@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk 11.0.0 → 12.0.1
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/ADAPTERS.md +4 -4
- package/ARCHITECTURE.md +6 -8
- package/CHANGELOG.md +1348 -0
- package/README.md +1 -1
- package/SECURITY.md +2 -2
- package/TROUBLESHOOTING.md +8 -8
- package/client/README.md +70 -37
- package/device/README.md +39 -85
- package/dist/client/client.d.ts +334 -63
- package/dist/client/client.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/client.js +1175 -186
- package/dist/client/client.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/config.d.ts +57 -42
- package/dist/client/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/config.js +1 -1
- package/dist/client/config.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/constants.d.ts +42 -8
- package/dist/client/constants.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/constants.js +48 -3
- package/dist/client/constants.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/content-adapter.d.ts +80 -0
- package/dist/client/content-adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/content-adapter.js +225 -12
- package/dist/client/content-adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/delivery-error.d.ts +150 -0
- package/dist/client/delivery-error.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/delivery-error.js +226 -0
- package/dist/client/delivery-error.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/delivery-status.d.ts +32 -6
- package/dist/client/delivery-status.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/delivery-status.js +61 -13
- package/dist/client/delivery-status.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/device-set-reconciliation.d.ts +196 -0
- package/dist/client/device-set-reconciliation.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/device-set-reconciliation.js +282 -0
- package/dist/client/device-set-reconciliation.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/distribution-records.d.ts +29 -0
- package/dist/client/distribution-records.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/distribution-records.js +33 -0
- package/dist/client/distribution-records.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/event-hooks.d.ts +280 -14
- package/dist/client/event-hooks.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/event-hooks.js +8 -0
- package/dist/client/event-hooks.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-device-set.d.ts +47 -0
- package/dist/client/group-device-set.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-device-set.js +65 -0
- package/dist/client/group-device-set.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-fetcher.d.ts +116 -0
- package/dist/client/group-fetcher.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-fetcher.js +598 -0
- package/dist/client/group-fetcher.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.d.ts +172 -10
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.js +915 -74
- package/dist/client/group-outbox.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-receive-authorization.d.ts +127 -4
- package/dist/client/group-receive-authorization.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-receive-authorization.js +270 -20
- package/dist/client/group-receive-authorization.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.js +1 -0
- package/dist/client/group-sealed-sender.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-sender-key-operations.d.ts +14 -3
- package/dist/client/group-sender-key-operations.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/group-sender-key-operations.js +26 -5
- package/dist/client/group-sender-key-operations.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/groups.d.ts +5 -5
- package/dist/client/groups.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/groups.js +5 -4
- package/dist/client/groups.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-anonymous-delivery.d.ts +61 -9
- package/dist/client/hosted-anonymous-delivery.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-anonymous-delivery.js +242 -48
- package/dist/client/hosted-anonymous-delivery.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-assertion-id.d.ts +7 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-assertion-id.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-assertion-id.js +51 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-assertion-id.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/hosted-mailbox-subscription.d.ts +34 -2
- package/dist/client/hosted-mailbox-subscription.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-mailbox-subscription.js +87 -17
- package/dist/client/hosted-mailbox-subscription.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.d.ts +22 -4
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.js +75 -22
- package/dist/client/hosted-push.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.d.ts +22 -28
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.js +115 -55
- package/dist/client/hosted-transport.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted.d.ts +10 -4
- package/dist/client/hosted.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/hosted.js +10 -4
- package/dist/client/hosted.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/index.d.ts +5 -3
- package/dist/client/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/index.js +2 -0
- package/dist/client/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/messages.d.ts +25 -3
- package/dist/client/messages.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/messages.js +111 -20
- package/dist/client/messages.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/receive-admission.d.ts +58 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-admission.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-admission.js +78 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-admission.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-expiry.d.ts +31 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-expiry.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-expiry.js +35 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-expiry.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-hook-bound.d.ts +50 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-hook-bound.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-hook-bound.js +115 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-hook-bound.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-queue.d.ts +299 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-queue.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-queue.js +1420 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-queue.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-work-seed.d.ts +54 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-work-seed.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-work-seed.js +116 -0
- package/dist/client/receive-work-seed.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/recovery-driver.d.ts +25 -0
- package/dist/client/recovery-driver.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/recovery-driver.js +121 -0
- package/dist/client/recovery-driver.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/relay-acceptance.d.ts +20 -7
- package/dist/client/relay-acceptance.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-acceptance.js +30 -12
- package/dist/client/relay-acceptance.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-device-refusal.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/client/relay-device-refusal.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-device-refusal.js +31 -0
- package/dist/client/relay-device-refusal.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-sealed-route.d.ts +36 -0
- package/dist/client/relay-sealed-route.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/relay-sealed-route.js +45 -0
- package/dist/client/relay-sealed-route.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/relay-subscription.d.ts +56 -13
- package/dist/client/relay-subscription.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/relay-subscription.js +193 -123
- package/dist/client/relay-subscription.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/resendable-content.d.ts +98 -0
- package/dist/client/resendable-content.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/resendable-content.js +136 -0
- package/dist/client/resendable-content.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/retry-family.d.ts +57 -10
- package/dist/client/retry-family.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-family.js +54 -12
- package/dist/client/retry-family.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-request-envelope.d.ts +107 -8
- package/dist/client/retry-request-envelope.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-request-envelope.js +172 -23
- package/dist/client/retry-request-envelope.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-request-lifecycle.d.ts +70 -14
- package/dist/client/retry-request-lifecycle.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-request-lifecycle.js +162 -32
- package/dist/client/retry-request-lifecycle.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-terminal-recovery.d.ts +100 -0
- package/dist/client/retry-terminal-recovery.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/retry-terminal-recovery.js +164 -0
- package/dist/client/retry-terminal-recovery.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/retry-utils.d.ts +27 -0
- package/dist/client/retry-utils.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry-utils.js +46 -0
- package/dist/client/retry-utils.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry.d.ts +100 -12
- package/dist/client/retry.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/retry.js +619 -116
- package/dist/client/retry.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender.d.ts +23 -6
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender.js +30 -6
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/sessions.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/client/sessions.js +2 -2
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts +726 -19
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js +2260 -342
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/state.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/client/state.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/state.js +11 -1
- package/dist/client/state.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/storage-protection.d.ts +64 -0
- package/dist/client/storage-protection.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/storage-protection.js +150 -0
- package/dist/client/storage-protection.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts +149 -15
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/client/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/constants.d.ts +0 -5
- package/dist/device/constants.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/constants.js +0 -5
- package/dist/device/constants.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/expo/index.d.ts +4 -17
- package/dist/device/expo/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/expo/index.js +4 -23
- package/dist/device/expo/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/index.d.ts +0 -2
- package/dist/device/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/index.js +0 -7
- package/dist/device/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/lifecycle/manager.d.ts +5 -4
- package/dist/device/lifecycle/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/lifecycle/manager.js +16 -16
- package/dist/device/lifecycle/manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/lifecycle/types.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/device/lifecycle/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/react-native/index.d.ts +4 -15
- package/dist/device/react-native/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/react-native/index.js +4 -21
- package/dist/device/react-native/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/device/types.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/groups/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/groups/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +8 -6
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +2 -1
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/ec/x25519-validation.d.ts +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/ec/x25519-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/ec/x25519-validation.js +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/ec/x25519-validation.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/validation.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/internal/groups/index.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/index.js +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts +37 -16
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js +46 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/receive-record.d.ts +78 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/receive-record.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/receive-record.js +43 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/receive-record.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.d.ts +27 -3
- package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.js +151 -19
- package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/wire.d.ts +12 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/wire.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/wire.js +36 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/wire.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/manager/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/manager/manager.d.ts +26 -20
- package/dist/internal/manager/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/manager/manager.js +64 -41
- package/dist/internal/manager/manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/chains.d.ts +4 -18
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/chains.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/chains.js +23 -74
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/chains.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/ratchet.d.ts +5 -7
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/ratchet.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/ratchet.js +4 -6
- package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/ratchet.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/pqxdh/pqxdh.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/pqxdh/pqxdh.js +2 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/pqxdh/pqxdh.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts +6 -8
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js +8 -9
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/handoff-ledger.d.ts +110 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/handoff-ledger.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/handoff-ledger.js +124 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/handoff-ledger.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts +71 -62
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js +228 -175
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/index.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/index.js +2 -2
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/serialize.d.ts +9 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/serialize.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/serialize.js +56 -16
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/serialize.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/spqr.d.ts +1 -14
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/spqr.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/spqr.js +54 -42
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/spqr.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/validate.d.ts +26 -6
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/validate.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/validate.js +49 -21
- package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/validate.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/sesame/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/sesame/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/sesame/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/sesame/manager.d.ts +66 -13
- package/dist/internal/sesame/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/sesame/manager.js +221 -87
- package/dist/internal/sesame/manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/sesame/types.d.ts +95 -17
- package/dist/internal/sesame/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/sesame/types.js +17 -0
- package/dist/internal/sesame/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/builder.d.ts +5 -5
- package/dist/internal/session/builder.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/builder.js +12 -17
- package/dist/internal/session/builder.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/cipher.d.ts +15 -13
- package/dist/internal/session/cipher.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/cipher.js +41 -23
- package/dist/internal/session/cipher.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/factory.d.ts +5 -5
- package/dist/internal/session/factory.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/factory.js +4 -4
- package/dist/internal/session/factory.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/handshake.d.ts +14 -16
- package/dist/internal/session/handshake.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/handshake.js +18 -75
- package/dist/internal/session/handshake.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/record-locks.d.ts +17 -6
- package/dist/internal/session/record-locks.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/record-locks.js +43 -7
- package/dist/internal/session/record-locks.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/session-resolver.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/session-resolver.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/state.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/internal/session/state.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/types.d.ts +5 -13
- package/dist/internal/session/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/session/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/keys/generation.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/keys/generation.js +2 -2
- package/dist/keys/types.d.ts +5 -5
- package/dist/keys/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/keys/types.js +1 -1
- package/dist/layers.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/layers.js +2 -2
- package/dist/layers.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js +12 -8
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/adapter.d.ts +76 -10
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/adapter.js +367 -61
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/backend-conformance.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/backend-conformance.js +74 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/backend-conformance.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/batch.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/batch.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/batch.js +26 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/batch.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/receive-work.d.ts +55 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/receive-work.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/receive-work.js +162 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/receive-work.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/send-log.d.ts +61 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/send-log.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/send-log.js +430 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/send-log.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/sender-key-handoff.d.ts +68 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/sender-key-handoff.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/sender-key-handoff.js +189 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/sender-key-handoff.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/storage.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/local/store/key-value/storage.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/keyed-index.d.ts +23 -0
- package/dist/local/store/keyed-index.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/keyed-index.js +41 -0
- package/dist/local/store/keyed-index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.d.ts +44 -12
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.js +197 -46
- package/dist/local/store/memory/adapter.js.map +1 -1
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- package/dist/local/store/memory/send-log.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/memory/send-log.js +190 -0
- package/dist/local/store/memory/send-log.js.map +1 -0
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- package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.js +8 -6
- package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.js.map +1 -1
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- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js +12 -8
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js.map +1 -1
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- package/dist/local/store/receive-work.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/receive-work.js +204 -0
- package/dist/local/store/receive-work.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/received-content.d.ts +3 -3
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- package/dist/local/store/received-content.js +2 -11
- package/dist/local/store/received-content.js.map +1 -1
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- package/dist/local/store/reliability.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.js +371 -46
- package/dist/local/store/reliability.js.map +1 -1
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- package/dist/local/store/sender-key-handoff-index.js +101 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sender-key-handoff-index.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sender-key-handoff-table.d.ts +29 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sender-key-handoff-table.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sender-key-handoff-table.js +97 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sender-key-handoff-table.js.map +1 -0
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- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/encryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/encryption.js +9 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/encryption.js.map +1 -1
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- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/index.js +68 -7
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/message-records.d.ts +16 -4
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/message-records.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/message-records.js +49 -6
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/message-records.js.map +1 -1
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- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/metadata.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/metadata.js +17 -15
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/metadata.js.map +1 -1
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- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/receive-work.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/receive-work.js +98 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/receive-work.js.map +1 -0
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- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/send-log.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/send-log.js +178 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/send-log.js.map +1 -0
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- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/sender-key-handoff.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/sender-key-handoff.js +75 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/sender-key-handoff.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/session-trust.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/session-trust.js +5 -5
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/key-storage/session-trust.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/migrations.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/migrations.js +101 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/migrations.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/index.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/index.js +5 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/message-record.d.ts +15 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/message-record.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/message-record.js +24 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/message-record.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/send-log.d.ts +51 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/send-log.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/send-log.js +206 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/models/send-log.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/open-store.d.ts +9 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/open-store.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/open-store.js +20 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/open-store.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/schema.d.ts +34 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/schema.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/schema.js +14 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/schema.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/store.d.ts +61 -11
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/store.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/store.js +191 -27
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/store.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/web/sqlite3mc/sqlite3.mjs +2 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/web/worker.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/web/worker.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/web/worker.js +64 -2
- package/dist/local/store/sqlite/web/worker.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts +76 -8
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js +579 -127
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/receive-work.d.ts +57 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/receive-work.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/receive-work.js +99 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/receive-work.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/send-log.d.ts +92 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/send-log.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/send-log.js +267 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/send-log.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/sender-key-handoff.d.ts +81 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/sender-key-handoff.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/sender-key-handoff.js +156 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/sender-key-handoff.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web-sqlite/adapter.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web-sqlite/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web-sqlite/adapter.js +12 -6
- package/dist/local/store/web-sqlite/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/custody.d.ts +8 -0
- package/dist/local/vault/custody.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/vault/custody.js +9 -0
- package/dist/local/vault/custody.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/local/vault/electron-safe-storage.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/electron-safe-storage.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/electron-safe-storage.js +2 -0
- package/dist/local/vault/electron-safe-storage.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/expo-secure-store.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/expo-secure-store.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/expo-secure-store.js +2 -0
- package/dist/local/vault/expo-secure-store.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/indexed-db.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/indexed-db.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/indexed-db.js +2 -0
- package/dist/local/vault/indexed-db.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/react-native-keychain.d.ts +3 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/react-native-keychain.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/vault/react-native-keychain.js +2 -0
- package/dist/local/vault/react-native-keychain.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/device-set.d.ts +94 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/device-set.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/device-set.js +156 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/device-set.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts +92 -107
- package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/safety/core.d.ts +15 -6
- package/dist/safety/core.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/safety/core.js +41 -27
- package/dist/safety/core.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/safety/index.d.ts +2 -1
- package/dist/safety/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/safety/index.js +12 -18
- package/dist/safety/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/api.d.ts +707 -62
- package/dist/types/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.d.ts +14 -33
- package/dist/types/errors.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/errors.js +14 -24
- package/dist/types/errors.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/messages.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/types/messages.js +1 -1
- package/dist/types/protocol-config.d.ts +175 -42
- package/dist/types/protocol-config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/protocol-config.js +19 -38
- package/dist/types/protocol-config.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/protocol-constants.d.ts +6 -6
- package/dist/types/protocol-constants.js +6 -6
- package/dist/types/session.d.ts +7 -7
- package/dist/types/session.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/session.js +39 -21
- package/dist/types/session.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/username/link.d.ts +2 -2
- package/dist/username/link.js +2 -2
- package/dist/utils/origin-lock.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/utils/origin-lock.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/utils/origin-lock.js +80 -0
- package/dist/utils/origin-lock.js.map +1 -0
- package/docs/ASSURANCE.md +6 -6
- package/docs/CLIENT_COMPOSITION.md +2 -2
- package/docs/DEVIATIONS.md +677 -182
- package/docs/E2EE.md +1 -1
- package/docs/ERROR_HANDLING.md +165 -2
- package/docs/GETTING_STARTED.md +7 -4
- package/docs/INTERFACES.md +1 -1
- package/docs/PACKAGE_SURFACE.md +6 -5
- package/docs/PROTOCOL_POLICY.md +102 -22
- package/docs/RECIPES.md +3 -15
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +90 -5
- package/keys/README.md +3 -3
- package/local/store/README.md +78 -14
- package/local/store/key-value/README.md +14 -3
- package/local/store/node/README.md +8 -3
- package/local/store/web/README.md +9 -0
- package/local/store/web-sqlite/README.md +14 -2
- package/local/vault/README.md +21 -0
- package/package.json +1 -6
- package/remote/README.md +0 -1
- package/remote/relay/README.md +2 -2
- package/dist/device/provisioning.d.ts +0 -242
- package/dist/device/provisioning.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/device/provisioning.js +0 -421
- package/dist/device/provisioning.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/index.d.ts +0 -15
- package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/index.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/index.js +0 -13
- package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/index.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/x3dh.d.ts +0 -131
- package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/x3dh.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/x3dh.js +0 -261
- package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/x3dh.js.map +0 -1
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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# Changelog
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## 12.0.1
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4
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5
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- **Fixed: a web SQLite store restores the last commit after a tab died inside a
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commit.** The `opfs-sahpool` VFS of the vendored engine reported a reserved
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lock on every check. SQLite then took the hot journal that a tab killed
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inside a commit left for the journal of a live transaction and never played
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9
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it back, so the next open read the half-written commit. In 12.0.0 and
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earlier, such a store could report `database disk image is malformed`. The
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patched engine reports no reserved lock, and the next open of such a store
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12
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plays the journal back.
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14
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- **Fixed: a web SQLite open with the wrong key state leaves the file as it was.**
|
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15
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The open reads the first page of the file through an immutable read-only
|
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connection with no key before it opens the file. An open with no key of an
|
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encrypted file, or an open with a key of a plaintext file, rejects with
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`file is not a database` and plays no hot journal back. In 12.0.0 and
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earlier, such an open of a file with a hot journal played the journal back
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through the wrong key state and left the file corrupt.
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- **Fixed: `ratchetConfig.maxSkip` sets the skip limit.** The client passes
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`SignalProtocolClientConfig.ratchetConfig.maxSkip` to the session cipher of
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the protocol manager that it creates. In 12.0.0 and earlier, the client did
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not read the option. A gap above the limit fails with
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`TOO_MANY_SKIPPED_MESSAGES`. The default is 25000, which is the value that
|
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the cipher used before. The API reference said 1000 and now says 25000. A
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value that is not a positive integer fails at client creation with
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`ratchetConfig.maxSkip must be a positive integer.` A `protocolManager` that
|
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the caller supplies keeps its own limit. The client does not read
|
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`maxMessageKeysStored` or `keyExpirationMs`. Their reference now states the
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fixed values: 2000 skipped message keys per receiver chain, deleted after 7
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days.
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## 12.0.0
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- **Breaking: every new session uses PQXDH, and the SDK has no classical key
|
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39
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agreement.** A peer bundle without an ML-KEM prekey fails with
|
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`PQXDH_REQUIRED`, and no setting allows a classical X3DH session.
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`'required'` is the only `postQuantum` value. `PostQuantumPolicy.Compatible`
|
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and the `'compatible'` value are removed, and `postQuantum: 'compatible'`
|
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throws `Unsupported postQuantum policy` at client creation.
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44
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`ProtocolStrategyConfig.allowClassicalFallback` is removed, and the SDK
|
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45
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ignores the key from an untyped caller. `ClassicalFallbackReason` is removed
|
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46
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from `./client/config` and `./types`. `ProtocolSelectionEvent` no longer
|
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carries `usedClassicalFallback` or `classicalFallbackReason`.
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`X3DH_INFO_DEFAULT` is removed from `./client/config` and `./types`, and
|
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49
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`ResolvedKeyExchangeInfoStrings` carries only `pqxdh`. `PQXDHFallbackType`,
|
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50
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`PQXDHRequiredErrorOptions.fallbackType`, and `PQXDHRequiredError.fallbackType`
|
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51
|
+
are removed; read `PQXDHRequiredError.reason` (`no_kyber_prekey` or
|
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52
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+
`pqxdh_failed`) instead. The X3DH module and its `performX3DH`,
|
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53
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+
`performX3DHResponder`, `calculateX3DHSharedSecret`, `EphemeralKeyPair`,
|
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`X3DHResult`, `X3DHResponderInput`, and `X3DHResponderResult` exports are
|
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removed. `validateProtocolStrategy` no
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longer warns about a classical fallback. A stored 11.x classical session
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continues as a Double Ratchet session.
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- **Breaking: the managed device link is the one link path.** The SDK no
|
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+
longer ships the device provisioning protocol. `linkHostedRelayDevice()` is
|
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+
the one way to link a device. A linked device gets the account identity by
|
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device transfer or by an application-owned channel. The managed device link
|
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runs in one process that holds the active device's store and the new
|
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+
device's store. It sends no private key to the Relay. These public names
|
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+
are removed: the `./device/provisioning` subpath and its exports
|
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+
`DEFAULT_PROVISIONING_LINK_PREFIX`, `LocalDeviceMetadata`,
|
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`ProvisioningGroupStateStore`, `ProvisioningIdentityStore`,
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+
`ProvisioningKeyPair`, `ProvisioningLocalStateStore`, `ProvisioningMessage`,
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68
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+
`ProvisioningQRData`, `ProvisioningReceiveOptions`, `ProvisioningSendOptions`,
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`ProvisioningUsernameStateStore`, `UserProfile`, `cancelProvisioning`,
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+
`connectToProvisioningSession`, `generateProvisioningQR`,
|
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+
`parseProvisioningQR`, `provisionDevice` and `receiveProvisioningMessage`,
|
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with their `./device` re-exports; `PROVISIONING_SESSION_TTL_MS` from
|
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73
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+
`./device/constants`; `getDeviceMetadata` from `./device/expo` and
|
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74
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+
`./device/react-native`; `ProvisioningService` from `./remote/relay/types`;
|
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75
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+
the `SignalProtocolRelayServer` methods `createProvisioningSession`,
|
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+
`connectNewDevice`, `sendProvisioningMessage`, `getProvisioningMessage`,
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77
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+
`completeProvisioning`, `acknowledgeProvisioning`, `rollbackProvisioning` and
|
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78
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+
`deleteProvisioningSession`, with their `HostedRelayHttpTransport` members;
|
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79
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+
and `DeviceChoice.requiresQR`. A relay adapter drops these methods.
|
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80
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+
- **Fixed: a blocked head of the mailbox no longer stalls the HTTP pull.**
|
|
81
|
+
A mailbox pull, and so `pullHostedRelayAfterWake`, now sends the Relay
|
|
82
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+
cursor of the page before it, so the pull moves past a full page of
|
|
83
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+
unacknowledged envelopes and gives the messages and Relay receipts behind
|
|
84
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+
it. Three kinds of envelope stay unacknowledged: an envelope that the
|
|
85
|
+
receive bounds refuse, a decrypt failure that no retry request owns, and
|
|
86
|
+
a retry request that waits for the next group fetch. The cursor lives in
|
|
87
|
+
memory only. An empty page, a page without a Relay cursor, a failed pull,
|
|
88
|
+
and a restart clear it, so the next pull starts at the head and offers
|
|
89
|
+
those envelopes again. The recovery pull after failed work also starts at
|
|
90
|
+
the head. Advancing
|
|
91
|
+
the cursor acknowledges nothing, so the Relay keeps each envelope. Before,
|
|
92
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+
a full page of such envelopes came back on each pull, and the messages
|
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93
|
+
behind it waited.
|
|
94
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+
- **Changed: hosted registration and recovery accept a native assertion with
|
|
95
|
+
no `jti`.** The transport binds the challenge to the exact assertion,
|
|
96
|
+
purpose, and operation ID. The Relay verifies the configured provider and
|
|
97
|
+
rejects an invalid token. An assertion with a valid `jti` keeps that
|
|
98
|
+
identifier.
|
|
99
|
+
- **Breaking: a send declares its device sets, and the Relay compares
|
|
100
|
+
them.** Each post to an account declares the device IDs that the sender
|
|
101
|
+
holds records for. `Envelope.declaredDeviceIds` carries the declaration of
|
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102
|
+
a direct post, and the hosted transport sends it as `deviceSets`.
|
|
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|
+
`SignalProtocolRelayServer.sendMultiRecipientUnidentified` takes a 9th
|
|
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|
+
argument, `deviceSets`, for a sealed post. The relay `send()` returns the
|
|
105
|
+
optional `deviceSetChecked` and `needsSync`.
|
|
106
|
+
`sendMultiRecipientUnidentified` returns the optional `deviceSetChecked`
|
|
107
|
+
and `refusals`. The Relay refuses a declaration that does not match with
|
|
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|
+
409 `DEVICE_SET_MISMATCH`, which names the missing and the extra devices,
|
|
109
|
+
or with 410 `STALE_DEVICE`, which names the devices whose registration
|
|
110
|
+
changed. The SDK then removes each extra device record, starts a new
|
|
111
|
+
session with each missing or stale device, encrypts the message again only
|
|
112
|
+
for those devices, and posts again. The hosted transport finds each device
|
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|
+
in the device directory before it posts, on the identified and on the
|
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114
|
+
sealed route. A declared post to a device that the directory does not list
|
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|
+
fails before the post with the 409 `DEVICE_SET_MISMATCH` refusal of the
|
|
116
|
+
Relay, which names the device as extra, so the SDK removes the device
|
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|
+
record and posts again. A device that the Relay accepted keeps
|
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118
|
+
its stored post. A send has a recipient phase and then a sync phase, and
|
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each phase can restart 10 times. When the recipient phase does not match
|
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|
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after the 10th restart, or the Relay refuses a restart post with
|
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121
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+
`OPERATION_EXPIRED`, the send throws the new
|
|
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|
+
`DeviceSetReconciliationError`. The outbox keeps the send as terminal, and
|
|
123
|
+
a call of `send()` with the same `clientMessageId` starts a new run at 0
|
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|
+
restarts. A group restart keeps the group ciphertext, seals the shared body
|
|
125
|
+
again, and replaces it in one write. A device-specific resend, a receipt,
|
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126
|
+
and a retry request declare nothing. A custom relay and a wrapper of a
|
|
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|
+
relay do not compare, get no declaration, and keep the device list reads. `docs/DEVIATIONS.md` sections 5.5 and 5.6 compare this
|
|
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|
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loop with Signal's.
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|
+
- **Breaking: a send to a recipient with a session reads no device list on a
|
|
130
|
+
comparing relay.** The Relay refuses a declared post that misses a device
|
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|
+
or names a removed one, so the 60 s freshness window applies only to a
|
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|
+
relay that does not compare. A recipient with no session gets one list
|
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read to start the sessions. A group send declares the devices of its
|
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+
records, and reads the list of a member only when it holds no record for
|
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135
|
+
that member. A replay reads no device list. One exception holds in a live
|
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|
+
send and in a replay. A repair that leaves an account with no device
|
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|
+
record reads the list of that account once.
|
|
138
|
+
- **Breaking: the own device list is read only on `needsSync`.** On a
|
|
139
|
+
comparing relay, the recipient phase posts first. Its receipt sets
|
|
140
|
+
`needsSync` when the sender account has other devices. The sync phase then
|
|
141
|
+
declares the own devices that the sender holds records for. When the
|
|
142
|
+
sender holds no record of another own device, the send reads the own list
|
|
143
|
+
once. A failed read no longer fails the send. The recipient result is
|
|
144
|
+
stored first, and the result carries `syncPending: true` when the sync
|
|
145
|
+
phase does not complete or the own list cannot be read. Call `send()`
|
|
146
|
+
again with the same `clientMessageId` to post the pending copies. A replay
|
|
147
|
+
reads the own list again when the send could not read it. The SDK makes no
|
|
148
|
+
sync post without a destination.
|
|
149
|
+
- **Breaking: a custom store keeps the device-set fields of an outgoing
|
|
150
|
+
intent.** An outgoing intent adds `deviceSetRestarts`,
|
|
151
|
+
`deviceSetUnresolved`, `deviceSetBundleMissing`, and `syncPending`. A
|
|
152
|
+
custom metadata store must keep each field of the stored intent value,
|
|
153
|
+
also a field that it does not know.
|
|
154
|
+
The fields need no schema step, because they live in the existing JSON
|
|
155
|
+
value of the intent.
|
|
156
|
+
- **Breaking: a refused group-token destination is no longer inferred as
|
|
157
|
+
stale.** The group-token receipt names each refused destination with its
|
|
158
|
+
code in `refusals`. A `STALE_DEVICE` destination leaves the shared group
|
|
159
|
+
message and gets the device repair once. A `NOT_FOUND` destination of a
|
|
160
|
+
declared post settles a removed account: the SDK adds nothing for it, and
|
|
161
|
+
`uuids404` names the account only when the receipt is not a duplicate.
|
|
162
|
+
`SendResult.refusedDestinationCount` stays a count, and the SDK infers no
|
|
163
|
+
code from it.
|
|
164
|
+
- **Breaking: a repair fails the send on a session error other than a
|
|
165
|
+
missing bundle.** When the start of a new session for a refused device
|
|
166
|
+
fails for another reason, such as an untrusted identity, the send fails
|
|
167
|
+
with that error. A listed device with no prekey bundle makes the send wait
|
|
168
|
+
and restart, and counts each restart. The repair write stores each such
|
|
169
|
+
device in the outbox. A replay after a process restart, a stop, or a
|
|
170
|
+
terminal end starts a session with each stored device before its first
|
|
171
|
+
post, so the device gets the message when it has a bundle again. When the
|
|
172
|
+
send holds no message for an account, a bundle fetch that the Relay
|
|
173
|
+
answers with `NOT_FOUND` removes the record of the device. The Relay gives
|
|
174
|
+
that answer for an unregistered device, and for a registered device with
|
|
175
|
+
no uploaded prekeys. Each other device that the account record holds gets
|
|
176
|
+
the message in the same repair when it has a session or a bundle. An
|
|
177
|
+
account left with no device record gets one list read, and a listed device
|
|
178
|
+
with no bundle waits again within the restart bound. Thus a replay reaches a device that the account linked
|
|
179
|
+
after an unlink. Before, a replay of a send whose recipient had no other
|
|
180
|
+
device failed with `SESSION_NOT_FOUND`, and a group replay completed
|
|
181
|
+
without the member.
|
|
182
|
+
- **Added: `SendResult.syncPending`.** It is true when the Relay accepted
|
|
183
|
+
the send for every recipient device and the copies for the other devices
|
|
184
|
+
of the own account are not posted yet.
|
|
185
|
+
- **Added: the `onRelayProtocolError` hook and `RelayProtocolError`.** The
|
|
186
|
+
Relay marks each accepted declared post with `deviceSetChecked`. When an
|
|
187
|
+
accepted declared post has no mark, the send is delivered and its result
|
|
188
|
+
does not change. The client reports a `RelayProtocolError` with the code
|
|
189
|
+
`DEVICE_SET_UNCHECKED` and the route of the post once for the send through
|
|
190
|
+
`onRelayProtocolError`. A sync copy to another own device is a declared
|
|
191
|
+
post too, on the `identified-direct` route. A sync payload of a method such
|
|
192
|
+
as `syncReadToLinkedDevices` reports its error once with no
|
|
193
|
+
`clientMessageId`. The new exported types are
|
|
194
|
+
`DeviceSetReconciliationError`, `RelayProtocolError`, `DeviceSetDevice`,
|
|
195
|
+
`DeviceSetLastRefusal`, `DeviceSetPhase`, `DeviceSetRefusalAccount`,
|
|
196
|
+
`DeviceSetUnresolved`, `DeviceSetUnresolvedReason`,
|
|
197
|
+
`RelayProtocolErrorCode`, and `RelayProtocolRoute`.
|
|
198
|
+
- **Added: `HostedAnonymousDeliveryError.data`.** The error keeps the
|
|
199
|
+
`details` object of the Relay answer. For a refused declared post, it
|
|
200
|
+
names the missing, the extra, or the stale devices.
|
|
201
|
+
- **Breaking: the skipped-key cap applies to each receiver chain.** A
|
|
202
|
+
receiver chain keeps at most `maxMessageKeysStored` skipped message keys,
|
|
203
|
+
2000 by default, as libsignal keeps `MAX_MESSAGE_KEYS` for each chain. When
|
|
204
|
+
a chain is at the cap, its key with the lowest index leaves. A store to one
|
|
205
|
+
chain never evicts a key of another chain. Before this change, the cap
|
|
206
|
+
applied to all five chains together, and the oldest key of any chain left.
|
|
207
|
+
A session now keeps up to 2000 keys in each of its five chains. The 7-day
|
|
208
|
+
`maxMessageKeyAge` limit does not change. `countTotalMessageKeys` and
|
|
209
|
+
`evictOldestMessageKey` are removed from the double-ratchet exports.
|
|
210
|
+
- **Breaking: a receive pass waits for each hook for at most 2 minutes.**
|
|
211
|
+
The new `protocol.receiveQueue.receiveHookTimeoutMs` option sets the
|
|
212
|
+
bound. The default is 120000 ms. The value must be a positive integer of
|
|
213
|
+
at most 2147483647 ms, so `create()` refuses zero, a negative value, a
|
|
214
|
+
fraction, and `Infinity`. The bound applies to each hook that a receive
|
|
215
|
+
pass awaits. At the bound, the SDK logs a warning with the
|
|
216
|
+
`RECEIVE_HOOK_TIMEOUT` behavior and no longer waits for the hook. A
|
|
217
|
+
timeout of `onMessageDecrypted` or `onDelivered` counts as one failed hook
|
|
218
|
+
attempt, with the normal backoff and attempt cap, and it logs no
|
|
219
|
+
`RECEIVE_HOOK_FAILED` warning. A timeout of another hook ends that call,
|
|
220
|
+
and the pass continues. A hook that settles after its bound writes
|
|
221
|
+
nothing. An application whose hook can run longer than 2 minutes sets a
|
|
222
|
+
larger bound.
|
|
223
|
+
- **Breaking: a delivery receipt stops its retries 1 day after it becomes
|
|
224
|
+
due.** One Signal client gives its delivery receipt job the same 1-day
|
|
225
|
+
lifespan.
|
|
226
|
+
When a receive record waits for its delivery receipt for 1 day,
|
|
227
|
+
the SDK completes the record. It sends no receipt, it does not call
|
|
228
|
+
`onMessageDecrypted` again, and it gives no `onReceiveExpired` report,
|
|
229
|
+
because the application already has the content. A resend record still
|
|
230
|
+
reports `onDeliveryRecovered`. The 30-day receive age still applies, so a
|
|
231
|
+
record whose age ends first completes at its age. Before this change, a
|
|
232
|
+
receipt retried until the receive age of 30 days.
|
|
233
|
+
- **Breaking: SPQR skipped keys leave by index distance in each epoch, not
|
|
234
|
+
by age.** The SPQR receive path now keeps held skipped keys as the
|
|
235
|
+
SparsePostQuantumRatchet chain keeps its key history. Each epoch keeps at
|
|
236
|
+
most `maxOutOfOrderKeys` keys after a trim, 2000 by default. A key whose
|
|
237
|
+
index plus `maxOutOfOrderKeys` is below the receive counter of its epoch
|
|
238
|
+
is refused with `DECRYPTION_FAILED` and the reason `key-trimmed`. A
|
|
239
|
+
receive holds only the skipped keys at or above its own horizon. A jump
|
|
240
|
+
above `maxOutOfOrderKeys` clears the held keys of that epoch. When an epoch
|
|
241
|
+
holds 2201 keys, the keys behind the horizon leave. No eviction reads the
|
|
242
|
+
clock, and the `timestamp` field stays in the persisted shape. When the
|
|
243
|
+
send epoch prunes an old epoch, the held keys of that epoch leave with its
|
|
244
|
+
chains, so a key of a pruned epoch no longer decrypts. Before this change,
|
|
245
|
+
the trim ran only when all epochs together held 2000 keys, and one receive
|
|
246
|
+
then added every key of its gap, up to 24999 keys. The internal
|
|
247
|
+
`deserializeSPQRState` loader refused a state above 2000 keys. It now
|
|
248
|
+
keeps the highest 2200 indexes of each epoch, drops the keys of an epoch
|
|
249
|
+
with no chain, and logs one warning with the dropped count. The
|
|
250
|
+
`cleanupSPQRState` export and `SPQR_CONFIG.MAX_SKIPPED_KEY_AGE` are
|
|
251
|
+
removed from the SPQR module for the 12.0.0 cut, because no receive path
|
|
252
|
+
called them. `trimSkippedKeys` is replaced by
|
|
253
|
+
`trimEpochSkippedKeys(state, epoch)`.
|
|
254
|
+
- **Breaking: safety numbers order the two parties as libsignal does.**
|
|
255
|
+
Each party gets its own 30-digit display string. The string that is lower
|
|
256
|
+
by byte comparison comes first, in the 60 digits, the emoji, and the hex.
|
|
257
|
+
The SDK no longer compares the two user identifiers, so no locale and no
|
|
258
|
+
identifier character can change the order. For some identifier pairs, the
|
|
259
|
+
displayed safety number of 12.0.0 differs from the one of 11.x. The 30
|
|
260
|
+
digits of each party do not change, and only their order changes. This
|
|
261
|
+
applies to `client.verify()` and `generateCompositeSafetyNumber`, and also
|
|
262
|
+
to `generateSingleKeyReferenceSafetyNumber`, `Fingerprint`, and
|
|
263
|
+
`createFingerprintData`. The composite QR profile version steps from 3 to
|
|
264
|
+
4 for the 12.0.0 cut. A QR code from an 11.x client then reports
|
|
265
|
+
`version_mismatch`, not `no_match`. The single-key QR profile stays at
|
|
266
|
+
version 2, because the new order makes its output equal to libsignal
|
|
267
|
+
version 2.
|
|
268
|
+
- **Breaking: a safety-number confirmation from an earlier version is
|
|
269
|
+
refused.** `SafetyNumberConfirmation.version` steps from 1 to 2 with the
|
|
270
|
+
composite QR profile step. `confirmSafetyNumber` refuses a version 1
|
|
271
|
+
confirmation with the unsupported-version error, not with
|
|
272
|
+
`IDENTITY_MISMATCH`. The app calls `verify()` again and shows the new safety
|
|
273
|
+
number.
|
|
274
|
+
- **Fixed: a cached safety number keeps the QR orientation of its caller.**
|
|
275
|
+
Before, the cache gave the swapped call for the other party the same cached
|
|
276
|
+
result. Its QR code then carried the first caller's orientation, so a scan
|
|
277
|
+
against the other party's QR code reported `no_match`. The cache now keeps
|
|
278
|
+
one entry for each orientation.
|
|
279
|
+
- **Fixed: an archived session no longer sends a PreKeyMessage.** When a
|
|
280
|
+
session moves to the archive, the SDK now clears its unacknowledged prekey
|
|
281
|
+
state: the pending flag, the prekey IDs, and the Kyber and KEM one-time
|
|
282
|
+
ciphertexts, as libsignal does. Before, a session that was archived before
|
|
283
|
+
the peer replied kept that state, and a later promotion made its next send
|
|
284
|
+
a PreKeyMessage for prekeys that the peer could already have deleted. The
|
|
285
|
+
in-memory store archive now follows the same record rule, so it also keeps
|
|
286
|
+
at most 40 archived sessions.
|
|
287
|
+
- **Changed: archived sessions are evicted by insertion order, not by last
|
|
288
|
+
use.** Over 40 archived sessions, the session that went into the archive
|
|
289
|
+
first leaves, as libsignal does. Before, the session with the oldest
|
|
290
|
+
`lastUsedAt` left. A session archived again under the same base key moves
|
|
291
|
+
to the newest end.
|
|
292
|
+
- **Breaking: a removed device keeps its record and its archived sessions.**
|
|
293
|
+
`SesameManager.removeDevice` now archives the current session of the
|
|
294
|
+
device, keeps the record, and marks it removed with the new
|
|
295
|
+
`DeviceRecord.removedAt` field. Before, the removal deleted the record and
|
|
296
|
+
its sessions, so a message that the device sent before its removal did not
|
|
297
|
+
decrypt. Now that message decrypts on the archived session. A removed
|
|
298
|
+
device gets no fan-out: a send, a sync copy, a receipt, and a sender-key
|
|
299
|
+
distribution skip it. A send to a user whose devices are all removed fails
|
|
300
|
+
with `NO_DEVICES`. A second removal of the same device writes nothing and
|
|
301
|
+
emits no second `onDeviceRemoved` event.
|
|
302
|
+
- **Changed: a device list that names a removed device again relists it.**
|
|
303
|
+
The removed marker clears, and the device returns to fan-out with no
|
|
304
|
+
current session. The archived sessions stay. The relist emits
|
|
305
|
+
`onDeviceAdded` once. A group send to a removed member device reads its
|
|
306
|
+
device list again before it gives the sender key. A device that is still
|
|
307
|
+
removed after that read gets no key. The new
|
|
308
|
+
`SesameManager.relistDevice` call relists one device.
|
|
309
|
+
- **Changed: a declared send counts a removed device record as absent.**
|
|
310
|
+
On a comparing relay, a send declares only the devices whose records are
|
|
311
|
+
not marked removed. A repair that removes an extra device, or a device
|
|
312
|
+
whose bundle fetch the Relay answers with `NOT_FOUND`, marks its record.
|
|
313
|
+
A member or an own account whose every record is marked removed gets the
|
|
314
|
+
list read of an account with no record. A repair that starts a session
|
|
315
|
+
with a missing device relists its record, so the next post declares it.
|
|
316
|
+
- **Changed: an identity change keeps the archived sessions.** When a device
|
|
317
|
+
list gives a new identity key for a device, the SDK archives the current
|
|
318
|
+
session, takes the new key, and marks the device pending verification.
|
|
319
|
+
Before, it deleted the record and its sessions and added the device again,
|
|
320
|
+
with an `onDeviceRemoved` and an `onDeviceAdded` event. Now a message under
|
|
321
|
+
the old session still decrypts, and the change emits no device event. A
|
|
322
|
+
removed device whose identity changes is relisted, with one
|
|
323
|
+
`onDeviceAdded` event.
|
|
324
|
+
- **Changed: the client deletes stale device records at each start.** The
|
|
325
|
+
receive queue runs `cleanupStaleRecords` once in each run, after its
|
|
326
|
+
resume. A removed record goes when its removal is older than `maxLatency`,
|
|
327
|
+
30 days by default. The cleanup also deletes a record that has no session
|
|
328
|
+
and is older than `maxLatency`. Before, no SDK path ran the cleanup.
|
|
329
|
+
- **Breaking: a custom store keeps and deletes removed device records.** A
|
|
330
|
+
`SesameStore` must keep the `removedAt` field of a device record.
|
|
331
|
+
`deleteStaleRecords` must also delete a record for which
|
|
332
|
+
`isExpiredRemovedDevice` is true. `getSesameDeviceIds` still returns the
|
|
333
|
+
removed devices, and a caller that sends to the devices skips them with
|
|
334
|
+
`isRemovedDevice`.
|
|
335
|
+
- **Breaking: the SQLite schema moves to version 6 and the IndexedDB database
|
|
336
|
+
to version 11.** Neither step changes a table or an object store. The steps
|
|
337
|
+
keep an earlier SDK, which sends to a removed device, from opening the
|
|
338
|
+
store. An earlier SDK refuses the SQLite file with
|
|
339
|
+
`SqliteSchemaTooNewError`, and the browser refuses the IndexedDB open with
|
|
340
|
+
a `VersionError`. A downgrade is not supported.
|
|
341
|
+
- **Added: `isRemovedDevice` and `isExpiredRemovedDevice`.** The two
|
|
342
|
+
predicates are exported from the `types` entry point. `isRemovedDevice`
|
|
343
|
+
tells whether a device record is marked removed. `isExpiredRemovedDevice`
|
|
344
|
+
tells whether the stale-record cleanup deletes a removed record.
|
|
345
|
+
- **Changed: a waiting receive record holds back only its conversation.** A
|
|
346
|
+
record that waits for its group state, or for a hook retry below the
|
|
347
|
+
attempt cap, holds back the later records of its conversation, as one
|
|
348
|
+
Signal client queues its message jobs. Group content keys by its group,
|
|
349
|
+
a sent transcript of this account keys by its destination, and other
|
|
350
|
+
content keys by its sender account. Before this change, a waiting record
|
|
351
|
+
held back every later record of its sender device, in every group and in
|
|
352
|
+
direct chats. Now direct chats and other groups make progress, and a
|
|
353
|
+
blocked group holds back its later content from every sender. A record
|
|
354
|
+
that waits behind an earlier record of its group counts toward the share
|
|
355
|
+
of that group in the receive queue, so a stalled group reaches its share
|
|
356
|
+
sooner, and its new sender-key messages wait at the Relay. The order in
|
|
357
|
+
which the device commits its records stays per sender device.
|
|
358
|
+
- **Added: `discardPendingReceive` removes a receive that the application
|
|
359
|
+
cannot process.** The call takes the `messageId` that
|
|
360
|
+
`listPendingReceives` gives. It removes a receive that has not reached its
|
|
361
|
+
delivery receipt, and returns the removed receive, or `null` when no
|
|
362
|
+
listed receive matches. It sends no receipt, it does not call
|
|
363
|
+
`onMessageDecrypted`, and it gives no `onReceiveExpired` report. A
|
|
364
|
+
redelivery of the envelope then gives `duplicate` and decrypts nothing.
|
|
365
|
+
A hook call that already started still runs. Each
|
|
366
|
+
`PendingReceive` now gives `hookAttempts`, the count of failed
|
|
367
|
+
`onMessageDecrypted` attempts. Its `messageId` is now always set: a
|
|
368
|
+
receive stored before the client kept message IDs gives its record ID, as
|
|
369
|
+
the `processed` outcome does.
|
|
370
|
+
- **Changed: group sends and session locks order the tabs of one origin.**
|
|
371
|
+
When `navigator.locks.request` exists and the store has a
|
|
372
|
+
`storeIdentity`, a group Sender Key operation runs under the Web Lock
|
|
373
|
+
`open-e2ee:group-send:<store identity>:<lock key>`. The session lock, the
|
|
374
|
+
user lock, and the device-list sync lock run under
|
|
375
|
+
`open-e2ee:session:<store identity>:<lock key>`. Two tabs or workers of
|
|
376
|
+
one origin on one store then encrypt in turn, so two group messages never
|
|
377
|
+
carry one iteration and two direct messages never carry one counter.
|
|
378
|
+
Before this change, each tab had only its own in-process lock. A page or
|
|
379
|
+
engine with no Web Locks, and a store with no identity, keeps the
|
|
380
|
+
in-process locks. Two tabs on one store are then not ordered, and the
|
|
381
|
+
application must give one tab exclusive access to the store. The session
|
|
382
|
+
lock and the device-list sync lock still end a wait after 5 seconds. On
|
|
383
|
+
the Web Lock path the wait rejects with `ORIGIN_LOCK_TIMEOUT_MESSAGE`, and
|
|
384
|
+
on the in-process path with the message of the in-process lock. A stop of
|
|
385
|
+
the relay work still ends the wait of a group operation. A Web Lock has no limit on its waiting requests. The
|
|
386
|
+
in-process session lock still refuses a request when 1,000 requests wait.
|
|
387
|
+
- **Added: `storeIdentity` on the local store contract.** The optional
|
|
388
|
+
member names the data of a store, so that each tab and worker of an
|
|
389
|
+
origin gives the same name for the same data. The IndexedDB store and the
|
|
390
|
+
web SQLite store give their database names. A
|
|
391
|
+
custom web store that shares its data across tabs sets it, so that its
|
|
392
|
+
sends take the Web Locks.
|
|
393
|
+
- **Fixed: a sender-key rotation keeps the states that another client
|
|
394
|
+
wrote.** Each `SenderKeyManager` kept its own copy of the previous
|
|
395
|
+
states, and a rotation or a new distribution built the archive from that
|
|
396
|
+
copy. When two clients on one store rotated in turn, for example in two
|
|
397
|
+
tabs, the archive lost the states that the other client wrote, so the
|
|
398
|
+
earlier messages of those states no longer decrypted. The manager now
|
|
399
|
+
reads the archive from the stored record each time, and the record keeps
|
|
400
|
+
at most 5 states.
|
|
401
|
+
- **Breaking: a group send gives its sender key to each device that has no
|
|
402
|
+
handoff row.** The SDK keeps a sender-key handoff row for each device of
|
|
403
|
+
another member when the Relay accepts a distribution of the own sender key
|
|
404
|
+
for that device. The row names the group, the sender key ID, the
|
|
405
|
+
generation, the recipient device, and the registration ID of the session.
|
|
406
|
+
A group send reads the device list of each member. It gives the current key
|
|
407
|
+
to each listed device that has no row for the current sender key ID,
|
|
408
|
+
generation, and registration. A row records a handoff. It is not proof
|
|
409
|
+
that the device installed the key. The SDK writes the row after the Relay
|
|
410
|
+
accepts the distribution and before the send marks the distribution sent.
|
|
411
|
+
A dropped distribution writes no row. A new own key, a rotation, and a
|
|
412
|
+
delete of the own key delete the rows of the group. A PreKey session from
|
|
413
|
+
the device, a bundle session that replaces a current session, a session
|
|
414
|
+
archive, a session delete, and a device-record delete delete the rows of
|
|
415
|
+
the device in every group. An identity rotation of a contact deletes the
|
|
416
|
+
rows of each device of that account. A retry request deletes the rows of
|
|
417
|
+
the requester in the group of the failed message only. A session reset
|
|
418
|
+
after an expired retry request deletes the rows of each device of the
|
|
419
|
+
sender account in every group. Client start
|
|
420
|
+
deletes each row that no current own key covers. `docs/DEVIATIONS.md`
|
|
421
|
+
section 7.5 compares this record with the record of the Signal apps and
|
|
422
|
+
gives the reason for each difference.
|
|
423
|
+
`SenderKeyState.distributionPending`,
|
|
424
|
+
`SenderKeyManager.getPendingSenderKeyDistribution`, and
|
|
425
|
+
`SenderKeyManager.confirmSenderKeyDistributionSent` are removed.
|
|
426
|
+
`SenderKeyManager.rotateSenderKey` and `rotateGroupSenderKey` do not take
|
|
427
|
+
`options.distributionPending`. The manager ignores a `distributionPending`
|
|
428
|
+
field in a stored state, and the next write of the state omits it.
|
|
429
|
+
- **Breaking: a custom store keeps the sender-key handoff rows.**
|
|
430
|
+
`SignalProtocolLocalStore` extends the new `SenderKeyHandoffStore`. A
|
|
431
|
+
custom store must implement its six methods: `recordSenderKeyHandoff`,
|
|
432
|
+
`listSenderKeyHandoffs`, `invalidateSenderKeyHandoff`,
|
|
433
|
+
`invalidateAccountSenderKeyHandoffs`, `listSenderKeyHandoffGroupIds`, and
|
|
434
|
+
`retainSenderKeyHandoffs`. Each row delete must be in the same write as
|
|
435
|
+
the change that causes it.
|
|
436
|
+
`storeSenderKeyRecord` and `deleteSenderKey` take the new
|
|
437
|
+
`SenderKeyRecordWriteOptions`. With `deleteSenderKeyHandoffs`, the write
|
|
438
|
+
deletes the rows of the group. `setDeviceRecord` takes the new
|
|
439
|
+
`SetDeviceRecordOptions`, and `SessionTrustCommit` has the field
|
|
440
|
+
`senderKeyHandoffInvalidation`. With the device, the write deletes the
|
|
441
|
+
rows of that device in every group. `archiveCurrentSession`,
|
|
442
|
+
`deleteSessionRecord`, `deleteDeviceRecord`,
|
|
443
|
+
`deleteAllSenderKeysForGroup`, and
|
|
444
|
+
`acceptContactIdentityRotationAndDeleteSessions` always delete the rows
|
|
445
|
+
of their device, group, or account. The memory store keeps the rows in its
|
|
446
|
+
state. The IndexedDB, key-value, and SQLite stores keep the rows durably,
|
|
447
|
+
so a restart does not give the key to a listed device again. The SQLite
|
|
448
|
+
stores add the `sender_key_handoff` table in schema version 5, and the
|
|
449
|
+
IndexedDB store adds the `senderKeyHandoff` object store in database
|
|
450
|
+
version 10. The IndexedDB and key-value stores encrypt each row and find it
|
|
451
|
+
by keyed hashes, so they hold no group ID, account ID, or device in the
|
|
452
|
+
clear.
|
|
453
|
+
- **Breaking: a custom key-value backend must apply
|
|
454
|
+
`removeSenderKeyHandoffs` inside `atomicWrite`.** `KeyValueOperation` has
|
|
455
|
+
the new variant. The part of a key after `keyPrefix` has five
|
|
456
|
+
colon-separated segments: the group hash, the generation, the account
|
|
457
|
+
hash, the recipient hash, and the entry hash. The backend removes each key
|
|
458
|
+
whose group, account, and recipient segments equal every given hash, and
|
|
459
|
+
keeps a key of another shape. It applies the operation in the same
|
|
460
|
+
transaction as the other operations of the batch, and the operation
|
|
461
|
+
observes the earlier writes of the batch. A backend built with
|
|
462
|
+
`createTransactionalKeyValueBackend` applies it already.
|
|
463
|
+
`assertBackendConformance` checks it.
|
|
464
|
+
- **Breaking: the group outbox context and the sync send change.**
|
|
465
|
+
`GroupOutboxContext` does not have `confirmSenderKeyDistributionSent`.
|
|
466
|
+
It has the required members `recordSenderKeyHandoff`,
|
|
467
|
+
`prepareSenderKeyHandoffs`, `resolveOwnDevices`,
|
|
468
|
+
`isConclusiveDeviceRejection`, `repairStaleDevice`, and
|
|
469
|
+
`postSyncMessage`. `postSyncMessage` takes, as its third argument, a
|
|
470
|
+
function that encrypts the transcript again for one own device.
|
|
471
|
+
`prepareSyncMessages` takes the own devices of the send as its fifth
|
|
472
|
+
argument. `postPreMessage` resolves to the new
|
|
473
|
+
`PreMessagePostResult`. `appendOutgoingGroupDeviceMessages` is removed.
|
|
474
|
+
`reconcileOutgoingGroupDeviceSet` removes the messages of devices from an
|
|
475
|
+
intent and adds new messages in one write.
|
|
476
|
+
`DefaultSesameManager.sendToLocalOtherDevices` requires
|
|
477
|
+
`listedDeviceIds`, and it sends only to those own devices.
|
|
478
|
+
- **Changed: each send gives a sync copy to exactly the listed own
|
|
479
|
+
devices.** On a relay that does not compare device sets, each direct or
|
|
480
|
+
group send, and each replay, reads the device list of the own account,
|
|
481
|
+
with no freshness window. A failed
|
|
482
|
+
read stops the recipient post and fails the send, also for an account
|
|
483
|
+
with no linked device, and the outbox retries a stored send. The first
|
|
484
|
+
attempt of a send that fails on this read throws before the SDK stores
|
|
485
|
+
it. The error carries the `clientMessageId`, but the outbox holds no
|
|
486
|
+
transmission for it. The application calls `send()` again, and the SDK
|
|
487
|
+
encrypts the content again. The send gives
|
|
488
|
+
a sync copy to each listed own device other than the sending device. Each
|
|
489
|
+
sync copy is keyed by its device. An own device gets the transcript and
|
|
490
|
+
never a sender-key handoff row. When the Relay refuses an own device as
|
|
491
|
+
stale, the SDK refreshes the session of that device once and encrypts the
|
|
492
|
+
copy again for it. For the transcript of a stored send, the SDK replaces
|
|
493
|
+
the copy in the intent and posts the new copy under a repair ID. The
|
|
494
|
+
device then gets the transcript of that send. When the Relay refuses the
|
|
495
|
+
new copy too, the SDK archives the session, removes the copy from the
|
|
496
|
+
intent, and completes the send. When the refresh fails, or the encryption
|
|
497
|
+
for the new session gives no copy, the send fails. The copy and the new
|
|
498
|
+
session stay, and the outbox retries the stored send. A sync copy of
|
|
499
|
+
account state, such as a read sync, gets the same refresh. The SDK posts
|
|
500
|
+
the new copy again with no operation ID and changes no intent.
|
|
501
|
+
- **Changed: a group replay reads the device lists again.** On a relay that
|
|
502
|
+
does not compare device sets, before the replay of a stored group send, the
|
|
503
|
+
SDK reads the device lists of the members and of the own account. One intent write removes each message of
|
|
504
|
+
a device that the lists do not show. A listed device that the stored send
|
|
505
|
+
does not reach gets the current key of the send and the stored group
|
|
506
|
+
ciphertext. When the sender rotated the key after the send, the added
|
|
507
|
+
device gets only the stored group ciphertext, and the replay completes.
|
|
508
|
+
The device recovers the content through its retry request, and the next
|
|
509
|
+
send gives it the current key. The stored ciphertext does not change, because the Relay
|
|
510
|
+
refuses another operation under the same message ID. Thus a device that
|
|
511
|
+
the replay adds gets the content only through its retry request and the
|
|
512
|
+
resend of a `Resendable` send.
|
|
513
|
+
|
|
514
|
+
- **Breaking: a group state store keeps a receive record for each group.**
|
|
515
|
+
`GroupStateStore` adds `getGroupReceiveRecord`,
|
|
516
|
+
`updateGroupReceiveRecord`, and `listGroupReceiveRecords`. A receive
|
|
517
|
+
record holds the group's required revision, which is the highest revision
|
|
518
|
+
that an authenticated group context has claimed, and the fetch backoff and
|
|
519
|
+
the last verified denial. A custom store must implement the three methods.
|
|
520
|
+
An update that returns null deletes the group's whole record. The SDK
|
|
521
|
+
store writes version 2 group records with an index. It migrates a version
|
|
522
|
+
1 record forward when it first reads or writes that group, and a crash at
|
|
523
|
+
any migration step reruns safely. A migrated group starts at required
|
|
524
|
+
revision 0 as a locally known group. A record that a context created
|
|
525
|
+
before the group's state was verified also names the sender device that
|
|
526
|
+
claimed it. `storeGroupState` and
|
|
527
|
+
`storeGroupStateWithSenderKeyRotationBarrier` must remove that origin in
|
|
528
|
+
the same write that stores the state. A custom store must do the same.
|
|
529
|
+
- **Breaking: managed group content carries its group context.** Each
|
|
530
|
+
send to a managed group, its sync transcript, and its send log entry now
|
|
531
|
+
carry the group's master key and the revision of the sender's verified
|
|
532
|
+
state inside the encrypted content, as Signal's `GroupContextV2` does. A
|
|
533
|
+
resend therefore carries the context of the original send. The receiving
|
|
534
|
+
client removes the context before it gives the content to the
|
|
535
|
+
application, so the application gets the bytes that the sender sent. An
|
|
536
|
+
ad hoc group send carries no context. `SignalProtocolContentAdapter` adds
|
|
537
|
+
two required methods, `serializeContentWithGroupContext` and
|
|
538
|
+
`withoutGroupContext`, and `inspectContent` reports `groupContext`, or
|
|
539
|
+
`'malformed'` for a context that does not decode. A custom adapter must
|
|
540
|
+
implement both methods and report the context. The default adapter puts
|
|
541
|
+
the context in a `groupContext` member of a JSON object and wraps any
|
|
542
|
+
other content in a `groupContent` member.
|
|
543
|
+
- **Breaking: a managed group receive follows Signal's order.** The
|
|
544
|
+
client decrypts, runs the replay check, and then installs a sender key
|
|
545
|
+
distribution with no group decision, as Signal does. Membership,
|
|
546
|
+
permission, and blocking no longer stop the install. After the install,
|
|
547
|
+
the client derives the group ID from the context's master key and
|
|
548
|
+
compares it with the group of the envelope and of the distribution. A
|
|
549
|
+
context that does not decode is refused as `malformed-context`, and a
|
|
550
|
+
context of another group as `context-mismatch`. Content that a sender
|
|
551
|
+
key decrypts, or that comes beside a distribution, is content of that
|
|
552
|
+
group in every shape. Sync content is content of this account. On the
|
|
553
|
+
Relay subscription, in `receiveIncomingEnvelopes`, and in
|
|
554
|
+
`processIncomingEnvelope` and `decryptGroupMessage`, content from
|
|
555
|
+
another account that carries a sync message is refused as
|
|
556
|
+
`sync-from-other-account` before the distribution install and before
|
|
557
|
+
any group decision, and the application gets no content. The raw
|
|
558
|
+
decrypt methods `receive`, `decryptMessage`, and `decryptMessages`
|
|
559
|
+
return the plaintext with no group classification and do not refuse
|
|
560
|
+
it. Sender-key content from another account is delivered under its
|
|
561
|
+
group, never under a conversation that its content names. When the
|
|
562
|
+
local state is
|
|
563
|
+
below the revision that the context claims, one fetcher brings the group
|
|
564
|
+
up to date before the client decides. The client decides each message
|
|
565
|
+
at the revision that its own context claims, so a false claim uses up
|
|
566
|
+
only its own fetch. The fetcher runs at most one fetch for each claimed
|
|
567
|
+
revision and at most 16 claims in a backoff window. A fetch that ends
|
|
568
|
+
below the claim is complete: the client decides that message at the
|
|
569
|
+
fetched state, the group's required revision becomes the server head,
|
|
570
|
+
or a higher claim that came while the fetch ran, and the backoff does
|
|
571
|
+
not grow. Only a fetch that fails or that the
|
|
572
|
+
server refuses backs off. A claim above the fetched state that the
|
|
573
|
+
window cannot fetch waits for the next window, so false claims hold an
|
|
574
|
+
honest claim for 30 s at most. When the trust
|
|
575
|
+
root has a server signing key, a context that carries the signed change
|
|
576
|
+
to the claimed revision applies that change with no fetch, also when
|
|
577
|
+
the window has fetched its 16 claims. Under
|
|
578
|
+
`allowUnauthenticatedGroupHistory`, the client never applies a carried
|
|
579
|
+
change. Content with no context is decided at the local state, and is
|
|
580
|
+
refused as `legacy-no-context` when the client has no state. While the
|
|
581
|
+
group cannot update, the content waits on the device in the receive
|
|
582
|
+
record that the decrypt committed with the ratchet state, and the receive
|
|
583
|
+
queue decides it when a fetch of its group completes. The client sends
|
|
584
|
+
no retry request and does not call `onDecryptionError`. The fetcher
|
|
585
|
+
tries again in the background and at start. `decryptGroupMessage` throws
|
|
586
|
+
`GroupReceiveUnavailableError` for such content, and the error carries
|
|
587
|
+
the `messageId` of the record. A second call with the same message
|
|
588
|
+
decides the stored content with no second decrypt, also after a restart.
|
|
589
|
+
Two concurrent calls with the same message give the content once. A sender
|
|
590
|
+
device can make at most 100 groups wait for verification. Past the cap,
|
|
591
|
+
a context for a new group is refused as `unverified-cap`. The new
|
|
592
|
+
`groups.isGroupBlocked` config drops the content of a blocked group with
|
|
593
|
+
no report and no fetch. The background fetcher also skips a blocked
|
|
594
|
+
group, at start and on its timer. A block hook that throws any value
|
|
595
|
+
skips only its own group. `decryptGroupMessage` now decrypts before it
|
|
596
|
+
decides, so a refused message uses its message key. `syncGroup` now runs
|
|
597
|
+
through the fetcher, so it joins a fetch in flight and records its
|
|
598
|
+
result. It returns that result only when the fetch called the group
|
|
599
|
+
server. After a fetch that only tried a carried change, it waits for the
|
|
600
|
+
next fetch, its own when no other caller starts one first. An ad hoc
|
|
601
|
+
distribution installs with no `groups` config. The
|
|
602
|
+
package root and the `client` entry export `GroupReceiveUnavailableError`,
|
|
603
|
+
`GroupReceiveRefusedError`, and `GroupResendDeferredError`.
|
|
604
|
+
`processIncomingEnvelope` returns `pending` for content that waits for
|
|
605
|
+
its group and `denied` for refused content, and the caller acknowledges
|
|
606
|
+
the envelope in both cases. A deferred resend leaves the retry request
|
|
607
|
+
with the Relay. See `docs/ERROR_HANDLING.md`.
|
|
608
|
+
- **Breaking: `processIncomingEnvelope` returns a receive outcome.** The
|
|
609
|
+
method now returns a `ReceiveOutcome` in place of the plaintext. Its
|
|
610
|
+
`kind` is `processed`, `pending`, `duplicate`, `null-message`, `denied`,
|
|
611
|
+
or `refused`. Acknowledge the envelope for each kind except `refused`,
|
|
612
|
+
which means that the receive queue has no room: nothing is decrypted or
|
|
613
|
+
stored, so give the envelope again later. A `processed` receive keeps
|
|
614
|
+
its content on the device until the application calls the new
|
|
615
|
+
`completeReceive` with its `messageId`, or until the new `onPersist`
|
|
616
|
+
option resolves. A redelivery before then returns the same outcome with
|
|
617
|
+
no second decrypt. A Relay delivery of an envelope that
|
|
618
|
+
`processIncomingEnvelope` committed reuses that record and installs no
|
|
619
|
+
sender key distribution from it. The new `listPendingReceives` lists the stored
|
|
620
|
+
receives one page at a time, and `{ ready: true }` lists only the
|
|
621
|
+
receives that wait for `completeReceive`. The new
|
|
622
|
+
`processPendingReceives` runs one pass of the receive queue now, and its
|
|
623
|
+
`deadlineMs` option bounds the pass. `processIncomingEnvelopes` returns
|
|
624
|
+
`{ envelope, outcome }` or `{ envelope, error }` for each envelope.
|
|
625
|
+
Before, the method returned the plaintext and deleted the stored content
|
|
626
|
+
before the application saved it, so a crash between the two lost the
|
|
627
|
+
message.
|
|
628
|
+
- **Breaking: a custom store commits a receive record with the ratchet
|
|
629
|
+
state.** `SessionTrustCommit.receiveWork` and
|
|
630
|
+
`SenderKeyReceiveCommit.work` replace `receivedContent` and `content`.
|
|
631
|
+
The store must write the `ReceiveWorkRecord` in the same transaction as
|
|
632
|
+
the session or sender key state, so the ratchet step and the record roll
|
|
633
|
+
back together. The store adds `getReceiveWork`,
|
|
634
|
+
`putReceiveWork`, `listReceiveWork`, `receiveWorkUsage`, and
|
|
635
|
+
`completeReceiveWork`, and removes `getReceivedContent`,
|
|
636
|
+
`deleteReceivedContent`, and `deleteExpiredReceivedContent`.
|
|
637
|
+
`listReceiveWork` returns records in arrival order, by `arrivalSeq` and
|
|
638
|
+
then `workId`, and its `after` query takes the last record of the page
|
|
639
|
+
before, so records with an equal `arrivalSeq` are never skipped.
|
|
640
|
+
`putReceiveWork` and `completeReceiveWork` compare the record revision
|
|
641
|
+
and write nothing on a mismatch. `completeReceiveWork` deletes the record
|
|
642
|
+
and writes its metadata in one transaction.
|
|
643
|
+
`SignalProtocolManager.decrypt` takes a `receiveWork` seed in place of
|
|
644
|
+
`receiveId`. The SQLite schema version 4 and the IndexedDB schema version
|
|
645
|
+
9 add only the `receive_work` table and object store. After the first
|
|
646
|
+
open, an SDK earlier than 12 cannot open the store. There is no
|
|
647
|
+
downgrade path. At open, each SDK
|
|
648
|
+
store converts the received content rows of SDK 11 to receive records
|
|
649
|
+
that wait for the redelivery of their envelope, and writes its completion
|
|
650
|
+
marker last, so a stop during the conversion is safe. A row that does not
|
|
651
|
+
parse stays in place, and the store reports it with no content: the
|
|
652
|
+
SQLite store through its logger, the other stores through
|
|
653
|
+
`console.error`. When the Relay subscription, `receiveIncomingEnvelopes`,
|
|
654
|
+
or `pullHostedRelayAfterWake` gets the redelivered envelope of a converted
|
|
655
|
+
record, and the client already processed that envelope, the client
|
|
656
|
+
completes the record with no hook call.
|
|
657
|
+
- **Fixed: a receiver installs a sender key that the sender creates again.**
|
|
658
|
+
`processSenderKeyDistribution` matches a key by its sender key ID, as
|
|
659
|
+
Signal's published implementation matches a state by its chain ID and
|
|
660
|
+
signing key. The generation rules apply only to a distribution of the
|
|
661
|
+
current key, and a later generation of that key replaces it in place. A
|
|
662
|
+
distribution of a kept previous key changes nothing. A distribution of
|
|
663
|
+
another key becomes the current state, and the earlier current state
|
|
664
|
+
becomes a previous state, so a message in flight under it still decrypts.
|
|
665
|
+
Before, a receiver dropped each distribution whose generation was not
|
|
666
|
+
above the generation of its current state. `createGroupSenderKey` over an
|
|
667
|
+
existing key, and a delete followed by a create, start again at
|
|
668
|
+
generation 1, so each receiver that held the earlier key failed every
|
|
669
|
+
later group message of that sender device with `SENDER_KEY_MISMATCH`,
|
|
670
|
+
until a rotation took the sender's generation above the one the receiver
|
|
671
|
+
held.
|
|
672
|
+
- **Fixed: every send error carries the logical-send identifier.**
|
|
673
|
+
`send()` chooses the `clientMessageId` before any other step, so
|
|
674
|
+
`isOutgoingMessageError` is true also for an error before the encryption,
|
|
675
|
+
such as a failed content serialization or a failed read of the own device
|
|
676
|
+
list. The application calls `send()` again with the same
|
|
677
|
+
`clientMessageId`. Before, only an error of the encryption carried the
|
|
678
|
+
identifier.
|
|
679
|
+
- **Fixed: a group resend checks membership at the required revision.**
|
|
680
|
+
Before a sender gives group content again, it brings a managed group
|
|
681
|
+
up to the highest revision that an authenticated context claimed. The
|
|
682
|
+
check uses the same receive record, fetch window, and backoff as a
|
|
683
|
+
receive. A requester who is not a member at that revision gets no
|
|
684
|
+
content, and the answer ends as `membership-refused`. When the update
|
|
685
|
+
is fresh, the sender answers from the local state, also when a false
|
|
686
|
+
claim keeps the required revision above the server head, so a removed
|
|
687
|
+
member who claims a false revision is refused and not deferred. When
|
|
688
|
+
the update fails or waits for its backoff, the sender defers the resend
|
|
689
|
+
and does not refuse it. The resend job stays pending for the resend job
|
|
690
|
+
driver, and the retry request envelope stays unacknowledged for the next
|
|
691
|
+
Relay delivery. Before, the sender checked a stale local state, so it could
|
|
692
|
+
resend to a removed member or refuse an added member.
|
|
693
|
+
- **Fixed: unacknowledged messages no longer stall the socket backlog.**
|
|
694
|
+
The mailbox socket now ends each page of durable frames with one
|
|
695
|
+
`acknowledge` frame, with no ID when the page acknowledged nothing. The
|
|
696
|
+
Relay sends the next page of a backlog only on that frame. Before, a page
|
|
697
|
+
of messages that all stayed unacknowledged stalled every page behind it
|
|
698
|
+
until the socket reconnected.
|
|
699
|
+
- **Fixed: received content keeps the time of its first admission.**
|
|
700
|
+
`DecryptedEnvelope.receivedAt` is the time the device first committed
|
|
701
|
+
the content. A first pass, a retry, and a delivery after a restart give
|
|
702
|
+
the same value. Content with no timestamp of its own gives this time as
|
|
703
|
+
its `timestamp` for receipt matching, so each delivery gives the same
|
|
704
|
+
timestamp. The 30-day receive age of stored content
|
|
705
|
+
also counts from this time, through a retry, a redelivery, and a
|
|
706
|
+
restart. Before, the first pass read the clock again after it stored
|
|
707
|
+
the content.
|
|
708
|
+
- **Changed: the client acknowledges a Relay message after its commit.**
|
|
709
|
+
On the Relay subscription and in `pullHostedRelayAfterWake`, the client
|
|
710
|
+
decrypts each envelope and commits its content as a receive record in
|
|
711
|
+
the same transaction as the ratchet step. It acknowledges the envelope
|
|
712
|
+
only after that commit, and sends no acknowledgment when the commit
|
|
713
|
+
fails, as Signal does. The receive queue then decides the group, gives
|
|
714
|
+
the content to `onMessageDecrypted`, and sends the E2EE delivery
|
|
715
|
+
receipt. That receipt is the only proof that the application processed
|
|
716
|
+
the content. A Relay delivery receipt marks only the handoff of the
|
|
717
|
+
content to the device. Content that waits for its group state stays on
|
|
718
|
+
the device, not at the Relay. A hook that throws is tried again after a
|
|
719
|
+
backoff. The device stores the count of each attempt before it calls the
|
|
720
|
+
hook, so a hook call that ends the process also counts as an attempt.
|
|
721
|
+
After 10 attempts, the content no longer holds back the
|
|
722
|
+
later content of its conversation. Each start then offers it to the hook
|
|
723
|
+
once: in the start pass, or at the registration of `onMessageDecrypted`
|
|
724
|
+
when the start pass had no hook. After that offer, only
|
|
725
|
+
`processPendingReceives` tries it again before the next start, until it
|
|
726
|
+
expires or the application discards it. A pass of those that ends before
|
|
727
|
+
the retry, at a deadline or at a failed page read, leaves the retry to
|
|
728
|
+
the next pass. That retry runs after the other content
|
|
729
|
+
of the device, so a hook call that ends the process on it does not stop
|
|
730
|
+
the later content of its conversation. `pullHostedRelayAfterWake` commits, acknowledges, then
|
|
731
|
+
runs `processPendingReceives`, and its new `deadlineMs` option bounds
|
|
732
|
+
that pass. It gives no content to the application before the
|
|
733
|
+
acknowledgment settles. `HostedRelayWakeClient` adds
|
|
734
|
+
`processPendingReceives`. `receiveIncomingEnvelopes` commits each
|
|
735
|
+
envelope and sends no acknowledgment. The content reaches
|
|
736
|
+
`onMessageDecrypted` in a later pass of the receive queue, after the
|
|
737
|
+
call returns. After `stop()`, the content waits for the next start of the
|
|
738
|
+
queue from `startRelaySubscription`, or for `processPendingReceives`. At
|
|
739
|
+
start, the client admits a new envelope only after its first read of the
|
|
740
|
+
stored content ends, so new content of a sender device comes after its stored
|
|
741
|
+
content, also when the clock stepped back across the restart. This order
|
|
742
|
+
holds only when that first read completes. It does not hold after a first
|
|
743
|
+
read that failed, after a `stop()` during the first read, or for an
|
|
744
|
+
envelope received before the first start. Two processes that share one
|
|
745
|
+
store, such as two browser tabs, each keep their own arrival order, so
|
|
746
|
+
content of one process can come before content that the other process
|
|
747
|
+
received earlier. Before, the client acknowledged only after the
|
|
748
|
+
application had the content, so group content that waited for its group
|
|
749
|
+
stayed at the Relay and came back on each delivery.
|
|
750
|
+
- **Added: a bounded receive queue with an expiry hook.** The new
|
|
751
|
+
`protocol.receiveQueue` config sets how much the device holds. Stored
|
|
752
|
+
content may wait 30 days, counted from its first commit on this
|
|
753
|
+
device. The age is fixed. `protocol.receiveQueue` has no age field, and
|
|
754
|
+
a client created with `protocol.receiveQueue.maxAgeMs` is refused with
|
|
755
|
+
an error that names 12.0.0 and the fixed 30 days. Content expires when
|
|
756
|
+
its age is equal to or more than
|
|
757
|
+
30 days. The earlier prune deleted content only at an age of more
|
|
758
|
+
than 30 days, so the expiry now comes 1 ms sooner. `maxItems` is 3000 and `maxBytes` is 750 MiB by default. They are
|
|
759
|
+
provisional until a measurement sets them. `blockedGroupShare`, 0.25 by
|
|
760
|
+
default, is the part of each bound that the waiting records of one group
|
|
761
|
+
can fill. At a bound the client decrypts nothing more and does not
|
|
762
|
+
acknowledge the envelope, so the Relay keeps it. A refused envelope
|
|
763
|
+
expires at the Relay at the TTL of the Relay project, and no local hook
|
|
764
|
+
reports that expiry. While the mailbox of the device is full, the Relay
|
|
765
|
+
refuses a new message to it with `MAILBOX_FULL` to its sender. The new
|
|
766
|
+
`onReceiveExpired` hook gets a `ReceiveExpiredEvent` for content that
|
|
767
|
+
waited 30 days, before the client drops it. Before the hook, the
|
|
768
|
+
client reads the record again, so content that the client completed
|
|
769
|
+
before that read, such as at the redelivery of its envelope, gets no
|
|
770
|
+
report. Before, the client deleted stored content after 30 days with no
|
|
771
|
+
report.
|
|
772
|
+
- **Added: `decryptEnvelope` decrypts one envelope with no receive
|
|
773
|
+
record.** It installs a sender key distribution that the content
|
|
774
|
+
carries and checks the group context against the transport. It stores
|
|
775
|
+
no content, decides no group state, and sends no receipt. The decrypt
|
|
776
|
+
spends the ratchet step, so a plaintext that the application loses is
|
|
777
|
+
gone. Use `processIncomingEnvelope` to keep the content until the
|
|
778
|
+
application completes the receive.
|
|
779
|
+
- **Changed: `decryptGroupMessage` is deprecated.** Use
|
|
780
|
+
`processIncomingEnvelope`, which returns a receive outcome and keeps the
|
|
781
|
+
content until the application completes the receive.
|
|
782
|
+
`decryptGroupMessage` completes the receive before it returns, so a
|
|
783
|
+
plaintext that the application loses is gone. It throws
|
|
784
|
+
`EncryptionError` with `STORAGE_QUOTA_EXCEEDED` when the receive queue
|
|
785
|
+
has no room, and with `MESSAGE_DUPLICATE` for a message that this client
|
|
786
|
+
processed or that gives no content.
|
|
787
|
+
- **Fixed: a retry deadline no longer resets a session whose resend
|
|
788
|
+
arrived.** The commit of a resend now records its failed envelope as
|
|
789
|
+
fulfilled before the client acknowledges the resend. At start, the
|
|
790
|
+
client records it again for each stored resend before the retry request
|
|
791
|
+
lifecycle starts. Before, a resend that waited for its group could reach
|
|
792
|
+
the retry deadline, and the deadline reset the session.
|
|
793
|
+
- **Changed: metadata values rest encrypted on the IndexedDB and key-value
|
|
794
|
+
stores.** Each value that `setMetadata` and `compareAndSetMetadata` write
|
|
795
|
+
now goes through the store's record cipher, AES-256-GCM. These values
|
|
796
|
+
include group master keys, the hosted device authentication key, and
|
|
797
|
+
outbox intents. The first open after the upgrade encrypts each clear value
|
|
798
|
+
that the store holds. A stop during that step is safe, and the next open
|
|
799
|
+
continues it. A store that is full keeps its clear values and still opens.
|
|
800
|
+
Metadata key names stay in clear, and some of them hold identifiers. The
|
|
801
|
+
SQLite stores need no change, because the file cipher covers them. An
|
|
802
|
+
earlier SDK version cannot read the encrypted values, so do not open the
|
|
803
|
+
store with one after the upgrade.
|
|
804
|
+
- **Fixed: a membership change no longer makes the next distribution
|
|
805
|
+
identified.** A member removal clears the group's endorsements. Before,
|
|
806
|
+
the next send resolved the sealed sender of each distribution pre-message
|
|
807
|
+
from the cache with no refresh. A pre-message to a member with no access
|
|
808
|
+
key then went identified in `preferred` mode, or failed the send in
|
|
809
|
+
`required` mode. A group send now refreshes the endorsements for all
|
|
810
|
+
recipients before it seals the pre-messages, at preparation and again at
|
|
811
|
+
dispatch. A pre-message goes identified only to a member that the refresh
|
|
812
|
+
does not endorse.
|
|
813
|
+
- **Fixed: an expired sender key no longer blocks group sends.** When the
|
|
814
|
+
own sender key of a group is older than `maxSenderKeyAge`, a group send
|
|
815
|
+
rotates the key before it prepares the distribution pre-messages. The
|
|
816
|
+
rotation deletes the handoff rows of the group. The send then gives the
|
|
817
|
+
new key to each device that needs it, and encrypts with the new key. A
|
|
818
|
+
distribution that fails, for example after a Relay refusal or an offline
|
|
819
|
+
send, does not make a later send to the group fail with
|
|
820
|
+
`SENDER_KEY_EXPIRED`.
|
|
821
|
+
- **Fixed: a retryable Relay refusal no longer ends a retry request.**
|
|
822
|
+
The retry request scheduler now reads the Relay's `retryable` flag before
|
|
823
|
+
the code and the HTTP status. A refusal with `retryable` true, for example
|
|
824
|
+
`AUTHORITY_DENIED` with HTTP 401 while a Relay binding is missing, is a
|
|
825
|
+
transport outage, or a rate refusal for `QUOTA_EXCEEDED`, `MAILBOX_FULL`,
|
|
826
|
+
and HTTP 429. The request waits and is posted again with the same bytes
|
|
827
|
+
and ID. Before, the request ended with `revoked-authority`. A refusal with
|
|
828
|
+
`retryable` false keeps its terminal class. A `TOKEN_INVALID` after the
|
|
829
|
+
one token refresh is `revoked-authority`.
|
|
830
|
+
- **Fixed: a failed `onDelivered` hook no longer loses the delivery.** The
|
|
831
|
+
client now marks a delivery source announced only after the hook returns.
|
|
832
|
+
Before, the client stored the mark first, so a hook that threw, a
|
|
833
|
+
`stop()` during the hook, or a crash lost the event. The hook now runs at
|
|
834
|
+
least once for each source. An error from the hook fails the Relay
|
|
835
|
+
receipt or the encrypted delivery receipt, so the relay delivers it again
|
|
836
|
+
and the hook runs again. Make the hook idempotent for one
|
|
837
|
+
`clientMessageId`, `recipientDeviceId`, and `source`.
|
|
838
|
+
- **Fixed: a failed `onRetryTerminal` hook no longer marks the end
|
|
839
|
+
emitted.** The SDK marks a retry end emitted only after the hook returns.
|
|
840
|
+
A hook that throws keeps the scheduler running. The next scheduler pass,
|
|
841
|
+
the next start, or the redelivery of the request runs the hook again.
|
|
842
|
+
The hook now runs at least once for each request.
|
|
843
|
+
- **Added: a session reset when a retry request ends as
|
|
844
|
+
`expired-content`.** Before the SDK calls `onRetryTerminal`, the
|
|
845
|
+
requester waits for each decrypt from the device that sent the failed
|
|
846
|
+
envelope that is in progress. It then archives its session with that
|
|
847
|
+
device, and its next send to the user reads the device list again. The
|
|
848
|
+
archive deletes the sender-key handoff rows of that device in every group.
|
|
849
|
+
The requester then deletes the rows of each device of that account in
|
|
850
|
+
every group, for a group message and for a pairwise message, as one
|
|
851
|
+
Signal client does at an automatic session reset. The reset does not
|
|
852
|
+
rotate a sender key. The next send to each group gives the current key to
|
|
853
|
+
each device of the account. The requester then sends one
|
|
854
|
+
null message to the device, at most one in an hour for each device. The
|
|
855
|
+
next ordinary message starts the new session when no null message goes.
|
|
856
|
+
The retry request record stores each step, so a replay after a restart
|
|
857
|
+
or a stop does not archive a newer session. The other terminal classes,
|
|
858
|
+
and a post that fails and is posted again, reset nothing.
|
|
859
|
+
`onSessionArchived` runs for the archive. The event gets the optional
|
|
860
|
+
field `recovery` of the new type `RetryTerminalRecoveryEvent`, which is
|
|
861
|
+
exported from the main entry and from `/client`. It has the device, the
|
|
862
|
+
sender key outcome, and the null message outcome `sent`, `limited`, or
|
|
863
|
+
`failed`. The sender key outcome is `applied` when the failed envelope is
|
|
864
|
+
a group message and the requester has a sender key for that group.
|
|
865
|
+
Otherwise it is `skipped`. The rows of the account are deleted with each
|
|
866
|
+
outcome.
|
|
867
|
+
- **Changed: a retry request is sealed when the client can seal it.** The
|
|
868
|
+
client seals a retry request when it holds the access key of the target,
|
|
869
|
+
and the Relay does not see the requester. The seal holds the payload of
|
|
870
|
+
the identified request as `PLAINTEXT_CONTENT` (8), and the sealed post
|
|
871
|
+
keeps the retry ID, the client message ID and the timestamp, so the Relay
|
|
872
|
+
deduplicates it as before. A group send endorsement never seals a retry
|
|
873
|
+
request. A retry request follows the `deliveryMode` of `sealedSender`, as
|
|
874
|
+
a delivery receipt does. In `'preferred'` mode the request goes identified
|
|
875
|
+
when the client has no access key or the Relay refuses it. In
|
|
876
|
+
`'required'` mode the request never goes identified: it stays pending, and
|
|
877
|
+
the scheduler posts it again until its deadline. In `'disabled'` mode it
|
|
878
|
+
is always identified. Before, each retry request was identified in every
|
|
879
|
+
mode, and an identified retry request does not have the privacy of a
|
|
880
|
+
sealed one. The `sendRetryRequest` callback of `processIncomingEnvelope`
|
|
881
|
+
gets an identified request, so `'required'` mode never calls it.
|
|
882
|
+
- **Changed: the client accepts a sealed retry request.** A sealed envelope
|
|
883
|
+
with the content type `PLAINTEXT_CONTENT` goes to the retry request
|
|
884
|
+
handler, never to a ratchet decrypt. `processIncomingEnvelope` rejects a
|
|
885
|
+
sealed retry request with `INVALID_CIPHERTEXT`, as it rejects an
|
|
886
|
+
identified one. A `11.0.x` client rejects this content type, so it drops
|
|
887
|
+
a sealed retry request from a newer client, and that request ends as
|
|
888
|
+
`expired-content` for the requester. A sealed retry request gets a
|
|
889
|
+
resend only from a sender device that runs this release or a later one.
|
|
890
|
+
- **Changed: the `deliveryMode` documentation names what each mode
|
|
891
|
+
covers.** The mode covers each message, resend, delivery receipt and
|
|
892
|
+
retry request to a device of another account. A typing indicator, and a
|
|
893
|
+
sync message to another device of the same account, are always
|
|
894
|
+
identified. `onIdentifiedFallback` reports only a message or a resend.
|
|
895
|
+
- **Changed: a group send seals its sender-key distributions.** In
|
|
896
|
+
`required` and `preferred` sealed-sender mode, each distribution
|
|
897
|
+
pre-message goes through the sealed route to its one recipient. The
|
|
898
|
+
recipient's access key comes first, and the group endorsement serves a
|
|
899
|
+
member without one. When the relay rejects the access key, the SDK
|
|
900
|
+
restricts the cached access mode of the recipient and posts the
|
|
901
|
+
distribution again with the group endorsement. A `required` send checks
|
|
902
|
+
this authorization before it encrypts a distribution and before any
|
|
903
|
+
post. When it cannot seal a distribution, it throws
|
|
904
|
+
`SEALED_SENDER_REQUIRED` and posts nothing. A `preferred` send posts a
|
|
905
|
+
distribution identified only after the relay rejects each sealed
|
|
906
|
+
authorization, and then calls `onIdentifiedFallback`.
|
|
907
|
+
A saved send whose distributions have no sealed transport seals them
|
|
908
|
+
from the stored ciphertext at replay, with no new ratchet effect.
|
|
909
|
+
- **Fixed: a refused distribution is repaired once.** When a device refuses
|
|
910
|
+
a distribution conclusively, for example after a reinstall with the same
|
|
911
|
+
device ID, the SDK refreshes the session of that device once and encrypts
|
|
912
|
+
the distribution again. It replaces the stored pre-message before the
|
|
913
|
+
post, so a replay never posts the refused ciphertext again. The repair
|
|
914
|
+
post has a new transport ID, `<id>:repair:<n>`. A replay after a restart
|
|
915
|
+
rebuilds a refused distribution from the current sender key with the same
|
|
916
|
+
`senderKeyId`. The repaired device then decrypts the later group messages
|
|
917
|
+
of the sender, but not the message of that send. When the sender key of
|
|
918
|
+
the send is no longer current, the replay refreshes the session, drops
|
|
919
|
+
the distribution, and continues. The next send gives the device the
|
|
920
|
+
current key.
|
|
921
|
+
- **Fixed: a group send drops the distribution of a removed device.** When
|
|
922
|
+
the relay refuses a distribution with `NOT_FOUND`, the SDK reads the
|
|
923
|
+
recipient's device list. If the list no longer shows the device, the
|
|
924
|
+
send drops that distribution and continues, as a direct send drops a
|
|
925
|
+
removed device. The send then makes no device post to that device. This
|
|
926
|
+
applies to the repair of a refused device message and to a device that the
|
|
927
|
+
re-read of a skipped account adds. A refused device that the list still
|
|
928
|
+
shows fails the send.
|
|
929
|
+
- **Fixed: all six post kinds name the registration of their device.** A
|
|
930
|
+
direct message, a sync copy, a sender-key distribution, a group device
|
|
931
|
+
message, a receipt, and a retry request send the registration ID of the
|
|
932
|
+
recipient session. This applies on the identified route, on the
|
|
933
|
+
access-key route, and on the group-token route. A post to a device with
|
|
934
|
+
no session names none. A sealed post names the registration of each device in its body,
|
|
935
|
+
and each hosted destination names the registration that the body gives
|
|
936
|
+
its device. A device with registration 0 names none. The Relay refuses a
|
|
937
|
+
device that was reinstalled with the same device ID. The refused post
|
|
938
|
+
then gets the one session repair, and the reinstalled device decrypts
|
|
939
|
+
the later messages. A group device post that the Relay refuses as a stale
|
|
940
|
+
device gets the same repair. The send gives the device the key of the
|
|
941
|
+
send and posts the device message again with the new registration. When
|
|
942
|
+
the repair of a refused distribution refreshes the session of a device,
|
|
943
|
+
that device leaves the shared group message of the send. The send posts
|
|
944
|
+
the device message to it on its own with the new registration, so the
|
|
945
|
+
device decrypts the message of that send. A device whose session changed
|
|
946
|
+
for another reason, such as a receipt that refreshed it, also leaves the
|
|
947
|
+
shared group message. When that device has no handoff row, it gets the key
|
|
948
|
+
of the send before its device post. On the attempt that prepared the send,
|
|
949
|
+
the device decrypts the message. On a replay, it gets the current key. It
|
|
950
|
+
recovers the message through its retry request only when the send was
|
|
951
|
+
Resendable and the send log kept it. For another send, the retry request
|
|
952
|
+
gets the current distribution alone, and the device does not get that
|
|
953
|
+
message. The group-token receipt names
|
|
954
|
+
each refused destination with its code. A destination that the Relay
|
|
955
|
+
refused as `STALE_DEVICE` leaves the shared group message. The send
|
|
956
|
+
repairs that device and posts the device message to it on its own. When the Relay refuses a receipt or a retry
|
|
957
|
+
request as a stale device, the SDK fetches a fresh bundle, starts a new
|
|
958
|
+
session once, and posts the receipt or the request again under the new
|
|
959
|
+
session. The session start archives the stale session in the same record
|
|
960
|
+
write, and the `onSessionArchived` hook runs after the start succeeds.
|
|
961
|
+
So a reinstalled device gets the retry request and resends the message.
|
|
962
|
+
A retry request ends with the terminal class `missing-sender` only when
|
|
963
|
+
the Relay has no bundle of the device or refuses the request again. When
|
|
964
|
+
the refresh fails for another reason, the receipt or the request is
|
|
965
|
+
posted again later. A failure before the session record write, such as a
|
|
966
|
+
failed bundle fetch, keeps the stale session, and the next stale refusal
|
|
967
|
+
refreshes again. A failure after that write, such as a failed SESAME
|
|
968
|
+
registration, leaves the new session, and the next post uses it. The sealed post sends
|
|
969
|
+
no sender identity. `sendMultiRecipientUnidentified` takes nine arguments.
|
|
970
|
+
- **Changed: a one-device sealed post can use the group endorsement on the
|
|
971
|
+
direct route.** A sender-key distribution, a resend, or a group message
|
|
972
|
+
to one device whose only sealed authorization is the group endorsement
|
|
973
|
+
now posts to `/anonymous/delivery/send`. The Relay accepts the
|
|
974
|
+
endorsement there only when it is for the destination account alone.
|
|
975
|
+
The shared group message stays on `/anonymous/groups/send`, also for one
|
|
976
|
+
device. When the direct route answers the endorsement with 401
|
|
977
|
+
`ANONYMOUS_AUTH_REJECTED`, the SDK posts the same message once on the
|
|
978
|
+
group route for that device and writes one `info` log line with the
|
|
979
|
+
behavior `GROUP_ROUTE_FALLBACK`. A 401 `GROUP_CREDENTIAL_REJECTED` gets no
|
|
980
|
+
route fallback. A `required` send never falls back to identified
|
|
981
|
+
delivery.
|
|
982
|
+
- **Fixed: a resend of a group send is sealed with the group endorsement.**
|
|
983
|
+
A resend to a member with no access key could not be sealed, because the
|
|
984
|
+
resend did not look up the group of the original send. It now uses the
|
|
985
|
+
group endorsement of that group for the one device. A `required`
|
|
986
|
+
resend with no sealed authorization fails with `SEALED_SENDER_REQUIRED`
|
|
987
|
+
and makes no identified post.
|
|
988
|
+
- **Fixed: a resend with only the sender key keeps the failed group message
|
|
989
|
+
open.** When the sender logged no content for the device, it answers a
|
|
990
|
+
group retry request with the current sender-key distribution alone. That
|
|
991
|
+
resend gives the key but no content, so it no longer marks the failed
|
|
992
|
+
group message processed. A redelivery of that message now decrypts with
|
|
993
|
+
the key and gives its text. This applies, for example, when
|
|
994
|
+
`receiveIncomingEnvelopes` reports the message in `failedMessageIds` and
|
|
995
|
+
the application does not acknowledge it. A resend that carries content
|
|
996
|
+
still marks the failed envelope processed. The client writes a `debug`
|
|
997
|
+
log line with the behavior `RETRY_SENDER_KEY_RESEND`.
|
|
998
|
+
- **Added: `SendResult.refusedDestinationCount`.** A group send through
|
|
999
|
+
the hosted group-token route reports the number of destinations that the
|
|
1000
|
+
Relay refused when it accepted the shared post. A later fan-out refusal
|
|
1001
|
+
is not counted. Other sends do not set the field.
|
|
1002
|
+
- **Added: send log and storage protection types.** `SendLogStore`
|
|
1003
|
+
describes the storage of resendable group content: a payload for each
|
|
1004
|
+
group send and a row for each recipient device, kept until that device
|
|
1005
|
+
confirms the message or the entry expires. `LocalStoreProtection` names
|
|
1006
|
+
how a local store encrypts its data and where its key is kept. A
|
|
1007
|
+
`SignalProtocolLocalSecretVault` can declare `custody`. A vault that does
|
|
1008
|
+
not declare it counts as `same-origin`.
|
|
1009
|
+
- **Added: recovery constants.** `RESENDABLE_CONTENT_RETENTION_MS` is 14
|
|
1010
|
+
days, `RETRY_PLACEHOLDER_DEADLINE_MS` is one hour, and
|
|
1011
|
+
`SEND_LOG_RESEND_JOB_TTL_MS` is one day. `MESSAGE_RECORD_TTL_MS` is now
|
|
1012
|
+
deprecated. It keeps the same 14-day value as
|
|
1013
|
+
`RESENDABLE_CONTENT_RETENTION_MS`.
|
|
1014
|
+
- **Breaking: every local store must declare its protection.**
|
|
1015
|
+
`SignalProtocolLocalStore` now requires a `protection` member, so a store
|
|
1016
|
+
that the application writes must add it. The SQLite stores report
|
|
1017
|
+
`file-cipher` with the custody of their vault. They read the cipher from
|
|
1018
|
+
the setting that the database records, so a store with
|
|
1019
|
+
`encryptionAtRest: false` reports `none` and no key.
|
|
1020
|
+
`KeyValueSignalProtocolStore` reports `record-cipher` with the custody of
|
|
1021
|
+
its vault. `IndexedDbSignalProtocolStore` reports `record-cipher` with
|
|
1022
|
+
`same-origin` custody. `InMemorySignalProtocolStore` reports `none`. The
|
|
1023
|
+
Expo SecureStore, react-native-keychain, and Electron safeStorage vaults
|
|
1024
|
+
declare `os-keychain` custody, and the IndexedDB vault declares
|
|
1025
|
+
`same-origin`.
|
|
1026
|
+
- **Added: the SQLite stores keep a send log.** The Node, Expo, React
|
|
1027
|
+
Native, and web SQLite stores implement `SendLogStore`. Schema version 3
|
|
1028
|
+
adds three tables for the payloads, the recipient rows, and the resend
|
|
1029
|
+
jobs. The store opens a version 2 file and adds the tables with no change
|
|
1030
|
+
to the existing data. The store clock sets `createdAt`, so retention does
|
|
1031
|
+
not read the client timestamp. `clearAllKeys` also clears the send log.
|
|
1032
|
+
- **Breaking: every local store keeps a send log.**
|
|
1033
|
+
`SignalProtocolLocalStore` now extends `SendLogStore`, so a store that
|
|
1034
|
+
the application writes must add the send log methods.
|
|
1035
|
+
`KeyValueSignalProtocolStore`, `IndexedDbSignalProtocolStore`, and
|
|
1036
|
+
`InMemorySignalProtocolStore` now implement them with the same behavior
|
|
1037
|
+
as the SQLite stores. The key-value and IndexedDB stores encrypt the
|
|
1038
|
+
group, the content hint, and the content of each payload. The recipient
|
|
1039
|
+
rows and the resend jobs hold no content and stay in the clear. The
|
|
1040
|
+
IndexedDB schema version 8 adds three object stores and keeps the data of
|
|
1041
|
+
a version 7 database. `clearAllKeys` and the key-value reset
|
|
1042
|
+
also clear the send log.
|
|
1043
|
+
- **Breaking: resendable content needs a protected store.** A sender
|
|
1044
|
+
keeps the plaintext of a resendable message to answer a retry request.
|
|
1045
|
+
`protocol.contentRecovery` now decides whether the local store may hold
|
|
1046
|
+
it. The default mode, `require-protected`, keeps it only when the store
|
|
1047
|
+
is encrypted and its key is in an operating system keychain or a
|
|
1048
|
+
declared application vault. The mode `allow-co-located-key` also keeps
|
|
1049
|
+
it when the key shares the storage of the data, as with
|
|
1050
|
+
`IndexedDbSignalProtocolStore` and the IndexedDB vault. Those stores
|
|
1051
|
+
encrypt each record, but a reader of the origin storage can also read
|
|
1052
|
+
the key. The mode `off` keeps no content. A store with no encryption
|
|
1053
|
+
never keeps it. When the policy refuses the store, the client keeps no
|
|
1054
|
+
pairwise message record, and a retry request for a direct message resets
|
|
1055
|
+
the session with no content. The client also deletes the message records
|
|
1056
|
+
and the send log entries that the store already holds.
|
|
1057
|
+
`contentRecoveryStatus` shows the decision and its reason, and the client
|
|
1058
|
+
logs it once at creation. To keep content recovery on a web store, use a
|
|
1059
|
+
keychain or application vault, or set `allow-co-located-key` after a
|
|
1060
|
+
product review. `retentionMs` sets the retention, at most 30 days.
|
|
1061
|
+
- **Breaking: the client validates the store protection.** Creation fails
|
|
1062
|
+
when the local store declares no `protection`, an unknown value, or a
|
|
1063
|
+
cipher without a key. A declaration adds no encryption. It must state
|
|
1064
|
+
what the store does.
|
|
1065
|
+
- **Corrected: storage protection and content hint documentation.** The
|
|
1066
|
+
security model lists the protection that each built-in store declares,
|
|
1067
|
+
and says that a deletion does not erase content. Received content is
|
|
1068
|
+
outside `protocol.contentRecovery`: every store keeps it until the
|
|
1069
|
+
application handles the envelope, and a later Relay receive deletes what
|
|
1070
|
+
is older than 30 days. `MessageRecord` holds no retry count. The `contentHint` docs give the retry request and
|
|
1071
|
+
`onDeliveryError` behavior of each hint.
|
|
1072
|
+
- **Added: `contentRecoveryStatus.groupMembershipSource`.** The sender
|
|
1073
|
+
asks a group membership source before it gives group content to a device
|
|
1074
|
+
again. A managed group is checked against its verified group state, from
|
|
1075
|
+
`groups` with `resolveAciBytesByUserIds`. The hook
|
|
1076
|
+
`protocol.contentRecovery.isCurrentMember` answers for an ad hoc group
|
|
1077
|
+
and gets the prefixed group ID. The status field is `managed`, `hook`, or
|
|
1078
|
+
`none`, with the type `GroupMembershipSource`. A client with no source
|
|
1079
|
+
is still created and keeps content. It logs one warning at creation, a
|
|
1080
|
+
direct message resend works, and the client refuses each group resend.
|
|
1081
|
+
- **Changed: a group message is resendable by default.** When
|
|
1082
|
+
`protocol.contentRecovery` keeps content, a group send of a `DataMessage`
|
|
1083
|
+
has the content hint `Resendable` unless the application sets another
|
|
1084
|
+
hint. The client writes the content and the recipient devices to the
|
|
1085
|
+
send log before it stores the outgoing intent, so a failed write stops
|
|
1086
|
+
the send before any post. The client writes the entry once. A replay of
|
|
1087
|
+
an unfinished send writes no row again, so a row that an E2EE delivery
|
|
1088
|
+
receipt deleted stays deleted. Each recipient gets the hint in the identified
|
|
1089
|
+
envelope, the sealed message for one device, and the shared sealed
|
|
1090
|
+
message for the group. When the policy keeps no content, or the send is
|
|
1091
|
+
a string or bytes with a `Resendable` hint, the send goes out as
|
|
1092
|
+
`Default` and the client logs this once.
|
|
1093
|
+
- **Changed: an E2EE delivery receipt ends the content of its device.**
|
|
1094
|
+
When a device confirms a message with an E2EE delivery receipt, the
|
|
1095
|
+
client deletes the send log row of that device. The last row takes the
|
|
1096
|
+
content with it. A Relay delivery receipt, a read receipt, and a viewed
|
|
1097
|
+
receipt delete no row, because a device also acknowledges a copy that it
|
|
1098
|
+
could not decrypt.
|
|
1099
|
+
- **Added: `forgetSentContent` and `getPendingRecipients`.**
|
|
1100
|
+
`client.getPendingRecipients(clientMessageId)` lists the devices that
|
|
1101
|
+
have not confirmed a group send with an E2EE delivery receipt.
|
|
1102
|
+
`client.forgetSentContent(clientMessageId)` deletes the logged content of
|
|
1103
|
+
one group send at once. It does not delete the pairwise message records.
|
|
1104
|
+
- **Changed: content retention follows `retentionMs`.** The client deletes
|
|
1105
|
+
send log entries and pairwise message records past
|
|
1106
|
+
`protocol.contentRecovery.retentionMs` at creation, at `stop()`, and
|
|
1107
|
+
before the first resendable group send of each day. It also deletes
|
|
1108
|
+
expired send log entries before each lookup. A retry request for a
|
|
1109
|
+
pairwise message older than the retention gets no content. Before, the
|
|
1110
|
+
client used the fixed 14-day value for the message records.
|
|
1111
|
+
- **Changed: the store clock sets the age of a pairwise message record.**
|
|
1112
|
+
Each local store sets `createdAt` of a `MessageRecord` from its clock at
|
|
1113
|
+
the first write, and keeps that value when a resend replaces the record.
|
|
1114
|
+
It does not store the `createdAt` that the caller gives. Retention, the
|
|
1115
|
+
sweep, and the sender refusal of an old retry request measure from this
|
|
1116
|
+
value, so the message timestamp does not change retention. A retry
|
|
1117
|
+
request for a message with no stored content takes its age from the
|
|
1118
|
+
failed timestamp. Records written before this change keep their stored
|
|
1119
|
+
`createdAt`. A custom `MessageRecordStore` must set `createdAt` the same
|
|
1120
|
+
way.
|
|
1121
|
+
- **Breaking: `KeyStorageOps` needs `clearSendLog`.** A device lifecycle
|
|
1122
|
+
reset now clears the send log with the other local crypto state. A
|
|
1123
|
+
custom `KeyStorageOps` must add `clearSendLog(): Promise<number>`. The
|
|
1124
|
+
built-in stores already implement it.
|
|
1125
|
+
- **Added: a retry request names the failed client message ID.**
|
|
1126
|
+
`RetryRequest` has an optional `failedClientMessageId`. When the relay of
|
|
1127
|
+
the requester delivers the client message ID of the failed envelope, the
|
|
1128
|
+
retry request carries it, so a sender can find the message when the
|
|
1129
|
+
relay assigns its own envelope ID. The payload stays at version 1, and a
|
|
1130
|
+
decoder that does not know the key ignores it. Each later attempt of the
|
|
1131
|
+
request carries the ID of the failed envelope, not the ID of a failed
|
|
1132
|
+
resend.
|
|
1133
|
+
- **Changed: a retry request for a sender-key message has no ratchet key.**
|
|
1134
|
+
The SDK no longer reads a ratchet key from the ciphertext of a failed
|
|
1135
|
+
sender-key message. A retry request without `ratchetKey` names a
|
|
1136
|
+
sender-key failure.
|
|
1137
|
+
- **Fixed: a pairwise retry request carries the ratchet key of the
|
|
1138
|
+
sender.** The SDK reads the ratchet key from the stored wire form of the
|
|
1139
|
+
failed message. A stale-session request now resets the session, and a
|
|
1140
|
+
request for a current session resends only. Before, the SDK read the
|
|
1141
|
+
wire form as a framed message, so no request carried a key. A sealed or
|
|
1142
|
+
malformed message still gives no key.
|
|
1143
|
+
- **Fixed: a session reset for a retry request sends its null message.**
|
|
1144
|
+
When the content of a failed pairwise message is gone, and the request
|
|
1145
|
+
names the ratchet key of the current session, the sender archives that
|
|
1146
|
+
session. The sender then starts a new session from a fresh prekey bundle
|
|
1147
|
+
of the requesting device and sends the null message on it. Before, the
|
|
1148
|
+
null message found no session, so the sender did not acknowledge the
|
|
1149
|
+
request. A request with another ratchet key, for another device, or from
|
|
1150
|
+
another sender does not change the session.
|
|
1151
|
+
- **Fixed: a new session from a prekey bundle keeps the earlier sessions.**
|
|
1152
|
+
A session that the client starts from a prekey bundle archives the
|
|
1153
|
+
current session and keeps the archived sessions. Before, it replaced the
|
|
1154
|
+
session record, so a message that the peer encrypted on an earlier
|
|
1155
|
+
session did not decrypt. After a session reset for a retry request, a
|
|
1156
|
+
message that the requester sent on the archived session now decrypts.
|
|
1157
|
+
- **Changed: a sender answers a group retry request from the send log.**
|
|
1158
|
+
The sender looks up the send log rows of the device that asked: by the
|
|
1159
|
+
failed client message ID, then by the failed envelope ID, then by the
|
|
1160
|
+
failed timestamp. Each logged entry that it finds goes again to that
|
|
1161
|
+
device only, with its timestamp and content hint, and only when the
|
|
1162
|
+
current membership source admits the requester to the group of the
|
|
1163
|
+
entry. A row counts its resends, and the count survives a restart. A row
|
|
1164
|
+
with 5 resends gets no more. A requester that is not a current member,
|
|
1165
|
+
and a group with no membership source, get no content and no
|
|
1166
|
+
distribution. The answer to the failed envelope then ends with the new
|
|
1167
|
+
`RetryTerminalClass` value `membership-refused`. The sender stores the
|
|
1168
|
+
end, calls `onRetryTerminal` once, and answers no later request for that
|
|
1169
|
+
envelope from that device. The refusal is not a delivery error, and the
|
|
1170
|
+
sender acknowledges the request envelope. A group with no membership
|
|
1171
|
+
source also writes one `warn` log line for the group with the behavior
|
|
1172
|
+
`RETRY_GROUP_RESEND_REFUSED`. This deviates from the recovery design,
|
|
1173
|
+
which logged the refusal only. When no row names the
|
|
1174
|
+
message, a sender-key failure gets the current sender-key distribution
|
|
1175
|
+
of the group alone, so the device decrypts the later group messages of
|
|
1176
|
+
the sender. A retry request without a ratchet key never resets the
|
|
1177
|
+
pairwise session. A retry request that names another device of the
|
|
1178
|
+
sender gets no answer, and the client writes a `warn` log line with the
|
|
1179
|
+
behavior `RETRY_REQUEST_OTHER_DEVICE`.
|
|
1180
|
+
- **Changed: a resend of logged group content carries the current sender
|
|
1181
|
+
key.** Each logged entry goes again with the current sender-key
|
|
1182
|
+
distribution of its group beside the content, in one pairwise envelope.
|
|
1183
|
+
The sender reads the distribution when it makes the resend, so the
|
|
1184
|
+
device also decrypts the later group messages of the sender. With no
|
|
1185
|
+
sender key for the group, the content goes alone. The `info` log line of
|
|
1186
|
+
the resend says whether it carried a distribution.
|
|
1187
|
+
- **Breaking: a content adapter must put content beside a distribution.**
|
|
1188
|
+
`SignalProtocolContentAdapter.serializeContentBesideSenderKeyDistribution(content, groupId, distribution)`
|
|
1189
|
+
is a new required method. It returns one content with the logged content
|
|
1190
|
+
and the distribution. The default adapter adds the distribution to the
|
|
1191
|
+
JSON object of the content, in the form of
|
|
1192
|
+
`serializeSenderKeyDistributionText`. It throws when the content is not
|
|
1193
|
+
a JSON object.
|
|
1194
|
+
- **Added: a resend of logged content survives a restart.** Before the
|
|
1195
|
+
membership check, the sender writes a pending resend job for each logged
|
|
1196
|
+
entry that a retry request attempt names. The job of the entry that
|
|
1197
|
+
answers the attempt names the failed envelope in the new field
|
|
1198
|
+
`SendLogResendJob.failedEnvelopeId`. The SQLite send log keeps it in the
|
|
1199
|
+
new column `failed_envelope_id` of `send_log_resend_job`. A job counts
|
|
1200
|
+
each post attempt before the post and ends as `posted` after it. The job
|
|
1201
|
+
of an entry that the membership or the resend limit refuses ends as
|
|
1202
|
+
`abandoned`. The client runs the pending jobs at `create()`, at each
|
|
1203
|
+
relay transition to connected, and after a failed job. The wait after a
|
|
1204
|
+
failure is a full-jitter wait from 1 s that doubles up to 30 s, and a
|
|
1205
|
+
failed job writes a `warn` log line with the behavior
|
|
1206
|
+
`RESEND_JOB_RETRY`. A job checks the membership again when it runs, and
|
|
1207
|
+
never resets a session: it makes one only when there is none. A job
|
|
1208
|
+
ends as `abandoned`, with one `info` log line, when it is older than
|
|
1209
|
+
`SEND_LOG_RESEND_JOB_TTL_MS`, when its logged entry is gone, when the
|
|
1210
|
+
answer to its failed envelope ended, when the membership refuses the
|
|
1211
|
+
requester, at the resend limit, or when no session can be made. A
|
|
1212
|
+
request without a request attempt writes no job. This deviates from the
|
|
1213
|
+
recovery design, which named a `send-log:resend-job` reliability record.
|
|
1214
|
+
The job lives in the send log store, with its entry.
|
|
1215
|
+
- **Changed: a message record keeps no sender-key distribution.** The
|
|
1216
|
+
message records of the pairwise sends keep no chain key. A send of a
|
|
1217
|
+
distribution alone keeps no record. A record of a distribution beside
|
|
1218
|
+
other content keeps only that content, so it stays resendable. A
|
|
1219
|
+
sent-sync transcript to an own device follows the same rule. At
|
|
1220
|
+
`create()`, the client removes each distribution from the records that
|
|
1221
|
+
an earlier version wrote, once, and then writes the marker
|
|
1222
|
+
`migration:skdm-records-removed`. It keeps the content and the
|
|
1223
|
+
`createdAt` of a mixed record and deletes a record of a distribution
|
|
1224
|
+
alone. When this sweep fails, `create()` fails, and the next start
|
|
1225
|
+
sweeps again. The retry handler applies the same rule to each record
|
|
1226
|
+
that it reads. A group timestamp whose record it deletes gets the
|
|
1227
|
+
current sender-key distribution of the group, as a missing record does.
|
|
1228
|
+
- **Changed: a start with content recovery off clears content once.** When
|
|
1229
|
+
content recovery is off, `create()` clears the message records and the
|
|
1230
|
+
send log once, and then writes the marker `resendable-content:cleared`.
|
|
1231
|
+
A later start with content recovery off clears nothing, until a start
|
|
1232
|
+
with content recovery on keeps content again. The clear deletes no
|
|
1233
|
+
sender-key state, so the next group send needs no new distribution.
|
|
1234
|
+
When the clear fails, `create()` fails, and the next start clears again.
|
|
1235
|
+
- **Breaking: a content adapter must remove a distribution from a
|
|
1236
|
+
record.** `SignalProtocolContentAdapter.withoutSenderKeyDistribution(plaintext)`
|
|
1237
|
+
is a new required method. It returns the plaintext unchanged when it
|
|
1238
|
+
carries no distribution, the other content when a distribution travels
|
|
1239
|
+
beside it, and `null` for a distribution alone. It applies the same
|
|
1240
|
+
rule to the content inside a sent-sync transcript of the adapter's
|
|
1241
|
+
format. The default adapter implements it.
|
|
1242
|
+
- **Breaking: a custom message record store must rewrite its records.**
|
|
1243
|
+
`MessageRecordStore.rewriteMessageRecords(rewrite)` is a new required
|
|
1244
|
+
method. It calls `rewrite` for each record, replaces the plaintext of a
|
|
1245
|
+
record when the result differs and keeps its `createdAt`, deletes the
|
|
1246
|
+
record when the result is `null`, and returns the number of changed
|
|
1247
|
+
records. The memory, key-value, web, and SQLite stores implement it.
|
|
1248
|
+
- **Fixed: content beside a sender-key distribution reaches the
|
|
1249
|
+
application.** Before, the client installed a distribution and then
|
|
1250
|
+
dropped the rest of its content. A data message in the same envelope
|
|
1251
|
+
never reached `onMessageDecrypted`, and no delivery receipt went out for
|
|
1252
|
+
it. Now the client installs the distribution, then routes the other
|
|
1253
|
+
content as a receipt, a typing indicator, or a data message. This
|
|
1254
|
+
applies on the relay subscription and on `receiveIncomingEnvelopes()`.
|
|
1255
|
+
A distribution that comes alone still gives nothing to the application.
|
|
1256
|
+
- **Breaking: a content adapter must decide a distribution-only content.**
|
|
1257
|
+
`InspectedSignalProtocolContent.senderKeyDistributionOnly` is a new
|
|
1258
|
+
required `boolean`. A custom content adapter must set it on every
|
|
1259
|
+
inspect result. It is `true` when the content carries a sender-key
|
|
1260
|
+
distribution and nothing else. The default adapter sets it.
|
|
1261
|
+
- **Changed: content beside a sender-key distribution is group content.**
|
|
1262
|
+
Before the client installs such a distribution, it checks that the
|
|
1263
|
+
sender may send messages to the group of the distribution. When the
|
|
1264
|
+
group refuses the sender, the client installs no key and gives no
|
|
1265
|
+
content. `onMessageDecrypted` gets the content with `isGroup` set to
|
|
1266
|
+
`true` and the group ID as `conversationId`. A retry resend can carry
|
|
1267
|
+
the content of a failed group message beside the current sender key.
|
|
1268
|
+
The application then gets that content under the `messageId` of the
|
|
1269
|
+
failed message, on the relay subscription and on
|
|
1270
|
+
`receiveIncomingEnvelopes()`. The resend marks the failed message
|
|
1271
|
+
processed, so a later redelivery of that message is dropped. When the
|
|
1272
|
+
failed message decrypts first, the later resend is dropped.
|
|
1273
|
+
- **Fixed: `processIncomingEnvelope()` asks for a failed group message
|
|
1274
|
+
again.** A group message that fails with a retryable error, for example
|
|
1275
|
+
after a lost sender-key distribution, now gets a retry request to its
|
|
1276
|
+
sender, and the client acknowledges it, as on the relay subscription.
|
|
1277
|
+
Before, the method threw with no request, so the message was lost. A
|
|
1278
|
+
group message with the Implicit content hint gets no request and is
|
|
1279
|
+
acknowledged. On every receive path, the stored request names the
|
|
1280
|
+
message as a group message, so a resend that brings only the sender key
|
|
1281
|
+
does not mark the message processed.
|
|
1282
|
+
- **Added: the `onDeliveryError` and `onDeliveryRecovered` hooks.** When a
|
|
1283
|
+
received message fails to decrypt and the client asks the sender for it
|
|
1284
|
+
again, `onDeliveryError` tells the application that the content did not
|
|
1285
|
+
come. The content hint of the message sets the time. A message with the
|
|
1286
|
+
Default hint, or with no hint, gets the error at once. A Resendable
|
|
1287
|
+
message gets it one hour after the first failure,
|
|
1288
|
+
`RETRY_PLACEHOLDER_DEADLINE_MS`, when its content has not come. An
|
|
1289
|
+
Implicit message never gets it. A request that a rate limit refuses, or
|
|
1290
|
+
a request that ends, gets the error at once. It deletes nothing, and the
|
|
1291
|
+
retry request continues after it. When the content comes after the
|
|
1292
|
+
error, `onDeliveryRecovered` runs with the receive time of the first
|
|
1293
|
+
failure. Each hook runs at least once for each failed message, also
|
|
1294
|
+
across a restart. The client marks the error shown, or the recovery,
|
|
1295
|
+
only after the hook returns. A hook that throws, a client stop, or a
|
|
1296
|
+
crash before that mark runs the hook again at the next retry request
|
|
1297
|
+
pass, start, or redelivery. A hook that throws in a retry request pass
|
|
1298
|
+
does not delay the next attempt or the end of the request. A receive
|
|
1299
|
+
does not acknowledge a failed message whose error or recovery hook threw
|
|
1300
|
+
before the content, but an error from the recovery hook after the
|
|
1301
|
+
content does not fail the receive that gave it. Make each hook
|
|
1302
|
+
idempotent for one `failedEnvelopeId`. The events are
|
|
1303
|
+
`DeliveryErrorEvent` and `DeliveryRecoveredEvent`, with the cause type
|
|
1304
|
+
`DeliveryErrorCause`. They are exported from the main entry and from
|
|
1305
|
+
`/client`. For a failed group message, both events carry `groupId`, in
|
|
1306
|
+
the form of `DecryptedEnvelope.conversationId`, when the client holds
|
|
1307
|
+
the sender key that the message names. The error of a message with a
|
|
1308
|
+
missing sender key has no `groupId`. Its recovery has one when the
|
|
1309
|
+
decrypt that gave
|
|
1310
|
+
the content installed or used the sender key of the group. The client checks the time at each redelivery of the failed message and at each retry
|
|
1311
|
+
request write. With a relay, it also checks at `create()` and, while the
|
|
1312
|
+
client runs, at the time when the error is due. A pairwise message has
|
|
1313
|
+
no content hint by default, so its error comes at once.
|
|
1314
|
+
- **Changed: a receive failure that no resend can repair asks for
|
|
1315
|
+
nothing.** Three failures are in this class: the group state refuses the
|
|
1316
|
+
sender, the identity of the sender is not trusted (`UNTRUSTED_IDENTITY`),
|
|
1317
|
+
and the envelope is malformed (`INVALID_CIPHERTEXT`). On the relay
|
|
1318
|
+
subscription, on `receiveIncomingEnvelopes()`, and on
|
|
1319
|
+
`processIncomingEnvelope()`, the client posts no retry request, stores
|
|
1320
|
+
no request record, and acknowledges the envelope. `onDecryptionError`
|
|
1321
|
+
runs once for the envelope, and a redelivery of it is dropped. The relay
|
|
1322
|
+
subscription writes an `error` log line that names the refusal. A
|
|
1323
|
+
ciphertext that does not decode or parse now fails with
|
|
1324
|
+
`INVALID_CIPHERTEXT`. Before, it got a retry request. Before, the relay subscription also asked again for a
|
|
1325
|
+
refused or untrusted envelope, and `processIncomingEnvelope()` did not
|
|
1326
|
+
acknowledge it.
|
|
1327
|
+
- **Changed: a retry request ends 14 days after the first failure.** The
|
|
1328
|
+
deadline of a request is the time of attempt 1 plus 14 days, the default
|
|
1329
|
+
retention of resendable content, `RESENDABLE_CONTENT_RETENTION_MS`.
|
|
1330
|
+
Each later attempt keeps it, and the timestamp of the
|
|
1331
|
+
failed message does not change it. Before, the deadline was 24 hours
|
|
1332
|
+
after attempt 1 and no later than 30 days after the failed message. A
|
|
1333
|
+
request that a rate limit refuses waits for the end of the rate window
|
|
1334
|
+
and keeps its deadline, also across a restart. At the deadline the
|
|
1335
|
+
request ends as `expired-content`, also when its stored attempt is
|
|
1336
|
+
answered. A request whose content came does not end. A stored request
|
|
1337
|
+
keeps its stored deadline. At the deadline, a sender key that has not
|
|
1338
|
+
rotated since the failure is older than the default `maxSenderKeyAge` of
|
|
1339
|
+
14 days. After an `expired-content` end of a group message, the next
|
|
1340
|
+
group send then rotates that key, as any send does, and distributes the
|
|
1341
|
+
new key to each member.
|
|
1342
|
+
- **Added: the `attempts-exhausted` retry terminal class.** When the
|
|
1343
|
+
resend that answers the fifth attempt of a request,
|
|
1344
|
+
`MAX_RETRY_RESPONSES_PER_MESSAGE`, also fails, the request ends as
|
|
1345
|
+
`attempts-exhausted` and posts no sixth attempt. `onRetryTerminal` runs
|
|
1346
|
+
with the class, and `onDeliveryError` runs with the cause
|
|
1347
|
+
`request-ended`. Only an `expired-content` end resets the session, so
|
|
1348
|
+
this end resets nothing. A switch over `RetryTerminalClass` must handle
|
|
1349
|
+
the new value.
|
|
1350
|
+
|
|
3
1351
|
## 11.0.0
|
|
4
1352
|
|
|
5
1353
|
- **Added: the connection reason `authority-refused`.** The mailbox
|