@openai/codex-security 0.6.0 → 0.7.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +68 -37
- package/_bundled_plugin/.mcp.json +1 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/helpers.mjs.br.part-000 +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/helpers.mjs.br.part-001 +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/native/THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.txt +1 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/native/darwin-arm64/unix.node +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/native/darwin-x64/unix.node +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/native/linux-arm64-gnu/unix.node +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/native/linux-arm64-musl/unix.node +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/native/linux-x64-gnu/unix.node +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/native/win32-arm64/windows.node +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/native/win32-x64/windows.node +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/server.mjs.br.part-000 +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/server.mjs.br.part-001 +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/server.mjs.br.part-002 +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/access-advisory.md +11 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/core-scan.md +30 -77
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/final-report.md +45 -189
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/scan-contract.md +2 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/scan-prologue.md +1 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/scan-runtime.md +1 -5
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/threat-model.md +33 -41
- package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/coverage.schema.json +12 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/scan-manifest.schema.json +1 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/tools/deep-reducer.schema.json +38 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/deep_scan_config.py +39 -39
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/deep_scan_workbench.py +145 -85
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/finalize_scan_contract.py +189 -57
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/report_projection.py +44 -15
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/threat_model_projection.py +4 -2
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/windows_scan_local_files.py +43 -14
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench/retained_coverage.py +3218 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench/retained_records.py +627 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench/saved_coverage.py +644 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench/saved_outputs.py +72 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench/saved_sources.py +712 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_cli.py +3 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_coverage_receipts.py +479 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_db.py +51 -22
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_feedback.py +0 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_finding_workflows.py +51 -9
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_native_indexes.py +56 -44
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_saved_results.py +641 -2387
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_scan_history.py +72 -7
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_schema.py +1 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_source_scopes.py +4 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_target.py +142 -17
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_validation.py +9 -2
- package/_bundled_plugin/shared/workbench-history-repairs.json +21 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/shared/workbench-migrations.json +28 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/assess-patch-risk/SKILL.md +3 -14
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/assess-patch-risk/references/windows-validation.md +14 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/SKILL.md +38 -103
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/references/attack-path-facts.md +11 -73
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/references/severity-policy.md +57 -116
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/deep-security-scan/SKILL.md +28 -51
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/define-security-policy/SKILL.md +9 -9
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/finding-discovery/SKILL.md +26 -140
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/fix-finding/SKILL.md +9 -28
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/propose-security-hardening/SKILL.md +28 -218
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/propose-security-hardening/references/proposal-format.md +29 -424
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/publish-findings/SKILL.md +28 -24
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/publish-findings/references/wiz-import.md +64 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-diff-scan/SKILL.md +12 -12
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-scan/SKILL.md +28 -16
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-scan/references/desktop-scan.md +11 -17
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-scan/references/scan-artifacts-and-ledger.md +52 -69
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/threat-model/SKILL.md +16 -9
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/triage-finding/SKILL.md +5 -15
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/triage-finding/references/ticket-intake.md +6 -6
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/validation/SKILL.md +42 -104
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/validation/references/validation-guidance.md +21 -106
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/verify-fix/SKILL.md +4 -2
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/vulnerability-writeup/SKILL.md +21 -159
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/vulnerability-writeup/references/report-format.md +18 -60
- package/dist/api.d.ts +5 -3
- package/dist/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/api.js +341 -37
- package/dist/api.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/auth.js +4 -1
- package/dist/auth.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/cli.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli.js +674 -419
- package/dist/cli.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/component-scan.d.ts +8 -2
- package/dist/component-scan.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/component-scan.js +2 -0
- package/dist/component-scan.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/contract.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/contract.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/contract.js +67 -33
- package/dist/contract.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cost.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/cost.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cost.js +107 -12
- package/dist/cost.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/coverage-presentation.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/coverage-presentation.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/coverage-presentation.js +34 -0
- package/dist/coverage-presentation.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/custom-validation-prompt.js +3 -3
- package/dist/custom-validation-prompt.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/custom-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/custom-validation.js +30 -4
- package/dist/custom-validation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/deduplication/checkpointed-review.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/deduplication/checkpointed-review.js +3 -1
- package/dist/deduplication/checkpointed-review.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/deduplication/scan.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/deduplication/scan.js +7 -5
- package/dist/deduplication/scan.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/endor-findings.d.ts +4 -3
- package/dist/endor-findings.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/endor-findings.js +16 -11
- package/dist/endor-findings.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-import.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-import.js +13 -5
- package/dist/external-findings-import.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-local.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-local.js +8 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-local.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-publish.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-publish.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-publish.js +11 -3
- package/dist/external-findings-publish.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-read.d.ts +11 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-read.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-findings-read.js +15 -6
- package/dist/external-findings-read.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-import-contract.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/external-import-contract.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-import-contract.js +33 -25
- package/dist/external-import-contract.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/external-imports-feature.d.ts +6 -0
- package/dist/external-imports-feature.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/external-imports-feature.js +51 -0
- package/dist/external-imports-feature.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/finding-workflow.d.ts +22 -5
- package/dist/finding-workflow.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/finding-workflow.js +21 -9
- package/dist/finding-workflow.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/github-advisories.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/github-advisories.js +3 -1
- package/dist/github-advisories.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/github-findings.d.ts +4 -3
- package/dist/github-findings.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/github-findings.js +16 -14
- package/dist/github-findings.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/hosted-remediation.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/hosted-remediation.js +19 -2
- package/dist/hosted-remediation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/hosted-scan.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/hosted-scan.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/hosted-scan.js +0 -5
- package/dist/hosted-scan.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/import-scan.js +1 -1
- package/dist/import-scan.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge-base.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/knowledge-base.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/knowledge-base.js +17 -8
- package/dist/knowledge-base.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/models.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/models.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/models.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/owner-evidence.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/owner-evidence.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/owner-evidence.js +2 -1
- package/dist/owner-evidence.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/publish.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/publish.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/publish.js +1 -1
- package/dist/publish.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remediation.d.ts +1 -25
- package/dist/remediation.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remediation.js +3 -24
- package/dist/remediation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/runtime.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/runtime.js +7 -7
- package/dist/runtime.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-dashboard.d.ts +5 -3
- package/dist/scan-dashboard.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-dashboard.js +79 -26
- package/dist/scan-dashboard.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-history-renderer.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-history-renderer.js +8 -2
- package/dist/scan-history-renderer.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-owner-suggestions.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-owner-suggestions.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-owner-suggestions.js +4 -4
- package/dist/scan-owner-suggestions.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-usage-display.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/scan-usage-display.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scan-usage-display.js +46 -0
- package/dist/scan-usage-display.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scanner-import.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/scanner-import.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scanner-import.js +7 -3
- package/dist/scanner-import.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/security-policy.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/security-policy.js +1 -20
- package/dist/security-policy.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/semgrep-findings.d.ts +4 -3
- package/dist/semgrep-findings.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/semgrep-findings.js +9 -9
- package/dist/semgrep-findings.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/skill-authentication.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/skill-authentication.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/skill-authentication.js +82 -0
- package/dist/skill-authentication.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/snyk-findings.d.ts +5 -4
- package/dist/snyk-findings.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/snyk-findings.js +18 -17
- package/dist/snyk-findings.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/suggest-owners.d.ts +4 -1
- package/dist/suggest-owners.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/suggest-owners.js +53 -21
- package/dist/suggest-owners.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/targets.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/targets.js +4 -1
- package/dist/targets.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/wiz-csv.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/wiz-csv.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/wiz-csv.js +3 -3
- package/dist/wiz-csv.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/wiz-findings.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/wiz-findings.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/wiz-findings.js +27 -23
- package/dist/wiz-findings.js.map +1 -1
- package/docs/classify-severity-records.md +3 -4
- package/docs/cli.md +155 -38
- package/docs/findings-service.md +119 -118
- package/docs/hosted-remediation.md +19 -17
- package/docs/hosted-scans.md +37 -11
- package/package.json +8 -8
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/generate_in_scope_files.py +0 -277
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/generate_rank_input.py +0 -350
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/rank_preview.py +0 -129
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# Security Attack Path Analysis
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Determine whether each supplied finding has a supported attacker path, what impact it has, and whether it is reportable. Before creating or retaining files, read `../../references/artifact-storage.md`.
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##
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## Establish the attack path
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For a scan phase, use its per-scan threat model and candidate set from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`. Preserve supplied input paths. If a required scan artifact is unavailable, report the missing input.
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For standalone analysis, use the supplied finding, repository, threat model or security policy, and context. A per-scan artifact is not required. State material assumptions and ask for missing context only when it prevents a meaningful assessment.
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1. Establish the in-scope attacker, affected product surface, entry point, controlled input, security boundary, and sensitive operation. Trace the path from repository evidence.
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2. Identify relevant controls and the strongest counterevidence. Explain what they establish, which prerequisites remain, and whether the exact claimed boundary is crossed.
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3. Assess impact and likelihood from those facts, then apply [references/severity-policy.md](references/severity-policy.md). Keep facts, severity calibration, and the final policy decision distinguishable in the result.
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4. Return an explicit decision for every eligible candidate, including ignored or deferred candidates. Do not replace a supported instance with a neighboring finding or lose its root-control location.
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Use repository evidence and explicitly supplied context. Access the network only when the user has expressly authorized it; an offline scan never accesses the network. Do not invent unsupported attack chains. Missing deployment or public-ingress evidence can limit confidence without defeating an otherwise supported finding.
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## Scan integration
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Standard scans and Deep Scan workers assess attack paths within their ordinary Standard scan workflow; neither invokes this separate phase skill.
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### Compact Workbench
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When a workbench-backed `$security-diff-scan` has a `scanId
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- Determine whether the finding is actually a real security vulnerability rather than a correctness bug or false positive.
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- Determine whether the affected code belongs to a product surface or production workflow.
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- Map the relevant service, component, or workflow context from repository evidence.
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- Establish exposure and entry points from repository evidence such as listeners, ingress, load balancers, service ports, manifests, routing, or network policy.
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- Establish identities, privileges, and trust boundaries that matter for the path.
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- Establish whether sensitive data, secrets references, or privileged control paths are involved.
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- Determine whether a realistic attacker can actually reach and use the issue from an in-scope attack surface.
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- Identify the strongest repository counterevidence against the scoping and reportability-driving fields before finalizing them.
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- Lower confidence or keep fields unknown when repository evidence is incomplete; do not automatically suppress a finding solely because deployment evidence is missing.
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## Counterevidence Checklist
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- In-Scope Status According to the Threat Model
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- Vector
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- Auth Scope
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- Exposure
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- Cross-Boundary Behavior
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- Preconditions
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- Impact Surface
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Look specifically for repository evidence that the path is:
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## Severity and Policy Checklist
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## Output Contract
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In compact diff mode, every candidate with validation disposition `reportable` or `deferred` must receive exactly one nested attack-path decision. The recorded decisions are the complete phase output; do not also create narrative reports or receipts. Otherwise, use the following report contract.
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For each surviving finding include:
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- title
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- candidate id, instance key, and ledger row id when provided
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- affected lines from validation, preserving labeled entrypoint/wrapper, root_control, sink, and concrete_implementation locations
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- attack path steps
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- rendered attack-path facts
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- counterevidence summary and challenges
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- severity calibration
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- final policy decision
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- enough reasoning that a later reader can understand why the finding survived or was suppressed
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Render attack-path facts using `references/attack-path-facts.md`.
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## Hard Rules
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- Use repository evidence and explicitly supplied context. Access the network only when the user has expressly authorized that access; an offline scan never accesses the network.
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- Do not invent attack chains that the code does not support.
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- Do not leave candidate coverage implicit. In compact diff mode, record a nested attack-path decision for every eligible candidate, even when the final policy decision is `ignore` or `deferred`. Otherwise, every candidate that reaches attack-path analysis must leave an attack-path receipt in its candidate-ledger path from `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`.
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- Do not drop exact affected locations while converting validated findings into attack paths. Repository-wide seeded/root-control rows that survive validation must keep their root-control file:line even when a wrapper, route, or transport is easier to explain.
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- Do not skip a reportable validation row because a neighboring same-family finding has a cleaner story. Either produce attack-path facts for that exact row or make an explicit final policy decision with repository counterevidence.
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-- Considerations for attack path --
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- The attack surface should generally be one that is plausibly exposed to end users / external actors (or another actor explicitly in scope in the threat model).
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### Compact Workbench Diff
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- Submit every decision together with `record_candidate_attack_paths({ scanId, attackPaths: [{ candidateId, attackPath }] })`. Submit `attackPaths: []` when no candidate enters this phase. The tool preserves the stored candidate order.
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- These nested decisions are the complete phase output. Do not create duplicate reports, receipts, or manual ledgers.
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### Other phase-based scans
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Use the active workflow's report and receipt paths in `../../references/scan-artifacts.md`. Every candidate entering this phase must have an explicit decision and a receipt with its ID, facts or exact proof gap, and report reference. Record ignored candidates before excluding them from the surviving finding set.
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For repository-wide or scoped-path scans, include validation closure rows marked `reportable` or `survives: yes`, even if discovery did not assign a polished finding number. Preserve affected entrypoint/wrapper, root-control, sink, and concrete-implementation locations supplied by validation.
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## Output
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For standalone analysis, follow the caller's format or return a concise assessment per finding. Scan phases use their output contract above. Include:
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- relevant facts from [references/attack-path-facts.md](references/attack-path-facts.md);
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Retain enough evidence to explain both surviving and suppressed findings. Apply the severity policy to the established facts rather than reopening discovery or substituting a different attack story.
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@@ -1,76 +1,14 @@
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# Attack Path Facts
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# Attack Path Facts
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Use
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Use these fields to explain the path and the reportability decision. Record unknowns explicitly when they matter. Follow the calling workflow's schema; in narrative output, use concise bullets or paragraphs rather than repeating the same evidence under several headings.
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- **Scope and context:** the affected component, applicable threat-model boundary, whether the impact is self-only or crosses a meaningful boundary, and the evidence.
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- **Attack path:** attacker-controlled input, numbered attacker steps, sensitive operation, and the evidence connecting them.
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- **Identity and preconditions:** effective privileges, required attacker position or capabilities, plausibility of those prerequisites, and assumptions.
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|
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- the evidence
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|
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- the evidence
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- Secrets References:
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|
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- the secret type and reference chain when present
|
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- Counterevidence:
|
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- the strongest conflicting repository evidence for the reportability-driving facts
|
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|
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- why that evidence is or is not dispositive
|
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- Blindspots
|
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- Controls
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- Confidence
|
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|
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58
|
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Prefer turning those facts into readable bullets or short labeled paragraphs instead of exposing a raw schema dump. The final report should make the scoping and reportability facts easy to inspect, including:
|
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59
|
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|
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60
|
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- whether the finding is in scope according to the threat model
|
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- whether the surface is public, internal, admin-only, localhost-only, or unknown
|
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|
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- what attacker-controlled input exists
|
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|
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- what preconditions the attacker needs and whether they are achievable
|
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|
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- whether a real trust boundary is crossed
|
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|
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- what identities, privileges, or secrets are involved
|
|
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|
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- what mitigations and controls already exist
|
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|
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- what the strongest repository counterevidence is
|
|
68
|
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- what blindspots or residual uncertainty remain
|
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Also make sure the rendered report carries forward:
|
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|
|
72
|
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- the factual attack path as numbered attacker steps
|
|
73
|
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- the reachability and scoping logic
|
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74
|
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- the strongest conflicting repository evidence
|
|
75
|
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- the final policy decision after suppression
|
|
76
|
-
- the reasoning behind impact and likelihood
|
|
14
|
+
Keep attack-path facts distinct from severity and suppression decisions. Preserve precise source locations and identifiers supplied by validation.
|
|
@@ -1,121 +1,62 @@
|
|
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1
1
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# Severity and Policy Guidance
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59
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|
60
|
-
- Low-impact information leaks
|
|
61
|
-
- Internal-only defects without attacker reachability
|
|
62
|
-
- The report shows a bug class in isolation, but not a realistic exploit path.
|
|
63
|
-
- The issue requires the attacker to already have privileged, admin, root, console, shell, or code-execution access.
|
|
64
|
-
- "Could maybe matter if chained with many assumptions" arguments
|
|
65
|
-
- Self-XSS without a victim or meaningful boundary crossing, or XSS whose actual origin, browser reachability, and impact do not justify `high`/`critical`. An `alert` proof demonstrates JavaScript execution and is not evidence against reflected XSS.
|
|
66
|
-
- SQLi or other injection claims with no demonstrated attacker control, no shown sink reachability, or only speculative impact.
|
|
67
|
-
- CSRF on low-impact actions, cosmetic actions, logout, preferences, or actions requiring unrealistic victim behavior.
|
|
68
|
-
- Open redirect, clickjacking, user enumeration, rate-limit weakness, banner leakage, version disclosure, directory listing, stack traces, internal hostnames, or basic error-message leakage, unless they are shown as part of a serious exploit chain.
|
|
69
|
-
- Memory corruption that is theoretical, non-triggerable from in-scope input, or not plausibly exploitable in the target environment.
|
|
70
|
-
- Missing headers, cookie flags, CSP weaknesses, TLS observations, or crypto hygiene issues without a concrete exploit path and meaningful demonstrated impact.
|
|
71
|
-
- Reports that effectively say "this could be dangerous if combined with something else" but do not show the something else.
|
|
72
|
-
- Denial of service that is transient, single-user, self-targeting, easy to mitigate, requires disproportionate attacker resources, or does not create severe and realistic business / safety impact.
|
|
73
|
-
- Authz findings that require already having the same privilege as the victim, or only expose trivial metadata.
|
|
74
|
-
- Bugs that already require admin/root/shell access unless the privilege-escalation delta itself is the issue being reported.
|
|
75
|
-
- Arbitrary file read limited to public files, low-sensitivity files, or source fragments with no realistic security consequence.
|
|
76
|
-
|
|
77
|
-
High/Critical acceptance checklist (all should be true, unless the threat model strongly justifies an exception):
|
|
78
|
-
|
|
79
|
-
- In-scope component
|
|
80
|
-
- Realistic attacker
|
|
81
|
-
- Reasonable in-scope attack surface
|
|
82
|
-
- Credible exploitation path (not simply speculation)
|
|
83
|
-
- Major security impact
|
|
84
|
-
- Would likely be accepted as `high`/`critical` (not informational/low) in serious audit or bug bounty triage by a major auditing firm who puts their reputation on the line.
|
|
85
|
-
|
|
86
|
-
## Severity and Policy Checklist
|
|
87
|
-
|
|
88
|
-
Apply severity adjustment only after scope, reachability, and counterevidence are established. Do not reopen discovery here.
|
|
89
|
-
|
|
90
|
-
Start from the candidate's original severity hypothesis, then adjust it using the repository-evidenced facts from this phase.
|
|
91
|
-
|
|
92
|
-
Severity adjustment guidance:
|
|
93
|
-
|
|
94
|
-
- Keep `critical` only when the attack path, reachability, and impact are all clear enough that the finding would demand immediate attention.
|
|
95
|
-
- Keep `high` only when there is a realistic in-scope attacker path and major security impact without a long speculative chain.
|
|
96
|
-
- Downgrade when the path is real but constrained to narrower objects, same-tenant impact, internal-only surfaces, or other materially limiting conditions.
|
|
97
|
-
- Reduce severity when the path is localhost-only, self-only, highly constrained, dependent on unrealistic preconditions, or already requires privileged access unless the privilege-escalation delta is the issue.
|
|
98
|
-
- Dangerous sink, scary bug class, or sensitive code area alone is not enough to preserve high severity.
|
|
99
|
-
- If the issue is a real bug but not meaningfully reportable as a security problem in context, set the final policy decision to `ignore`.
|
|
100
|
-
- Do not discard an otherwise reportable finding solely because its impact or likelihood is `low`; downgrade its severity instead.
|
|
101
|
-
|
|
102
|
-
Final policy-adjustment guidance:
|
|
103
|
-
|
|
104
|
-
- Apply hard suppression first:
|
|
105
|
-
- self-only impact -> `ignore`
|
|
106
|
-
- unachievable or highly unrealistic preconditions -> `ignore`
|
|
107
|
-
- privileged-only, operator-only, developer-only, physical-access-only, or protected-write-path preconditions -> `ignore`, unless the privilege-escalation delta itself is the issue
|
|
108
|
-
- Then weight likelihood using the established network scope:
|
|
109
|
-
- `remote` usually supports high likelihood when the attacker position is realistic and in scope
|
|
110
|
-
- `local_network` usually supports medium likelihood unless the evidence is stronger or weaker
|
|
111
|
-
- `localhost` usually supports low likelihood unless a lower-privileged attacker can realistically reach that listener
|
|
112
|
-
- `none` does not increase likelihood based on exposure
|
|
113
|
-
- Then decide reportability using the existing facts:
|
|
114
|
-
- if repository evidence does not establish a realistic lower-privileged in-scope attacker path, set `ignore`
|
|
115
|
-
|
|
116
|
-
Do not suppress solely because the surface is private or internal when repository evidence still shows a meaningful authorization, trust-boundary, identity, or security-control regression in a real product or production-service workflow. In those cases, internal exposure should usually reduce likelihood or confidence rather than force `ignore`.
|
|
117
|
-
|
|
118
|
-
Use missing deployment or ingress evidence to lower confidence or keep fields unknown when appropriate; do not automatically defeat an otherwise well-evidenced finding on that basis alone.
|
|
3
|
+
Apply this policy after establishing the attack path, scope, and counterevidence. Start from the candidate's severity hypothesis and adjust it using repository-supported impact, likelihood, prerequisites, and mitigations. Do not reopen discovery during calibration.
|
|
4
|
+
|
|
5
|
+
## Severity criteria
|
|
6
|
+
|
|
7
|
+
Reserve `critical` for a realistic in-scope path to severe compromise that requires immediate attention. Use `high` for a realistic attacker path with major security impact. A bug class, dangerous sink, unusual configuration, or scanner label alone does not establish either level.
|
|
8
|
+
|
|
9
|
+
Evidence that can support `critical` includes:
|
|
10
|
+
|
|
11
|
+
- arbitrary code execution or readily exploitable memory corruption;
|
|
12
|
+
- account takeover, strong authentication bypass, or XSS that enables account compromise or privileged actions;
|
|
13
|
+
- broad authorization or tenant-boundary failure;
|
|
14
|
+
- access to highly sensitive data, signing keys, private keys, credential stores, or similarly valuable secrets;
|
|
15
|
+
- query injection that exposes sensitive data or creates dangerous records;
|
|
16
|
+
- sandbox, container, VM, browser, or interpreter escape;
|
|
17
|
+
- server-side template execution that enables code execution or secret access;
|
|
18
|
+
- arbitrary file writes with a realistic path to persistence or execution;
|
|
19
|
+
- irreversible or broad integrity compromise, such as cross-tenant deletion or unauthorized changes to security-critical configuration.
|
|
20
|
+
|
|
21
|
+
These examples require evidence of attacker control, an in-scope reachable path, and the claimed impact. Unauthenticated reachability, low-friction exploitation, cross-tenant effects, identity or signing compromise, persistence, and mass exploitation can support raising an otherwise plausible `high` to `critical`.
|
|
22
|
+
|
|
23
|
+
Evidence that can support `high` includes:
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
25
|
+
- SSRF with attacker-controlled destinations and meaningful internal, metadata, file-backed, or side-effecting access;
|
|
26
|
+
- exploitable memory corruption with major impact;
|
|
27
|
+
- unauthorized reads of meaningful user data or source code, with highly sensitive secret exposure considered for `critical`;
|
|
28
|
+
- file writes with a realistic execution or persistence path;
|
|
29
|
+
- CSRF that enables sensitive state changes with realistic victim interaction;
|
|
30
|
+
- valid, reachable hardcoded or default credentials granting meaningful access;
|
|
31
|
+
- practical cryptographic failures enabling forgery, secure-channel bypass, or sensitive-data decryption;
|
|
32
|
+
- update or supply-chain compromise delivering malicious code or trusted artifacts;
|
|
33
|
+
- authorization or privilege failures with meaningful but narrower object or same-tenant impact;
|
|
34
|
+
- exploitable XXE;
|
|
35
|
+
- uploads enabling stored active content, trusted-origin script execution, or consequential content-type confusion;
|
|
36
|
+
- reachable deserialization, template, plugin, macro, or interpreter primitives with demonstrated impact but without the proof needed for `critical`.
|
|
37
|
+
|
|
38
|
+
For SSRF, a documented outbound-request feature or optional operator filter does not defeat a demonstrated destination-control bypass. For CSRF, evaluate browser credential attachment, cookie policy, preflight, request parsing, and effective controls; method or JSON content type alone is not a categorical defense. For XSS, distinguish self-only effects from victim impact; an `alert` reproduction proves script execution but does not alone establish the severity.
|
|
39
|
+
|
|
40
|
+
Constrained, same-tenant, internal, localhost, self-only, or already-privileged paths generally reduce severity unless the threat model or privilege gained supports greater impact. Ordinary correctness bugs, low-impact information leaks, speculative injection or memory-corruption claims, security-header or crypto-hygiene observations, and transient or self-targeting denial of service do not warrant `high` or `critical` without a demonstrated severe consequence. Evaluate the actual privilege delta and boundary crossing.
|
|
41
|
+
|
|
42
|
+
## Reportability
|
|
43
|
+
|
|
44
|
+
- Set `ignore` for a disproved finding or a bug without a meaningful security impact.
|
|
45
|
+
- Do not discard a real, reportable finding solely because its impact or likelihood is low; use the corresponding lower severity.
|
|
46
|
+
- Apply hard suppression to self-only impact or unachievable/highly unrealistic prerequisites.
|
|
47
|
+
- Privileged-only, operator-only, developer-only, physical-access-only, or protected-write-path prerequisites imply `ignore` unless a privilege-escalation delta is the issue.
|
|
48
|
+
- If repository evidence does not establish a realistic lower-privileged in-scope attacker path, set `ignore`.
|
|
49
|
+
|
|
50
|
+
Private or internal exposure alone does not suppress a supported authorization, identity, trust-boundary, or security-control failure in a real product or production workflow. Missing deployment or ingress evidence can lower confidence or leave facts unknown without defeating an otherwise supported finding.
|
|
51
|
+
|
|
52
|
+
Weight likelihood using the established attacker position and exposure:
|
|
53
|
+
|
|
54
|
+
- `remote` usually supports high likelihood when the attacker position is realistic and in scope;
|
|
55
|
+
- `local_network` usually supports medium likelihood unless the evidence supports a different level;
|
|
56
|
+
- `localhost` usually supports low likelihood unless a lower-privileged attacker can realistically reach the listener;
|
|
57
|
+
- `none` does not increase likelihood based on exposure.
|
|
58
|
+
|
|
59
|
+
## Calibration matrix
|
|
119
60
|
|
|
120
61
|
Severity calibration and final policy-adjustment matrix:
|
|
121
62
|
|