing keys in the secret storage if they are known, and they are not
+     *   already stored in secret storage.
+     * - If {@link CreateSecretStorageOpts.setupNewKeyBackup} is set, calls {@link CryptoApi.resetKeyBackup}; otherwise,
+     *   stores the key backup decryption key in secret storage if it is known, and it is not
+     *   already stored in secret storage.
+     *
+     * Note that there may be multiple accesses to secret storage during the course of this call, each of which will
+     * result in a call to {@link CryptoCallbacks.getSecretStorageKey}.
+     *
+     * @param opts - Options object.
+     */
+    bootstrapSecretStorage(opts: CreateSecretStorageOpts): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Get the status of our cross-signing keys.
+     *
+     * @returns The current status of cross-signing keys: whether we have public and private keys cached locally, and
+     * whether the private keys are in secret storage.
+     *
+     * @throws May throw {@link matrix.ClientStoppedError} if the `MatrixClient` is stopped before or during the call.
+     */
+    getCrossSigningStatus(): Promise<CrossSigningStatus>;
+
+    /**
+     * Create a recovery key (ie, a key suitable for use with server-side secret storage).
+     *
+     * The key can either be based on a user-supplied passphrase, or just created randomly.
+     *
+     * @param password - Optional passphrase string to use to derive the key,
+     *      which can later be entered by the user as an alternative to entering the
+     *      recovery key itself. If omitted, a key is generated randomly.
+     *
+     * @returns Object including recovery key and server upload parameters.
+     *      The private key should be disposed of after displaying to the use.
+     */
+    createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase(password?: string): Promise<GeneratedSecretStorageKey>;
+
+    /**
+     * Get information about the encryption of the given event.
+     *
+     * @param event - the event to get information for
+     *
+     * @returns `null` if the event is not encrypted, or has not (yet) been successfully decrypted. Otherwise, an
+     *      object with information about the encryption of the event.
+     */
+    getEncryptionInfoForEvent(event: MatrixEvent): Promise<EventEncryptionInfo | null>;
+
+    /**
+     * Encrypts a given payload object via Olm to-device messages to a given
+     * set of devices.
+     *
+     * @param eventType - the type of the event to send.
+     * @param devices - an array of devices to encrypt the payload for.
+     * @param payload - the payload to encrypt.
+     *
+     * @returns the batch of encrypted payloads which can then be sent via {@link matrix.MatrixClient#queueToDevice}.
+     */
+    encryptToDeviceMessages(
+        eventType: string,
+        devices: { userId: string; deviceId: string }[],
+        payload: ToDevicePayload,
+    ): Promise<ToDeviceBatch>;
+
+    /**
+     * Reset the encryption of the user by going through the following steps:
+     * - Remove the dehydrated device and stop the periodic creation of dehydrated devices.
+     * - Disable backing up room keys and delete any existing backups.
+     * - Remove the default secret storage key from the account data (ie: the recovery key).
+     * - Reset the cross-signing keys.
+     * - Create a new key backup.
+     *
+     * Note that the dehydrated device will be removed, but will not be replaced
+     * and it will not schedule creating new dehydrated devices.  To do this,
+     * {@link startDehydration} should be called after a new secret storage key
+     * is created.
+     *
+     * @param authUploadDeviceSigningKeys - Callback to authenticate the upload of device signing keys.
+     *      Used when resetting the cross signing keys.
+     *      See {@link BootstrapCrossSigningOpts#authUploadDeviceSigningKeys}.
+     */
+    resetEncryption(authUploadDeviceSigningKeys: UIAuthCallback<void>): Promise<void>;
+
+    ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+    //
+    // Device/User verification
+    //
+    ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+    /**
+     * Returns to-device verification requests that are already in progress for the given user id.
+     *
+     * @param userId - the ID of the user to query
+     *
+     * @returns the VerificationRequests that are in progress
+     */
+    getVerificationRequestsToDeviceInProgress(userId: string): VerificationRequest[];
+
+    /**
+     * Finds a DM verification request that is already in progress for the given room and user.
+     *
+     * @param roomId - the room to use for verification.
+     * @param userId - search for a verification request for the given user.
+     *
+     * @returns the VerificationRequest that is in progress, if any.
+     */
+    findVerificationRequestDMInProgress(roomId: string, userId?: string): VerificationRequest | undefined;
+
+    /**
+     * Request a key verification from another user, using a DM.
+     *
+     * @param userId - the user to request verification with.
+     * @param roomId - the room to use for verification.
+     *
+     * @returns resolves to a VerificationRequest when the request has been sent to the other party.
+     */
+    requestVerificationDM(userId: string, roomId: string): Promise<VerificationRequest>;
+
+    /**
+     * Send a verification request to our other devices.
+     *
+     * This is normally used when the current device is new, and we want to ask another of our devices to cross-sign.
+     *
+     * If an all-devices verification is already in flight, returns it. Otherwise, initiates a new one.
+     *
+     * To control the methods offered, set {@link matrix.ICreateClientOpts.verificationMethods} when creating the
+     * `MatrixClient`.
+     *
+     * @returns a VerificationRequest when the request has been sent to the other party.
+     */
+    requestOwnUserVerification(): Promise<VerificationRequest>;
+
+    /**
+     * Request an interactive verification with the given device.
+     *
+     * This is normally used on one of our own devices, when the current device is already cross-signed, and we want to
+     * validate another device.
+     *
+     * If a verification for this user/device is already in flight, returns it. Otherwise, initiates a new one.
+     *
+     * To control the methods offered, set {@link  matrix.ICreateClientOpts.verificationMethods} when creating the
+     * `MatrixClient`.
+     *
+     * @param userId - ID of the owner of the device to verify
+     * @param deviceId - ID of the device to verify
+     *
+     * @returns a VerificationRequest when the request has been sent to the other party.
+     */
+    requestDeviceVerification(userId: string, deviceId: string): Promise<VerificationRequest>;
+
+    ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+    //
+    // Secure key backup
+    //
+    ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+    /**
+     * Fetch the backup decryption key we have saved in our store.
+     *
+     * This can be used for gossiping the key to other devices.
+     *
+     * @returns the key, if any, or null
+     */
+    getSessionBackupPrivateKey(): Promise<Uint8Array | null>;
+
+    /**
+     * Store the backup decryption key.
+     *
+     * This should be called if the client has received the key from another device via secret sharing (gossiping).
+     * It is the responsability of the caller to check that the decryption key is valid for the given backup version.
+     *
+     * @param key - the backup decryption key
+     * @param version - the backup version corresponding to this decryption key
+     */
+    storeSessionBackupPrivateKey(key: Uint8Array, version: string): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Attempt to fetch the backup decryption key from secret storage.
+     *
+     * If the key is found in secret storage, checks it against the latest backup on the server;
+     * if they match, stores the key in the crypto store by calling {@link storeSessionBackupPrivateKey},
+     * which enables automatic restore of individual keys when an Unable-to-decrypt error is encountered.
+     *
+     * If the backup decryption key from secret storage does not match the
+     * latest backup on the server, we throw a {@link DecryptionKeyDoesNotMatchError}.
+     *
+     * If we are unable to fetch the key from secret storage or there is no backup on the server,
+     * we throw an exception.
+     */
+    loadSessionBackupPrivateKeyFromSecretStorage(): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Get the current status of key backup.
+     *
+     * @returns If automatic key backups are enabled, the `version` of the active backup. Otherwise, `null`.
+     */
+    getActiveSessionBackupVersion(): Promise<string | null>;
+
+    /**
+     * Determine if a key backup can be trusted.
+     *
+     * @param info - key backup info dict from {@link CryptoApi.getKeyBackupInfo}.
+     */
+    isKeyBackupTrusted(info: KeyBackupInfo): Promise<BackupTrustInfo>;
+
+    /**
+     * Return the details of the latest backup on the server, when we last checked.
+     *
+     * This normally returns a cached value, but if we haven't yet made a request to the server, it will fire one off.
+     * It will always return the details of the active backup if key backup is enabled.
+     *
+     * Return null if there is no backup.
+     *
+     * @returns the key backup information
+     */
+    getKeyBackupInfo(): Promise<KeyBackupInfo | null>;
+
+    /**
+     * Force a re-check of the key backup and enable/disable it as appropriate.
+     *
+     * Fetches the current backup information from the server. If there is a backup, and it is trusted, starts
+     * backing up to it; otherwise, disables backups.
+     *
+     * @returns `null` if there is no backup on the server. Otherwise, data on the backup as returned by the server,
+     *   and trust information (as returned by {@link isKeyBackupTrusted}).
+     */
+    checkKeyBackupAndEnable(): Promise<KeyBackupCheck | null>;
+
+    /**
+     * Creates a new key backup version.
+     *
+     * If there are existing backups they will be replaced.
+     *
+     * If secret storage is set up, the new decryption key will be saved (the {@link CryptoCallbacks.getSecretStorageKey}
+     * callback will be called to obtain the secret storage key).
+     *
+     * The backup engine will be started using the new backup version (i.e., {@link checkKeyBackupAndEnable} is called).
+     */
+    resetKeyBackup(): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Disables server-side key storage and deletes server-side backups.
+     *  * Deletes the current key backup version, if any (but not any previous versions).
+     *  * Disables 4S, deleting the info for the default key, the default key pointer itself and any
+     *    known 4S data (cross-signing keys and the megolm key backup key).
+     *  * Deletes any dehydrated devices.
+     */
+    disableKeyStorage(): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Deletes the given key backup.
+     *
+     * @param version - The backup version to delete.
+     */
+    deleteKeyBackupVersion(version: string): Promise<void>;
+
+    /**
+     * Download and restore the full key backup from the homeserver.
+     *
+     * Before calling this method, a decryption key, and the backup version to restore,
+     * must have been saved in the crypto store. This happens in one of the following ways:
+     *
+     * - When a new backup version is created with {@link CryptoApi.resetKeyBackup}, a new key is created and cached.
+     * - The key can be loaded from secret storage with {@link CryptoApi.loadSessionBackupPrivateKeyFromSecretStorage}.
+     * - The key can be received from another device via secret sharing, typically as part of the interactive verification flow.
+     * - The key and backup version can also be set explicitly via {@link CryptoApi.storeSessionBackupPrivateKey},
+     *   though this is not expected to be a common operation.
+     *
+     * Warning: the full key backup may be quite large, so this operation may take several hours to complete.
+     * Use of {@link KeyBackupRestoreOpts.progressCallback} is recommended.
+     *
+     * @param opts
+     */
+    restoreKeyBackup(opts?: KeyBackupRestoreOpts): Promise<KeyBackupRestoreResult>;
+
+    /**
+     * Restores a key backup using a passphrase.
+     * The decoded key (derived from the passphrase) is stored locally by calling {@link CryptoApi#storeSessionBackupPrivateKey}.
+     *
+     * @param passphrase - The passphrase to use to restore the key backup.
+     * @param opts
+     *
+     * @deprecated Deriving a backup key from a passphrase is not part of the matrix spec. Instead, a random key is generated and stored/shared via 4S.
+     */
+    restoreKeyBackupWithPassphrase(passphrase: string, opts?: KeyBackupRestoreOpts): Promise<KeyBackupRestoreResult>;
+
+    ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+    //
+    // Dehydrated devices
+    //
+    ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+    /**
+     * Returns whether MSC3814 dehydrated devices are supported by the crypto
+     * backend and by the server.
+     *
+     * This should be called before calling `startDehydration`, and if this
+     * returns `false`, `startDehydration` should not be called.
+     */
+    isDehydrationSupported(): Promise<boolean>;
+
+    /**
+     * Start using device dehydration.
+     *
+     * - Rehydrates a dehydrated device, if one is available and `opts.rehydrate`
+     *   is `true`.
+     * - Creates a new dehydration key, if necessary, and stores it in Secret
+     *   Storage.
+     *   - If `opts.createNewKey` is set to true, always creates a new key.
+     *   - If a dehydration key is not available, creates a new one.
+     * - Creates a new dehydrated device, and schedules periodically creating
+     *   new dehydrated devices.
+     *
+     * This function must not be called unless `isDehydrationSupported` returns
+     * `true`, and must not be called until after cross-signing and secret
+     * storage have been set up.
+     *
+     * @param opts - options for device dehydration. For backwards compatibility
+     *     with old code, a boolean can be given here, which will be treated as
+     *     the `createNewKey` option. However, this is deprecated.
+     */
+    startDehydration(opts?: StartDehydrationOpts | boolean): Promise<void>;
+
+    ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+    //
+    // Import/export of secret keys
+    //
+    ///////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////////
+
+    /**
+     * Export secrets bundle for transmitting to another device as part of OIDC QR login
+     */
+    exportSecretsBundle?(): Promise<Awaited<ReturnType<SecretsBundle["to_json"]>>>;
+
+    /**
+     * Import secrets bundle transmitted from another device.
+     * @param secrets - The secrets bundle received from the other device
+     */
+    importSecretsBundle?(secrets: Awaited<ReturnType<SecretsBundle["to_json"]>>): Promise<void>;
+}
+
+/** A reason code for a failure to decrypt an event. */
+export enum DecryptionFailureCode {
+    /** Message was encrypted with a Megolm session whose keys have not been shared with us. */
+    MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID = "MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID",
+
+    /** A special case of {@link MEGOLM_UNKNOWN_INBOUND_SESSION_ID}: the sender has told us it is withholding the key. */
+    MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD = "MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD",
+
+    /** A special case of {@link MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD}: the sender has told us it is withholding the key, because the current device is unverified. */
+    MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD_FOR_UNVERIFIED_DEVICE = "MEGOLM_KEY_WITHHELD_FOR_UNVERIFIED_DEVICE",
+
+    /** Message was encrypted with a Megolm session which has been shared with us, but in a later ratchet state. */
+    OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX = "OLM_UNKNOWN_MESSAGE_INDEX",
+
+    /**
+     * Message was sent before the current device was created; there is no key backup on the server, so this
+     * decryption failure is expected.
+     */
+    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_NO_KEY_BACKUP",
+
+    /**
+     * Message was sent before the current device was created; there was a key backup on the server, but we don't
+     * seem to have access to the backup. (Probably we don't have the right key.)
+     */
+    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_BACKUP_UNCONFIGURED = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_BACKUP_UNCONFIGURED",
+
+    /**
+     * Message was sent before the current device was created; there was a (usable) key backup on the server, but we
+     * still can't decrypt. (Either the session isn't in the backup, or we just haven't gotten around to checking yet.)
+     */
+    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_WORKING_BACKUP = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_WORKING_BACKUP",
+
+    /**
+     * Message was sent when the user was not a member of the room.
+     */
+    HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_USER_NOT_JOINED = "HISTORICAL_MESSAGE_USER_NOT_JOINED",
+
+    /**
+     * The sender's identity is not verified, but was previously verified.
+     */
+    SENDER_IDENTITY_PREVIOUSLY_VERIFIED = "SENDER_IDENTITY_PREVIOUSLY_VERIFIED",
+
+    /**
+     * The sender device is not cross-signed.  This will only be used if the
+     * device isolation mode is set to `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode`.
+     */
+    UNSIGNED_SENDER_DEVICE = "UNSIGNED_SENDER_DEVICE",
+
+    /**
+     * We weren't able to link the message back to any known device.  This will
+     * only be used if the device isolation mode is set to `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode`.
+     */
+    UNKNOWN_SENDER_DEVICE = "UNKNOWN_SENDER_DEVICE",
+
+    /** Unknown or unclassified error. */
+    UNKNOWN_ERROR = "UNKNOWN_ERROR",
+}
+
+/** Base {@link DeviceIsolationMode} kind. */
+export enum DeviceIsolationModeKind {
+    AllDevicesIsolationMode,
+    OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode,
+}
+
+/**
+ * A type of {@link DeviceIsolationMode}.
+ *
+ * Message encryption keys are shared with all devices in the room, except in case of
+ * verified user problems (see {@link errorOnVerifiedUserProblems}).
+ *
+ * Events from all senders are always decrypted (and should be decorated with message shields in case
+ * of authenticity warnings, see {@link EventEncryptionInfo}).
+ *
+ * `AllDevicesIsolationMode` is used in the legacy, non-'exclude insecure devices' mode in Element Web. It is not
+ * recommended (see {@link https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4153 | MSC4153}).
+ */
+export class AllDevicesIsolationMode {
+    public readonly kind = DeviceIsolationModeKind.AllDevicesIsolationMode;
+
+    /**
+     *
+     * @param errorOnVerifiedUserProblems - Behavior when sharing keys to remote devices.
+     *
+     * If set to `true`, sharing keys will fail (i.e. message sending will fail) with an error if:
+     *   - The user was previously verified but is not anymore, or:
+     *   - A verified user has some unverified devices (not cross-signed).
+     *
+     * If `false`, the keys will be distributed as usual. In this case, the client UX should display
+     * warnings to inform the user about problematic devices/users, and stop them hitting this case.
+     */
+    public constructor(public readonly errorOnVerifiedUserProblems: boolean) {}
+}
+
+/**
+ * A type of {@link DeviceIsolationMode}.
+ *
+ * Message encryption keys are only shared with devices that have been cross-signed by their owner.
+ * Encryption will throw an error if a verified user replaces their identity.
+ *
+ * Events are decrypted only if they come from a cross-signed device. Other events will result in a decryption
+ * failure. (To access the failure reason, see {@link MatrixEvent.decryptionFailureReason}.)
+ *
+ * `OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode` corresponds to the 'Exclude insecure devices' mode in Element Web, which is
+ * recommended by {@link https://github.com/matrix-org/matrix-spec-proposals/pull/4153 | MSC4153}.
+ */
+export class OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode {
+    public readonly kind = DeviceIsolationModeKind.OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode;
+}
+
+/**
+ * DeviceIsolationMode represents the mode of device isolation used when encrypting or decrypting messages.
+ * It can be one of two types: {@link AllDevicesIsolationMode} or {@link OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode}.
+ *
+ * Only supported by rust Crypto.
+ */
+export type DeviceIsolationMode = AllDevicesIsolationMode | OnlySignedDevicesIsolationMode;
+
+/**
+ * Options object for `CryptoApi.bootstrapCrossSigning`.
+ */
+export interface BootstrapCrossSigningOpts {
+    /** Optional. Reset the cross-signing keys even if keys already exist. */
+    setupNewCrossSigning?: boolean;
+
+    /**
+     * An application callback to collect the authentication data for uploading the keys. If not given, the keys
+     * will not be uploaded to the server (which seems like a bad thing?).
+     */
+    authUploadDeviceSigningKeys?: UIAuthCallback<void>;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Represents the ways in which we trust a user
+ */
+export class UserVerificationStatus {
+    /**
+     * Indicates if we have saved a known identity for this user. Typically, this means that we share a
+     * room with them (or have done in the past).
+     *
+     * If this is `false`, then the other flags ({@link isCrossSigningVerified}, {@link wasCrossSigningVerified},
+     * {@link needsUserApproval}) will also be `false`. This means that we haven't seen this user before.
+     *
+     * If this is `true`, then there are further possibilities:
+     *
+     *  - If {@link isCrossSigningVerified} returns `true`, then we have cryptographically verified the current
+     *    identity of this user: that is the highest form of trust we have.
+     *
+     *  - If {@link needsUserApproval} is `true`, that means that the user has changed their identity.
+     *
+     *  - Otherwise, the user is "TOFU trusted": we have a record of their identity, and, typically, will share
+     *    encrypted content with them as long as they retain that identity.
+     */
+    public readonly known: boolean;
+
+    /**
+     * Indicates if the identity has changed in a way that needs user approval.
+     *
+     * This happens if the identity has changed since we first saw it, *unless* the new identity has also been verified
+     * by our user (eg via an interactive verification).
+     *
+     * To rectify this, either:
+     *
+     *  * Conduct a verification of the new identity via {@link CryptoApi.requestVerificationDM}.
+     *  * Pin the new identity, via {@link CryptoApi.pinCurrentUserIdentity}.
+     *
+     * @returns true if the identity has changed in a way that needs user approval.
+     */
+    public readonly needsUserApproval: boolean;
+
+    /** @internal */
+    public constructor(
+        private readonly crossSigningVerified: boolean,
+        private readonly crossSigningVerifiedBefore: boolean,
+        known: boolean,
+        needsUserApproval: boolean = false,
+    ) {
+        this.known = known;
+        this.needsUserApproval = needsUserApproval;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * @returns true if this user is verified via any means
+     */
+    public isVerified(): boolean {
+        return this.isCrossSigningVerified();
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * @returns true if this user is verified via cross signing
+     */
+    public isCrossSigningVerified(): boolean {
+        return this.crossSigningVerified;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * @returns true if we ever verified this user before (at least for
+     * the history of verifications observed by this device).
+     */
+    public wasCrossSigningVerified(): boolean {
+        return this.crossSigningVerifiedBefore;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * @returns true if this user's key is trusted on first use
+     *
+     * @deprecated No longer supported, with the Rust crypto stack.
+     */
+    public isTofu(): boolean {
+        return false;
+    }
+}
+
+export class DeviceVerificationStatus {
+    /**
+     * True if this device has been signed by its owner (and that signature verified).
+     *
+     * This doesn't necessarily mean that we have verified the device, since we may not have verified the
+     * owner's cross-signing key.
+     */
+    public readonly signedByOwner: boolean;
+
+    /**
+     * True if this device has been verified via cross signing.
+     *
+     * This does *not* take into account `trustCrossSignedDevices`.
+     */
+    public readonly crossSigningVerified: boolean;
+
+    /**
+     * TODO: tofu magic wtf does this do?
+     */
+    public readonly tofu: boolean;
+
+    /**
+     * True if the device has been marked as locally verified.
+     */
+    public readonly localVerified: boolean;
+
+    /**
+     * True if the client has been configured to trust cross-signed devices via {@link CryptoApi#setTrustCrossSignedDevices}.
+     */
+    private readonly trustCrossSignedDevices: boolean;
+
+    public constructor(
+        opts: Partial<DeviceVerificationStatus> & {
+            /**
+             * True if cross-signed devices should be considered verified for {@link DeviceVerificationStatus#isVerified}.
+             */
+            trustCrossSignedDevices?: boolean;
+        },
+    ) {
+        this.signedByOwner = opts.signedByOwner ?? false;
+        this.crossSigningVerified = opts.crossSigningVerified ?? false;
+        this.tofu = opts.tofu ?? false;
+        this.localVerified = opts.localVerified ?? false;
+        this.trustCrossSignedDevices = opts.trustCrossSignedDevices ?? false;
+    }
+
+    /**
+     * Check if we should consider this device "verified".
+     *
+     * A device is "verified" if either:
+     *  * it has been manually marked as such via {@link CryptoApi.setDeviceVerified}.
+     *  * it has been cross-signed with a verified signing key, **and** the client has been configured to trust
+     *    cross-signed devices via {@link CryptoApi.setTrustCrossSignedDevices}.
+     *
+     * @returns true if this device is verified via any means.
+     */
+    public isVerified(): boolean {
+        return this.localVerified || (this.trustCrossSignedDevices && this.crossSigningVerified);
+    }
+}
+
+/**
+ * Enum representing the different stages of importing room keys.
+ *
+ * This is the type of the `stage` property of {@link ImportRoomKeyProgressData}.
+ */
+export enum ImportRoomKeyStage {
+    /**
+     * The stage where room keys are being fetched.
+     *
+     * @see {@link ImportRoomKeyFetchProgress}.
+     */
+    Fetch = "fetch",
+    /**
+     * The stage where room keys are being loaded.
+     *
+     * @see {@link ImportRoomKeyLoadProgress}.
+     */
+    LoadKeys = "load_keys",
+}
+
+/**
+ * Type representing the progress during the 'fetch' stage of the room key import process.
+ *
+ * @see {@link ImportRoomKeyProgressData}.
+ */
+export type ImportRoomKeyFetchProgress = {
+    /**
+     * The current stage of the import process.
+     */
+    stage: ImportRoomKeyStage.Fetch;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Type representing the progress during the 'load_keys' stage of the room key import process.
+ *
+ * @see {@link ImportRoomKeyProgressData}.
+ */
+export type ImportRoomKeyLoadProgress = {
+    /**
+     * The current stage of the import process.
+     */
+    stage: ImportRoomKeyStage.LoadKeys;
+
+    /**
+     * The number of successfully loaded room keys so far.
+     */
+    successes: number;
+
+    /**
+     * The number of room keys that failed to load so far.
+     */
+    failures: number;
+
+    /**
+     * The total number of room keys being loaded.
+     */
+    total: number;
+};
+
+/**
+ * Room key import progress report.
+ * Used when calling {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeys},
+ * {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeysAsJson} or {@link CryptoApi#restoreKeyBackup} as the parameter of
+ * the progressCallback. Used to display feedback.
+ */
+export type ImportRoomKeyProgressData = ImportRoomKeyFetchProgress | ImportRoomKeyLoadProgress;
+
+/**
+ * Options object for {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeys} and
+ * {@link CryptoApi#importRoomKeysAsJson}.
+ */
+export interface ImportRoomKeysOpts {
+    /** Reports ongoing progress of the import process. Can be used for feedback. */
+    progressCallback?: (stage: ImportRoomKeyProgressData) => void;
+    /** @deprecated not useful externally */
+    source?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The result of a call to {@link CryptoApi.getCrossSigningStatus}.
+ */
+export interface CrossSigningStatus {
+    /**
+     * True if the public master, self signing and user signing keys are available on this device.
+     */
+    publicKeysOnDevice: boolean;
+    /**
+     * True if the private keys are stored in the secret storage.
+     */
+    privateKeysInSecretStorage: boolean;
+    /**
+     * True if the private keys are stored locally.
+     */
+    privateKeysCachedLocally: {
+        masterKey: boolean;
+        selfSigningKey: boolean;
+        userSigningKey: boolean;
+    };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Crypto callbacks provided by the application
+ */
+export interface CryptoCallbacks {
+    /**
+     * Called to retrieve a secret storage encryption key.
+     *
+     * [Server-side secret storage](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#key-storage)
+     * is, as the name implies, a mechanism for storing secrets which should be shared between
+     * clients on the server. For example, it is typically used for storing the
+     * [key backup decryption key](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#decryption-key)
+     * and the private [cross-signing keys](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.12/client-server-api/#cross-signing).
+     *
+     * The secret storage mechanism encrypts the secrets before uploading them to the server using a
+     * secret storage key. The schema supports multiple keys, but in practice only one tends to be used
+     * at once; this is the "default secret storage key" and may be known as the "recovery key" (or, sometimes,
+     * the "security key").
+     *
+     * Secret storage can be set up by calling {@link CryptoApi.bootstrapSecretStorage}. Having done so, when
+     * the crypto stack needs to access secret storage (for example, when setting up a new device, or to
+     * store newly-generated secrets), it will use this callback (`getSecretStorageKey`).
+     *
+     * Note that the secret storage key may be needed several times in quick succession: it is recommended
+     * that applications use a temporary cache to avoid prompting the user multiple times for the key. See
+     * also {@link cacheSecretStorageKey} which is called when a new key is created.
+     *
+     * The helper method {@link deriveRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase} may be useful if the secret storage key
+     * was derived from a passphrase.
+     *
+     * @param opts - An options object.
+     *
+     * @param name - the name of the *secret* (NB: not the encryption key) being stored or retrieved.
+     *    When the item is stored in account data, it will have this `type`.
+     *
+     * @returns a pair [`keyId`, `privateKey`], where `keyId` is one of the keys from the `keys` parameter,
+     *    and `privateKey` is the raw private encryption key, as appropriate for the encryption algorithm.
+     *    (For `m.secret_storage.v1.aes-hmac-sha2`, it is the input to an HKDF as defined in the
+     *    [specification](https://spec.matrix.org/v1.6/client-server-api/#msecret_storagev1aes-hmac-sha2).)
+     *
+     *    Alternatively, if none of the keys are known, may return `null` — in which case the original
+     *     operation that requires access to a secret in secret storage may fail with an exception.
+     */
+    getSecretStorageKey?: (
+        opts: {
+            /**
+             * Details of the secret storage keys required: a map from the key ID
+             * (excluding the `m.secret_storage.key.` prefix) to details of the key.
+             *
+             * When storing a secret, `keys` will contain exactly one entry.
+             *
+             * For secret retrieval, `keys` may contain several entries, and the application can return
+             * any one of the requested keys. Unless your application specifically wants to offer the
+             * user the ability to have more than one secret storage key active at a time, it is recommended
+             * to call {@link matrix.SecretStorage.ServerSideSecretStorage.getDefaultKeyId | ServerSideSecretStorage.getDefaultKeyId}
+             * to figure out which is the current default key, and to return `null` if the default key is not listed in `keys`.
+             */
+            keys: Record<string, SecretStorageKeyDescription>;
+        },
+        name: string,
+    ) => Promise<[string, Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>] | null>;
+
+    /**
+     * Called by {@link CryptoApi.bootstrapSecretStorage} when a new default secret storage key is created.
+     *
+     * Applications can use this to (temporarily) cache the secret storage key, for later return by
+     * {@link getSecretStorageKey}.
+     *
+     * @param keyId - secret storage key id
+     * @param keyInfo - secret storage key info
+     * @param key - private key to store
+     */
+    cacheSecretStorageKey?: (keyId: string, keyInfo: SecretStorageKeyDescription, key: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>) => void;
+}
+
+/**
+ * The result of a call to {@link CryptoApi.getSecretStorageStatus}.
+ */
+export interface SecretStorageStatus {
+    /** Whether secret storage is fully populated. The same as {@link CryptoApi.isSecretStorageReady}. */
+    ready: boolean;
+
+    /** The ID of the current default secret storage key. */
+    defaultKeyId: string | null;
+
+    /**
+     * For each secret that we checked whether it is correctly stored in secret storage with the default secret storage key.
+     *
+     * Note that we will only check that the key backup key is stored if key backup is currently enabled (i.e. that
+     * {@link CryptoApi.getActiveSessionBackupVersion} returns non-null). `m.megolm_backup.v1` will only be present in that case.
+     *
+     * (This is an object rather than a `Map` so that it JSON.stringify()s nicely, since its main purpose is to end up
+     * in logs.)
+     */
+    secretStorageKeyValidityMap: {
+        [P in SecretStorageKey]?: boolean;
+    };
+}
+
+/**
+ * Parameter of {@link CryptoApi#bootstrapSecretStorage}
+ */
+export interface CreateSecretStorageOpts {
+    /**
+     * Function called to await a secret storage key creation flow.
+     * @returns Promise resolving to an object with public key metadata, encoded private
+     *     recovery key which should be disposed of after displaying to the user,
+     *     and raw private key to avoid round tripping if needed.
+     */
+    createSecretStorageKey?: () => Promise<GeneratedSecretStorageKey>;
+
+    /**
+     * If true, a new key backup version will be
+     * created and the private key stored in the new SSSS store. Ignored if keyBackupInfo
+     * is supplied.
+     */
+    setupNewKeyBackup?: boolean;
+
+    /**
+     * Reset even if keys already exist.
+     */
+    setupNewSecretStorage?: boolean;
+}
+
+/** Types of cross-signing key */
+export enum CrossSigningKey {
+    Master = "master",
+    SelfSigning = "self_signing",
+    UserSigning = "user_signing",
+}
+
+/**
+ * Information on one of the cross-signing keys.
+ * @see https://spec.matrix.org/v1.7/client-server-api/#post_matrixclientv3keysdevice_signingupload
+ */
+export interface CrossSigningKeyInfo {
+    keys: { [algorithm: string]: string };
+    signatures?: ISignatures;
+    usage: string[];
+    user_id: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Recovery key created by {@link CryptoApi#createRecoveryKeyFromPassphrase} or {@link CreateSecretStorageOpts#createSecretStorageKey}.
+ */
+export interface GeneratedSecretStorageKey {
+    keyInfo?: {
+        /** If the key was derived from a passphrase, information (algorithm, salt, etc) on that derivation. */
+        passphrase?: PassphraseInfo;
+        /** Optional human-readable name for the key, to be stored in account_data. */
+        name?: string;
+    };
+    /** The raw generated private key. */
+    privateKey: Uint8Array<ArrayBuffer>;
+    /** The generated key, encoded for display to the user per https://spec.matrix.org/v1.7/client-server-api/#key-representation. */
+    encodedPrivateKey?: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ *  Result type of {@link CryptoApi#getEncryptionInfoForEvent}.
+ */
+export interface EventEncryptionInfo {
+    /** "Shield" to be shown next to this event representing its verification status */
+    shieldColour: EventShieldColour;
+
+    /**
+     * `null` if `shieldColour` is `EventShieldColour.NONE`; otherwise a reason code for the shield in `shieldColour`.
+     */
+    shieldReason: EventShieldReason | null;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Types of shield to be shown for {@link EventEncryptionInfo#shieldColour}.
+ */
+export enum EventShieldColour {
+    NONE,
+    GREY,
+    RED,
+}
+
+/**
+ * Reason codes for {@link EventEncryptionInfo#shieldReason}.
+ */
+export enum EventShieldReason {
+    /** An unknown reason from the crypto library (if you see this, it is a bug in matrix-js-sdk). */
+    UNKNOWN,
+
+    /** "Encrypted by an unverified user." */
+    UNVERIFIED_IDENTITY,
+
+    /** "Encrypted by a device not verified by its owner." */
+    UNSIGNED_DEVICE,
+
+    /** "Encrypted by an unknown or deleted device." */
+    UNKNOWN_DEVICE,
+
+    /**
+     * "The authenticity of this encrypted message can't be guaranteed on this device."
+     *
+     * ie: the key has been forwarded, or retrieved from an insecure backup.
+     */
+    AUTHENTICITY_NOT_GUARANTEED,
+
+    /**
+     * The (deprecated) sender_key field in the event does not match the Ed25519 key of the device that sent us the
+     * decryption keys.
+     *
+     * @deprecated The sender_key field is not checked by matrix-sdk-crypto, and this value is therefore unused since
+     * the migration to matrix-sdk-crypto in v37.0.0.
+     */
+    MISMATCHED_SENDER_KEY,
+
+    /**
+     * The event was sent unencrypted in an encrypted room.
+     *
+     * @deprecated This has never been used. The fact it is here was due to a misunderstanding of the behaviour of
+     * `matrix-sdk-crypto`.
+     */
+    SENT_IN_CLEAR,
+
+    /**
+     * The sender was previously verified but changed their identity.
+     */
+    VERIFICATION_VIOLATION,
+
+    /**
+     * The `sender` field on the event does not match the owner of the device
+     * that established the Megolm session.
+     */
+    MISMATCHED_SENDER,
+}
+
+/** The result of a call to {@link CryptoApi.getOwnDeviceKeys} */
+export interface OwnDeviceKeys {
+    /** Public part of the Ed25519 fingerprint key for the current device, base64 encoded. */
+    ed25519: string;
+    /** Public part of the Curve25519 identity key for the current device, base64 encoded. */
+    curve25519: string;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Information about the encryption of a successfully decrypted to-device message.
+ */
+export interface OlmEncryptionInfo {
+    /** The user ID of the event sender, note this is untrusted data unless `isVerified` is true **/
+    sender: string;
+    /**
+     * The device ID of the device that sent us the event.
+     * Note this is untrusted data unless {@link senderVerified} is true.
+     * If the device ID is not known, this will be `null`.
+     **/
+    senderDevice?: string;
+    /** The sender device's public Curve25519 key, base64 encoded **/
+    senderCurve25519KeyBase64: string;
+    /**
+     *  If true, this message is guaranteed to be authentic as it is coming from a device belonging to a user that we have verified.
+     *  This is the state at the time of decryption (the user could be verified later).
+     */
+    senderVerified: boolean;
+}
+
+/**
+ * An error thrown by loadSessionBackupPrivateKeyFromSecretStorage indicating
+ * that the decryption key found in secret storage does not match the public key
+ * of the latest backup.
+ */
+export class DecryptionKeyDoesNotMatchError extends Error {
+    public constructor(message: string) {
+        super(message);
+        this.name = "DecryptionKeyDoesNotMatchError";
+    }
+}
+
+export * from "./verification.ts";
+export type * from "./keybackup.ts";
+export * from "./recovery-key.ts";
+export * from "./key-passphrase.ts";
+export * from "./CryptoEvent.ts";
+export type * from "./CryptoEventHandlerMap.ts";