@openclaw/fs-safe 0.19.0 → 0.21.0

package/dist/sidecar-lock.js

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 import fsSync from "node:fs";
 import { FsSafeError } from "./errors.js";
-import { sameFileIdentity } from "./file-identity.js";
+import { sameFileIdentityForCleanup } from "./file-identity.js";
 import { removeSidecarLockIfUnchanged, sidecarLockSnapshotMatches, } from "./sidecar-lock-reclaim.js";
 import { acquireSidecarLock } from "./sidecar-lock-acquire.js";
 import { createHeldSidecarLockHandle, stopSidecarLockMonitoring } from "./sidecar-lock-handle.js";
@@ -61,7 +61,9 @@ function snapshotMatchesSync(lockPath, observed) {
             (typeof fsSync.constants.O_NONBLOCK === "number" ? fsSync.constants.O_NONBLOCK : 0);
         fd = fsSync.openSync(lockPath, openFlags);
         const openedStat = fsSync.fstatSync(fd);
-        if (!openedStat.isFile()) {
+        // Token-owned files can have different descriptor/path identities on VirtioFS.
+        // Require a known descriptor identity without rejecting that supported drift.
+        if (!openedStat.isFile() || !sameFileIdentityForCleanup(openedStat, openedStat)) {
             return false;
         }
         if (observed.raw !== undefined && openedStat.size !== Buffer.byteLength(observed.raw)) {
@@ -69,7 +71,7 @@ function snapshotMatchesSync(lockPath, observed) {
         }
         const raw = fsSync.readFileSync(fd, "utf8");
         const afterStat = fsSync.lstatSync(lockPath);
-        if (!afterStat.isFile() || !sameFileIdentity(beforeStat, afterStat)) {
+        if (!afterStat.isFile() || !sameFileIdentityForCleanup(beforeStat, afterStat)) {
             return false;
         }
         return sidecarLockSnapshotMatches({ raw, payload: null, stat: afterStat }, observed);

package/dist/staged-symlink-types.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,49 @@
+import type { StagedFileReceipt } from "./staged-file-types.js";
+/** Caller-captured admission evidence, never a same-target ownership heuristic. */
+export type StagedSymlinkExpected = Readonly<{
+    dev: bigint;
+    ino: bigint;
+    uid: number;
+    gid: number;
+    ctimeNs: bigint;
+    target: string;
+}>;
+export type StagedSymlinkReceipt = StagedFileReceipt & Readonly<{
+    target: string;
+}>;
+export type PublishedSymlinkReceipt = Readonly<{
+    status: "published";
+    staged: StagedSymlinkReceipt;
+    basename: string;
+    overwrite: false;
+}>;
+export type StagedSymlinkPublication = Readonly<{
+    status: "not-published";
+}> | PublishedSymlinkReceipt | Readonly<{
+    status: "indeterminate";
+    basename: string;
+    overwrite: false;
+}>;
+export type StagedSymlinkRemoval = "removed" | "name-absent" | "preserved";
+export type StagedSymlinkCleanupReceipt = Readonly<{
+    temporaryBasename: string;
+    publication: StagedSymlinkPublication;
+    status: StagedSymlinkRemoval | "failed" | "not-needed";
+    resources: "closed" | "close-failed";
+}>;
+export type StagedSymlinkFailureDetails = Readonly<{
+    phase: "prepare" | "publish" | "remove-published" | "cleanup";
+    publication: StagedSymlinkPublication;
+    cleanup?: StagedSymlinkCleanupReceipt;
+}>;
+export interface StagedSymlink extends AsyncDisposable {
+    readonly receipt: StagedSymlinkReceipt;
+    assertCurrent(): Promise<void>;
+    publish(basename: string): Promise<PublishedSymlinkReceipt>;
+    /** Check the published name against the still-retained original symlink. */
+    assertPublished(): Promise<void>;
+    /** Explicit recovery only. Never removes an observed foreign replacement. */
+    removePublished(): Promise<StagedSymlinkRemoval>;
+    /** Closes the owner; only an unattempted, still-owned stage is removed. */
+    cleanup(): Promise<StagedSymlinkCleanupReceipt>;
+}

package/dist/staged-symlink-types.js

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+export {};

package/dist/symlink-parents.js

@@ -3,24 +3,46 @@ import path from "node:path";
 import { FsSafeError } from "./errors.js";
 import { hasNodeErrorCode, isPathRelativeEscape } from "./path.js";
 import { assertNoWindowsPathAlias, resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot, } from "./windows-path-alias.js";
+function outsideRootError(params, root) {
+    return new Error(`${params.messagePrefix ?? "Path"} must stay under ${root}.`);
+}
+function pathSegments(value) {
+    return value.split(process.platform === "win32" ? /[/\\]+/ : /\/+/)
+        .filter((segment) => segment.length > 0 && segment !== ".");
+}
+function rawTargetSegments(root, targetPath) {
+    // Resolve only the drive/root or cwd, never the caller's dotdot segments.
+    const targetRoot = path.parse(targetPath).root;
+    const base = resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot(targetRoot || ".");
+    const absoluteTarget = `${base}${path.sep}${targetPath.slice(targetRoot.length)}`;
+    const rootSegments = pathSegments(root);
+    const targetSegments = pathSegments(absoluteTarget);
+    const fold = (segment) => process.platform === "win32" ? segment.toLowerCase() : segment;
+    if (rootSegments.some((segment, index) => fold(segment) !== fold(targetSegments[index] ?? ""))) {
+        return undefined;
+    }
+    return targetSegments.slice(rootSegments.length);
+}
 function resolvePathWalk(params) {
     const rawRootDir = params.rootDir;
     assertNoWindowsPathAlias(rawRootDir, "filesystem", "root dir uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
     const rawTargetPath = params.targetPath;
     assertNoWindowsPathAlias(rawTargetPath, "filesystem", "target path uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
     const root = resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot(rawRootDir);
-    const target = resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot(rawTargetPath);
-    const relative = path.relative(root, target);
+    const lexicalTarget = resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot(rawTargetPath);
+    const relative = path.relative(root, lexicalTarget);
     if (isPathRelativeEscape(relative)) {
         if (params.allowOutsideRoot) {
             return null;
         }
-        throw new Error(`${params.messagePrefix ?? "Path"} must stay under ${root}.`);
+        throw outsideRootError(params, root);
     }
-    return {
-        root,
-        segments: relative && relative !== "." ? relative.split(path.sep).filter(Boolean) : [],
-    };
+    const segments = rawTargetSegments(root, rawTargetPath);
+    // A spelling outside the root must not fall back to a normalized walk that
+    // could erase a symlink before the filesystem receives the original path.
+    if (!segments)
+        throw outsideRootError(params, root);
+    return { root, segments };
 }
 function formatUnsafePath(params, current) {
     return `${params.messagePrefix ?? "Path"} must not traverse symlinked directory: ${current}`;
@@ -28,18 +50,39 @@ function formatUnsafePath(params, current) {
 export async function assertNoSymlinkParents(params) {
     assertNoSymlinkParentsSync(params);
 }
+function isFilesystemRoot(root) {
+    return root === path.parse(root).root;
+}
 export function assertNoSymlinkParentsSync(params) {
     const walk = resolvePathWalk(params);
     if (!walk) {
         return;
     }
     let current = walk.root;
+    // `..` may only undo a real directory this walk already lstat'd.
+    const walked = [];
     for (const [index, segment] of walk.segments.entries()) {
+        if (segment === "..") {
+            const top = walked[walked.length - 1];
+            if (top?.kind === "dir") {
+                walked.pop();
+                current = walked[walked.length - 1]?.path ?? walk.root;
+                continue;
+            }
+            if (top?.kind === "symlink") {
+                throw new Error(formatUnsafePath(params, top.path));
+            }
+            if (!isFilesystemRoot(walk.root)) {
+                throw outsideRootError(params, walk.root);
+            }
+            continue;
+        }
         current = path.join(current, segment);
         try {
             const stat = fsSync.lstatSync(current);
             if (stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
                 if (params.allowRootChildSymlink && path.dirname(current) === walk.root) {
+                    walked.push({ path: current, kind: "symlink" });
                     continue;
                 }
                 throw new Error(formatUnsafePath(params, current));
@@ -47,9 +90,17 @@ export function assertNoSymlinkParentsSync(params) {
             if ((params.requireDirectories || index < walk.segments.length - 1) && !stat.isDirectory()) {
                 throw new FsSafeError("not-file", `${params.messagePrefix ?? "Path"} must traverse directories: ${current}`);
             }
+            if (stat.isDirectory()) {
+                walked.push({ path: current, kind: "dir" });
+            }
         }
         catch (err) {
             if (hasNodeErrorCode(err, "ENOENT") && params.allowMissing !== false) {
+                // Win32 can cancel a nonexistent component before filesystem lookup.
+                // Returning early would leave later, reachable symlinks unchecked.
+                if (process.platform === "win32" && walk.segments.slice(index + 1).includes("..")) {
+                    throw new FsSafeError("invalid-path", `${params.messagePrefix ?? "Path"} must not cancel a missing directory: ${current}`);
+                }
                 return;
             }
             throw err;

package/dist/temp-target.js

@@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ import fs from "node:fs/promises";
 import path from "node:path";
 import { suffixWindowsReservedDeviceName } from "./filename.js";
 import { sameFileIdentityForCleanup } from "./file-identity.js";
-import { assertSafePathSegment, sanitizeSafePathSegment, trimHyphenEdges } from "./safe-path-segment.js";
+import { assertSafePathSegment, isSafePathSegment, normalizeSafePathSegment, trimHyphenEdges, } from "./safe-path-segment.js";
 import { resolveSecureTempRoot } from "./secure-temp-dir.js";
 import { hasNodeErrorCode } from "./path.js";
 import { registerTempPathForExit } from "./temp-cleanup.js";
@@ -60,7 +60,10 @@ function sanitizeExtension(extension) {
     return token ? `.${token}` : "";
 }
 export function sanitizeTempFileName(fileName) {
-    return suffixWindowsReservedDeviceName(sanitizeSafePathSegment(path.basename(fileName)) ?? "download.bin");
+    // Suffix reserved stems before admission so CON.txt stays CON_.txt.
+    const suffixed = suffixWindowsReservedDeviceName(normalizeSafePathSegment(path.basename(fileName)));
+    // The suffix only inserts "_", so this value is already normalized.
+    return isSafePathSegment(suffixed, { allowDotPrefix: true }) ? suffixed : "download.bin";
 }
 export function buildRandomTempFilePath(params) {
     const rootDir = resolveTempRoot(params.rootDir);

package/dist/temp-workspace-admission.js

@@ -36,20 +36,21 @@ function copyExactDirectoryObservation(stat) {
         dev: stat.dev,
         ino: stat.ino,
         uid: stat.uid,
+        gid: stat.gid,
         mode: stat.mode,
         directory: stat.isDirectory(),
         symbolicLink: stat.isSymbolicLink(),
     });
 }
-function snapshotFromExactObservation(dir, uid, realPath, stat) {
+function snapshotFromExactObservation(dir, uid, realPath, stat, privateDirectory = false) {
     if (stat.symbolicLink || !stat.directory) {
         throw new FsSafeError("not-file", "temp workspace root component must be a real directory");
     }
-    assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat, uid);
+    assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat, uid, privateDirectory);
     const identity = Object.freeze({ dev: stat.dev, ino: stat.ino });
     // Retain copied immutable scalars, never a mutable Stats object supplied by
     // an observation hook. Every later permission check uses a fresh snapshot.
-    return Object.freeze({ dir, identity, numericIdentity: safeNumericIdentity(stat), realPath });
+    return Object.freeze({ dir, identity, numericIdentity: safeNumericIdentity(stat), realPath, privateDirectory });
 }
 function canonicalTempWorkspacePath(dir) {
     assertNoWindowsPathAlias(dir, "filesystem");
@@ -57,10 +58,10 @@ function canonicalTempWorkspacePath(dir) {
     assertNoWindowsPathAlias(canonical, "filesystem");
     return canonical;
 }
-function snapshot(dir, uid, realPath = canonicalTempWorkspacePath(dir)) {
+function snapshot(dir, uid, realPath = canonicalTempWorkspacePath(dir), privateDirectory = false) {
     const stat = inspectDirectoryIdentitySync(dir);
     const observation = copyExactDirectoryObservation(stat);
-    return { entry: snapshotFromExactObservation(dir, uid, realPath, observation), stat };
+    return { entry: snapshotFromExactObservation(dir, uid, realPath, observation, privateDirectory), stat };
 }
 function hasCompleteExactIdentity(stat) {
     return typeof stat.dev === "bigint" && typeof stat.ino === "bigint" &&
@@ -105,16 +106,16 @@ function inspectSnapshotIdentity(entry) {
 }
 function assertSnapshot(entry, uid) {
     const stat = inspectSnapshotIdentity(entry);
-    assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat, uid);
+    assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat, uid, entry.privateDirectory);
     assertCanonicalRoot(entry);
 }
-function snapshotMissingRootComponent(parent, dir, ownerUid) {
+function snapshotMissingRootComponent(parent, dir, ownerUid, privateDirectory) {
     if (parent.dir !== parent.realPath) {
         assertSnapshot(parent, ownerUid);
-        return snapshot(dir, ownerUid);
+        return snapshot(dir, ownerUid, undefined, privateDirectory);
     }
     const current = inspectSnapshotIdentity(parent);
-    assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(current, ownerUid);
+    assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(current, ownerUid, parent.privateDirectory);
     let realPath;
     try {
         realPath = canonicalTempWorkspacePath(dir);
@@ -126,16 +127,16 @@ function snapshotMissingRootComponent(parent, dir, ownerUid) {
     }
     if (path.dirname(realPath) !== parent.realPath) {
         assertCanonicalRoot(parent);
-        return snapshot(dir, ownerUid);
+        return snapshot(dir, ownerUid, undefined, privateDirectory);
     }
     // The child's canonical parent confirms the same parent name at this phase.
     // Its exact non-symlink/owner observation still precedes mode initialization.
-    return snapshot(dir, ownerUid, realPath);
+    return snapshot(dir, ownerUid, realPath, privateDirectory);
 }
 function assertChain(chain, uid) {
     for (const entry of chain) {
         const current = inspectSnapshotIdentity(entry);
-        assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(current, uid);
+        assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(current, uid, entry.privateDirectory);
     }
     const last = chain[chain.length - 1];
     assertCanonicalRoot(last);
@@ -158,7 +159,7 @@ function associateTempWorkspaceRoot(entry, ownerUid, descriptorFd) {
     if (stat.isSymbolicLink() || !stat.isDirectory()) {
         throw new FsSafeError("not-file", "temp workspace cleanup parent must be a real directory");
     }
-    assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat, ownerUid);
+    assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat, ownerUid, entry.privateDirectory);
 }
 function discoverMissingTempWorkspaceAncestor(ancestor, missing, missingError) {
     // The caller already classified the first ENOENT. Keep this handoff out of
@@ -219,14 +220,14 @@ function rootPlan(rootDir) {
     const existingCanonicalRoot = missing.length === 0 && observedAncestor === ancestor &&
         !initial.symbolicLink && initial.directory && hasCompleteExactIdentity(initial);
     if (existingCanonicalRoot) {
-        const discovery = snapshotFromExactObservation(ancestor, ownerUid, ancestor, initial);
+        const discovery = snapshotFromExactObservation(ancestor, ownerUid, ancestor, initial, true);
         return {
             admission: canonicalRootAdmission(discovery, ownerUid),
             missing,
             ownerUid,
         };
     }
-    const chain = canonicalAncestry(ancestor).map((dir) => snapshot(dir, ownerUid, dir).entry);
+    const chain = canonicalAncestry(ancestor).map((dir) => snapshot(dir, ownerUid, dir, missing.length === 0 && dir === ancestor).entry);
     // Missing-component creation needs a replay before its first mutation. When
     // the complete root already exists through an alias, retain the historical
     // guarded route because discovery and mutation use different path spellings.
@@ -286,10 +287,10 @@ function canonicalRootAdmission(discovery, ownerUid) {
             const ancestry = canonicalAncestry(discovery.dir);
             const candidate = ancestry.map((dir, index) => {
                 if (!TEMP_WORKSPACE_NUMERIC_IDENTITY_REPLAY || index !== ancestry.length - 1) {
-                    return snapshot(dir, ownerUid, dir).entry;
+                    return snapshot(dir, ownerUid, dir, index === ancestry.length - 1 && discovery.privateDirectory).entry;
                 }
                 const current = inspectSnapshotIdentity(discovery);
-                assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(current, ownerUid);
+                assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(current, ownerUid, discovery.privateDirectory);
                 return discovery;
             });
             const current = candidate[candidate.length - 1];
@@ -332,7 +333,7 @@ export async function admitTempWorkspaceRoot(rootDir) {
     if (admission)
         return admission;
     const guardedChain = chain;
-    for (const segment of missing) {
+    for (const [index, segment] of missing.entries()) {
         const parentEntry = guardedChain[guardedChain.length - 1];
         const parent = rootAdmission(guardedChain, ownerUid);
         const dir = path.join(parent.dir, segment);
@@ -347,7 +348,7 @@ export async function admitTempWorkspaceRoot(rootDir) {
             if (error.code !== "EEXIST")
                 throw error;
         }
-        const observed = snapshotMissingRootComponent(parentEntry, dir, ownerUid);
+        const observed = snapshotMissingRootComponent(parentEntry, dir, ownerUid, index === missing.length - 1);
         if (created) {
             const modeInitialization = admitTempWorkspaceChild(dir, observed.stat, parent, 0o700);
             if (modeInitialization)
@@ -362,7 +363,7 @@ export function admitTempWorkspaceRootSync(rootDir) {
     if (admission)
         return admission;
     const guardedChain = chain;
-    for (const segment of missing) {
+    for (const [index, segment] of missing.entries()) {
         const parentEntry = guardedChain[guardedChain.length - 1];
         const parent = rootAdmission(guardedChain, ownerUid);
         const dir = path.join(parent.dir, segment);
@@ -377,7 +378,7 @@ export function admitTempWorkspaceRootSync(rootDir) {
             if (error.code !== "EEXIST")
                 throw error;
         }
-        const observed = snapshotMissingRootComponent(parentEntry, dir, ownerUid);
+        const observed = snapshotMissingRootComponent(parentEntry, dir, ownerUid, index === missing.length - 1);
         if (created)
             admitTempWorkspaceChildSync(dir, observed.stat, parent, 0o700);
         guardedChain.push(observed.entry);

package/dist/temp-workspace-child-admission.d.ts

@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ export declare function projectTempWorkspaceNumericIdentity(identity: TempWorksp
 export declare function inspectTempWorkspaceDescriptorIdentitySync(fd: number, expected: TempWorkspaceIdentity, numeric: TempWorkspaceNumericIdentity | undefined): TempWorkspaceIdentityStat;
 export declare function inspectTempWorkspaceDirectoryIdentitySync(dir: string, expected: TempWorkspaceIdentity, numeric: TempWorkspaceNumericIdentity | undefined): TempWorkspaceIdentityStat;
 export declare function validateTempWorkspaceDirMode(mode: number): void;
-export declare function assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat: Pick<BigIntStats, "uid" | "mode"> | Pick<Stats, "uid" | "mode">, uid: number | undefined, child?: boolean): void;
+export declare function assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat: Pick<BigIntStats, "uid" | "gid" | "mode"> | Pick<Stats, "uid" | "gid" | "mode">, uid: number | undefined, privateDirectory?: boolean): void;
 export declare function assertTempWorkspaceChildState(stat: BigIntStats | Stats, ownerUid: number | undefined): void;
 export declare function validateInitialTempWorkspaceChild(stat: BigIntStats, ownerUid: number | undefined, mode: number): boolean;
 export declare function childHasRequestedMode(stat: BigIntStats | Stats, mode: number): boolean;

package/dist/temp-workspace-child-admission.js

@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ import { inspectDirectoryIdentitySync, observeDirectoryIdentitySync } from "./di
 import { pinNodeDirectoryForMode, pinNodeDirectoryForModeSync } from "./directory-mode-node.js";
 import { FsSafeError } from "./errors.js";
 import { fileIdentityMismatchError, inspectFileIdentitySync } from "./strict-file-identity.js";
+import { classifyTempWorkspaceOwner, warnUnmappedTempWorkspaceAncestor } from "./temp-workspace-ownership.js";
 export const TEMP_WORKSPACE_NUMERIC_IDENTITY_REPLAY = process.platform === "linux" || process.platform === "darwin";
 export function projectTempWorkspaceNumericIdentity(identity) {
     const dev = Number(identity.dev);
@@ -42,16 +43,16 @@ export function validateTempWorkspaceDirMode(mode) {
         throw new FsSafeError("insecure-permissions", "temp workspace must not be group/world writable");
     }
 }
-export function assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat, uid, child = false) {
+export function assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat, uid, privateDirectory = false) {
     if (uid === undefined)
         return;
-    const ownedByUser = typeof stat.uid === "bigint" ? stat.uid === BigInt(uid) : stat.uid === uid;
-    const ownedByRoot = typeof stat.uid === "bigint" ? stat.uid === 0n : stat.uid === 0;
-    if (!ownedByUser && (child || !ownedByRoot)) {
-        throw new FsSafeError("not-owned", "temp workspace directory has an untrusted owner");
+    const ownership = classifyTempWorkspaceOwner(stat, uid);
+    if (ownership === "foreign" || (privateDirectory && ownership !== "user")) {
+        throw new FsSafeError("not-owned", "temp workspace directory has an untrusted owner; use a private temp root owned by the effective user under a trusted directory hierarchy");
     }
-    // A root/current-user-owned sticky directory protects children owned by us,
-    // including the usual shared system temp directory. Never chmod that parent.
+    // Unmapped host owners are unverifiable; trust the host directory hierarchy.
+    // Admit sticky ancestors so PrivateUsers keeps host /tmp and PrivateTmp usable.
+    // Leaf roots stay euid-owned/private; non-sticky writable ancestors are rejected.
     const writable = typeof stat.mode === "bigint"
         ? (stat.mode & 18n) !== 0n
         : Number.isSafeInteger(stat.mode) && stat.mode >= 0 && (stat.mode & 0o022) !== 0;
@@ -61,9 +62,13 @@ export function assertTrustedTempWorkspaceDirectory(stat, uid, child = false) {
     if (typeof stat.mode !== "bigint" && (!Number.isSafeInteger(stat.mode) || stat.mode < 0)) {
         throw new FsSafeError("insecure-permissions", "temp workspace directory permissions are invalid");
     }
-    if (writable && (child || !sticky)) {
-        throw new FsSafeError("insecure-permissions", "temp workspace directory is group/world writable without sticky protection");
+    if (writable && (privateDirectory || !sticky)) {
+        throw new FsSafeError("insecure-permissions", privateDirectory
+            ? "temp workspace root and child must not be group/world writable; use a private temp directory"
+            : "temp workspace ancestor is group/world writable without sticky protection");
     }
+    if (ownership === "unmapped")
+        warnUnmappedTempWorkspaceAncestor();
 }
 const WINDOWS = process.platform === "win32";
 export function assertTempWorkspaceChildState(stat, ownerUid) {

package/dist/temp-workspace-owner.js

@@ -14,13 +14,6 @@ function isNativeCleanupBinding(binding) {
         typeof binding.removeOwnedTreeSync === "function" &&
         typeof binding.ownedTreeRemovalAvailable === "function";
 }
-function nativeRemovalError(result) {
-    if (!result.errorCode)
-        return undefined;
-    return Object.assign(new Error(result.errorMessage ?? "native owned-tree cleanup failed"), {
-        code: result.errorCode,
-    });
-}
 export class TempWorkspaceCleanupCapability {
     binding;
     parent;
@@ -309,8 +302,10 @@ export class TempWorkspaceCleanupOwner {
         this.#capability.assertCurrent();
     }
     #mapRemoval(result) {
-        const error = nativeRemovalError(result);
-        if (error) {
+        if (result.errorCode) {
+            const error = Object.assign(new Error(result.errorMessage ?? "native owned-tree cleanup failed"), {
+                code: result.errorCode,
+            });
             if (error.code === "path-mismatch")
                 return "indeterminate";
             throw error;

package/dist/temp-workspace-ownership.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
+type DirectoryOwner = {
+    uid: number | bigint;
+    gid: number | bigint;
+};
+export type TempWorkspaceOwnership = "user" | "root" | "unmapped" | "foreign";
+export declare function classifyTempWorkspaceOwner(stat: DirectoryOwner, uid: number): TempWorkspaceOwnership;
+export declare function warnUnmappedTempWorkspaceAncestor(): void;
+export {};

package/dist/temp-workspace-ownership.js

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+import fs from "node:fs";
+let warned = false;
+function overflowId(kind) {
+    try {
+        const value = Number(fs.readFileSync(`/proc/sys/kernel/overflow${kind}`, "utf8").trim());
+        if (Number.isSafeInteger(value) && value >= 0 && value < 0xffffffff)
+            return value;
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Linux defaults when the sysctl files are unavailable in the service mount.
+    }
+    return 65534;
+}
+function unmappedId(kind) {
+    const mappings = fs.readFileSync(`/proc/self/${kind}_map`, "utf8").trim()
+        .split("\n").map((line) => line.trim().split(/\s+/).map(Number));
+    if (!mappings.every((row) => row.length === 3 && row.every((id) => Number.isSafeInteger(id) && id >= 0 && id <= 0xffffffff) && row[2] > 0))
+        return null;
+    if (mappings.length === 1 && mappings[0][0] === 0 &&
+        mappings[0][1] === 0 && mappings[0][2] === 0xffffffff)
+        return null;
+    const id = overflowId(kind);
+    // Recheck every admission: an explicitly mapped overflow-number ID is real ownership.
+    return mappings.some(([start, , count]) => id >= start && id < start + count) ? null : id;
+}
+export function classifyTempWorkspaceOwner(stat, uid) {
+    if (stat.uid === uid || stat.uid === BigInt(uid))
+        return "user";
+    if (stat.uid === 0 || stat.uid === 0n)
+        return "root";
+    if (process.platform !== "linux")
+        return "foreign";
+    try {
+        const overflowUid = unmappedId("uid");
+        const overflowGid = unmappedId("gid");
+        return overflowUid !== null && overflowGid !== null &&
+            (stat.uid === overflowUid || stat.uid === BigInt(overflowUid)) &&
+            (stat.gid === overflowGid || stat.gid === BigInt(overflowGid))
+            ? "unmapped"
+            : "foreign";
+    }
+    catch {
+        // Unavailable mapping evidence cannot authorize the namespace exception.
+        return "foreign";
+    }
+}
+export function warnUnmappedTempWorkspaceAncestor() {
+    if (warned)
+        return;
+    warned = true;
+    process.emitWarning("Temp workspace ancestor ownership is unverifiable in this user namespace; trusting the host directory hierarchy while enforcing ancestor modes and a process-owned private root.", { code: "FS_SAFE_UNMAPPED_TEMP_ANCESTOR", type: "FsSafeWarning" });
+}

package/dist/test-hooks.d.ts

@@ -1,6 +1,9 @@
 import type { FileHandle } from "node:fs/promises";
 import type { FileIdentityStat } from "./file-identity.js";
 export type FsSafeTestHooks = {
+    beforeWatchRegistration?: (path: string) => void | Promise<void>;
+    afterWatchRegistration?: (path: string) => void | Promise<void>;
+    afterWatchBackendCreated?: (root: string, emit: (batch: import("./watch-native.js").NativeWatchBatch) => void, nativeEvent?: (path: string, flags: number) => void) => void;
     afterPreOpenLstat?: (filePath: string) => Promise<void> | void;
     beforeOpen?: (filePath: string, flags: number) => Promise<void> | void;
     afterOpen?: (filePath: string, handle: FileHandle) => Promise<void> | void;

package/dist/text-atomic.d.ts

@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
-export type WriteTextAtomicOptions = {
+import { type ReplaceFileAtomicOptions } from "./replace-file.js";
+export type WriteTextAtomicOptions = Pick<ReplaceFileAtomicOptions, "beforeRename" | "tempPrefix"> & {
     mode?: number;
     dirMode?: number;
     trailingNewline?: boolean;

package/dist/text-atomic.js

@@ -12,5 +12,7 @@ export async function writeTextAtomic(filePath, content, options) {
         copyFallbackOnPermissionError: true,
         syncTempFile: durable,
         syncParentDir: durable,
+        beforeRename: options?.beforeRename,
+        tempPrefix: options?.tempPrefix,
     });
 }

package/dist/trash.js

@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
 import fs from "node:fs";
 import os from "node:os";
 import path from "node:path";
+import { assertSyncDirectoryGuard, createSyncDirectoryGuard } from "./directory-guard.js";
 import { sameFileIdentity } from "./file-identity.js";
 import { guardedRenameSync, guardedRmSync } from "./guarded-mutation.js";
 import { realpathSync } from "./realpath.js";
@@ -72,6 +73,22 @@ function resolveTrashTargetPath(targetPath) {
     assertNoTrashPathAlias(resolvedPath, "target path");
     return { path: resolvedPath, resolved: true };
 }
+function resolveTrashEntryParent(lexicalTarget, targetPath) {
+    const lexicalParent = path.dirname(lexicalTarget);
+    assertNoTrashPathAlias(lexicalParent, "target path");
+    let realParent;
+    try {
+        // The renamed name lives in this parent. rename follows intermediate
+        // symlinks, so a lexical parent inside an allowed root is not enough.
+        realParent = realpathSync.native(lexicalParent);
+    }
+    catch {
+        throw new Error(`Refusing to trash path outside allowed roots: ${targetPath}`);
+    }
+    const resolvedParent = path.resolve(realParent);
+    assertNoTrashPathAlias(resolvedParent, "target path");
+    return resolvedParent;
+}
 function assertAllowedTrashTarget(targetPath, allowedRoots) {
     assertNoTrashPathAlias(targetPath, "target path");
     const lexicalTarget = path.resolve(targetPath);
@@ -79,11 +96,19 @@ function assertAllowedTrashTarget(targetPath, allowedRoots) {
     const stat = fs.lstatSync(lexicalTarget);
     const resolvedTarget = resolveTrashTargetPath(targetPath);
     const resolvedTargetPath = resolvedTarget.path;
-    const isAllowed = resolveAllowedTrashRoots(allowedRoots).some((root) => resolvedTargetPath !== root && isSameOrChildPath(resolvedTargetPath, root));
+    const parent = createSyncDirectoryGuard(path.dirname(lexicalTarget));
+    // Admit the directory entry only when its parent really stays inside an
+    // allowed root. Do not admit it because the symlink target is inside.
+    const resolvedParent = resolveTrashEntryParent(lexicalTarget, targetPath);
+    const isAllowed = resolveAllowedTrashRoots(allowedRoots).some((root) => isSameOrChildPath(resolvedParent, root));
     if (!isAllowed) {
         throw new Error(`Refusing to trash path outside allowed roots: ${targetPath}`);
     }
+    // Sync and native realpath can use different Windows short-name spellings.
+    // Recheck the retained guard around native containment instead of comparing them.
+    assertSyncDirectoryGuard(parent);
     return {
+        parent,
         path: lexicalTarget,
         realPath: resolvedTargetPath,
         realPathResolved: resolvedTarget.resolved,
@@ -91,6 +116,7 @@ function assertAllowedTrashTarget(targetPath, allowedRoots) {
     };
 }
 function assertTrashTargetGuard(guard) {
+    assertSyncDirectoryGuard(guard.parent);
     const stat = fs.lstatSync(guard.path);
     if (!sameFileIdentity(stat, guard.stat)) {
         throw new Error(`Refusing to trash path after it changed: ${guard.path}`);

package/dist/walk.d.ts

@@ -20,12 +20,9 @@ export type AsyncWalkDirectoryOptions = Omit<WalkDirectoryOptions, "include" | "
     include?: (entry: WalkDirectoryEntry) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
     descend?: (entry: WalkDirectoryEntry) => boolean | Promise<boolean>;
 };
-export type WalkDirectoryFailure = {
-    path: string;
-    relativePath: string;
-    depth: number;
+export type WalkDirectoryFailure = Pick<WalkDirectoryEntry & {
     error: unknown;
-};
+}, "path" | "relativePath" | "depth" | "error">;
 export type WalkDirectoryResult = {
     entries: WalkDirectoryEntry[];
     scannedEntryCount: number;

package/dist/watch-alias.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,6 @@
+import { type RootContext } from "./root-context.js";
+import type { NativeWatchBatch } from "./watch-native.js";
+import type { WatchSnapshot } from "./watch-scan.js";
+import type { WatchChange, WatchScope } from "./watch-types.js";
+/** Resolve native spelling aliases without treating case folding as identity. */
+export declare function admittedNativeChanges(root: RootContext, scopes: readonly WatchScope[], before: WatchSnapshot | undefined, after: WatchSnapshot, batch: NativeWatchBatch, signal: AbortSignal, limit: number): Promise<WatchChange[] | undefined>;