@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk 0.1.0-alpha.6 → 0.1.0-alpha.8
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/ADAPTERS.md +1 -1
- package/ARCHITECTURE.md +1 -1
- package/CHANGELOG.md +876 -3
- package/COMMERCIAL.md +56 -0
- package/README.md +13 -8
- package/SECURITY.md +15 -1
- package/client/README.md +1 -1
- package/dist/client/client.d.ts +32 -28
- package/dist/client/client.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/client.js +136 -80
- package/dist/client/client.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/compose.d.ts +6 -1
- package/dist/client/compose.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/compose.js +2 -0
- package/dist/client/compose.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/config.d.ts +53 -19
- package/dist/client/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/config.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.d.ts +23 -2
- package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.js +35 -10
- package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/groups.d.ts +29 -29
- package/dist/client/groups.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/groups.js +54 -37
- package/dist/client/groups.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/headless.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/client/headless.js +1 -1
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.d.ts +27 -1
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js +36 -6
- package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts +21 -2
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js +119 -53
- package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts +20 -7
- package/dist/client/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/client/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/groups/index.d.ts +4 -4
- package/dist/groups/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/groups/index.js +3 -3
- package/dist/groups/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.d.ts +12 -5
- package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/index.js +10 -3
- package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/random.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/internal/crypto/random.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/crypto/random.js +16 -0
- package/dist/internal/crypto/random.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/access-control.d.ts +170 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/access-control.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/access-control.js +284 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/access-control.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/change-actions.d.ts +57 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/change-actions.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/change-actions.js +827 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/change-actions.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/change-authorization.d.ts +16 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/change-authorization.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/change-authorization.js +120 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/change-authorization.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/encrypted-state.d.ts +12 -2
- package/dist/internal/groups/encrypted-state.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/encrypted-state.js +122 -22
- package/dist/internal/groups/encrypted-state.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/group-id.d.ts +9 -9
- package/dist/internal/groups/group-id.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/group-id.js +11 -12
- package/dist/internal/groups/group-id.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/index.d.ts +16 -6
- package/dist/internal/groups/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/index.js +9 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups/invite-link.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/invite-link.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/manager.d.ts +188 -40
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js +1923 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.d.ts +32 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.js +111 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.d.ts +83 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.js +1186 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/trust-root.d.ts +32 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/trust-root.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/trust-root.js +91 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/trust-root.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/types.d.ts +188 -46
- package/dist/internal/groups/types.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/types.js +3 -2
- package/dist/internal/groups/types.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/wire.d.ts +68 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/wire.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/wire.js +708 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups/wire.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js +32 -18
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js +33 -19
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js +8 -14
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts +9 -4
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js +7 -15
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts +6 -7
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js +5 -7
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts +45 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js +77 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts +64 -9
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js +43 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts +38 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js +109 -8
- package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/auth-credential.d.ts +9 -7
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/auth-credential.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/auth-credential.js +68 -29
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/auth-credential.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/server-params.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/server-params.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/server-params.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/uid-struct.d.ts +2 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/uid-struct.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/uid-struct.js +4 -0
- package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/uid-struct.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/layers.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/layers.js +3 -3
- package/dist/layers.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts +14 -15
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js +109 -102
- package/dist/local/store/expo/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/db.d.ts +4 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/db.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/db.js +5 -0
- package/dist/local/store/expo/db.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/index.d.ts +0 -2
- package/dist/local/store/expo/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/index.js +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.js +2 -2
- package/dist/local/store/expo/models/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.d.ts +101 -77
- package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.js +154 -124
- package/dist/local/store/expo/models/sender-key.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.d.ts +134 -32
- package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.js +36 -7
- package/dist/local/store/expo/schema.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.js +18 -0
- package/dist/local/store/mock/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.d.ts +39 -0
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js +163 -8
- package/dist/local/store/react-native/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts +1 -0
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js +33 -1
- package/dist/local/store/web/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.d.ts +402 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.js +684 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/backend.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.d.ts +58 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.js +31 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/api.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.d.ts +480 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.js +11 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/component.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.d.ts +46 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.js +11 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/dataModel.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.d.ts +129 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.js +79 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/_generated/server.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.d.ts +43 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.js +181 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/accounts.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.d.ts +10 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.js +122 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/certificates.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.d.ts +26 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.js +127 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/cleanup.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.d.ts +5 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.js +33 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/convex.config.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.js +9 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/crons.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.d.ts +101 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.js +299 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/devices.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.d.ts +22 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.js +17 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/errors.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.d.ts +60 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.js +331 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/groups.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.d.ts +130 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.js +578 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/keys.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.d.ts +119 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.js +649 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/messages.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.d.ts +92 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.js +359 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/provisioning.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.d.ts +18 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.js +142 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/runtime.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.d.ts +344 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.js +266 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/schema.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.d.ts +12 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.js +71 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/component/zkAuth.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.d.ts +3 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.js +3 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/constants.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.d.ts +25 -21
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.js +51 -21
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/group-server.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.d.ts +4 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.js +3 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/index.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.d.ts +54 -67
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.js +123 -42
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/relay.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.d.ts +16 -103
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.js +8 -13
- package/dist/remote/relay/convex/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/index.d.ts +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.d.ts +33 -20
- package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.js +98 -81
- package/dist/remote/relay/mock/adapter.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/mock/group-server.d.ts +9 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/mock/group-server.d.ts.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/mock/group-server.js +9 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/mock/group-server.js.map +1 -0
- package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts +73 -79
- package/dist/remote/relay/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/types.js +0 -1
- package/dist/remote/relay/types.js.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/api.d.ts +23 -2
- package/dist/types/api.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/protocol-config.d.ts +51 -0
- package/dist/types/protocol-config.d.ts.map +1 -1
- package/dist/types/protocol-config.js +46 -0
- package/dist/types/protocol-config.js.map +1 -1
- package/docs/ASSURANCE.md +10 -6
- package/docs/CLIENT_COMPOSITION.md +23 -69
- package/docs/DEVIATIONS.md +77 -41
- package/docs/E2EE.md +71 -6
- package/docs/GETTING_STARTED.md +1 -1
- package/docs/PACKAGE_SURFACE.md +6 -0
- package/docs/RECIPES.md +1 -1
- package/docs/SECURITY.md +8 -0
- package/groups/README.md +16 -5
- package/local/store/expo/README.md +10 -1
- package/local/store/node/README.md +10 -1
- package/package.json +20 -4
- package/remote/relay/convex/README.md +6 -0
- package/remote/relay/convex/component/README.md +428 -0
- package/scripts/oe-groups.mjs +162 -0
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/access-control.d.ts +0 -108
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/access-control.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/access-control.js +0 -191
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/access-control.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/change-actions.d.ts +0 -40
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/change-actions.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/change-actions.js +0 -363
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/change-actions.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/encrypted-state.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/encrypted-state.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/index.d.ts +0 -19
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/index.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/index.js +0 -11
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/index.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/invite-link.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/invite-link.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/manager.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/manager.js +0 -1095
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/manager.js.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/types.d.ts.map +0 -1
- package/dist/internal/groups-v2/types.js.map +0 -1
- package/docs/api/README.md +0 -471
- package/docs/api/classes/EncryptionError.md +0 -112
- package/docs/api/classes/EndorsementManager.md +0 -307
- package/docs/api/classes/SealedSenderAuthError.md +0 -127
- package/docs/api/classes/ServerDerivedKeyPair.md +0 -68
- package/docs/api/classes/ServerDerivedPublicKey.md +0 -33
- package/docs/api/classes/ServerRootKeyPair.md +0 -94
- package/docs/api/classes/ServerRootPublicKey.md +0 -72
- package/docs/api/classes/SignalProtocolBlockingManager.md +0 -106
- package/docs/api/classes/SignalProtocolClient.md +0 -2654
- package/docs/api/classes/VerificationFailure.md +0 -25
- package/docs/api/enumerations/ContentHint.md +0 -63
- package/docs/api/enumerations/EncryptionErrorCode.md +0 -488
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- package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/type-aliases/CompareResult.md +0 -21
- package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/variables/DEFAULT_VERIFY_LINK_CONFIG.md +0 -12
- package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/variables/FINGERPRINT_ITERATIONS.md +0 -12
- package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/variables/FINGERPRINT_VERSION.md +0 -12
- package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/variables/VERIFY_BASE_URL.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/variables/VERIFY_SCHEME_URL.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/Base64.md +0 -20
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/BraidPolicy.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/Bytes.md +0 -20
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/Ciphertext.md +0 -21
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/DeviceType.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/DownloadedAttachment.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/GroupId.md +0 -27
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/Hex.md +0 -20
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/HookName.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/PostQuantumPolicy.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/PreparedAttachmentUpload.md +0 -14
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/PrivateKey.md +0 -22
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/ProgressCallback.md +0 -45
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/PublicKey.md +0 -22
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectCompleteUploadRequest.md +0 -19
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectDeleteRequest.md +0 -19
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectDownloadRequest.md +0 -19
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectUploadRequest.md +0 -42
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/SCKAMode.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/SealedSenderAuth.md +0 -15
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaCleanupInput.md +0 -9
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaCleanupResult.md +0 -9
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaDownloadInput.md +0 -9
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaDownloadResult.md +0 -9
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaOperationResult.md +0 -9
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaUploadInput.md +0 -9
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaUploadResult.md +0 -9
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/Signature.md +0 -21
- package/docs/api/type-aliases/Unsubscribe.md +0 -15
- package/docs/api/variables/BraidPolicy.md +0 -21
- package/docs/api/variables/DEFAULT_DEVICE_ID.md +0 -12
- package/docs/api/variables/DOUBLE_RATCHET_SPEC.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/GROUP_V2_PREFIX.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/KEY_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS_DEFAULT.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/MAX_MESSAGE_KEYS.md +0 -14
- package/docs/api/variables/MAX_PREKEY_AGE_MS_DEFAULT.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/MAX_RECEIVER_CHAINS.md +0 -14
- package/docs/api/variables/MAX_REGISTRATION_ID.md +0 -16
- package/docs/api/variables/MAX_SKIP.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/MESSAGE_FORMAT.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/MIN_REGISTRATION_ID.md +0 -16
- package/docs/api/variables/ML_KEM_BRAID_SPEC.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/ONE_TIME_PREKEY_BATCH_SIZE.md +0 -21
- package/docs/api/variables/PQXDH_SPEC.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/PostQuantumPolicy.md +0 -21
- package/docs/api/variables/SENDER_KEY_FORMAT.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/SENDER_KEY_SPEC.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/SESAME_SPEC.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/SESSION_FORMAT.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/SPQR_LIMITS_DEFAULTS.md +0 -11
- package/docs/api/variables/X3DH_SPEC.md +0 -9
- package/docs/api/variables/defaultSignalProtocolLogger.md +0 -32
- /package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/invite-link.d.ts +0 -0
- /package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/invite-link.js +0 -0
package/CHANGELOG.md
CHANGED
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@@ -1,5 +1,878 @@
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# Changelog
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## 0.1.0-alpha.8
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- **An internal pricing exploration is no longer published, and business
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planning is now structurally unexportable.** `docs/pricing-preview.html` —
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an internal pricing and revenue exploration — was allowlisted into the
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public export in `0.1.0-alpha.5`. Nothing linked to it and it was never in
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the npm package, but it had no business being public. It is removed from
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the allowlist, and the release policy now refuses any file whose name
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matches pricing, revenue, or business-model patterns, so re-adding one
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becomes a deliberate policy edit instead of a one-line allowlist change.
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14
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- **The assurance figures are now a build product.** The figures table in
|
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`docs/ASSURANCE.md` was hand-maintained and had gone stale across two
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releases. `npm run assurance:update` regenerates it from a real run and
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refuses to write figures from a failing run; `release:verify` refuses to
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cut an export when the figures are more than three days old. The README no
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longer duplicates the numbers — it points at the one generated table.
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- **README: the product speaks before the disclaimer.** The Signal
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non-affiliation paragraph moved below the benefit bullets (still above the
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fold); the nav line gains `open-e2ee.dev` and `docs.open-e2ee.dev`, which
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the README previously never linked; the hard-coded patch version — four
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releases stale at time of fix — is replaced by the `0.1.0-alpha` maturity
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line, with the npm badge carrying the exact version; the weekly-downloads
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badge, which renders a near-zero number for a days-old package, is
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replaced by a native-modules count that states a real differentiator.
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- **`COMMERCIAL.md` answers the highest-intent click.** Commercial licensing
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previously dead-ended at an email address. The new file states who needs a
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commercial license, what it changes and does not change, the public tiers,
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and how buying works. Shipped in the npm package too.
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- **A contribution surface that tells the truth about the export model.**
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`CONTRIBUTING.md` explains that `main` is generated, why PRs are ported
|
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rather than merged, and that issues are triaged in public;
|
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`CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, issue templates (with a security-reporting
|
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off-ramp), and a PR template complete the set.
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- **Vulnerability reporting: private GitHub reporting and a safe harbor.**
|
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`SECURITY.md` now offers GitHub private vulnerability reporting alongside
|
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43
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email, and commits to a good-faith safe harbor for security research.
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+
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- **`docs/E2EE.md` grew from a summary into the architecture explainer its
|
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README billing promises** — server-becomes-relay, device as source of
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47
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truth, identity as device keys, recovery as a product decision, metadata
|
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48
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+
visibility, and the new failure modes, each linking to the doc that goes
|
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deeper. Its "ML-KEM (Kyber)" phrasing is corrected to "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)",
|
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+
matching the distinction this changelog drew in `0.1.0-alpha.6`.
|
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+
|
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- **The npm package no longer ships 1.8 MB of generated API reference.**
|
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`docs/api` (391 generated files) stays in the repository for browsing but
|
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leaves the tarball; installs should not pay for reference docs that are
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regenerable and hosted.
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+
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- **Supply-chain hardening.** Every workflow action is pinned to a commit
|
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SHA; dependabot watches npm production dependencies and workflow actions
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weekly; CodeQL runs the security-extended queries on every push, PR, and
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weekly schedule.
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- **The composition guide leads with the shipped API.** The "Target
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Composition" section — `deviceStorage`, `createExpoDeviceStorage`,
|
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`signal.messages.subscribe`, none of which exist in the package — sat above
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the real API at the top of `docs/CLIENT_COMPOSITION.md`, which is exactly
|
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the position that gets copy-pasted. It moved to the bottom under "Future
|
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Direction (Not Shipped)" behind an explicit these-imports-fail warning.
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- **The Node store README no longer claims an interface the adapter does not
|
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implement.** `NodeSignalProtocolStore` covers the core single-device
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surface but not the Sesame device-record, sender-key, or message-record
|
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portions of `ISignalProtocolLocalStore` — and it has no `implements`
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clause, so the compiler was never checking the README's claim. The README
|
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now states the real coverage and points multi-device and group users at
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the interface docs. Completing the adapter is tracked work; documenting
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the boundary honestly could not wait for it.
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- **BREAKING: the group change log is for members; pending principals catch
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up by snapshot.** The change log authorizes at the snapshot at
|
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`fromVersion`, and a pending-profile-key entry appears in that roster, so
|
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an invitee could walk the log forward from their invitation — reading, for
|
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the whole invitation-to-acceptance window, a narration `getGroup` refuses
|
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them by name, including who made each change. The server now requires the
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requester to be a *member* of the authorizing snapshot (rejecting with the
|
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distinct reason `not_a_member`), which closes the log to invitees outright
|
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and, for members, states the tenure bound that the roster check previously
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provided by accident.
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Pending principals do not lose their catch-up path — they lose the log as
|
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the mechanism. A pending client now advances by fetching the current state
|
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as a fresh signed baseline, verified and installed whole, which is also
|
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how the reference ecosystem's clients behave whenever the server does not
|
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recognize them as a member. Acceptance is unaffected: it was always
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submitted against the current state, which is exactly what the snapshot
|
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provides. The specification records this as S10a, with the C1/C3 span
|
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rules restated to make explicit what was previously implicit: a pending
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view is a provisional baseline, not a span with living continuity, and a
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member's span begins at the verified transition or baseline that makes
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them a member.
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One behavioral consequence: an invitee whose invitation is withdrawn no
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longer receives the deletion as a signed change (the log that carried it
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is closed to them). The next catch-up finds the current state refused and
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surfaces `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED`, mutating nothing — the cached pending
|
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view remains the last verified state, and a later re-invitation serves a
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fresh baseline. Members are untouched: removal and ban still arrive as
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verified transitions through the log, never as refusals.
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|
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- **A full 256 KiB multi-recipient payload is accepted, as advertised.** The
|
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content ceilings are enforced on the base64 columns as string-length
|
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limits, and the multi-recipient limit was computed as `ceil((n / 3) * 4)`
|
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+
instead of `4 * ceil(n / 3)` — two characters short of what 256 KiB
|
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actually encodes to, since 262144 is not a multiple of 3. A payload at
|
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exactly the advertised ceiling was refused with a 413. The single-recipient
|
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limit was computed the same way but 96 KiB divides by 3, so only the
|
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multi-recipient bound was wrong.
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|
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- **A FORBIDDEN group read now says which question it answers, and only a
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membership refusal reads as revocation.** Two different rejections share
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the 403 `FORBIDDEN` code on the group read paths: "you may not read this
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group at all" (banned, or absent from the authorizing roster) and "you may
|
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not read this version of it" (the join-version floor added in the
|
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removal-revocation work). They differed only in message text, and the
|
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client treated any `FORBIDDEN` on a pinned baseline read as
|
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`GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED` — so a floor rejection, raised while the membership
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itself was fine, would have been reported to the application as a revoked
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membership. The rejections now carry a machine-readable `reason`
|
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(`not_readable` / `before_join`) alongside the code, the client interprets
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only `not_readable` as revocation and propagates everything else, and the
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conformance tests assert on the reason rather than on message wording.
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- **A multi-recipient send may name each device only once, and retry
|
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requests are rate limited.** The multi-recipient path is deliberately
|
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exempt from the per-recipient inbound-bytes budget, matching the
|
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reference, because a group-send token is supposed to price it. That
|
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exemption assumes one call fans out to *distinct* devices. The reference
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gets that from its wire format, which parses recipients into a map keyed
|
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by service ID, so duplicates collapse before the handler ever sees them;
|
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our flat array does not, so one endorsed device repeated a thousand times
|
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in a single call stored a thousand copies of the ciphertext against an
|
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141
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unmetered budget. The handler now rejects a repeated `(userId, deviceId)`
|
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with a 400 rather than collapsing it, since a repeat is a client bug and
|
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quietly picking between two conflicting key blocks would bury it.
|
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144
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+
|
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145
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`sendRetryRequest` was unmetered too, and nothing else on that path bounds
|
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it: a retry request carries no caller-supplied content to charge by size,
|
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and it names an original sender the caller never has to have talked to, so
|
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there is no relationship to check either. It is now counted per requester
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against a token bucket sized for the legitimate case — a client returning
|
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150
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from a broken session asks for one per message it could not decrypt — and
|
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refuses only a caller that keeps asking indefinitely.
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+
|
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153
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- **BREAKING: group-send tokens are verified before any account is read, and
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sealed sends carry the recipient identities they claim.** A group-send
|
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token is a signature over ACIs, but sealed sends name recipients by user
|
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ID, so the relay resolved every named recipient to its stored ACI — up to
|
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157
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one indexed read per recipient, a thousand on the multi-recipient path —
|
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*before* it could check the token. An anonymous caller holding a garbage
|
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token could bill that work to the deployment on every call, on the one
|
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path that is deliberately exempt from the per-recipient send budget
|
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because the token is supposed to be the gate.
|
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The order is now the reference implementation's, where sealed payloads
|
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name recipients by service ID and the token is checked against the request
|
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before any account is touched: the caller supplies the ACI it claims for
|
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each recipient, the entire cryptographic check runs against those claims
|
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first, and only then is each claim bound to the recipient's stored
|
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account. A caller who lies about a binding has necessarily already
|
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169
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presented a token our own group server issued over the claimed set, so
|
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the reads it spends were an authenticated member's to spend.
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|
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The claims ride the existing plumbing: the endorsement cache now stores,
|
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next to each member's endorsement, the ACI it was issued over — the
|
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174
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identity that is *correct* to claim, as opposed to whatever a later lookup
|
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175
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would resolve — and the send paths pass them through. This changes the
|
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176
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app-owned `EndorsementCacheStore` interface (entries are now
|
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177
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`{ endorsement, aciBytes }` records rather than raw bytes) and adds
|
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`targetAciBytes` / per-recipient `aciBytes` arguments to the sealed send
|
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179
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mutations, required when authorizing by group-send token.
|
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180
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+
|
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181
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- **One ACI, one account.** Nothing stopped two user IDs from registering
|
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the same ACI: `identify` is host-owned and unvalidated, and the second
|
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183
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account to claim an ACI would inherit every authorization decision made
|
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about the first — sealed-sender access, group-send endorsements, identity
|
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binding. The `accounts` table now has an `aciBytes` index and
|
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`rememberAccount` refuses a claim on an ACI already registered to a
|
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different user ID with a 409 `CONFLICT`. A deployment that already holds
|
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duplicate-ACI rows keeps working — the check reads one claimant and the
|
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duplicate surfaces as the intended 409 rather than an untyped error — but
|
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190
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+
which of the two accounts is refused depends on index order, so resolve
|
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such rows deliberately before deploying.
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+
|
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193
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+
- **Removal and ban now revoke historical group-state reads.** `getGroup` with
|
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194
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an explicit version authorized the requester against the roster of the
|
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195
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*requested* snapshot, so anyone removed or banned at version N could keep
|
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fetching every snapshot of their former tenure indefinitely — a removal that
|
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does not revoke read access is not a removal. The server now authorizes
|
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every full-state read against the group as it is *now*, and adds the floor
|
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that snapshot-based authorization used to provide by accident: a member may
|
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200
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not read state from before the version they joined at, so membership grants
|
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the group from when you joined, not its history.
|
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202
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+
|
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203
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The change log deliberately keeps snapshot-at-`fromVersion` authorization,
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as the group specification already required: the walk serves entries only
|
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205
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while the requester stays readable and stops at — and includes — the change
|
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that removed them, which is how a polling member learns of their removal.
|
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207
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+
Authorizing the log at the current state would 403 them into silence. What
|
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this leaves reachable to a former member is bounded and not new: changes
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from within their own tenure, ending at their removal — bytes they were
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served while entitled.
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+
|
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212
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One client-visible consequence: a join that is accepted and then revoked
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before the joiner reads its baseline snapshot — an admin removing them in
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the race window — now fails with `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED` instead of
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reporting a membership the client could never verify or use. Nothing is
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installed locally, and the principal becomes the ordinary re-entitlement
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case: a later re-add serves a fresh signed baseline.
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218
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+
|
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An invitation grants the current state and nothing else. A
|
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pending-profile-key entry entitles its holder to read the group as it is —
|
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221
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acceptance needs that — but it is not a tenure, and its wire format pins
|
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222
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+
`joinedAtVersion` to zero, so deriving a history floor from it would read
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as "joined at the beginning of time". An invitee who never accepts holds
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the group master key, so every snapshot the server serves them decrypts;
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versioned reads are therefore refused outright for pending principals.
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+
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This bounds `getGroup` only. The change log authorizes against the
|
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snapshot at `fromVersion`, and a pending-profile-key entry appears in that
|
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+
roster, so an invitee can still walk the log forward from their
|
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invitation — a window during which they could already fetch the current
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state at will, though the log additionally names who made each change.
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Flooring the log would deny a pending member the entries they need to
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reach the state their acceptance is submitted against, so closing that
|
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window means changing how pending members catch up, not adding a check.
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- **The relay's send paths are bounded: per-recipient inbound budget, a
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content-size ceiling, and a device-existence check on sealed sends.** None
|
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of the component's send paths was rate limited or size limited, so one
|
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caller — anonymous on the sealed path, any authenticated account on the
|
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identified one — could grow a victim's message queue without bound for the
|
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full seven-day retention window. Three bounds close this, each matching the
|
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reference implementation's shape: message content is capped at 96 KiB for a
|
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single-recipient envelope and 256 KiB for the shared multi-recipient
|
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payload; single-recipient sends spend from a per-*recipient* byte budget
|
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(4 MiB burst, 1 MiB/minute sustained) — keyed by the target because a
|
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sealed sender is anonymous by design, so a per-sender limit on that path is
|
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either meaningless or a hole; and `sendUnidentified` now refuses a target
|
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device that does not exist, the check its multi-recipient sibling always
|
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had. The multi-recipient path is deliberately not metered, also matching
|
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the reference: the group-send token already prices it, and a per-recipient
|
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budget there would let one noisy group partially starve delivery to its
|
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quietest member.
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The shared bucket is bounded from the sender side too. Keying by target is
|
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forced on the sealed path — the sender is anonymous by design — but on the
|
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identified path the sender is known, and a single authenticated account
|
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must not be able to drain a victim's whole budget and starve every other
|
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sender: identified sends also spend a per-(sender, recipient) sub-limit of
|
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|
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a quarter of the shared bucket. Neither bucket can be spent by a request
|
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that goes on to fail: the charges are written in the mutation's own
|
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transaction, so a send that 410s on the stale-device check — or trips the
|
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|
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other limit — rolls its charge back with everything else.
|
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+
|
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- **The `STALE_DEVICE` error no longer discloses the recipient's current
|
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registration ID.** The 410 thrown when a sender's view of a device is stale
|
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echoed back `currentRegistrationId` — the live value — to any
|
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|
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account-authenticated caller, with no rate limit. That is the same read the
|
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|
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prekey-bundle fetch serves, minus its rate limiter: a free oracle for
|
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watching registration-ID changes (device reinstalls) on arbitrary devices.
|
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The error now names the stale device and nothing else, which is the
|
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reference implementation's 410 body; the sender's recovery path is
|
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unchanged, since recovering means re-fetching the bundle anyway.
|
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|
+
|
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|
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- **BREAKING: no group identifier travels on a message envelope any more.**
|
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|
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Every relayed message carried a plaintext `groupId` alongside its target, and
|
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|
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the relay stored it on each `messages` row for the seven-day retention
|
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+
window. Grouping those rows by that column yielded the set of accounts that
|
|
278
|
+
received traffic for a group, so a relay operator could reconstruct rosters
|
|
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|
+
without breaking any encryption. The column is gone, and so are the `groupId`
|
|
280
|
+
arguments on `messages.send`, `sendUnidentified`, and
|
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|
+
`sendMultiRecipientUnidentified`, and the field on the envelopes those
|
|
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|
+
functions return.
|
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283
|
+
|
|
284
|
+
What replaces it is a message type. A group message is now typed
|
|
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|
+
`sender_key`, which tells the receiver to decrypt the payload as a framed
|
|
286
|
+
SenderKeyMessage — and nothing else. The receiver reads the frame's
|
|
287
|
+
distribution identifier, which is opaque, and resolves the group against its
|
|
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|
+
own sender key store. The envelope says how to decrypt, never which group.
|
|
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|
+
This also removes a small trust problem: the receiver no longer selects a
|
|
290
|
+
sender key using a group id the sender asserted.
|
|
291
|
+
|
|
292
|
+
This closes the group's *name*, not the group *partition*. The distribution
|
|
293
|
+
identifier is unencrypted and stable for the life of a sender key, one send
|
|
294
|
+
produces byte-identical ciphertext on every recipient's row, and the
|
|
295
|
+
multi-recipient sealed path hands the relay a roster. A relay can still
|
|
296
|
+
partition delivery pairs into unlabeled groups; it can no longer put a
|
|
297
|
+
meaningful, cross-send label on one. The component README states the
|
|
298
|
+
remaining channels explicitly.
|
|
299
|
+
|
|
300
|
+
Sealed sender needed its own channel for this, because the outer envelope of
|
|
301
|
+
a sealed message is always `unidentified_sender` and cannot carry an inner
|
|
302
|
+
type. Sealed envelopes now begin with a content-type byte inside the seal,
|
|
303
|
+
matching the `Type` enum of the reference implementation's
|
|
304
|
+
`UnidentifiedSenderMessage.Message` (`PREKEY_MESSAGE`, `MESSAGE`,
|
|
305
|
+
`SENDERKEY_MESSAGE`, `PLAINTEXT_CONTENT`), and `SealOptions.groupId` —
|
|
306
|
+
encrypted, never populated by the send path — is removed in favour of
|
|
307
|
+
`contentType`. This is a wire-format change to sealed sender for both V1 and
|
|
308
|
+
V2.
|
|
309
|
+
|
|
310
|
+
Deploying this against an existing Convex deployment needs a manual step:
|
|
311
|
+
Convex validates stored documents against the new schema during the push,
|
|
312
|
+
before any of your code runs, so a `messages` row still carrying a `groupId`
|
|
313
|
+
fails the deploy and no migration can run ahead of it. Clear the `messages`
|
|
314
|
+
table — or stop sending and let the seven-day retention window drain it —
|
|
315
|
+
before deploying. Messages are transient and clients re-request undelivered
|
|
316
|
+
ones. See "Upgrading" in the component README.
|
|
317
|
+
|
|
318
|
+
- **Fixed: on React Native, one member's sender key could permanently break
|
|
319
|
+
another's group messages.** The store indexes sender keys by the frame's
|
|
320
|
+
distribution identifier so a receiver can resolve a group without being told
|
|
321
|
+
which one. Every other adapter scopes that index by sender; the React Native
|
|
322
|
+
adapter keyed a flat pointer on the identifier alone, so a second sender
|
|
323
|
+
presenting the same identifier overwrote the first, and the displaced
|
|
324
|
+
sender's group messages failed to decrypt until it rotated. Distribution
|
|
325
|
+
identifiers are chosen by their sender and travel in the clear, so this was
|
|
326
|
+
reachable by any account sharing a group with the victim. The pointer key is
|
|
327
|
+
now scoped by sender and device.
|
|
328
|
+
|
|
329
|
+
- **Fixed: on React Native, a host that issues colon-scoped user IDs could not
|
|
330
|
+
receive group messages at all.** The adapter joins composite storage keys on
|
|
331
|
+
`:` and split the sender key record key from the right, which silently
|
|
332
|
+
mis-assigns the components when a user ID contains a `:` of its own — and
|
|
333
|
+
nothing constrains user IDs, since they come from the host application's
|
|
334
|
+
identify hook, where a tenant- or issuer-scoped subject is ordinary. Every
|
|
335
|
+
group message resolved to nothing on such a deployment, deterministically and
|
|
336
|
+
permanently. The same join made a group ID a prefix of `<groupId>:<sub>`, so
|
|
337
|
+
deleting a group's sender keys also swept any group whose ID extended it.
|
|
338
|
+
|
|
339
|
+
Key components are now percent-escaped before they are joined, so no
|
|
340
|
+
identifier can carry a separator into a key or a scan prefix. This also
|
|
341
|
+
retires the residue left by the sender-scoping fix above, which had only
|
|
342
|
+
pushed the collision behind the same assumption.
|
|
343
|
+
|
|
344
|
+
Sender key records and pointers are unaffected on upgrade for a deployment
|
|
345
|
+
whose IDs contain neither `:` nor `%`, because such values escape to
|
|
346
|
+
themselves; only the values that were already broken move. Retry records are
|
|
347
|
+
different, and do move for everyone: their key is scanned by session ID, and
|
|
348
|
+
a session ID is `<userId>:<deviceId>`, so it always carries a separator. That
|
|
349
|
+
separator was load-bearing in the same way — a session ID of `alice:1` has
|
|
350
|
+
scan prefix `alice:1:`, which also matches the records of user `alice:1` on
|
|
351
|
+
device 2 — so the escaping applies there too.
|
|
352
|
+
|
|
353
|
+
The cost is that retry records written before the upgrade are not reachable
|
|
354
|
+
by session ID afterwards, so a retry request for a message sent before the
|
|
355
|
+
upgrade cannot be served and the sender's peer re-requests or gives up. They
|
|
356
|
+
are not leaked: the expiry sweep and the clear-all path scan the whole record
|
|
357
|
+
prefix and filter on the stored timestamp, so they are reaped on the normal
|
|
358
|
+
retention schedule regardless of key format.
|
|
359
|
+
|
|
360
|
+
- **BREAKING: the `plaintext_content` envelope type is removed.** It was in the
|
|
361
|
+
relay's message-type union and the client's accepted list, but no send path
|
|
362
|
+
ever produced one and neither decrypt path handled one — an envelope carrying
|
|
363
|
+
it fell through to the pairwise ratchet and failed there. The reference uses
|
|
364
|
+
the corresponding sealed content type to carry a decryption-error receipt
|
|
365
|
+
when no session exists; this SDK delivers those over a dedicated relay
|
|
366
|
+
channel instead, so the type has no role here. The sealed-sender parser now
|
|
367
|
+
rejects the content-type byte outright rather than mapping it to an envelope
|
|
368
|
+
type with no handler. `docs/DEVIATIONS.md` §6.2 records the difference.
|
|
369
|
+
|
|
370
|
+
The literal is also gone from the relay's stored `messageType` union, so it
|
|
371
|
+
carries the same deploy-time hazard as the `groupId` removal above: a stored
|
|
372
|
+
row whose `messageType` is `plaintext_content` fails Convex schema validation
|
|
373
|
+
during the push. Clearing the `messages` table handles both at once.
|
|
374
|
+
|
|
375
|
+
- **Sealed sender reads its content-type enum through a static import.** Four
|
|
376
|
+
call sites in `client/sealed-sender-ops.ts` and
|
|
377
|
+
`client/signal-service-cipher.ts` reached for
|
|
378
|
+
`internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types` with `await import(...)` on every
|
|
379
|
+
seal and unseal, to read `SealedSenderContentType` and the V2 version bytes.
|
|
380
|
+
Two of them were already redundant with a static import of the same module at
|
|
381
|
+
the top of the same file, and `client/client.ts` had none. This is a
|
|
382
|
+
consistency and readability change, not a bug fix: the module has runtime
|
|
383
|
+
exports, so a resolved dynamic import always carries the enum.
|
|
384
|
+
|
|
385
|
+
- **Sealed sender envelope parsing is now canonical and validated.** Both the
|
|
386
|
+
V1 and V2 inner-envelope parsers accepted a payload with trailing bytes, an
|
|
387
|
+
unrecognised content-type byte, a truncated varint, or a missing content
|
|
388
|
+
hint. Parsing runs after authentication, so none of these was reachable by an
|
|
389
|
+
attacker, but two distinct byte strings could parse to identical content and
|
|
390
|
+
an unknown content type fell through to a routing default. The parsers now
|
|
391
|
+
reject all four, and the content hint is a required field rather than an
|
|
392
|
+
optional one.
|
|
393
|
+
|
|
394
|
+
- **`maxSenderKeyAge` is bounded at 90 days.** The age-based rotation policy
|
|
395
|
+
already expired locally generated sender keys after a configurable interval,
|
|
396
|
+
defaulting to the 14 days the reference implementation uses, and the group
|
|
397
|
+
send path caught that expiry to rotate and redistribute before retrying. The
|
|
398
|
+
interval itself was unbounded, so a host could configure an age no key would
|
|
399
|
+
reach and switch rotation off without saying so. It is now clamped to 90
|
|
400
|
+
days, the same ceiling the reference applies to its own remotely configured
|
|
401
|
+
value — the difference being that this value comes from the host application
|
|
402
|
+
rather than from the SDK, which is what makes the clamp load-bearing rather
|
|
403
|
+
than belt-and-braces. A sender key is the group material no ratchet
|
|
404
|
+
refreshes, so a member who holds it can read everything sent under it until
|
|
405
|
+
it rotates; membership changes normally force that sooner, and the age bound
|
|
406
|
+
is what covers a group whose membership never changes. A configured value
|
|
407
|
+
that is not a positive finite number now falls back to the default instead of
|
|
408
|
+
being used, since such a value states no policy at all and a zero is far more
|
|
409
|
+
often an unset field than a request to rotate constantly. Both the clamp and
|
|
410
|
+
the fallback log a warning.
|
|
411
|
+
|
|
412
|
+
- **`maxSenderKeyAge` is also bounded below, at one hour.** The interval had no
|
|
413
|
+
lower bound, and one that is too short fails in a way that is worse than not
|
|
414
|
+
rotating: expiry is enforced on the send path, which answers it by rotating
|
|
415
|
+
the key and fanning a distribution message out to every other member over
|
|
416
|
+
sequential network calls, then retrying the encrypt — against the age of the
|
|
417
|
+
key it just created. Configure an interval shorter than that fan-out takes
|
|
418
|
+
and the retry finds the new key expired too, so every group send fails
|
|
419
|
+
permanently, having burned a rotation and a message to every member on each
|
|
420
|
+
attempt. Since the field is milliseconds, a host that means fourteen days and
|
|
421
|
+
passes `14` reaches this, and it does so without ever sending a message that
|
|
422
|
+
would reveal the mistake in testing.
|
|
423
|
+
|
|
424
|
+
Values below the floor are raised to it with a warning rather than rejected.
|
|
425
|
+
Unlike the ceiling this is not a security bound — rotating sooner is strictly
|
|
426
|
+
safer — so the honest reading of an unreachably short interval is "rotate as
|
|
427
|
+
often as this implementation can actually deliver", which is what a host that
|
|
428
|
+
wants aggressive rotation was asking for. An hour clears the worst realistic
|
|
429
|
+
fan-out by a wide margin while leaving deliberately aggressive policies
|
|
430
|
+
intact, which a bound measured in days would not. `SENDER_KEY_AGE_FLOOR` is
|
|
431
|
+
exported alongside `SENDER_KEY_AGE_CEILING`.
|
|
432
|
+
|
|
433
|
+
Note what the clamp leaves you with if you hit it by mistake: a host that
|
|
434
|
+
passes `14` meaning days now rotates hourly, which is a distribution message
|
|
435
|
+
to every member of every group every hour. That is functional but not free,
|
|
436
|
+
and the warning is how you find out it is happening — which is the argument
|
|
437
|
+
for clamping rather than rejecting, since the alternative was group messaging
|
|
438
|
+
that simply did not work.
|
|
439
|
+
|
|
440
|
+
Separately, the expiry check no longer skips a locally generated key whose
|
|
441
|
+
stored creation time is missing or non-positive. Such a key is the one whose
|
|
442
|
+
life is genuinely unbounded, so waiving the age check on it exempted exactly
|
|
443
|
+
the case the check exists for; it is now treated as expired, which the send
|
|
444
|
+
path answers by rotating to a key whose age is known.
|
|
445
|
+
|
|
446
|
+
- **Sender key identifiers are now opaque random UUIDs, closing a group
|
|
447
|
+
metadata leak.** A sender key's id was built as
|
|
448
|
+
`groupId:userId:deviceId:timestamp`, and that id travels the wire as the
|
|
449
|
+
SenderKeyMessage `distribution_uuid` — a field outside the ciphertext that
|
|
450
|
+
every relay on the delivery path reads off each group message. Sealed sender
|
|
451
|
+
does not cover this: it conceals the frame from the relay but not from the
|
|
452
|
+
rest of the path, and a deployment may have it disabled. A passive observer
|
|
453
|
+
could therefore reconstruct group rosters by grouping messages on a field it
|
|
454
|
+
cannot be prevented from reading. Ids are now random UUIDv4s carrying no
|
|
455
|
+
group, sender, device, or clock, matching the reference implementation's
|
|
456
|
+
random distribution UUID. The sender-keys specification states the
|
|
457
|
+
requirement in a new section on identifier opacity. This also fixes a
|
|
458
|
+
rotation bug: receivers detect a rotation by
|
|
459
|
+
comparing the incoming id against their stored state, so two rotations inside
|
|
460
|
+
the same millisecond produced an identical id and the second went unnoticed —
|
|
461
|
+
the rotation tests previously needed a `Date.now()` mock advancing a
|
|
462
|
+
millisecond per call to stay green, and now run against the real clock.
|
|
463
|
+
- **BREAKING: the Expo store now keeps sender keys on the device instead of
|
|
464
|
+
sending them to a remote store.** Every sender-key and skipped-key operation
|
|
465
|
+
was proxied to an optional `ISignalProtocolRemoteSenderStateStore`, which
|
|
466
|
+
took the chain key and the sender's private signature key as parameters and
|
|
467
|
+
wrote them to whatever backend the application supplied. Those two values
|
|
468
|
+
together are enough to read every message on a sender's group chain and to
|
|
469
|
+
forge new ones, so a server holding them would nullify group message
|
|
470
|
+
confidentiality and authenticity; the skipped-key methods handed over the
|
|
471
|
+
message keys themselves. The reference implementation keeps its sender key
|
|
472
|
+
store local for exactly this reason. No shipped relay implemented the
|
|
473
|
+
interface, so in practice these calls threw and Expo group messaging did not
|
|
474
|
+
work at all — the fix is a real local implementation, not a guard.
|
|
475
|
+
|
|
476
|
+
Sender key records and skipped message keys now live in the Expo store's own
|
|
477
|
+
SQLCipher-encrypted database. The `sender_keys` table holds each record as
|
|
478
|
+
one row so a rotation's current and previous states can never be written
|
|
479
|
+
apart, and its `distribution_id` column is renamed `group_id` to match what
|
|
480
|
+
it has always contained. A new `skipped_sender_keys` table replaces the
|
|
481
|
+
remote skipped-key calls and bounds itself by evicting the lowest chain
|
|
482
|
+
indexes first.
|
|
483
|
+
|
|
484
|
+
`ISignalProtocolRemoteSenderStateStore` is removed, along with the `relay`
|
|
485
|
+
option on `expoStore()` and the corresponding `ExpoSignalProtocolStore`
|
|
486
|
+
constructor parameter. `expoStore({ relay })` becomes `expoStore()`. The
|
|
487
|
+
`sender_keys` schema change is not migrated: applications own Expo database
|
|
488
|
+
migrations, and any existing rows hold state that should not have left the
|
|
489
|
+
device.
|
|
490
|
+
- **Device teardown no longer orphans key material, and the provisioning cron
|
|
491
|
+
no longer risks stalling.** `purgeDeviceStorage` deleted at most 4096 rows
|
|
492
|
+
per prekey table in a single transaction and stopped there. A device's
|
|
493
|
+
one-time prekeys have no ceiling — the component marks a consumed prekey
|
|
494
|
+
rather than deleting it, and no cron reclaims consumed rows — so a
|
|
495
|
+
long-lived device could exceed that and leave the remainder behind, keyed to
|
|
496
|
+
a deviceId a later link reuses. Teardown now deletes a fixed budget and
|
|
497
|
+
schedules a continuation until nothing remains. The device's identity
|
|
498
|
+
registration is always deleted in the first pass and `fetchPreKeyBundle`
|
|
499
|
+
gates on that row, so the device is unreachable the moment teardown returns
|
|
500
|
+
even while the sweep continues. Separately, the provisioning cleanup cron
|
|
501
|
+
swept 100 sessions per transaction while each `linked_pending_ack` row
|
|
502
|
+
cascades into a full device teardown; a cron that exceeds Convex's
|
|
503
|
+
per-mutation limits does not degrade, it stalls, and expired sessions then
|
|
504
|
+
stop being reaped at all. That sweep now uses a batch of 10 and relies on
|
|
505
|
+
its existing self-reschedule for throughput.
|
|
506
|
+
- **Provisioning teardown now identifies the device it linked by an opaque
|
|
507
|
+
token rather than a millisecond timestamp.** Device rows are reused across
|
|
508
|
+
registrations, so rollback matched the device's `linkedAt` stamp to avoid
|
|
509
|
+
reaping a device the user had legitimately re-registered into the freed
|
|
510
|
+
slot. Two links landing in the same millisecond on the same slot produce
|
|
511
|
+
equal stamps, and teardown would then unlink the wrong — newer — device.
|
|
512
|
+
Every registration and link now mints a `linkToken`; it is never returned to
|
|
513
|
+
clients. A test that removes and re-registers without advancing the clock at
|
|
514
|
+
all fails against the old stamp comparison.
|
|
515
|
+
- **Removed five exported Convex row types that described tables no consumer
|
|
516
|
+
can read.** `ConvexIdentityKey`, `ConvexEcSignedPreKey`, `ConvexEcPreKey`,
|
|
517
|
+
`ConvexKemPreKey`, and `ConvexKemLastResortPreKey` were unreferenced and
|
|
518
|
+
every one of them disagreed with `component/schema.ts`: all five omitted the
|
|
519
|
+
`identityType` discriminator, `ConvexIdentityKey` claimed a `deviceId` and a
|
|
520
|
+
raw `publicKey` where the real table holds a per-account
|
|
521
|
+
`compositeIdentity`, and both one-time prekey types documented that keys are
|
|
522
|
+
"DELETED when consumed" when the component marks `consumedAt` and leaves the
|
|
523
|
+
row for the sweep. The premise was wrong to begin with — the component's
|
|
524
|
+
tables are isolated, so an application cannot obtain these rows under any
|
|
525
|
+
type. The file header claiming nine component tables, one of them a
|
|
526
|
+
`prekeyBundleFetches` table that no longer exists, is corrected. The
|
|
527
|
+
surviving `FetchedPreKeyBundle` is now derived from the component's own
|
|
528
|
+
return validator instead of hand-written, so it cannot drift again.
|
|
529
|
+
- **`ConvexSignalProtocolRelayApi` now carries real argument and return
|
|
530
|
+
types.** Its 43 function references were declared as bare
|
|
531
|
+
`FunctionReference<'mutation'>` / `<'query'>`, so every argument the relay
|
|
532
|
+
adapter passed to the component was `any` and a mismatch surfaced only as a
|
|
533
|
+
runtime validator rejection in the deployment. The type is now *derived*
|
|
534
|
+
from `defineConvexSignalProtocolBackend`'s return type via `ApiFromModules`
|
|
535
|
+
rather than restated by hand, which is what makes it meaningful — a
|
|
536
|
+
hand-written contract can drift from the functions it describes, and this
|
|
537
|
+
one had. The `getProvisioningMessage` return cast is removed as a
|
|
538
|
+
consequence: the reference now carries the component's own return
|
|
539
|
+
validator, so a component change that stops satisfying the interface fails
|
|
540
|
+
to compile instead of being cast away.
|
|
541
|
+
- **Fixed sealed-sender fallback detection**, which decided whether to retry a
|
|
542
|
+
failed sealed send on the identified path by testing whether the error
|
|
543
|
+
message contained the substring `'Unauthorized'`. That was wrong in both
|
|
544
|
+
directions: any unrelated failure whose message happened to contain the word
|
|
545
|
+
— a rate limit, an app-level wrapper — downgraded the send to identified
|
|
546
|
+
delivery and disclosed the sender to the relay, while a genuine
|
|
547
|
+
`code: 'UNAUTHORIZED'` rejection whose message did not spell the word went
|
|
548
|
+
undetected and surfaced as a hard send failure. Detection now reads the
|
|
549
|
+
structured `ConvexError` payload; the string contract is removed with no
|
|
550
|
+
fallback.
|
|
551
|
+
- **Rewrote `docs/SCHEMA.md`.** It described a 7-table schema the application
|
|
552
|
+
was instructed to define itself, with a multi-tenant `appId` column, index
|
|
553
|
+
names, a `deliveredAt` field, and a `sender_key_distribution` message type
|
|
554
|
+
that exist nowhere in the codebase, plus cleanup crons the component already
|
|
555
|
+
runs. The component owns all sixteen tables; the document now describes what
|
|
556
|
+
is stored, what the relay can and cannot see, and the real retention
|
|
557
|
+
behavior.
|
|
558
|
+
|
|
559
|
+
- **Sealed sender can now be enabled.** `oe-groups trust-root` exports the
|
|
560
|
+
Ed25519 sender-certificate root alongside the group trust root, printing both
|
|
561
|
+
labelled (`group trust root:` / `sealed sender trust root:`). Previously only
|
|
562
|
+
the group root was printed, so there was no supported way to obtain the value
|
|
563
|
+
clients pin in `sealedSender.trustRoots`; inbound sealed-sender validation
|
|
564
|
+
stayed disabled and every send fell back to identified delivery, disclosing
|
|
565
|
+
the sender to the relay. The derivation now lives in one shared module
|
|
566
|
+
(`internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root`) used by both the CLI and the
|
|
567
|
+
relay's certificate issuance, so the printed root cannot drift from the key
|
|
568
|
+
the deployment signs with, and a contract test pins the two as equal.
|
|
569
|
+
Corrects the `sealedSender` configuration docs, which required a
|
|
570
|
+
`SEALED_SENDER_SIGNING_KEY` environment variable that has never existed.
|
|
571
|
+
|
|
572
|
+
- **`getProvisioningMessage` now returns `expiresAt`**, the session's absolute
|
|
573
|
+
deadline in epoch milliseconds (`null` when the session is unknown). The
|
|
574
|
+
Convex component already returned it, but the relay interface did not declare
|
|
575
|
+
it and the adapter cast it away, so no client could compute expiry locally.
|
|
576
|
+
The mock relay was brought to parity at the same time: it models the
|
|
577
|
+
acknowledgment's own TTL window granted by `completeProvisioning` — without
|
|
578
|
+
which a link completed near the deadline strands a device the client has
|
|
579
|
+
already persisted keys for — rejects expired sessions in
|
|
580
|
+
`connectNewDevice`, `sendProvisioningMessage`, `completeProvisioning`, and
|
|
581
|
+
`acknowledgeProvisioning`, and reports expiry as a computed status instead of
|
|
582
|
+
writing `expired` from inside a read. The shared relay contract suite now
|
|
583
|
+
pins all three behaviors.
|
|
584
|
+
- **Security (Convex component):** the component now declares
|
|
585
|
+
`OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET` as a typed component environment variable and
|
|
586
|
+
reads it through the declared-environment accessor. Convex components are
|
|
587
|
+
isolated from app deployment environment variables, so the previous
|
|
588
|
+
`process.env` read was unreachable in any real `app.use()` install and
|
|
589
|
+
every group, credential-issuance, and sender-certificate call failed at
|
|
590
|
+
runtime; apps must forward the secret with
|
|
591
|
+
`app.use(signalProtocol, { env: { OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET: app.env.OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET } })`.
|
|
592
|
+
The test-only injection seam is now default-deny: it refuses configuration
|
|
593
|
+
outside a recognized test runner instead of allowing it whenever a
|
|
594
|
+
deployment marker is absent.
|
|
595
|
+
- **Breaking (relay API):** removed `getGroupMembers` from the relay surface
|
|
596
|
+
— the component, the app wrapper, `ConvexSignalProtocolRelayServer`, the
|
|
597
|
+
mock adapter (including its `setGroupMembers` test seam), and
|
|
598
|
+
`ISignalProtocolRelayServer`. The relay keeps no server-side group
|
|
599
|
+
membership map by design; relayed group sends now require
|
|
600
|
+
`SendOptions.groupMemberUserIds`, which the relay resolves to devices via
|
|
601
|
+
`getActiveDevices`. Group sends without a roster previously dropped the
|
|
602
|
+
message to zero recipients while reporting success.
|
|
603
|
+
- Fixed cross-sender message suppression: `clientMessageId` deduplication is
|
|
604
|
+
now scoped to the sending account. The key was previously
|
|
605
|
+
`(targetUserId, targetDeviceId, clientMessageId)`, so two senders that mint
|
|
606
|
+
non-random client message IDs — a counter or a timestamp — silently
|
|
607
|
+
suppressed each other's messages to a shared recipient, and the suppressed
|
|
608
|
+
sender was handed the other sender's message ID and server timestamp.
|
|
609
|
+
Same-sender retries still collapse as before.
|
|
610
|
+
- Documented two properties the component does not provide, both previously
|
|
611
|
+
unstated or overstated. **Group metadata privacy:** the relay can still
|
|
612
|
+
approximate a group's recipient set from delivery metadata — `messages` rows
|
|
613
|
+
carry a plaintext `groupId`, and the unencrypted `distributionUuid` in the
|
|
614
|
+
SenderKeyMessage frame embeds `groupId:senderUserId:senderDeviceId` — so the
|
|
615
|
+
component README's previous claim to keep no membership map has been
|
|
616
|
+
corrected to describe what removing `getGroupMembers` actually buys. Closing
|
|
617
|
+
the leak requires opaque distribution identifiers in the sender-key layer and
|
|
618
|
+
is tracked separately. **Device-scoped authorization:** `identify` resolves an
|
|
619
|
+
account, not a device, so every `deviceId` argument is a caller-chosen
|
|
620
|
+
routing selector and any session for an account can drain that account's
|
|
621
|
+
other device queues, send as any of its device IDs, and rotate any of its key
|
|
622
|
+
material.
|
|
623
|
+
- Fixed silent message loss for skipped multi-recipient sealed-sender
|
|
624
|
+
recipients: the client now consumes the server's `uuids404` list,
|
|
625
|
+
refreshes those users' device lists, and redelivers per-device instead of
|
|
626
|
+
discarding the field while reporting the send as delivered.
|
|
627
|
+
- Fixed provisioning acknowledgment data loss: completing a session now
|
|
628
|
+
grants the acknowledgment its own full session TTL (previously the ack
|
|
629
|
+
deadline was whatever remained of the original five-minute window, and
|
|
630
|
+
the every-minute cleanup cron could delete the freshly linked device
|
|
631
|
+
before the ack arrived), `acknowledgeProvisioning` rejects expired
|
|
632
|
+
sessions instead of racing the cron for the device's survival, and
|
|
633
|
+
session teardown deletes only the device the session created (matched by
|
|
634
|
+
its `linkedAt` stamp) with a full cascade of its key material, queued
|
|
635
|
+
messages, and heartbeats. Dead `patch`-before-`throw` writes that Convex
|
|
636
|
+
transaction rollback always discarded were removed, along with the never
|
|
637
|
+
persisted stored `expired` status; `getProvisioningMessage` now also
|
|
638
|
+
returns `expiresAt` so subscribed clients can compute expiry locally.
|
|
639
|
+
- Retry requests now expire with the same seven-day TTL as messages, backed
|
|
640
|
+
by an hourly cleanup cron; `getPendingMessages` and
|
|
641
|
+
`getPendingRetryRequests` filter expired rows at read time instead of
|
|
642
|
+
serving them until the next cron pass.
|
|
643
|
+
- Reduced write contention on the per-account identity row: mutations now
|
|
644
|
+
skip the account patch when the caller's identity bytes are unchanged,
|
|
645
|
+
instead of unconditionally rewriting the row (an OCC conflict hotspot
|
|
646
|
+
between a user's own concurrent mutations and sealed sends addressed to
|
|
647
|
+
them).
|
|
648
|
+
- Corrected the exported `FetchedPreKeyBundle` type to the actual wire shape
|
|
649
|
+
(`registrationId`, `ecSignedPreKey`, `ecOneTimePreKey`,
|
|
650
|
+
`kemLastResortPreKey`, `kemOneTimePreKey`); the previous declaration
|
|
651
|
+
omitted `registrationId` and named four of five fields incorrectly.
|
|
652
|
+
- `getActiveDevices` now caps its device scan at `MAX_DEVICES` instead of a
|
|
653
|
+
hardcoded 5, and the missing-snapshot guard in `getGroupChanges` throws
|
|
654
|
+
structured `ConvexError` data instead of a plain `Error`.
|
|
655
|
+
- Extended the installable Convex component to own the complete relay backend,
|
|
656
|
+
adding isolated devices, identity and prekey storage, message and retry
|
|
657
|
+
queues, provisioning sessions, and sender-certificate issuance behind five
|
|
658
|
+
new public wrapper namespaces.
|
|
659
|
+
- Added `@convex-dev/rate-limiter` as an optional child component and enforce a
|
|
660
|
+
ten-per-minute prekey-bundle fetch limit for each authenticated
|
|
661
|
+
fetcher/target pair.
|
|
662
|
+
- Standardized component rejections on structured `ConvexError` data carrying
|
|
663
|
+
`{ code, status, message }`, including sealed-sender authorization failures
|
|
664
|
+
that retain an `Unauthorized:` message prefix for current client fallback
|
|
665
|
+
handling.
|
|
666
|
+
- Added an installable Convex component defined as
|
|
667
|
+
`defineComponent('signalProtocol')`, with isolated group state, change, and
|
|
668
|
+
snapshot tables plus a `defineConvexSignalProtocolBackend()` app-wrapper
|
|
669
|
+
factory. The credential-issuance wrappers resolve application identity and
|
|
670
|
+
pass explicit ACI and optional PNI bytes into the component; group
|
|
671
|
+
operations remain authorized solely by their zero-knowledge presentations
|
|
672
|
+
and carry no caller identity.
|
|
673
|
+
- Added the `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/convex.config` export for mounting
|
|
674
|
+
the component with `app.use(signalProtocol)`.
|
|
675
|
+
- **Breaking (Convex group backend):** removed `defineConvexGroupServer`,
|
|
676
|
+
`defineConvexGroupServerForTest`, `convexGroupServerTables`, and the
|
|
677
|
+
`@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/remote/relay/convex/server` export. The
|
|
678
|
+
pre-launch factory and app-owned tables are replaced directly by the
|
|
679
|
+
component and wrapper, with no compatibility aliases.
|
|
680
|
+
|
|
681
|
+
## 0.1.0-alpha.7
|
|
682
|
+
|
|
683
|
+
- **Security (Convex group server):** structured rejection data now survives
|
|
684
|
+
real deployments. Engine rejections and the adapter's own conflict and
|
|
685
|
+
missing-group rejections are thrown as `ConvexError` values carrying
|
|
686
|
+
`{ code, status, message }`; production Convex strips custom properties
|
|
687
|
+
from plain errors, which silently disabled the client's documented
|
|
688
|
+
`VERSION_CONFLICT` rebase-and-retry path on live deployments.
|
|
689
|
+
- Fixed the Convex group server reading snapshots and changes through a
|
|
690
|
+
partial index range with a post-filter, which scanned every stored row for
|
|
691
|
+
the group on each lookup; catch-up reads for long-lived groups could exceed
|
|
692
|
+
Convex transaction limits and permanently fail. Snapshot lookups now use
|
|
693
|
+
the full compound index and change reads constrain the version range in
|
|
694
|
+
the index.
|
|
695
|
+
- **Security (groups):** the pending-member, requesting-member, and
|
|
696
|
+
banned-member collections are now bounded by the same 1000-entry limit as
|
|
697
|
+
full members, enforced during change application and on every validated
|
|
698
|
+
state, with the client-side structural validation mirroring the caps. A
|
|
699
|
+
single change could previously inflate a group's stored state without
|
|
700
|
+
bound.
|
|
701
|
+
- The Convex group server now derives its server parameters once per isolate
|
|
702
|
+
and caches them keyed by the environment secret, instead of re-deriving on
|
|
703
|
+
every request; the deployment seed is also zeroized when validation of the
|
|
704
|
+
configured secret fails, and `identify()` returning no identity is
|
|
705
|
+
rejected with a structured `UNAUTHORIZED` error instead of a `TypeError`.
|
|
706
|
+
- Fixed `oe-groups trust-root` failing on Windows by importing its runtime
|
|
707
|
+
modules via `file://` URLs.
|
|
708
|
+
- **Security (relay group bridge):** `ConvexSignalProtocolRelayServer.submitGroupChange`
|
|
709
|
+
now rejects legacy six-argument submissions carrying a caller-selected
|
|
710
|
+
epoch, matching `ConvexGroupServer`'s S13 guard; the relay bridge is now
|
|
711
|
+
certified by its own run of the §14 conformance suite, and endorsement
|
|
712
|
+
issuance is cryptographically verified against the reference server in the
|
|
713
|
+
parity suite.
|
|
714
|
+
- Documented that the Convex group-server modules must be mounted inside the
|
|
715
|
+
relay's generated `api.signal` namespace (`convex/signal/groups.ts` and
|
|
716
|
+
`convex/signal/zkAuth.ts`); the previous top-level placement compiled
|
|
717
|
+
cleanly but never enabled the relay's `groupServer` capability. Also
|
|
718
|
+
documented snapshot-retention growth, the placeholder-PNI prohibition for
|
|
719
|
+
`identify()`, and updated `docs/DEVIATIONS.md` to describe the enforcing
|
|
720
|
+
group server and its unblinded profile-key issuance deviation.
|
|
721
|
+
- Added the production `defineConvexGroupServer` integration at
|
|
722
|
+
`@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/remote/relay/convex/server`, including
|
|
723
|
+
package-scoped canonical-state, signed-change, and historical-snapshot
|
|
724
|
+
tables; S1–S14 enforcement; auth/profile-key credential issuance;
|
|
725
|
+
group-send endorsements; environment-secret custody; and the
|
|
726
|
+
`oe-groups trust-root` CLI. Profile-key credential issuance receives the
|
|
727
|
+
raw profile key and is not blinded. The public
|
|
728
|
+
`ConvexSignalProtocolRelayApi` now makes `groups` and `zkAuth` optional,
|
|
729
|
+
and the relay advertises its `groupServer` capability only when both API
|
|
730
|
+
modules are configured.
|
|
731
|
+
- **Breaking (groups):** client configuration now accepts one versioned,
|
|
732
|
+
serialized `trustRoot` instead of separate credential, change-signing,
|
|
733
|
+
profile-key credential, and endorsement trust fields. Group identities are
|
|
734
|
+
derived from the client's own identity configuration, and group state
|
|
735
|
+
defaults to the SDK storage layer. Relays may expose an optional
|
|
736
|
+
`groupServer` capability containing the server and credential-issuance
|
|
737
|
+
transports; clients use it automatically while retaining explicit server
|
|
738
|
+
and issuer overrides for custom deployments. Configuring groups without
|
|
739
|
+
either the relay capability or complete explicit overrides now fails with a
|
|
740
|
+
targeted configuration error, and configured endorsement verification must
|
|
741
|
+
match the endorsement root in the pinned blob. No compatibility aliases are
|
|
742
|
+
provided.
|
|
743
|
+
- **Breaking (groups): removed the borrowed `v2` naming from the group
|
|
744
|
+
system.** `GroupsV2Manager` is now `GroupManager`,
|
|
745
|
+
`GroupsV2ManagerOptions` is now `GroupManagerOptions`, the client
|
|
746
|
+
configuration key is now `groups`, and the client group methods no longer
|
|
747
|
+
carry a `V2` suffix. The implementation now lives entirely under
|
|
748
|
+
`internal/groups/`. No compatibility aliases are provided.
|
|
749
|
+
- **Breaking (group identifiers):** `GROUP_V2_PREFIX` is now
|
|
750
|
+
`GROUP_ID_PREFIX`, and group IDs use the package-owned
|
|
751
|
+
`open-e2ee:group:` prefix. The pre-launch prefix has no migration or
|
|
752
|
+
dual-read path.
|
|
753
|
+
- **Breaking (group validation):** `validateChange` is now
|
|
754
|
+
`validateChangeStructure` to make clear that it checks well-formedness, not
|
|
755
|
+
authorization. It now rejects already-banned additions and promotion
|
|
756
|
+
targets that are absent after explicit ACI/PNI-to-ServiceId widening.
|
|
757
|
+
- **Breaking (group membership):** group setup now requires the account's
|
|
758
|
+
profile-key credential issuer, trust root, and 32-byte profile key.
|
|
759
|
+
`createGroup()` and `addGroupMember()` accept either a target with verified
|
|
760
|
+
presentation material for an immediate add or a ServiceId-only invitation;
|
|
761
|
+
invited targets call `acceptGroupMemberInvitation()` and present their own
|
|
762
|
+
profile key. The old `{ aciBytes, profileKey }` direct-add path is removed,
|
|
763
|
+
and runtime inputs must match exactly one variant's complete field and byte
|
|
764
|
+
domains instead of being omitted, partially discarded, or processed
|
|
765
|
+
ambiguously.
|
|
766
|
+
- Fixed pending-member promotion comparing 16-byte ACI/PNI values directly
|
|
767
|
+
with 17-byte ServiceIds, silently skipping valid promotions. Promotions now
|
|
768
|
+
fail when the pending entry is absent or the destination is already a
|
|
769
|
+
member, preserve the invited role, and apply in the normative action order.
|
|
770
|
+
- Fixed `AccessRequired.ANY` excluding non-members, and implemented the full
|
|
771
|
+
target-sensitive group authorization table including self-leave,
|
|
772
|
+
self-decline, self-withdraw, invite-link requests, and member-label access.
|
|
773
|
+
- Fixed group mutations encoding their editor as a raw 16-byte ACI instead of
|
|
774
|
+
a canonical 17-byte ServiceId, and consistently use full ServiceIds for
|
|
775
|
+
authorization principals and banned-member checks.
|
|
776
|
+
- Fixed encrypted group state storing only the 32-byte group identifier in
|
|
777
|
+
`publicKey`; it now stores the canonical 96-byte serialized
|
|
778
|
+
`GroupPublicParams` required for credential verification.
|
|
779
|
+
- **Breaking (group server contract):** group changes now carry exact
|
|
780
|
+
server-accepted `actions`, `changeEpoch`, and the independently presented
|
|
781
|
+
invite-link password; clients no longer submit a replacement encrypted
|
|
782
|
+
snapshot. Group servers must also implement the password-gated reduced
|
|
783
|
+
`getGroupJoinInfo` read and exact-version `getGroup` snapshots for race-safe
|
|
784
|
+
post-join baselines. Every full-state response now carries a
|
|
785
|
+
`baselineSignature` over its group ID, version, and exact encrypted-state
|
|
786
|
+
bytes; clients accept signed snapshots only for a first baseline or after
|
|
787
|
+
their own verified revocation ends an entitlement span. Change submissions
|
|
788
|
+
no longer carry a caller-selected epoch: the server derives epoch 0, 5, or
|
|
789
|
+
6 from the canonical accepted actions and signs it, and clients recompute
|
|
790
|
+
the same value exactly before applying the change.
|
|
791
|
+
- **Security (groups):** every applied change is now checked for its server
|
|
792
|
+
signature, group binding, strict sequence, pre-state authorization, and
|
|
793
|
+
structural validity. Signatures bind the exact accepted actions together
|
|
794
|
+
with their compatibility epoch.
|
|
795
|
+
- **Breaking (group state storage):** `IGroupStateStore` now atomically stores
|
|
796
|
+
accepted state with a durable sender-key rotation barrier and exposes
|
|
797
|
+
revision-checked barrier read/clear methods. Removal, ban, and termination
|
|
798
|
+
block every group-send path until rotation succeeds, including after
|
|
799
|
+
callback failure or client reconstruction. Endorsement invalidation remains
|
|
800
|
+
non-fatal.
|
|
801
|
+
- **Security (group sending):** managed groups now require verified accepted
|
|
802
|
+
state at send time showing an unterminated group, current ACI membership,
|
|
803
|
+
and no ban on either of the sender's own identifiers. A stored master key
|
|
804
|
+
with missing state fails closed until sync restores a verified baseline;
|
|
805
|
+
ad-hoc sender-key groups with no group master key remain unaffected.
|
|
806
|
+
- **Security (group governance):** every non-terminated group must retain at
|
|
807
|
+
least one stored administrator. Creation, server-side atomic application,
|
|
808
|
+
complete-state client transitions, and signed baselines enforce the same
|
|
809
|
+
result-state invariant; last administrators may leave only while installing
|
|
810
|
+
a successor atomically. The deliberately member-free invite-link projection
|
|
811
|
+
remains private and is exempt only for its single additive self-join or
|
|
812
|
+
self-request action, with direct membership installed through the complete
|
|
813
|
+
signed baseline that follows.
|
|
814
|
+
- **Security (groups):** authentication credentials now represent a missing
|
|
815
|
+
PNI as true absence instead of a shared nil-UUID principal. Issuance and
|
|
816
|
+
client encryption/decryption reject nil identifiers; the reference server
|
|
817
|
+
applies ACI/PNI alias matching to roles, reads, bans, deterministic
|
|
818
|
+
attribution, and requester-specific pending status without attempting to
|
|
819
|
+
decrypt opaque identifiers.
|
|
820
|
+
- **Security (groups):** access-control fields now enforce their
|
|
821
|
+
specification-defined domains on creation, mutation, and decryption.
|
|
822
|
+
Out-of-domain hostile state fails closed, so `members = ANY` cannot become a
|
|
823
|
+
password-free self-add or third-party recruitment path.
|
|
824
|
+
- **Security (groups):** every creation or action path that introduces or
|
|
825
|
+
changes a profile-key ciphertext now requires a credential presentation
|
|
826
|
+
bound to the submitted ACI, profile key, and group. Missing, empty, or
|
|
827
|
+
mismatched proofs are rejected, pending invitations carry no profile
|
|
828
|
+
material, and verified request credentials are stripped before state or
|
|
829
|
+
signed history is persisted.
|
|
830
|
+
- **Security (group creation):** creation submissions no longer carry
|
|
831
|
+
client-asserted invitation provenance or pre-existing requesting and banned
|
|
832
|
+
entries. The enforcing server derives the creator and timestamp, signs only
|
|
833
|
+
canonical version zero, and the creator verifies and caches that exact
|
|
834
|
+
baseline instead of its optimistic submission.
|
|
835
|
+
- **Security (groups):** group actions now have exact per-action field
|
|
836
|
+
surfaces. The reference relay rejects client-asserted inviters, timestamps,
|
|
837
|
+
join revisions, labels, and PNIs where those fields are not defined; derives
|
|
838
|
+
accepted provenance and join metadata itself; and signs only that canonical
|
|
839
|
+
form. One shared exhaustive wire-domain validator makes the reference server
|
|
840
|
+
reject malformed submissions before applying or signing and makes clients
|
|
841
|
+
reject malformed signed actions and baselines before decrypting or
|
|
842
|
+
installing them, including wrong primitive, container, byte, enum,
|
|
843
|
+
timestamp, and join-revision types.
|
|
844
|
+
- **Security (groups):** nil or undecryptable pending, requesting, and banned
|
|
845
|
+
entry targets are now retained byte-for-byte as inert quarantined entries
|
|
846
|
+
instead of making a signed revision permanently unappliable. Activation
|
|
847
|
+
targets remain strict, and administrator delete actions can remove
|
|
848
|
+
quarantined entries by their preserved ciphertext.
|
|
849
|
+
- **Security (groups):** change-log reads in the executable reference server
|
|
850
|
+
are authorized at the requested historical snapshot and include the first
|
|
851
|
+
signed transition that removes, bans, or un-invites the requester, while
|
|
852
|
+
withholding every later transition.
|
|
853
|
+
- Fixed PNI-to-ACI promotion when both ACI- and PNI-keyed invitations exist.
|
|
854
|
+
Equal-role aliases are consumed atomically into one ACI member; conflicting
|
|
855
|
+
roles are rejected by both authorization monitors and can be resolved by
|
|
856
|
+
declining either invitation before promotion. Self-decline attribution now
|
|
857
|
+
follows the invitation alias named by the action, including when the same
|
|
858
|
+
requester also matches an ACI membership.
|
|
859
|
+
- **Breaking (groups):** omitting `serverSigningPublicKey` no longer silently
|
|
860
|
+
selects unsigned group history. Deployments without a conforming signing
|
|
861
|
+
server must explicitly set `allowUnauthenticatedGroupHistory: true`, which
|
|
862
|
+
continues to emit the documented security warning.
|
|
863
|
+
- The development-only in-memory relay is now the executable reference for the
|
|
864
|
+
complete encrypted group-server authorization contract: zk presentation
|
|
865
|
+
verification, server-derived requester attribution, pre-state authorization,
|
|
866
|
+
atomic sequencing, group binding, exact-byte signing, reduced invite reads,
|
|
867
|
+
independent invite-password checks, ACI/PNI field separation, and
|
|
868
|
+
representation-independent structural validation. Repeated invite joins are
|
|
869
|
+
idempotent. No production enforcing group server is supplied; explicitly
|
|
870
|
+
opting into operation without a pinned signing key emits the documented
|
|
871
|
+
non-conforming-deployment warning.
|
|
872
|
+
- Fixed `deserializeGroupPublicParams()` calling CommonJS `require()` from the
|
|
873
|
+
ESM package, which crashed the first real server-side group credential
|
|
874
|
+
verification before the proof could be checked.
|
|
875
|
+
|
|
3
876
|
## 0.1.0-alpha.6
|
|
4
877
|
|
|
5
878
|
- **Breaking (key derivation): the X3DH and PQXDH info strings now name this
|
|
@@ -9,7 +882,7 @@
|
|
|
9
882
|
parameters were wrong. PQXDH §2.2 requires the info string to name the
|
|
10
883
|
`pqkem` actually in use, and the SDK runs ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203), not
|
|
11
884
|
round-3 CRYSTALS-Kyber — so two implementations feeding an identical label
|
|
12
|
-
derived
|
|
885
|
+
derived _different_ shared secrets, which is precisely what the info string
|
|
13
886
|
exists to prevent. And §2.1 defines `info` as an identifier of the
|
|
14
887
|
application deriving the key; this SDK is not Signal Messenger. **Sessions
|
|
15
888
|
established under the old labels derive a different `SK` and cannot be
|
|
@@ -65,9 +938,9 @@
|
|
|
65
938
|
gone. Protocol domain-separation strings are untouched and remain
|
|
66
939
|
byte-identical. The Expo storage error message no longer carries a "Signal
|
|
67
940
|
Protocol " prefix; it now reads `Expo storage DB bindings not configured.
|
|
68
|
-
|
|
941
|
+
Configure them from the host app before using Expo storage.` Anything
|
|
69
942
|
matching on that text must be updated.
|
|
70
|
-
- Corrected
|
|
943
|
+
- Corrected group-system source comments that described the permission model as
|
|
71
944
|
server-enforced. The checks in `access-control.ts` run on the client over
|
|
72
945
|
already-decrypted state and bind an honest client, not a hostile one — the
|
|
73
946
|
server sees only opaque state and a version number. Change application order
|