@open-mercato/shared 0.7.1-develop.7172.1.a45dece080 → 0.7.1-develop.7175.1.d49ab48ee2
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/lib/encryption/tenantDataEncryptionService.js +31 -6
- package/dist/lib/encryption/tenantDataEncryptionService.js.map +2 -2
- package/dist/lib/version.js +1 -1
- package/dist/lib/version.js.map +1 -1
- package/package.json +2 -2
- package/src/lib/encryption/__tests__/dek-lifecycle.test.ts +36 -0
- package/src/lib/encryption/tenantDataEncryptionService.ts +45 -5
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@@ -62,6 +62,9 @@ function readEncryptedFieldsJson(row) {
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}
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return [];
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}
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function resolveEncryptionKeyId(entityId, keyScope, tenantId) {
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return keyScope === "system" ? `system:${entityId}` : tenantId ?? null;
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}
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function getSqlConnection(em) {
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const source = em;
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const conn = source.getConnection?.();
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@@ -119,9 +122,20 @@ class TenantDataEncryptionService {
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if (dek) this.dekCache.set(tenantId, dek);
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return dek;
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}
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/**
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* Resolves the DEK an encrypt call should seal under, provisioning one when the
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* tenant has none yet.
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*
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* Provisioning writes real key material to the KMS/Vault backend, so it is a
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* state change — not a cache fill. Callers whose intent is only to preview or
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* check ("would this row be encrypted?") pass `createIfMissing: false` to get a
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* `null` instead, leaving KMS untouched (issue #5950). The default stays `true`
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* so every existing write path keeps provisioning on first use.
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*/
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async resolveDekForEncrypt(tenantId, options) {
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const existing = await this.getDek(tenantId);
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if (existing || !tenantId) return existing ?? null;
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if (options?.createIfMissing === false) return null;
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if (typeof this.kms.createTenantDek !== "function") return existing ?? null;
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const pending = this.inflightDeks.get(tenantId);
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if (pending) return pending;
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@@ -337,7 +351,17 @@ class TenantDataEncryptionService {
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}
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return clone;
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}
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/**
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* Encrypts the fields an entity's encryption map covers.
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*
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* `options.createMissingDek` (default `true`) controls whether a tenant without
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* a DEK gets one provisioned as a side effect. Preview/check callers — most
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* notably `mercato entities rotate-encryption-key --dry-run` — pass `false` so a
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* read-only invocation cannot write key material to KMS (issue #5950). With
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* `false` and no existing DEK the payload is returned unchanged, exactly as it
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* is when the KMS declines to issue a key.
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*/
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async encryptEntityPayload(entityId, payload, tenantId, organizationId, options) {
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if (!this.isEnabled()) {
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debug("\u26AA\uFE0F encrypt.skip.disabled", { entityId, tenantId });
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return payload;
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@@ -347,8 +371,8 @@ class TenantDataEncryptionService {
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debug("\u26AA\uFE0F encrypt.skip.no-map", { entityId, tenantId });
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return payload;
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}
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const keyId = map.keyScope
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const dek = await this.resolveDekForEncrypt(keyId);
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const keyId = resolveEncryptionKeyId(entityId, map.keyScope, tenantId);
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const dek = await this.resolveDekForEncrypt(keyId, { createIfMissing: options?.createMissingDek !== false });
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if (!dek) {
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debug("\u26A0\uFE0F encrypt.skip.no-dek", { entityId, tenantId, keyScope: map.keyScope ?? "tenant" });
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return payload;
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@@ -366,7 +390,7 @@ class TenantDataEncryptionService {
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debug("\u26AA\uFE0F decrypt.skip.no-map", { entityId, tenantId });
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return payload;
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}
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const keyId = map.keyScope
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const keyId = resolveEncryptionKeyId(entityId, map.keyScope, tenantId);
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const dek = await this.getDek(keyId);
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if (!dek) {
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debug("\u26A0\uFE0F decrypt.skip.no-dek", { entityId, tenantId, keyScope: map.keyScope ?? "tenant" });
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@@ -378,6 +402,7 @@ class TenantDataEncryptionService {
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}
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export {
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TenantDataEncryptionService,
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parseDecryptedFieldValue
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parseDecryptedFieldValue,
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resolveEncryptionKeyId
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};
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//# sourceMappingURL=tenantDataEncryptionService.js.map
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@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
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{
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"version": 3,
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"sources": ["../../../src/lib/encryption/tenantDataEncryptionService.ts"],
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"sourcesContent": ["import type { EntityManager } from '@mikro-orm/postgresql'\nimport type { CacheStrategy } from '@open-mercato/cache'\nimport { decryptWithAesGcm, encryptWithAesGcm, hashForLookup } from './aes'\nimport { createKmsService, type KmsService, type TenantDek } from './kms'\nimport { isTenantDataEncryptionEnabled, isEncryptionDebugEnabled } from './toggles'\nimport { createLogger } from '../logger'\nimport type { EncryptionKeyScope, ModuleEncryptionMap } from '../../modules/encryption'\n\nconst logger = createLogger('shared').child({ component: 'tenant-encryption' })\n\nexport type EncryptedFieldRule = {\n field: string\n hashField?: string | null\n}\n\nexport type EncryptionMapRecord = {\n entityId: string\n keyScope?: EncryptionKeyScope\n fields: EncryptedFieldRule[]\n}\n\ntype MapCacheKey = {\n entityId: string\n tenantId: string | null\n organizationId: string | null\n}\n\ntype SqlConnection = {\n execute(sql: string, params?: readonly unknown[]): Promise<unknown>\n}\n\nconst MAP_MISS_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000\n// Mirror the Vault KMS default DEK TTL so a rotated/revoked tenant key is picked\n// up by long-lived processes without a restart (#2746). The service-level cache\n// previously had no TTL and shadowed the KMS's own 15-minute expiry.\nconst DEK_CACHE_TTL_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000\n\nfunction cacheKey(key: MapCacheKey): string {\n return [\n 'encmap',\n key.entityId.toLowerCase(),\n key.tenantId ?? 'null',\n key.organizationId ?? 'null',\n ].join(':')\n}\n\nfunction debug(event: string, payload: Record<string, unknown>) {\n if (!isEncryptionDebugEnabled()) return\n try {\n logger.debug(event, payload)\n } catch {\n // ignore\n }\n}\n\nconst toSnakeCase = (value: string): string =>\n value.replace(/([A-Z])/g, '_$1').replace(/__/g, '_').toLowerCase()\n\nconst toCamelCase = (value: string): string =>\n value.replace(/_([a-z])/g, (_, c) => c.toUpperCase())\n\nfunction findKey(obj: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): string | null {\n const candidates = [key, toSnakeCase(key), toCamelCase(key)]\n for (const candidate of candidates) {\n if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, candidate)) return candidate\n }\n return null\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a decrypted entity-field payload back into its original value.\n *\n * The encrypt path stores raw strings unwrapped and JSON-stringifies non-string\n * values. Blindly running `JSON.parse` on every decrypted value would coerce\n * text columns whose contents happen to be valid JSON primitives \u2014 e.g. the\n * string `\"123\"` \u2014 back into numbers/booleans, which then breaks string-typed\n * consumers (see issue #1734). Only restructure the value when the decrypted\n * payload is unambiguously a JSON object or array; otherwise return the raw\n * decrypted string. Numeric/boolean entity columns are not in any current\n * encryption map, so this is backward-compatible.\n *\n * NOTE (issue #1810 follow-up): `decryptFields` no longer calls this helper for\n * entity-field decryption \u2014 typed string columns whose contents happen to look\n * like JSON (e.g. a display name `{\"a\":1}`) must remain raw strings to avoid\n * downstream React-render crashes. Callers that legitimately need the parse\n * (audit-log jsonb columns, custom-field rotation, encryption CLI) MUST invoke\n * `parseDecryptedFieldValue` themselves on the decrypted payload.\n */\nexport function parseDecryptedFieldValue(decrypted: string): unknown {\n if (decrypted.length === 0) return decrypted\n const first = decrypted[0]\n if (first !== '{' && first !== '[') return decrypted\n try {\n return JSON.parse(decrypted)\n } catch {\n return decrypted\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * A value is only treated as \"already encrypted\" when it actually decrypts\n * under the tenant DEK \u2014 i.e. the AES-GCM authentication tag verifies. A purely\n * structural `<iv>:<ct>:<tag>:v1` shape check is forgeable: attacker-controlled\n * field values (e.g. their own profile email/phone) could impersonate ciphertext\n * to skip encryption-at-rest and the lookup hash entirely (issue #2720). Binding\n * the check to a successful authenticated decrypt makes forgery infeasible, so a\n * fake payload simply gets encrypted like any other plaintext.\n */\nfunction isEncryptedWithDek(value: unknown, dek: TenantDek): boolean {\n if (typeof value !== 'string') return false\n const parts = value.split(':')\n if (parts.length !== 4 || parts[3] !== 'v1') return false\n return decryptWithAesGcm(value, dek.key) !== null\n}\n\nfunction normalizeEncryptedFieldNames(fields: readonly { field?: unknown }[] | null | undefined): string[] {\n if (!Array.isArray(fields)) return []\n return fields\n .map((rule) => rule.field)\n .filter((field): field is string => typeof field === 'string' && field.trim().length > 0)\n}\n\nfunction readEncryptedFieldsJson(row: Record<string, unknown>): EncryptedFieldRule[] {\n const raw = row.fields_json ?? row.fieldsJson\n if (Array.isArray(raw)) return raw as EncryptedFieldRule[]\n if (typeof raw === 'string') {\n try {\n const parsed = JSON.parse(raw)\n return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed as EncryptedFieldRule[] : []\n } catch {\n return []\n }\n }\n return []\n}\n\nfunction getSqlConnection(em: EntityManager): SqlConnection | null {\n const source = em as { getConnection?: () => unknown }\n const conn = source.getConnection?.()\n if (!conn || typeof conn !== 'object') return null\n const candidate = conn as { execute?: unknown }\n if (typeof candidate.execute !== 'function') return null\n return candidate as SqlConnection\n}\n\nexport class TenantDataEncryptionService {\n private static globalMemoryCache = new Map<string, EncryptionMapRecord>()\n private static globalInflightMaps = new Map<string, Promise<EncryptionMapRecord | null>>()\n private static globalDekCache = new Map<string, TenantDek>()\n private static globalInflightDeks = new Map<string, Promise<TenantDek | null>>()\n private static globalMissCache = new Map<string, number>()\n private readonly kms: KmsService\n private readonly cache?: CacheStrategy\n private readonly memoryCache = TenantDataEncryptionService.globalMemoryCache\n private readonly dekCache = TenantDataEncryptionService.globalDekCache\n private readonly inflightDeks = TenantDataEncryptionService.globalInflightDeks\n private readonly inflightMaps = TenantDataEncryptionService.globalInflightMaps\n private readonly missCache = TenantDataEncryptionService.globalMissCache\n private readonly systemDefaultMaps: Map<string, ModuleEncryptionMap>\n\n constructor(\n private em: EntityManager,\n opts?: {\n cache?: CacheStrategy\n kms?: KmsService\n defaultEncryptionMaps?: readonly ModuleEncryptionMap[]\n }\n ) {\n this.cache = opts?.cache\n this.kms = opts?.kms ?? createKmsService()\n this.systemDefaultMaps = new Map(\n (opts?.defaultEncryptionMaps ?? [])\n .filter((map) => map.keyScope === 'system')\n .map((map) => [map.entityId, map]),\n )\n }\n\n isEnabled(): boolean {\n return isTenantDataEncryptionEnabled() && this.kms.isHealthy()\n }\n\n private isDekExpired(dek: TenantDek): boolean {\n return Date.now() - dek.fetchedAt > DEK_CACHE_TTL_MS\n }\n\n async getDek(tenantId: string | null | undefined): Promise<TenantDek | null> {\n if (!tenantId) return null\n const cached = this.dekCache.get(tenantId)\n if (cached && !this.isDekExpired(cached)) return cached\n if (cached) this.dekCache.delete(tenantId)\n const dek = await this.kms.getTenantDek(tenantId)\n if (!dek) {\n debug('\uD83D\uDD0E dek.miss', { tenantId })\n } else {\n debug('\u2705 dek.hit', { tenantId })\n }\n if (dek) this.dekCache.set(tenantId, dek)\n return dek\n }\n\n private async resolveDekForEncrypt(tenantId: string | null): Promise<TenantDek | null> {\n const existing = await this.getDek(tenantId)\n if (existing || !tenantId) return existing ?? null\n if (typeof this.kms.createTenantDek !== 'function') return existing ?? null\n // Dedupe concurrent first-time creation within this process so two callers\n // can't each generate a distinct DEK and overwrite one another (#2746).\n // Mirrors the encryption-map inflight dedupe (`globalInflightMaps`).\n const pending = this.inflightDeks.get(tenantId)\n if (pending) return pending\n const creation = (async () => {\n const created = await this.kms.createTenantDek(tenantId)\n if (created) this.dekCache.set(tenantId, created)\n return created ?? null\n })()\n this.inflightDeks.set(tenantId, creation)\n try {\n return await creation\n } finally {\n this.inflightDeks.delete(tenantId)\n }\n }\n\n async createDek(tenantId: string): Promise<TenantDek | null> {\n const dek = await this.kms.createTenantDek(tenantId)\n if (dek) this.dekCache.set(tenantId, dek)\n return dek\n }\n\n private async fetchMap(key: MapCacheKey): Promise<EncryptionMapRecord | null> {\n // Bypass ORM lifecycle hooks to avoid recursive decrypt loops by querying directly.\n const conn = getSqlConnection(this.em)\n if (!conn) return null\n const sql = `\n select entity_id, fields_json\n from encryption_maps\n where entity_id = ?\n and tenant_id is not distinct from ?\n and organization_id is not distinct from ?\n and is_active = true\n and deleted_at is null\n limit 1\n `\n const rows = await conn.execute(sql, [key.entityId, key.tenantId ?? null, key.organizationId ?? null])\n const row = Array.isArray(rows) && rows.length && rows[0] && typeof rows[0] === 'object'\n ? rows[0] as Record<string, unknown>\n : null\n if (!row) return null\n return {\n entityId: String(row.entity_id ?? row.entityId ?? key.entityId),\n fields: readEncryptedFieldsJson(row),\n }\n }\n\n private applySystemDefault(record: EncryptionMapRecord | null, entityId: string): EncryptionMapRecord | null {\n const declared = this.systemDefaultMaps.get(entityId)\n if (!declared) return record\n const fields: EncryptedFieldRule[] = declared.fields.map((field) => ({\n field: field.field,\n hashField: field.hashField ?? null,\n }))\n const declaredFields = new Set(fields.map((field) => field.field))\n for (const field of record?.fields ?? []) {\n if (!declaredFields.has(field.field)) fields.push(field)\n }\n return {\n entityId,\n keyScope: 'system',\n fields,\n }\n }\n\n private async getMap(key: MapCacheKey): Promise<EncryptionMapRecord | null> {\n const shouldSkipLookup = (tag: string) => {\n const expiresAt = this.missCache.get(tag)\n if (!expiresAt) return false\n if (expiresAt > Date.now()) return true\n this.missCache.delete(tag)\n return false\n }\n const recordMiss = (tag: string) => {\n this.missCache.set(tag, Date.now() + MAP_MISS_TTL_MS)\n }\n\n const candidates: MapCacheKey[] = [\n key,\n { entityId: key.entityId, tenantId: key.tenantId ?? null, organizationId: null },\n { entityId: key.entityId, tenantId: null, organizationId: null },\n ]\n for (const candidate of candidates) {\n const tag = cacheKey(candidate)\n if (shouldSkipLookup(tag)) continue\n if (this.inflightMaps.has(tag)) {\n const pending = this.inflightMaps.get(tag)!\n const resolved = await pending\n if (resolved) return this.applySystemDefault(resolved, key.entityId)\n }\n const mem = this.memoryCache.get(tag)\n if (mem) return this.applySystemDefault(mem, key.entityId)\n if (this.cache && typeof this.cache.get === 'function') {\n const cached = await this.cache.get(tag)\n if (cached) return this.applySystemDefault(cached as EncryptionMapRecord, key.entityId)\n }\n const pending = this.fetchMap(candidate)\n this.inflightMaps.set(tag, pending)\n const loaded = await pending\n this.inflightMaps.delete(tag)\n if (!loaded) {\n recordMiss(tag)\n debug('\uD83D\uDD0D encmap.miss', {\n entityId: candidate.entityId,\n tenantId: candidate.tenantId,\n organizationId: candidate.organizationId,\n })\n continue\n }\n this.missCache.delete(tag)\n this.memoryCache.set(tag, loaded)\n if (this.cache && typeof this.cache.set === 'function') {\n await this.cache.set(tag, loaded, { ttl: 300 })\n }\n return this.applySystemDefault(loaded, key.entityId)\n }\n return this.applySystemDefault(null, key.entityId)\n }\n\n private async fetchAllOrganizationFieldNames(entityId: string, tenantId: string | null): Promise<string[]> {\n const conn = getSqlConnection(this.em)\n if (!conn) return []\n const sql = `\n select fields_json\n from encryption_maps\n where entity_id = ?\n and tenant_id is not distinct from ?\n and organization_id is not null\n and is_active = true\n and deleted_at is null\n `\n const rows = await conn.execute(sql, [entityId, tenantId])\n if (!Array.isArray(rows) || rows.length === 0) return []\n const names = new Set<string>()\n for (const row of rows) {\n if (!row || typeof row !== 'object') continue\n for (const field of normalizeEncryptedFieldNames(readEncryptedFieldsJson(row as Record<string, unknown>))) {\n names.add(field)\n }\n }\n return Array.from(names)\n }\n\n async invalidateMap(entityId: string, tenantId: string | null, organizationId: string | null): Promise<void> {\n const tag = cacheKey({ entityId, tenantId, organizationId })\n this.memoryCache.delete(tag)\n this.inflightMaps.delete(tag)\n this.missCache.delete(tag)\n if (this.cache && typeof (this.cache as any).delete === 'function') {\n await (this.cache as any).delete(tag)\n }\n }\n\n // Force a flush of a tenant's cached DEK across the service-level cache and the\n // underlying KMS cache so an operator can pick up a rotated/revoked key without\n // a process restart (#2746).\n invalidateDek(tenantId: string): void {\n this.dekCache.delete(tenantId)\n this.inflightDeks.delete(tenantId)\n this.kms.invalidateDek?.(tenantId)\n }\n\n /**\n * Lists the fields an encryption map marks as encrypted at rest.\n *\n * `isEnabled()` folds the environment toggle together with KMS health, so by default an\n * unhealthy KMS reports \"nothing is encrypted\" \u2014 which is safe for write paths but wrong for\n * readers that must decide whether a stored column holds ciphertext. `ignoreRuntimeHealth`\n * answers the on-disk question instead: it consults the map even when the KMS cannot currently\n * resolve a DEK, so callers can fail closed rather than treat ciphertext as plaintext (#4622).\n */\n async getEncryptedFieldNames(\n entityId: string,\n tenantId: string | null | undefined,\n organizationId?: string | null,\n options?: { ignoreRuntimeHealth?: boolean }\n ): Promise<string[]> {\n if (options?.ignoreRuntimeHealth) {\n if (!isTenantDataEncryptionEnabled()) return []\n } else if (!this.isEnabled()) {\n return []\n }\n const map = await this.getMap({ entityId, tenantId: tenantId ?? null, organizationId: organizationId ?? null })\n const fields = new Set(normalizeEncryptedFieldNames(map?.fields))\n if (organizationId == null) {\n for (const field of await this.fetchAllOrganizationFieldNames(entityId, tenantId ?? null)) {\n fields.add(field)\n }\n }\n return Array.from(fields)\n }\n\n private encryptFields(\n obj: Record<string, unknown>,\n fields: EncryptedFieldRule[],\n dek: TenantDek\n ): Record<string, unknown> {\n const clone: Record<string, unknown> = { ...obj }\n for (const rule of fields) {\n const key = findKey(clone, rule.field)\n if (!key) continue\n const value = clone[key]\n if (value === null || value === undefined) continue\n // Avoid double-encrypting payloads that genuinely decrypt under this DEK.\n // A forged ciphertext-shaped string fails this check and is encrypted as\n // plaintext, closing the encryption-at-rest bypass (issue #2720).\n if (isEncryptedWithDek(value, dek)) continue\n const serialized = typeof value === 'string' ? value : JSON.stringify(value)\n const payload = encryptWithAesGcm(serialized, dek.key)\n clone[key] = payload.value\n if (rule.hashField) {\n const hashKey = findKey(clone, rule.hashField) ?? rule.hashField\n clone[hashKey] = hashForLookup(serialized)\n }\n }\n return clone\n }\n\n private decryptFields(\n obj: Record<string, unknown>,\n fields: EncryptedFieldRule[],\n dek: TenantDek\n ): Record<string, unknown> {\n const clone: Record<string, unknown> = { ...obj }\n const maybeDecrypt = (payload: string): string | null => {\n const first = decryptWithAesGcm(payload, dek.key)\n if (first === null) return null\n // Handle accidental double-encryption: if the first pass still looks like a v1 payload, try once more.\n const parts = first.split(':')\n if (parts.length === 4 && parts[3] === 'v1') {\n const second = decryptWithAesGcm(first, dek.key)\n return second ?? first\n }\n return first\n }\n for (const rule of fields) {\n const key = findKey(clone, rule.field)\n if (!key) continue\n const value = clone[key]\n if (typeof value !== 'string') continue\n const decrypted = maybeDecrypt(value)\n if (decrypted === null) continue\n // Entity fields are typed columns (string/text). Never auto-parse to an object \u2014\n // it triggers React-render crashes when a string value happens to be valid JSON\n // (issue #1810 follow-up). Custom field values use a separate helper that\n // preserves their typed-JSON contract.\n clone[key] = decrypted\n }\n return clone\n }\n\n async encryptEntityPayload(\n entityId: string,\n payload: Record<string, unknown>,\n tenantId: string | null | undefined,\n organizationId?: string | null\n ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {\n if (!this.isEnabled()) {\n debug('\u26AA\uFE0F encrypt.skip.disabled', { entityId, tenantId })\n return payload\n }\n const map = await this.getMap({ entityId, tenantId: tenantId ?? null, organizationId: organizationId ?? null })\n if (!map || !map.fields?.length) {\n debug('\u26AA\uFE0F encrypt.skip.no-map', { entityId, tenantId })\n return payload\n }\n const keyId = map.keyScope === 'system' ? `system:${entityId}` : tenantId ?? null\n const dek = await this.resolveDekForEncrypt(keyId)\n if (!dek) {\n debug('\u26A0\uFE0F encrypt.skip.no-dek', { entityId, tenantId, keyScope: map.keyScope ?? 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5
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-
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"sourcesContent": ["import type { EntityManager } from '@mikro-orm/postgresql'\nimport type { CacheStrategy } from '@open-mercato/cache'\nimport { decryptWithAesGcm, encryptWithAesGcm, hashForLookup } from './aes'\nimport { createKmsService, type KmsService, type TenantDek } from './kms'\nimport { isTenantDataEncryptionEnabled, isEncryptionDebugEnabled } from './toggles'\nimport { createLogger } from '../logger'\nimport type { EncryptionKeyScope, ModuleEncryptionMap } from '../../modules/encryption'\n\nconst logger = createLogger('shared').child({ component: 'tenant-encryption' })\n\nexport type EncryptedFieldRule = {\n field: string\n hashField?: string | null\n}\n\nexport type EncryptionMapRecord = {\n entityId: string\n keyScope?: EncryptionKeyScope\n fields: EncryptedFieldRule[]\n}\n\ntype MapCacheKey = {\n entityId: string\n tenantId: string | null\n organizationId: string | null\n}\n\ntype SqlConnection = {\n execute(sql: string, params?: readonly unknown[]): Promise<unknown>\n}\n\nconst MAP_MISS_TTL_MS = 5 * 60 * 1000\n// Mirror the Vault KMS default DEK TTL so a rotated/revoked tenant key is picked\n// up by long-lived processes without a restart (#2746). The service-level cache\n// previously had no TTL and shadowed the KMS's own 15-minute expiry.\nconst DEK_CACHE_TTL_MS = 15 * 60 * 1000\n\nfunction cacheKey(key: MapCacheKey): string {\n return [\n 'encmap',\n key.entityId.toLowerCase(),\n key.tenantId ?? 'null',\n key.organizationId ?? 'null',\n ].join(':')\n}\n\nfunction debug(event: string, payload: Record<string, unknown>) {\n if (!isEncryptionDebugEnabled()) return\n try {\n logger.debug(event, payload)\n } catch {\n // ignore\n }\n}\n\nconst toSnakeCase = (value: string): string =>\n value.replace(/([A-Z])/g, '_$1').replace(/__/g, '_').toLowerCase()\n\nconst toCamelCase = (value: string): string =>\n value.replace(/_([a-z])/g, (_, c) => c.toUpperCase())\n\nfunction findKey(obj: Record<string, unknown>, key: string): string | null {\n const candidates = [key, toSnakeCase(key), toCamelCase(key)]\n for (const candidate of candidates) {\n if (Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(obj, candidate)) return candidate\n }\n return null\n}\n\n/**\n * Decode a decrypted entity-field payload back into its original value.\n *\n * The encrypt path stores raw strings unwrapped and JSON-stringifies non-string\n * values. Blindly running `JSON.parse` on every decrypted value would coerce\n * text columns whose contents happen to be valid JSON primitives \u2014 e.g. the\n * string `\"123\"` \u2014 back into numbers/booleans, which then breaks string-typed\n * consumers (see issue #1734). Only restructure the value when the decrypted\n * payload is unambiguously a JSON object or array; otherwise return the raw\n * decrypted string. Numeric/boolean entity columns are not in any current\n * encryption map, so this is backward-compatible.\n *\n * NOTE (issue #1810 follow-up): `decryptFields` no longer calls this helper for\n * entity-field decryption \u2014 typed string columns whose contents happen to look\n * like JSON (e.g. a display name `{\"a\":1}`) must remain raw strings to avoid\n * downstream React-render crashes. Callers that legitimately need the parse\n * (audit-log jsonb columns, custom-field rotation, encryption CLI) MUST invoke\n * `parseDecryptedFieldValue` themselves on the decrypted payload.\n */\nexport function parseDecryptedFieldValue(decrypted: string): unknown {\n if (decrypted.length === 0) return decrypted\n const first = decrypted[0]\n if (first !== '{' && first !== '[') return decrypted\n try {\n return JSON.parse(decrypted)\n } catch {\n return decrypted\n }\n}\n\n/**\n * A value is only treated as \"already encrypted\" when it actually decrypts\n * under the tenant DEK \u2014 i.e. the AES-GCM authentication tag verifies. A purely\n * structural `<iv>:<ct>:<tag>:v1` shape check is forgeable: attacker-controlled\n * field values (e.g. their own profile email/phone) could impersonate ciphertext\n * to skip encryption-at-rest and the lookup hash entirely (issue #2720). Binding\n * the check to a successful authenticated decrypt makes forgery infeasible, so a\n * fake payload simply gets encrypted like any other plaintext.\n */\nfunction isEncryptedWithDek(value: unknown, dek: TenantDek): boolean {\n if (typeof value !== 'string') return false\n const parts = value.split(':')\n if (parts.length !== 4 || parts[3] !== 'v1') return false\n return decryptWithAesGcm(value, dek.key) !== null\n}\n\nfunction normalizeEncryptedFieldNames(fields: readonly { field?: unknown }[] | null | undefined): string[] {\n if (!Array.isArray(fields)) return []\n return fields\n .map((rule) => rule.field)\n .filter((field): field is string => typeof field === 'string' && field.trim().length > 0)\n}\n\nfunction readEncryptedFieldsJson(row: Record<string, unknown>): EncryptedFieldRule[] {\n const raw = row.fields_json ?? row.fieldsJson\n if (Array.isArray(raw)) return raw as EncryptedFieldRule[]\n if (typeof raw === 'string') {\n try {\n const parsed = JSON.parse(raw)\n return Array.isArray(parsed) ? parsed as EncryptedFieldRule[] : []\n } catch {\n return []\n }\n }\n return []\n}\n\n/**\n * The KMS key id an encryption map's payloads are sealed under: a system-scoped map\n * uses a per-entity key that exists before any tenant does, everything else uses the\n * tenant's own key. Exported so callers that need to probe key availability without\n * encrypting (the encryption CLIs) derive the same id instead of re-spelling the\n * `system:` convention (#5950).\n */\nexport function resolveEncryptionKeyId(\n entityId: string,\n keyScope: EncryptionKeyScope | undefined,\n tenantId: string | null | undefined\n): string | null {\n return keyScope === 'system' ? `system:${entityId}` : tenantId ?? null\n}\n\nfunction getSqlConnection(em: EntityManager): SqlConnection | null {\n const source = em as { getConnection?: () => unknown }\n const conn = source.getConnection?.()\n if (!conn || typeof conn !== 'object') return null\n const candidate = conn as { execute?: unknown }\n if (typeof candidate.execute !== 'function') return null\n return candidate as SqlConnection\n}\n\nexport class TenantDataEncryptionService {\n private static globalMemoryCache = new Map<string, EncryptionMapRecord>()\n private static globalInflightMaps = new Map<string, Promise<EncryptionMapRecord | null>>()\n private static globalDekCache = new Map<string, TenantDek>()\n private static globalInflightDeks = new Map<string, Promise<TenantDek | null>>()\n private static globalMissCache = new Map<string, number>()\n private readonly kms: KmsService\n private readonly cache?: CacheStrategy\n private readonly memoryCache = TenantDataEncryptionService.globalMemoryCache\n private readonly dekCache = TenantDataEncryptionService.globalDekCache\n private readonly inflightDeks = TenantDataEncryptionService.globalInflightDeks\n private readonly inflightMaps = TenantDataEncryptionService.globalInflightMaps\n private readonly missCache = TenantDataEncryptionService.globalMissCache\n private readonly systemDefaultMaps: Map<string, ModuleEncryptionMap>\n\n constructor(\n private em: EntityManager,\n opts?: {\n cache?: CacheStrategy\n kms?: KmsService\n defaultEncryptionMaps?: readonly ModuleEncryptionMap[]\n }\n ) {\n this.cache = opts?.cache\n this.kms = opts?.kms ?? createKmsService()\n this.systemDefaultMaps = new Map(\n (opts?.defaultEncryptionMaps ?? [])\n .filter((map) => map.keyScope === 'system')\n .map((map) => [map.entityId, map]),\n )\n }\n\n isEnabled(): boolean {\n return isTenantDataEncryptionEnabled() && this.kms.isHealthy()\n }\n\n private isDekExpired(dek: TenantDek): boolean {\n return Date.now() - dek.fetchedAt > DEK_CACHE_TTL_MS\n }\n\n async getDek(tenantId: string | null | undefined): Promise<TenantDek | null> {\n if (!tenantId) return null\n const cached = this.dekCache.get(tenantId)\n if (cached && !this.isDekExpired(cached)) return cached\n if (cached) this.dekCache.delete(tenantId)\n const dek = await this.kms.getTenantDek(tenantId)\n if (!dek) {\n debug('\uD83D\uDD0E dek.miss', { tenantId })\n } else {\n debug('\u2705 dek.hit', { tenantId })\n }\n if (dek) this.dekCache.set(tenantId, dek)\n return dek\n }\n\n /**\n * Resolves the DEK an encrypt call should seal under, provisioning one when the\n * tenant has none yet.\n *\n * Provisioning writes real key material to the KMS/Vault backend, so it is a\n * state change \u2014 not a cache fill. Callers whose intent is only to preview or\n * check (\"would this row be encrypted?\") pass `createIfMissing: false` to get a\n * `null` instead, leaving KMS untouched (issue #5950). The default stays `true`\n * so every existing write path keeps provisioning on first use.\n */\n private async resolveDekForEncrypt(\n tenantId: string | null,\n options?: { createIfMissing?: boolean }\n ): Promise<TenantDek | null> {\n const existing = await this.getDek(tenantId)\n if (existing || !tenantId) return existing ?? null\n if (options?.createIfMissing === false) return null\n if (typeof this.kms.createTenantDek !== 'function') return existing ?? null\n // Dedupe concurrent first-time creation within this process so two callers\n // can't each generate a distinct DEK and overwrite one another (#2746).\n // Mirrors the encryption-map inflight dedupe (`globalInflightMaps`).\n const pending = this.inflightDeks.get(tenantId)\n if (pending) return pending\n const creation = (async () => {\n const created = await this.kms.createTenantDek(tenantId)\n if (created) this.dekCache.set(tenantId, created)\n return created ?? null\n })()\n this.inflightDeks.set(tenantId, creation)\n try {\n return await creation\n } finally {\n this.inflightDeks.delete(tenantId)\n }\n }\n\n async createDek(tenantId: string): Promise<TenantDek | null> {\n const dek = await this.kms.createTenantDek(tenantId)\n if (dek) this.dekCache.set(tenantId, dek)\n return dek\n }\n\n private async fetchMap(key: MapCacheKey): Promise<EncryptionMapRecord | null> {\n // Bypass ORM lifecycle hooks to avoid recursive decrypt loops by querying directly.\n const conn = getSqlConnection(this.em)\n if (!conn) return null\n const sql = `\n select entity_id, fields_json\n from encryption_maps\n where entity_id = ?\n and tenant_id is not distinct from ?\n and organization_id is not distinct from ?\n and is_active = true\n and deleted_at is null\n limit 1\n `\n const rows = await conn.execute(sql, [key.entityId, key.tenantId ?? null, key.organizationId ?? null])\n const row = Array.isArray(rows) && rows.length && rows[0] && typeof rows[0] === 'object'\n ? rows[0] as Record<string, unknown>\n : null\n if (!row) return null\n return {\n entityId: String(row.entity_id ?? row.entityId ?? key.entityId),\n fields: readEncryptedFieldsJson(row),\n }\n }\n\n private applySystemDefault(record: EncryptionMapRecord | null, entityId: string): EncryptionMapRecord | null {\n const declared = this.systemDefaultMaps.get(entityId)\n if (!declared) return record\n const fields: EncryptedFieldRule[] = declared.fields.map((field) => ({\n field: field.field,\n hashField: field.hashField ?? null,\n }))\n const declaredFields = new Set(fields.map((field) => field.field))\n for (const field of record?.fields ?? []) {\n if (!declaredFields.has(field.field)) fields.push(field)\n }\n return {\n entityId,\n keyScope: 'system',\n fields,\n }\n }\n\n private async getMap(key: MapCacheKey): Promise<EncryptionMapRecord | null> {\n const shouldSkipLookup = (tag: string) => {\n const expiresAt = this.missCache.get(tag)\n if (!expiresAt) return false\n if (expiresAt > Date.now()) return true\n this.missCache.delete(tag)\n return false\n }\n const recordMiss = (tag: string) => {\n this.missCache.set(tag, Date.now() + MAP_MISS_TTL_MS)\n }\n\n const candidates: MapCacheKey[] = [\n key,\n { entityId: key.entityId, tenantId: key.tenantId ?? null, organizationId: null },\n { entityId: key.entityId, tenantId: null, organizationId: null },\n ]\n for (const candidate of candidates) {\n const tag = cacheKey(candidate)\n if (shouldSkipLookup(tag)) continue\n if (this.inflightMaps.has(tag)) {\n const pending = this.inflightMaps.get(tag)!\n const resolved = await pending\n if (resolved) return this.applySystemDefault(resolved, key.entityId)\n }\n const mem = this.memoryCache.get(tag)\n if (mem) return this.applySystemDefault(mem, key.entityId)\n if (this.cache && typeof this.cache.get === 'function') {\n const cached = await this.cache.get(tag)\n if (cached) return this.applySystemDefault(cached as EncryptionMapRecord, key.entityId)\n }\n const pending = this.fetchMap(candidate)\n this.inflightMaps.set(tag, pending)\n const loaded = await pending\n this.inflightMaps.delete(tag)\n if (!loaded) {\n recordMiss(tag)\n debug('\uD83D\uDD0D encmap.miss', {\n entityId: candidate.entityId,\n tenantId: candidate.tenantId,\n organizationId: candidate.organizationId,\n })\n continue\n }\n this.missCache.delete(tag)\n this.memoryCache.set(tag, loaded)\n if (this.cache && typeof this.cache.set === 'function') {\n await this.cache.set(tag, loaded, { ttl: 300 })\n }\n return this.applySystemDefault(loaded, key.entityId)\n }\n return this.applySystemDefault(null, key.entityId)\n }\n\n private async fetchAllOrganizationFieldNames(entityId: string, tenantId: string | null): Promise<string[]> {\n const conn = getSqlConnection(this.em)\n if (!conn) return []\n const sql = `\n select fields_json\n from encryption_maps\n where entity_id = ?\n and tenant_id is not distinct from ?\n and organization_id is not null\n and is_active = true\n and deleted_at is null\n `\n const rows = await conn.execute(sql, [entityId, tenantId])\n if (!Array.isArray(rows) || rows.length === 0) return []\n const names = new Set<string>()\n for (const row of rows) {\n if (!row || typeof row !== 'object') continue\n for (const field of normalizeEncryptedFieldNames(readEncryptedFieldsJson(row as Record<string, unknown>))) {\n names.add(field)\n }\n }\n return Array.from(names)\n }\n\n async invalidateMap(entityId: string, tenantId: string | null, organizationId: string | null): Promise<void> {\n const tag = cacheKey({ entityId, tenantId, organizationId })\n this.memoryCache.delete(tag)\n this.inflightMaps.delete(tag)\n this.missCache.delete(tag)\n if (this.cache && typeof (this.cache as any).delete === 'function') {\n await (this.cache as any).delete(tag)\n }\n }\n\n // Force a flush of a tenant's cached DEK across the service-level cache and the\n // underlying KMS cache so an operator can pick up a rotated/revoked key without\n // a process restart (#2746).\n invalidateDek(tenantId: string): void {\n this.dekCache.delete(tenantId)\n this.inflightDeks.delete(tenantId)\n this.kms.invalidateDek?.(tenantId)\n }\n\n /**\n * Lists the fields an encryption map marks as encrypted at rest.\n *\n * `isEnabled()` folds the environment toggle together with KMS health, so by default an\n * unhealthy KMS reports \"nothing is encrypted\" \u2014 which is safe for write paths but wrong for\n * readers that must decide whether a stored column holds ciphertext. `ignoreRuntimeHealth`\n * answers the on-disk question instead: it consults the map even when the KMS cannot currently\n * resolve a DEK, so callers can fail closed rather than treat ciphertext as plaintext (#4622).\n */\n async getEncryptedFieldNames(\n entityId: string,\n tenantId: string | null | undefined,\n organizationId?: string | null,\n options?: { ignoreRuntimeHealth?: boolean }\n ): Promise<string[]> {\n if (options?.ignoreRuntimeHealth) {\n if (!isTenantDataEncryptionEnabled()) return []\n } else if (!this.isEnabled()) {\n return []\n }\n const map = await this.getMap({ entityId, tenantId: tenantId ?? null, organizationId: organizationId ?? null })\n const fields = new Set(normalizeEncryptedFieldNames(map?.fields))\n if (organizationId == null) {\n for (const field of await this.fetchAllOrganizationFieldNames(entityId, tenantId ?? null)) {\n fields.add(field)\n }\n }\n return Array.from(fields)\n }\n\n private encryptFields(\n obj: Record<string, unknown>,\n fields: EncryptedFieldRule[],\n dek: TenantDek\n ): Record<string, unknown> {\n const clone: Record<string, unknown> = { ...obj }\n for (const rule of fields) {\n const key = findKey(clone, rule.field)\n if (!key) continue\n const value = clone[key]\n if (value === null || value === undefined) continue\n // Avoid double-encrypting payloads that genuinely decrypt under this DEK.\n // A forged ciphertext-shaped string fails this check and is encrypted as\n // plaintext, closing the encryption-at-rest bypass (issue #2720).\n if (isEncryptedWithDek(value, dek)) continue\n const serialized = typeof value === 'string' ? value : JSON.stringify(value)\n const payload = encryptWithAesGcm(serialized, dek.key)\n clone[key] = payload.value\n if (rule.hashField) {\n const hashKey = findKey(clone, rule.hashField) ?? rule.hashField\n clone[hashKey] = hashForLookup(serialized)\n }\n }\n return clone\n }\n\n private decryptFields(\n obj: Record<string, unknown>,\n fields: EncryptedFieldRule[],\n dek: TenantDek\n ): Record<string, unknown> {\n const clone: Record<string, unknown> = { ...obj }\n const maybeDecrypt = (payload: string): string | null => {\n const first = decryptWithAesGcm(payload, dek.key)\n if (first === null) return null\n // Handle accidental double-encryption: if the first pass still looks like a v1 payload, try once more.\n const parts = first.split(':')\n if (parts.length === 4 && parts[3] === 'v1') {\n const second = decryptWithAesGcm(first, dek.key)\n return second ?? first\n }\n return first\n }\n for (const rule of fields) {\n const key = findKey(clone, rule.field)\n if (!key) continue\n const value = clone[key]\n if (typeof value !== 'string') continue\n const decrypted = maybeDecrypt(value)\n if (decrypted === null) continue\n // Entity fields are typed columns (string/text). Never auto-parse to an object \u2014\n // it triggers React-render crashes when a string value happens to be valid JSON\n // (issue #1810 follow-up). Custom field values use a separate helper that\n // preserves their typed-JSON contract.\n clone[key] = decrypted\n }\n return clone\n }\n\n /**\n * Encrypts the fields an entity's encryption map covers.\n *\n * `options.createMissingDek` (default `true`) controls whether a tenant without\n * a DEK gets one provisioned as a side effect. Preview/check callers \u2014 most\n * notably `mercato entities rotate-encryption-key --dry-run` \u2014 pass `false` so a\n * read-only invocation cannot write key material to KMS (issue #5950). With\n * `false` and no existing DEK the payload is returned unchanged, exactly as it\n * is when the KMS declines to issue a key.\n */\n async encryptEntityPayload(\n entityId: string,\n payload: Record<string, unknown>,\n tenantId: string | null | undefined,\n organizationId?: string | null,\n options?: { createMissingDek?: boolean }\n ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {\n if (!this.isEnabled()) {\n debug('\u26AA\uFE0F encrypt.skip.disabled', { entityId, tenantId })\n return payload\n }\n const map = await this.getMap({ entityId, tenantId: tenantId ?? null, organizationId: organizationId ?? null })\n if (!map || !map.fields?.length) {\n debug('\u26AA\uFE0F encrypt.skip.no-map', { entityId, tenantId })\n return payload\n }\n const keyId = resolveEncryptionKeyId(entityId, map.keyScope, tenantId)\n const dek = await this.resolveDekForEncrypt(keyId, { createIfMissing: options?.createMissingDek !== false })\n if (!dek) {\n debug('\u26A0\uFE0F encrypt.skip.no-dek', { entityId, tenantId, keyScope: map.keyScope ?? 'tenant' })\n return payload\n }\n debug('\uD83D\uDD12 encrypt_entity', { entityId, tenantId, organizationId, fields: map.fields.length })\n return this.encryptFields(payload, map.fields, dek)\n }\n\n async decryptEntityPayload(\n entityId: string,\n payload: Record<string, unknown>,\n tenantId: string | null | undefined,\n organizationId?: string | null\n ): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {\n if (!isTenantDataEncryptionEnabled()) {\n debug('\u26AA\uFE0F decrypt.skip.disabled', { entityId, tenantId })\n return payload\n }\n const map = await this.getMap({ entityId, tenantId: tenantId ?? null, organizationId: organizationId ?? null })\n if (!map || !map.fields?.length) {\n debug('\u26AA\uFE0F decrypt.skip.no-map', { entityId, tenantId })\n return payload\n }\n const keyId = resolveEncryptionKeyId(entityId, map.keyScope, tenantId)\n const dek = await this.getDek(keyId)\n if (!dek) {\n debug('\u26A0\uFE0F decrypt.skip.no-dek', { entityId, tenantId, keyScope: map.keyScope ?? 'tenant' })\n return payload\n }\n debug('\uD83D\uDD13 decrypt_entity', { entityId, tenantId, organizationId, fields: map.fields.length })\n return this.decryptFields(payload, map.fields, dek)\n }\n}\n"],
|
|
5
|
+
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|
|
6
6
|
"names": ["pending"]
|
|
7
7
|
}
|
package/dist/lib/version.js
CHANGED
package/dist/lib/version.js.map
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"version": 3,
|
|
3
3
|
"sources": ["../../src/lib/version.ts"],
|
|
4
|
-
"sourcesContent": ["// Build-time generated version\nexport const APP_VERSION = '0.7.1-develop.
|
|
4
|
+
"sourcesContent": ["// Build-time generated version\nexport const APP_VERSION = '0.7.1-develop.7175.1.d49ab48ee2';\nexport const appVersion = APP_VERSION;\n"],
|
|
5
5
|
"mappings": "AACO,MAAM,cAAc;AACpB,MAAM,aAAa;",
|
|
6
6
|
"names": []
|
|
7
7
|
}
|
package/package.json
CHANGED
|
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
|
|
1
1
|
{
|
|
2
2
|
"name": "@open-mercato/shared",
|
|
3
|
-
"version": "0.7.1-develop.
|
|
3
|
+
"version": "0.7.1-develop.7175.1.d49ab48ee2",
|
|
4
4
|
"license": "MIT",
|
|
5
5
|
"type": "module",
|
|
6
6
|
"main": "./dist/index.js",
|
|
@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@
|
|
|
113
113
|
"@mikro-orm/core": "^7.1.14",
|
|
114
114
|
"@mikro-orm/decorators": "^7.1.14",
|
|
115
115
|
"@mikro-orm/postgresql": "^7.1.14",
|
|
116
|
-
"@open-mercato/cache": "0.7.1-develop.
|
|
116
|
+
"@open-mercato/cache": "0.7.1-develop.7175.1.d49ab48ee2",
|
|
117
117
|
"@types/html-to-text": "^9.0.4",
|
|
118
118
|
"@types/sanitize-html": "^2.16.1",
|
|
119
119
|
"dotenv": "^17.4.2",
|
|
@@ -174,6 +174,42 @@ describe('TenantDataEncryptionService DEK lifecycle (issue #2746)', () => {
|
|
|
174
174
|
expect((kms.getTenantDek as jest.Mock)).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(2) // expired → re-fetch
|
|
175
175
|
})
|
|
176
176
|
|
|
177
|
+
it('provisions no DEK when the caller opts out, so a preview leaves KMS untouched', async () => {
|
|
178
|
+
const { kms, created } = makeCreatingKms()
|
|
179
|
+
const service = new TenantDataEncryptionService({} as never, { kms })
|
|
180
|
+
jest.spyOn(service, 'isEnabled').mockReturnValue(true)
|
|
181
|
+
;(service as unknown as { getMap: () => Promise<{ entityId: string; fields: { field: string }[] }> }).getMap =
|
|
182
|
+
jest.fn(async () => ({ entityId, fields: [{ field: 'secret' }] }))
|
|
183
|
+
const tenantId = uniqueTenant('no-create')
|
|
184
|
+
|
|
185
|
+
const row = await service.encryptEntityPayload(
|
|
186
|
+
entityId,
|
|
187
|
+
{ secret: 'value' },
|
|
188
|
+
tenantId,
|
|
189
|
+
null,
|
|
190
|
+
{ createMissingDek: false },
|
|
191
|
+
)
|
|
192
|
+
|
|
193
|
+
expect((kms.createTenantDek as jest.Mock)).not.toHaveBeenCalled()
|
|
194
|
+
expect(created).toHaveLength(0)
|
|
195
|
+
expect(row.secret).toBe('value') // returned unchanged, exactly as when the KMS declines a key
|
|
196
|
+
expect(await service.getDek(tenantId)).toBeNull()
|
|
197
|
+
})
|
|
198
|
+
|
|
199
|
+
it('still provisions on the default path so existing write callers are unaffected', async () => {
|
|
200
|
+
const { kms, created } = makeCreatingKms()
|
|
201
|
+
const service = new TenantDataEncryptionService({} as never, { kms })
|
|
202
|
+
jest.spyOn(service, 'isEnabled').mockReturnValue(true)
|
|
203
|
+
;(service as unknown as { getMap: () => Promise<{ entityId: string; fields: { field: string }[] }> }).getMap =
|
|
204
|
+
jest.fn(async () => ({ entityId, fields: [{ field: 'secret' }] }))
|
|
205
|
+
const tenantId = uniqueTenant('default-create')
|
|
206
|
+
|
|
207
|
+
const row = await service.encryptEntityPayload(entityId, { secret: 'value' }, tenantId)
|
|
208
|
+
|
|
209
|
+
expect((kms.createTenantDek as jest.Mock)).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1)
|
|
210
|
+
expect(decryptWithAesGcm(String(row.secret), created[0])).toBe('value')
|
|
211
|
+
})
|
|
212
|
+
|
|
177
213
|
it('invalidateDek clears both the service cache and the KMS cache', async () => {
|
|
178
214
|
const { kms } = makeFetchingKms()
|
|
179
215
|
const kmsInvalidate = jest.fn()
|
|
@@ -134,6 +134,21 @@ function readEncryptedFieldsJson(row: Record<string, unknown>): EncryptedFieldRu
|
|
|
134
134
|
return []
|
|
135
135
|
}
|
|
136
136
|
|
|
137
|
+
/**
|
|
138
|
+
* The KMS key id an encryption map's payloads are sealed under: a system-scoped map
|
|
139
|
+
* uses a per-entity key that exists before any tenant does, everything else uses the
|
|
140
|
+
* tenant's own key. Exported so callers that need to probe key availability without
|
|
141
|
+
* encrypting (the encryption CLIs) derive the same id instead of re-spelling the
|
|
142
|
+
* `system:` convention (#5950).
|
|
143
|
+
*/
|
|
144
|
+
export function resolveEncryptionKeyId(
|
|
145
|
+
entityId: string,
|
|
146
|
+
keyScope: EncryptionKeyScope | undefined,
|
|
147
|
+
tenantId: string | null | undefined
|
|
148
|
+
): string | null {
|
|
149
|
+
return keyScope === 'system' ? `system:${entityId}` : tenantId ?? null
|
|
150
|
+
}
|
|
151
|
+
|
|
137
152
|
function getSqlConnection(em: EntityManager): SqlConnection | null {
|
|
138
153
|
const source = em as { getConnection?: () => unknown }
|
|
139
154
|
const conn = source.getConnection?.()
|
|
@@ -198,9 +213,23 @@ export class TenantDataEncryptionService {
|
|
|
198
213
|
return dek
|
|
199
214
|
}
|
|
200
215
|
|
|
201
|
-
|
|
216
|
+
/**
|
|
217
|
+
* Resolves the DEK an encrypt call should seal under, provisioning one when the
|
|
218
|
+
* tenant has none yet.
|
|
219
|
+
*
|
|
220
|
+
* Provisioning writes real key material to the KMS/Vault backend, so it is a
|
|
221
|
+
* state change — not a cache fill. Callers whose intent is only to preview or
|
|
222
|
+
* check ("would this row be encrypted?") pass `createIfMissing: false` to get a
|
|
223
|
+
* `null` instead, leaving KMS untouched (issue #5950). The default stays `true`
|
|
224
|
+
* so every existing write path keeps provisioning on first use.
|
|
225
|
+
*/
|
|
226
|
+
private async resolveDekForEncrypt(
|
|
227
|
+
tenantId: string | null,
|
|
228
|
+
options?: { createIfMissing?: boolean }
|
|
229
|
+
): Promise<TenantDek | null> {
|
|
202
230
|
const existing = await this.getDek(tenantId)
|
|
203
231
|
if (existing || !tenantId) return existing ?? null
|
|
232
|
+
if (options?.createIfMissing === false) return null
|
|
204
233
|
if (typeof this.kms.createTenantDek !== 'function') return existing ?? null
|
|
205
234
|
// Dedupe concurrent first-time creation within this process so two callers
|
|
206
235
|
// can't each generate a distinct DEK and overwrite one another (#2746).
|
|
@@ -455,11 +484,22 @@ export class TenantDataEncryptionService {
|
|
|
455
484
|
return clone
|
|
456
485
|
}
|
|
457
486
|
|
|
487
|
+
/**
|
|
488
|
+
* Encrypts the fields an entity's encryption map covers.
|
|
489
|
+
*
|
|
490
|
+
* `options.createMissingDek` (default `true`) controls whether a tenant without
|
|
491
|
+
* a DEK gets one provisioned as a side effect. Preview/check callers — most
|
|
492
|
+
* notably `mercato entities rotate-encryption-key --dry-run` — pass `false` so a
|
|
493
|
+
* read-only invocation cannot write key material to KMS (issue #5950). With
|
|
494
|
+
* `false` and no existing DEK the payload is returned unchanged, exactly as it
|
|
495
|
+
* is when the KMS declines to issue a key.
|
|
496
|
+
*/
|
|
458
497
|
async encryptEntityPayload(
|
|
459
498
|
entityId: string,
|
|
460
499
|
payload: Record<string, unknown>,
|
|
461
500
|
tenantId: string | null | undefined,
|
|
462
|
-
organizationId?: string | null
|
|
501
|
+
organizationId?: string | null,
|
|
502
|
+
options?: { createMissingDek?: boolean }
|
|
463
503
|
): Promise<Record<string, unknown>> {
|
|
464
504
|
if (!this.isEnabled()) {
|
|
465
505
|
debug('⚪️ encrypt.skip.disabled', { entityId, tenantId })
|
|
@@ -470,8 +510,8 @@ export class TenantDataEncryptionService {
|
|
|
470
510
|
debug('⚪️ encrypt.skip.no-map', { entityId, tenantId })
|
|
471
511
|
return payload
|
|
472
512
|
}
|
|
473
|
-
const keyId = map.keyScope
|
|
474
|
-
const dek = await this.resolveDekForEncrypt(keyId)
|
|
513
|
+
const keyId = resolveEncryptionKeyId(entityId, map.keyScope, tenantId)
|
|
514
|
+
const dek = await this.resolveDekForEncrypt(keyId, { createIfMissing: options?.createMissingDek !== false })
|
|
475
515
|
if (!dek) {
|
|
476
516
|
debug('⚠️ encrypt.skip.no-dek', { entityId, tenantId, keyScope: map.keyScope ?? 'tenant' })
|
|
477
517
|
return payload
|
|
@@ -495,7 +535,7 @@ export class TenantDataEncryptionService {
|
|
|
495
535
|
debug('⚪️ decrypt.skip.no-map', { entityId, tenantId })
|
|
496
536
|
return payload
|
|
497
537
|
}
|
|
498
|
-
const keyId = map.keyScope
|
|
538
|
+
const keyId = resolveEncryptionKeyId(entityId, map.keyScope, tenantId)
|
|
499
539
|
const dek = await this.getDek(keyId)
|
|
500
540
|
if (!dek) {
|
|
501
541
|
debug('⚠️ decrypt.skip.no-dek', { entityId, tenantId, keyScope: map.keyScope ?? 'tenant' })
|