@openclaw/fs-safe 0.12.0 → 0.13.0

package/dist/root-write-compatibility.js

@@ -0,0 +1,74 @@
+import fs from "node:fs";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { FsSafeError } from "./errors.js";
+import { isNotFoundPathError } from "./path.js";
+import { admitPathInsideRoot } from "./root-boundary.js";
+import { withPinnedWriteRenameIdentityLock } from "./pinned-write.js";
+import { realpathSync } from "./realpath.js";
+import { serializePathWrite } from "./write-queue.js";
+function unsupportedSpelling() {
+    return new FsSafeError("path-alias", "Windows compatibility writes require lower-case ASCII destination components");
+}
+// The caller first applies the Root's ordinary path and mutation policies. This
+// extra admission rule is deliberately narrower than general Windows filenames:
+// the existing lock protocol has no portable case/Unicode equivalence key for a
+// missing name. Do not guess one, or switch keys when a placeholder appears.
+function effectiveDestination(rootPath, targetPath, rootIdentity) {
+    let effective;
+    try {
+        effective = realpathSync.native(targetPath);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (!isNotFoundPathError(error))
+            throw error;
+        let cursor = targetPath;
+        const missing = [];
+        for (;;) {
+            try {
+                fs.lstatSync(cursor);
+                break;
+            }
+            catch (error) {
+                if (!isNotFoundPathError(error) || cursor === rootPath)
+                    throw error;
+                const parent = path.dirname(cursor);
+                if (parent === cursor)
+                    throw error;
+                missing.unshift(path.basename(cursor));
+                cursor = parent;
+            }
+        }
+        // An existing dangling link must fail resolution, not become a missing
+        // lexical component. Keep the fallback bounded by the retained Root.
+        effective = path.join(realpathSync.native(cursor), ...missing);
+    }
+    const admitted = admitPathInsideRoot({ rootPath, candidatePath: effective, rootIdentity });
+    if (!admitted)
+        throw unsupportedSpelling();
+    const relative = admitted.relativePath;
+    if (!relative || !relative.split(path.sep).every(component => /^[a-z0-9._-]+$/.test(component) && !component.endsWith(".")))
+        throw unsupportedSpelling();
+    return admitted.path;
+}
+export function assertRootFallbackWritePath(expected, actual) {
+    if (expected !== undefined && actual !== expected) {
+        throw new FsSafeError("path-mismatch", "compatibility write destination changed after lock selection");
+    }
+}
+export async function withRootFallbackCompatibilityLock(params, run) {
+    const targetPath = effectiveDestination(params.rootPath, params.targetPath, params.rootIdentity);
+    const relativePath = path.relative(params.rootPath, targetPath).split(path.sep).join("/");
+    const assertCurrent = () => assertRootFallbackWritePath(targetPath, effectiveDestination(params.rootPath, targetPath, params.rootIdentity));
+    // Sidecars are reentrant within one manager; aliases also need the same local
+    // queue before acquisition. The outer Root queue uses the caller's spelling.
+    return await serializePathWrite(targetPath, async () => await withPinnedWriteRenameIdentityLock({
+        rootPath: params.rootPath, targetPath, relativeTargetPath: relativePath,
+    }, async () => {
+        // The guarded open resolves again under the lock; each mutation rechecks
+        // below. Lock selection is never reused as post-lock filesystem authority.
+        return await run({
+            targetPath, relativePath,
+            assertBeforeMutation: () => { params.assertBeforeMutation?.(); assertCurrent(); },
+        });
+    }));
+}

package/dist/root-write-complete-parent.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
+import type { BigIntStats } from "node:fs";
+import { type AsyncDirectoryGuard } from "./directory-guard.js";
+import type { RootContext } from "./root-context.js";
+import type { GuardedRootWriteTarget } from "./root-write-admission.js";
+type PreparedWriteTargetObservation = Readonly<{
+    exists: false;
+} | {
+    exists: true;
+    stat: BigIntStats;
+}>;
+/**
+ * Exact, operation-local evidence that an ordinary shared-JavaScript write
+ * already has a complete parent. Path selection consumes this instead of
+ * recapturing the same parent after a component walk.
+ */
+export type PreparedRootWriteParent = Readonly<{
+    operationTargetPath: string;
+    selectedTargetPath: string;
+    parentGuard: AsyncDirectoryGuard<BigIntStats>;
+    rootPath: string;
+    rootIdentity: Readonly<{
+        dev: bigint;
+        ino: bigint;
+    }>;
+    nativeMode: string;
+    target: PreparedWriteTargetObservation;
+}>;
+type SharedRootWriteTargetParams = Readonly<{
+    relativePath: string;
+    guardedTarget: GuardedRootWriteTarget;
+    mkdir?: boolean;
+    assertBeforeMutation?: () => void;
+}>;
+export type SharedRootWriteTarget = Readonly<{
+    targetPath: string;
+    mutationAdmission: GuardedRootWriteTarget["mutationAdmission"];
+    preparedParent?: PreparedRootWriteParent;
+}>;
+export declare function assertPreparedRootWriteParentCurrent(prepared: PreparedRootWriteParent, verifyTarget?: boolean): void;
+export declare function prepareSharedRootWriteTarget(root: RootContext, params: SharedRootWriteTargetParams): Promise<SharedRootWriteTarget>;
+export {};
+//# sourceMappingURL=root-write-complete-parent.d.ts.map

package/dist/root-write-complete-parent.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/root-write-complete-parent.js

@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+import fsSync from "node:fs";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { assertDirectoryIdentitySync, createAsyncDirectoryGuard, inspectDirectoryIdentitySync, } from "./directory-guard.js";
+import { WINDOWS_RESERVED_DEVICE_NAMES } from "./device-path.js";
+import { FsSafeError } from "./errors.js";
+import { getFsSafeNativeConfig } from "./native-config.js";
+import { hasNodeErrorCode } from "./path.js";
+import { realpathSync } from "./realpath.js";
+import { admitPathInsideRoot } from "./root-boundary.js";
+import { prepareRootWriteTarget } from "./root-directory-creation.js";
+import { isSafePathSegment } from "./safe-path-segment.js";
+import { inspectFileIdentitySync } from "./strict-file-identity.js";
+import { getFsSafeTestHooks } from "./test-hooks.js";
+function writeSelectionChanged(cause) {
+    return new FsSafeError("path-mismatch", "write target changed during operation", {
+        cause: cause instanceof Error ? cause : undefined,
+    });
+}
+function sameNormalizedPathSpelling(left, right) {
+    // Windows can expose case-sensitive directories, so normalize separators
+    // and roots without using path.relative's case-folding comparison.
+    return path.resolve(left) === path.resolve(right);
+}
+function windowsReservedDeviceSegment(segment) {
+    const extension = segment.indexOf(".");
+    const stem = segment.slice(0, extension < 0 ? segment.length : extension).toUpperCase();
+    return WINDOWS_RESERVED_DEVICE_NAMES.has(stem);
+}
+function ordinarySharedWriteRoute(root, relativePath, operationTargetPath) {
+    if (process.versions.bun || relativePath === "" || relativePath.startsWith("~") ||
+        relativePath.includes("\0") || path.isAbsolute(relativePath))
+        return false;
+    const separator = process.platform === "win32" ? "\\" : "/";
+    const alternateSeparator = process.platform === "win32" ? "/" : "\\";
+    if (relativePath.includes(alternateSeparator))
+        return false;
+    const segments = relativePath.split(separator);
+    if (segments.some((segment) => segment === "" || segment === "." || segment === ".." ||
+        (process.platform === "win32" &&
+            (!isSafePathSegment(segment, { allowDotPrefix: true }) ||
+                segment.endsWith(".") || segment.endsWith(" ") ||
+                windowsReservedDeviceSegment(segment)))))
+        return false;
+    const routed = path.resolve(root.rootReal, relativePath);
+    const admitted = admitPathInsideRoot({
+        rootPath: root.rootReal,
+        candidatePath: routed,
+        rootIdentity: root.rootIdentity,
+    });
+    return admitted?.admission === "exact" &&
+        sameNormalizedPathSpelling(admitted.path, routed) &&
+        sameNormalizedPathSpelling(routed, operationTargetPath);
+}
+// Preparation is optional evidence. An exact identity mismatch is conclusive
+// and remains fail-closed; every other probe failure must let the established
+// ordered component admission classify the same filesystem state.
+function deoptPreparationFailure(error) {
+    if (error instanceof FsSafeError && error.code === "path-mismatch")
+        throw error;
+    return undefined;
+}
+function capturePreparedTargetObservation(targetPath) {
+    let stat;
+    try {
+        stat = inspectFileIdentitySync(() => fsSync.lstatSync(targetPath, { bigint: true }));
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (hasNodeErrorCode(error, "ENOENT"))
+            return Object.freeze({ exists: false });
+        return deoptPreparationFailure(error);
+    }
+    // Final aliases retain the established full component walk and selected-path
+    // admission. The shortcut is intentionally limited to an ordinary spelling.
+    if (stat.isSymbolicLink())
+        return undefined;
+    let realPath;
+    try {
+        realPath = realpathSync.native(targetPath);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        return deoptPreparationFailure(error);
+    }
+    if (!sameNormalizedPathSpelling(realPath, targetPath))
+        return undefined;
+    return Object.freeze({ exists: true, stat });
+}
+function samePreparedTargetFacts(left, right) {
+    return left.dev === right.dev && left.ino === right.ino && left.mode === right.mode &&
+        left.nlink === right.nlink;
+}
+function assertPreparedTargetCurrent(prepared) {
+    if (!prepared.target.exists) {
+        try {
+            fsSync.lstatSync(prepared.selectedTargetPath, { bigint: true });
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            if (hasNodeErrorCode(error, "ENOENT"))
+                return;
+            throw writeSelectionChanged(error);
+        }
+        throw writeSelectionChanged();
+    }
+    try {
+        const current = inspectFileIdentitySync(() => fsSync.lstatSync(prepared.selectedTargetPath, { bigint: true }), prepared.target.stat);
+        if (current.isSymbolicLink() || !samePreparedTargetFacts(prepared.target.stat, current)) {
+            throw writeSelectionChanged();
+        }
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (error instanceof FsSafeError && error.code === "path-mismatch")
+            throw error;
+        throw writeSelectionChanged(error);
+    }
+}
+export function assertPreparedRootWriteParentCurrent(prepared, verifyTarget = false) {
+    try {
+        if (getFsSafeNativeConfig().mode !== prepared.nativeMode)
+            throw writeSelectionChanged();
+        if (!sameNormalizedPathSpelling(prepared.parentGuard.dir, prepared.rootPath)) {
+            assertDirectoryIdentitySync(prepared.rootPath, prepared.rootIdentity);
+        }
+        else if (prepared.parentGuard.stat.dev !== prepared.rootIdentity.dev ||
+            prepared.parentGuard.stat.ino !== prepared.rootIdentity.ino) {
+            throw writeSelectionChanged();
+        }
+        const parent = inspectDirectoryIdentitySync(prepared.parentGuard.dir, prepared.parentGuard.stat);
+        if (parent.mode !== prepared.parentGuard.stat.mode ||
+            parent.nlink !== prepared.parentGuard.stat.nlink ||
+            !sameNormalizedPathSpelling(realpathSync.native(prepared.parentGuard.dir), prepared.parentGuard.realPath))
+            throw writeSelectionChanged();
+        if (verifyTarget)
+            assertPreparedTargetCurrent(prepared);
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        if (error instanceof FsSafeError && error.code === "path-mismatch")
+            throw error;
+        throw writeSelectionChanged(error);
+    }
+}
+async function prepareCompleteRootWriteParent(root, guarded, relativePath) {
+    if (!guarded.mutationAdmission || !guarded.selectedTargetAdmission ||
+        typeof root.rootIdentity.dev !== "bigint" || typeof root.rootIdentity.ino !== "bigint" ||
+        !ordinarySharedWriteRoute(root, relativePath, guarded.targetPath) ||
+        !sameNormalizedPathSpelling(guarded.resolvedPath.resolved, guarded.targetPath))
+        return undefined;
+    const parentPath = path.dirname(guarded.targetPath);
+    const admittedParent = admitPathInsideRoot({
+        rootPath: root.rootReal,
+        candidatePath: parentPath,
+        rootIdentity: root.rootIdentity,
+    });
+    if (admittedParent?.admission !== "exact" ||
+        !sameNormalizedPathSpelling(admittedParent.path, parentPath))
+        return undefined;
+    let parentGuard;
+    try {
+        parentGuard = await createAsyncDirectoryGuard(parentPath, { bigint: true });
+    }
+    catch (error) {
+        return deoptPreparationFailure(error);
+    }
+    if (!sameNormalizedPathSpelling(parentGuard.dir, parentPath) ||
+        !sameNormalizedPathSpelling(parentGuard.realPath, parentPath))
+        return undefined;
+    const target = capturePreparedTargetObservation(guarded.targetPath);
+    if (!target)
+        return undefined;
+    return Object.freeze({
+        operationTargetPath: guarded.targetPath,
+        selectedTargetPath: guarded.targetPath,
+        parentGuard,
+        rootPath: root.rootReal,
+        rootIdentity: Object.freeze({ dev: root.rootIdentity.dev, ino: root.rootIdentity.ino }),
+        nativeMode: getFsSafeNativeConfig().mode,
+        target,
+    });
+}
+export async function prepareSharedRootWriteTarget(root, params) {
+    const { guardedTarget } = params;
+    const resolvedPath = guardedTarget.resolvedPath.resolved;
+    const mutationAdmission = guardedTarget.mutationAdmission;
+    const beforeParentAdmission = mutationAdmission
+        ? getFsSafeTestHooks()?.beforePinnedWriteParentAdmission
+        : undefined;
+    if (mutationAdmission)
+        await beforeParentAdmission?.(resolvedPath);
+    const preparedParent = params.mkdir !== false &&
+        params.assertBeforeMutation === undefined && beforeParentAdmission === undefined
+        ? await prepareCompleteRootWriteParent(root, guardedTarget, params.relativePath)
+        : undefined;
+    const targetPath = params.mkdir === false
+        ? guardedTarget.targetPath
+        : preparedParent?.selectedTargetPath ?? await prepareRootWriteTarget(root, resolvedPath, params.assertBeforeMutation, mutationAdmission);
+    return { targetPath, mutationAdmission, preparedParent };
+}

package/dist/root-write-publication.d.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+import { type BigIntStats } from "node:fs";
+import type { FileHandle } from "node:fs/promises";
+import type { AnyAsyncDirectoryGuard } from "./directory-guard.js";
+import type { RootContext } from "./root-context.js";
+import type { RootWriteOptions } from "./root-options.js";
+export declare function finishRootFallbackWrite(params: {
+    root: RootContext;
+    targetPath: string;
+    handle: FileHandle;
+    identity: BigIntStats;
+    parentGuard: AnyAsyncDirectoryGuard;
+    mode: number;
+    options: RootWriteOptions & {
+        data: string | Buffer;
+    };
+    openForCompatibility: () => Promise<{
+        opened: {
+            handle: FileHandle;
+        };
+        identity: BigIntStats;
+    }>;
+    onVerificationFailure: (error: unknown) => void;
+}): Promise<void>;
+//# sourceMappingURL=root-write-publication.d.ts.map

package/dist/root-write-publication.d.ts.map

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
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package/dist/root-write-publication.js

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+import fsSync, {} from "node:fs";
+import path from "node:path";
+import { readFileHandleBounded } from "./bounded-read.js";
+import { syncDirectoryBestEffort } from "./directory-durability.js";
+import { FsSafeError } from "./errors.js";
+import { sameFileIdentityForCleanup, sha256Hex } from "./file-identity.js";
+import { cleanupPinnedFilePath } from "./replace-file-temp-owner.js";
+import { verifyAtomicWriteResult } from "./root-write-verification.js";
+// Compatibility callers hold the lock throughout this operation. The caller
+// owns the original write handle; this helper owns a content-verified reopen.
+export async function finishRootFallbackWrite(params) {
+    let handle = params.handle;
+    let identity = params.identity;
+    let accepted;
+    const compatibility = params.options.renameIdentity === "verify-content-with-lock";
+    const verify = async () => {
+        try {
+            await verifyAtomicWriteResult({
+                root: params.root, targetPath: params.targetPath, fd: handle.fd,
+                expectedIdentity: identity, parentGuard: params.parentGuard,
+            });
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            params.onVerificationFailure(error);
+            throw error;
+        }
+    };
+    try {
+        if (compatibility) {
+            const current = fsSync.lstatSync(params.targetPath, { bigint: true });
+            if (current.isSymbolicLink() || !current.isFile()) {
+                throw new FsSafeError("path-mismatch", "fallback target changed during write");
+            }
+            if (process.platform === "win32" && (current.dev === 0n || current.ino === 0n)) {
+                // Opaque pathname stats are not evidence of rename identity drift. The
+                // strict verifier can reopen against the retained descriptor's exact
+                // identity without reading bytes; a different object must still fail.
+                await verify();
+            }
+            else if (!sameFileIdentityForCleanup(current, identity)) {
+                const opened = await params.openForCompatibility();
+                accepted = handle = opened.opened.handle;
+                identity = opened.identity;
+                // Admit the destination under the retained Root and parent before any
+                // read, chmod, or sync; the original temp no longer proves its identity.
+                await verify();
+                const data = params.options.data;
+                const expectedBytes = typeof data === "string"
+                    ? Buffer.byteLength(data, params.options.encoding ?? "utf8") : data.byteLength;
+                const content = await readFileHandleBounded(handle, expectedBytes).catch((error) => {
+                    if (error instanceof FsSafeError && error.code === "too-large") {
+                        throw new FsSafeError("path-mismatch", "fallback target changed during write", { cause: error });
+                    }
+                    throw error;
+                });
+                if (sha256Hex(content) !== sha256Hex(data, params.options.encoding)) {
+                    throw new FsSafeError("path-mismatch", "fallback target changed during write");
+                }
+                await verify();
+            }
+        }
+        // Final mode belongs to the accepted object, including on rename-unstable
+        // filesystems; never chmod the old temp and assume its mode was transferred.
+        try {
+            await handle.chmod(params.mode);
+        }
+        catch (error) {
+            await cleanupPinnedFilePath({
+                pathname: params.targetPath, handle, identity, parentGuard: params.parentGuard,
+            });
+            throw error;
+        }
+        if (params.options.durable !== false)
+            await handle.sync();
+        await verify();
+        if (params.options.durable !== false) {
+            await syncDirectoryBestEffort(path.dirname(params.targetPath));
+            if (compatibility)
+                await verify();
+        }
+    }
+    finally {
+        await accepted?.close().catch(() => undefined);
+    }
+}

package/dist/root-write-verification.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"root-write-verification.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/root-write-verification.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAEA,OAAO,EAA6B,KAAK,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAK9F,OAAO,KAAK,EAAE,sBAAsB,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAEhE,OAAO,EAA6B,KAAK,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,mBAAmB,CAAC;AAIhF,wBAAsB,uBAAuB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE;IACpD,IAAI,EAAE,WAAW,CAAC;IAClB,UAAU,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACnB,EAAE,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACX,gBAAgB,EAAE,sBAAsB,CAAC;IACzC,YAAY,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACtB,WAAW,EAAE,sBAAsB,CAAC;CACrC,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAgGhB"}

package/dist/root-write-verification.js

@@ -48,8 +48,10 @@ export async function verifyAtomicWriteResult(params) {
         // This descriptor remains owned by the writer, even when final mode forbids opens.
         const stat = assertDescriptor();
         assertPath(fsSync.lstatSync(params.targetPath, { bigint: true }));
-        const { realPath } = await resolveOpenedFileRealPathForFd(params.fd, stat, params.targetPath);
-        assertPath(fsSync.statSync(realPath, { bigint: true }));
+        const { realPath, stat: resolvedStat } = await resolveOpenedFileRealPathForFd(params.fd, stat, params.targetPath);
+        // Consume the resolver's observation only in this pass; the checks after
+        // the directory guards must still sample the current path and descriptor.
+        assertPath(resolvedStat);
         if (!admitPathInsideRoot({
             rootPath: params.root.rootReal,
             candidatePath: realPath,
@@ -79,8 +81,8 @@ export async function verifyAtomicWriteResult(params) {
             try {
                 const reopenedStat = assertDescriptor(opened.fd);
                 assertPath(fsSync.lstatSync(params.targetPath, { bigint: true }));
-                const { realPath: reopenedPath } = await resolveOpenedFileRealPathForFd(opened.fd, reopenedStat, params.targetPath);
-                assertPath(fsSync.statSync(reopenedPath, { bigint: true }));
+                const { realPath: reopenedPath, stat: reopenedPathStat } = await resolveOpenedFileRealPathForFd(opened.fd, reopenedStat, params.targetPath);
+                assertPath(reopenedPathStat);
                 if (!admitPathInsideRoot({
                     rootPath: params.root.rootReal,
                     candidatePath: reopenedPath,

package/dist/secret-file.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"secret-file.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/secret-file.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA,OAAW,EAAE,KAAK,WAAW,EAAE,MAAM,SAAS,CAAC;AAM/C,OAAO,EAAkF,KAAK,mBAAmB,EAAE,MAAM,sBAAsB,CAAC;AAUhJ,OAAO,EAML,KAAK,qBAAqB,EAC3B,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAQjC,eAAO,MAAM,uBAAuB,MAAQ,CAAC;AAC7C,eAAO,MAAM,wBAAwB,MAAQ,CAAC;AAE9C,wBAAgB,kBAAkB,CAChC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAChB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EACb,OAAO,GAAE,qBAA0B,GAClC,MAAM,CAmER;AAED,wBAAgB,qBAAqB,CACnC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,EAC5B,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EACb,OAAO,GAAE,qBAA0B,GAClC,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAUpB;AA8JD,KAAK,qBAAqB,GAAG;IAC3B,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IAChB,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,OAAO,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,UAAU,CAAC;IAC7B,IAAI,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACd,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,OAAO,CAAC,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC;CACnB,CAAC;AA+BF,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAC1C,MAAM,EAAE,IAAI,CAAC,qBAAqB,EAAE,SAAS,CAAC,GAC7C,OAAO,CAAC;IACT,IAAI,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACb,SAAS,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;IAC5C,WAAW,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,WAAW,CAAC,CAAC;IAC9C,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;IACjB,aAAa,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC;CACvB,CAAC,CAgCD;AAwDD,wBAAsB,qBAAqB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAUxF;AAED,wBAAsB,sBAAsB,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,qBAAqB,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,IAAI,CAAC,CAoBzF"}

package/dist/secret-file.js

@@ -17,32 +17,36 @@ import { verifyAtomicWriteResult } from "./root-write-verification.js";
 import { assertSecretFilePreview, resolveSecretReadPolicy, secretPathErrorCode, secretReadError, trimSecretFileContent, } from "./secret-read-policy.js";
 import { inspectFileIdentity, inspectFileIdentitySync } from "./strict-file-identity.js";
 import { serializePathWrite } from "./write-queue.js";
+import { assertNoWindowsPathAlias, resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot, } from "./windows-path-alias.js";
 export const PRIVATE_SECRET_DIR_MODE = 0o700;
 export const PRIVATE_SECRET_FILE_MODE = 0o600;
 export function readSecretFileSync(filePath, label, options = {}) {
     const { resolvedPath, maxBytes } = resolveSecretReadPolicy(filePath, label, options);
-    function inspectInput(symlinkMessage) {
-        const stat = options.rejectSymlink
-            ? fs.lstatSync(resolvedPath, { bigint: true })
-            : fs.statSync(resolvedPath, { bigint: true });
-        if (options.rejectSymlink && stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
-            throw new FsSafeError("symlink", symlinkMessage);
-        }
-        return stat;
-    }
+    let rejectSymlink;
     let previewStat;
     try {
         assertNoUnsafeDeviceReadPath(resolvedPath);
+        rejectSymlink = Boolean(options.rejectSymlink);
         previewStat = inspectFileIdentitySync(() => inspectInput(`${label} file at ${resolvedPath} must not be a symlink.`));
     }
     catch (error) {
         throw secretReadError(error instanceof FsSafeError ? error.code : secretPathErrorCode(error), "inspect", label, resolvedPath, error);
     }
-    assertSecretFilePreview(previewStat, label, resolvedPath, maxBytes, options.rejectHardlinks !== false);
+    function inspectInput(symlinkMessage) {
+        const stat = rejectSymlink
+            ? fs.lstatSync(resolvedPath, { bigint: true })
+            : fs.statSync(resolvedPath, { bigint: true });
+        if (rejectSymlink && stat.isSymbolicLink()) {
+            throw new FsSafeError("symlink", symlinkMessage);
+        }
+        return stat;
+    }
+    const rejectHardlinks = options.rejectHardlinks !== false;
+    assertSecretFilePreview(previewStat, label, resolvedPath, maxBytes, rejectHardlinks);
     const opened = openPinnedFileSync({
         filePath: resolvedPath,
-        rejectPathSymlink: options.rejectSymlink,
-        rejectHardlinks: options.rejectHardlinks !== false,
+        rejectPathSymlink: rejectSymlink,
+        rejectHardlinks,
     });
     if (!opened.ok) {
         throw secretReadError(opened.reason === "path" ? "not-found" : "path-mismatch", "read", label, resolvedPath, opened.reason === "validation" ? new Error("security validation failed") : opened.error);
@@ -51,14 +55,14 @@ export function readSecretFileSync(filePath, label, options = {}) {
     try {
         const openedIdentity = inspectFileIdentitySync(() => {
             const stat = fs.fstatSync(opened.fd, { bigint: true });
-            if (!stat.isFile() || (options.rejectHardlinks !== false && stat.nlink > 1n)) {
+            if (!stat.isFile() || (rejectHardlinks && stat.nlink > 1n)) {
                 throw new FsSafeError("path-mismatch", "security validation failed");
             }
             return stat;
         }, previewStat);
         inspectFileIdentitySync(() => {
             const stat = fs.lstatSync(opened.path, { bigint: true });
-            if (!stat.isFile() || (options.rejectHardlinks !== false && stat.nlink > 1n)) {
+            if (!stat.isFile() || (rejectHardlinks && stat.nlink > 1n)) {
                 throw new FsSafeError("path-mismatch", "security validation failed");
             }
             return stat;
@@ -152,8 +156,8 @@ async function inspectPrivateDirectory(directory, kind) {
     });
 }
 async function ensurePrivateDirectory(rootDir, targetDir, mode) {
-    const resolvedRoot = path.resolve(rootDir);
-    const resolvedTarget = path.resolve(targetDir);
+    const resolvedRoot = resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot(rootDir);
+    const resolvedTarget = resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot(targetDir);
     let rootStat = await inspectPrivateDirectory(resolvedRoot, "root").catch((error) => {
         if (error.code !== "ENOENT")
             throw error;
@@ -228,21 +232,42 @@ async function ensurePrivateDirectory(rootDir, targetDir, mode) {
     }
     return { rootGuard, parentGuard: targetGuard };
 }
+function snapshotSecretFileWriteParams(params, rootDir, filePath) {
+    return {
+        rootDir,
+        filePath,
+        content: params.content,
+        mode: params.mode,
+        dirMode: params.dirMode,
+        durable: params.durable,
+    };
+}
 async function secretFileWriteQueueKey(filePath) {
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(filePath, "filesystem", "private secret path uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
     try {
         return await canonicalPathFromExistingAncestor(filePath);
     }
-    catch {
+    catch (error) {
+        if (error instanceof FsSafeError && error.code === "invalid-path")
+            throw error;
         // Keep validation and its public error shape owned by the write path below.
-        return path.resolve(filePath);
+        const resolved = path.resolve(filePath);
+        assertNoWindowsPathAlias(resolved, "filesystem", "private secret path uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+        return resolved;
     }
 }
 // Internal preparation for private writers and their pre-write locks; not lasting authorization.
 export async function prepareSecretFileWrite(params) {
+    const rootDir = params.rootDir;
+    const filePath = params.filePath;
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(rootDir, "filesystem", "private secret root uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(filePath, "filesystem", "private secret path uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
     const mode = params.mode ?? PRIVATE_SECRET_FILE_MODE;
     const dirMode = params.dirMode ?? PRIVATE_SECRET_DIR_MODE;
-    const resolvedRoot = path.resolve(params.rootDir);
-    const resolvedFile = path.resolve(params.filePath);
+    const resolvedRoot = resolvePathPreservingWindowsRoot(rootDir);
+    const resolvedFile = path.resolve(filePath);
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(resolvedRoot, "filesystem", "private secret root uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(resolvedFile, "filesystem", "private secret path uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
     assertPathWithinRoot(resolvedRoot, resolvedFile);
     for (const [kind, value] of [["file", mode], ["directory", dirMode]]) {
         if (!Number.isInteger(value) || value < 0 || value > 0o7777) {
@@ -254,8 +279,11 @@ export async function prepareSecretFileWrite(params) {
     await assertAsyncDirectoryGuard(rootGuard);
     await assertAsyncDirectoryGuard(parentGuard);
     assertRealPathWithinRoot(rootGuard.realPath, parentGuard.realPath);
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(rootGuard.realPath, "filesystem", "private secret root uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(parentGuard.realPath, "filesystem", "private secret parent uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
     const fileName = path.basename(resolvedFile);
     const finalFilePath = path.join(parentGuard.realPath, fileName);
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(finalFilePath, "filesystem", "private secret path uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
     return { mode, rootGuard, parentGuard, fileName, finalFilePath };
 }
 async function materializeSecretFileAtomic(params, createOnly) {
@@ -309,16 +337,26 @@ async function materializeSecretFileAtomic(params, createOnly) {
     });
 }
 export async function writeSecretFileAtomic(params) {
-    const canonicalPath = await secretFileWriteQueueKey(params.filePath);
+    const rootDir = params.rootDir;
+    const filePath = params.filePath;
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(rootDir, "filesystem", "private secret root uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+    assertNoWindowsPathAlias(filePath, "filesystem", "private secret path uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+    const ownedParams = snapshotSecretFileWriteParams(params, rootDir, filePath);
+    const canonicalPath = await secretFileWriteQueueKey(filePath);
     await serializePathWrite(canonicalPath, async () => {
-        await materializeSecretFileAtomic(params, false);
+        await materializeSecretFileAtomic(ownedParams, false);
     });
 }
 export async function createSecretFileAtomic(params) {
     try {
-        const canonicalPath = await secretFileWriteQueueKey(params.filePath);
+        const rootDir = params.rootDir;
+        const filePath = params.filePath;
+        assertNoWindowsPathAlias(rootDir, "filesystem", "private secret root uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+        assertNoWindowsPathAlias(filePath, "filesystem", "private secret path uses a Windows filesystem namespace alias");
+        const ownedParams = snapshotSecretFileWriteParams(params, rootDir, filePath);
+        const canonicalPath = await secretFileWriteQueueKey(filePath);
         await serializePathWrite(canonicalPath, async () => {
-            await materializeSecretFileAtomic(params, true);
+            await materializeSecretFileAtomic(ownedParams, true);
         });
     }
     catch (error) {

package/dist/secret-read-async.d.ts.map

@@ -1 +1 @@
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+{"version":3,"file":"secret-read-async.d.ts","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../src/secret-read-async.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAQA,OAAO,EAML,KAAK,qBAAqB,EAC3B,MAAM,yBAAyB,CAAC;AAGjC,wBAAsB,cAAc,CAClC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAChB,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EACb,OAAO,GAAE,qBAA0B,GAClC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,CA6DjB;AAED,wBAAsB,iBAAiB,CACrC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,EAC5B,KAAK,EAAE,MAAM,EACb,OAAO,GAAE,qBAA0B,GAClC,OAAO,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC,CAQ7B"}