@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk 0.1.0-alpha.7 → 0.1.0-alpha.8

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (646) hide show
  1. package/ADAPTERS.md +1 -1
  2. package/CHANGELOG.md +680 -2
  3. package/COMMERCIAL.md +56 -0
  4. package/README.md +13 -8
  5. package/SECURITY.md +15 -1
  6. package/client/README.md +1 -1
  7. package/dist/client/client.d.ts.map +1 -1
  8. package/dist/client/client.js +16 -8
  9. package/dist/client/client.js.map +1 -1
  10. package/dist/client/config.d.ts +12 -2
  11. package/dist/client/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
  12. package/dist/client/config.js.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.d.ts +19 -2
  14. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  15. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.js +26 -10
  16. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.js.map +1 -1
  17. package/dist/client/headless.d.ts +1 -1
  18. package/dist/client/headless.js +1 -1
  19. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.d.ts +27 -1
  20. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.d.ts.map +1 -1
  21. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js +36 -6
  22. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js.map +1 -1
  23. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts +16 -1
  24. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts.map +1 -1
  25. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js +112 -52
  26. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js.map +1 -1
  27. package/dist/client/types.d.ts +20 -7
  28. package/dist/client/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  29. package/dist/client/types.js.map +1 -1
  30. package/dist/index.d.ts +7 -0
  31. package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  32. package/dist/index.js +7 -0
  33. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
  34. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.d.ts +1 -1
  35. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  36. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.js +1 -1
  37. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.js.map +1 -1
  38. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.d.ts +9 -0
  39. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.d.ts.map +1 -1
  40. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.js +16 -0
  41. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.js.map +1 -1
  42. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts +13 -0
  43. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  44. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js +73 -12
  45. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js.map +1 -1
  46. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.d.ts +31 -0
  47. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.d.ts.map +1 -1
  48. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.js +67 -7
  49. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.js.map +1 -1
  50. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.d.ts.map +1 -1
  51. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js +32 -18
  52. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js.map +1 -1
  53. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
  54. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js +33 -19
  55. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js.map +1 -1
  56. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.d.ts.map +1 -1
  57. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js +8 -14
  58. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js.map +1 -1
  59. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts +9 -4
  60. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
  61. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js +7 -15
  62. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js.map +1 -1
  63. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts +6 -7
  64. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  65. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js +5 -7
  66. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js.map +1 -1
  67. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts +45 -0
  68. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts.map +1 -0
  69. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js +77 -0
  70. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js.map +1 -0
  71. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts +64 -9
  72. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  73. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js +43 -0
  74. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js.map +1 -1
  75. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts +37 -0
  76. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  77. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js +108 -7
  78. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js.map +1 -1
  79. package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts +14 -15
  80. package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  81. package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js +109 -102
  82. package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  83. package/dist/local/store/expo/db.d.ts +4 -1
  84. package/dist/local/store/expo/db.d.ts.map +1 -1
  85. package/dist/local/store/expo/db.js +5 -0
  86. package/dist/local/store/expo/db.js.map +1 -1
  87. package/dist/local/store/expo/index.d.ts +0 -2
  88. package/dist/local/store/expo/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  89. package/dist/local/store/expo/index.js +1 -1
  90. package/dist/local/store/expo/index.js.map +1 -1
  91. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.d.ts +1 -1
  92. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  93. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.js +2 -2
  94. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.js.map +1 -1
  95. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.d.ts +101 -77
  96. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.d.ts.map +1 -1
  97. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.js +154 -124
  98. package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.js.map +1 -1
  99. package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.d.ts +134 -32
  100. package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.d.ts.map +1 -1
  101. package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.js +36 -7
  102. package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.js.map +1 -1
  103. package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
  104. package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  105. package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.js +18 -0
  106. package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  107. package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.d.ts +39 -0
  108. package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  109. package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js +163 -8
  110. package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  111. package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
  112. package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  113. package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js +33 -1
  114. package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  115. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.d.ts +402 -0
  116. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.d.ts.map +1 -0
  117. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.js +684 -0
  118. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.js.map +1 -0
  119. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.d.ts +58 -0
  120. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.d.ts.map +1 -0
  121. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.js +31 -0
  122. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.js.map +1 -0
  123. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.d.ts +480 -0
  124. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.d.ts.map +1 -0
  125. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.js +11 -0
  126. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.js.map +1 -0
  127. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.d.ts +46 -0
  128. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.d.ts.map +1 -0
  129. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.js +11 -0
  130. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.js.map +1 -0
  131. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.d.ts +129 -0
  132. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.d.ts.map +1 -0
  133. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.js +79 -0
  134. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.js.map +1 -0
  135. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.d.ts +43 -0
  136. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.d.ts.map +1 -0
  137. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.js +181 -0
  138. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.js.map +1 -0
  139. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.d.ts +10 -0
  140. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.d.ts.map +1 -0
  141. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.js +122 -0
  142. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.js.map +1 -0
  143. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.d.ts +26 -0
  144. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.d.ts.map +1 -0
  145. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.js +127 -0
  146. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.js.map +1 -0
  147. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.d.ts +5 -0
  148. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.d.ts.map +1 -0
  149. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.js +33 -0
  150. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.js.map +1 -0
  151. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.d.ts +3 -0
  152. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.d.ts.map +1 -0
  153. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.js +9 -0
  154. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.js.map +1 -0
  155. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.d.ts +101 -0
  156. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.d.ts.map +1 -0
  157. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.js +299 -0
  158. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.js.map +1 -0
  159. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.d.ts +22 -0
  160. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.d.ts.map +1 -0
  161. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.js +17 -0
  162. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.js.map +1 -0
  163. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.d.ts +60 -0
  164. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.d.ts.map +1 -0
  165. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.js +331 -0
  166. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.js.map +1 -0
  167. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.d.ts +130 -0
  168. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.d.ts.map +1 -0
  169. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.js +578 -0
  170. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.js.map +1 -0
  171. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.d.ts +119 -0
  172. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.d.ts.map +1 -0
  173. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.js +649 -0
  174. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.js.map +1 -0
  175. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.d.ts +92 -0
  176. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.d.ts.map +1 -0
  177. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.js +359 -0
  178. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.js.map +1 -0
  179. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.d.ts +18 -0
  180. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.d.ts.map +1 -0
  181. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.js +142 -0
  182. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.js.map +1 -0
  183. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.d.ts +344 -0
  184. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.d.ts.map +1 -0
  185. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.js +266 -0
  186. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.js.map +1 -0
  187. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.d.ts +12 -0
  188. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.d.ts.map +1 -0
  189. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.js +71 -0
  190. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.js.map +1 -0
  191. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.d.ts +3 -0
  192. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.d.ts.map +1 -0
  193. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.js +3 -0
  194. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.js.map +1 -0
  195. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.d.ts +4 -2
  196. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.d.ts.map +1 -1
  197. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.js +4 -2
  198. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.js.map +1 -1
  199. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.d.ts +4 -1
  200. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  201. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.js +3 -1
  202. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.js.map +1 -1
  203. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.d.ts +42 -63
  204. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.d.ts.map +1 -1
  205. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.js +51 -29
  206. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.js.map +1 -1
  207. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.d.ts +16 -103
  208. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  209. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.js +8 -13
  210. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.js.map +1 -1
  211. package/dist/remote/relay/index.d.ts +1 -1
  212. package/dist/remote/relay/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  213. package/dist/remote/relay/index.js.map +1 -1
  214. package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.d.ts +2 -7
  215. package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  216. package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.js +32 -20
  217. package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.js.map +1 -1
  218. package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts +32 -69
  219. package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  220. package/dist/remote/relay/types.js +0 -1
  221. package/dist/remote/relay/types.js.map +1 -1
  222. package/dist/types/api.d.ts +21 -0
  223. package/dist/types/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
  224. package/dist/types/protocol-config.d.ts +51 -0
  225. package/dist/types/protocol-config.d.ts.map +1 -1
  226. package/dist/types/protocol-config.js +46 -0
  227. package/dist/types/protocol-config.js.map +1 -1
  228. package/docs/ASSURANCE.md +10 -6
  229. package/docs/CLIENT_COMPOSITION.md +23 -69
  230. package/docs/DEVIATIONS.md +44 -11
  231. package/docs/E2EE.md +71 -6
  232. package/docs/GETTING_STARTED.md +1 -1
  233. package/docs/PACKAGE_SURFACE.md +6 -5
  234. package/docs/RECIPES.md +1 -1
  235. package/docs/SECURITY.md +8 -0
  236. package/local/store/expo/README.md +10 -1
  237. package/local/store/node/README.md +10 -1
  238. package/package.json +12 -7
  239. package/remote/relay/convex/README.md +1 -1
  240. package/remote/relay/convex/component/README.md +428 -0
  241. package/scripts/oe-groups.mjs +21 -1
  242. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server/index.d.ts +0 -2
  243. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server/index.d.ts.map +0 -1
  244. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server/index.js +0 -2
  245. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server/index.js.map +0 -1
  246. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server.d.ts +0 -150
  247. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server.d.ts.map +0 -1
  248. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server.js +0 -506
  249. package/dist/remote/relay/convex/server.js.map +0 -1
  250. package/docs/api/README.md +0 -471
  251. package/docs/api/classes/EncryptionError.md +0 -112
  252. package/docs/api/classes/EndorsementManager.md +0 -325
  253. package/docs/api/classes/SealedSenderAuthError.md +0 -127
  254. package/docs/api/classes/ServerDerivedKeyPair.md +0 -68
  255. package/docs/api/classes/ServerDerivedPublicKey.md +0 -33
  256. package/docs/api/classes/ServerRootKeyPair.md +0 -94
  257. package/docs/api/classes/ServerRootPublicKey.md +0 -72
  258. package/docs/api/classes/SignalProtocolBlockingManager.md +0 -106
  259. package/docs/api/classes/SignalProtocolClient.md +0 -2654
  260. package/docs/api/classes/VerificationFailure.md +0 -25
  261. package/docs/api/enumerations/ContentHint.md +0 -63
  262. package/docs/api/enumerations/EncryptionErrorCode.md +0 -488
  263. package/docs/api/enumerations/IdentityKeyChange.md +0 -65
  264. package/docs/api/enumerations/MessageType.md +0 -29
  265. package/docs/api/enumerations/TrustDirection.md +0 -33
  266. package/docs/api/enumerations/TypingAction.md +0 -31
  267. package/docs/api/functions/createDefaultSignalProtocolContentAdapter.md +0 -13
  268. package/docs/api/functions/createDefaultSignalProtocolLogger.md +0 -36
  269. package/docs/api/functions/createGroupId.md +0 -32
  270. package/docs/api/functions/createSignalProtocolClient.md +0 -36
  271. package/docs/api/functions/createSignalProtocolClientConfig.md +0 -24
  272. package/docs/api/functions/decodeGroupTrustRoot.md +0 -21
  273. package/docs/api/functions/encodeGroupTrustRoot.md +0 -28
  274. package/docs/api/functions/extractGroupId.md +0 -32
  275. package/docs/api/functions/formatVersion.md +0 -25
  276. package/docs/api/functions/isCompatible.md +0 -31
  277. package/docs/api/functions/isGroupId.md +0 -37
  278. package/docs/api/functions/isSealedSenderAuthError.md +0 -25
  279. package/docs/api/functions/parseVersion.md +0 -29
  280. package/docs/api/functions/resolveSPQRLimits.md +0 -21
  281. package/docs/api/functions/resolveSignalProtocolLogger.md +0 -42
  282. package/docs/api/interfaces/AccountIdentityProvisioning.md +0 -43
  283. package/docs/api/interfaces/AccountIdentityRotation.md +0 -69
  284. package/docs/api/interfaces/AttachmentTransferOptions.md +0 -49
  285. package/docs/api/interfaces/BlockedRecipientEntry.md +0 -25
  286. package/docs/api/interfaces/BlockedRecipientsSyncInput.md +0 -27
  287. package/docs/api/interfaces/ConfigurationSyncInput.md +0 -19
  288. package/docs/api/interfaces/CredentialPublicKey.md +0 -25
  289. package/docs/api/interfaces/DataMessageInput.md +0 -21
  290. package/docs/api/interfaces/DecryptedEnvelope.md +0 -95
  291. package/docs/api/interfaces/DecryptedGroup.md +0 -86
  292. package/docs/api/interfaces/DeviceInfo.md +0 -79
  293. package/docs/api/interfaces/DeviceRecord.md +0 -87
  294. package/docs/api/interfaces/DeviceRegistration.md +0 -27
  295. package/docs/api/interfaces/DoubleRatchetConfig.md +0 -36
  296. package/docs/api/interfaces/EcOneTimePreKey.md +0 -27
  297. package/docs/api/interfaces/EcSignedPreKey.md +0 -39
  298. package/docs/api/interfaces/EcSignedPreKeyUpload.md +0 -50
  299. package/docs/api/interfaces/EncryptionErrorContext.md +0 -51
  300. package/docs/api/interfaces/Envelope.md +0 -154
  301. package/docs/api/interfaces/ForceKeyResetResult.md +0 -37
  302. package/docs/api/interfaces/GroupAuthorization.md +0 -23
  303. package/docs/api/interfaces/GroupChangeEntry.md +0 -42
  304. package/docs/api/interfaces/GroupMemberDevice.md +0 -26
  305. package/docs/api/interfaces/GroupTrustRoot.md +0 -33
  306. package/docs/api/interfaces/IEcOneTimePreKeyStore.md +0 -86
  307. package/docs/api/interfaces/IEcSignedPreKeyStore.md +0 -133
  308. package/docs/api/interfaces/IGroupServer.md +0 -120
  309. package/docs/api/interfaces/IGroupStateStore.md +0 -128
  310. package/docs/api/interfaces/IIdentityKeyStore.md +0 -312
  311. package/docs/api/interfaces/IKemPreKeyStore.md +0 -144
  312. package/docs/api/interfaces/IKyberLastResortPreKeyStore.md +0 -112
  313. package/docs/api/interfaces/ILogger.md +0 -117
  314. package/docs/api/interfaces/IProtocolStore.md +0 -1033
  315. package/docs/api/interfaces/IRelayGroupServer.md +0 -60
  316. package/docs/api/interfaces/ISenderKeyStore.md +0 -417
  317. package/docs/api/interfaces/ISesameStore.md +0 -249
  318. package/docs/api/interfaces/ISessionStore.md +0 -178
  319. package/docs/api/interfaces/ISignalProtocolClient.md +0 -1185
  320. package/docs/api/interfaces/ISignalProtocolLocalSecretVault.md +0 -71
  321. package/docs/api/interfaces/ISignalProtocolLocalStore.md +0 -2053
  322. package/docs/api/interfaces/ISignalProtocolManager.md +0 -272
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  613. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaCleanupInput.md +0 -9
  614. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaCleanupResult.md +0 -9
  615. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaDownloadInput.md +0 -9
  616. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaDownloadResult.md +0 -9
  617. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaOperationResult.md +0 -9
  618. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaUploadInput.md +0 -9
  619. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaUploadResult.md +0 -9
  620. package/docs/api/type-aliases/Signature.md +0 -21
  621. package/docs/api/type-aliases/Unsubscribe.md +0 -15
  622. package/docs/api/variables/BraidPolicy.md +0 -21
  623. package/docs/api/variables/DEFAULT_DEVICE_ID.md +0 -12
  624. package/docs/api/variables/DOUBLE_RATCHET_SPEC.md +0 -11
  625. package/docs/api/variables/GROUP_ID_PREFIX.md +0 -11
  626. package/docs/api/variables/GROUP_TRUST_ROOT_VERSION.md +0 -11
  627. package/docs/api/variables/KEY_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS_DEFAULT.md +0 -11
  628. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_MESSAGE_KEYS.md +0 -14
  629. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_PREKEY_AGE_MS_DEFAULT.md +0 -11
  630. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_RECEIVER_CHAINS.md +0 -14
  631. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_REGISTRATION_ID.md +0 -16
  632. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_SKIP.md +0 -11
  633. package/docs/api/variables/MESSAGE_FORMAT.md +0 -11
  634. package/docs/api/variables/MIN_REGISTRATION_ID.md +0 -16
  635. package/docs/api/variables/ML_KEM_BRAID_SPEC.md +0 -11
  636. package/docs/api/variables/ONE_TIME_PREKEY_BATCH_SIZE.md +0 -21
  637. package/docs/api/variables/PQXDH_SPEC.md +0 -11
  638. package/docs/api/variables/PostQuantumPolicy.md +0 -21
  639. package/docs/api/variables/SENDER_KEY_FORMAT.md +0 -11
  640. package/docs/api/variables/SENDER_KEY_SPEC.md +0 -11
  641. package/docs/api/variables/SESAME_SPEC.md +0 -11
  642. package/docs/api/variables/SESSION_FORMAT.md +0 -11
  643. package/docs/api/variables/SPQR_LIMITS_DEFAULTS.md +0 -11
  644. package/docs/api/variables/X3DH_SPEC.md +0 -9
  645. package/docs/api/variables/defaultSignalProtocolLogger.md +0 -32
  646. package/remote/relay/convex/server/README.md +0 -146
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,683 @@
1
1
  # Changelog
2
2
 
3
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.8
4
+
5
+ - **An internal pricing exploration is no longer published, and business
6
+ planning is now structurally unexportable.** `docs/pricing-preview.html` —
7
+ an internal pricing and revenue exploration — was allowlisted into the
8
+ public export in `0.1.0-alpha.5`. Nothing linked to it and it was never in
9
+ the npm package, but it had no business being public. It is removed from
10
+ the allowlist, and the release policy now refuses any file whose name
11
+ matches pricing, revenue, or business-model patterns, so re-adding one
12
+ becomes a deliberate policy edit instead of a one-line allowlist change.
13
+
14
+ - **The assurance figures are now a build product.** The figures table in
15
+ `docs/ASSURANCE.md` was hand-maintained and had gone stale across two
16
+ releases. `npm run assurance:update` regenerates it from a real run and
17
+ refuses to write figures from a failing run; `release:verify` refuses to
18
+ cut an export when the figures are more than three days old. The README no
19
+ longer duplicates the numbers — it points at the one generated table.
20
+
21
+ - **README: the product speaks before the disclaimer.** The Signal
22
+ non-affiliation paragraph moved below the benefit bullets (still above the
23
+ fold); the nav line gains `open-e2ee.dev` and `docs.open-e2ee.dev`, which
24
+ the README previously never linked; the hard-coded patch version — four
25
+ releases stale at time of fix — is replaced by the `0.1.0-alpha` maturity
26
+ line, with the npm badge carrying the exact version; the weekly-downloads
27
+ badge, which renders a near-zero number for a days-old package, is
28
+ replaced by a native-modules count that states a real differentiator.
29
+
30
+ - **`COMMERCIAL.md` answers the highest-intent click.** Commercial licensing
31
+ previously dead-ended at an email address. The new file states who needs a
32
+ commercial license, what it changes and does not change, the public tiers,
33
+ and how buying works. Shipped in the npm package too.
34
+
35
+ - **A contribution surface that tells the truth about the export model.**
36
+ `CONTRIBUTING.md` explains that `main` is generated, why PRs are ported
37
+ rather than merged, and that issues are triaged in public;
38
+ `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, issue templates (with a security-reporting
39
+ off-ramp), and a PR template complete the set.
40
+
41
+ - **Vulnerability reporting: private GitHub reporting and a safe harbor.**
42
+ `SECURITY.md` now offers GitHub private vulnerability reporting alongside
43
+ email, and commits to a good-faith safe harbor for security research.
44
+
45
+ - **`docs/E2EE.md` grew from a summary into the architecture explainer its
46
+ README billing promises** — server-becomes-relay, device as source of
47
+ truth, identity as device keys, recovery as a product decision, metadata
48
+ visibility, and the new failure modes, each linking to the doc that goes
49
+ deeper. Its "ML-KEM (Kyber)" phrasing is corrected to "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)",
50
+ matching the distinction this changelog drew in `0.1.0-alpha.6`.
51
+
52
+ - **The npm package no longer ships 1.8 MB of generated API reference.**
53
+ `docs/api` (391 generated files) stays in the repository for browsing but
54
+ leaves the tarball; installs should not pay for reference docs that are
55
+ regenerable and hosted.
56
+
57
+ - **Supply-chain hardening.** Every workflow action is pinned to a commit
58
+ SHA; dependabot watches npm production dependencies and workflow actions
59
+ weekly; CodeQL runs the security-extended queries on every push, PR, and
60
+ weekly schedule.
61
+
62
+ - **The composition guide leads with the shipped API.** The "Target
63
+ Composition" section — `deviceStorage`, `createExpoDeviceStorage`,
64
+ `signal.messages.subscribe`, none of which exist in the package — sat above
65
+ the real API at the top of `docs/CLIENT_COMPOSITION.md`, which is exactly
66
+ the position that gets copy-pasted. It moved to the bottom under "Future
67
+ Direction (Not Shipped)" behind an explicit these-imports-fail warning.
68
+
69
+ - **The Node store README no longer claims an interface the adapter does not
70
+ implement.** `NodeSignalProtocolStore` covers the core single-device
71
+ surface but not the Sesame device-record, sender-key, or message-record
72
+ portions of `ISignalProtocolLocalStore` — and it has no `implements`
73
+ clause, so the compiler was never checking the README's claim. The README
74
+ now states the real coverage and points multi-device and group users at
75
+ the interface docs. Completing the adapter is tracked work; documenting
76
+ the boundary honestly could not wait for it.
77
+
78
+ - **BREAKING: the group change log is for members; pending principals catch
79
+ up by snapshot.** The change log authorizes at the snapshot at
80
+ `fromVersion`, and a pending-profile-key entry appears in that roster, so
81
+ an invitee could walk the log forward from their invitation — reading, for
82
+ the whole invitation-to-acceptance window, a narration `getGroup` refuses
83
+ them by name, including who made each change. The server now requires the
84
+ requester to be a *member* of the authorizing snapshot (rejecting with the
85
+ distinct reason `not_a_member`), which closes the log to invitees outright
86
+ and, for members, states the tenure bound that the roster check previously
87
+ provided by accident.
88
+
89
+ Pending principals do not lose their catch-up path — they lose the log as
90
+ the mechanism. A pending client now advances by fetching the current state
91
+ as a fresh signed baseline, verified and installed whole, which is also
92
+ how the reference ecosystem's clients behave whenever the server does not
93
+ recognize them as a member. Acceptance is unaffected: it was always
94
+ submitted against the current state, which is exactly what the snapshot
95
+ provides. The specification records this as S10a, with the C1/C3 span
96
+ rules restated to make explicit what was previously implicit: a pending
97
+ view is a provisional baseline, not a span with living continuity, and a
98
+ member's span begins at the verified transition or baseline that makes
99
+ them a member.
100
+
101
+ One behavioral consequence: an invitee whose invitation is withdrawn no
102
+ longer receives the deletion as a signed change (the log that carried it
103
+ is closed to them). The next catch-up finds the current state refused and
104
+ surfaces `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED`, mutating nothing — the cached pending
105
+ view remains the last verified state, and a later re-invitation serves a
106
+ fresh baseline. Members are untouched: removal and ban still arrive as
107
+ verified transitions through the log, never as refusals.
108
+
109
+ - **A full 256 KiB multi-recipient payload is accepted, as advertised.** The
110
+ content ceilings are enforced on the base64 columns as string-length
111
+ limits, and the multi-recipient limit was computed as `ceil((n / 3) * 4)`
112
+ instead of `4 * ceil(n / 3)` — two characters short of what 256 KiB
113
+ actually encodes to, since 262144 is not a multiple of 3. A payload at
114
+ exactly the advertised ceiling was refused with a 413. The single-recipient
115
+ limit was computed the same way but 96 KiB divides by 3, so only the
116
+ multi-recipient bound was wrong.
117
+
118
+ - **A FORBIDDEN group read now says which question it answers, and only a
119
+ membership refusal reads as revocation.** Two different rejections share
120
+ the 403 `FORBIDDEN` code on the group read paths: "you may not read this
121
+ group at all" (banned, or absent from the authorizing roster) and "you may
122
+ not read this version of it" (the join-version floor added in the
123
+ removal-revocation work). They differed only in message text, and the
124
+ client treated any `FORBIDDEN` on a pinned baseline read as
125
+ `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED` — so a floor rejection, raised while the membership
126
+ itself was fine, would have been reported to the application as a revoked
127
+ membership. The rejections now carry a machine-readable `reason`
128
+ (`not_readable` / `before_join`) alongside the code, the client interprets
129
+ only `not_readable` as revocation and propagates everything else, and the
130
+ conformance tests assert on the reason rather than on message wording.
131
+
132
+ - **A multi-recipient send may name each device only once, and retry
133
+ requests are rate limited.** The multi-recipient path is deliberately
134
+ exempt from the per-recipient inbound-bytes budget, matching the
135
+ reference, because a group-send token is supposed to price it. That
136
+ exemption assumes one call fans out to *distinct* devices. The reference
137
+ gets that from its wire format, which parses recipients into a map keyed
138
+ by service ID, so duplicates collapse before the handler ever sees them;
139
+ our flat array does not, so one endorsed device repeated a thousand times
140
+ in a single call stored a thousand copies of the ciphertext against an
141
+ unmetered budget. The handler now rejects a repeated `(userId, deviceId)`
142
+ with a 400 rather than collapsing it, since a repeat is a client bug and
143
+ quietly picking between two conflicting key blocks would bury it.
144
+
145
+ `sendRetryRequest` was unmetered too, and nothing else on that path bounds
146
+ it: a retry request carries no caller-supplied content to charge by size,
147
+ and it names an original sender the caller never has to have talked to, so
148
+ there is no relationship to check either. It is now counted per requester
149
+ against a token bucket sized for the legitimate case — a client returning
150
+ from a broken session asks for one per message it could not decrypt — and
151
+ refuses only a caller that keeps asking indefinitely.
152
+
153
+ - **BREAKING: group-send tokens are verified before any account is read, and
154
+ sealed sends carry the recipient identities they claim.** A group-send
155
+ token is a signature over ACIs, but sealed sends name recipients by user
156
+ ID, so the relay resolved every named recipient to its stored ACI — up to
157
+ one indexed read per recipient, a thousand on the multi-recipient path —
158
+ *before* it could check the token. An anonymous caller holding a garbage
159
+ token could bill that work to the deployment on every call, on the one
160
+ path that is deliberately exempt from the per-recipient send budget
161
+ because the token is supposed to be the gate.
162
+
163
+ The order is now the reference implementation's, where sealed payloads
164
+ name recipients by service ID and the token is checked against the request
165
+ before any account is touched: the caller supplies the ACI it claims for
166
+ each recipient, the entire cryptographic check runs against those claims
167
+ first, and only then is each claim bound to the recipient's stored
168
+ account. A caller who lies about a binding has necessarily already
169
+ presented a token our own group server issued over the claimed set, so
170
+ the reads it spends were an authenticated member's to spend.
171
+
172
+ The claims ride the existing plumbing: the endorsement cache now stores,
173
+ next to each member's endorsement, the ACI it was issued over — the
174
+ identity that is *correct* to claim, as opposed to whatever a later lookup
175
+ would resolve — and the send paths pass them through. This changes the
176
+ app-owned `EndorsementCacheStore` interface (entries are now
177
+ `{ endorsement, aciBytes }` records rather than raw bytes) and adds
178
+ `targetAciBytes` / per-recipient `aciBytes` arguments to the sealed send
179
+ mutations, required when authorizing by group-send token.
180
+
181
+ - **One ACI, one account.** Nothing stopped two user IDs from registering
182
+ the same ACI: `identify` is host-owned and unvalidated, and the second
183
+ account to claim an ACI would inherit every authorization decision made
184
+ about the first — sealed-sender access, group-send endorsements, identity
185
+ binding. The `accounts` table now has an `aciBytes` index and
186
+ `rememberAccount` refuses a claim on an ACI already registered to a
187
+ different user ID with a 409 `CONFLICT`. A deployment that already holds
188
+ duplicate-ACI rows keeps working — the check reads one claimant and the
189
+ duplicate surfaces as the intended 409 rather than an untyped error — but
190
+ which of the two accounts is refused depends on index order, so resolve
191
+ such rows deliberately before deploying.
192
+
193
+ - **Removal and ban now revoke historical group-state reads.** `getGroup` with
194
+ an explicit version authorized the requester against the roster of the
195
+ *requested* snapshot, so anyone removed or banned at version N could keep
196
+ fetching every snapshot of their former tenure indefinitely — a removal that
197
+ does not revoke read access is not a removal. The server now authorizes
198
+ every full-state read against the group as it is *now*, and adds the floor
199
+ that snapshot-based authorization used to provide by accident: a member may
200
+ not read state from before the version they joined at, so membership grants
201
+ the group from when you joined, not its history.
202
+
203
+ The change log deliberately keeps snapshot-at-`fromVersion` authorization,
204
+ as the group specification already required: the walk serves entries only
205
+ while the requester stays readable and stops at — and includes — the change
206
+ that removed them, which is how a polling member learns of their removal.
207
+ Authorizing the log at the current state would 403 them into silence. What
208
+ this leaves reachable to a former member is bounded and not new: changes
209
+ from within their own tenure, ending at their removal — bytes they were
210
+ served while entitled.
211
+
212
+ One client-visible consequence: a join that is accepted and then revoked
213
+ before the joiner reads its baseline snapshot — an admin removing them in
214
+ the race window — now fails with `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED` instead of
215
+ reporting a membership the client could never verify or use. Nothing is
216
+ installed locally, and the principal becomes the ordinary re-entitlement
217
+ case: a later re-add serves a fresh signed baseline.
218
+
219
+ An invitation grants the current state and nothing else. A
220
+ pending-profile-key entry entitles its holder to read the group as it is —
221
+ acceptance needs that — but it is not a tenure, and its wire format pins
222
+ `joinedAtVersion` to zero, so deriving a history floor from it would read
223
+ as "joined at the beginning of time". An invitee who never accepts holds
224
+ the group master key, so every snapshot the server serves them decrypts;
225
+ versioned reads are therefore refused outright for pending principals.
226
+
227
+ This bounds `getGroup` only. The change log authorizes against the
228
+ snapshot at `fromVersion`, and a pending-profile-key entry appears in that
229
+ roster, so an invitee can still walk the log forward from their
230
+ invitation — a window during which they could already fetch the current
231
+ state at will, though the log additionally names who made each change.
232
+ Flooring the log would deny a pending member the entries they need to
233
+ reach the state their acceptance is submitted against, so closing that
234
+ window means changing how pending members catch up, not adding a check.
235
+
236
+ - **The relay's send paths are bounded: per-recipient inbound budget, a
237
+ content-size ceiling, and a device-existence check on sealed sends.** None
238
+ of the component's send paths was rate limited or size limited, so one
239
+ caller — anonymous on the sealed path, any authenticated account on the
240
+ identified one — could grow a victim's message queue without bound for the
241
+ full seven-day retention window. Three bounds close this, each matching the
242
+ reference implementation's shape: message content is capped at 96 KiB for a
243
+ single-recipient envelope and 256 KiB for the shared multi-recipient
244
+ payload; single-recipient sends spend from a per-*recipient* byte budget
245
+ (4 MiB burst, 1 MiB/minute sustained) — keyed by the target because a
246
+ sealed sender is anonymous by design, so a per-sender limit on that path is
247
+ either meaningless or a hole; and `sendUnidentified` now refuses a target
248
+ device that does not exist, the check its multi-recipient sibling always
249
+ had. The multi-recipient path is deliberately not metered, also matching
250
+ the reference: the group-send token already prices it, and a per-recipient
251
+ budget there would let one noisy group partially starve delivery to its
252
+ quietest member.
253
+
254
+ The shared bucket is bounded from the sender side too. Keying by target is
255
+ forced on the sealed path — the sender is anonymous by design — but on the
256
+ identified path the sender is known, and a single authenticated account
257
+ must not be able to drain a victim's whole budget and starve every other
258
+ sender: identified sends also spend a per-(sender, recipient) sub-limit of
259
+ a quarter of the shared bucket. Neither bucket can be spent by a request
260
+ that goes on to fail: the charges are written in the mutation's own
261
+ transaction, so a send that 410s on the stale-device check — or trips the
262
+ other limit — rolls its charge back with everything else.
263
+
264
+ - **The `STALE_DEVICE` error no longer discloses the recipient's current
265
+ registration ID.** The 410 thrown when a sender's view of a device is stale
266
+ echoed back `currentRegistrationId` — the live value — to any
267
+ account-authenticated caller, with no rate limit. That is the same read the
268
+ prekey-bundle fetch serves, minus its rate limiter: a free oracle for
269
+ watching registration-ID changes (device reinstalls) on arbitrary devices.
270
+ The error now names the stale device and nothing else, which is the
271
+ reference implementation's 410 body; the sender's recovery path is
272
+ unchanged, since recovering means re-fetching the bundle anyway.
273
+
274
+ - **BREAKING: no group identifier travels on a message envelope any more.**
275
+ Every relayed message carried a plaintext `groupId` alongside its target, and
276
+ the relay stored it on each `messages` row for the seven-day retention
277
+ window. Grouping those rows by that column yielded the set of accounts that
278
+ received traffic for a group, so a relay operator could reconstruct rosters
279
+ without breaking any encryption. The column is gone, and so are the `groupId`
280
+ arguments on `messages.send`, `sendUnidentified`, and
281
+ `sendMultiRecipientUnidentified`, and the field on the envelopes those
282
+ functions return.
283
+
284
+ What replaces it is a message type. A group message is now typed
285
+ `sender_key`, which tells the receiver to decrypt the payload as a framed
286
+ SenderKeyMessage — and nothing else. The receiver reads the frame's
287
+ distribution identifier, which is opaque, and resolves the group against its
288
+ own sender key store. The envelope says how to decrypt, never which group.
289
+ This also removes a small trust problem: the receiver no longer selects a
290
+ sender key using a group id the sender asserted.
291
+
292
+ This closes the group's *name*, not the group *partition*. The distribution
293
+ identifier is unencrypted and stable for the life of a sender key, one send
294
+ produces byte-identical ciphertext on every recipient's row, and the
295
+ multi-recipient sealed path hands the relay a roster. A relay can still
296
+ partition delivery pairs into unlabeled groups; it can no longer put a
297
+ meaningful, cross-send label on one. The component README states the
298
+ remaining channels explicitly.
299
+
300
+ Sealed sender needed its own channel for this, because the outer envelope of
301
+ a sealed message is always `unidentified_sender` and cannot carry an inner
302
+ type. Sealed envelopes now begin with a content-type byte inside the seal,
303
+ matching the `Type` enum of the reference implementation's
304
+ `UnidentifiedSenderMessage.Message` (`PREKEY_MESSAGE`, `MESSAGE`,
305
+ `SENDERKEY_MESSAGE`, `PLAINTEXT_CONTENT`), and `SealOptions.groupId` —
306
+ encrypted, never populated by the send path — is removed in favour of
307
+ `contentType`. This is a wire-format change to sealed sender for both V1 and
308
+ V2.
309
+
310
+ Deploying this against an existing Convex deployment needs a manual step:
311
+ Convex validates stored documents against the new schema during the push,
312
+ before any of your code runs, so a `messages` row still carrying a `groupId`
313
+ fails the deploy and no migration can run ahead of it. Clear the `messages`
314
+ table — or stop sending and let the seven-day retention window drain it —
315
+ before deploying. Messages are transient and clients re-request undelivered
316
+ ones. See "Upgrading" in the component README.
317
+
318
+ - **Fixed: on React Native, one member's sender key could permanently break
319
+ another's group messages.** The store indexes sender keys by the frame's
320
+ distribution identifier so a receiver can resolve a group without being told
321
+ which one. Every other adapter scopes that index by sender; the React Native
322
+ adapter keyed a flat pointer on the identifier alone, so a second sender
323
+ presenting the same identifier overwrote the first, and the displaced
324
+ sender's group messages failed to decrypt until it rotated. Distribution
325
+ identifiers are chosen by their sender and travel in the clear, so this was
326
+ reachable by any account sharing a group with the victim. The pointer key is
327
+ now scoped by sender and device.
328
+
329
+ - **Fixed: on React Native, a host that issues colon-scoped user IDs could not
330
+ receive group messages at all.** The adapter joins composite storage keys on
331
+ `:` and split the sender key record key from the right, which silently
332
+ mis-assigns the components when a user ID contains a `:` of its own — and
333
+ nothing constrains user IDs, since they come from the host application's
334
+ identify hook, where a tenant- or issuer-scoped subject is ordinary. Every
335
+ group message resolved to nothing on such a deployment, deterministically and
336
+ permanently. The same join made a group ID a prefix of `<groupId>:<sub>`, so
337
+ deleting a group's sender keys also swept any group whose ID extended it.
338
+
339
+ Key components are now percent-escaped before they are joined, so no
340
+ identifier can carry a separator into a key or a scan prefix. This also
341
+ retires the residue left by the sender-scoping fix above, which had only
342
+ pushed the collision behind the same assumption.
343
+
344
+ Sender key records and pointers are unaffected on upgrade for a deployment
345
+ whose IDs contain neither `:` nor `%`, because such values escape to
346
+ themselves; only the values that were already broken move. Retry records are
347
+ different, and do move for everyone: their key is scanned by session ID, and
348
+ a session ID is `<userId>:<deviceId>`, so it always carries a separator. That
349
+ separator was load-bearing in the same way — a session ID of `alice:1` has
350
+ scan prefix `alice:1:`, which also matches the records of user `alice:1` on
351
+ device 2 — so the escaping applies there too.
352
+
353
+ The cost is that retry records written before the upgrade are not reachable
354
+ by session ID afterwards, so a retry request for a message sent before the
355
+ upgrade cannot be served and the sender's peer re-requests or gives up. They
356
+ are not leaked: the expiry sweep and the clear-all path scan the whole record
357
+ prefix and filter on the stored timestamp, so they are reaped on the normal
358
+ retention schedule regardless of key format.
359
+
360
+ - **BREAKING: the `plaintext_content` envelope type is removed.** It was in the
361
+ relay's message-type union and the client's accepted list, but no send path
362
+ ever produced one and neither decrypt path handled one — an envelope carrying
363
+ it fell through to the pairwise ratchet and failed there. The reference uses
364
+ the corresponding sealed content type to carry a decryption-error receipt
365
+ when no session exists; this SDK delivers those over a dedicated relay
366
+ channel instead, so the type has no role here. The sealed-sender parser now
367
+ rejects the content-type byte outright rather than mapping it to an envelope
368
+ type with no handler. `docs/DEVIATIONS.md` §6.2 records the difference.
369
+
370
+ The literal is also gone from the relay's stored `messageType` union, so it
371
+ carries the same deploy-time hazard as the `groupId` removal above: a stored
372
+ row whose `messageType` is `plaintext_content` fails Convex schema validation
373
+ during the push. Clearing the `messages` table handles both at once.
374
+
375
+ - **Sealed sender reads its content-type enum through a static import.** Four
376
+ call sites in `client/sealed-sender-ops.ts` and
377
+ `client/signal-service-cipher.ts` reached for
378
+ `internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types` with `await import(...)` on every
379
+ seal and unseal, to read `SealedSenderContentType` and the V2 version bytes.
380
+ Two of them were already redundant with a static import of the same module at
381
+ the top of the same file, and `client/client.ts` had none. This is a
382
+ consistency and readability change, not a bug fix: the module has runtime
383
+ exports, so a resolved dynamic import always carries the enum.
384
+
385
+ - **Sealed sender envelope parsing is now canonical and validated.** Both the
386
+ V1 and V2 inner-envelope parsers accepted a payload with trailing bytes, an
387
+ unrecognised content-type byte, a truncated varint, or a missing content
388
+ hint. Parsing runs after authentication, so none of these was reachable by an
389
+ attacker, but two distinct byte strings could parse to identical content and
390
+ an unknown content type fell through to a routing default. The parsers now
391
+ reject all four, and the content hint is a required field rather than an
392
+ optional one.
393
+
394
+ - **`maxSenderKeyAge` is bounded at 90 days.** The age-based rotation policy
395
+ already expired locally generated sender keys after a configurable interval,
396
+ defaulting to the 14 days the reference implementation uses, and the group
397
+ send path caught that expiry to rotate and redistribute before retrying. The
398
+ interval itself was unbounded, so a host could configure an age no key would
399
+ reach and switch rotation off without saying so. It is now clamped to 90
400
+ days, the same ceiling the reference applies to its own remotely configured
401
+ value — the difference being that this value comes from the host application
402
+ rather than from the SDK, which is what makes the clamp load-bearing rather
403
+ than belt-and-braces. A sender key is the group material no ratchet
404
+ refreshes, so a member who holds it can read everything sent under it until
405
+ it rotates; membership changes normally force that sooner, and the age bound
406
+ is what covers a group whose membership never changes. A configured value
407
+ that is not a positive finite number now falls back to the default instead of
408
+ being used, since such a value states no policy at all and a zero is far more
409
+ often an unset field than a request to rotate constantly. Both the clamp and
410
+ the fallback log a warning.
411
+
412
+ - **`maxSenderKeyAge` is also bounded below, at one hour.** The interval had no
413
+ lower bound, and one that is too short fails in a way that is worse than not
414
+ rotating: expiry is enforced on the send path, which answers it by rotating
415
+ the key and fanning a distribution message out to every other member over
416
+ sequential network calls, then retrying the encrypt — against the age of the
417
+ key it just created. Configure an interval shorter than that fan-out takes
418
+ and the retry finds the new key expired too, so every group send fails
419
+ permanently, having burned a rotation and a message to every member on each
420
+ attempt. Since the field is milliseconds, a host that means fourteen days and
421
+ passes `14` reaches this, and it does so without ever sending a message that
422
+ would reveal the mistake in testing.
423
+
424
+ Values below the floor are raised to it with a warning rather than rejected.
425
+ Unlike the ceiling this is not a security bound — rotating sooner is strictly
426
+ safer — so the honest reading of an unreachably short interval is "rotate as
427
+ often as this implementation can actually deliver", which is what a host that
428
+ wants aggressive rotation was asking for. An hour clears the worst realistic
429
+ fan-out by a wide margin while leaving deliberately aggressive policies
430
+ intact, which a bound measured in days would not. `SENDER_KEY_AGE_FLOOR` is
431
+ exported alongside `SENDER_KEY_AGE_CEILING`.
432
+
433
+ Note what the clamp leaves you with if you hit it by mistake: a host that
434
+ passes `14` meaning days now rotates hourly, which is a distribution message
435
+ to every member of every group every hour. That is functional but not free,
436
+ and the warning is how you find out it is happening — which is the argument
437
+ for clamping rather than rejecting, since the alternative was group messaging
438
+ that simply did not work.
439
+
440
+ Separately, the expiry check no longer skips a locally generated key whose
441
+ stored creation time is missing or non-positive. Such a key is the one whose
442
+ life is genuinely unbounded, so waiving the age check on it exempted exactly
443
+ the case the check exists for; it is now treated as expired, which the send
444
+ path answers by rotating to a key whose age is known.
445
+
446
+ - **Sender key identifiers are now opaque random UUIDs, closing a group
447
+ metadata leak.** A sender key's id was built as
448
+ `groupId:userId:deviceId:timestamp`, and that id travels the wire as the
449
+ SenderKeyMessage `distribution_uuid` — a field outside the ciphertext that
450
+ every relay on the delivery path reads off each group message. Sealed sender
451
+ does not cover this: it conceals the frame from the relay but not from the
452
+ rest of the path, and a deployment may have it disabled. A passive observer
453
+ could therefore reconstruct group rosters by grouping messages on a field it
454
+ cannot be prevented from reading. Ids are now random UUIDv4s carrying no
455
+ group, sender, device, or clock, matching the reference implementation's
456
+ random distribution UUID. The sender-keys specification states the
457
+ requirement in a new section on identifier opacity. This also fixes a
458
+ rotation bug: receivers detect a rotation by
459
+ comparing the incoming id against their stored state, so two rotations inside
460
+ the same millisecond produced an identical id and the second went unnoticed —
461
+ the rotation tests previously needed a `Date.now()` mock advancing a
462
+ millisecond per call to stay green, and now run against the real clock.
463
+ - **BREAKING: the Expo store now keeps sender keys on the device instead of
464
+ sending them to a remote store.** Every sender-key and skipped-key operation
465
+ was proxied to an optional `ISignalProtocolRemoteSenderStateStore`, which
466
+ took the chain key and the sender's private signature key as parameters and
467
+ wrote them to whatever backend the application supplied. Those two values
468
+ together are enough to read every message on a sender's group chain and to
469
+ forge new ones, so a server holding them would nullify group message
470
+ confidentiality and authenticity; the skipped-key methods handed over the
471
+ message keys themselves. The reference implementation keeps its sender key
472
+ store local for exactly this reason. No shipped relay implemented the
473
+ interface, so in practice these calls threw and Expo group messaging did not
474
+ work at all — the fix is a real local implementation, not a guard.
475
+
476
+ Sender key records and skipped message keys now live in the Expo store's own
477
+ SQLCipher-encrypted database. The `sender_keys` table holds each record as
478
+ one row so a rotation's current and previous states can never be written
479
+ apart, and its `distribution_id` column is renamed `group_id` to match what
480
+ it has always contained. A new `skipped_sender_keys` table replaces the
481
+ remote skipped-key calls and bounds itself by evicting the lowest chain
482
+ indexes first.
483
+
484
+ `ISignalProtocolRemoteSenderStateStore` is removed, along with the `relay`
485
+ option on `expoStore()` and the corresponding `ExpoSignalProtocolStore`
486
+ constructor parameter. `expoStore({ relay })` becomes `expoStore()`. The
487
+ `sender_keys` schema change is not migrated: applications own Expo database
488
+ migrations, and any existing rows hold state that should not have left the
489
+ device.
490
+ - **Device teardown no longer orphans key material, and the provisioning cron
491
+ no longer risks stalling.** `purgeDeviceStorage` deleted at most 4096 rows
492
+ per prekey table in a single transaction and stopped there. A device's
493
+ one-time prekeys have no ceiling — the component marks a consumed prekey
494
+ rather than deleting it, and no cron reclaims consumed rows — so a
495
+ long-lived device could exceed that and leave the remainder behind, keyed to
496
+ a deviceId a later link reuses. Teardown now deletes a fixed budget and
497
+ schedules a continuation until nothing remains. The device's identity
498
+ registration is always deleted in the first pass and `fetchPreKeyBundle`
499
+ gates on that row, so the device is unreachable the moment teardown returns
500
+ even while the sweep continues. Separately, the provisioning cleanup cron
501
+ swept 100 sessions per transaction while each `linked_pending_ack` row
502
+ cascades into a full device teardown; a cron that exceeds Convex's
503
+ per-mutation limits does not degrade, it stalls, and expired sessions then
504
+ stop being reaped at all. That sweep now uses a batch of 10 and relies on
505
+ its existing self-reschedule for throughput.
506
+ - **Provisioning teardown now identifies the device it linked by an opaque
507
+ token rather than a millisecond timestamp.** Device rows are reused across
508
+ registrations, so rollback matched the device's `linkedAt` stamp to avoid
509
+ reaping a device the user had legitimately re-registered into the freed
510
+ slot. Two links landing in the same millisecond on the same slot produce
511
+ equal stamps, and teardown would then unlink the wrong — newer — device.
512
+ Every registration and link now mints a `linkToken`; it is never returned to
513
+ clients. A test that removes and re-registers without advancing the clock at
514
+ all fails against the old stamp comparison.
515
+ - **Removed five exported Convex row types that described tables no consumer
516
+ can read.** `ConvexIdentityKey`, `ConvexEcSignedPreKey`, `ConvexEcPreKey`,
517
+ `ConvexKemPreKey`, and `ConvexKemLastResortPreKey` were unreferenced and
518
+ every one of them disagreed with `component/schema.ts`: all five omitted the
519
+ `identityType` discriminator, `ConvexIdentityKey` claimed a `deviceId` and a
520
+ raw `publicKey` where the real table holds a per-account
521
+ `compositeIdentity`, and both one-time prekey types documented that keys are
522
+ "DELETED when consumed" when the component marks `consumedAt` and leaves the
523
+ row for the sweep. The premise was wrong to begin with — the component's
524
+ tables are isolated, so an application cannot obtain these rows under any
525
+ type. The file header claiming nine component tables, one of them a
526
+ `prekeyBundleFetches` table that no longer exists, is corrected. The
527
+ surviving `FetchedPreKeyBundle` is now derived from the component's own
528
+ return validator instead of hand-written, so it cannot drift again.
529
+ - **`ConvexSignalProtocolRelayApi` now carries real argument and return
530
+ types.** Its 43 function references were declared as bare
531
+ `FunctionReference<'mutation'>` / `<'query'>`, so every argument the relay
532
+ adapter passed to the component was `any` and a mismatch surfaced only as a
533
+ runtime validator rejection in the deployment. The type is now *derived*
534
+ from `defineConvexSignalProtocolBackend`'s return type via `ApiFromModules`
535
+ rather than restated by hand, which is what makes it meaningful — a
536
+ hand-written contract can drift from the functions it describes, and this
537
+ one had. The `getProvisioningMessage` return cast is removed as a
538
+ consequence: the reference now carries the component's own return
539
+ validator, so a component change that stops satisfying the interface fails
540
+ to compile instead of being cast away.
541
+ - **Fixed sealed-sender fallback detection**, which decided whether to retry a
542
+ failed sealed send on the identified path by testing whether the error
543
+ message contained the substring `'Unauthorized'`. That was wrong in both
544
+ directions: any unrelated failure whose message happened to contain the word
545
+ — a rate limit, an app-level wrapper — downgraded the send to identified
546
+ delivery and disclosed the sender to the relay, while a genuine
547
+ `code: 'UNAUTHORIZED'` rejection whose message did not spell the word went
548
+ undetected and surfaced as a hard send failure. Detection now reads the
549
+ structured `ConvexError` payload; the string contract is removed with no
550
+ fallback.
551
+ - **Rewrote `docs/SCHEMA.md`.** It described a 7-table schema the application
552
+ was instructed to define itself, with a multi-tenant `appId` column, index
553
+ names, a `deliveredAt` field, and a `sender_key_distribution` message type
554
+ that exist nowhere in the codebase, plus cleanup crons the component already
555
+ runs. The component owns all sixteen tables; the document now describes what
556
+ is stored, what the relay can and cannot see, and the real retention
557
+ behavior.
558
+
559
+ - **Sealed sender can now be enabled.** `oe-groups trust-root` exports the
560
+ Ed25519 sender-certificate root alongside the group trust root, printing both
561
+ labelled (`group trust root:` / `sealed sender trust root:`). Previously only
562
+ the group root was printed, so there was no supported way to obtain the value
563
+ clients pin in `sealedSender.trustRoots`; inbound sealed-sender validation
564
+ stayed disabled and every send fell back to identified delivery, disclosing
565
+ the sender to the relay. The derivation now lives in one shared module
566
+ (`internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root`) used by both the CLI and the
567
+ relay's certificate issuance, so the printed root cannot drift from the key
568
+ the deployment signs with, and a contract test pins the two as equal.
569
+ Corrects the `sealedSender` configuration docs, which required a
570
+ `SEALED_SENDER_SIGNING_KEY` environment variable that has never existed.
571
+
572
+ - **`getProvisioningMessage` now returns `expiresAt`**, the session's absolute
573
+ deadline in epoch milliseconds (`null` when the session is unknown). The
574
+ Convex component already returned it, but the relay interface did not declare
575
+ it and the adapter cast it away, so no client could compute expiry locally.
576
+ The mock relay was brought to parity at the same time: it models the
577
+ acknowledgment's own TTL window granted by `completeProvisioning` — without
578
+ which a link completed near the deadline strands a device the client has
579
+ already persisted keys for — rejects expired sessions in
580
+ `connectNewDevice`, `sendProvisioningMessage`, `completeProvisioning`, and
581
+ `acknowledgeProvisioning`, and reports expiry as a computed status instead of
582
+ writing `expired` from inside a read. The shared relay contract suite now
583
+ pins all three behaviors.
584
+ - **Security (Convex component):** the component now declares
585
+ `OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET` as a typed component environment variable and
586
+ reads it through the declared-environment accessor. Convex components are
587
+ isolated from app deployment environment variables, so the previous
588
+ `process.env` read was unreachable in any real `app.use()` install and
589
+ every group, credential-issuance, and sender-certificate call failed at
590
+ runtime; apps must forward the secret with
591
+ `app.use(signalProtocol, { env: { OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET: app.env.OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET } })`.
592
+ The test-only injection seam is now default-deny: it refuses configuration
593
+ outside a recognized test runner instead of allowing it whenever a
594
+ deployment marker is absent.
595
+ - **Breaking (relay API):** removed `getGroupMembers` from the relay surface
596
+ — the component, the app wrapper, `ConvexSignalProtocolRelayServer`, the
597
+ mock adapter (including its `setGroupMembers` test seam), and
598
+ `ISignalProtocolRelayServer`. The relay keeps no server-side group
599
+ membership map by design; relayed group sends now require
600
+ `SendOptions.groupMemberUserIds`, which the relay resolves to devices via
601
+ `getActiveDevices`. Group sends without a roster previously dropped the
602
+ message to zero recipients while reporting success.
603
+ - Fixed cross-sender message suppression: `clientMessageId` deduplication is
604
+ now scoped to the sending account. The key was previously
605
+ `(targetUserId, targetDeviceId, clientMessageId)`, so two senders that mint
606
+ non-random client message IDs — a counter or a timestamp — silently
607
+ suppressed each other's messages to a shared recipient, and the suppressed
608
+ sender was handed the other sender's message ID and server timestamp.
609
+ Same-sender retries still collapse as before.
610
+ - Documented two properties the component does not provide, both previously
611
+ unstated or overstated. **Group metadata privacy:** the relay can still
612
+ approximate a group's recipient set from delivery metadata — `messages` rows
613
+ carry a plaintext `groupId`, and the unencrypted `distributionUuid` in the
614
+ SenderKeyMessage frame embeds `groupId:senderUserId:senderDeviceId` — so the
615
+ component README's previous claim to keep no membership map has been
616
+ corrected to describe what removing `getGroupMembers` actually buys. Closing
617
+ the leak requires opaque distribution identifiers in the sender-key layer and
618
+ is tracked separately. **Device-scoped authorization:** `identify` resolves an
619
+ account, not a device, so every `deviceId` argument is a caller-chosen
620
+ routing selector and any session for an account can drain that account's
621
+ other device queues, send as any of its device IDs, and rotate any of its key
622
+ material.
623
+ - Fixed silent message loss for skipped multi-recipient sealed-sender
624
+ recipients: the client now consumes the server's `uuids404` list,
625
+ refreshes those users' device lists, and redelivers per-device instead of
626
+ discarding the field while reporting the send as delivered.
627
+ - Fixed provisioning acknowledgment data loss: completing a session now
628
+ grants the acknowledgment its own full session TTL (previously the ack
629
+ deadline was whatever remained of the original five-minute window, and
630
+ the every-minute cleanup cron could delete the freshly linked device
631
+ before the ack arrived), `acknowledgeProvisioning` rejects expired
632
+ sessions instead of racing the cron for the device's survival, and
633
+ session teardown deletes only the device the session created (matched by
634
+ its `linkedAt` stamp) with a full cascade of its key material, queued
635
+ messages, and heartbeats. Dead `patch`-before-`throw` writes that Convex
636
+ transaction rollback always discarded were removed, along with the never
637
+ persisted stored `expired` status; `getProvisioningMessage` now also
638
+ returns `expiresAt` so subscribed clients can compute expiry locally.
639
+ - Retry requests now expire with the same seven-day TTL as messages, backed
640
+ by an hourly cleanup cron; `getPendingMessages` and
641
+ `getPendingRetryRequests` filter expired rows at read time instead of
642
+ serving them until the next cron pass.
643
+ - Reduced write contention on the per-account identity row: mutations now
644
+ skip the account patch when the caller's identity bytes are unchanged,
645
+ instead of unconditionally rewriting the row (an OCC conflict hotspot
646
+ between a user's own concurrent mutations and sealed sends addressed to
647
+ them).
648
+ - Corrected the exported `FetchedPreKeyBundle` type to the actual wire shape
649
+ (`registrationId`, `ecSignedPreKey`, `ecOneTimePreKey`,
650
+ `kemLastResortPreKey`, `kemOneTimePreKey`); the previous declaration
651
+ omitted `registrationId` and named four of five fields incorrectly.
652
+ - `getActiveDevices` now caps its device scan at `MAX_DEVICES` instead of a
653
+ hardcoded 5, and the missing-snapshot guard in `getGroupChanges` throws
654
+ structured `ConvexError` data instead of a plain `Error`.
655
+ - Extended the installable Convex component to own the complete relay backend,
656
+ adding isolated devices, identity and prekey storage, message and retry
657
+ queues, provisioning sessions, and sender-certificate issuance behind five
658
+ new public wrapper namespaces.
659
+ - Added `@convex-dev/rate-limiter` as an optional child component and enforce a
660
+ ten-per-minute prekey-bundle fetch limit for each authenticated
661
+ fetcher/target pair.
662
+ - Standardized component rejections on structured `ConvexError` data carrying
663
+ `{ code, status, message }`, including sealed-sender authorization failures
664
+ that retain an `Unauthorized:` message prefix for current client fallback
665
+ handling.
666
+ - Added an installable Convex component defined as
667
+ `defineComponent('signalProtocol')`, with isolated group state, change, and
668
+ snapshot tables plus a `defineConvexSignalProtocolBackend()` app-wrapper
669
+ factory. The credential-issuance wrappers resolve application identity and
670
+ pass explicit ACI and optional PNI bytes into the component; group
671
+ operations remain authorized solely by their zero-knowledge presentations
672
+ and carry no caller identity.
673
+ - Added the `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/convex.config` export for mounting
674
+ the component with `app.use(signalProtocol)`.
675
+ - **Breaking (Convex group backend):** removed `defineConvexGroupServer`,
676
+ `defineConvexGroupServerForTest`, `convexGroupServerTables`, and the
677
+ `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/remote/relay/convex/server` export. The
678
+ pre-launch factory and app-owned tables are replaced directly by the
679
+ component and wrapper, with no compatibility aliases.
680
+
3
681
  ## 0.1.0-alpha.7
4
682
 
5
683
  - **Security (Convex group server):** structured rejection data now survives
@@ -204,7 +882,7 @@
204
882
  parameters were wrong. PQXDH §2.2 requires the info string to name the
205
883
  `pqkem` actually in use, and the SDK runs ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203), not
206
884
  round-3 CRYSTALS-Kyber — so two implementations feeding an identical label
207
- derived *different* shared secrets, which is precisely what the info string
885
+ derived _different_ shared secrets, which is precisely what the info string
208
886
  exists to prevent. And §2.1 defines `info` as an identifier of the
209
887
  application deriving the key; this SDK is not Signal Messenger. **Sessions
210
888
  established under the old labels derive a different `SK` and cannot be
@@ -260,7 +938,7 @@
260
938
  gone. Protocol domain-separation strings are untouched and remain
261
939
  byte-identical. The Expo storage error message no longer carries a "Signal
262
940
  Protocol " prefix; it now reads `Expo storage DB bindings not configured.
263
- Configure them from the host app before using Expo storage.` Anything
941
+ Configure them from the host app before using Expo storage.` Anything
264
942
  matching on that text must be updated.
265
943
  - Corrected group-system source comments that described the permission model as
266
944
  server-enforced. The checks in `access-control.ts` run on the client over