@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk 0.1.0-alpha.7 → 0.1.0-alpha.9

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (655) hide show
  1. package/ADAPTERS.md +1 -1
  2. package/CHANGELOG.md +767 -2
  3. package/COMMERCIAL.md +56 -0
  4. package/README.md +13 -8
  5. package/SECURITY.md +15 -1
  6. package/client/README.md +1 -1
  7. package/dist/client/client.d.ts.map +1 -1
  8. package/dist/client/client.js +16 -8
  9. package/dist/client/client.js.map +1 -1
  10. package/dist/client/config.d.ts +12 -2
  11. package/dist/client/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
  12. package/dist/client/config.js.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.d.ts +19 -2
  14. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  15. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.js +26 -10
  16. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.js.map +1 -1
  17. package/dist/client/headless.d.ts +1 -1
  18. package/dist/client/headless.js +1 -1
  19. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.d.ts +27 -1
  20. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.d.ts.map +1 -1
  21. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js +36 -6
  22. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js.map +1 -1
  23. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts +16 -1
  24. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts.map +1 -1
  25. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js +112 -52
  26. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js.map +1 -1
  27. package/dist/client/types.d.ts +20 -7
  28. package/dist/client/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  29. package/dist/client/types.js.map +1 -1
  30. package/dist/index.d.ts +7 -0
  31. package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  32. package/dist/index.js +7 -0
  33. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
  34. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.d.ts +1 -1
  35. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  36. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.js +1 -1
  37. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.js.map +1 -1
  38. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.d.ts +9 -0
  39. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.d.ts.map +1 -1
  40. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.js +16 -0
  41. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.js.map +1 -1
  42. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts +37 -5
  43. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  44. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js +98 -15
  45. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js.map +1 -1
  46. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.d.ts +48 -2
  47. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.d.ts.map +1 -1
  48. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.js +122 -13
  49. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.js.map +1 -1
  50. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.d.ts.map +1 -1
  51. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js +32 -18
  52. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js.map +1 -1
  53. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
  54. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js +33 -19
  55. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js.map +1 -1
  56. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.d.ts.map +1 -1
  57. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js +8 -14
  58. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js.map +1 -1
  59. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts +9 -4
  60. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
  61. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js +7 -15
  62. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js.map +1 -1
  63. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts +6 -7
  64. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  65. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js +5 -7
  66. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js.map +1 -1
  67. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts +45 -0
  68. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts.map +1 -0
  69. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js +77 -0
  70. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js.map +1 -0
  71. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts +64 -9
  72. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  73. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js +43 -0
  74. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js.map +1 -1
  75. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts +37 -0
  76. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  77. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js +108 -7
  78. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js.map +1 -1
  79. package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts +14 -15
  80. package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  81. package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js +109 -102
  82. package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  83. package/dist/local/store/expo/db.d.ts +4 -1
  84. package/dist/local/store/expo/db.d.ts.map +1 -1
  85. package/dist/local/store/expo/db.js +5 -0
  86. package/dist/local/store/expo/db.js.map +1 -1
  87. package/dist/local/store/expo/index.d.ts +0 -2
  88. package/dist/local/store/expo/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  89. package/dist/local/store/expo/index.js +1 -1
  90. package/dist/local/store/expo/index.js.map +1 -1
  91. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.d.ts +1 -1
  92. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  93. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.js +2 -2
  94. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.js.map +1 -1
  95. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.d.ts +101 -77
  96. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.d.ts.map +1 -1
  97. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.js +154 -124
  98. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.js.map +1 -1
  99. package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.d.ts +134 -32
  100. package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.d.ts.map +1 -1
  101. package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.js +36 -7
  102. package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.js.map +1 -1
  103. package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
  104. package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  105. package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.js +18 -0
  106. package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  107. package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.d.ts +53 -4
  108. package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  109. package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.js +456 -9
  110. package/dist/local/store/node/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  111. package/dist/local/store/node/database.d.ts +68 -0
  112. package/dist/local/store/node/database.d.ts.map +1 -1
  113. package/dist/local/store/node/database.js +201 -18
  114. package/dist/local/store/node/database.js.map +1 -1
  115. package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.d.ts +39 -0
  116. package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  117. package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js +163 -8
  118. package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  119. package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
  120. package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  121. package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js +33 -1
  122. package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  123. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.d.ts +405 -0
  124. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.d.ts.map +1 -0
  125. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.js +687 -0
  126. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.js.map +1 -0
  127. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.d.ts +58 -0
  128. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.d.ts.map +1 -0
  129. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.js +31 -0
  130. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.js.map +1 -0
  131. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.d.ts +483 -0
  132. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.d.ts.map +1 -0
  133. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.js +11 -0
  134. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.js.map +1 -0
  135. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.d.ts +46 -0
  136. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.d.ts.map +1 -0
  137. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.js +11 -0
  138. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.js.map +1 -0
  139. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.d.ts +129 -0
  140. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.d.ts.map +1 -0
  141. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.js +79 -0
  142. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.js.map +1 -0
  143. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.d.ts +43 -0
  144. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.d.ts.map +1 -0
  145. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.js +181 -0
  146. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.js.map +1 -0
  147. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.d.ts +10 -0
  148. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.d.ts.map +1 -0
  149. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.js +122 -0
  150. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.js.map +1 -0
  151. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.d.ts +32 -0
  152. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.d.ts.map +1 -0
  153. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.js +146 -0
  154. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.js.map +1 -0
  155. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.d.ts +5 -0
  156. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.d.ts.map +1 -0
  157. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.js +33 -0
  158. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.js.map +1 -0
  159. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.d.ts +3 -0
  160. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.d.ts.map +1 -0
  161. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.js +10 -0
  162. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.js.map +1 -0
  163. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.d.ts +101 -0
  164. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.d.ts.map +1 -0
  165. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.js +299 -0
  166. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.js.map +1 -0
  167. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.d.ts +22 -0
  168. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.d.ts.map +1 -0
  169. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.js +17 -0
  170. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.js.map +1 -0
  171. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.d.ts +63 -0
  172. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.d.ts.map +1 -0
  173. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.js +341 -0
  174. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.js.map +1 -0
  175. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.d.ts +130 -0
  176. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.d.ts.map +1 -0
  177. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.js +578 -0
  178. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.js.map +1 -0
  179. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.d.ts +119 -0
  180. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.d.ts.map +1 -0
  181. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.js +723 -0
  182. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.js.map +1 -0
  183. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.d.ts +92 -0
  184. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.d.ts.map +1 -0
  185. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.js +359 -0
  186. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.js.map +1 -0
  187. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.d.ts +18 -0
  188. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.d.ts.map +1 -0
  189. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.js +142 -0
  190. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.js.map +1 -0
  191. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.d.ts +358 -0
  192. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.d.ts.map +1 -0
  193. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.js +287 -0
  194. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.js.map +1 -0
  195. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.d.ts +12 -0
  196. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.d.ts.map +1 -0
  197. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.js +71 -0
  198. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.js.map +1 -0
  199. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.d.ts +3 -0
  200. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.d.ts.map +1 -0
  201. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.js +3 -0
  202. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.js.map +1 -0
  203. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.d.ts +9 -6
  204. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.d.ts.map +1 -1
  205. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.js +17 -11
  206. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.js.map +1 -1
  207. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.d.ts +4 -1
  208. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  209. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.js +3 -1
  210. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.js.map +1 -1
  211. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.d.ts +44 -65
  212. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.d.ts.map +1 -1
  213. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.js +61 -36
  214. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.js.map +1 -1
  215. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.d.ts +16 -103
  216. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  217. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.js +8 -13
  218. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.js.map +1 -1
  219. package/dist/remote/relay/index.d.ts +1 -1
  220. package/dist/remote/relay/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  221. package/dist/remote/relay/index.js.map +1 -1
  222. package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.d.ts +4 -9
  223. package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  224. package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.js +39 -22
  225. package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  226. package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts +57 -75
  227. package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  228. package/dist/remote/relay/types.js +0 -1
  229. package/dist/remote/relay/types.js.map +1 -1
  230. package/dist/types/api.d.ts +21 -0
  231. package/dist/types/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
  232. package/dist/types/protocol-config.d.ts +51 -0
  233. package/dist/types/protocol-config.d.ts.map +1 -1
  234. package/dist/types/protocol-config.js +46 -0
  235. package/dist/types/protocol-config.js.map +1 -1
  236. package/docs/ASSURANCE.md +10 -6
  237. package/docs/CLIENT_COMPOSITION.md +23 -69
  238. package/docs/DEVIATIONS.md +44 -11
  239. package/docs/E2EE.md +71 -6
  240. package/docs/GETTING_STARTED.md +1 -1
  241. package/docs/PACKAGE_SURFACE.md +6 -5
  242. package/docs/RECIPES.md +1 -1
  243. package/docs/SECURITY.md +8 -0
  244. package/local/store/README.md +3 -1
  245. package/local/store/expo/README.md +10 -1
  246. package/local/store/node/README.md +8 -1
  247. package/package.json +12 -7
  248. package/remote/relay/convex/README.md +1 -1
  249. package/remote/relay/convex/component/README.md +428 -0
  250. package/scripts/oe-groups.mjs +21 -1
  251. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server/index.d.ts +0 -2
  252. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server/index.d.ts.map +0 -1
  253. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server/index.js +0 -2
  254. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server/index.js.map +0 -1
  255. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server.d.ts +0 -150
  256. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server.d.ts.map +0 -1
  257. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server.js +0 -506
  258. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server.js.map +0 -1
  259. package/docs/api/README.md +0 -471
  260. package/docs/api/classes/EncryptionError.md +0 -112
  261. package/docs/api/classes/EndorsementManager.md +0 -325
  262. package/docs/api/classes/SealedSenderAuthError.md +0 -127
  263. package/docs/api/classes/ServerDerivedKeyPair.md +0 -68
  264. package/docs/api/classes/ServerDerivedPublicKey.md +0 -33
  265. package/docs/api/classes/ServerRootKeyPair.md +0 -94
  266. package/docs/api/classes/ServerRootPublicKey.md +0 -72
  267. package/docs/api/classes/SignalProtocolBlockingManager.md +0 -106
  268. package/docs/api/classes/SignalProtocolClient.md +0 -2654
  269. package/docs/api/classes/VerificationFailure.md +0 -25
  270. package/docs/api/enumerations/ContentHint.md +0 -63
  271. package/docs/api/enumerations/EncryptionErrorCode.md +0 -488
  272. package/docs/api/enumerations/IdentityKeyChange.md +0 -65
  273. package/docs/api/enumerations/MessageType.md +0 -29
  274. package/docs/api/enumerations/TrustDirection.md +0 -33
  275. package/docs/api/enumerations/TypingAction.md +0 -31
  276. package/docs/api/functions/createDefaultSignalProtocolContentAdapter.md +0 -13
  277. package/docs/api/functions/createDefaultSignalProtocolLogger.md +0 -36
  278. package/docs/api/functions/createGroupId.md +0 -32
  279. package/docs/api/functions/createSignalProtocolClient.md +0 -36
  280. package/docs/api/functions/createSignalProtocolClientConfig.md +0 -24
  281. package/docs/api/functions/decodeGroupTrustRoot.md +0 -21
  282. package/docs/api/functions/encodeGroupTrustRoot.md +0 -28
  283. package/docs/api/functions/extractGroupId.md +0 -32
  284. package/docs/api/functions/formatVersion.md +0 -25
  285. package/docs/api/functions/isCompatible.md +0 -31
  286. package/docs/api/functions/isGroupId.md +0 -37
  287. package/docs/api/functions/isSealedSenderAuthError.md +0 -25
  288. package/docs/api/functions/parseVersion.md +0 -29
  289. package/docs/api/functions/resolveSPQRLimits.md +0 -21
  290. package/docs/api/functions/resolveSignalProtocolLogger.md +0 -42
  291. package/docs/api/interfaces/AccountIdentityProvisioning.md +0 -43
  292. package/docs/api/interfaces/AccountIdentityRotation.md +0 -69
  293. package/docs/api/interfaces/AttachmentTransferOptions.md +0 -49
  294. package/docs/api/interfaces/BlockedRecipientEntry.md +0 -25
  295. package/docs/api/interfaces/BlockedRecipientsSyncInput.md +0 -27
  296. package/docs/api/interfaces/ConfigurationSyncInput.md +0 -19
  297. package/docs/api/interfaces/CredentialPublicKey.md +0 -25
  298. package/docs/api/interfaces/DataMessageInput.md +0 -21
  299. package/docs/api/interfaces/DecryptedEnvelope.md +0 -95
  300. package/docs/api/interfaces/DecryptedGroup.md +0 -86
  301. package/docs/api/interfaces/DeviceInfo.md +0 -79
  302. package/docs/api/interfaces/DeviceRecord.md +0 -87
  303. package/docs/api/interfaces/DeviceRegistration.md +0 -27
  304. package/docs/api/interfaces/DoubleRatchetConfig.md +0 -36
  305. package/docs/api/interfaces/EcOneTimePreKey.md +0 -27
  306. package/docs/api/interfaces/EcSignedPreKey.md +0 -39
  307. package/docs/api/interfaces/EcSignedPreKeyUpload.md +0 -50
  308. package/docs/api/interfaces/EncryptionErrorContext.md +0 -51
  309. package/docs/api/interfaces/Envelope.md +0 -154
  310. package/docs/api/interfaces/ForceKeyResetResult.md +0 -37
  311. package/docs/api/interfaces/GroupAuthorization.md +0 -23
  312. package/docs/api/interfaces/GroupChangeEntry.md +0 -42
  313. package/docs/api/interfaces/GroupMemberDevice.md +0 -26
  314. package/docs/api/interfaces/GroupTrustRoot.md +0 -33
  315. package/docs/api/interfaces/IEcOneTimePreKeyStore.md +0 -86
  316. package/docs/api/interfaces/IEcSignedPreKeyStore.md +0 -133
  317. package/docs/api/interfaces/IGroupServer.md +0 -120
  318. package/docs/api/interfaces/IGroupStateStore.md +0 -128
  319. package/docs/api/interfaces/IIdentityKeyStore.md +0 -312
  320. package/docs/api/interfaces/IKemPreKeyStore.md +0 -144
  321. package/docs/api/interfaces/IKyberLastResortPreKeyStore.md +0 -112
  322. package/docs/api/interfaces/ILogger.md +0 -117
  323. package/docs/api/interfaces/IProtocolStore.md +0 -1033
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  614. package/docs/api/type-aliases/ProgressCallback.md +0 -45
  615. package/docs/api/type-aliases/PublicKey.md +0 -22
  616. package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectCompleteUploadRequest.md +0 -19
  617. package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectDeleteRequest.md +0 -19
  618. package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectDownloadRequest.md +0 -19
  619. package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectUploadRequest.md +0 -42
  620. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SCKAMode.md +0 -11
  621. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SealedSenderAuth.md +0 -15
  622. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaCleanupInput.md +0 -9
  623. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaCleanupResult.md +0 -9
  624. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaDownloadInput.md +0 -9
  625. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaDownloadResult.md +0 -9
  626. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaOperationResult.md +0 -9
  627. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaUploadInput.md +0 -9
  628. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaUploadResult.md +0 -9
  629. package/docs/api/type-aliases/Signature.md +0 -21
  630. package/docs/api/type-aliases/Unsubscribe.md +0 -15
  631. package/docs/api/variables/BraidPolicy.md +0 -21
  632. package/docs/api/variables/DEFAULT_DEVICE_ID.md +0 -12
  633. package/docs/api/variables/DOUBLE_RATCHET_SPEC.md +0 -11
  634. package/docs/api/variables/GROUP_ID_PREFIX.md +0 -11
  635. package/docs/api/variables/GROUP_TRUST_ROOT_VERSION.md +0 -11
  636. package/docs/api/variables/KEY_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS_DEFAULT.md +0 -11
  637. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_MESSAGE_KEYS.md +0 -14
  638. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_PREKEY_AGE_MS_DEFAULT.md +0 -11
  639. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_RECEIVER_CHAINS.md +0 -14
  640. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_REGISTRATION_ID.md +0 -16
  641. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_SKIP.md +0 -11
  642. package/docs/api/variables/MESSAGE_FORMAT.md +0 -11
  643. package/docs/api/variables/MIN_REGISTRATION_ID.md +0 -16
  644. package/docs/api/variables/ML_KEM_BRAID_SPEC.md +0 -11
  645. package/docs/api/variables/ONE_TIME_PREKEY_BATCH_SIZE.md +0 -21
  646. package/docs/api/variables/PQXDH_SPEC.md +0 -11
  647. package/docs/api/variables/PostQuantumPolicy.md +0 -21
  648. package/docs/api/variables/SENDER_KEY_FORMAT.md +0 -11
  649. package/docs/api/variables/SENDER_KEY_SPEC.md +0 -11
  650. package/docs/api/variables/SESAME_SPEC.md +0 -11
  651. package/docs/api/variables/SESSION_FORMAT.md +0 -11
  652. package/docs/api/variables/SPQR_LIMITS_DEFAULTS.md +0 -11
  653. package/docs/api/variables/X3DH_SPEC.md +0 -9
  654. package/docs/api/variables/defaultSignalProtocolLogger.md +0 -32
  655. package/remote/relay/convex/server/README.md +0 -146
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,770 @@
1
1
  # Changelog
2
2
 
3
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.9
4
+
5
+ - **BREAKING: the multi-recipient content ceiling is the reference's
6
+ 96 KiB, and the shared payload is stored once, not once per
7
+ recipient.** The 256 KiB ceiling was a misreading of the reference,
8
+ which validates what each recipient will *receive* against the same
9
+ 96 KiB message-size constant it applies to individual sends — its
10
+ 256 KiB constant is an HTTP entity-read cap on the whole request, not
11
+ a content bound. Worse, the fan-out stored a full copy of the shared
12
+ ciphertext in every recipient's row, so one full-size send to a large
13
+ group multiplied itself by the device count inside a single
14
+ transaction — the reference's message store instead inserts one
15
+ shared multi-recipient payload and hands each recipient a pointer,
16
+ and this relay now does the same: per-recipient rows keep only their
17
+ 48 bytes of key material, delivery reassembles the exact wire form,
18
+ and the shared payload row shares the message queue's retention.
19
+ Found by this round's adversarial review; the ceiling boundary and
20
+ the once-per-send storage each carry a revert-proven test.
21
+
22
+ - **The mock relay's send dedup is now sender-scoped, matching the
23
+ Convex backend**, and `clientMessageId` is documented as requiring
24
+ global uniqueness: sealed senders are anonymous by design, so every
25
+ sealed send to a device shares one dedup namespace, and a reused
26
+ counter or timestamp from two senders would silently collapse into
27
+ one stored message.
28
+
29
+ - **The change-log walk now stops where the tenure ends, not where
30
+ readability ends.** The S10a work narrowed the change log's entry gate to
31
+ members but left the walk's continue condition on the weaker readable
32
+ set, so a removal that left another of the requester's aliases pending —
33
+ an ACI member whose PNI was invited, then the ACI removed — kept serving
34
+ post-tenure history to a principal the group now lists only as invited,
35
+ from any `fromVersion` inside the old tenure. Both gates now share one
36
+ membership predicate: the walk serves through the tenure-ending
37
+ transition, inclusive, and nothing after it. Versioned `getGroup` had the
38
+ sibling misclassification: a requester with no tenure at all fell into
39
+ the same `before_join` refusal as the join-version floor, telling a
40
+ revoked-then-re-invited member that their membership was intact. The
41
+ no-tenure case is now refused as `not_a_member`, `before_join` is raised
42
+ only against a live tenure, and the accepted-join read translates
43
+ `not_a_member` into `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED`. Found by this round's
44
+ adversarial review; the alias-removal walk, the versioned-read reasons,
45
+ the empty-page fault, and the snapshot-regression guard each carry a
46
+ revert-proven test, and the S10a catch-up test now proves the snapshot
47
+ mechanism against a server whose log throws.
48
+
49
+ - **The Node store now implements all of `ISignalProtocolLocalStore`, and the
50
+ compiler enforces it.** `NodeSignalProtocolStore` was missing 37 of the
51
+ interface's 72 members — the whole Sesame device-record, sender-key,
52
+ skipped-sender-key, and message-record surfaces, plus metadata and the
53
+ prekey-recovery helpers — so multi-device linking and both group APIs were
54
+ unavailable to any Node process, and passing the store as `adapters.storage`
55
+ needed a cast. All 37 are implemented against the same encrypted, atomically
56
+ committed state document the adapter already used, and the class now carries
57
+ an `implements ISignalProtocolLocalStore` clause, so a missing member or a
58
+ drifted signature fails the build instead of surfacing as a runtime gap. The
59
+ store also joins the shared storage contract with extended boundaries and the
60
+ shared sender-key resolution contract, which the other adapters already ran.
61
+
62
+ - **The Node store's registration ID survives a restart.** It was held in an
63
+ in-memory `Map` inside an adapter whose entire purpose is persistence, so
64
+ every process start reported registration ID 0 and every peer read the
65
+ restart as a reinstall. It is now part of the persisted state document,
66
+ keyed by identity type so ACI and PNI stay distinct. Kyber prekey usage
67
+ markers, previously in-memory for the same reason, persist alongside it.
68
+
69
+ - **BREAKING: the group change log is served in pages.** `getGroupChanges`
70
+ returned the entire remaining log in one response — in practice the
71
+ Convex transport silently truncated its restore at 4096 changes with no
72
+ has-more signal, which is worse: a long log simply stopped syncing. The
73
+ endpoint now returns `{ entries, hasMore }`: at most 64 entries per
74
+ request, `hasMore` set only when the page was cut for size with the
75
+ requester still a member, and each resumed request authorized
76
+ independently at its own `fromVersion` snapshot. A walk that ends at the
77
+ log's tip or at the requester's own tenure-ending transition is complete
78
+ and says so — a removed member never sees `hasMore` dangle past the
79
+ change that removed them. The client sync loop pages until done,
80
+ resuming from the last verified revision, and treats a has-more page
81
+ that served nothing as a server fault rather than looping on it. The
82
+ reference's clients also drive an explicit paging loop off a has-more
83
+ signal, though their resume cursor is server-supplied where ours is the
84
+ client's own last verified revision; the page size here follows the
85
+ shape, not a verified reference constant. The Convex transport bounds
86
+ its storage restore to one page plus the look-ahead entry that decides
87
+ `hasMore`, so the read cost now scales with the page rather than with
88
+ `min(history, 4096)`.
89
+
90
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.8
91
+
92
+ - **An internal pricing exploration is no longer published, and business
93
+ planning is now structurally unexportable.** `docs/pricing-preview.html` —
94
+ an internal pricing and revenue exploration — was allowlisted into the
95
+ public export in `0.1.0-alpha.5`. Nothing linked to it and it was never in
96
+ the npm package, but it had no business being public. It is removed from
97
+ the allowlist, and the release policy now refuses any file whose name
98
+ matches pricing, revenue, or business-model patterns, so re-adding one
99
+ becomes a deliberate policy edit instead of a one-line allowlist change.
100
+
101
+ - **The assurance figures are now a build product.** The figures table in
102
+ `docs/ASSURANCE.md` was hand-maintained and had gone stale across two
103
+ releases. `npm run assurance:update` regenerates it from a real run and
104
+ refuses to write figures from a failing run; `release:verify` refuses to
105
+ cut an export when the figures are more than three days old. The README no
106
+ longer duplicates the numbers — it points at the one generated table.
107
+
108
+ - **README: the product speaks before the disclaimer.** The Signal
109
+ non-affiliation paragraph moved below the benefit bullets (still above the
110
+ fold); the nav line gains `open-e2ee.dev` and `docs.open-e2ee.dev`, which
111
+ the README previously never linked; the hard-coded patch version — four
112
+ releases stale at time of fix — is replaced by the `0.1.0-alpha` maturity
113
+ line, with the npm badge carrying the exact version; the weekly-downloads
114
+ badge, which renders a near-zero number for a days-old package, is
115
+ replaced by a native-modules count that states a real differentiator.
116
+
117
+ - **`COMMERCIAL.md` answers the highest-intent click.** Commercial licensing
118
+ previously dead-ended at an email address. The new file states who needs a
119
+ commercial license, what it changes and does not change, the public tiers,
120
+ and how buying works. Shipped in the npm package too.
121
+
122
+ - **A contribution surface that tells the truth about the export model.**
123
+ `CONTRIBUTING.md` explains that `main` is generated, why PRs are ported
124
+ rather than merged, and that issues are triaged in public;
125
+ `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, issue templates (with a security-reporting
126
+ off-ramp), and a PR template complete the set.
127
+
128
+ - **Vulnerability reporting: private GitHub reporting and a safe harbor.**
129
+ `SECURITY.md` now offers GitHub private vulnerability reporting alongside
130
+ email, and commits to a good-faith safe harbor for security research.
131
+
132
+ - **`docs/E2EE.md` grew from a summary into the architecture explainer its
133
+ README billing promises** — server-becomes-relay, device as source of
134
+ truth, identity as device keys, recovery as a product decision, metadata
135
+ visibility, and the new failure modes, each linking to the doc that goes
136
+ deeper. Its "ML-KEM (Kyber)" phrasing is corrected to "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)",
137
+ matching the distinction this changelog drew in `0.1.0-alpha.6`.
138
+
139
+ - **The npm package no longer ships 1.8 MB of generated API reference.**
140
+ `docs/api` (391 generated files) stays in the repository for browsing but
141
+ leaves the tarball; installs should not pay for reference docs that are
142
+ regenerable and hosted.
143
+
144
+ - **Supply-chain hardening.** Every workflow action is pinned to a commit
145
+ SHA; dependabot watches npm production dependencies and workflow actions
146
+ weekly; CodeQL runs the security-extended queries on every push, PR, and
147
+ weekly schedule.
148
+
149
+ - **The composition guide leads with the shipped API.** The "Target
150
+ Composition" section — `deviceStorage`, `createExpoDeviceStorage`,
151
+ `signal.messages.subscribe`, none of which exist in the package — sat above
152
+ the real API at the top of `docs/CLIENT_COMPOSITION.md`, which is exactly
153
+ the position that gets copy-pasted. It moved to the bottom under "Future
154
+ Direction (Not Shipped)" behind an explicit these-imports-fail warning.
155
+
156
+ - **The Node store README no longer claims an interface the adapter does not
157
+ implement.** `NodeSignalProtocolStore` covers the core single-device
158
+ surface but not the Sesame device-record, sender-key, or message-record
159
+ portions of `ISignalProtocolLocalStore` — and it has no `implements`
160
+ clause, so the compiler was never checking the README's claim. The README
161
+ now states the real coverage and points multi-device and group users at
162
+ the interface docs. Completing the adapter is tracked work; documenting
163
+ the boundary honestly could not wait for it.
164
+
165
+ - **BREAKING: the group change log is for members; pending principals catch
166
+ up by snapshot.** The change log authorizes at the snapshot at
167
+ `fromVersion`, and a pending-profile-key entry appears in that roster, so
168
+ an invitee could walk the log forward from their invitation — reading, for
169
+ the whole invitation-to-acceptance window, a narration `getGroup` refuses
170
+ them by name, including who made each change. The server now requires the
171
+ requester to be a *member* of the authorizing snapshot (rejecting with the
172
+ distinct reason `not_a_member`), which closes the log to invitees outright
173
+ and, for members, states the tenure bound that the roster check previously
174
+ provided by accident.
175
+
176
+ Pending principals do not lose their catch-up path — they lose the log as
177
+ the mechanism. A pending client now advances by fetching the current state
178
+ as a fresh signed baseline, verified and installed whole, which is also
179
+ how the reference ecosystem's clients behave whenever the server does not
180
+ recognize them as a member. Acceptance is unaffected: it was always
181
+ submitted against the current state, which is exactly what the snapshot
182
+ provides. The specification records this as S10a, with the C1/C3 span
183
+ rules restated to make explicit what was previously implicit: a pending
184
+ view is a provisional baseline, not a span with living continuity, and a
185
+ member's span begins at the verified transition or baseline that makes
186
+ them a member.
187
+
188
+ One behavioral consequence: an invitee whose invitation is withdrawn no
189
+ longer receives the deletion as a signed change (the log that carried it
190
+ is closed to them). The next catch-up finds the current state refused and
191
+ surfaces `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED`, mutating nothing — the cached pending
192
+ view remains the last verified state, and a later re-invitation serves a
193
+ fresh baseline. Members are untouched: removal and ban still arrive as
194
+ verified transitions through the log, never as refusals.
195
+
196
+ - **A full 256 KiB multi-recipient payload is accepted, as advertised.** The
197
+ content ceilings are enforced on the base64 columns as string-length
198
+ limits, and the multi-recipient limit was computed as `ceil((n / 3) * 4)`
199
+ instead of `4 * ceil(n / 3)` — two characters short of what 256 KiB
200
+ actually encodes to, since 262144 is not a multiple of 3. A payload at
201
+ exactly the advertised ceiling was refused with a 413. The single-recipient
202
+ limit was computed the same way but 96 KiB divides by 3, so only the
203
+ multi-recipient bound was wrong.
204
+
205
+ - **A FORBIDDEN group read now says which question it answers, and only a
206
+ membership refusal reads as revocation.** Two different rejections share
207
+ the 403 `FORBIDDEN` code on the group read paths: "you may not read this
208
+ group at all" (banned, or absent from the authorizing roster) and "you may
209
+ not read this version of it" (the join-version floor added in the
210
+ removal-revocation work). They differed only in message text, and the
211
+ client treated any `FORBIDDEN` on a pinned baseline read as
212
+ `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED` — so a floor rejection, raised while the membership
213
+ itself was fine, would have been reported to the application as a revoked
214
+ membership. The rejections now carry a machine-readable `reason`
215
+ (`not_readable` / `before_join`) alongside the code, the client interprets
216
+ only `not_readable` as revocation and propagates everything else, and the
217
+ conformance tests assert on the reason rather than on message wording.
218
+
219
+ - **A multi-recipient send may name each device only once, and retry
220
+ requests are rate limited.** The multi-recipient path is deliberately
221
+ exempt from the per-recipient inbound-bytes budget, matching the
222
+ reference, because a group-send token is supposed to price it. That
223
+ exemption assumes one call fans out to *distinct* devices. The reference
224
+ gets that from its wire format, which parses recipients into a map keyed
225
+ by service ID, so duplicates collapse before the handler ever sees them;
226
+ our flat array does not, so one endorsed device repeated a thousand times
227
+ in a single call stored a thousand copies of the ciphertext against an
228
+ unmetered budget. The handler now rejects a repeated `(userId, deviceId)`
229
+ with a 400 rather than collapsing it, since a repeat is a client bug and
230
+ quietly picking between two conflicting key blocks would bury it.
231
+
232
+ `sendRetryRequest` was unmetered too, and nothing else on that path bounds
233
+ it: a retry request carries no caller-supplied content to charge by size,
234
+ and it names an original sender the caller never has to have talked to, so
235
+ there is no relationship to check either. It is now counted per requester
236
+ against a token bucket sized for the legitimate case — a client returning
237
+ from a broken session asks for one per message it could not decrypt — and
238
+ refuses only a caller that keeps asking indefinitely.
239
+
240
+ - **BREAKING: group-send tokens are verified before any account is read, and
241
+ sealed sends carry the recipient identities they claim.** A group-send
242
+ token is a signature over ACIs, but sealed sends name recipients by user
243
+ ID, so the relay resolved every named recipient to its stored ACI — up to
244
+ one indexed read per recipient, a thousand on the multi-recipient path —
245
+ *before* it could check the token. An anonymous caller holding a garbage
246
+ token could bill that work to the deployment on every call, on the one
247
+ path that is deliberately exempt from the per-recipient send budget
248
+ because the token is supposed to be the gate.
249
+
250
+ The order is now the reference implementation's, where sealed payloads
251
+ name recipients by service ID and the token is checked against the request
252
+ before any account is touched: the caller supplies the ACI it claims for
253
+ each recipient, the entire cryptographic check runs against those claims
254
+ first, and only then is each claim bound to the recipient's stored
255
+ account. A caller who lies about a binding has necessarily already
256
+ presented a token our own group server issued over the claimed set, so
257
+ the reads it spends were an authenticated member's to spend.
258
+
259
+ The claims ride the existing plumbing: the endorsement cache now stores,
260
+ next to each member's endorsement, the ACI it was issued over — the
261
+ identity that is *correct* to claim, as opposed to whatever a later lookup
262
+ would resolve — and the send paths pass them through. This changes the
263
+ app-owned `EndorsementCacheStore` interface (entries are now
264
+ `{ endorsement, aciBytes }` records rather than raw bytes) and adds
265
+ `targetAciBytes` / per-recipient `aciBytes` arguments to the sealed send
266
+ mutations, required when authorizing by group-send token.
267
+
268
+ - **One ACI, one account.** Nothing stopped two user IDs from registering
269
+ the same ACI: `identify` is host-owned and unvalidated, and the second
270
+ account to claim an ACI would inherit every authorization decision made
271
+ about the first — sealed-sender access, group-send endorsements, identity
272
+ binding. The `accounts` table now has an `aciBytes` index and
273
+ `rememberAccount` refuses a claim on an ACI already registered to a
274
+ different user ID with a 409 `CONFLICT`. A deployment that already holds
275
+ duplicate-ACI rows keeps working — the check reads one claimant and the
276
+ duplicate surfaces as the intended 409 rather than an untyped error — but
277
+ which of the two accounts is refused depends on index order, so resolve
278
+ such rows deliberately before deploying.
279
+
280
+ - **Removal and ban now revoke historical group-state reads.** `getGroup` with
281
+ an explicit version authorized the requester against the roster of the
282
+ *requested* snapshot, so anyone removed or banned at version N could keep
283
+ fetching every snapshot of their former tenure indefinitely — a removal that
284
+ does not revoke read access is not a removal. The server now authorizes
285
+ every full-state read against the group as it is *now*, and adds the floor
286
+ that snapshot-based authorization used to provide by accident: a member may
287
+ not read state from before the version they joined at, so membership grants
288
+ the group from when you joined, not its history.
289
+
290
+ The change log deliberately keeps snapshot-at-`fromVersion` authorization,
291
+ as the group specification already required: the walk serves entries only
292
+ while the requester stays readable and stops at — and includes — the change
293
+ that removed them, which is how a polling member learns of their removal.
294
+ Authorizing the log at the current state would 403 them into silence. What
295
+ this leaves reachable to a former member is bounded and not new: changes
296
+ from within their own tenure, ending at their removal — bytes they were
297
+ served while entitled.
298
+
299
+ One client-visible consequence: a join that is accepted and then revoked
300
+ before the joiner reads its baseline snapshot — an admin removing them in
301
+ the race window — now fails with `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED` instead of
302
+ reporting a membership the client could never verify or use. Nothing is
303
+ installed locally, and the principal becomes the ordinary re-entitlement
304
+ case: a later re-add serves a fresh signed baseline.
305
+
306
+ An invitation grants the current state and nothing else. A
307
+ pending-profile-key entry entitles its holder to read the group as it is —
308
+ acceptance needs that — but it is not a tenure, and its wire format pins
309
+ `joinedAtVersion` to zero, so deriving a history floor from it would read
310
+ as "joined at the beginning of time". An invitee who never accepts holds
311
+ the group master key, so every snapshot the server serves them decrypts;
312
+ versioned reads are therefore refused outright for pending principals.
313
+
314
+ This bounds `getGroup` only. The change log authorizes against the
315
+ snapshot at `fromVersion`, and a pending-profile-key entry appears in that
316
+ roster, so an invitee can still walk the log forward from their
317
+ invitation — a window during which they could already fetch the current
318
+ state at will, though the log additionally names who made each change.
319
+ Flooring the log would deny a pending member the entries they need to
320
+ reach the state their acceptance is submitted against, so closing that
321
+ window means changing how pending members catch up, not adding a check.
322
+
323
+ - **The relay's send paths are bounded: per-recipient inbound budget, a
324
+ content-size ceiling, and a device-existence check on sealed sends.** None
325
+ of the component's send paths was rate limited or size limited, so one
326
+ caller — anonymous on the sealed path, any authenticated account on the
327
+ identified one — could grow a victim's message queue without bound for the
328
+ full seven-day retention window. Three bounds close this, each matching the
329
+ reference implementation's shape: message content is capped at 96 KiB for a
330
+ single-recipient envelope and 256 KiB for the shared multi-recipient
331
+ payload; single-recipient sends spend from a per-*recipient* byte budget
332
+ (4 MiB burst, 1 MiB/minute sustained) — keyed by the target because a
333
+ sealed sender is anonymous by design, so a per-sender limit on that path is
334
+ either meaningless or a hole; and `sendUnidentified` now refuses a target
335
+ device that does not exist, the check its multi-recipient sibling always
336
+ had. The multi-recipient path is deliberately not metered, also matching
337
+ the reference: the group-send token already prices it, and a per-recipient
338
+ budget there would let one noisy group partially starve delivery to its
339
+ quietest member.
340
+
341
+ The shared bucket is bounded from the sender side too. Keying by target is
342
+ forced on the sealed path — the sender is anonymous by design — but on the
343
+ identified path the sender is known, and a single authenticated account
344
+ must not be able to drain a victim's whole budget and starve every other
345
+ sender: identified sends also spend a per-(sender, recipient) sub-limit of
346
+ a quarter of the shared bucket. Neither bucket can be spent by a request
347
+ that goes on to fail: the charges are written in the mutation's own
348
+ transaction, so a send that 410s on the stale-device check — or trips the
349
+ other limit — rolls its charge back with everything else.
350
+
351
+ - **The `STALE_DEVICE` error no longer discloses the recipient's current
352
+ registration ID.** The 410 thrown when a sender's view of a device is stale
353
+ echoed back `currentRegistrationId` — the live value — to any
354
+ account-authenticated caller, with no rate limit. That is the same read the
355
+ prekey-bundle fetch serves, minus its rate limiter: a free oracle for
356
+ watching registration-ID changes (device reinstalls) on arbitrary devices.
357
+ The error now names the stale device and nothing else, which is the
358
+ reference implementation's 410 body; the sender's recovery path is
359
+ unchanged, since recovering means re-fetching the bundle anyway.
360
+
361
+ - **BREAKING: no group identifier travels on a message envelope any more.**
362
+ Every relayed message carried a plaintext `groupId` alongside its target, and
363
+ the relay stored it on each `messages` row for the seven-day retention
364
+ window. Grouping those rows by that column yielded the set of accounts that
365
+ received traffic for a group, so a relay operator could reconstruct rosters
366
+ without breaking any encryption. The column is gone, and so are the `groupId`
367
+ arguments on `messages.send`, `sendUnidentified`, and
368
+ `sendMultiRecipientUnidentified`, and the field on the envelopes those
369
+ functions return.
370
+
371
+ What replaces it is a message type. A group message is now typed
372
+ `sender_key`, which tells the receiver to decrypt the payload as a framed
373
+ SenderKeyMessage — and nothing else. The receiver reads the frame's
374
+ distribution identifier, which is opaque, and resolves the group against its
375
+ own sender key store. The envelope says how to decrypt, never which group.
376
+ This also removes a small trust problem: the receiver no longer selects a
377
+ sender key using a group id the sender asserted.
378
+
379
+ This closes the group's *name*, not the group *partition*. The distribution
380
+ identifier is unencrypted and stable for the life of a sender key, one send
381
+ produces byte-identical ciphertext on every recipient's row, and the
382
+ multi-recipient sealed path hands the relay a roster. A relay can still
383
+ partition delivery pairs into unlabeled groups; it can no longer put a
384
+ meaningful, cross-send label on one. The component README states the
385
+ remaining channels explicitly.
386
+
387
+ Sealed sender needed its own channel for this, because the outer envelope of
388
+ a sealed message is always `unidentified_sender` and cannot carry an inner
389
+ type. Sealed envelopes now begin with a content-type byte inside the seal,
390
+ matching the `Type` enum of the reference implementation's
391
+ `UnidentifiedSenderMessage.Message` (`PREKEY_MESSAGE`, `MESSAGE`,
392
+ `SENDERKEY_MESSAGE`, `PLAINTEXT_CONTENT`), and `SealOptions.groupId` —
393
+ encrypted, never populated by the send path — is removed in favour of
394
+ `contentType`. This is a wire-format change to sealed sender for both V1 and
395
+ V2.
396
+
397
+ Deploying this against an existing Convex deployment needs a manual step:
398
+ Convex validates stored documents against the new schema during the push,
399
+ before any of your code runs, so a `messages` row still carrying a `groupId`
400
+ fails the deploy and no migration can run ahead of it. Clear the `messages`
401
+ table — or stop sending and let the seven-day retention window drain it —
402
+ before deploying. Messages are transient and clients re-request undelivered
403
+ ones. See "Upgrading" in the component README.
404
+
405
+ - **Fixed: on React Native, one member's sender key could permanently break
406
+ another's group messages.** The store indexes sender keys by the frame's
407
+ distribution identifier so a receiver can resolve a group without being told
408
+ which one. Every other adapter scopes that index by sender; the React Native
409
+ adapter keyed a flat pointer on the identifier alone, so a second sender
410
+ presenting the same identifier overwrote the first, and the displaced
411
+ sender's group messages failed to decrypt until it rotated. Distribution
412
+ identifiers are chosen by their sender and travel in the clear, so this was
413
+ reachable by any account sharing a group with the victim. The pointer key is
414
+ now scoped by sender and device.
415
+
416
+ - **Fixed: on React Native, a host that issues colon-scoped user IDs could not
417
+ receive group messages at all.** The adapter joins composite storage keys on
418
+ `:` and split the sender key record key from the right, which silently
419
+ mis-assigns the components when a user ID contains a `:` of its own — and
420
+ nothing constrains user IDs, since they come from the host application's
421
+ identify hook, where a tenant- or issuer-scoped subject is ordinary. Every
422
+ group message resolved to nothing on such a deployment, deterministically and
423
+ permanently. The same join made a group ID a prefix of `<groupId>:<sub>`, so
424
+ deleting a group's sender keys also swept any group whose ID extended it.
425
+
426
+ Key components are now percent-escaped before they are joined, so no
427
+ identifier can carry a separator into a key or a scan prefix. This also
428
+ retires the residue left by the sender-scoping fix above, which had only
429
+ pushed the collision behind the same assumption.
430
+
431
+ Sender key records and pointers are unaffected on upgrade for a deployment
432
+ whose IDs contain neither `:` nor `%`, because such values escape to
433
+ themselves; only the values that were already broken move. Retry records are
434
+ different, and do move for everyone: their key is scanned by session ID, and
435
+ a session ID is `<userId>:<deviceId>`, so it always carries a separator. That
436
+ separator was load-bearing in the same way — a session ID of `alice:1` has
437
+ scan prefix `alice:1:`, which also matches the records of user `alice:1` on
438
+ device 2 — so the escaping applies there too.
439
+
440
+ The cost is that retry records written before the upgrade are not reachable
441
+ by session ID afterwards, so a retry request for a message sent before the
442
+ upgrade cannot be served and the sender's peer re-requests or gives up. They
443
+ are not leaked: the expiry sweep and the clear-all path scan the whole record
444
+ prefix and filter on the stored timestamp, so they are reaped on the normal
445
+ retention schedule regardless of key format.
446
+
447
+ - **BREAKING: the `plaintext_content` envelope type is removed.** It was in the
448
+ relay's message-type union and the client's accepted list, but no send path
449
+ ever produced one and neither decrypt path handled one — an envelope carrying
450
+ it fell through to the pairwise ratchet and failed there. The reference uses
451
+ the corresponding sealed content type to carry a decryption-error receipt
452
+ when no session exists; this SDK delivers those over a dedicated relay
453
+ channel instead, so the type has no role here. The sealed-sender parser now
454
+ rejects the content-type byte outright rather than mapping it to an envelope
455
+ type with no handler. `docs/DEVIATIONS.md` §6.2 records the difference.
456
+
457
+ The literal is also gone from the relay's stored `messageType` union, so it
458
+ carries the same deploy-time hazard as the `groupId` removal above: a stored
459
+ row whose `messageType` is `plaintext_content` fails Convex schema validation
460
+ during the push. Clearing the `messages` table handles both at once.
461
+
462
+ - **Sealed sender reads its content-type enum through a static import.** Four
463
+ call sites in `client/sealed-sender-ops.ts` and
464
+ `client/signal-service-cipher.ts` reached for
465
+ `internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types` with `await import(...)` on every
466
+ seal and unseal, to read `SealedSenderContentType` and the V2 version bytes.
467
+ Two of them were already redundant with a static import of the same module at
468
+ the top of the same file, and `client/client.ts` had none. This is a
469
+ consistency and readability change, not a bug fix: the module has runtime
470
+ exports, so a resolved dynamic import always carries the enum.
471
+
472
+ - **Sealed sender envelope parsing is now canonical and validated.** Both the
473
+ V1 and V2 inner-envelope parsers accepted a payload with trailing bytes, an
474
+ unrecognised content-type byte, a truncated varint, or a missing content
475
+ hint. Parsing runs after authentication, so none of these was reachable by an
476
+ attacker, but two distinct byte strings could parse to identical content and
477
+ an unknown content type fell through to a routing default. The parsers now
478
+ reject all four, and the content hint is a required field rather than an
479
+ optional one.
480
+
481
+ - **`maxSenderKeyAge` is bounded at 90 days.** The age-based rotation policy
482
+ already expired locally generated sender keys after a configurable interval,
483
+ defaulting to the 14 days the reference implementation uses, and the group
484
+ send path caught that expiry to rotate and redistribute before retrying. The
485
+ interval itself was unbounded, so a host could configure an age no key would
486
+ reach and switch rotation off without saying so. It is now clamped to 90
487
+ days, the same ceiling the reference applies to its own remotely configured
488
+ value — the difference being that this value comes from the host application
489
+ rather than from the SDK, which is what makes the clamp load-bearing rather
490
+ than belt-and-braces. A sender key is the group material no ratchet
491
+ refreshes, so a member who holds it can read everything sent under it until
492
+ it rotates; membership changes normally force that sooner, and the age bound
493
+ is what covers a group whose membership never changes. A configured value
494
+ that is not a positive finite number now falls back to the default instead of
495
+ being used, since such a value states no policy at all and a zero is far more
496
+ often an unset field than a request to rotate constantly. Both the clamp and
497
+ the fallback log a warning.
498
+
499
+ - **`maxSenderKeyAge` is also bounded below, at one hour.** The interval had no
500
+ lower bound, and one that is too short fails in a way that is worse than not
501
+ rotating: expiry is enforced on the send path, which answers it by rotating
502
+ the key and fanning a distribution message out to every other member over
503
+ sequential network calls, then retrying the encrypt — against the age of the
504
+ key it just created. Configure an interval shorter than that fan-out takes
505
+ and the retry finds the new key expired too, so every group send fails
506
+ permanently, having burned a rotation and a message to every member on each
507
+ attempt. Since the field is milliseconds, a host that means fourteen days and
508
+ passes `14` reaches this, and it does so without ever sending a message that
509
+ would reveal the mistake in testing.
510
+
511
+ Values below the floor are raised to it with a warning rather than rejected.
512
+ Unlike the ceiling this is not a security bound — rotating sooner is strictly
513
+ safer — so the honest reading of an unreachably short interval is "rotate as
514
+ often as this implementation can actually deliver", which is what a host that
515
+ wants aggressive rotation was asking for. An hour clears the worst realistic
516
+ fan-out by a wide margin while leaving deliberately aggressive policies
517
+ intact, which a bound measured in days would not. `SENDER_KEY_AGE_FLOOR` is
518
+ exported alongside `SENDER_KEY_AGE_CEILING`.
519
+
520
+ Note what the clamp leaves you with if you hit it by mistake: a host that
521
+ passes `14` meaning days now rotates hourly, which is a distribution message
522
+ to every member of every group every hour. That is functional but not free,
523
+ and the warning is how you find out it is happening — which is the argument
524
+ for clamping rather than rejecting, since the alternative was group messaging
525
+ that simply did not work.
526
+
527
+ Separately, the expiry check no longer skips a locally generated key whose
528
+ stored creation time is missing or non-positive. Such a key is the one whose
529
+ life is genuinely unbounded, so waiving the age check on it exempted exactly
530
+ the case the check exists for; it is now treated as expired, which the send
531
+ path answers by rotating to a key whose age is known.
532
+
533
+ - **Sender key identifiers are now opaque random UUIDs, closing a group
534
+ metadata leak.** A sender key's id was built as
535
+ `groupId:userId:deviceId:timestamp`, and that id travels the wire as the
536
+ SenderKeyMessage `distribution_uuid` — a field outside the ciphertext that
537
+ every relay on the delivery path reads off each group message. Sealed sender
538
+ does not cover this: it conceals the frame from the relay but not from the
539
+ rest of the path, and a deployment may have it disabled. A passive observer
540
+ could therefore reconstruct group rosters by grouping messages on a field it
541
+ cannot be prevented from reading. Ids are now random UUIDv4s carrying no
542
+ group, sender, device, or clock, matching the reference implementation's
543
+ random distribution UUID. The sender-keys specification states the
544
+ requirement in a new section on identifier opacity. This also fixes a
545
+ rotation bug: receivers detect a rotation by
546
+ comparing the incoming id against their stored state, so two rotations inside
547
+ the same millisecond produced an identical id and the second went unnoticed —
548
+ the rotation tests previously needed a `Date.now()` mock advancing a
549
+ millisecond per call to stay green, and now run against the real clock.
550
+ - **BREAKING: the Expo store now keeps sender keys on the device instead of
551
+ sending them to a remote store.** Every sender-key and skipped-key operation
552
+ was proxied to an optional `ISignalProtocolRemoteSenderStateStore`, which
553
+ took the chain key and the sender's private signature key as parameters and
554
+ wrote them to whatever backend the application supplied. Those two values
555
+ together are enough to read every message on a sender's group chain and to
556
+ forge new ones, so a server holding them would nullify group message
557
+ confidentiality and authenticity; the skipped-key methods handed over the
558
+ message keys themselves. The reference implementation keeps its sender key
559
+ store local for exactly this reason. No shipped relay implemented the
560
+ interface, so in practice these calls threw and Expo group messaging did not
561
+ work at all — the fix is a real local implementation, not a guard.
562
+
563
+ Sender key records and skipped message keys now live in the Expo store's own
564
+ SQLCipher-encrypted database. The `sender_keys` table holds each record as
565
+ one row so a rotation's current and previous states can never be written
566
+ apart, and its `distribution_id` column is renamed `group_id` to match what
567
+ it has always contained. A new `skipped_sender_keys` table replaces the
568
+ remote skipped-key calls and bounds itself by evicting the lowest chain
569
+ indexes first.
570
+
571
+ `ISignalProtocolRemoteSenderStateStore` is removed, along with the `relay`
572
+ option on `expoStore()` and the corresponding `ExpoSignalProtocolStore`
573
+ constructor parameter. `expoStore({ relay })` becomes `expoStore()`. The
574
+ `sender_keys` schema change is not migrated: applications own Expo database
575
+ migrations, and any existing rows hold state that should not have left the
576
+ device.
577
+ - **Device teardown no longer orphans key material, and the provisioning cron
578
+ no longer risks stalling.** `purgeDeviceStorage` deleted at most 4096 rows
579
+ per prekey table in a single transaction and stopped there. A device's
580
+ one-time prekeys have no ceiling — the component marks a consumed prekey
581
+ rather than deleting it, and no cron reclaims consumed rows — so a
582
+ long-lived device could exceed that and leave the remainder behind, keyed to
583
+ a deviceId a later link reuses. Teardown now deletes a fixed budget and
584
+ schedules a continuation until nothing remains. The device's identity
585
+ registration is always deleted in the first pass and `fetchPreKeyBundle`
586
+ gates on that row, so the device is unreachable the moment teardown returns
587
+ even while the sweep continues. Separately, the provisioning cleanup cron
588
+ swept 100 sessions per transaction while each `linked_pending_ack` row
589
+ cascades into a full device teardown; a cron that exceeds Convex's
590
+ per-mutation limits does not degrade, it stalls, and expired sessions then
591
+ stop being reaped at all. That sweep now uses a batch of 10 and relies on
592
+ its existing self-reschedule for throughput.
593
+ - **Provisioning teardown now identifies the device it linked by an opaque
594
+ token rather than a millisecond timestamp.** Device rows are reused across
595
+ registrations, so rollback matched the device's `linkedAt` stamp to avoid
596
+ reaping a device the user had legitimately re-registered into the freed
597
+ slot. Two links landing in the same millisecond on the same slot produce
598
+ equal stamps, and teardown would then unlink the wrong — newer — device.
599
+ Every registration and link now mints a `linkToken`; it is never returned to
600
+ clients. A test that removes and re-registers without advancing the clock at
601
+ all fails against the old stamp comparison.
602
+ - **Removed five exported Convex row types that described tables no consumer
603
+ can read.** `ConvexIdentityKey`, `ConvexEcSignedPreKey`, `ConvexEcPreKey`,
604
+ `ConvexKemPreKey`, and `ConvexKemLastResortPreKey` were unreferenced and
605
+ every one of them disagreed with `component/schema.ts`: all five omitted the
606
+ `identityType` discriminator, `ConvexIdentityKey` claimed a `deviceId` and a
607
+ raw `publicKey` where the real table holds a per-account
608
+ `compositeIdentity`, and both one-time prekey types documented that keys are
609
+ "DELETED when consumed" when the component marks `consumedAt` and leaves the
610
+ row for the sweep. The premise was wrong to begin with — the component's
611
+ tables are isolated, so an application cannot obtain these rows under any
612
+ type. The file header claiming nine component tables, one of them a
613
+ `prekeyBundleFetches` table that no longer exists, is corrected. The
614
+ surviving `FetchedPreKeyBundle` is now derived from the component's own
615
+ return validator instead of hand-written, so it cannot drift again.
616
+ - **`ConvexSignalProtocolRelayApi` now carries real argument and return
617
+ types.** Its 43 function references were declared as bare
618
+ `FunctionReference<'mutation'>` / `<'query'>`, so every argument the relay
619
+ adapter passed to the component was `any` and a mismatch surfaced only as a
620
+ runtime validator rejection in the deployment. The type is now *derived*
621
+ from `defineConvexSignalProtocolBackend`'s return type via `ApiFromModules`
622
+ rather than restated by hand, which is what makes it meaningful — a
623
+ hand-written contract can drift from the functions it describes, and this
624
+ one had. The `getProvisioningMessage` return cast is removed as a
625
+ consequence: the reference now carries the component's own return
626
+ validator, so a component change that stops satisfying the interface fails
627
+ to compile instead of being cast away.
628
+ - **Fixed sealed-sender fallback detection**, which decided whether to retry a
629
+ failed sealed send on the identified path by testing whether the error
630
+ message contained the substring `'Unauthorized'`. That was wrong in both
631
+ directions: any unrelated failure whose message happened to contain the word
632
+ — a rate limit, an app-level wrapper — downgraded the send to identified
633
+ delivery and disclosed the sender to the relay, while a genuine
634
+ `code: 'UNAUTHORIZED'` rejection whose message did not spell the word went
635
+ undetected and surfaced as a hard send failure. Detection now reads the
636
+ structured `ConvexError` payload; the string contract is removed with no
637
+ fallback.
638
+ - **Rewrote `docs/SCHEMA.md`.** It described a 7-table schema the application
639
+ was instructed to define itself, with a multi-tenant `appId` column, index
640
+ names, a `deliveredAt` field, and a `sender_key_distribution` message type
641
+ that exist nowhere in the codebase, plus cleanup crons the component already
642
+ runs. The component owns all sixteen tables; the document now describes what
643
+ is stored, what the relay can and cannot see, and the real retention
644
+ behavior.
645
+
646
+ - **Sealed sender can now be enabled.** `oe-groups trust-root` exports the
647
+ Ed25519 sender-certificate root alongside the group trust root, printing both
648
+ labelled (`group trust root:` / `sealed sender trust root:`). Previously only
649
+ the group root was printed, so there was no supported way to obtain the value
650
+ clients pin in `sealedSender.trustRoots`; inbound sealed-sender validation
651
+ stayed disabled and every send fell back to identified delivery, disclosing
652
+ the sender to the relay. The derivation now lives in one shared module
653
+ (`internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root`) used by both the CLI and the
654
+ relay's certificate issuance, so the printed root cannot drift from the key
655
+ the deployment signs with, and a contract test pins the two as equal.
656
+ Corrects the `sealedSender` configuration docs, which required a
657
+ `SEALED_SENDER_SIGNING_KEY` environment variable that has never existed.
658
+
659
+ - **`getProvisioningMessage` now returns `expiresAt`**, the session's absolute
660
+ deadline in epoch milliseconds (`null` when the session is unknown). The
661
+ Convex component already returned it, but the relay interface did not declare
662
+ it and the adapter cast it away, so no client could compute expiry locally.
663
+ The mock relay was brought to parity at the same time: it models the
664
+ acknowledgment's own TTL window granted by `completeProvisioning` — without
665
+ which a link completed near the deadline strands a device the client has
666
+ already persisted keys for — rejects expired sessions in
667
+ `connectNewDevice`, `sendProvisioningMessage`, `completeProvisioning`, and
668
+ `acknowledgeProvisioning`, and reports expiry as a computed status instead of
669
+ writing `expired` from inside a read. The shared relay contract suite now
670
+ pins all three behaviors.
671
+ - **Security (Convex component):** the component now declares
672
+ `OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET` as a typed component environment variable and
673
+ reads it through the declared-environment accessor. Convex components are
674
+ isolated from app deployment environment variables, so the previous
675
+ `process.env` read was unreachable in any real `app.use()` install and
676
+ every group, credential-issuance, and sender-certificate call failed at
677
+ runtime; apps must forward the secret with
678
+ `app.use(signalProtocol, { env: { OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET: app.env.OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET } })`.
679
+ The test-only injection seam is now default-deny: it refuses configuration
680
+ outside a recognized test runner instead of allowing it whenever a
681
+ deployment marker is absent.
682
+ - **Breaking (relay API):** removed `getGroupMembers` from the relay surface
683
+ — the component, the app wrapper, `ConvexSignalProtocolRelayServer`, the
684
+ mock adapter (including its `setGroupMembers` test seam), and
685
+ `ISignalProtocolRelayServer`. The relay keeps no server-side group
686
+ membership map by design; relayed group sends now require
687
+ `SendOptions.groupMemberUserIds`, which the relay resolves to devices via
688
+ `getActiveDevices`. Group sends without a roster previously dropped the
689
+ message to zero recipients while reporting success.
690
+ - Fixed cross-sender message suppression: `clientMessageId` deduplication is
691
+ now scoped to the sending account. The key was previously
692
+ `(targetUserId, targetDeviceId, clientMessageId)`, so two senders that mint
693
+ non-random client message IDs — a counter or a timestamp — silently
694
+ suppressed each other's messages to a shared recipient, and the suppressed
695
+ sender was handed the other sender's message ID and server timestamp.
696
+ Same-sender retries still collapse as before.
697
+ - Documented two properties the component does not provide, both previously
698
+ unstated or overstated. **Group metadata privacy:** the relay can still
699
+ approximate a group's recipient set from delivery metadata — `messages` rows
700
+ carry a plaintext `groupId`, and the unencrypted `distributionUuid` in the
701
+ SenderKeyMessage frame embeds `groupId:senderUserId:senderDeviceId` — so the
702
+ component README's previous claim to keep no membership map has been
703
+ corrected to describe what removing `getGroupMembers` actually buys. Closing
704
+ the leak requires opaque distribution identifiers in the sender-key layer and
705
+ is tracked separately. **Device-scoped authorization:** `identify` resolves an
706
+ account, not a device, so every `deviceId` argument is a caller-chosen
707
+ routing selector and any session for an account can drain that account's
708
+ other device queues, send as any of its device IDs, and rotate any of its key
709
+ material.
710
+ - Fixed silent message loss for skipped multi-recipient sealed-sender
711
+ recipients: the client now consumes the server's `uuids404` list,
712
+ refreshes those users' device lists, and redelivers per-device instead of
713
+ discarding the field while reporting the send as delivered.
714
+ - Fixed provisioning acknowledgment data loss: completing a session now
715
+ grants the acknowledgment its own full session TTL (previously the ack
716
+ deadline was whatever remained of the original five-minute window, and
717
+ the every-minute cleanup cron could delete the freshly linked device
718
+ before the ack arrived), `acknowledgeProvisioning` rejects expired
719
+ sessions instead of racing the cron for the device's survival, and
720
+ session teardown deletes only the device the session created (matched by
721
+ its `linkedAt` stamp) with a full cascade of its key material, queued
722
+ messages, and heartbeats. Dead `patch`-before-`throw` writes that Convex
723
+ transaction rollback always discarded were removed, along with the never
724
+ persisted stored `expired` status; `getProvisioningMessage` now also
725
+ returns `expiresAt` so subscribed clients can compute expiry locally.
726
+ - Retry requests now expire with the same seven-day TTL as messages, backed
727
+ by an hourly cleanup cron; `getPendingMessages` and
728
+ `getPendingRetryRequests` filter expired rows at read time instead of
729
+ serving them until the next cron pass.
730
+ - Reduced write contention on the per-account identity row: mutations now
731
+ skip the account patch when the caller's identity bytes are unchanged,
732
+ instead of unconditionally rewriting the row (an OCC conflict hotspot
733
+ between a user's own concurrent mutations and sealed sends addressed to
734
+ them).
735
+ - Corrected the exported `FetchedPreKeyBundle` type to the actual wire shape
736
+ (`registrationId`, `ecSignedPreKey`, `ecOneTimePreKey`,
737
+ `kemLastResortPreKey`, `kemOneTimePreKey`); the previous declaration
738
+ omitted `registrationId` and named four of five fields incorrectly.
739
+ - `getActiveDevices` now caps its device scan at `MAX_DEVICES` instead of a
740
+ hardcoded 5, and the missing-snapshot guard in `getGroupChanges` throws
741
+ structured `ConvexError` data instead of a plain `Error`.
742
+ - Extended the installable Convex component to own the complete relay backend,
743
+ adding isolated devices, identity and prekey storage, message and retry
744
+ queues, provisioning sessions, and sender-certificate issuance behind five
745
+ new public wrapper namespaces.
746
+ - Added `@convex-dev/rate-limiter` as an optional child component and enforce a
747
+ ten-per-minute prekey-bundle fetch limit for each authenticated
748
+ fetcher/target pair.
749
+ - Standardized component rejections on structured `ConvexError` data carrying
750
+ `{ code, status, message }`, including sealed-sender authorization failures
751
+ that retain an `Unauthorized:` message prefix for current client fallback
752
+ handling.
753
+ - Added an installable Convex component defined as
754
+ `defineComponent('signalProtocol')`, with isolated group state, change, and
755
+ snapshot tables plus a `defineConvexSignalProtocolBackend()` app-wrapper
756
+ factory. The credential-issuance wrappers resolve application identity and
757
+ pass explicit ACI and optional PNI bytes into the component; group
758
+ operations remain authorized solely by their zero-knowledge presentations
759
+ and carry no caller identity.
760
+ - Added the `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/convex.config` export for mounting
761
+ the component with `app.use(signalProtocol)`.
762
+ - **Breaking (Convex group backend):** removed `defineConvexGroupServer`,
763
+ `defineConvexGroupServerForTest`, `convexGroupServerTables`, and the
764
+ `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/remote/relay/convex/server` export. The
765
+ pre-launch factory and app-owned tables are replaced directly by the
766
+ component and wrapper, with no compatibility aliases.
767
+
3
768
  ## 0.1.0-alpha.7
4
769
 
5
770
  - **Security (Convex group server):** structured rejection data now survives
@@ -204,7 +969,7 @@
204
969
  parameters were wrong. PQXDH §2.2 requires the info string to name the
205
970
  `pqkem` actually in use, and the SDK runs ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203), not
206
971
  round-3 CRYSTALS-Kyber — so two implementations feeding an identical label
207
- derived *different* shared secrets, which is precisely what the info string
972
+ derived _different_ shared secrets, which is precisely what the info string
208
973
  exists to prevent. And §2.1 defines `info` as an identifier of the
209
974
  application deriving the key; this SDK is not Signal Messenger. **Sessions
210
975
  established under the old labels derive a different `SK` and cannot be
@@ -260,7 +1025,7 @@
260
1025
  gone. Protocol domain-separation strings are untouched and remain
261
1026
  byte-identical. The Expo storage error message no longer carries a "Signal
262
1027
  Protocol " prefix; it now reads `Expo storage DB bindings not configured.
263
- Configure them from the host app before using Expo storage.` Anything
1028
+ Configure them from the host app before using Expo storage.` Anything
264
1029
  matching on that text must be updated.
265
1030
  - Corrected group-system source comments that described the permission model as
266
1031
  server-enforced. The checks in `access-control.ts` run on the client over