@open-mercato/core 0.7.1-develop.7105.1.0d2f4c6651 → 0.7.1-develop.7106.1.53fe9dd1b1

package/dist/modules/auth/api/users/acl/route.js

@@ -245,7 +245,7 @@ async function PUT(req) {
     return NextResponse.json({
       error: translate(
         "auth.acl.organizationWarning",
-        "Organization restrictions are saved only when at least one feature override is selected. Add a feature or enable a module wildcard before saving."
+        "Organization restrictions require at least one feature override. Add a feature or module wildcard, or clear the organization scope before saving."
       )
     }, { status: 400 });
   }
@@ -328,7 +328,7 @@ const openApi = {
     },
     PUT: {
       summary: "Update user ACL",
-      description: "Updates a per-user ACL override. Omitted super admin, feature, and organization fields preserve their stored values. An organization-scoped non-super-admin override requires at least one feature grant.",
+      description: "Updates a per-user ACL override. Omitted super admin, feature, and organization fields preserve their stored values. Authorization evaluates the merged ACL, so a partial request returns 403 when a preserved grant is outside the actor's grantable ACL. An organization-scoped non-super-admin override requires at least one feature grant.",
       requestBody: {
         contentType: "application/json",
         schema: putSchema

package/dist/modules/auth/api/users/acl/route.js.map

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
 {
   "version": 3,
   "sources": ["../../../../../../src/modules/auth/api/users/acl/route.ts"],
-  "sourcesContent": ["import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'\nimport { z } from 'zod'\nimport type { OpenApiRouteDoc } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/openapi'\nimport { getAuthFromRequest, type AuthContext } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/auth/server'\nimport { createRequestContainer } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/di/container'\nimport { logCrudAccess } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/crud/factory'\nimport { forbidden, isCrudHttpError } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/crud/errors'\nimport { enforceCommandOptimisticLockWithGuards } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/crud/optimistic-lock-command'\nimport { resolveTranslations } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/i18n/server'\nimport type { CommandBus, CommandRuntimeContext } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/commands'\nimport { User, UserAcl } from '@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/data/entities'\nimport {\n  assertActorCanAccessUserTarget,\n  assertActorCanGrantAcl,\n  assertActorCanModifySuperAdminUserTarget,\n  normalizeGrantFeatureList,\n} from '@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/lib/grantChecks'\nimport type { RbacService } from '@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/services/rbacService'\nimport { findOneWithDecryption } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/encryption/find'\nimport type { EntityManager, FilterQuery } from '@mikro-orm/postgresql'\nimport { resolveOrganizationScopeForRequest } from '@open-mercato/core/modules/directory/utils/organizationScope'\nimport {\n  AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID,\n  type AclUpdateResult,\n  type UserAclUpdateInput,\n} from '@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/commands/acl'\n\nconst getSchema = z.object({\n  userId: z.string().uuid(),\n  tenantId: z.string().uuid().optional(),\n})\nconst putSchema = z.object({\n  userId: z.string().uuid(),\n  isSuperAdmin: z.boolean().optional(),\n  features: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  organizations: z.array(z.string()).nullable().optional(),\n  tenantId: z.string().uuid().optional(),\n})\n\nexport const metadata = {\n  GET: { requireAuth: true, requireFeatures: ['auth.acl.manage'] },\n  PUT: { requireAuth: true, requireFeatures: ['auth.acl.manage'] },\n}\n\nconst userAclResponseSchema = z.object({\n  hasCustomAcl: z.boolean(),\n  isSuperAdmin: z.boolean(),\n  features: z.array(z.string()),\n  organizations: z.array(z.string()).nullable(),\n  updatedAt: z.string().nullable(),\n})\n\nconst userAclUpdateResponseSchema = z.object({\n  ok: z.literal(true),\n  sanitized: z.boolean(),\n})\n\nconst userAclErrorSchema = z.object({ error: z.string() })\n\ntype TenantResolution = { tenantId: string | null } | { error: NextResponse }\n\n/**\n * The single tenant scope both handlers work in. GET and PUT MUST resolve it the\n * same way: the admin user form PUTs the ACL panel's state on every save, so a\n * GET that reads a narrower scope than the PUT writes hands the operator an\n * empty form and turns the next name-only edit into a silent revocation, with no\n * `updatedAt` to arm the optimistic lock against it.\n *\n * `user_acls.tenant_id` is NOT NULL while `users.tenant_id` is nullable, so a\n * global account legitimately signs in with `auth.tenantId === null` and the\n * scope has to come from the target user instead. That fallback is reserved for\n * a super admin: for anyone else it would let the target pick the scope its own\n * access is then checked against, and it decrypts a possibly foreign user ahead\n * of every guard. A tenant-less non-super-admin therefore resolves to `null`,\n * which reads as \"no override\" and refuses to write \u2014 the behaviour that held\n * before this route resolved a scope at all. The read is also skipped whenever a\n * tenant is already known.\n *\n * An explicit `tenantId` wins, mirroring the role ACL route (additive there and\n * here; no caller sends it yet) \u2014 but only for a super admin or for the actor's\n * own tenant, so it cannot widen anyone's reach. The result is that for a\n * non-super-admin the resolved scope is always the actor's own.\n */\nasync function resolveAclTenantId(args: {\n  em: EntityManager\n  auth: NonNullable<AuthContext>\n  actorIsSuperAdmin: boolean\n  userId: string\n  requestedTenantId?: string\n}): Promise<TenantResolution> {\n  const authTenantId = args.auth.tenantId ?? null\n  if (args.requestedTenantId && args.requestedTenantId !== authTenantId && !args.actorIsSuperAdmin) {\n    return { error: NextResponse.json({ error: 'Forbidden' }, { status: 403 }) }\n  }\n  const known = args.requestedTenantId ?? authTenantId\n  if (known) return { tenantId: known }\n  if (!args.actorIsSuperAdmin) return { tenantId: null }\n  const targetUser = await findOneWithDecryption(\n    args.em,\n    User,\n    { id: args.userId } as FilterQuery<User>,\n    {},\n    { tenantId: null, organizationId: args.auth.orgId ?? null },\n  )\n  return { tenantId: targetUser?.tenantId ? String(targetUser.tenantId) : null }\n}\n\nexport async function GET(req: Request) {\n  const auth = await getAuthFromRequest(req)\n  if (!auth) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })\n  const url = new URL(req.url)\n  const parsed = getSchema.safeParse({\n    userId: url.searchParams.get('userId'),\n    tenantId: url.searchParams.get('tenantId') || undefined,\n  })\n  if (!parsed.success) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid input' }, { status: 400 })\n  const container = await createRequestContainer()\n  const em = container.resolve('em') as any\n  const rbacService = container.resolve('rbacService') as any\n  // Every grant check is answered in the actor's own scope, never in the scope\n  // resolved for the record: passing the resolved one would ask a foreign tenant\n  // whether this caller may act there, and for a tenant-less actor \u2014 whose scope\n  // comes from the target \u2014 it would compare the target against itself.\n  const actorTenantId = auth.tenantId ?? null\n  const actorAcl = auth.sub\n    ? await rbacService.loadAcl(auth.sub, { tenantId: actorTenantId, organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null })\n    : null\n  const actorIsSuperAdmin = !!actorAcl?.isSuperAdmin\n\n  const resolution = await resolveAclTenantId({\n    em: em as EntityManager,\n    auth,\n    actorIsSuperAdmin,\n    userId: parsed.data.userId,\n    requestedTenantId: parsed.data.tenantId,\n  })\n  if ('error' in resolution) return resolution.error\n  // An unresolvable scope reads as \"no override\", which is what PUT then refuses\n  // to write (`Tenant required`) \u2014 so the pair still cannot destroy a row.\n  const tenantId = resolution.tenantId\n\n  if (!actorIsSuperAdmin && auth.sub) {\n    try {\n      await assertActorCanModifySuperAdminUserTarget({\n        em: em as EntityManager,\n        rbacService: rbacService as RbacService,\n        actorUserId: auth.sub,\n        tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n        targetUserId: parsed.data.userId,\n        actorIsSuperAdmin: false,\n      })\n      await assertActorCanAccessUserTarget({\n        em: em as EntityManager,\n        rbacService: rbacService as RbacService,\n        actorUserId: auth.sub,\n        tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n        targetUserId: parsed.data.userId,\n        actorIsSuperAdmin: false,\n        organizationScope: await resolveOrganizationScopeForRequest({\n          container,\n          auth,\n          request: req,\n          tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        }),\n      })\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (isCrudHttpError(err)) return NextResponse.json(err.body, { status: err.status })\n      throw err\n    }\n  }\n  const acl = tenantId\n    ? await em.findOne(UserAcl, { user: parsed.data.userId as any, tenantId })\n    : null\n  const response = acl\n    ? {\n        hasCustomAcl: true,\n        isSuperAdmin: !!acl.isSuperAdmin,\n        features: Array.isArray(acl.featuresJson) ? acl.featuresJson : [],\n        organizations: Array.isArray(acl.organizationsJson) ? acl.organizationsJson : null,\n        updatedAt: acl.updatedAt instanceof Date ? acl.updatedAt.toISOString() : null,\n      }\n    : { hasCustomAcl: false, isSuperAdmin: false, features: [], organizations: null, updatedAt: null }\n\n  await logCrudAccess({\n    container,\n    auth,\n    request: req,\n    items: [{ id: parsed.data.userId, ...response }],\n    idField: 'id',\n    resourceKind: 'auth.user_acl',\n    organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n    tenantId,\n    query: { userId: parsed.data.userId, tenantId },\n    accessType: 'read:item',\n  })\n\n  return NextResponse.json(response)\n}\n\nexport async function PUT(req: Request) {\n  const auth = await getAuthFromRequest(req)\n  if (!auth) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })\n  const body = await req.json().catch(() => ({}))\n  const parsed = putSchema.safeParse(body)\n  if (!parsed.success) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid input' }, { status: 400 })\n  const container = await createRequestContainer()\n  const em = container.resolve('em') as any\n  const rbacService = container.resolve('rbacService') as any\n\n  // Every grant check is answered in the actor's own scope, never in the scope\n  // resolved for the record: passing the resolved one would ask a foreign tenant\n  // whether this caller may act there, and for a tenant-less actor \u2014 whose scope\n  // comes from the target \u2014 it would compare the target against itself.\n  const actorTenantId = auth.tenantId ?? null\n  const actorAcl = auth.sub\n    ? await rbacService.loadAcl(auth.sub, { tenantId: actorTenantId, organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null })\n    : null\n  const actorIsSuperAdmin = !!actorAcl?.isSuperAdmin\n\n  // The scope the row is read and written in. `auth.tenantId` is `string | null`\n  // \u2014 never `undefined`, since every producer normalizes with `?? null` \u2014 so the\n  // pre-fix lookup ran `tenant_id IS NULL` against a NOT NULL column: it matched\n  // no row, leaving create/update to fail the NOT NULL constraint and clear to\n  // no-op silently. Nothing cross-tenant was ever matched; the fix turns a 500\n  // into a working, correctly scoped write.\n  const resolution = await resolveAclTenantId({\n    em: em as EntityManager,\n    auth,\n    actorIsSuperAdmin,\n    userId: parsed.data.userId,\n    requestedTenantId: parsed.data.tenantId,\n  })\n  if ('error' in resolution) return resolution.error\n  const tenantId = resolution.tenantId\n  if (!tenantId) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Tenant required' }, { status: 400 })\n\n  if (!actorIsSuperAdmin && auth.sub) {\n    try {\n      await assertActorCanModifySuperAdminUserTarget({\n        em: em as EntityManager,\n        rbacService: rbacService as RbacService,\n        actorUserId: auth.sub,\n        tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n        targetUserId: parsed.data.userId,\n        actorIsSuperAdmin: false,\n      })\n      await assertActorCanAccessUserTarget({\n        em: em as EntityManager,\n        rbacService: rbacService as RbacService,\n        actorUserId: auth.sub,\n        tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n        targetUserId: parsed.data.userId,\n        actorIsSuperAdmin: false,\n        organizationScope: await resolveOrganizationScopeForRequest({\n          container,\n          auth,\n          request: req,\n          tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        }),\n      })\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (isCrudHttpError(err)) return NextResponse.json(err.body, { status: err.status })\n      throw err\n    }\n  }\n\n  const acl = await em.findOne(UserAcl, { user: parsed.data.userId as any, tenantId })\n  // Optimistic lock: refuse a stale per-user ACL overwrite so concurrent edits\n  // cannot silently clobber each other (#2055). Strictly additive \u2014 a no-op when\n  // the client sends no expected-version header; skipped when no ACL row exists.\n  if (acl) {\n    try {\n      await enforceCommandOptimisticLockWithGuards(container, {\n        resourceKind: 'auth.user_acl',\n        resourceId: acl.id,\n        current: acl.updatedAt ?? null,\n        request: req,\n      })\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (isCrudHttpError(err)) return NextResponse.json(err.body, { status: err.status })\n      throw err\n    }\n  }\n  const existingIsSuperAdmin = acl ? !!acl.isSuperAdmin : false\n  const existingFeatures = acl ? normalizeGrantFeatureList(acl.featuresJson) : []\n  const existingOrganizations = acl ? normalizeOrganizations(acl.organizationsJson) : null\n\n  // A per-user ACL is an absolute override, so an omitted dimension must keep\n  // its stored value. Normalizing an omitted `features` to `[]` or an omitted\n  // `organizations` to `null` turned a single-dimension edit into a silent\n  // clear, deleting the row and widening the user back to their full role.\n  const featuresWereProvided = parsed.data.features !== undefined\n  const requestedFeatures = featuresWereProvided\n    ? normalizeGrantFeatureList(parsed.data.features)\n    : existingFeatures\n  const requestedOrganizations = parsed.data.organizations === undefined\n    ? existingOrganizations\n    : normalizeOrganizations(parsed.data.organizations)\n\n  const requestedIsSuperAdmin = parsed.data.isSuperAdmin ?? existingIsSuperAdmin\n\n  try {\n    await assertActorCanGrantAcl({\n      em: em as EntityManager,\n      rbacService: rbacService as RbacService,\n      actorUserId: auth.sub,\n      tenantId: actorTenantId,\n      organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n      isSuperAdmin: requestedIsSuperAdmin,\n      features: requestedFeatures,\n      organizations: requestedOrganizations,\n    })\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (isCrudHttpError(err)) return NextResponse.json(err.body, { status: err.status })\n    throw err\n  }\n\n  // An omitted feature list is already stored and in effect. Re-sanitizing it\n  // during an unrelated organization edit would silently revoke grants the\n  // actor did not touch, so only an explicitly submitted list is sanitized.\n  const effectiveFeatures = actorIsSuperAdmin || !featuresWereProvided\n    ? requestedFeatures\n    : sanitizeTenantFeatures(requestedFeatures)\n\n  let effectiveIsSuperAdmin = requestedIsSuperAdmin\n\n  if (!actorIsSuperAdmin) {\n    if (requestedIsSuperAdmin && !existingIsSuperAdmin) {\n      throw forbidden('Only super administrators can grant super admin access.')\n    }\n    if (existingIsSuperAdmin && requestedIsSuperAdmin === false) {\n      effectiveIsSuperAdmin = false\n    } else {\n      effectiveIsSuperAdmin = existingIsSuperAdmin\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Retaining an organization-only override with no features would revoke every\n  // role-granted feature instead of narrowing the role. Refuse that state rather\n  // than persisting it or silently dropping the organization scope.\n  if (!effectiveIsSuperAdmin && effectiveFeatures.length === 0 && hasOrganizationRestriction(requestedOrganizations)) {\n    const { translate } = await resolveTranslations()\n    return NextResponse.json({\n      error: translate(\n        'auth.acl.organizationWarning',\n        'Organization restrictions are saved only when at least one feature override is selected. Add a feature or enable a module wildcard before saving.',\n      ),\n    }, { status: 400 })\n  }\n\n  // An unrestricted organization list carries no override on its own, and the guard\n  // above already refused the restricted-but-featureless case, so the override is\n  // custom exactly when it grants super admin or at least one feature.\n  const hasCustomAcl = effectiveIsSuperAdmin || effectiveFeatures.length > 0\n\n  // What the caller asked for, handed to the command only when it exceeds what\n  // is about to be written. `assertActorCanGrantAcl` above refuses the blatant\n  // escalations; what reaches the strip is quieter \u2014 a restricted grant the\n  // actor does hold \u2014 and it leaves before/after identical, so the audit entry\n  // would otherwise be indistinguishable from a no-op and skipped as one.\n  //\n  // Features are the only axis that can be trimmed. A super-admin request is\n  // either honoured or refused outright above, never silently downgraded, so\n  // comparing the two flags here would be dead weight.\n  //\n  // Deliberately independent of the `sanitized` response flag below:\n  // `hasRestrictedChanges` stays false when the trimmed result equals the\n  // existing ACL, to avoid nagging the user about a save that changed nothing \u2014\n  // but that is precisely an attempt the trail must keep.\n  const strippedFeatures = requestedFeatures.filter((feature) => !effectiveFeatures.includes(feature))\n\n  // Route the write through the command bus so the permission change lands in\n  // the action log. The command owns the transactional write (or removal) and\n  // the RBAC cache invalidation that used to live here.\n  const commandBus = container.resolve('commandBus') as CommandBus\n  // A tenant-less actor edits an override in the target user's tenant, so their\n  // organization belongs to a tenant the entry is not about. The bus resolves\n  // the log row's organization as `metadata.organizationId ??\n  // ctx.selectedOrganizationId ?? ctx.auth.orgId` \u2014 a `??` chain, so the\n  // handler's `resolveOrganizationId` cannot express \"explicitly no\n  // organization\" and the actor's would be restored. Strip it from the context\n  // instead, exactly as the roles route does: otherwise the entry carries a\n  // (target tenant, foreign organization) pair that `ActionLogService` \u2014 which\n  // filters organization with strict equality \u2014 can never surface for anyone.\n  const isForeignTenant = tenantId !== (auth.tenantId ?? null)\n  const actorOrgId = isForeignTenant ? null : auth.orgId ?? null\n  const commandCtx: CommandRuntimeContext = {\n    container,\n    auth: isForeignTenant ? { ...auth, orgId: null } : auth,\n    organizationScope: null,\n    selectedOrganizationId: actorOrgId,\n    organizationIds: actorOrgId ? [actorOrgId] : null,\n    request: req,\n  }\n  await commandBus.execute<UserAclUpdateInput, AclUpdateResult>(AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID, {\n    input: {\n      userId: parsed.data.userId,\n      tenantId,\n      isSuperAdmin: effectiveIsSuperAdmin,\n      features: effectiveFeatures,\n      organizations: requestedOrganizations,\n      clear: !hasCustomAcl,\n      requested: strippedFeatures.length ? { features: requestedFeatures } : null,\n    },\n    ctx: commandCtx,\n  })\n\n  return NextResponse.json({\n    ok: true,\n    sanitized: !actorIsSuperAdmin && (hasRestrictedChanges(requestedFeatures, effectiveFeatures, existingFeatures) || requestedIsSuperAdmin !== effectiveIsSuperAdmin),\n  })\n}\n\nfunction normalizeOrganizations(organizations: unknown): string[] | null {\n  if (!Array.isArray(organizations)) return null\n  return normalizeGrantFeatureList(organizations)\n}\n\n// Whether the caller expressed an intentional narrowing. `null` and `__all__`\n// are the two documented ways to say \"every organization\"; an empty list is the\n// editor's \"no organization picked\" state (\"Empty = all organizations\"), which\n// is not a restriction an administrator chose. Only a concrete list narrows, so\n// only a concrete list has to justify itself against the feature grant below.\nfunction hasOrganizationRestriction(organizations: string[] | null): boolean {\n  if (!organizations || organizations.length === 0) return false\n  return !organizations.includes('__all__')\n}\n\nfunction sanitizeTenantFeatures(features: string[]): string[] {\n  return features.filter((feature) => !isTenantRestrictedFeature(feature))\n}\n\nfunction isTenantRestrictedFeature(feature: string): boolean {\n  if (feature === '*' || feature === 'directory.*') return true\n  if (feature.startsWith('directory.tenants')) return true\n  return false\n}\n\nfunction hasRestrictedChanges(requested: string[], effective: string[], existing: string[]): boolean {\n  if (requested.length === effective.length) return false\n  const effectiveSet = new Set(effective)\n  const existingSet = new Set(existing)\n  // If the effective set matches existing, we only trimmed restricted duplicates and should not report\n  if (effectiveSet.size === existingSet.size) {\n    let identical = true\n    for (const value of effectiveSet) {\n      if (!existingSet.has(value)) {\n        identical = false\n        break\n      }\n    }\n    if (identical) return false\n  }\n  return true\n}\n\nexport const openApi: OpenApiRouteDoc = {\n  tag: 'Authentication & Accounts',\n  summary: 'User ACL management',\n  methods: {\n    GET: {\n      summary: 'Fetch user ACL',\n      description: 'Returns custom ACL overrides for a user, scoped to the requested tenant when supplied and to the actor or target user tenant otherwise.',\n      query: getSchema,\n      responses: [\n        { status: 200, description: 'User ACL entry', schema: userAclResponseSchema },\n        { status: 400, description: 'Invalid user id', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n        { status: 401, description: 'Unauthorized', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n        { status: 403, description: 'Insufficient privileges for the requested tenant scope', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n      ],\n    },\n    PUT: {\n      summary: 'Update user ACL',\n      description: 'Updates a per-user ACL override. Omitted super admin, feature, and organization fields preserve their stored values. An organization-scoped non-super-admin override requires at least one feature grant.',\n      requestBody: {\n        contentType: 'application/json',\n        schema: putSchema,\n      },\n      responses: [\n        { status: 200, description: 'User ACL updated', schema: userAclUpdateResponseSchema },\n        { status: 400, description: 'Invalid payload or unresolved tenant scope', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n        { status: 401, description: 'Unauthorized', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n        { status: 403, description: 'Insufficient privileges to modify ACL', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n      ],\n    },\n  },\n}\n"],
+  "sourcesContent": ["import { NextResponse } from 'next/server'\nimport { z } from 'zod'\nimport type { OpenApiRouteDoc } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/openapi'\nimport { getAuthFromRequest, type AuthContext } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/auth/server'\nimport { createRequestContainer } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/di/container'\nimport { logCrudAccess } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/crud/factory'\nimport { forbidden, isCrudHttpError } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/crud/errors'\nimport { enforceCommandOptimisticLockWithGuards } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/crud/optimistic-lock-command'\nimport { resolveTranslations } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/i18n/server'\nimport type { CommandBus, CommandRuntimeContext } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/commands'\nimport { User, UserAcl } from '@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/data/entities'\nimport {\n  assertActorCanAccessUserTarget,\n  assertActorCanGrantAcl,\n  assertActorCanModifySuperAdminUserTarget,\n  normalizeGrantFeatureList,\n} from '@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/lib/grantChecks'\nimport type { RbacService } from '@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/services/rbacService'\nimport { findOneWithDecryption } from '@open-mercato/shared/lib/encryption/find'\nimport type { EntityManager, FilterQuery } from '@mikro-orm/postgresql'\nimport { resolveOrganizationScopeForRequest } from '@open-mercato/core/modules/directory/utils/organizationScope'\nimport {\n  AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID,\n  type AclUpdateResult,\n  type UserAclUpdateInput,\n} from '@open-mercato/core/modules/auth/commands/acl'\n\nconst getSchema = z.object({\n  userId: z.string().uuid(),\n  tenantId: z.string().uuid().optional(),\n})\nconst putSchema = z.object({\n  userId: z.string().uuid(),\n  isSuperAdmin: z.boolean().optional(),\n  features: z.array(z.string()).optional(),\n  organizations: z.array(z.string()).nullable().optional(),\n  tenantId: z.string().uuid().optional(),\n})\n\nexport const metadata = {\n  GET: { requireAuth: true, requireFeatures: ['auth.acl.manage'] },\n  PUT: { requireAuth: true, requireFeatures: ['auth.acl.manage'] },\n}\n\nconst userAclResponseSchema = z.object({\n  hasCustomAcl: z.boolean(),\n  isSuperAdmin: z.boolean(),\n  features: z.array(z.string()),\n  organizations: z.array(z.string()).nullable(),\n  updatedAt: z.string().nullable(),\n})\n\nconst userAclUpdateResponseSchema = z.object({\n  ok: z.literal(true),\n  sanitized: z.boolean(),\n})\n\nconst userAclErrorSchema = z.object({ error: z.string() })\n\ntype TenantResolution = { tenantId: string | null } | { error: NextResponse }\n\n/**\n * The single tenant scope both handlers work in. GET and PUT MUST resolve it the\n * same way: the admin user form PUTs the ACL panel's state on every save, so a\n * GET that reads a narrower scope than the PUT writes hands the operator an\n * empty form and turns the next name-only edit into a silent revocation, with no\n * `updatedAt` to arm the optimistic lock against it.\n *\n * `user_acls.tenant_id` is NOT NULL while `users.tenant_id` is nullable, so a\n * global account legitimately signs in with `auth.tenantId === null` and the\n * scope has to come from the target user instead. That fallback is reserved for\n * a super admin: for anyone else it would let the target pick the scope its own\n * access is then checked against, and it decrypts a possibly foreign user ahead\n * of every guard. A tenant-less non-super-admin therefore resolves to `null`,\n * which reads as \"no override\" and refuses to write \u2014 the behaviour that held\n * before this route resolved a scope at all. The read is also skipped whenever a\n * tenant is already known.\n *\n * An explicit `tenantId` wins, mirroring the role ACL route (additive there and\n * here; no caller sends it yet) \u2014 but only for a super admin or for the actor's\n * own tenant, so it cannot widen anyone's reach. The result is that for a\n * non-super-admin the resolved scope is always the actor's own.\n */\nasync function resolveAclTenantId(args: {\n  em: EntityManager\n  auth: NonNullable<AuthContext>\n  actorIsSuperAdmin: boolean\n  userId: string\n  requestedTenantId?: string\n}): Promise<TenantResolution> {\n  const authTenantId = args.auth.tenantId ?? null\n  if (args.requestedTenantId && args.requestedTenantId !== authTenantId && !args.actorIsSuperAdmin) {\n    return { error: NextResponse.json({ error: 'Forbidden' }, { status: 403 }) }\n  }\n  const known = args.requestedTenantId ?? authTenantId\n  if (known) return { tenantId: known }\n  if (!args.actorIsSuperAdmin) return { tenantId: null }\n  const targetUser = await findOneWithDecryption(\n    args.em,\n    User,\n    { id: args.userId } as FilterQuery<User>,\n    {},\n    { tenantId: null, organizationId: args.auth.orgId ?? null },\n  )\n  return { tenantId: targetUser?.tenantId ? String(targetUser.tenantId) : null }\n}\n\nexport async function GET(req: Request) {\n  const auth = await getAuthFromRequest(req)\n  if (!auth) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })\n  const url = new URL(req.url)\n  const parsed = getSchema.safeParse({\n    userId: url.searchParams.get('userId'),\n    tenantId: url.searchParams.get('tenantId') || undefined,\n  })\n  if (!parsed.success) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid input' }, { status: 400 })\n  const container = await createRequestContainer()\n  const em = container.resolve('em') as any\n  const rbacService = container.resolve('rbacService') as any\n  // Every grant check is answered in the actor's own scope, never in the scope\n  // resolved for the record: passing the resolved one would ask a foreign tenant\n  // whether this caller may act there, and for a tenant-less actor \u2014 whose scope\n  // comes from the target \u2014 it would compare the target against itself.\n  const actorTenantId = auth.tenantId ?? null\n  const actorAcl = auth.sub\n    ? await rbacService.loadAcl(auth.sub, { tenantId: actorTenantId, organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null })\n    : null\n  const actorIsSuperAdmin = !!actorAcl?.isSuperAdmin\n\n  const resolution = await resolveAclTenantId({\n    em: em as EntityManager,\n    auth,\n    actorIsSuperAdmin,\n    userId: parsed.data.userId,\n    requestedTenantId: parsed.data.tenantId,\n  })\n  if ('error' in resolution) return resolution.error\n  // An unresolvable scope reads as \"no override\", which is what PUT then refuses\n  // to write (`Tenant required`) \u2014 so the pair still cannot destroy a row.\n  const tenantId = resolution.tenantId\n\n  if (!actorIsSuperAdmin && auth.sub) {\n    try {\n      await assertActorCanModifySuperAdminUserTarget({\n        em: em as EntityManager,\n        rbacService: rbacService as RbacService,\n        actorUserId: auth.sub,\n        tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n        targetUserId: parsed.data.userId,\n        actorIsSuperAdmin: false,\n      })\n      await assertActorCanAccessUserTarget({\n        em: em as EntityManager,\n        rbacService: rbacService as RbacService,\n        actorUserId: auth.sub,\n        tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n        targetUserId: parsed.data.userId,\n        actorIsSuperAdmin: false,\n        organizationScope: await resolveOrganizationScopeForRequest({\n          container,\n          auth,\n          request: req,\n          tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        }),\n      })\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (isCrudHttpError(err)) return NextResponse.json(err.body, { status: err.status })\n      throw err\n    }\n  }\n  const acl = tenantId\n    ? await em.findOne(UserAcl, { user: parsed.data.userId as any, tenantId })\n    : null\n  const response = acl\n    ? {\n        hasCustomAcl: true,\n        isSuperAdmin: !!acl.isSuperAdmin,\n        features: Array.isArray(acl.featuresJson) ? acl.featuresJson : [],\n        organizations: Array.isArray(acl.organizationsJson) ? acl.organizationsJson : null,\n        updatedAt: acl.updatedAt instanceof Date ? acl.updatedAt.toISOString() : null,\n      }\n    : { hasCustomAcl: false, isSuperAdmin: false, features: [], organizations: null, updatedAt: null }\n\n  await logCrudAccess({\n    container,\n    auth,\n    request: req,\n    items: [{ id: parsed.data.userId, ...response }],\n    idField: 'id',\n    resourceKind: 'auth.user_acl',\n    organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n    tenantId,\n    query: { userId: parsed.data.userId, tenantId },\n    accessType: 'read:item',\n  })\n\n  return NextResponse.json(response)\n}\n\nexport async function PUT(req: Request) {\n  const auth = await getAuthFromRequest(req)\n  if (!auth) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Unauthorized' }, { status: 401 })\n  const body = await req.json().catch(() => ({}))\n  const parsed = putSchema.safeParse(body)\n  if (!parsed.success) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Invalid input' }, { status: 400 })\n  const container = await createRequestContainer()\n  const em = container.resolve('em') as any\n  const rbacService = container.resolve('rbacService') as any\n\n  // Every grant check is answered in the actor's own scope, never in the scope\n  // resolved for the record: passing the resolved one would ask a foreign tenant\n  // whether this caller may act there, and for a tenant-less actor \u2014 whose scope\n  // comes from the target \u2014 it would compare the target against itself.\n  const actorTenantId = auth.tenantId ?? null\n  const actorAcl = auth.sub\n    ? await rbacService.loadAcl(auth.sub, { tenantId: actorTenantId, organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null })\n    : null\n  const actorIsSuperAdmin = !!actorAcl?.isSuperAdmin\n\n  // The scope the row is read and written in. `auth.tenantId` is `string | null`\n  // \u2014 never `undefined`, since every producer normalizes with `?? null` \u2014 so the\n  // pre-fix lookup ran `tenant_id IS NULL` against a NOT NULL column: it matched\n  // no row, leaving create/update to fail the NOT NULL constraint and clear to\n  // no-op silently. Nothing cross-tenant was ever matched; the fix turns a 500\n  // into a working, correctly scoped write.\n  const resolution = await resolveAclTenantId({\n    em: em as EntityManager,\n    auth,\n    actorIsSuperAdmin,\n    userId: parsed.data.userId,\n    requestedTenantId: parsed.data.tenantId,\n  })\n  if ('error' in resolution) return resolution.error\n  const tenantId = resolution.tenantId\n  if (!tenantId) return NextResponse.json({ error: 'Tenant required' }, { status: 400 })\n\n  if (!actorIsSuperAdmin && auth.sub) {\n    try {\n      await assertActorCanModifySuperAdminUserTarget({\n        em: em as EntityManager,\n        rbacService: rbacService as RbacService,\n        actorUserId: auth.sub,\n        tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n        targetUserId: parsed.data.userId,\n        actorIsSuperAdmin: false,\n      })\n      await assertActorCanAccessUserTarget({\n        em: em as EntityManager,\n        rbacService: rbacService as RbacService,\n        actorUserId: auth.sub,\n        tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n        targetUserId: parsed.data.userId,\n        actorIsSuperAdmin: false,\n        organizationScope: await resolveOrganizationScopeForRequest({\n          container,\n          auth,\n          request: req,\n          tenantId: actorTenantId,\n        }),\n      })\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (isCrudHttpError(err)) return NextResponse.json(err.body, { status: err.status })\n      throw err\n    }\n  }\n\n  const acl = await em.findOne(UserAcl, { user: parsed.data.userId as any, tenantId })\n  // Optimistic lock: refuse a stale per-user ACL overwrite so concurrent edits\n  // cannot silently clobber each other (#2055). Strictly additive \u2014 a no-op when\n  // the client sends no expected-version header; skipped when no ACL row exists.\n  if (acl) {\n    try {\n      await enforceCommandOptimisticLockWithGuards(container, {\n        resourceKind: 'auth.user_acl',\n        resourceId: acl.id,\n        current: acl.updatedAt ?? null,\n        request: req,\n      })\n    } catch (err) {\n      if (isCrudHttpError(err)) return NextResponse.json(err.body, { status: err.status })\n      throw err\n    }\n  }\n  const existingIsSuperAdmin = acl ? !!acl.isSuperAdmin : false\n  const existingFeatures = acl ? normalizeGrantFeatureList(acl.featuresJson) : []\n  const existingOrganizations = acl ? normalizeOrganizations(acl.organizationsJson) : null\n\n  // A per-user ACL is an absolute override, so an omitted dimension must keep\n  // its stored value. Normalizing an omitted `features` to `[]` or an omitted\n  // `organizations` to `null` turned a single-dimension edit into a silent\n  // clear, deleting the row and widening the user back to their full role.\n  const featuresWereProvided = parsed.data.features !== undefined\n  const requestedFeatures = featuresWereProvided\n    ? normalizeGrantFeatureList(parsed.data.features)\n    : existingFeatures\n  const requestedOrganizations = parsed.data.organizations === undefined\n    ? existingOrganizations\n    : normalizeOrganizations(parsed.data.organizations)\n\n  const requestedIsSuperAdmin = parsed.data.isSuperAdmin ?? existingIsSuperAdmin\n\n  try {\n    await assertActorCanGrantAcl({\n      em: em as EntityManager,\n      rbacService: rbacService as RbacService,\n      actorUserId: auth.sub,\n      tenantId: actorTenantId,\n      organizationId: auth.orgId ?? null,\n      isSuperAdmin: requestedIsSuperAdmin,\n      features: requestedFeatures,\n      organizations: requestedOrganizations,\n    })\n  } catch (err) {\n    if (isCrudHttpError(err)) return NextResponse.json(err.body, { status: err.status })\n    throw err\n  }\n\n  // An omitted feature list is already stored and in effect. Re-sanitizing it\n  // during an unrelated organization edit would silently revoke grants the\n  // actor did not touch, so only an explicitly submitted list is sanitized.\n  const effectiveFeatures = actorIsSuperAdmin || !featuresWereProvided\n    ? requestedFeatures\n    : sanitizeTenantFeatures(requestedFeatures)\n\n  let effectiveIsSuperAdmin = requestedIsSuperAdmin\n\n  if (!actorIsSuperAdmin) {\n    if (requestedIsSuperAdmin && !existingIsSuperAdmin) {\n      throw forbidden('Only super administrators can grant super admin access.')\n    }\n    if (existingIsSuperAdmin && requestedIsSuperAdmin === false) {\n      effectiveIsSuperAdmin = false\n    } else {\n      effectiveIsSuperAdmin = existingIsSuperAdmin\n    }\n  }\n\n  // Retaining an organization-only override with no features would revoke every\n  // role-granted feature instead of narrowing the role. Refuse that state rather\n  // than persisting it or silently dropping the organization scope.\n  if (!effectiveIsSuperAdmin && effectiveFeatures.length === 0 && hasOrganizationRestriction(requestedOrganizations)) {\n    const { translate } = await resolveTranslations()\n    return NextResponse.json({\n      error: translate(\n        'auth.acl.organizationWarning',\n        'Organization restrictions require at least one feature override. Add a feature or module wildcard, or clear the organization scope before saving.',\n      ),\n    }, { status: 400 })\n  }\n\n  // An unrestricted organization list carries no override on its own, and the guard\n  // above already refused the restricted-but-featureless case, so the override is\n  // custom exactly when it grants super admin or at least one feature.\n  const hasCustomAcl = effectiveIsSuperAdmin || effectiveFeatures.length > 0\n\n  // What the caller asked for, handed to the command only when it exceeds what\n  // is about to be written. `assertActorCanGrantAcl` above refuses the blatant\n  // escalations; what reaches the strip is quieter \u2014 a restricted grant the\n  // actor does hold \u2014 and it leaves before/after identical, so the audit entry\n  // would otherwise be indistinguishable from a no-op and skipped as one.\n  //\n  // Features are the only axis that can be trimmed. A super-admin request is\n  // either honoured or refused outright above, never silently downgraded, so\n  // comparing the two flags here would be dead weight.\n  //\n  // Deliberately independent of the `sanitized` response flag below:\n  // `hasRestrictedChanges` stays false when the trimmed result equals the\n  // existing ACL, to avoid nagging the user about a save that changed nothing \u2014\n  // but that is precisely an attempt the trail must keep.\n  const strippedFeatures = requestedFeatures.filter((feature) => !effectiveFeatures.includes(feature))\n\n  // Route the write through the command bus so the permission change lands in\n  // the action log. The command owns the transactional write (or removal) and\n  // the RBAC cache invalidation that used to live here.\n  const commandBus = container.resolve('commandBus') as CommandBus\n  // A tenant-less actor edits an override in the target user's tenant, so their\n  // organization belongs to a tenant the entry is not about. The bus resolves\n  // the log row's organization as `metadata.organizationId ??\n  // ctx.selectedOrganizationId ?? ctx.auth.orgId` \u2014 a `??` chain, so the\n  // handler's `resolveOrganizationId` cannot express \"explicitly no\n  // organization\" and the actor's would be restored. Strip it from the context\n  // instead, exactly as the roles route does: otherwise the entry carries a\n  // (target tenant, foreign organization) pair that `ActionLogService` \u2014 which\n  // filters organization with strict equality \u2014 can never surface for anyone.\n  const isForeignTenant = tenantId !== (auth.tenantId ?? null)\n  const actorOrgId = isForeignTenant ? null : auth.orgId ?? null\n  const commandCtx: CommandRuntimeContext = {\n    container,\n    auth: isForeignTenant ? { ...auth, orgId: null } : auth,\n    organizationScope: null,\n    selectedOrganizationId: actorOrgId,\n    organizationIds: actorOrgId ? [actorOrgId] : null,\n    request: req,\n  }\n  await commandBus.execute<UserAclUpdateInput, AclUpdateResult>(AUTH_USER_ACL_UPDATE_COMMAND_ID, {\n    input: {\n      userId: parsed.data.userId,\n      tenantId,\n      isSuperAdmin: effectiveIsSuperAdmin,\n      features: effectiveFeatures,\n      organizations: requestedOrganizations,\n      clear: !hasCustomAcl,\n      requested: strippedFeatures.length ? { features: requestedFeatures } : null,\n    },\n    ctx: commandCtx,\n  })\n\n  return NextResponse.json({\n    ok: true,\n    sanitized: !actorIsSuperAdmin && (hasRestrictedChanges(requestedFeatures, effectiveFeatures, existingFeatures) || requestedIsSuperAdmin !== effectiveIsSuperAdmin),\n  })\n}\n\nfunction normalizeOrganizations(organizations: unknown): string[] | null {\n  if (!Array.isArray(organizations)) return null\n  return normalizeGrantFeatureList(organizations)\n}\n\n// Whether the caller expressed an intentional narrowing. `null` and `__all__`\n// are the two documented ways to say \"every organization\"; an empty list is the\n// editor's \"no organization picked\" state (\"Empty = all organizations\"), which\n// is not a restriction an administrator chose. Only a concrete list narrows, so\n// only a concrete list has to justify itself against the feature grant below.\nfunction hasOrganizationRestriction(organizations: string[] | null): boolean {\n  if (!organizations || organizations.length === 0) return false\n  return !organizations.includes('__all__')\n}\n\nfunction sanitizeTenantFeatures(features: string[]): string[] {\n  return features.filter((feature) => !isTenantRestrictedFeature(feature))\n}\n\nfunction isTenantRestrictedFeature(feature: string): boolean {\n  if (feature === '*' || feature === 'directory.*') return true\n  if (feature.startsWith('directory.tenants')) return true\n  return false\n}\n\nfunction hasRestrictedChanges(requested: string[], effective: string[], existing: string[]): boolean {\n  if (requested.length === effective.length) return false\n  const effectiveSet = new Set(effective)\n  const existingSet = new Set(existing)\n  // If the effective set matches existing, we only trimmed restricted duplicates and should not report\n  if (effectiveSet.size === existingSet.size) {\n    let identical = true\n    for (const value of effectiveSet) {\n      if (!existingSet.has(value)) {\n        identical = false\n        break\n      }\n    }\n    if (identical) return false\n  }\n  return true\n}\n\nexport const openApi: OpenApiRouteDoc = {\n  tag: 'Authentication & Accounts',\n  summary: 'User ACL management',\n  methods: {\n    GET: {\n      summary: 'Fetch user ACL',\n      description: 'Returns custom ACL overrides for a user, scoped to the requested tenant when supplied and to the actor or target user tenant otherwise.',\n      query: getSchema,\n      responses: [\n        { status: 200, description: 'User ACL entry', schema: userAclResponseSchema },\n        { status: 400, description: 'Invalid user id', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n        { status: 401, description: 'Unauthorized', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n        { status: 403, description: 'Insufficient privileges for the requested tenant scope', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n      ],\n    },\n    PUT: {\n      summary: 'Update user ACL',\n      description: 'Updates a per-user ACL override. Omitted super admin, feature, and organization fields preserve their stored values. Authorization evaluates the merged ACL, so a partial request returns 403 when a preserved grant is outside the actor\\'s grantable ACL. An organization-scoped non-super-admin override requires at least one feature grant.',\n      requestBody: {\n        contentType: 'application/json',\n        schema: putSchema,\n      },\n      responses: [\n        { status: 200, description: 'User ACL updated', schema: userAclUpdateResponseSchema },\n        { status: 400, description: 'Invalid payload or unresolved tenant scope', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n        { status: 401, description: 'Unauthorized', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n        { status: 403, description: 'Insufficient privileges to modify ACL', schema: userAclErrorSchema },\n      ],\n    },\n  },\n}\n"],
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   "names": []
 }

package/package.json

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 {
   "name": "@open-mercato/core",
-  "version": "0.7.1-develop.7105.1.0d2f4c6651",
+  "version": "0.7.1-develop.7106.1.53fe9dd1b1",
   "license": "MIT",
   "type": "module",
   "main": "./dist/index.js",
@@ -252,16 +252,16 @@
     "zod": "^4.4.3"
   },
   "peerDependencies": {
-    "@open-mercato/ai-assistant": "0.7.1-develop.7105.1.0d2f4c6651",
-    "@open-mercato/shared": "0.7.1-develop.7105.1.0d2f4c6651",
-    "@open-mercato/ui": "0.7.1-develop.7105.1.0d2f4c6651",
+    "@open-mercato/ai-assistant": "0.7.1-develop.7106.1.53fe9dd1b1",
+    "@open-mercato/shared": "0.7.1-develop.7106.1.53fe9dd1b1",
+    "@open-mercato/ui": "0.7.1-develop.7106.1.53fe9dd1b1",
     "react": "^19.0.0",
     "react-dom": "^19.0.0"
   },
   "devDependencies": {
-    "@open-mercato/ai-assistant": "0.7.1-develop.7105.1.0d2f4c6651",
-    "@open-mercato/shared": "0.7.1-develop.7105.1.0d2f4c6651",
-    "@open-mercato/ui": "0.7.1-develop.7105.1.0d2f4c6651",
+    "@open-mercato/ai-assistant": "0.7.1-develop.7106.1.53fe9dd1b1",
+    "@open-mercato/shared": "0.7.1-develop.7106.1.53fe9dd1b1",
+    "@open-mercato/ui": "0.7.1-develop.7106.1.53fe9dd1b1",
     "@testing-library/dom": "^10.4.1",
     "@testing-library/jest-dom": "^7.0.0",
     "@testing-library/react": "^16.3.1",

package/src/modules/auth/api/users/acl/route.ts

@@ -347,7 +347,7 @@ export async function PUT(req: Request) {
     return NextResponse.json({
       error: translate(
         'auth.acl.organizationWarning',
-        'Organization restrictions are saved only when at least one feature override is selected. Add a feature or enable a module wildcard before saving.',
+        'Organization restrictions require at least one feature override. Add a feature or module wildcard, or clear the organization scope before saving.',
       ),
     }, { status: 400 })
   }
@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ export const openApi: OpenApiRouteDoc = {
     },
     PUT: {
       summary: 'Update user ACL',
-      description: 'Updates a per-user ACL override. Omitted super admin, feature, and organization fields preserve their stored values. An organization-scoped non-super-admin override requires at least one feature grant.',
+      description: 'Updates a per-user ACL override. Omitted super admin, feature, and organization fields preserve their stored values. Authorization evaluates the merged ACL, so a partial request returns 403 when a preserved grant is outside the actor\'s grantable ACL. An organization-scoped non-super-admin override requires at least one feature grant.',
       requestBody: {
         contentType: 'application/json',
         schema: putSchema,

package/src/modules/auth/i18n/de.json

@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@
   "auth.acl.modules.webhooks": "Webhooks",
   "auth.acl.modules.wms": "Warehouse Management System",
   "auth.acl.modules.workflows": "Workflow Engine",
-  "auth.acl.organizationWarning": "Organisationseinschränkungen werden nur gespeichert, wenn mindestens eine Berechtigungsüberschreibung ausgewählt ist. Füge eine Berechtigung hinzu oder aktiviere einen Modul-Wildcard vor dem Speichern.",
+  "auth.acl.organizationWarning": "Organisationseinschränkungen erfordern mindestens eine Berechtigungsüberschreibung. Füge eine Berechtigung oder einen Modul-Platzhalter hinzu, oder lösche den Organisationsbereich vor dem Speichern.",
   "auth.acl.organizationsScope": "Organisationsbereich",
   "auth.acl.organizationsScopeHint": "Empty means all organizations. Select one or more to restrict access.",
   "auth.acl.restricted": "Eingeschränkt",

package/src/modules/auth/i18n/en.json

@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@
   "auth.acl.modules.webhooks": "Webhooks",
   "auth.acl.modules.wms": "Warehouse Management System",
   "auth.acl.modules.workflows": "Workflow Engine",
-  "auth.acl.organizationWarning": "Organization restrictions are saved only when at least one feature override is selected. Add a feature or enable a module wildcard before saving.",
+  "auth.acl.organizationWarning": "Organization restrictions require at least one feature override. Add a feature or module wildcard, or clear the organization scope before saving.",
   "auth.acl.organizationsScope": "Organizations scope",
   "auth.acl.organizationsScopeHint": "Empty means all organizations. Select one or more to restrict access.",
   "auth.acl.restricted": "Restricted",

package/src/modules/auth/i18n/es.json

@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@
   "auth.acl.modules.webhooks": "Webhooks",
   "auth.acl.modules.wms": "Warehouse Management System",
   "auth.acl.modules.workflows": "Workflow Engine",
-  "auth.acl.organizationWarning": "Las restricciones de organización se guardan solo cuando se selecciona al menos una anulación de función. Agrega una función o habilita un comodín de módulo antes de guardar.",
+  "auth.acl.organizationWarning": "Las restricciones de organización requieren al menos una anulación de función. Agrega una función o un comodín de módulo, o borra el ámbito de organización antes de guardar.",
   "auth.acl.organizationsScope": "Alcance de organizaciones",
   "auth.acl.organizationsScopeHint": "Empty means all organizations. Select one or more to restrict access.",
   "auth.acl.restricted": "Restringido",

package/src/modules/auth/i18n/ko.json

@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@
   "auth.acl.modules.webhooks": "Webhooks",
   "auth.acl.modules.wms": "Warehouse Management System",
   "auth.acl.modules.workflows": "Workflow Engine",
-  "auth.acl.organizationWarning": "조직 제한은 최소 하나의 기능 재정의가 선택된 경우에만 저장됩니다. 저장하기 전에 기능을 추가하거나 모듈 와일드카드를 활성화하세요.",
+  "auth.acl.organizationWarning": "조직 제한에는 하나 이상의 기능 재정의가 필요합니다. 기능이나 모듈 와일드카드를 추가하거나 저장하기 전에 조직 범위를 지우세요.",
   "auth.acl.organizationsScope": "조직 범위",
   "auth.acl.organizationsScopeHint": "Empty means all organizations. Select one or more to restrict access.",
   "auth.acl.restricted": "제한됨",

package/src/modules/auth/i18n/pl.json

@@ -390,7 +390,7 @@
   "auth.acl.modules.webhooks": "Webhooki",
   "auth.acl.modules.wms": "System zarządzania magazynem",
   "auth.acl.modules.workflows": "Mechanizm przepływów pracy",
-  "auth.acl.organizationWarning": "Ograniczenia organizacyjne są zapisywane tylko wtedy, gdy wybrano co najmniej jedno nadpisanie uprawnień. Dodaj uprawnienie lub włącz symbol wieloznaczny modułu przed zapisaniem.",
+  "auth.acl.organizationWarning": "Ograniczenia organizacyjne wymagają co najmniej jednego nadpisania uprawnień. Dodaj uprawnienie lub wildcard modułu albo wyczyść zakres organizacji przed zapisaniem.",
   "auth.acl.organizationsScope": "Zakres organizacji",
   "auth.acl.organizationsScopeHint": "Brak wyboru oznacza wszystkie organizacje. Wybierz co najmniej jedną, aby ograniczyć dostęp.",
   "auth.acl.restricted": "Ograniczone",