@openai/codex-security 0.1.16 → 0.1.18
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/README.md +228 -18
- package/_bundled_plugin/.app.json +1 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/.mcp.json +10 -3
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/server.mjs.br.part-000 +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/mcp/server.mjs.br.part-001 +0 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/config-preflight.md +1 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/core-scan.md +1 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/final-report.md +4 -2
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/sarif-adapter.md +2 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/scan-artifacts.md +1 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/references/scan-contract.md +18 -7
- package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/scan-manifest.schema.json +2 -2
- package/_bundled_plugin/schemas/tools/scan-draft.schema.json +23 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/deep_scan_workbench.py +122 -7
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/finalize_scan_contract.py +106 -38
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/generate_in_scope_files.py +20 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/generate_rank_input.py +23 -7
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/launch_codex_security_mcp +32 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/launch_codex_security_mcp.cmd +27 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/report_projection.py +19 -8
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_cli.py +35 -15
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_db.py +184 -202
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_finding_index.py +101 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_progress.py +6 -3
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_remediation.py +19 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_saved_results.py +1289 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_scan_history.py +17 -2
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_schema.py +28 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_target.py +36 -5
- package/_bundled_plugin/scripts/workbench_validation.py +9 -0
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/deep-security-scan/SKILL.md +4 -4
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/fix-finding/SKILL.md +17 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-diff-scan/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-scan/SKILL.md +1 -1
- package/_bundled_plugin/skills/security-scan/references/desktop-scan.md +1 -1
- package/dist/api.d.ts +18 -1
- package/dist/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/api.js +234 -18
- package/dist/api.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli.d.ts +5 -3
- package/dist/cli.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cli.js +348 -43
- package/dist/cli.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/component-plan.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/component-plan.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/component-plan.js +145 -0
- package/dist/component-plan.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/component-scan.d.ts +83 -0
- package/dist/component-scan.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/component-scan.js +279 -0
- package/dist/component-scan.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/contract.d.ts +8 -2
- package/dist/contract.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/contract.js +27 -8
- package/dist/contract.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cost-model.d.ts +20 -0
- package/dist/cost-model.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/cost-model.js +86 -0
- package/dist/cost-model.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/cost.d.ts +2 -11
- package/dist/cost.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/cost.js +15 -98
- package/dist/cost.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/custom-validation-prompt.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/custom-validation-prompt.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/custom-validation-prompt.js +94 -0
- package/dist/custom-validation-prompt.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/custom-validation.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/custom-validation.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/custom-validation.js +292 -0
- package/dist/custom-validation.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/errors.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/errors.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/errors.js +1 -1
- package/dist/errors.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +6 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +2 -0
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/models.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/models.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/models.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/multiscan.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/multiscan.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/multiscan.js +53 -5
- package/dist/multiscan.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/patch-tui.js +1 -1
- package/dist/patch-tui.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/publication.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/publication.js +3 -4
- package/dist/publication.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/runtime.d.ts +4 -2
- package/dist/runtime.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/runtime.js +109 -38
- package/dist/runtime.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-comparison.d.ts +12 -5
- package/dist/scan-comparison.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-comparison.js +72 -28
- package/dist/scan-comparison.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-dashboard.d.ts +9 -2
- package/dist/scan-dashboard.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-dashboard.js +198 -3
- package/dist/scan-dashboard.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-logs.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-logs.js +5 -21
- package/dist/scan-logs.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/scan-sessions.d.ts +4 -0
- package/dist/scan-sessions.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/scan-sessions.js +35 -0
- package/dist/scan-sessions.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/targets.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/targets.js +16 -1
- package/dist/targets.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/version.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/version.js +2 -20
- package/dist/version.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/windows-path.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/windows-path.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/windows-path.js +16 -0
- package/dist/windows-path.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/worker-progress.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/worker-progress.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/worker-progress.js +12 -0
- package/dist/worker-progress.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +8 -2
package/README.md
CHANGED
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@@ -54,6 +54,11 @@ Use `security.preflight()` to validate local inputs, `onWorkerStatus` and
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`onReconnect` to observe long-running scans, and an `AbortSignal` to cancel a
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scan.
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For separate standard scans under one project, the SDK also exports
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`runComponentScans({ repository, outputDir, components })`. Each component has
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a `name` and `paths` array. Use `auto: true` instead of `components` for
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model-assisted planning, and `planOnly: true` to save the plan without scanning.
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Successful results include open repository findings in `repositoryFindings`,
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when available; `findings` remains the current scan. Matching earlier findings
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can make one additional model call, including with a scan cost limit.
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steps. Keep result directories and saved reports outside the repository and
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limit access to authorized reviewers.
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### Validate an existing finding
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Use `security.validate()` to assess one finding without running a repository
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scan or invoking the Codex Security CLI:
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```ts
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const security = new CodexSecurity();
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try {
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const result = await security.validate({
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repositoryPath: "/path/to/repository",
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finding: {
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title: "Possible SQL injection",
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location: "src/query.ts:42",
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},
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outputDir: "/path/outside/repository/validation",
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});
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console.log(result.disposition);
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console.log(result.report);
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} finally {
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await security.close();
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}
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```
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`finding` accepts literal text or a JSON-serializable object, never a file
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path. Read files explicitly. Validation uses the CLI's validation skill and
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the client's settings and authentication. It leaves repository files unchanged
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and does not add a scan to scan history.
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The result contains `disposition` (`reportable`, `suppressed`, `not_applicable`,
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or `deferred`), a Markdown `report`, `threadId`, and `outputDir` for evidence.
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The report explains root cause, exploitability, evidence, and proof gaps.
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`reportable` can rely on static analysis; `deferred` means insufficient evidence.
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`outputDir` must be empty and outside the enclosing Git worktree. It defaults
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to the Codex Security state directory's `validations/` folder. Pass `auth` to
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select authentication or `signal` to cancel. Failed, incomplete, or malformed
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responses reject the promise.
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### SDK configuration and scan options
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Pass runtime configuration to the `CodexSecurity` constructor:
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Pass scan configuration to `security.run(repository, options)` or
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`security.preflight(repository, options)`:
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| Option | Description
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| ----------------------- |
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| `auth` | Select `"auto"`, `"chatgpt"`, or `"api-key"`.
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| `
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| Option | Description |
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| ----------------------- | ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ |
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| `auth` | Select `"auto"`, `"chatgpt"`, or `"api-key"`. |
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| `safetyIdentifier` | Stable hashed end-user ID for this scan's model requests; requires API-key authentication. |
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| `target` | Select a repository, repository-relative paths, committed diff, or working-tree diff. |
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| `mode` | Select `"standard"` or `"deep"`; deep mode supports repositories and paths. |
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| `knowledgeBasePaths` | Add architecture documents, security policies, threat models, or directories. |
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| `outputDir` | Choose an artifact directory outside the enclosing Git worktree. |
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| `archiveExisting` | Archive results already in `outputDir` before starting a scan. |
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| `maxCostUsd` | Stop after the estimated model cost exceeds a positive USD amount. |
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| `maxTimeHours` | Limit deep-scan discovery to a positive number of hours, up to 96. |
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| `failureSeverity` | Record a finding-severity policy in the saved scan recipe. |
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| `parentScanId` | Link a rerun to an existing parent scan. |
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| `expectedPluginVersion` | Require the original plugin version when replaying a scan. |
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| `signal` | Cancel a scan with an `AbortSignal`. |
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Progress and lifecycle callbacks are `onAuthentication`, `onCost`,
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`onOutputArchived`, `onOutputDirReady`, `onScanStarted`,
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npx @openai/codex-security scan /path/to/repository --model gpt-5.6-terra
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npx @openai/codex-security scan /path/to/repository --model gpt-5.6-terra --effort high
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npx @openai/codex-security scan /path/to/repository --path src --path tests
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npx @openai/codex-security scan-components /path/to/repository --component apps/api --component apps/web --output-dir /path/outside/repository/results
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npx @openai/codex-security scan-components /path/to/repository --auto --output-dir /path/outside/repository/results
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npx @openai/codex-security scan /path/to/repository --knowledge-base /path/to/threat-models --knowledge-base /path/to/architecture.pdf
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npx @openai/codex-security scan /path/to/repository --scan-prompt-file scan.md --post-scan-prompt-file follow-up.md
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npx @openai/codex-security scan /path/to/repository --diff origin/main --json
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shares them with every repository. Directories are searched recursively for
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Markdown, text, PDF, and Word (`.docx`) files.
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### Attribute scans to end users
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For an application that serves multiple users, pass the originating user's
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stable hashed ID on each scan:
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```ts
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await security.run("/path/to/repository", {
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auth: "api-key",
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safetyIdentifier: hashedUserId,
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});
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```
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```bash
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codex-security scan /path/to/repository --auth api-key --safety-identifier hashed-user-id
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```
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The ID must contain 1–64 characters and cannot be blank or contain NUL.
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Do not use an email address or other personal data. The ID is passed to Codex
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for the scan, nested workers, retries, and follow-up work. It is not saved in
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shared configuration or the scan recipe. Supply it again for a later rerun.
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Concurrent SDK clients can use different IDs without changing `process.env`.
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This requires a Codex runtime with native `--safety-identifier` support and a
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plugin that forwards it to workers. The current bundled runtime does not yet
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support this option. Use `CODEX_CLI_PATH` to select a compatible build.
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The SDK does not check runtime or plugin compatibility; older versions may
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omit the identifier. Omitting the option leaves ordinary scans unchanged.
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Preflight checks the ID's format; authentication is checked when the scan starts.
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### Scan project components
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`scan --path` runs one scan across the selected paths. Use `scan-components`
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to run a separate standard scan for each component of one local project:
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```bash
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npx @openai/codex-security scan-components /path/to/project \
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--component apps/api --component apps/web --component packages/shared \
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--workers 4 --output-dir /path/outside/project/results
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```
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Use `--auth chatgpt` or `--auth api-key` to select credentials for planning,
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component scans, and matching. The default is `--auth auto`, as with `scan`.
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The SDK accepts the same choice through `scanOptions.auth`.
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Use `--auto` instead of `--component` to let Codex propose the split. To review
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or edit it first, save a plan, then run that plan into a new output directory:
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```bash
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npx @openai/codex-security scan-components /path/to/project \
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--auto --plan-only --output-dir /path/outside/project/plan
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npx @openai/codex-security scan-components /path/to/project \
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--components-file /path/outside/project/plan/components.json \
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--output-dir /path/outside/project/results
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```
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A component can contain several repository-relative paths:
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```json
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{
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"components": [
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{ "name": "API", "paths": ["apps/api", "packages/auth"] },
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{ "name": "Web", "paths": ["apps/web"] }
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]
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}
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```
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Automatic planning uses a local file inventory. In Git repositories it follows
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Git's ignore rules. Each automatic path must cover at least one inventoried file.
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Explicit `--component` and `--components-file` selections keep their existing behavior.
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Inventoried files omitted by the model are added to an
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`Other files` component. No source files are changed during planning.
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In an interactive terminal, one dashboard shows all components and their scan
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progress. Use the arrow keys to select a component, Enter to view its activity,
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and Esc to return. Other scans continue while you inspect one. Finding counts
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are preliminary until cross-component matching finishes. Use `--headless` for
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plain status lines; CI and redirected output use those automatically.
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Failed or incomplete components are also saved in `retry-components.json`.
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Pass that file to `--components-file` with a new output directory to retry them.
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Each component keeps its normal scan artifacts under `component-N/`.
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The combined `findings.json` uses the same root-cause matcher as `scans match`.
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It merges high-confidence matches even when their titles, locations, or
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fingerprints differ. Each group keeps its highest-severity finding and all
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original scan and occurrence IDs. Match reasons and uncertain pairs are saved;
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uncertain findings stay separate. `summary.json` records scan coverage and
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whether matching finished. `report.md` links to the component reports.
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These combined files are a project summary, not a new sealed scan. Use the
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individual scan folders with `export` and `publish`.
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The output directory must be empty and outside the project. Failed components
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do not stop the others. The command saves the available results and exits with
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code `2` if a component fails, coverage is incomplete, or cross-component
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matching fails. `--max-cost` applies to each component scan, not planning,
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cross-component matching, or the whole project. `--model` and `--effort` also
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apply to matching. `--knowledge-base`,
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`--scan-prompt-file`, and `--post-scan-prompt-file` work as they do for bulk scans.
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+
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### Configure deep scans
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For `scan --mode deep`, `--workers` limits concurrent discovery workers,
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@@ -352,11 +496,11 @@ ask whether to open a color-coded finding browser with complete finding details
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and a separate patch-instructions panel. Use the arrow keys to
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browse, `Tab` to inspect details, `Space` to select individual findings, `i` to
|
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|
edit instructions for the focused finding, `1`–`4` to select by severity, and
|
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-
`r` to optionally create a GitHub pull request after patching. Press
|
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-
patch or `q` to keep the checkout unchanged. Each selected finding
|
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-
own saved Codex desktop task. Add `--create-pr` to `scan --patch` or a
|
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|
+
`r` to optionally create a draft GitHub pull request after patching. Press
|
|
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|
+
`Enter` to patch or `q` to keep the checkout unchanged. Each selected finding
|
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+
runs in its own saved Codex desktop task. Add `--create-pr` to `scan --patch` or a
|
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saved-finding `patch` command to commit only verified patch files and open a
|
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-
pull request with `gh`. If the push or pull request fails, run the printed
|
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+
draft pull request with `gh`. If the push or pull request fails, run the printed
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`patch --resume-pr BRANCH` command from the same repository. It uses the saved
|
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commit without running Codex again and refuses to publish if the branch changed.
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JSON scan results include `patchSeverity`. Scan and
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@@ -586,6 +730,72 @@ and scans stopped at their configured cost limit do not start another turn.
|
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|
invocation and defaults to `1`. Results remain under `--output-dir`; rerun the
|
|
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731
|
same command to resume.
|
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732
|
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|
733
|
+
### Custom validation
|
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734
|
+
|
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735
|
+
Use a prompt file to replace the final validation step in a standard or diff
|
|
736
|
+
scan. The ordinary source review still runs. The supplied text goes directly
|
|
737
|
+
into a separate validation turn and is not sent to discovery workers.
|
|
738
|
+
The SDK adapts the bundled discovery workflow without changing the plugin.
|
|
739
|
+
An incompatible plugin workflow stops the scan instead of using default validation.
|
|
740
|
+
|
|
741
|
+
```bash
|
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|
+
npx @openai/codex-security scan . --validation-prompt-file validation.md
|
|
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|
+
```
|
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|
+
|
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|
+
The SDK accepts the same text as `validationPrompt`:
|
|
746
|
+
|
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|
+
```ts
|
|
748
|
+
const result = await security.run(repository, {
|
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|
+
validationPrompt:
|
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|
+
"Run scripts/validate.sh, test each candidate through the local API, and stop the test environment when finished.",
|
|
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|
+
});
|
|
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|
+
```
|
|
753
|
+
|
|
754
|
+
Describe setup, allowed test targets, expected evidence, and cleanup in the
|
|
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|
+
prompt. Refer to credentials through environment variables; do not put secrets
|
|
756
|
+
in the prompt or validation output. There are no separate setup or teardown
|
|
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|
+
hooks. Deep scans reject this option. Empty candidate sets skip the custom turn.
|
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|
+
|
|
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|
+
The SDK supplies the candidate IDs and requires a `CustomValidationResult`:
|
|
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|
+
|
|
761
|
+
```json
|
|
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|
+
{
|
|
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|
+
"status": "complete",
|
|
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|
+
"reason": null,
|
|
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|
+
"validations": [
|
|
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|
+
{
|
|
767
|
+
"candidateId": "candidate-1",
|
|
768
|
+
"validation": {
|
|
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|
+
"disposition": "reportable",
|
|
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|
+
"method": "integration test",
|
|
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|
+
"confidence": "high",
|
|
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|
+
"confidence_rationale": "The test reproduced the reported behavior.",
|
|
773
|
+
"rubric": "Check the protected operation.",
|
|
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|
+
"evidence": ["The unauthorized request succeeded."],
|
|
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|
+
"counterevidence_or_proof_gap": "",
|
|
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|
+
"remaining_uncertainty": "",
|
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|
+
"artifact_paths": []
|
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|
+
},
|
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|
+
"severity": null,
|
|
780
|
+
"impact": null
|
|
781
|
+
}
|
|
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|
+
]
|
|
783
|
+
}
|
|
784
|
+
```
|
|
785
|
+
|
|
786
|
+
Each candidate needs exactly one result. The disposition is `reportable`,
|
|
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|
+
`suppressed`, `not_applicable`, or `deferred`. Optional assessment changes use
|
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|
+
`{ "level": "medium", "rationale": "..." }` in `severity` or `impact`; use
|
|
789
|
+
`null` to retain the original assessment. Finding identity and source locations
|
|
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|
+
do not change. Deferred candidates make coverage partial. Suppressed and
|
|
791
|
+
deferred candidates remain in the saved validation artifacts.
|
|
792
|
+
|
|
793
|
+
The scan directory contains `artifacts/custom-validation/candidates.json` and
|
|
794
|
+
`results.json`. Setup failure, incomplete output, or invalid output leaves the
|
|
795
|
+
scan incomplete. There is no automatic fallback to default validation. When
|
|
796
|
+
rerunning a saved custom-validation scan, supply
|
|
797
|
+
`scans rerun SCAN_ID --validation-prompt-file validation.md` again.
|
|
798
|
+
|
|
589
799
|
### Publish completed scans to Linear
|
|
590
800
|
|
|
591
801
|
Publish every finding from a completed standard, deep, or scoped scan to one
|
|
@@ -1,14 +1,19 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"mcpServers": {
|
|
3
3
|
"codex-security": {
|
|
4
|
-
"command": "
|
|
5
|
-
"args": ["
|
|
4
|
+
"command": "./scripts/launch_codex_security_mcp",
|
|
5
|
+
"args": ["--stdio"],
|
|
6
6
|
"cwd": ".",
|
|
7
7
|
"env_vars": [
|
|
8
8
|
"CODEX_HOME",
|
|
9
9
|
"CODEX_SQLITE_HOME",
|
|
10
10
|
"CODEX_API_KEY",
|
|
11
|
+
"CODEX_SAFETY_IDENTIFIER",
|
|
12
|
+
"CODEX_BROWSER_USE_NODE_PATH",
|
|
11
13
|
"CODEX_CLI_PATH",
|
|
14
|
+
"CODEX_ELECTRON_RESOURCES_PATH",
|
|
15
|
+
"CODEX_MANAGED_PACKAGE_ROOT",
|
|
16
|
+
"CODEX_MCP_NODE_PATH",
|
|
12
17
|
"OPENROUTER_API_KEY",
|
|
13
18
|
"FIREWORKS_API_KEY",
|
|
14
19
|
"AWS_BEARER_TOKEN_BEDROCK",
|
|
@@ -28,6 +33,7 @@
|
|
|
28
33
|
"AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN",
|
|
29
34
|
"AWS_CONTAINER_AUTHORIZATION_TOKEN_FILE",
|
|
30
35
|
"PYTHON",
|
|
36
|
+
"PYTHONUTF8",
|
|
31
37
|
"CODEX_SECURITY_KNOWLEDGE_BASE",
|
|
32
38
|
"CODEX_SECURITY_DEEP_SCAN_CONFIG_PATH",
|
|
33
39
|
"CODEX_SECURITY_SCAN_ROOT",
|
|
@@ -39,7 +45,8 @@
|
|
|
39
45
|
"NO_PROXY",
|
|
40
46
|
"SSL_CERT_FILE",
|
|
41
47
|
"REQUESTS_CA_BUNDLE",
|
|
42
|
-
"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS"
|
|
48
|
+
"NODE_EXTRA_CA_CERTS",
|
|
49
|
+
"XDG_CACHE_HOME"
|
|
43
50
|
],
|
|
44
51
|
"tool_timeout_sec": 349200
|
|
45
52
|
}
|
|
Binary file
|
|
Binary file
|
|
@@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ When the profile includes remediation patches, present the concrete config delta
|
|
|
60
60
|
|
|
61
61
|
Some remediation patches have `kind = "host_setting"`. Present those as host-level setup guidance, not as edits to persistent Codex config.
|
|
62
62
|
|
|
63
|
-
Deep Security Scan uses MCP-owned SDK sessions rather than the parent thread's worker pool. Its preflight does not require a particular parent delegation runtime, ownership, capacity, or depth. Discovery workers inherit the scan's model and
|
|
63
|
+
Deep Security Scan uses MCP-owned SDK sessions rather than the parent thread's worker pool. Its preflight does not require a particular parent delegation runtime, ownership, capacity, or depth. Discovery workers inherit the scan's model and use the reserved `codex_security_deep_scan_worker` permission profile with the parent's supported filesystem denials. The selected Codex executable must support permission-profile configuration and allowance checks. If that command fails to start or exits early, report its path and the tool's diagnostic; do not infer that its version is unsupported. If the tool identifies a missing API, ask the user to update the Codex installation at the reported path: the desktop app for an app-bundled executable, or the selected CLI otherwise. If Codex policy rejects the profile, report the tool's administrator guidance. Do not remove deny rules or select a broader sandbox to work around the error.
|
|
64
64
|
|
|
65
65
|
Do not warn merely because a user's value differs from the profile's suggested patch. Warn or block only when the evaluated capability requirement is unmet.
|
|
66
66
|
|
|
@@ -9,7 +9,7 @@ Perform one complete, evidence-backed security audit of the exact supplied repos
|
|
|
9
9
|
3. While the baseline runs, read `threat-model.md` once and obtain its independent architecture review within the available worker allowance. Verify its resource rows against their actual consumers, use the returned canonical `threatModel` as the generated model, and build source-backed investigation packets from it. Carry that object and its evidence into the final result instead of reconstructing a shorter summary. Preserve any user-supplied threat model unchanged as the authoritative security assumptions; map its real surfaces and controls without replacing it.
|
|
10
10
|
4. Group related source-backed security questions into investigation packets. Each group shares its plausible attacker, protected asset, entry points, expected controls, sensitive operations, component relationships, and actual repository-relative source anchors. Keep each question concrete, preserve distinct attacker boundaries and security mechanisms, and let investigators establish the detailed dataflow.
|
|
11
11
|
5. Launch focused investigator subagents with `fork_turns: "none"` as soon as useful packet groups exist. Choose their number and assignments from the amount, complexity, and independence of source-backed work, bounded by the supplied available subagent allowance; use fewer for related packets and more only when distinct surfaces justify them. Keep mapping other surfaces while they run. Send each only its focused-investigator prompt below, assigned packets, investigator perspective, repository path, authorized scope, any supplied scoped-source inventory, exact user context, supplied threat model, applicable packet-specific security guidance and its resolver command, the optional authoritative knowledge-base location, and verified search command. Do not include this reference or another worker's prompt. Supporting code may be outside a requested path, but an affected entry point, control, or operation must be in scope.
|
|
12
|
-
6. Reconcile source coverage before combining findings. Union only the baseline and focused investigators' `fully_reviewed_files` with files the parent fully security-audited, then intersect that set with the supplied authorized inventory or an inventory of the selected current scope. Architecture mapping alone and supporting files outside that inventory do not count toward completed audit coverage. Finish the remaining in-scope files in coherent groups, reusing available investigators within the same allowance. Inspect implementation-owning generated or compressed code as data. Do not add overlapping worker counts or claim that a search hit completed a file. Keep this one transient set; do not create a separate progress ledger or receipt format. If a user limit or unavailable source prevents completion, identify the actual remaining paths and report partial coverage. Then combine baseline and investigator findings once. Group observations only when they share the same broken security control and effective remediation; preserve every affected route, operation, sink, and supporting source location. Never merge different security failures solely because they share a CWE.
|
|
12
|
+
6. Before combining or revalidating any returned baseline or investigator result, persist it through the caller's bound `record_codex_security_scan_draft` tool when available, using `complete: false` and partial coverage. Give each candidate a stable `candidateId`; put candidates awaiting parent validation in `coverage.deferred` with a meaningful reason and their original finding payload under `candidate`. Preserve returned counterevidence and unresolved questions too. Checkpoint again after each validation decision, without waiting for other workers or the final report. Put source-validated findings in `findings` with the same `provenance.candidateId`; for a rejection, retain the candidate ID, original evidence, and source-backed counterevidence on a `rejected` coverage surface. An unfinished scan must retain its saved findings and pending candidates without presenting pending work as validated. Reconcile source coverage before combining findings. Union only the baseline and focused investigators' `fully_reviewed_files` with files the parent fully security-audited, then intersect that set with the supplied authorized inventory or an inventory of the selected current scope. Architecture mapping alone and supporting files outside that inventory do not count toward completed audit coverage. Finish the remaining in-scope files in coherent groups, reusing available investigators within the same allowance. Inspect implementation-owning generated or compressed code as data. Do not add overlapping worker counts or claim that a search hit completed a file. Keep this one transient set; do not create a separate progress ledger or receipt format. If a user limit or unavailable source prevents completion, identify the actual remaining paths and report partial coverage. Then combine baseline and investigator findings once. Group observations only when they share the same broken security control and effective remediation; preserve every affected route, operation, sink, and supporting source location. Never merge different security failures solely because they share a CWE.
|
|
13
13
|
7. Independently validate each unique finding against local source once. Establish its attacker, entry point, trust boundary, attacker-controlled dataflow, transformations, broken control, sensitive operation, prerequisites, effective mitigations, strongest counterevidence, and concrete impact. Record concise, source-backed `rootCause.summary`, `validation.summary`, `attackPath.dataflow.summary`, and `attackPath.reachability.summary` alongside their supporting facts; determine impact, likelihood, and severity from those established facts. State optional configuration, dependency-version, or deployment prerequisites; do not require proof of a real deployment or runtime reproduction. A public library or parser boundary is sufficient when callers control the input. Reject only with source-backed counterevidence, preserve valid baseline findings, record material unresolved proof gaps, and apply the severity rules below.
|
|
14
14
|
8. Assemble complete semantic `scope`, `threatModel`, `findings`, and `coverage` using the plugin's `examples/completed-scan/` and `schemas/` as shape references, never as values to copy. Use the canonical field mapping and scenario reconciliation in `threat-model.md`, preserving supplied models unchanged and retaining source-backed architecture, capability, deployment, and uncertainty facts. Give each finding a stable lowercase vulnerability-family `ruleId`, its precise `taxonomy.category` and `taxonomy.cwe` values, genuine `provenance.source`, an instance when separately reported findings would otherwise collide, a `root_control` location when identifiable, all materially affected locations, calibrated severity and rationale, confidence and rationale, verified nonempty source evidence, attacker-to-sink reachability, and practical remediation. Use actual coverage surface labels and dispositions; report reviewed surfaces, explicit exclusions, deferred work, and unresolved questions honestly, and mark coverage `complete` only when the requested source scope was actually reviewed. Preserve every genuine finding, evidence item, user-supplied assumption, and unresolved proof gap in the caller's complete semantic result.
|
|
15
15
|
|
|
@@ -22,13 +22,15 @@ For each finding, supply an evidence-supported lowercase vulnerability-family `r
|
|
|
22
22
|
|
|
23
23
|
Supply semantic coverage as `{ completeness, surfaces, explicitExclusions, deferred }`, with each surface using the actual `label` and one existing `disposition`. Mark coverage `partial` when a deferred item or `needs_follow_up` surface remains; preserve its real reason and supporting context. Each deferred item needs a meaningful reason; preserve any existing `id` or `candidateId`. The workbench derives a missing ID from its candidate identity or stable deferred-work details. Open questions may be nonempty strings or `{ question, followUpPrompt? }` objects. The workbench derives target and scope metadata, scope include and exclude paths, coverage mode and inventory strategy, finding identities and fingerprints, and surface IDs. Do not put those workbench-owned values or top-level coverage receipt references into the semantic draft.
|
|
24
24
|
|
|
25
|
-
After a workbench-owned Standard or workbench-backed diff draft is accepted, or the Deep coordinator returns its parent scan's canonical manifest, call `complete_codex_security_scan({ scanId, handoffClaimToken? })` and use its returned completion metadata. An SDK-owned scan returns its unsealed canonical files without calling a completion tool or finalizer; the SDK owns completion and report generation. Read full canonical results only when explicitly requested. For a terminal/chat workflow without a `scanId` or completion tool, retain `python <plugin_dir>/scripts/finalize_scan_contract.py --scan-dir <scan_dir> --source-root <repo_root>` after writing the canonical JSON. Outside the SDK path, do not mark the scan goal complete until finalization succeeds and the generated report exists.
|
|
25
|
+
During a host-backed scan, checkpoint saved findings and pending candidates with `complete: false`; a checkpoint is not a completed audit. After a final workbench-owned Standard or workbench-backed diff draft is accepted with `complete: true` (or the backwards-compatible omitted flag), or the Deep coordinator returns its parent scan's canonical manifest, call `complete_codex_security_scan({ scanId, handoffClaimToken? })` and use its returned completion metadata. An SDK-owned scan returns its unsealed canonical files without calling a completion tool or finalizer; the SDK owns completion and report generation. Read full canonical results only when explicitly requested. For a terminal/chat workflow without a `scanId` or completion tool, retain `python <plugin_dir>/scripts/finalize_scan_contract.py --scan-dir <scan_dir> --source-root <repo_root>` after writing the canonical JSON. Outside the SDK path, do not mark the scan goal complete until finalization succeeds and the generated report exists.
|
|
26
|
+
|
|
27
|
+
On a confirmed failure or explicit cancellation, the workbench preserves saved results without marking the scan successful. Report validated findings separately from pending candidates and explain the incomplete coverage. Use the retained report and exports; do not start additional model work after cancellation or replace saved results with a no-findings response.
|
|
26
28
|
|
|
27
29
|
After `complete_codex_security_scan` succeeds, include its returned `usage.totalTokens`, `usage.inputTokens`, and `usage.cachedInputTokens` in the final response when `usage.coverage` is `complete` or `partial`; explicitly label a partial measurement. If coverage is `unavailable`, say that token usage could not be measured instead of reporting zero or estimating a cost. Report only measured completion metadata in a terminal/chat host. Token usage is workbench metadata, not a reason to modify sealed scan artifacts or the deterministic report.
|
|
28
30
|
|
|
29
31
|
Before workbench-owned Standard or workbench-backed diff completion, require `record_codex_security_scan_draft` to succeed. Before Deep completion, require the coordinator to return the parent scan's already-authored canonical manifest; do not submit another draft or rerun worker phases. SDK-owned Standard and terminal diff workflows instead verify their canonical JSON before the appropriate owner finalizes it. Completion validates and seals existing canonical artifacts and generates `report.md`; it does not create missing artifacts or run skipped scan phases.
|
|
30
32
|
|
|
31
|
-
An MCP `-32602` input rejection, an `isError: true` result reporting `Input validation error`, or an explicit pre-write rejection of complete coverage containing deferred work or a follow-up surface makes no draft write. Correct only the named paths in the same draft, preserving all valid findings, fields, evidence, and deferred work; retry the same scan at most twice. Stop after the first accepted draft. Do not blindly retry an ambiguous transport or write failure.
|
|
33
|
+
An MCP `-32602` input rejection, an `isError: true` result reporting `Input validation error`, or an explicit pre-write rejection of complete coverage containing deferred work or a follow-up surface makes no draft write. Correct only the named paths in the same draft, preserving all valid findings, fields, evidence, and deferred work; retry the same scan at most twice. Stop final submission after the first accepted complete draft; an accepted complete:false checkpoint does not end the audit. Do not blindly retry an ambiguous transport or write failure.
|
|
32
34
|
|
|
33
35
|
For any other required scan phase, canonical-artifact write, or on-disk existence check that fails before completion, stop the current response and surface the exact workflow blocker. Do not call completion with missing artifacts, return a final report or no-findings result, or satisfy a structured output schema. Leave the durable scan available for a later continuation instead of canceling or failing it solely because canonical assembly is blocked.
|
|
34
36
|
|
|
@@ -20,6 +20,8 @@ The adapter:
|
|
|
20
20
|
|
|
21
21
|
Lifecycle, rich validation evidence, attack-path context, and coverage are lossy or omitted in SARIF. Preserve them in semantic JSON.
|
|
22
22
|
|
|
23
|
+
SARIF `executionSuccessful` is true only for complete coverage. Incomplete scans retain findings and warnings. Integrations must read the coverage file referenced by `scan.coverageRef`; manifest status `completed` alone does not mean success.
|
|
24
|
+
|
|
23
25
|
Automatic SARIF export during finalization is best-effort so projection errors cannot invalidate a canonical seal. Use the strict adapter entry point when a consumer requires SARIF and should surface export errors.
|
|
24
26
|
|
|
25
27
|
References:
|
|
@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ End each repository-scoped threat model with these two lines:
|
|
|
40
40
|
|
|
41
41
|
### Compact Deep And Workbench-Backed Diff Discovery
|
|
42
42
|
|
|
43
|
-
Workbench-owned Standard scans submit findings and coverage through `record_codex_security_scan_draft`; SDK-owned Standard scans write unsealed canonical files directly. Deep scans run complete Standard scan workers, each of which submits its validated findings, coverage, threat model, and optional scope through its bound `record_codex_security_scan_draft` tool. The coordinator semantically reduces those complete results and writes the parent scan's unsealed `scan-manifest.json`, `findings.json`, and `coverage.json`. The parent does not list candidates, rerun validation or attack-path phases, or submit another draft. Workbench-backed diff scans retain the compact artifacts described below.
|
|
43
|
+
Workbench-owned Standard scans submit findings and coverage through `record_codex_security_scan_draft`; SDK-owned Standard scans write unsealed canonical files directly. Deep scans run complete Standard scan workers, each of which saves `complete: false` checkpoints and submits its final validated findings, coverage, threat model, and optional scope through its bound `record_codex_security_scan_draft` tool. Pending candidates retain their original evidence in `coverage.deferred`. Host-owned immutable checkpoints survive retries, cancellation, and failure; a checkpoint alone is never an accepted complete worker result. The coordinator semantically reduces those complete results and writes the parent scan's unsealed `scan-manifest.json`, `findings.json`, and `coverage.json`. The parent does not list candidates, rerun validation or attack-path phases, or submit another draft. Workbench-backed diff scans retain the compact artifacts described below.
|
|
44
44
|
|
|
45
45
|
- A workbench-backed diff scan records all candidates once with `record_codex_security_discovery_candidates({ scanId, candidates })` and reads the canonical candidates with `list_codex_security_candidates({ scanId, cursor?, limit? })`.
|
|
46
46
|
- The writer validates candidates against assigned source paths, merges rows with the same CWE ids, locations, and optional instance, preserves their text, and assigns deterministic `candidate_id` values.
|
|
@@ -1,13 +1,13 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
#
|
|
1
|
+
# Sealed Scan Contract
|
|
2
2
|
|
|
3
|
-
This contract defines the canonical machine-readable documents for
|
|
3
|
+
This contract defines the canonical machine-readable documents for scans that reached a sealed terminal outcome and their readable markdown report projection.
|
|
4
4
|
|
|
5
5
|
## Canonical Documents
|
|
6
6
|
|
|
7
|
-
A
|
|
7
|
+
A sealed terminal bundle contains these files under `<scan_dir>`:
|
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- `scan-manifest.json`: immutable
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- `findings.json`: semantic finding records
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- `scan-manifest.json`: immutable terminal scan receipt after finalization
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- `findings.json`: semantic finding records retained when the scan reached its terminal outcome
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- `coverage.json`: structured coverage summary with detailed receipt references
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Canonical UTF-8 document sizes are bounded consistently by the producer and SDK: `scan-manifest.json` is limited to 16 MiB, `findings.json` to 128 MiB, and `coverage.json` to 32 MiB. Finalization rejects oversized inputs or generated documents before sealing or changing scan outputs. Keep detailed evidence in scan-local artifacts and reference it from the canonical summaries.
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@@ -20,11 +20,22 @@ Deep-scan SARIF results and CSV rows preserve their existing instance-level pres
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This bundle records immutable scan observations. It is not a workflow-state database. Consumers must store mutable annotations, lifecycle decisions, external links, retention policy, and synchronization state separately.
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Retention is an explicit consumer decision. Producing a
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Retention is an explicit consumer decision. Producing a sealed bundle must not silently copy it into an archive.
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## Manifest Semantics
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A sealed manifest records the
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A sealed manifest records the terminal timestamp and hashes for the canonical documents and immutable evidence receipts included in that bundle. Readable reports and generated exports are projections and are not included in the canonical seal. Later adapters may read the sealed bundle to create projections, but must not mutate the sealed manifest or canonical documents. Store projections separately. Every sealed manifest includes exactly one artifact record for each canonical JSON document, and artifact paths must not repeat.
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`scan.status` records why the bundle was sealed:
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| Status | Meaning |
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| --- | --- |
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| `completed` | The requested scan reached normal completion. |
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| `failed` | The scan stopped after an unrecoverable failure; retained artifacts may be partial. |
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| `canceled` | The scan stopped after an explicit cancellation; retained artifacts may be partial. |
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| `interrupted` | The scan stopped before normal completion because execution was interrupted; retained artifacts may be partial. |
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Only `completed` supports a completed-scan conclusion. For every stopped outcome, consumers must preserve retained findings and coverage while treating absence of findings as inconclusive.
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## Target Snapshots
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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{
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"$schema": "https://json-schema.org/draft/2020-12/schema",
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"$id": "https://openai.com/codex-security/schemas/scan-manifest.schema.json",
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"title": "Codex Security
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"title": "Codex Security sealed scan manifest",
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"type": "object",
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"required": [
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"documentType",
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}
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},
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"status": {
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"
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"enum": ["completed", "failed", "canceled", "interrupted"]
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},
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"startedAt": {
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"type": "string",
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"provenance": {
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"type": "object",
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"properties": {
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"sourceFindingIds": {
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"type": "array",
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"items": { "$ref": "#/$defs/text" },
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"uniqueItems": true,
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"description": "Host-provided source finding references represented by this Deep reduction. Preserve every assigned reference exactly once."
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},
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"sourceFindings": {
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"type": "array",
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"items": {
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"type": "object",
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"properties": {
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"id": { "$ref": "#/$defs/text" },
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"finding": { "type": "object", "additionalProperties": true }
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},
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"required": ["id", "finding"],
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"additionalProperties": false
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},
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"description": "Original source payloads retained by the host for lossless semantic merges."
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},
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"source": {
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"$ref": "#/$defs/text",
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"description": "The actual finding producer. Use local_plugin only for a finding discovered by this plugin."
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@@ -805,6 +824,10 @@
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"scanDraftInput": {
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"type": "object",
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"properties": {
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"complete": {
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"type": "boolean",
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"description": "Set false to save progress without declaring this worker or parent audit finished. Omit or set true only for the terminal result. Put provisional candidates in coverage.deferred, not findings."
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},
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"scanId": {
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"$ref": "#/$defs/scanId"
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},
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