@openai/codex-security 0.1.4 → 0.1.6

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (106) hide show
  1. package/README.md +127 -13
  2. package/_bundled_plugin/.codex-plugin/plugin.json +1 -1
  3. package/_bundled_plugin/.mcp.json +8 -1
  4. package/_bundled_plugin/examples/completed-scan/findings.json +6 -0
  5. package/_bundled_plugin/examples/completed-scan/scan-manifest.json +1 -1
  6. package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/mcp-app.html.br +0 -0
  7. package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/server.mjs.br.part-000 +0 -0
  8. package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/server.mjs.br.part-001 +0 -0
  9. package/_bundled_plugin/preflight/capability-profiles.toml +0 -57
  10. package/_bundled_plugin/references/config-preflight.md +1 -1
  11. package/_bundled_plugin/references/final-report.md +15 -7
  12. package/_bundled_plugin/references/finding-detail-fields.md +10 -2
  13. package/_bundled_plugin/references/scan-artifacts.md +11 -9
  14. package/_bundled_plugin/references/scan-contract.md +3 -1
  15. package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/definitions/artifact-common.schema.json +42 -0
  16. package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/definitions/discovery-candidate.schema.json +100 -0
  17. package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/tools/candidate-attack-paths.schema.json +181 -0
  18. package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/tools/candidate-validations.schema.json +166 -0
  19. package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/tools/deep-reducer.schema.json +120 -0
  20. package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/tools/discovery-candidates.schema.json +83 -0
  21. package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/tools/review-items.schema.json +80 -0
  22. package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/tools/scan-draft.schema.json +572 -0
  23. package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/tools/worker-threat-model.schema.json +18 -0
  24. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/deep_scan_config.py +11 -3
  25. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/deep_scan_workbench.py +153 -133
  26. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/finalize_scan_contract.py +39 -0
  27. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/generate_in_scope_files.py +134 -0
  28. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_cli.py +33 -1
  29. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_db.py +181 -118
  30. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_feedback.py +2 -0
  31. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_native_indexes.py +5 -49
  32. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_progress.py +86 -3
  33. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_remediation.py +19 -1
  34. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_scan_history.py +7 -1
  35. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_scan_start.py +11 -5
  36. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_scan_usage.py +557 -0
  37. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_schema.py +501 -0
  38. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_target.py +14 -1
  39. package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_validation.py +117 -13
  40. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/attack-path-analysis/SKILL.md +4 -4
  41. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/deep-security-scan/SKILL.md +34 -28
  42. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/finding-discovery/SKILL.md +1 -1
  43. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-diff-scan/SKILL.md +11 -8
  44. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-scan/SKILL.md +16 -9
  45. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-scan/references/repository-wide-scan.md +26 -14
  46. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-scan/references/scan-artifacts-and-ledger.md +1 -1
  47. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/threat-model/SKILL.md +2 -2
  48. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/validation/SKILL.md +5 -5
  49. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/vulnerability-writeup/SKILL.md +145 -227
  50. package/_bundled_plugin/skills/vulnerability-writeup/references/report-format.md +53 -68
  51. package/dist/api.d.ts +30 -8
  52. package/dist/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
  53. package/dist/api.js +438 -66
  54. package/dist/api.js.map +1 -1
  55. package/dist/auth.d.ts.map +1 -1
  56. package/dist/auth.js +262 -44
  57. package/dist/auth.js.map +1 -1
  58. package/dist/cli.d.ts +4 -3
  59. package/dist/cli.d.ts.map +1 -1
  60. package/dist/cli.js +713 -148
  61. package/dist/cli.js.map +1 -1
  62. package/dist/config.d.ts +28 -0
  63. package/dist/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
  64. package/dist/config.js +39 -2
  65. package/dist/config.js.map +1 -1
  66. package/dist/contract.d.ts.map +1 -1
  67. package/dist/contract.js +14 -0
  68. package/dist/contract.js.map +1 -1
  69. package/dist/cost.d.ts +7 -0
  70. package/dist/cost.d.ts.map +1 -1
  71. package/dist/cost.js +397 -26
  72. package/dist/cost.js.map +1 -1
  73. package/dist/errors.d.ts +2 -0
  74. package/dist/errors.d.ts.map +1 -1
  75. package/dist/errors.js +48 -0
  76. package/dist/errors.js.map +1 -1
  77. package/dist/index.d.ts +3 -2
  78. package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  79. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
  80. package/dist/multiscan.d.ts +1 -0
  81. package/dist/multiscan.d.ts.map +1 -1
  82. package/dist/multiscan.js +5 -7
  83. package/dist/multiscan.js.map +1 -1
  84. package/dist/runtime.d.ts +40 -1
  85. package/dist/runtime.d.ts.map +1 -1
  86. package/dist/runtime.js +742 -46
  87. package/dist/runtime.js.map +1 -1
  88. package/dist/scan-activity.d.ts +13 -0
  89. package/dist/scan-activity.d.ts.map +1 -0
  90. package/dist/scan-activity.js +319 -0
  91. package/dist/scan-activity.js.map +1 -0
  92. package/dist/scan-dashboard.d.ts +47 -0
  93. package/dist/scan-dashboard.d.ts.map +1 -0
  94. package/dist/scan-dashboard.js +444 -0
  95. package/dist/scan-dashboard.js.map +1 -0
  96. package/dist/scan-history-renderer.d.ts.map +1 -1
  97. package/dist/scan-history-renderer.js +4 -1
  98. package/dist/scan-history-renderer.js.map +1 -1
  99. package/dist/version.d.ts +1 -1
  100. package/dist/version.js +1 -1
  101. package/dist/version.js.map +1 -1
  102. package/dist/worker-progress.d.ts +7 -0
  103. package/dist/worker-progress.d.ts.map +1 -1
  104. package/dist/worker-progress.js +68 -0
  105. package/dist/worker-progress.js.map +1 -1
  106. package/package.json +3 -3
package/dist/runtime.js CHANGED
@@ -1,17 +1,18 @@
1
- import { execFile as execFileCallback } from "node:child_process";
1
+ import { execFile as execFileCallback, spawn } from "node:child_process";
2
2
  import { createHash, randomUUID } from "node:crypto";
3
3
  import { constants, existsSync } from "node:fs";
4
- import { chmod, copyFile, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, open, readFile, readdir, realpath, rename, rm, rmdir, stat, writeFile, } from "node:fs/promises";
4
+ import { chmod, copyFile, link, lstat, mkdir, mkdtemp, open, opendir, readFile, readdir, realpath, rename, rm, rmdir, stat, writeFile, } from "node:fs/promises";
5
5
  import { homedir, tmpdir } from "node:os";
6
6
  import { createRequire } from "node:module";
7
7
  import { basename, dirname, extname, isAbsolute, join, relative, resolve, sep, } from "node:path";
8
+ import { createInterface } from "node:readline";
8
9
  import { fileURLToPath } from "node:url";
9
10
  import { promisify } from "node:util";
10
11
  import { crc32 } from "node:zlib";
11
12
  import { setTimeout as delay } from "node:timers/promises";
12
13
  import extractZip from "extract-zip";
13
14
  import { parse } from "smol-toml";
14
- import { CodexSecurityError, OutputDirectoryError, PluginBootstrapError, PluginPythonUnavailableError, } from "./errors.js";
15
+ import { CodexSecurityError, OutputDirectoryError, PluginBootstrapError, PluginPythonUnavailableError, redactedErrorMessage, } from "./errors.js";
15
16
  import { resolveTrustedExecutable } from "./trusted-executable.js";
16
17
  const execFile = promisify(execFileCallback);
17
18
  export const MARKETPLACE_NAME = "codex-security-sdk";
@@ -29,6 +30,7 @@ const CREDENTIAL_LOCK_NAME = ".codex-security-scan.lock";
29
30
  const CREDENTIAL_LOGOUT_MARKER = ".codex-security-logged-out";
30
31
  const CREDENTIAL_LOCK_POLL_MILLISECONDS = 25;
31
32
  const INCOMPLETE_CREDENTIAL_LOCK_MILLISECONDS = 30_000;
33
+ const MAX_WINDOWS_CREDENTIAL_ACL_STDERR = 64 * 1024;
32
34
  export function codexSecurityStateDirectory(environment = process.env) {
33
35
  const environmentValue = (requested) => {
34
36
  const exact = environment[requested]?.trim();
@@ -72,7 +74,9 @@ export async function prepareCodexSecurityCredentialHome(environment = process.e
72
74
  const canonical = await realpath(path);
73
75
  requireModelSafeOutputDir(canonical);
74
76
  validateLocation?.(canonical);
75
- await requirePrivateCredentialHome(metadata, canonical);
77
+ await requireSecureCredentialHome(canonical, {
78
+ metadata,
79
+ });
76
80
  return canonical;
77
81
  }
78
82
  catch (error) {
@@ -81,6 +85,58 @@ export async function prepareCodexSecurityCredentialHome(environment = process.e
81
85
  throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Unable to prepare the Codex Security credential home: ${path}`, { cause: error });
82
86
  }
83
87
  }
88
+ /**
89
+ * Re-verify the credential home before every use.
90
+ *
91
+ * Durable cross-process `(st_dev, st_ino)` pins are deferred: there is no
92
+ * workbench row for credential homes, and path+mode+trusted-ancestry checks on
93
+ * each use already close the cross-user rename/replace class. Lock acquisition
94
+ * still pins identity for the duration of a single lock session.
95
+ */
96
+ export async function requireSecureCredentialHome(path, options = {}) {
97
+ const platform = options.platform ?? process.platform;
98
+ let metadata = options.metadata;
99
+ if (metadata === undefined) {
100
+ try {
101
+ metadata = await lstat(path);
102
+ }
103
+ catch (error) {
104
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Unable to inspect the Codex Security credential home: ${path}`, { cause: error });
105
+ }
106
+ }
107
+ if (!metadata.isDirectory() || metadata.isSymbolicLink()) {
108
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Codex Security credential home is not a directory: ${path}`);
109
+ }
110
+ const canonical = await realpath(path);
111
+ requireModelSafeOutputDir(canonical);
112
+ const canonicalMetadata = await lstat(canonical);
113
+ if (canonicalMetadata.dev !== metadata.dev ||
114
+ canonicalMetadata.ino !== metadata.ino) {
115
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Codex Security credential home was replaced: ${canonical}`);
116
+ }
117
+ metadata = canonicalMetadata;
118
+ if (!metadata.isDirectory() || metadata.isSymbolicLink()) {
119
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Codex Security credential home is not a directory: ${path}`);
120
+ }
121
+ if (options.expectedDevice !== undefined &&
122
+ options.expectedInode !== undefined &&
123
+ (metadata.dev !== options.expectedDevice ||
124
+ metadata.ino !== options.expectedInode)) {
125
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Codex Security credential home was replaced: ${canonical}`);
126
+ }
127
+ if (platform === "win32") {
128
+ if (options.validateWindowsAcl !== false) {
129
+ await requirePrivateCredentialHome(metadata, canonical, {
130
+ platform,
131
+ secureWindowsHome: options.secureWindowsHome,
132
+ });
133
+ }
134
+ return metadata;
135
+ }
136
+ await requirePrivateCredentialHome(metadata, canonical, { platform });
137
+ await requireSecureOutputAncestry(canonical);
138
+ return metadata;
139
+ }
84
140
  export async function requirePrivateCredentialHome(metadata, path, options = {}) {
85
141
  if ((options.platform ?? process.platform) !== "win32") {
86
142
  requirePrivateOutputDirectory(metadata, path);
@@ -90,45 +146,581 @@ export async function requirePrivateCredentialHome(metadata, path, options = {})
90
146
  await (options.secureWindowsHome ?? secureWindowsCredentialHome)(path);
91
147
  }
92
148
  catch (error) {
93
- throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Unable to create a private Windows credential home: ${path}`, { cause: error });
149
+ const detail = windowsCredentialAclFailure(error);
150
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Unable to create a private Windows credential home: ${path}${detail}`, { cause: error });
151
+ }
152
+ }
153
+ function windowsCredentialAclFailure(error) {
154
+ const stderr = typeof error === "object" && error !== null && "stderr" in error
155
+ ? error.stderr
156
+ : undefined;
157
+ const detail = typeof stderr === "string" && stderr.trim() !== ""
158
+ ? stderr
159
+ : error instanceof Error
160
+ ? error.message
161
+ : String(error);
162
+ const sanitized = redactedErrorMessage(detail)
163
+ .replace(/\s+/gu, " ")
164
+ .trim()
165
+ .slice(0, 512);
166
+ return sanitized === "" ? "" : `. ${sanitized}`;
167
+ }
168
+ const WINDOWS_SYSTEM_SID = "S-1-5-18";
169
+ const WINDOWS_ADMINISTRATORS_SID = "S-1-5-32-544";
170
+ const WINDOWS_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_SID = "S-1-5-80-956008885-3418522649-1831038044-1853292631-2271478464";
171
+ const WINDOWS_LOCAL_SERVICE_SID = "S-1-5-19";
172
+ const WINDOWS_NETWORK_SERVICE_SID = "S-1-5-20";
173
+ const WINDOWS_EVERYONE_SID = "S-1-1-0";
174
+ const WINDOWS_AUTHENTICATED_USERS_SID = "S-1-5-11";
175
+ const WINDOWS_USERS_SID = "S-1-5-32-545";
176
+ const WINDOWS_CREATOR_OWNER_SID = "S-1-3-0";
177
+ const WINDOWS_CREATOR_GROUP_SID = "S-1-3-1";
178
+ const WINDOWS_OWNER_RIGHTS_SID = "S-1-3-4";
179
+ const WINDOWS_ALL_APPLICATION_PACKAGES_SID = "S-1-15-2-1";
180
+ const WINDOWS_PRINCIPAL_ALIASES = {
181
+ SY: WINDOWS_SYSTEM_SID,
182
+ BA: WINDOWS_ADMINISTRATORS_SID,
183
+ LS: WINDOWS_LOCAL_SERVICE_SID,
184
+ NS: WINDOWS_NETWORK_SERVICE_SID,
185
+ WD: WINDOWS_EVERYONE_SID,
186
+ AU: WINDOWS_AUTHENTICATED_USERS_SID,
187
+ BU: WINDOWS_USERS_SID,
188
+ CO: WINDOWS_CREATOR_OWNER_SID,
189
+ CG: WINDOWS_CREATOR_GROUP_SID,
190
+ OW: WINDOWS_OWNER_RIGHTS_SID,
191
+ AC: WINDOWS_ALL_APPLICATION_PACKAGES_SID,
192
+ AN: "S-1-5-7",
193
+ IU: "S-1-5-4",
194
+ NU: "S-1-5-2",
195
+ SU: "S-1-5-6",
196
+ RC: "S-1-5-12",
197
+ ED: "S-1-5-9",
198
+ BG: "S-1-5-32-546",
199
+ PU: "S-1-5-32-547",
200
+ AO: "S-1-5-32-548",
201
+ SO: "S-1-5-32-549",
202
+ PO: "S-1-5-32-550",
203
+ BO: "S-1-5-32-551",
204
+ RE: "S-1-5-32-552",
205
+ RU: "S-1-5-32-554",
206
+ RD: "S-1-5-32-555",
207
+ NO: "S-1-5-32-556",
208
+ MU: "S-1-5-32-558",
209
+ LU: "S-1-5-32-559",
210
+ IS: "S-1-5-32-568",
211
+ CY: "S-1-5-32-569",
212
+ ER: "S-1-5-32-573",
213
+ CD: "S-1-5-32-574",
214
+ RA: "S-1-5-32-575",
215
+ ES: "S-1-5-32-576",
216
+ HA: "S-1-5-32-578",
217
+ AA: "S-1-5-32-579",
218
+ };
219
+ const WINDOWS_SID = /^S-1-(?:\d+-)*\d+$/u;
220
+ const WINDOWS_GUID = /^[\da-f]{8}-[\da-f]{4}-[\da-f]{4}-[\da-f]{4}-[\da-f]{12}$/iu;
221
+ const WINDOWS_SDDL_SID = "(?:S-1-(?:\\d+-)*\\d+|[A-Z]{2})";
222
+ const WINDOWS_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR = new RegExp(`^O:(${WINDOWS_SDDL_SID})(?:G:${WINDOWS_SDDL_SID})?D:([A-Z_]*)(.*)$`, "u");
223
+ class UntrustedWindowsCredentialOwnerError extends Error {
224
+ constructor(owner) {
225
+ super(`Windows credential ACL owner is not a trusted principal: ${owner}`);
226
+ }
227
+ }
228
+ class RepairableWindowsCredentialAclError extends Error {
229
+ constructor(cause) {
230
+ super("Windows credential ACL requires repair", { cause });
231
+ }
232
+ }
233
+ /** Inspect a Windows DACL without translating locale-specific account names. */
234
+ export function inspectWindowsCredentialAcl(descriptor, currentUserSid, options = {}) {
235
+ if (!WINDOWS_SID.test(currentUserSid)) {
236
+ throw new Error("Unable to identify the current Windows user SID");
237
+ }
238
+ const match = WINDOWS_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR.exec(descriptor.trim());
239
+ if (match === null) {
240
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL has no owner or DACL");
241
+ }
242
+ const principalAliases = {
243
+ ...WINDOWS_PRINCIPAL_ALIASES,
244
+ ...options.resolvedAliases,
245
+ };
246
+ const trustedPrincipals = new Set([
247
+ currentUserSid,
248
+ WINDOWS_SYSTEM_SID,
249
+ WINDOWS_ADMINISTRATORS_SID,
250
+ principalAliases["LA"] ?? "LA",
251
+ ]);
252
+ if (options.scope === "ancestor") {
253
+ trustedPrincipals.add(WINDOWS_TRUSTED_INSTALLER_SID);
254
+ }
255
+ const normalizePrincipal = (principal) => principalAliases[principal] ?? principal;
256
+ const trustedPrincipal = (principal) => trustedPrincipals.has(principal);
257
+ const owner = normalizePrincipal(match[1]);
258
+ if (!trustedPrincipal(owner)) {
259
+ throw new UntrustedWindowsCredentialOwnerError(owner);
260
+ }
261
+ const flags = match[2];
262
+ if (flags.includes("NO_ACCESS_CONTROL")) {
263
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL grants unrestricted access");
264
+ }
265
+ let remaining = match[3];
266
+ let grantsCurrentDirectoryAccess = false;
267
+ let grantsCurrentFileAccess = false;
268
+ let grantsCurrentContainerAccess = false;
269
+ let hasAccessRules = false;
270
+ const untrustedPrincipals = new Set();
271
+ const deniedPrincipals = new Set();
272
+ while (remaining.startsWith("(")) {
273
+ const { rule, rest } = windowsSecurityDescriptorRule(remaining);
274
+ const fields = rule.split(";");
275
+ const callback = ["XA", "XD", "ZA"].includes(fields[0]);
276
+ if ((callback && fields.length < 7) || (!callback && fields.length !== 6)) {
277
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL has a malformed access rule");
278
+ }
279
+ const [type, inheritance, rights, objectGuid, inheritObjectGuid, rawPrincipal,] = fields;
280
+ if (!["A", "OA", "D", "OD", "XA", "XD", "ZA"].includes(type)) {
281
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL has an unsupported access rule");
282
+ }
283
+ if (rawPrincipal === "" || rights === "") {
284
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL has an incomplete access rule");
285
+ }
286
+ const objectRule = type === "OA" || type === "OD" || type === "ZA";
287
+ for (const guid of [objectGuid, inheritObjectGuid]) {
288
+ if (guid !== "" && (!objectRule || !WINDOWS_GUID.test(guid))) {
289
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL has a malformed object rule");
290
+ }
291
+ }
292
+ const inheritanceFlags = windowsAceFlags(inheritance);
293
+ hasAccessRules = true;
294
+ const principal = normalizePrincipal(rawPrincipal);
295
+ if (type === "A" || type === "OA" || type === "XA" || type === "ZA") {
296
+ if (!trustedPrincipal(principal)) {
297
+ if (options.scope !== "ancestor" ||
298
+ windowsAceAllowsAncestorReplacement(rights, inheritanceFlags)) {
299
+ untrustedPrincipals.add(principal);
300
+ }
301
+ }
302
+ else if (!callback &&
303
+ objectGuid === "" &&
304
+ inheritObjectGuid === "" &&
305
+ principal === currentUserSid &&
306
+ windowsAceGrantsFullControl(rights)) {
307
+ if (!inheritanceFlags.has("IO")) {
308
+ grantsCurrentDirectoryAccess = true;
309
+ }
310
+ if (inheritanceFlags.has("OI") && !inheritanceFlags.has("NP")) {
311
+ grantsCurrentFileAccess = true;
312
+ }
313
+ if (inheritanceFlags.has("CI") && !inheritanceFlags.has("NP")) {
314
+ grantsCurrentContainerAccess = true;
315
+ }
316
+ }
317
+ }
318
+ else {
319
+ deniedPrincipals.add(principal);
320
+ }
321
+ remaining = rest;
322
+ }
323
+ if (!hasAccessRules || (remaining !== "" && !remaining.startsWith("S:"))) {
324
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL has an invalid access-rule list");
325
+ }
326
+ return {
327
+ owner,
328
+ protected: flags.includes("P"),
329
+ grantsCurrentUserAccess: grantsCurrentDirectoryAccess &&
330
+ (options.scope === "file" ||
331
+ (grantsCurrentFileAccess && grantsCurrentContainerAccess)) &&
332
+ deniedPrincipals.size === 0,
333
+ untrustedPrincipals: [...untrustedPrincipals],
334
+ deniedPrincipals: [...deniedPrincipals],
335
+ };
336
+ }
337
+ function windowsSecurityDescriptorRule(value) {
338
+ let depth = 0;
339
+ let quoted = false;
340
+ let escaped = false;
341
+ for (let index = 0; index < value.length; index += 1) {
342
+ const character = value[index];
343
+ if (quoted) {
344
+ if (!escaped && character === '"')
345
+ quoted = false;
346
+ escaped = character === "\\" && !escaped;
347
+ continue;
348
+ }
349
+ if (character === '"') {
350
+ quoted = true;
351
+ }
352
+ else if (character === "(") {
353
+ depth += 1;
354
+ }
355
+ else if (character === ")") {
356
+ depth -= 1;
357
+ if (depth === 0) {
358
+ return { rule: value.slice(1, index), rest: value.slice(index + 1) };
359
+ }
360
+ }
361
+ }
362
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL has a malformed rule");
363
+ }
364
+ function windowsAceFlags(value) {
365
+ if (value.length % 2 !== 0) {
366
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL has malformed inheritance flags");
367
+ }
368
+ const flags = new Set();
369
+ for (let offset = 0; offset < value.length; offset += 2) {
370
+ const flag = value.slice(offset, offset + 2);
371
+ if (!["OI", "CI", "NP", "IO", "ID"].includes(flag)) {
372
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL has unsupported inheritance flags");
373
+ }
374
+ flags.add(flag);
375
+ }
376
+ return flags;
377
+ }
378
+ function windowsAceGrantsFullControl(rights) {
379
+ if (rights === "FA" || rights === "GA")
380
+ return true;
381
+ if (!/^0x[\da-f]+$/iu.test(rights))
382
+ return false;
383
+ const mask = BigInt(rights);
384
+ return (mask & 0x1f01ffn) === 0x1f01ffn || (mask & 0x10000000n) !== 0n;
385
+ }
386
+ function windowsAceAllowsAncestorReplacement(rights, inheritanceFlags) {
387
+ if (inheritanceFlags.has("IO"))
388
+ return false;
389
+ if (/^0x[\da-f]+$/iu.test(rights)) {
390
+ return (BigInt(rights) & 0x100d0040n) !== 0n;
391
+ }
392
+ for (let index = 0; index < rights.length; index += 2) {
393
+ if (["FA", "GA", "FW", "GW", "SD", "WD", "WO", "DC", "DT"].includes(rights.slice(index, index + 2))) {
394
+ return true;
395
+ }
396
+ }
397
+ return false;
398
+ }
399
+ export async function verifyStableWindowsCredentialDescendants(path, inspectDescriptors) {
400
+ for (let attempt = 0; attempt < 3; attempt += 1) {
401
+ let descendants = 0;
402
+ const pending = [path];
403
+ while (pending.length !== 0) {
404
+ const current = pending.pop();
405
+ const directory = await opendir(current);
406
+ for await (const entry of directory) {
407
+ const child = join(current, entry.name);
408
+ const metadata = await lstat(child);
409
+ if (metadata.isSymbolicLink()) {
410
+ throw new Error("Windows credential home contains a symbolic link or junction");
411
+ }
412
+ if (!metadata.isDirectory() && !metadata.isFile()) {
413
+ throw new Error("Windows credential home contains an unsafe entry");
414
+ }
415
+ descendants += 1;
416
+ if (metadata.isDirectory())
417
+ pending.push(child);
418
+ }
419
+ }
420
+ if (descendants === 0)
421
+ return;
422
+ if ((await inspectDescriptors()) === descendants)
423
+ return;
424
+ }
425
+ throw new Error("Windows credential descendants could not be verified");
426
+ }
427
+ export async function streamWindowsCredentialAclDescriptors(command, args, inspectDescriptor, options = {}) {
428
+ const child = spawn(command, [...args], {
429
+ env: options.environment,
430
+ stdio: ["ignore", "pipe", "pipe"],
431
+ windowsHide: true,
432
+ });
433
+ let stderr = "";
434
+ child.stderr.setEncoding("utf8");
435
+ child.stderr.on("data", (chunk) => {
436
+ const remaining = MAX_WINDOWS_CREDENTIAL_ACL_STDERR - stderr.length;
437
+ if (remaining > 0)
438
+ stderr += chunk.slice(0, remaining);
439
+ });
440
+ const completion = new Promise((resolve, reject) => {
441
+ child.once("error", reject);
442
+ child.once("close", (code, signal) => {
443
+ if (code === 0) {
444
+ resolve();
445
+ return;
446
+ }
447
+ const reason = signal === null ? `exit code ${code}` : `signal ${signal}`;
448
+ reject(Object.assign(new Error(`Windows credential ACL inspection failed with ${reason}`), { code, signal, stderr }));
449
+ });
450
+ });
451
+ let descriptors = 0;
452
+ try {
453
+ await Promise.all([
454
+ completion,
455
+ (async () => {
456
+ const lines = createInterface({
457
+ input: child.stdout,
458
+ crlfDelay: Infinity,
459
+ });
460
+ for await (const descriptor of lines) {
461
+ if (descriptor === "")
462
+ continue;
463
+ await inspectDescriptor(descriptor);
464
+ descriptors += 1;
465
+ }
466
+ })(),
467
+ ]);
468
+ }
469
+ catch (error) {
470
+ if (child.exitCode === null && child.signalCode === null)
471
+ child.kill();
472
+ throw error;
94
473
  }
474
+ return descriptors;
95
475
  }
96
476
  async function secureWindowsCredentialHome(path) {
97
477
  const systemRoot = process.env["SystemRoot"] ?? "C:\\Windows";
98
- const powershell = join(systemRoot, "System32", "WindowsPowerShell", "v1.0", "powershell.exe");
99
- const script = [
100
- "$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'",
101
- "$path = [Environment]::GetEnvironmentVariable('CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH', 'Process')",
102
- "$identity = [System.Security.Principal.WindowsIdentity]::GetCurrent()",
103
- "if ($null -eq $identity.User) { throw 'Unable to identify the current Windows user' }",
104
- "$acl = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.DirectorySecurity",
105
- "$acl.SetAccessRuleProtection($true, $false)",
106
- "$inheritance = [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]::ContainerInherit -bor [System.Security.AccessControl.InheritanceFlags]::ObjectInherit",
107
- "$rule = New-Object System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemAccessRule($identity.User, [System.Security.AccessControl.FileSystemRights]::FullControl, $inheritance, [System.Security.AccessControl.PropagationFlags]::None, [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow)",
108
- "$acl.SetOwner($identity.User)",
109
- "$acl.SetAccessRule($rule)",
110
- "[System.IO.Directory]::SetAccessControl($path, $acl)",
111
- "$verified = [System.IO.Directory]::GetAccessControl($path)",
112
- "if (-not $verified.AreAccessRulesProtected) { throw 'Credential ACL still inherits access rules' }",
113
- "$unexpected = @($verified.Access | Where-Object { $_.AccessControlType -eq [System.Security.AccessControl.AccessControlType]::Allow -and $_.IdentityReference.Translate([System.Security.Principal.SecurityIdentifier]).Value -ne $identity.User.Value })",
114
- "if ($unexpected.Count -ne 0) { throw 'Credential ACL grants access to another identity' }",
115
- ].join("; ");
116
- await execFile(powershell, ["-NoLogo", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", script], {
478
+ const systemDirectory = join(systemRoot, "System32");
479
+ const powershell = join(systemDirectory, "WindowsPowerShell", "v1.0", "powershell.exe");
480
+ const inheritedEnvironment = Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(process.env).filter(([name]) => name.toUpperCase() !== "PSMODULEPATH"));
481
+ const processOptions = {
117
482
  env: {
118
- ...process.env,
483
+ ...inheritedEnvironment,
119
484
  CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH: path,
485
+ PSModulePath: join(systemDirectory, "WindowsPowerShell", "v1.0", "Modules"),
120
486
  },
121
487
  encoding: "utf8",
122
488
  windowsHide: true,
123
489
  maxBuffer: 1024 * 1024,
124
- });
490
+ };
491
+ const identity = await execFile(join(systemDirectory, "whoami.exe"), ["/user", "/fo", "csv", "/nh"], processOptions);
492
+ const sid = /^"(?:[^"]|"")*","(S-1-(?:\d+-)*\d+)"$/u.exec(identity.stdout.trim())?.[1];
493
+ if (sid === undefined) {
494
+ throw new Error("Unable to identify the current Windows user SID");
495
+ }
496
+ // Signed built-in cmdlets remain available under ConstrainedLanguage;
497
+ // arbitrary .NET constructors, static methods, and SID translation do not.
498
+ const script = [
499
+ "$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'",
500
+ "Microsoft.PowerShell.Security\\Get-Acl -LiteralPath $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\Select-Object -ExpandProperty Sddl",
501
+ ].join("; ");
502
+ const resolvePrincipalScript = [
503
+ "$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'",
504
+ "$descriptor = 'O:' + $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_PRINCIPAL + 'G:SYD:(A;;GA;;;SY)'",
505
+ "Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\ConvertFrom-SddlString -Sddl $descriptor | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\Select-Object -ExpandProperty RawDescriptor | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\Select-Object -ExpandProperty Owner | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\Select-Object -ExpandProperty Value",
506
+ ].join("; ");
507
+ const resolvedAliases = {};
508
+ const resolvePrincipal = async (principal) => {
509
+ if (!/^[A-Z]{2}$/u.test(principal) ||
510
+ WINDOWS_PRINCIPAL_ALIASES[principal] !== undefined ||
511
+ resolvedAliases[principal] !== undefined) {
512
+ return;
513
+ }
514
+ const resolved = await execFile(powershell, [
515
+ "-NoLogo",
516
+ "-NoProfile",
517
+ "-NonInteractive",
518
+ "-Command",
519
+ resolvePrincipalScript,
520
+ ], {
521
+ ...processOptions,
522
+ env: {
523
+ ...processOptions.env,
524
+ CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_PRINCIPAL: principal,
525
+ },
526
+ });
527
+ const numeric = resolved.stdout.trim();
528
+ if (!WINDOWS_SID.test(numeric)) {
529
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL contains an unresolvable identity");
530
+ }
531
+ resolvedAliases[principal] = numeric;
532
+ };
533
+ const resolveDescriptorAliases = async (descriptor) => {
534
+ const header = WINDOWS_SECURITY_DESCRIPTOR.exec(descriptor.trim());
535
+ if (header === null)
536
+ return;
537
+ await resolvePrincipal(header[1]);
538
+ let remaining = header[3];
539
+ while (remaining.startsWith("(")) {
540
+ const { rule, rest } = windowsSecurityDescriptorRule(remaining);
541
+ const principal = rule.split(";")[5];
542
+ if (principal !== undefined)
543
+ await resolvePrincipal(principal);
544
+ remaining = rest;
545
+ }
546
+ };
547
+ const readAcl = async () => {
548
+ const descriptor = await execFile(powershell, ["-NoLogo", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", script], processOptions);
549
+ try {
550
+ await resolveDescriptorAliases(descriptor.stdout);
551
+ return inspectWindowsCredentialAcl(descriptor.stdout, sid, {
552
+ resolvedAliases,
553
+ });
554
+ }
555
+ catch (error) {
556
+ if (error instanceof UntrustedWindowsCredentialOwnerError)
557
+ throw error;
558
+ throw new RepairableWindowsCredentialAclError(error);
559
+ }
560
+ };
561
+ const icacls = join(systemDirectory, "icacls.exe");
562
+ const installTrustedAcl = async (target = path) => {
563
+ await execFile(icacls, [
564
+ target,
565
+ "/inheritance:r",
566
+ "/grant:r",
567
+ `*${sid}:(OI)(CI)F`,
568
+ `*${WINDOWS_SYSTEM_SID}:(OI)(CI)F`,
569
+ `*${WINDOWS_ADMINISTRATORS_SID}:(OI)(CI)F`,
570
+ ], processOptions);
571
+ };
572
+ const ancestorScript = [
573
+ "$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'",
574
+ "$path = $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH",
575
+ "while ($true) { $parent = Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\\Split-Path -Path $path -Parent; if (-not $parent -or $parent -eq $path) { break }; Microsoft.PowerShell.Security\\Get-Acl -LiteralPath $parent | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\Select-Object -ExpandProperty Sddl; $path = $parent }",
576
+ ].join("; ");
577
+ const ancestorPaths = [];
578
+ for (let ancestor = dirname(path);; ancestor = dirname(ancestor)) {
579
+ ancestorPaths.push(ancestor);
580
+ if (ancestor === dirname(ancestor))
581
+ break;
582
+ }
583
+ const ancestry = await execFile(powershell, ["-NoLogo", "-NoProfile", "-NonInteractive", "-Command", ancestorScript], processOptions);
584
+ const ancestorDescriptors = ancestry.stdout
585
+ .split(/\r?\n/u)
586
+ .filter((descriptor) => descriptor !== "");
587
+ if (ancestorDescriptors.length !== ancestorPaths.length) {
588
+ throw new Error("Windows credential-home ancestry could not be verified");
589
+ }
590
+ for (const descriptor of ancestorDescriptors) {
591
+ await resolveDescriptorAliases(descriptor);
592
+ const ancestor = inspectWindowsCredentialAcl(descriptor, sid, {
593
+ resolvedAliases,
594
+ scope: "ancestor",
595
+ });
596
+ if (ancestor.untrustedPrincipals.length === 0)
597
+ continue;
598
+ throw new Error("Windows credential-home ancestor allows another identity to replace the directory");
599
+ }
600
+ const descendantsArePrivate = async () => {
601
+ const descendantScript = [
602
+ "$ErrorActionPreference = 'Stop'",
603
+ "Microsoft.PowerShell.Management\\Get-ChildItem -LiteralPath $env:CODEX_SECURITY_CREDENTIAL_ACL_PATH -Recurse -Force | Microsoft.PowerShell.Security\\Get-Acl | Microsoft.PowerShell.Utility\\Select-Object -ExpandProperty Sddl",
604
+ ].join("; ");
605
+ let privateDescendants = true;
606
+ await verifyStableWindowsCredentialDescendants(path, async () => {
607
+ privateDescendants = true;
608
+ return streamWindowsCredentialAclDescriptors(powershell, [
609
+ "-NoLogo",
610
+ "-NoProfile",
611
+ "-NonInteractive",
612
+ "-Command",
613
+ descendantScript,
614
+ ], async (descriptor) => {
615
+ await resolveDescriptorAliases(descriptor);
616
+ const descendant = inspectWindowsCredentialAcl(descriptor, sid, {
617
+ resolvedAliases,
618
+ scope: "file",
619
+ });
620
+ if (!descendant.grantsCurrentUserAccess ||
621
+ descendant.untrustedPrincipals.length !== 0) {
622
+ privateDescendants = false;
623
+ }
624
+ }, { environment: processOptions.env });
625
+ });
626
+ return privateDescendants;
627
+ };
628
+ let existing;
629
+ for (let attempt = 0; existing === undefined && attempt < 3; attempt += 1) {
630
+ try {
631
+ existing = await readAcl();
632
+ }
633
+ catch (error) {
634
+ if (error instanceof UntrustedWindowsCredentialOwnerError) {
635
+ await execFile(icacls, [path, "/setowner", `*${sid}`], processOptions);
636
+ }
637
+ else if (error instanceof RepairableWindowsCredentialAclError) {
638
+ await installTrustedAcl();
639
+ }
640
+ else {
641
+ throw error;
642
+ }
643
+ }
644
+ }
645
+ if (existing === undefined) {
646
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL could not be repaired");
647
+ }
648
+ if (existing.grantsCurrentUserAccess &&
649
+ existing.untrustedPrincipals.length === 0 &&
650
+ !existing.protected) {
651
+ await execFile(icacls, [path, "/inheritance:d"], processOptions);
652
+ existing = await readAcl();
653
+ }
654
+ let verified = existing;
655
+ if (!verified.protected ||
656
+ !verified.grantsCurrentUserAccess ||
657
+ verified.untrustedPrincipals.length !== 0) {
658
+ await installTrustedAcl();
659
+ verified = await readAcl();
660
+ for (const principal of verified.untrustedPrincipals) {
661
+ if (!WINDOWS_SID.test(principal)) {
662
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL contains an unresolvable identity");
663
+ }
664
+ await execFile(icacls, [path, "/remove:g", `*${principal}`], processOptions);
665
+ }
666
+ for (const principal of verified.deniedPrincipals) {
667
+ if (!WINDOWS_SID.test(principal)) {
668
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL contains an unresolvable identity");
669
+ }
670
+ await execFile(icacls, [path, "/remove:d", `*${principal}`], processOptions);
671
+ }
672
+ if (verified.untrustedPrincipals.length !== 0 ||
673
+ verified.deniedPrincipals.length !== 0) {
674
+ verified = await readAcl();
675
+ }
676
+ }
677
+ if (!verified.protected) {
678
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL still inherits access rules");
679
+ }
680
+ if (!verified.grantsCurrentUserAccess) {
681
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL does not grant the current user access");
682
+ }
683
+ if (verified.untrustedPrincipals.length !== 0) {
684
+ throw new Error("Windows credential ACL grants access to another identity");
685
+ }
686
+ if (!(await descendantsArePrivate())) {
687
+ await execFile(icacls, [join(path, "*"), "/reset", "/t", "/q"], processOptions);
688
+ if (!(await descendantsArePrivate())) {
689
+ throw new Error("Windows credential descendants remain accessible");
690
+ }
691
+ }
125
692
  }
126
- export async function acquireCodexSecurityCredentialHomeLock(codexHome, signal) {
693
+ export async function acquireCodexSecurityCredentialHomeLock(codexHome, signal, securityOptions = {}) {
694
+ const homeMetadata = await requireSecureCredentialHome(codexHome, securityOptions);
695
+ const expectedDevice = homeMetadata.dev;
696
+ const expectedInode = homeMetadata.ino;
127
697
  const lock = join(codexHome, CREDENTIAL_LOCK_NAME);
128
698
  const ownerPath = join(lock, "owner.json");
129
699
  const token = randomUUID();
130
700
  while (true) {
131
701
  throwIfSignalAborted(signal);
702
+ await requireSecureCredentialHome(codexHome, {
703
+ ...securityOptions,
704
+ expectedDevice,
705
+ expectedInode,
706
+ validateWindowsAcl: false,
707
+ });
708
+ const existingLock = await lstat(lock).catch((error) => {
709
+ if (nodeErrorCode(error) === "ENOENT")
710
+ return null;
711
+ throw error;
712
+ });
713
+ if (existingLock !== null) {
714
+ if (await recoverStaleCredentialHomeLock(lock))
715
+ continue;
716
+ await delay(CREDENTIAL_LOCK_POLL_MILLISECONDS, undefined, { signal });
717
+ continue;
718
+ }
719
+ await requireSecureCredentialHome(codexHome, {
720
+ ...securityOptions,
721
+ expectedDevice,
722
+ expectedInode,
723
+ });
132
724
  try {
133
725
  await mkdir(lock, { mode: 0o700 });
134
726
  }
@@ -151,6 +743,11 @@ export async function acquireCodexSecurityCredentialHomeLock(codexHome, signal)
151
743
  return async () => {
152
744
  if (released)
153
745
  return;
746
+ await requireSecureCredentialHome(codexHome, {
747
+ ...securityOptions,
748
+ expectedDevice,
749
+ expectedInode,
750
+ });
154
751
  const owner = JSON.parse(await readFile(ownerPath, "utf8"));
155
752
  if (owner.token !== token) {
156
753
  throw new PluginBootstrapError("The Codex Security credential-home lock is no longer owned by this scan.");
@@ -214,6 +811,7 @@ async function recoverStaleCredentialHomeLock(lock) {
214
811
  return true;
215
812
  }
216
813
  export async function setCodexSecurityCredentialLogout(codexHome, loggedOut) {
814
+ await requireSecureCredentialHome(codexHome);
217
815
  const marker = join(codexHome, CREDENTIAL_LOGOUT_MARKER);
218
816
  if (!loggedOut) {
219
817
  await rm(marker, { force: true });
@@ -237,6 +835,7 @@ export async function setCodexSecurityCredentialLogout(codexHome, loggedOut) {
237
835
  }
238
836
  }
239
837
  export async function codexSecurityCredentialAllowsAmbientImport(codexHome) {
838
+ await requireSecureCredentialHome(codexHome);
240
839
  try {
241
840
  const marker = await lstat(join(codexHome, CREDENTIAL_LOGOUT_MARKER));
242
841
  if (!marker.isFile() || marker.isSymbolicLink()) {
@@ -251,6 +850,7 @@ export async function codexSecurityCredentialAllowsAmbientImport(codexHome) {
251
850
  }
252
851
  }
253
852
  export async function codexSecurityHasStoredFileCredentials(codexHome) {
853
+ await requireSecureCredentialHome(codexHome);
254
854
  const path = join(codexHome, "auth.json");
255
855
  let metadata;
256
856
  try {
@@ -264,8 +864,19 @@ export async function codexSecurityHasStoredFileCredentials(codexHome) {
264
864
  if (!metadata.isFile() || metadata.isSymbolicLink()) {
265
865
  throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Codex Security stored authentication is not a regular file: ${path}`);
266
866
  }
867
+ requirePrivateCredentialFile(metadata, path);
267
868
  return true;
268
869
  }
870
+ export function requirePrivateCredentialFile(metadata, path, effectiveUid = process.geteuid?.()) {
871
+ if (process.platform === "win32")
872
+ return;
873
+ if ((metadata.mode & 0o077) !== 0) {
874
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Codex Security stored authentication must not be accessible to other users: ${path}`);
875
+ }
876
+ if (effectiveUid !== undefined && metadata.uid !== effectiveUid) {
877
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Codex Security stored authentication must be owned by the current user: ${path}`);
878
+ }
879
+ }
269
880
  export async function preserveCodexSecurityPluginRegistration(codexHome, config) {
270
881
  let existing;
271
882
  try {
@@ -320,7 +931,9 @@ export async function runWorkbench(options, args) {
320
931
  ...args,
321
932
  ], {
322
933
  env: Object.fromEntries(Object.entries(options.environment).filter(([name]) => name.toUpperCase() !== "OPENAI_API_KEY" &&
323
- name.toUpperCase() !== "CODEX_API_KEY")),
934
+ name.toUpperCase() !== "CODEX_API_KEY" &&
935
+ name.toUpperCase() !== "OPENROUTER_API_KEY" &&
936
+ name.toUpperCase() !== "FIREWORKS_API_KEY")),
324
937
  encoding: "utf8",
325
938
  maxBuffer: 4 * 1024 * 1024,
326
939
  windowsHide: true,
@@ -390,6 +1003,7 @@ export async function validateOutputDir(outputDirectory, archiveExisting = false
390
1003
  throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Scan output directory is not empty: ${path}. To keep the existing results and start a new scan, add --archive-existing.`);
391
1004
  }
392
1005
  requirePrivateOutputDirectory(metadata, path);
1006
+ await requireSecureOutputAncestry(path);
393
1007
  const canonical = await realpath(path);
394
1008
  requireModelSafeOutputDir(canonical);
395
1009
  return canonical;
@@ -400,6 +1014,7 @@ export async function validateOutputDir(outputDirectory, archiveExisting = false
400
1014
  if ((await stat(parent)).isDirectory()) {
401
1015
  const canonical = resolve(await realpath(parent), relative(parent, path));
402
1016
  requireModelSafeOutputDir(canonical);
1017
+ await requireSecureOutputAncestry(canonical);
403
1018
  return canonical;
404
1019
  }
405
1020
  break;
@@ -507,6 +1122,7 @@ export async function validatePreparedOutputDir(path, validateLocation) {
507
1122
  throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Scan output directory must be empty: ${path}`);
508
1123
  }
509
1124
  requirePrivateOutputDirectory(metadata, path);
1125
+ await requireSecureOutputAncestry(canonical);
510
1126
  return canonical;
511
1127
  }
512
1128
  export function requirePrivateOutputDirectory(metadata, path, effectiveUid = process.geteuid?.()) {
@@ -519,6 +1135,57 @@ export function requirePrivateOutputDirectory(metadata, path, effectiveUid = pro
519
1135
  throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Scan output directory must be owned by the current user: ${path}`);
520
1136
  }
521
1137
  }
1138
+ /** Reject shared parents whose owner can rename or replace private scan output. */
1139
+ export async function requireSecureOutputAncestry(path, effectiveUid = process.geteuid?.()) {
1140
+ if (process.platform === "win32")
1141
+ return;
1142
+ let current = dirname(resolve(path));
1143
+ while (true) {
1144
+ try {
1145
+ current = await realpath(current);
1146
+ break;
1147
+ }
1148
+ catch (error) {
1149
+ if (nodeErrorCode(error) !== "ENOENT") {
1150
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Unable to inspect scan output parent directory: ${current}`, { cause: error });
1151
+ }
1152
+ const parent = dirname(current);
1153
+ if (parent === current) {
1154
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Unable to inspect scan output parent directory: ${current}`, { cause: error });
1155
+ }
1156
+ current = parent;
1157
+ }
1158
+ }
1159
+ while (true) {
1160
+ let metadata;
1161
+ try {
1162
+ metadata = await lstat(current);
1163
+ }
1164
+ catch (error) {
1165
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Unable to inspect scan output parent directory: ${current}`, { cause: error });
1166
+ }
1167
+ if (!metadata.isDirectory() || metadata.isSymbolicLink()) {
1168
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Scan output parent must be a non-symlink directory: ${current}`);
1169
+ }
1170
+ requireTrustedOutputAncestor(metadata, current, effectiveUid);
1171
+ const parent = dirname(current);
1172
+ if (parent === current)
1173
+ return;
1174
+ current = parent;
1175
+ }
1176
+ }
1177
+ export function requireTrustedOutputAncestor(metadata, path, effectiveUid = process.geteuid?.()) {
1178
+ if (effectiveUid !== undefined &&
1179
+ metadata.uid !== 0 &&
1180
+ metadata.uid !== effectiveUid) {
1181
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Scan output parent must have a trusted owner: ${path}`);
1182
+ }
1183
+ if ((metadata.mode & 0o022) === 0)
1184
+ return;
1185
+ if ((metadata.mode & 0o1000) === 0) {
1186
+ throw new OutputDirectoryError(`Scan output parent must not be group- or world-writable without the sticky bit: ${path}`);
1187
+ }
1188
+ }
522
1189
  async function removeEmptyDirectories(path, root) {
523
1190
  let current = path;
524
1191
  while (true) {
@@ -562,6 +1229,9 @@ export async function importAmbientAuth(ambientHome, isolatedHome) {
562
1229
  return false;
563
1230
  }
564
1231
  await mkdir(isolatedHome, { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
1232
+ if (process.platform !== "win32" && (process.umask() & 0o700) !== 0) {
1233
+ await chmod(isolatedHome, 0o700);
1234
+ }
565
1235
  if (await codexSecurityHasStoredFileCredentials(isolatedHome))
566
1236
  return true;
567
1237
  const destination = join(isolatedHome, "auth.json");
@@ -570,7 +1240,15 @@ export async function importAmbientAuth(ambientHome, isolatedHome) {
570
1240
  await copyFile(source, temporary, constants.COPYFILE_EXCL);
571
1241
  await chmod(temporary, 0o600);
572
1242
  try {
573
- await copyFile(temporary, destination, constants.COPYFILE_EXCL);
1243
+ try {
1244
+ await link(temporary, destination);
1245
+ }
1246
+ catch (error) {
1247
+ if (!["EPERM", "ENOTSUP", "EOPNOTSUPP", "EXDEV", "EMLINK"].includes(nodeErrorCode(error) ?? "")) {
1248
+ throw error;
1249
+ }
1250
+ await copyFile(temporary, destination, constants.COPYFILE_EXCL);
1251
+ }
574
1252
  }
575
1253
  catch (error) {
576
1254
  if (nodeErrorCode(error) === "EEXIST" &&
@@ -802,20 +1480,21 @@ async function pluginProjectionFingerprint(root, signal) {
802
1480
  else {
803
1481
  paths = [];
804
1482
  const pending = [canonical];
805
- let entries = 0;
1483
+ let entries = 1;
806
1484
  while (pending.length > 0) {
807
1485
  throwIfSignalAborted(signal);
808
1486
  const path = pending.pop();
809
1487
  const metadata = await lstat(path);
810
- if (++entries > MAX_PLUGIN_COPY_ENTRIES) {
811
- throw new PluginBootstrapError(`Plugin source exceeds the copy entry limit: ${path}`);
812
- }
813
1488
  if (metadata.isSymbolicLink()) {
814
1489
  throw new PluginBootstrapError(`Plugin contains an unsafe source path: ${path}`);
815
1490
  }
816
1491
  if (metadata.isDirectory()) {
817
- for (const entry of await readdir(path)) {
818
- pending.push(join(path, entry));
1492
+ for await (const entry of pluginDirectoryEntries(path, signal)) {
1493
+ const child = join(path, entry);
1494
+ if (++entries > MAX_PLUGIN_COPY_ENTRIES) {
1495
+ throw new PluginBootstrapError(`Plugin source exceeds the copy entry limit: ${child}`);
1496
+ }
1497
+ pending.push(child);
819
1498
  }
820
1499
  }
821
1500
  else if (metadata.isFile()) {
@@ -1179,7 +1858,7 @@ async function copyPluginTree(source, destination, signal) {
1179
1858
  { source, destination },
1180
1859
  ];
1181
1860
  const directories = new Map();
1182
- let entries = 0;
1861
+ let entries = 1;
1183
1862
  let size = 0;
1184
1863
  await mkdir(dirname(destination), { recursive: true, mode: 0o700 });
1185
1864
  try {
@@ -1188,26 +1867,26 @@ async function copyPluginTree(source, destination, signal) {
1188
1867
  const current = pending.pop();
1189
1868
  await requirePluginAncestors(source, current.source, directories, signal);
1190
1869
  const metadata = await lstat(current.source);
1191
- if (++entries > MAX_PLUGIN_COPY_ENTRIES) {
1192
- throw new PluginBootstrapError(`Plugin source exceeds the copy entry limit: ${current.source}`);
1193
- }
1194
1870
  if (metadata.isSymbolicLink()) {
1195
1871
  throw new PluginBootstrapError(`Plugin contains an unsafe source path: ${current.source}`);
1196
1872
  }
1197
1873
  if (metadata.isDirectory()) {
1198
- const children = await readdir(current.source);
1874
+ for await (const entry of pluginDirectoryEntries(current.source, signal)) {
1875
+ const childSource = join(current.source, entry);
1876
+ if (++entries > MAX_PLUGIN_COPY_ENTRIES) {
1877
+ throw new PluginBootstrapError(`Plugin source exceeds the copy entry limit: ${childSource}`);
1878
+ }
1879
+ pending.push({
1880
+ source: childSource,
1881
+ destination: join(current.destination, entry),
1882
+ });
1883
+ }
1199
1884
  const afterRead = await lstat(current.source);
1200
1885
  if (!samePluginFile(metadata, afterRead)) {
1201
1886
  throw new PluginBootstrapError(`Plugin directory changed while it was being copied: ${current.source}`);
1202
1887
  }
1203
1888
  directories.set(current.source, afterRead);
1204
1889
  await mkdir(current.destination, { mode: 0o700 });
1205
- for (const child of children) {
1206
- pending.push({
1207
- source: join(current.source, child),
1208
- destination: join(current.destination, child),
1209
- });
1210
- }
1211
1890
  continue;
1212
1891
  }
1213
1892
  if (!metadata.isFile()) {
@@ -1253,6 +1932,23 @@ async function copyPluginTree(source, destination, signal) {
1253
1932
  throw error;
1254
1933
  }
1255
1934
  }
1935
+ async function* pluginDirectoryEntries(path, signal) {
1936
+ throwIfSignalAborted(signal);
1937
+ const directory = await opendir(path);
1938
+ try {
1939
+ for (;;) {
1940
+ throwIfSignalAborted(signal);
1941
+ const entry = await directory.read();
1942
+ throwIfSignalAborted(signal);
1943
+ if (entry === null)
1944
+ return;
1945
+ yield entry.name;
1946
+ }
1947
+ }
1948
+ finally {
1949
+ await directory.close();
1950
+ }
1951
+ }
1256
1952
  async function requirePluginAncestors(root, path, directories, signal) {
1257
1953
  const relativePath = relative(root, path);
1258
1954
  if (relativePath === ".." ||