@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk 13.4.0 → 13.5.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/CHANGELOG.md +423 -0
- package/README.md +4 -8
- package/SECURITY.md +2 -2
- package/TROUBLESHOOTING.md +55 -27
- package/dist/client/binary-send.d.ts +28 -0
- package/dist/client/binary-send.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/binary-send.js +26 -0
- package/dist/client/binary-send.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/client.d.ts +46 -6
- package/dist/client/client.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/client.js +181 -66
- package/dist/client/client.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/content-adapter.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/client/content-adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/content-adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/device-set-reconciliation.d.ts +23 -8
- package/dist/client/device-set-reconciliation.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/device-set-reconciliation.js +25 -11
- package/dist/client/device-set-reconciliation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/event-hooks.d.ts +88 -8
- package/dist/client/event-hooks.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/event-hooks.js +1 -0
- package/dist/client/event-hooks.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.d.ts +45 -10
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.js +246 -154
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-receive-authorization.d.ts +10 -1
- package/dist/client/group-receive-authorization.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-receive-authorization.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-anonymous-delivery.d.ts +18 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-anonymous-delivery.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-anonymous-delivery.js +84 -12
- package/dist/client/hosted-anonymous-delivery.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-connection.js +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-connection.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-group-authority.d.ts +6 -2
- package/dist/client/hosted-group-authority.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-group-authority.js +11 -7
- package/dist/client/hosted-group-authority.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-groups.d.ts +5 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-groups.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-groups.js +8 -4
- package/dist/client/hosted-groups.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-http-error.d.ts +5 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-http-error.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-http-error.js +5 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-http-error.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-mailbox-subscription.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-mailbox-subscription.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-mailbox-subscription.js +5 -5
- package/dist/client/hosted-mailbox-subscription.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.d.ts +11 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.js +75 -30
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted.js +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/client/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/receive-queue.d.ts +5 -2
- package/dist/client/receive-queue.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/receive-queue.js +55 -18
- package/dist/client/receive-queue.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-acceptance.d.ts +49 -6
- package/dist/client/relay-acceptance.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-acceptance.js +49 -3
- package/dist/client/relay-acceptance.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-protocol.d.ts +37 -7
- package/dist/client/relay-protocol.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-protocol.js +53 -10
- package/dist/client/relay-protocol.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-family.d.ts +3 -3
- package/dist/client/retry-family.js +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-family.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-request-envelope.d.ts +18 -8
- package/dist/client/retry-request-envelope.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-request-envelope.js +57 -29
- package/dist/client/retry-request-envelope.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-request-lifecycle.d.ts +24 -11
- package/dist/client/retry-request-lifecycle.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-request-lifecycle.js +46 -20
- package/dist/client/retry-request-lifecycle.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-terminal-recovery.d.ts +11 -8
- package/dist/client/retry-terminal-recovery.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-terminal-recovery.js +18 -12
- package/dist/client/retry-terminal-recovery.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry.d.ts +8 -7
- package/dist/client/retry.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry.js +30 -22
- package/dist/client/retry.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/send-deadline.d.ts +308 -0
- package/dist/client/send-deadline.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/send-deadline.js +914 -0
- package/dist/client/send-deadline.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/send-intent-driver.d.ts +116 -0
- package/dist/client/send-intent-driver.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/send-intent-driver.js +373 -0
- package/dist/client/send-intent-driver.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts +257 -27
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js +1274 -283
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts +48 -5
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/conformance/cases/metadata.d.ts +3 -2
- package/dist/local/store/conformance/cases/metadata.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/conformance/cases/metadata.js +153 -2
- package/dist/local/store/conformance/cases/metadata.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/adapter.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/adapter.js +9 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.js +4 -0
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/metadata-keys.d.ts +13 -0
- package/dist/local/store/metadata-keys.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/metadata-keys.js +20 -0
- package/dist/local/store/metadata-keys.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/receive-work.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/receive-work.js +12 -1
- package/dist/local/store/receive-work.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.d.ts +482 -33
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.js +690 -48
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/index.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/index.js +3 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/metadata.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/metadata.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/metadata.js +12 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/metadata.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/store.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/store.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/store.js +3 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/store.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts +8 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js +18 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/request-admission.d.ts +49 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/request-admission.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/request-admission.js +74 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/request-admission.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/types/api.d.ts +77 -0
- package/dist/types/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.d.ts +144 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.js +146 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.js.map +1 -1
- package/docs/ASSURANCE.md +31 -15
- package/docs/DEVIATIONS.md +34 -4
- package/docs/ERROR_HANDLING.md +134 -7
- package/docs/GETTING_STARTED.md +30 -23
- package/docs/PROTOCOL_POLICY.md +31 -20
- package/groups/README.md +1 -1
- package/hooks/README.md +6 -3
- package/local/store/react-native/README.md +9 -10
- package/local/store/web/README.md +1 -1
- package/package.json +1 -1
- package/safety/README.md +48 -11
package/dist/types/errors.js
CHANGED
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@@ -16,7 +16,9 @@
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* ├── PQXDHRequiredError which post-quantum key the peer is missing
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* ├── StorageQuotaExceededError the store that ran out of room
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* ├── SecureRandomUnavailableError the runtime has no secure random source
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-
*
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* ├── InvalidSendTimestampError the refused send timestamp and the accepted window
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* ├── SendAcceptanceUnknownError the devices of an ended send whose acceptance is not known
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* └── SendNeverAcceptedByRelayError the devices of an ended send that the Relay never accepted and that have no refusal code
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* ```
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*
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* A code or a subclass belongs here only if production code can produce it. An
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@@ -117,6 +119,19 @@ export var EncryptionErrorCode;
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* before it stores or posts anything for the send.
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*/
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EncryptionErrorCode["INVALID_SEND_TIMESTAMP"] = "INVALID_SEND_TIMESTAMP";
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/**
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* The posting deadline of a direct or group send ended, and the Relay
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* acceptance of one or more devices is not known. The message might have arrived. The SDK
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* throws `SendAcceptanceUnknownError` and posts nothing more for the send.
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*/
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EncryptionErrorCode["SEND_ACCEPTANCE_UNKNOWN"] = "SEND_ACCEPTANCE_UNKNOWN";
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/**
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* The posting deadline of a send ended, the call raised no refusal (a
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* thrown refusal or a refusal in the receipt of a shared body), and no
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* refused device has a stored refusal code. The SDK throws
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* `SendNeverAcceptedByRelayError` and posts nothing more for the send.
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*/
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EncryptionErrorCode["SEND_NEVER_ACCEPTED"] = "SEND_NEVER_ACCEPTED";
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/**
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* Duplicate message detected (replay attack).
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*
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@@ -630,6 +645,136 @@ export class InvalidSendTimestampError extends EncryptionError {
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export function isInvalidSendTimestampError(error) {
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return error instanceof InvalidSendTimestampError;
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}
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/**
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* Error thrown when the posting deadline of a direct or group send ends and
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* the Relay acceptance of one or more devices is not known.
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*
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* The posting deadline, `deadlineAt`, is the earlier of 24 hours after the
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* SDK first stored the send and 24 hours after its timestamp. At or after it,
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* the SDK starts no request for the send. The message might have arrived on
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* each device in `unknownDevices`, so `mayHaveArrived` is true. The devices in
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* `acceptedDevices` have the message. The devices in `refusedDevices` do not.
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* `retryable` is false, because the SDK posts nothing more for the send.
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*
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* The outbox keeps the end of the send. A call of `send()` with the same
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* `clientMessageId`, content and timestamp throws this error again and posts
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* nothing. Such an error has no `cause`, because the outbox keeps no error.
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* Otherwise `cause` is the last error of the send.
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*
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* A replay or a resend after this error can add one charged unit within 24
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* hours, when the Relay no longer holds the first acceptance. The SDK does not
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* promise that a retry is free of charge.
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*
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* `isOutgoingMessageError` is true for this error.
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*
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* @example
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* ```typescript
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* try {
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* await signal.send(recipientId, { body }, { clientMessageId });
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* } catch (error) {
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* if (isSendAcceptanceUnknownError(error)) {
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* showMightHaveArrived(error.clientMessageId);
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* }
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* }
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* ```
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*/
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export class SendAcceptanceUnknownError extends EncryptionError {
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name = 'SendAcceptanceUnknownError';
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/** The logical-send identifier of the send. */
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clientMessageId;
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/** The posting deadline of the send, in milliseconds since the epoch. */
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deadlineAt;
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/** The devices whose Relay acceptance the SDK holds. */
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acceptedDevices;
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/** The devices whose Relay acceptance is not known. */
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unknownDevices;
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/** The devices that the Relay never accepted the send for. */
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refusedDevices;
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/** Always true: the message might have arrived on each unknown device. */
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mayHaveArrived = true;
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/** Always false: the SDK posts nothing more for the send. */
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retryable = false;
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constructor(details) {
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super(`The posting deadline of send ${details.clientMessageId} ended, and the Relay acceptance of ${String(details.unknownDevices.length)} devices is not known`, EncryptionErrorCode.SEND_ACCEPTANCE_UNKNOWN, { operation: 'send', clientMessageId: details.clientMessageId, deadlineAt: details.deadlineAt });
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this.clientMessageId = details.clientMessageId;
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this.deadlineAt = details.deadlineAt;
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this.acceptedDevices = details.acceptedDevices;
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this.unknownDevices = details.unknownDevices;
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this.refusedDevices = details.refusedDevices;
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if (details.cause !== undefined)
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this.cause = details.cause;
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}
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}
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/**
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* Type guard to check if an error is a SendAcceptanceUnknownError.
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*
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* @param error - Error to check
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* @returns true if error is SendAcceptanceUnknownError
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*/
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export function isSendAcceptanceUnknownError(error) {
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return error instanceof SendAcceptanceUnknownError;
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}
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/**
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* Error thrown when the posting deadline of a send ends, the call raised no
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* refusal (a thrown refusal or a refusal in the receipt of a shared body), and
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* no refused device has a stored refusal code.
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*
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* The Relay never stored the send for the devices in `refusedDevices`, so
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* they do not have the message. The devices in `acceptedDevices` have it.
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* `retryable` is false, because the SDK posts nothing more for the send. A
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* send whose timestamp is 24 hours old gets this error at once.
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*
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* The outbox keeps the end of the send. A call of `send()` with the same
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* `clientMessageId`, content and timestamp throws this error again and posts
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* nothing. When the call that ends the send raised a refusal, the SDK throws
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* the first such refusal with the same fields in place of this error. A
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* thrown refusal keeps its class, and a refusal in a receipt is an `Error`
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* with its code. Otherwise, when a refused device has a stored refusal code,
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* the SDK throws an `Error` with the code of the first such device in the
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* order of the destinations.
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*
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* `isOutgoingMessageError` is true for this error.
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*
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* @example
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* ```typescript
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* try {
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* await signal.send(recipientId, { body }, { clientMessageId });
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* } catch (error) {
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* if (isSendNeverAcceptedByRelayError(error)) {
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* showNotDelivered(error.refusedDevices);
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* }
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* }
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* ```
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*/
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export class SendNeverAcceptedByRelayError extends EncryptionError {
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name = 'SendNeverAcceptedByRelayError';
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/** The logical-send identifier of the send. */
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clientMessageId;
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/** The posting deadline of the send, in milliseconds since the epoch. */
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deadlineAt;
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/** The devices whose Relay acceptance the SDK holds. */
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acceptedDevices;
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/** The devices that the Relay never accepted the send for. */
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refusedDevices;
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/** Always false: the SDK posts nothing more for the send. */
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retryable = false;
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constructor(details) {
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super(`The posting deadline of send ${details.clientMessageId} ended before the Relay accepted it for ${String(details.refusedDevices.length)} devices`, EncryptionErrorCode.SEND_NEVER_ACCEPTED, { operation: 'send', clientMessageId: details.clientMessageId, deadlineAt: details.deadlineAt });
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this.clientMessageId = details.clientMessageId;
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this.deadlineAt = details.deadlineAt;
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this.acceptedDevices = details.acceptedDevices;
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this.refusedDevices = details.refusedDevices;
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}
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}
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/**
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|
770
|
+
* Type guard to check if an error is a SendNeverAcceptedByRelayError.
|
|
771
|
+
*
|
|
772
|
+
* @param error - Error to check
|
|
773
|
+
* @returns true if error is SendNeverAcceptedByRelayError
|
|
774
|
+
*/
|
|
775
|
+
export function isSendNeverAcceptedByRelayError(error) {
|
|
776
|
+
return error instanceof SendNeverAcceptedByRelayError;
|
|
777
|
+
}
|
|
633
778
|
/**
|
|
634
779
|
* Type guard to check if an error is a SecureRandomUnavailableError.
|
|
635
780
|
*
|
package/dist/types/errors.js.map
CHANGED
|
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
|
|
1
|
-
{"version":3,"file":"errors.js","sourceRoot":"","sources":["../../types/errors.ts"],"names":[],"mappings":"AAAA
|
|
1
|
+
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;;;;;;;;;GAkBG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,4BAA6B,SAAQ,eAAe;IAC7C,IAAI,GAAG,8BAA8B,CAAC;IACxD,YAAY,OAAe;QACzB,KAAK,CAAC,OAAO,EAAE,mBAAmB,CAAC,yBAAyB,EAAE;YAC5D,SAAS,EAAE,qBAAqB;SACjC,CAAC,CAAC;IACL,CAAC;CACF;AAKD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgCG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,yBAA0B,SAAQ,eAAe;IAC1C,IAAI,GAAG,2BAA2B,CAAC;IAErD,6BAA6B;IACb,SAAS,CAAS;IAClC,yCAAyC;IACzB,MAAM,CAA6B;IACnD,uFAAuF;IACvE,QAAQ,CAAS;IACjC,qFAAqF;IACrE,MAAM,CAAS;IAE/B,YACE,SAAiB,EACjB,MAAkC,EAClC,MAA4C;QAE5C,MAAM,OAAO,GACX,MAAM,KAAK,2BAA2B;YACpC,CAAC,CAAC,gCAAgC;YAClC,CAAC,CAAC,MAAM,KAAK,eAAe;gBAC1B,CAAC,CAAC,+CAA+C;gBACjD,CAAC,CAAC,4CAA4C,CAAC;QACrD,KAAK,CACH,sBAAsB,MAAM,CAAC,SAAS,CAAC,IAAI,OAAO,wBAAwB,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,YAAY,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,EACpH,mBAAmB,CAAC,sBAAsB,EAC1C,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,EAAE,CAC3F,CAAC;QACF,IAAI,CAAC,SAAS,GAAG,SAAS,CAAC;QAC3B,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC;QACrB,IAAI,CAAC,QAAQ,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,QAAQ,CAAC;QAChC,IAAI,CAAC,MAAM,GAAG,MAAM,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC;IAC9B,CAAC;CACF;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAc;IACxD,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACpD,CAAC;AAQD;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GAgCG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,0BAA2B,SAAQ,eAAe;IAC3C,IAAI,GAAG,4BAA4B,CAAC;IAEtD,+CAA+C;IAC/B,eAAe,CAAS;IACxC,yEAAyE;IACzD,UAAU,CAAS;IACnC,wDAAwD;IACxC,eAAe,CAA6B;IAC5D,uDAAuD;IACvC,cAAc,CAA6B;IAC3D,8DAA8D;IAC9C,cAAc,CAA6B;IAC3D,0EAA0E;IAC1D,cAAc,GAAG,IAAa,CAAC;IAC/C,6DAA6D;IAC7C,SAAS,GAAG,KAAc,CAAC;IAE3C,YAAY,OAOX;QACC,KAAK,CACH,gCAAgC,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,uCAAuC,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,uBAAuB,EAC1J,mBAAmB,CAAC,uBAAuB,EAC3C,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAChG,CAAC;QACF,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC;QAC/C,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;QACrC,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC;QAC/C,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;QAC7C,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;QAC7C,IAAI,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,KAAK,SAAS;YAAE,IAAI,CAAC,KAAK,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,KAAK,CAAC;IAC9D,CAAC;CACF;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,4BAA4B,CAAC,KAAc;IACzD,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,0BAA0B,CAAC;AACrD,CAAC;AAED;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;;GA+BG;AACH,MAAM,OAAO,6BAA8B,SAAQ,eAAe;IAC9C,IAAI,GAAG,+BAA+B,CAAC;IAEzD,+CAA+C;IAC/B,eAAe,CAAS;IACxC,yEAAyE;IACzD,UAAU,CAAS;IACnC,wDAAwD;IACxC,eAAe,CAA6B;IAC5D,8DAA8D;IAC9C,cAAc,CAA6B;IAC3D,6DAA6D;IAC7C,SAAS,GAAG,KAAc,CAAC;IAE3C,YAAY,OAKX;QACC,KAAK,CACH,gCAAgC,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,2CAA2C,MAAM,CAAC,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC,MAAM,CAAC,UAAU,EACjJ,mBAAmB,CAAC,mBAAmB,EACvC,EAAE,SAAS,EAAE,MAAM,EAAE,eAAe,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,EAAE,UAAU,EAAE,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,EAAE,CAChG,CAAC;QACF,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC;QAC/C,IAAI,CAAC,UAAU,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,UAAU,CAAC;QACrC,IAAI,CAAC,eAAe,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,eAAe,CAAC;QAC/C,IAAI,CAAC,cAAc,GAAG,OAAO,CAAC,cAAc,CAAC;IAC/C,CAAC;CACF;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,+BAA+B,CAC7C,KAAc;IAEd,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,6BAA6B,CAAC;AACxD,CAAC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,8BAA8B,CAAC,KAAc;IAC3D,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,4BAA4B,CAAC;AACvD,CAAC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,2BAA2B,CAAC,KAAc;IACxD,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,yBAAyB,CAAC;AACpD,CAAC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,oBAAoB,CAAC,KAAc;IACjD,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,kBAAkB,CAAC;AAC7C,CAAC;AAED;;;;;GAKG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,wBAAwB,CAAC,KAAc;IACrD,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,sBAAsB,CAAC;AACjD,CAAC;AAED;;GAEG;AACH,MAAM,UAAU,iBAAiB,CAAC,KAAc;IAC9C,OAAO,KAAK,YAAY,eAAe,CAAC;AAC1C,CAAC"}
|
package/docs/ASSURANCE.md
CHANGED
|
@@ -10,22 +10,22 @@ The public repository contains SDK client source, documentation, and build check
|
|
|
10
10
|
|
|
11
11
|
You can inspect the client implementation and run the public checks. Relay server implementations and the internal runtime examples remain private. You cannot reproduce the private results from this repository alone.
|
|
12
12
|
|
|
13
|
-
Private testing also exists in other open-source projects. [SQLite publishes some checks and keeps TH3 private](https://www.sqlite.org/testing.html). [Convex documents a private testing framework](https://github.com/
|
|
13
|
+
Private testing also exists in other open-source projects. [SQLite publishes some checks and keeps TH3 private](https://www.sqlite.org/testing.html). [Convex documents a private testing framework](https://github.com/convex/convex-backend/blob/main/README.md). Those projects do not review or endorse this SDK.
|
|
14
14
|
|
|
15
15
|
## Reported engineering results
|
|
16
16
|
|
|
17
17
|
Engineering CI runs the default automated checks on pull requests that are ready for review and on changes to the main branch. Release preparation requires a passing run.
|
|
18
18
|
|
|
19
|
-
Most recent full run on 2026-10-
|
|
19
|
+
Most recent full run on 2026-10-31:
|
|
20
20
|
|
|
21
21
|
| | |
|
|
22
22
|
|---|---|
|
|
23
|
-
| Test modules |
|
|
24
|
-
| Test cases |
|
|
25
|
-
| Passed |
|
|
23
|
+
| Test modules | 598 |
|
|
24
|
+
| Test cases | 12,383 |
|
|
25
|
+
| Passed | 12,379 |
|
|
26
26
|
| Skipped | 4 |
|
|
27
27
|
| Failed | 0 |
|
|
28
|
-
| Wall time |
|
|
28
|
+
| Wall time | 761 s |
|
|
29
29
|
|
|
30
30
|
The total counts test cases. One test case can contain several assertions. Separate commands run the longer performance and endurance checks.
|
|
31
31
|
|
|
@@ -38,12 +38,14 @@ Release tooling generates this table from a completed run. It refuses results fr
|
|
|
38
38
|
- **Generated inputs:** check protocol and encoding properties across randomized inputs.
|
|
39
39
|
- **Messaging flows:** exercise device fanout, groups, device linking, device transfer, PNI-to-ACI changes, and relay delivery.
|
|
40
40
|
- **Storage contracts:** check persistence, concurrency, interruption, recovery, and storage pressure at adapter boundaries.
|
|
41
|
-
- **Runtime behavior:** run the browser storage contracts in Chromium, Firefox, and WebKit. Run each public flow on the Hermes V1 command-line engine that React Native 0.86 uses
|
|
41
|
+
- **Runtime behavior:** run the browser storage contracts in Chromium, Firefox, and WebKit. Run each public flow on the Hermes V1 command-line engine that React Native 0.86 uses. Use only the globals of a bare React Native app. A committed list records each flow step that fails on that engine and its error. The job fails when a result differs from that list.
|
|
42
|
+
|
|
43
|
+
Run release builds of the Expo example and the bare React Native example on an Android emulator. Both use Hermes V1. The Expo build uses Expo SDK 57 and React Native 0.86. The bare build uses React Native 0.87.1.
|
|
42
44
|
- **Public API:** check exported types, import paths, documented calls, and expected example output against the packed package.
|
|
43
45
|
- **React Native hosts:** add the packed package to React Native and Expo projects without an override of peer conflicts. The projects cover React Native 0.83 through 0.87 and the Expo SDK 55 through 57 lines. Build the Expo example's Hermes bundle on Expo SDK 55 and 57.
|
|
44
46
|
- **Errors:** check construction sites for exported error classes and codes. Reject unresolved code forwarding.
|
|
45
47
|
|
|
46
|
-
The browser storage job also runs 2,000 open, write, read, and close cycles of the IndexedDB store
|
|
48
|
+
The browser storage job also runs 2,000 open, write, read, and close cycles of the IndexedDB store. It also runs a soak of the web SQLite store. Each checks for upward memory and latency drift.
|
|
47
49
|
|
|
48
50
|
In Chromium, the browser storage job also builds an app with the Vite version of the browser example and the packed package. The entry module of the app completes an exchange in each direction with a top-level await. The job fails when the exchange does not finish in 30 seconds, or when a chunk of the build imports the entry chunk. A default automated check also fails when the SDK loads a module with a dynamic import and that module imports another module. Other bundlers are not checked.
|
|
49
51
|
|
|
@@ -51,7 +53,9 @@ A storage contract check does not prove a full encrypted exchange. Internal brow
|
|
|
51
53
|
|
|
52
54
|
## SQLite store checks
|
|
53
55
|
|
|
54
|
-
Four package entries keep device-local state in a SQLite database: `./local/store/node`, `./local/store/expo`, `./local/store/react-native`, and `./local/store/web-sqlite`. A Tauri app uses `./local/store/web-sqlite`. Each row gives one runtime claim and the check that proves it. Rows that do not name public CI run in the project's engineering CI. A check runs on each change to the main branch and on each pull request that is ready for review, unless its row says otherwise.
|
|
56
|
+
Four package entries keep device-local state in a SQLite database: `./local/store/node`, `./local/store/expo`, `./local/store/react-native`, and `./local/store/web-sqlite`. A Tauri app uses `./local/store/web-sqlite`. Each row gives one runtime claim and the check that proves it. Rows that do not name public CI run in the project's engineering CI. A check runs on each change to the main branch and on each pull request that is ready for review, unless its row says otherwise.
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On a pull request, a job on macOS or Windows runs only when a maintainer requests it. Without that request, the Node store job uses only Linux and Node 22 on a pull request. The default automated checks run its tests on Linux with Node 26.
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| On Linux, with a running Secret portal and the default Chromium features, the store passes the shared storage contract. `safeStorage` does not use the key of the portal. | Electron store job: Linux, Electron 44 | Electron with `--password-store=gnome-libsecret`, and xdg-desktop-portal with the GNOME keyring as the back end of its Secret portal. |
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| On Linux, the vault refuses the key of the Secret portal, which `safeStorage` uses with the Chromium feature `SecretPortalKeyProviderUseForEncryption`. The store does not open, and no key reaches the disk. | Electron store job: Linux, Electron 44 | Electron with that feature and a Secret portal, with the GNOME keyring as the back end of the portal. The test checks that the ciphertext starts with `v12`. Run 36528132421 also refused the key with KWallet 6 (`kwallet6`, Ubuntu 26.04) as the back end of the portal. No job runs that case again. |
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No CI job signs the app with a Developer ID. On 2026-09-29, a manual check built the packaged app twice from the main branch. The check used macOS 15.7.2 arm64 with Xcode 26.3 for both builds. It built version 1.0.0 and version 1.0.1 of the app. The build used the SDK 8.1.0 package and Electron 44.4.5.
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Electron Forge signed each build with a Developer ID identity and the hardened runtime, and notarized and stapled it. For each build, `spctl -a -vv` reported `accepted` and `source=Notarized Developer ID`. A check script wrote a value with version 1.0.0 in the main process and in a utility process. Then it copied version 1.0.1 over the app, and the relaunches read each value back. The securityd log had no Keychain prompt for a launch.
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The check replaced version 1.0.0 with an ad-hoc signed copy of version 1.0.1 of the app. Then securityd logged a Keychain prompt for each read. The check stopped the app. The access list of the key's Keychain item holds the app's designated requirement. That requirement names the bundle identifier and the Developer ID team. It does not name a code hash.
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| The Expo example, which imports this entry, bundles with the Hermes compiler that React Native pins. | Engineering CI | The Android bundle of the Expo example with the packed package, on Expo SDK 55 and Expo SDK 57. |
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| In an Expo web build, an encrypted open and a reset fail with `SqliteEncryptionUnavailableError` (`KEY_STORAGE_ERROR`) before they use the vault. With `encryptionAtRest: false`, the store opens and keeps its data across a page load. | Browser storage job: Chromium on Linux | An `expo export --platform web` of an Expo SDK 57 app that installs the packed package, loaded in Chromium. The page reads no `PRAGMA cipher_version` row, and Expo SecureStore reports that it is not available. The check does not open a store with `./local/store/web-sqlite` in the Expo web build. |
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The Hermes flow job does not load a SQLite store. Its flows use the memory and key-value stores. The Android emulator job is the only CI job that runs the Expo store on Hermes. No check runs the conversion on iOS, so
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The Hermes flow job does not load a SQLite store. Its flows use the memory and key-value stores. The Android emulator job is the only CI job that runs the Expo store on Hermes. No check runs the conversion on iOS, so no check verifies it there.
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| A release build of the bare React Native example converts a plaintext database with SQLCipher on Android. The rows and the schema version stay, the file has no SQLite header, and the vault holds one key that opens it. | Android emulator job | The release APK of the row above. Each run must log the number of rows and the schema version that the conversion kept. The same trigger rules apply. |
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| The bare React Native example, which imports this entry, bundles with the Hermes compiler that React Native pins. | Engineering CI | The Android release bundle of the bare React Native example with the packed package. |
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The Android emulator job is the only CI job that runs this store on Hermes with the native op-sqlite module. No CI job runs it on iOS. No check runs the conversion on iOS, so
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The Android emulator job is the only CI job that runs this store on Hermes with the native op-sqlite module. No CI job runs it on iOS. No check runs the conversion on iOS, so no check verifies it there.
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On 2026-09-28, a manual check ran the bare React Native example. It used a development build from before the SDK's 8.0.0 release. The check used Xcode 26.3 and the iOS 26.2 simulator. Each of four launches logged a SQLCipher version, a database header that is not the SQLite header, and the wrong-key failure. Each launch after the first resumed the stored identity.
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On 2026-09-29, a manual check with Xcode 26.3 ran the release build of the example four times in the iOS 26.2 simulator. The check used the SDK 8.1.0 package built from the main branch. Each launch passed the same checks. A temporary native log in the app read the storage attributes. The example does not include this log:
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| Over a long run, the store holds latency, memory, and file size flat. A closed store leaves no worker, no lock of the store, and no IndexedDB connection. Two tabs that write in turn each read the last write of the other. | Browser storage job: Chromium on Linux | 150 open, write, read, and close cycles, one session of 2,000 churn operations over 250 sessions, and 100 writes that two tabs make in turn. The check counts the workers, locks, IndexedDB connections, and OPFS entries that the cycles leave. It times each cycle and each two-tab read next to a control that does the same platform work with no store state, and compares the early and late thirds of that ratio. It compares the medians of the early and late thirds of the churn, and fits a slope to the page heap of the cycles. It reads the page heap, the IndexedDB connections, and the heap and Wasm memory of the store's worker, through the DevTools protocol. Firefox and WebKit have no such protocol in the test runner, and no CI job runs this check in them. |
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| A worker without OPFS synchronous access handles fails with `OPFS_UNAVAILABLE` before it loads the engine. | Browser storage job: Chromium, Firefox, and WebKit on Linux | WebKit on Linux (WebKitGTK) has no OPFS synchronous access handles, so there WebKit runs only these checks and the checks that need no OPFS. |
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The WebKit store job runs Playwright's WebKit on macOS, where WebKit has OPFS synchronous access handles. Playwright's WebKit is not Safari
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The WebKit store job runs Playwright's WebKit on macOS, where WebKit has OPFS synchronous access handles. Playwright's WebKit is not Safari. The same job then runs the same checks in the macOS runner's Safari through `safaridriver`. It records the Safari version. A WebDriver runner runs the Playwright checks unchanged.
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It counts the workers of a page from inside the page, and it reports the uncaught errors of a page only after the page loads. Each browser context is a Safari WebDriver session. The check for an ephemeral context that refuses OPFS access handles skips when that session has them.
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Only changes to the web SQLite store, the SQLite core, the storage contract, the key vault, the job, or a dependency trigger the job. On a pull request, it runs only when a maintainer requests it. In the browser storage job for Chromium and Firefox and in the WebKit store job, a check that skips for want of OPFS fails.
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The internal code-generation check runs an encrypted exchange with the memory store. It does not load a SQLite store.
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| In a Tauri 2.12.0 app on Linux, the first open fails with `OPFS_UNAVAILABLE`, because WebKitGTK has no OPFS synchronous access handles. No other step of the check runs. | Tauri example job: Linux x64, WebKitGTK 2.52.6 | The same app under Xvfb. The job fails when the first open succeeds or fails with a different code. |
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| In a Tauri 2.12.0 app on Android, the store opens in the Android WebView with the default IndexedDB vault. Every step of the Windows check passes, including the relaunch in a new process. | Tauri example job: Android API 36 x86_64 emulator, Android WebView 133.0.6943.137 | A debug APK of the same app, installed on the emulator and launched twice. The app writes its report to its data directory, and the job reads the report with `adb`. The job fails unless every step passes. On a pull request, the Android leg runs only when a maintainer requests it. |
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A Tauri 2 app uses `./local/store/web-sqlite` in its webview, with no Tauri-specific SDK code. The [web SQLite store guide](../local/store/web-sqlite/README.md#tauri) gives the Tauri setup.
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A Tauri 2 app uses `./local/store/web-sqlite` in its webview, with no Tauri-specific SDK code. The [web SQLite store guide](../local/store/web-sqlite/README.md#tauri) gives the Tauri setup.
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On 2026-09-28, a manual check used a development build of the SDK before 8.0.0 in a Tauri 2.12.0 app. It passed in WKWebView on macOS 15.7.2 and in the iOS 18.0 simulator. The check covered a two-device exchange, a close and reopen, an app relaunch, and the store locks. It also covered the next relaunch after an app kill with both stores open.
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On 2026-09-29, a manual check ran a debug build of the Tauri example with Tauri 2.12.0 in its shell. The app installed SDK 8.1.0, packed from the same commit as the example. On macOS 15.7.2 and in the iOS 17.5 simulator, every step of the first launch and of the relaunch passed. On macOS, two windows of the app shared one store. The second window opened the store that the first window held, and each window read the writes of the other. A reset in the second window failed with `INVALID_STATE`.
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- **A full origin quota in Firefox, WebKit, and Safari.** In these browsers, the quota check injects `QuotaExceededError` in the worker. No check fills a real origin quota there.
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- **Tauri on macOS and iOS.** No CI job runs the Tauri example on macOS or iOS. The manual checks ran a debug build on macOS 15.7.2 and in the iOS 17.5 and 18.0 simulators. No check ran the store in a Tauri app on a physical iOS device.
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- **A Tauri store that WebKit removes.** A check cleared all website data of the webview with a Tauri call. No check saw WebKit remove the data under storage pressure or after a period without use. No check removed the IndexedDB vault of a Tauri app while its database file stayed.
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- **A Tauri release build, and Tauri on physical Android devices.** The Tauri example job runs
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- **A Tauri release build, and Tauri on physical Android devices.** The Tauri example job runs debug builds. On Windows and Linux, they have no bundle. On an Android API 36 emulator, the job runs a debug APK. No check ran the store in a release build or an installed desktop app. No check ran it on another Android API level or a physical Android device.
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- **The React Native store on iOS and on physical devices.** No CI job opens `./local/store/react-native` on iOS. The manual checks used only the iOS simulator. No check ran the store on a physical Android or iOS device.
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- **iOS devices.** No CI job runs on iOS. The manual checks used only the iOS simulator.
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- **iOS Data Protection.** The simulator does not keep a file protection class. So no check recorded the class of the React Native store files. No check observed a file class or the keychain class enforced on a locked device.
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package/docs/DEVIATIONS.md
CHANGED
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| **Registration IDs** | `libsignal` `sealed_sender.rs` | **Faithful.** Generated in `[1, 16383]`, strictly inside the 14 bits the wire format reserves | — | — |
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| **Linked-device registration IDs** | Signal's device linking | **Faithful** for a new link: the linked device gets its own fresh registration ID. **Deviation:** a device that a 12.0.x release linked keeps the ID of its active device, and a link that a 12.0.x release began keeps its stored ID (§5.7) | A changed ID on a live device fails its next prekey sync. A fresh ID on a link already begun can reserve a second device | Two devices of one account can share a registration ID. The sender-key handoff ledger keys each row by the device, so they stay apart |
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| **Linked-device group keys** | Signal's device linking | **Deviation.** The link copies each group master key from the active device's group store in the calling process. A group record that a release before 12.0.0 wrote, and that the active device has not read since, is not copied (§5.8) | The SDK has no storage service, and no master key crosses the Relay | The process that links the device must hold the active device's store. Such an unread group initializes from its first group message |
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| **Posting deadline and send progress** | Signal's Android client `IndividualSendJob`; Signal's Desktop client `conversationJobQueue` | **Faithful** on a window of 1 day and on progress at the deadline: an accepted device stays accepted. **Deviation** in detail. The deadline also ends 24 hours after the send timestamp, has no message-expiry term, and never moves on a restart. A lost Relay answer is acceptance-unknown, not failed. An automatic retry posts the stored bytes and epoch. With a store that lists its metadata keys, the SDK replays open sends at start and on reconnect, as the Signal job runners do, and reports each end once through `onSendOutcome`. On a custom store without the listing method, the application replays (§5.9) | The Relay admits an epoch at most 24 hours behind its clock, keeps a fingerprint of each operation, and charges each accepted operation. Custom stores stay supported, so the listing method is optional | A direct send posts nothing at or after its deadline. When the acceptance of a device is not known, the send throws `SendAcceptanceUnknownError`, and a replay or a resend after it can add one charged unit. When the plaintext of an open send is gone, `onSendOutcome` reports `content-required` |
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---
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### 5.6 Device-set reconciliation differs in detail
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Reviewed: 2026-10-
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Reviewed: 2026-10-29.
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The reconciliation of §5.5 follows Signal's server and Signal's Desktop
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client in its rule: the server compares, the client repairs and posts again,
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| D1 | A stale registration is reported after missing and extra devices on every route, also for a direct post to one account | One answer order for every route | Signal's server reports stale devices first on its route for one account | Relay tests assert the order on each route |
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| D2 | A direct send is one post for each device, and each post carries the full declaration of the account | The direct Relay route takes one destination for each body. A replay works for each device | One Signal request carries every device of the account. Here a race can accept some posts and refuse others | A restart posts the stored bytes to each accepted device, and each device gets the message once. A partly accepted pass posts every device again, and an accepted device replays |
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| D3 | A group comparison reads the record of each account, up to 1,000, when the Relay accepts the post | The Relay keeps one record for each account | Signal's server reads accounts from one store in one process | Relay tests, and a cost measurement |
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| D4 | The operation time is fixed. `OPERATION_EXPIRED` ends the reconciliation. A new send refuses an application timestamp outside the delivery window with `InvalidSendTimestampError
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| D4 | The operation time is fixed. `OPERATION_EXPIRED` ends the reconciliation as acceptance-unknown. A new send refuses an application timestamp outside the delivery window with `InvalidSendTimestampError`. A manual resend carries its own stored operation time (row P8) | From the Relay release that follows v2026.10.25, the Relay admits a mailbox delivery epoch and a new group fan-out operation at most 5 minutes ahead of its clock and at most 24 hours behind it. Earlier Relay releases admit a new operation only within 5 minutes of its epoch. On an earlier Relay release, a time 5 minutes to 24 hours old passes the SDK check but gets `OPERATION_EXPIRED`. The SDK check uses the same bounds, so the SDK refuses an application-supplied time before any post | Signal has no admission window | A restart post that gets `OPERATION_EXPIRED` ends the phase as expired, and a recipient-phase end stores the outcome `acceptance-unknown`. A new send with a timestamp outside the window throws `InvalidSendTimestampError`, and stores and posts nothing |
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| D5 | No fallback to one post for each recipient after the bound | The same bound covers every path | Signal's Desktop client falls back because its one-to-one path has no bound. Under the bound, a fallback only moves the churn | The 11th refusal of a phase ends the send with `DeviceSetReconciliationError` |
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| D6 | A direct send also stops at 10 restarts | One bound for every send | Signal's Desktop client has no bound on missing or extra devices for a one-to-one send | The restart bound test of the direct send |
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| D7 | No empty sync post. A `needsSync` mark on the recipient receipt and one read of the own list replace it | A Relay post needs at least one destination | Signal's server accepts an empty sync list, and Signal's Android client addresses its own device | A new own device repairs the sync phase and the recipient post is not sent again. The own list is read only on `needsSync` with no own record, and a failed read leaves the sync phase pending |
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| D8 | A group post settles a not-found account as a refusal of each of its destinations, and the Relay accepts the rest | `NOT_FOUND` is a fan-out result code. A refusal of the whole post would use a restart | This is equivalent to the group-send-token path of Signal's server, which sends to the accounts it resolves and returns the others. Only the form differs: a refusal code for each destination | A removed account settles as refused and the send adds nothing. A lost response resumes as a duplicate with no not-found account |
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| D9 | The receipt of a declared post carries a `deviceSetChecked` mark | The identified Relay route passes unknown keys, and a deployment lane can lag the SDK | Signal ships its client and server together | A receipt without the mark raises `DEVICE_SET_UNCHECKED` through `onRelayProtocolError` |
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| D10 | The SDK seals a group body again only before the Relay accepts it, and only after a definite refusal | The Relay keeps a fingerprint of
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| D11 | A group restart keeps the group ciphertext, seals the shared body again, and replaces it in one write. It does not encrypt the content again | One group pass posts the same ciphertext in the shared body and in the device posts. A new ciphertext would change a device post that the Relay already accepted,
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| D10 | The SDK seals a group body again only before the Relay accepts it, and only after a definite refusal | The Relay keys each delivery operation by message ID, class, destination device, generation and epoch, and keeps a fingerprint of it. It answers `RETRY_CONFLICT` to a changed body under the same operation. It also refuses a new operation whose message ID a row or journal entry of that mailbox holds. The message ID alone is not the operation key | Signal stores nothing on the server for a send attempt | A refused body is replaced in one write. A crash before the post of the replaced body posts it on resume. A `RETRY_CONFLICT` answer to a group shared post counts as acceptance and raises no `onRelayProtocolError` report |
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| D11 | A group restart keeps the group ciphertext, seals the shared body again, and replaces it in one write. It does not encrypt the content again | One group pass posts the same ciphertext in the shared body and in the device posts. A new ciphertext would change a device post that the Relay already accepted. The Relay keys that post by its operation, so its replay would get `RETRY_CONFLICT`. The message-ID check of each mailbox also refuses a new operation under the same message ID | Signal's Desktop client encrypts again for each attempt | The group ciphertext is byte-equal before and after the replacement, the accepted device post replays to its stored receipt, and the new body names the repaired destinations. A repaired pre-message that gets `RETRY_CONFLICT` records no sender-key handoff |
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| D12 | A declared post with no `recipientRegistrationId` skips the registration check | The field is optional on every Relay route | Signal's server compares the registration of each device of a post | A Relay test posts an unnamed registration |
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| D13 | A declaration that names the sender device gets 400 | The Relay refuses a malformed declaration before it compares | Signal's server answers 409 and names the sender device as an extra device | Relay tests on the direct and the group routes. The SDK does not declare the sender device |
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| D14 | The identified group route compares the declared device set, with the codes and the order of the direct route | The route serves Relay API customers | Signal has no identified group route | Relay tests. No SDK code calls the route |
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@@ -960,6 +961,35 @@ its groups from the storage service.
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| G1 | The link copies group master keys in the calling process | No master key crosses the Relay, and the adapter gets no private key | The SDK has no storage service | Each listed group arrives on the linked device with the master key of the active device and initializes with no application step. A link stopped at any write of the copy and restarted, also in a new browser tab, ends with the group set of the active device. A Relay refusal removes each copied group |
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| G2 | A group record that a release before 12.0.0 wrote, and that the active device has not read since, is not copied | The group store lists only migrated records. The link has no other source of the group IDs | Signal restores each group from the storage service | Such a group initializes on the linked device from its first group message. Read each group once on the active device before the link to copy it |
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### 5.9 The posting deadline and send progress
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Reviewed: 2026-10-30.
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Signal's Android client gives a send job a lifespan of one day from its
|
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creation, and Signal's Desktop client stops a send job one day after its
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timestamp. A direct or group send of the SDK has a posting deadline in the same window.
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At or after the deadline, the SDK starts no Relay request for the send. A
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request that started before the deadline still counts when its answer arrives
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later, and a device that the Relay accepted stays accepted, as in Signal. A
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replay posts only the devices that the Relay did not accept, as Signal skips
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the recipients that completed. The SDK replays open sends at start and on
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reconnect, and the deadline ends the replay, as the Signal job runners do. On
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a custom store without the optional listing method, the application replays.
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A retry request has its own posting deadline, in row P9. The following details differ.
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| ID | Deviation | Constraint | Why Signal's form does not fit | Guarantee test |
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|---|---|---|---|---|
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| P1 | The deadline is the earlier of 24 hours after the SDK first stores the send and 24 hours after its `clientTimestamp` | The epoch of each post is the send timestamp, and the Relay admits an epoch at most 24 hours behind its clock. A founder ruling sets this term | Signal has no caller timestamp and no admission window | A send backdated by 23 hours posts inside the remaining hour and posts nothing after it. A send backdated by 24 hours posts nothing and throws `SendNeverAcceptedByRelayError` |
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|
+
| P2 | The deadline has no message-expiry term | The SDK has no message expiry. `SendOptions.expiresIn` is a future feature. The founder ruling "DA1 F1 posting window terms: the 24-hour terms only, no expiry term until a message expiry feature exists (2026-10-28, founder)" sets this term. When that feature ships, its timer starts after acceptance and controls local deletion only, and it never ends a pending post | Signal starts its expiry timer after the send | The stored deadline is 24 hours after the clock read that first stores the send, with no other term. At `deadlineAt` plus 1 ms, a replay of a declared or an undeclared send posts nothing and throws `SendAcceptanceUnknownError` |
|
|
984
|
+
| P3 | A replay, a restart or a repair never moves the deadline | The deadline bounds the age of the kept epoch, and the Relay refuses an older epoch. A founder ruling says that retries and restarts never reset it | Signal's Android client starts a new job for a pending send | The deadline after a replay, a restart and a repair equals the first stored value. The deadline read after a restart equals the stored value |
|
|
985
|
+
| P4 | A device whose Relay answer is lost, or whose answer follows an uncertain request, ends acceptance-unknown, not failed | The Relay can accept a post whose answer the SDK does not get, and a later post under the same ID can add one charged unit | Signal's Desktop client shows such a send as failed | An unanswered post and then an `OPERATION_EXPIRED` refusal end with `SendAcceptanceUnknownError`. A replay with no stored evidence for a device does not count that device as refused |
|
|
986
|
+
| P5 | An automatic retry posts the stored bytes and the stored epoch, also for a retry resend | The Relay keeps a fingerprint of each operation and answers `RETRY_CONFLICT` to other bytes under one ID. A fresh epoch makes a new charged operation | Signal encrypts the content again for each attempt | A replay after a restart posts the same bytes under the same ID and the first epoch, and a repair keeps that epoch. A stored retry resend that gets `OPERATION_EXPIRED` keeps its stored epoch and bytes, posts nothing more under its ID and encrypts nothing again |
|
|
987
|
+
| P6 | The SDK stores the progress of each destination device, for recipients and sync copies. Before each request, it marks the device as posted and counts the request. At the end, a device counts as refused only when its stored answer is a refusal or a pending answer and its `uncertain` flag is unset. A request with no answer, an uncertain answer, or a send that SDK 13.3 stored sets the flag for good. A replay skips a refused device, and counts it toward an end at once, only when no recovery in the call can change the refusal or its repair already ran | The Relay can store a post whose answer the SDK does not get, and a later post under the same ID can add one charged unit. The Relay gives a refusal or a pending answer before it stores the post | Signal has no charged operation, so it does not keep a durable mark of each request | A replay after a restart posts only the devices with no stored acceptance. A replay ends at once, and posts nothing, when each open device has a stored refusal that the SDK cannot recover, and throws an `Error` with the stored code of the first refused device that has one, in the order of the destinations. A stored `STALE_DEVICE` refusal with no spent repair gets a new post. A crash after a request, or a send that SDK 13.3 stored, ends with `SendAcceptanceUnknownError` when the replay gets `OPERATION_EXPIRED` |
|
|
988
|
+
| P7 | A repair of a stale device keeps the operation and its epoch. A `RETRY_CONFLICT` answer to the repaired post makes the device unknown, not accepted. The repair writes its mark to the stored progress, and the same call reads that mark | The repaired post has new bytes under the kept ID. The Relay answers `RETRY_CONFLICT` when it holds other bytes for that ID, so the SDK cannot tell which bytes it holds | Signal encrypts the content again for each attempt | A `RETRY_CONFLICT` answer to a repaired post throws a retryable `RETRY_CONFLICT` error, and the device is stored unknown with the `uncertain` flag. The answer never counts as an earlier acceptance, in the same call or on a replay |
|
|
989
|
+
| P8 | A manual resend with `resendMessage` after a send end is a new operation. It has a fresh stored operation time, the message ID `<clientMessageId>:manual:N` and its own posting deadline 24 hours after its creation. Its content keeps the original timestamp, and the receive queue of a recipient drops a copy with the same sender device, the same original timestamp and the same content digest. The drop needs the timestamp that the content adapter reads from the message, so raw string or byte content takes no drop key and a recipient that holds it receives the copy again. A resend of a group send posts the content of its send log entry, so each copy carries the group context of the original send, not the current one. The recipient records the message with the completion of its receive record. When a delivery receipt is due, it records the message right after the receipt-due write and again with the completion of the receipt. The record expires after 60 days. The caller-origin receive path gives every decrypted message to the caller, and a caller that keeps its own records removes a copy itself. Only a send younger than 30 days takes a new manual resend. The Relay can charge the resend as a new message, and the message might already have arrived | The Relay admits an operation time at most 24 hours behind its clock and charges each accepted operation. The founder ruling "DA1 F4 manual resend identity: a fresh operation epoch with the original timestamp in the content (2026-10-28, founder)" sets this identity. The SDK encrypts the content again for each device, as the retry-request resend does | Signal's clients resend the stored message with its original timestamp in a new job, and the receivers drop a copy by sender and timestamp alone. The SDK adds the SHA-256 digest of the content to the key, so an application that sends two messages in one millisecond keeps both. This rule holds in SDK 13.x and ends in the next major SDK version, which keys a received message by its sender and timestamp only. Signal's server keeps no operation time and charges no send | A resend posts under a fresh operation time and the manual message ID, with the original timestamp in the content. The Relay admits it after the original ended at its deadline. The entry stores its operation time, and a stored send without manual entries reads as an empty list. A recipient that holds the original drops the resend copy, and a recipient that never got the original receives it once. Two different messages of one sender device with one timestamp both deliver. When no receipt is owed, a stop before the completion of the receive record runs `onMessageDecrypted` again. When a receipt is owed, only a stop before the receipt-due write runs it again. A new resend at or after 30 days from the send throws and posts nothing |
|
|
990
|
+
| P9 | A retry request has a posting deadline 24 hours after the first failure of its message, and no post starts at or after it. A request whose post is due then ends as `posting-deadline`. After its posting deadline, a request whose post the Relay accepted posts nothing more and waits for its content until its 14-day deadline. `OPERATION_EXPIRED` before the posting deadline ends the request as `posting-deadline` with acceptance unknown. Each `posting-deadline` end resets the session, emits one `onRetryTerminal` event and posts no replacement attempt | The Relay admits an epoch at most 24 hours behind its clock. Its `OPERATION_EXPIRED` also answers an accepted operation that left its retained period, so it does not prove that the Relay holds nothing. The founder ruling "DA1 F3 OPERATION_EXPIRED before the posting deadline: end as acceptance-unknown now, resend on proof after DA1-Q3 (2026-10-28, founder)" sets this end. The version 2 code `DELIVERY_ALREADY_ACCEPTED` proves that the Relay holds the attempt, so a retry request reads it as `RETRY_CONFLICT` and posts no replacement | Signal's server refuses a send only for a wrong device set, before it stores anything, so a Signal client repairs and sends again at once. Signal's Android client gives its retry receipt job a lifespan of one day | A stored attempt that gets `OPERATION_EXPIRED` before the posting deadline posts no attempt 2, ends as `posting-deadline`, resets the session and emits one `onRetryTerminal` event. A fresh attempt and a stale-session repeat end the same way. No retry request posts at or after its first failure plus 24 hours, also after a restart. A request whose post the Relay accepted posts nothing after its posting deadline and ends as `expired-content` at its deadline. The next major SDK version renames this class to `request-expired`. A retry request that SDK 13.3 stored derives the posting deadline from its first failure, at most its deadline. A stored `posting-deadline` record reads back, and an unknown terminal class or a posting deadline that is not a number still reads as corrupt |
|
|
991
|
+
| P10 | With a store that implements `listMetadataKeys`, as every built-in store does, the SDK replays each open send at start and when the Relay connection returns, ends each send at its posting deadline, and reports each end once through `onSendOutcome`. An internal send of the SDK, such as a sender key distribution, never reaches `onSendOutcome`. The SDK keeps no content of a sender key distribution at rest, so it does not replay one: with the listing method, it ends an open distribution at its deadline and reports nothing, and a retry request of the receiver recovers a lost distribution, as in Signal. An open sender key distribution that an earlier SDK version stored carries no marker, so the SDK reports `content-required` for it once for each client run before its deadline, and reports its end through `onSendOutcome` once, at its deadline. When the stored plaintext of an open send is gone or does not match the send, the SDK reports `content-required` once for each client run, and the send stays open until its deadline. On a custom store without the optional listing method, the SDK does not replay open sends by itself, and the application replays with the same `clientMessageId` | The founder ruling "Managed-group receive follows Signal's complete workflow (DA13-L correction)" keeps custom stores supported through a documented contract and conformance tests, so the store contract does not require the listing method. The SDK keeps the plaintext of a send only when the store and the content recovery policy keep resendable content | Signal's clients keep each pending send as a job, with its content, in their own database, and run the job queue at start and when the network returns. The SDK runs on a store that the application provides, and that store can keep no content | An open send replays at start under its stored epoch and bytes, and again when the Relay connection returns. A send past its deadline at start ends with the class that its stored progress gives, posts nothing, and reports once, also across a restart before the report. A send whose plaintext is gone or does not match its digest reports `content-required` once for each client run. A store without the method starts no driver, logs one line, and still reports the end of an application send, and the conformance suite skips its listing cases on that store |
|
|
992
|
+
|
|
963
993
|
---
|
|
964
994
|
|
|
965
995
|
## 6. Sealed sender
|