@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk 0.1.0-alpha.1 → 0.1.0-alpha.11

This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
Files changed (1095) hide show
  1. package/ADAPTERS.md +24 -24
  2. package/ARCHITECTURE.md +4 -4
  3. package/CHANGELOG.md +1370 -0
  4. package/COMMERCIAL.md +56 -0
  5. package/NOTICE +3 -1
  6. package/README.md +40 -35
  7. package/SECURITY.md +15 -1
  8. package/blocking/README.md +5 -5
  9. package/client/README.md +5 -5
  10. package/device/README.md +3 -1
  11. package/dist/blocking/index.d.ts +2 -2
  12. package/dist/blocking/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  13. package/dist/blocking/index.js +1 -1
  14. package/dist/blocking/index.js.map +1 -1
  15. package/dist/blocking/manager.d.ts +7 -7
  16. package/dist/blocking/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  17. package/dist/blocking/manager.js +3 -3
  18. package/dist/blocking/manager.js.map +1 -1
  19. package/dist/blocking/types.d.ts +4 -4
  20. package/dist/blocking/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  21. package/dist/blocking/types.js +1 -1
  22. package/dist/client/client.d.ts +48 -41
  23. package/dist/client/client.d.ts.map +1 -1
  24. package/dist/client/client.js +160 -101
  25. package/dist/client/client.js.map +1 -1
  26. package/dist/client/compose.d.ts +15 -10
  27. package/dist/client/compose.d.ts.map +1 -1
  28. package/dist/client/compose.js +2 -0
  29. package/dist/client/compose.js.map +1 -1
  30. package/dist/client/config.d.ts +68 -34
  31. package/dist/client/config.d.ts.map +1 -1
  32. package/dist/client/config.js.map +1 -1
  33. package/dist/client/content-adapter.d.ts +4 -4
  34. package/dist/client/content-adapter.d.ts.map +1 -1
  35. package/dist/client/content-adapter.js +1 -1
  36. package/dist/client/content-adapter.js.map +1 -1
  37. package/dist/client/dual-store.d.ts +5 -5
  38. package/dist/client/dual-store.d.ts.map +1 -1
  39. package/dist/client/dual-store.js.map +1 -1
  40. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.d.ts +23 -2
  41. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  42. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.js +37 -12
  43. package/dist/client/endorsement-manager.js.map +1 -1
  44. package/dist/client/event-hooks.d.ts +1 -1
  45. package/dist/client/groups.d.ts +29 -29
  46. package/dist/client/groups.d.ts.map +1 -1
  47. package/dist/client/groups.js +54 -37
  48. package/dist/client/groups.js.map +1 -1
  49. package/dist/client/headless.d.ts +12 -12
  50. package/dist/client/headless.d.ts.map +1 -1
  51. package/dist/client/headless.js +9 -9
  52. package/dist/client/headless.js.map +1 -1
  53. package/dist/client/index.d.ts +4 -4
  54. package/dist/client/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  55. package/dist/client/index.js +1 -1
  56. package/dist/client/index.js.map +1 -1
  57. package/dist/client/key-rotation-core.d.ts +11 -11
  58. package/dist/client/key-rotation-core.d.ts.map +1 -1
  59. package/dist/client/key-rotation-core.js +22 -22
  60. package/dist/client/key-rotation-core.js.map +1 -1
  61. package/dist/client/media.d.ts +2 -2
  62. package/dist/client/media.js +5 -5
  63. package/dist/client/media.js.map +1 -1
  64. package/dist/client/messages.js +2 -2
  65. package/dist/client/messages.js.map +1 -1
  66. package/dist/client/prekeys.js +1 -1
  67. package/dist/client/prekeys.js.map +1 -1
  68. package/dist/client/relay-subscription.d.ts +2 -2
  69. package/dist/client/relay-subscription.d.ts.map +1 -1
  70. package/dist/client/relay-subscription.js +18 -1
  71. package/dist/client/relay-subscription.js.map +1 -1
  72. package/dist/client/retry.js +1 -1
  73. package/dist/client/retry.js.map +1 -1
  74. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.d.ts +28 -2
  75. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.d.ts.map +1 -1
  76. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js +40 -10
  77. package/dist/client/sealed-sender-ops.js.map +1 -1
  78. package/dist/client/sessions.d.ts.map +1 -1
  79. package/dist/client/sessions.js +3 -0
  80. package/dist/client/sessions.js.map +1 -1
  81. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts +34 -11
  82. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.d.ts.map +1 -1
  83. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js +149 -75
  84. package/dist/client/signal-service-cipher.js.map +1 -1
  85. package/dist/client/types.d.ts +28 -15
  86. package/dist/client/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  87. package/dist/client/types.js.map +1 -1
  88. package/dist/device/connection.js +2 -2
  89. package/dist/device/connection.js.map +1 -1
  90. package/dist/device/device-id.d.ts.map +1 -1
  91. package/dist/device/device-id.js +4 -4
  92. package/dist/device/device-id.js.map +1 -1
  93. package/dist/device/expo-metadata.d.ts +26 -0
  94. package/dist/device/expo-metadata.d.ts.map +1 -0
  95. package/dist/device/expo-metadata.js +33 -0
  96. package/dist/device/expo-metadata.js.map +1 -0
  97. package/dist/device/index.d.ts +1 -1
  98. package/dist/device/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  99. package/dist/device/index.js +5 -1
  100. package/dist/device/index.js.map +1 -1
  101. package/dist/device/provisioning.d.ts +9 -17
  102. package/dist/device/provisioning.d.ts.map +1 -1
  103. package/dist/device/provisioning.js +13 -30
  104. package/dist/device/provisioning.js.map +1 -1
  105. package/dist/device/transfer.d.ts.map +1 -1
  106. package/dist/device/transfer.js +14 -14
  107. package/dist/device/transfer.js.map +1 -1
  108. package/dist/files/index.d.ts +1 -1
  109. package/dist/files/index.js +1 -1
  110. package/dist/groups/index.d.ts +4 -4
  111. package/dist/groups/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  112. package/dist/groups/index.js +3 -3
  113. package/dist/groups/index.js.map +1 -1
  114. package/dist/hooks/use-connection-presence.d.ts +5 -5
  115. package/dist/hooks/use-connection-presence.d.ts.map +1 -1
  116. package/dist/hooks/use-connection-presence.js +5 -5
  117. package/dist/hooks/use-connection-presence.js.map +1 -1
  118. package/dist/hooks/use-group-membership.d.ts +2 -2
  119. package/dist/hooks/use-key-rotation.js +2 -2
  120. package/dist/hooks/use-key-rotation.js.map +1 -1
  121. package/dist/index.d.ts +29 -22
  122. package/dist/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  123. package/dist/index.js +20 -13
  124. package/dist/index.js.map +1 -1
  125. package/dist/internal/crypto/ec/x25519-validation.d.ts.map +1 -1
  126. package/dist/internal/crypto/ec/x25519-validation.js +4 -4
  127. package/dist/internal/crypto/ec/x25519-validation.js.map +1 -1
  128. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.d.ts +1 -1
  129. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  130. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.js +2 -2
  131. package/dist/internal/crypto/index.js.map +1 -1
  132. package/dist/internal/crypto/kdf/hkdf.d.ts +1 -1
  133. package/dist/internal/crypto/kdf/hkdf.d.ts.map +1 -1
  134. package/dist/internal/crypto/kdf/hkdf.js +2 -2
  135. package/dist/internal/crypto/kdf/hkdf.js.map +1 -1
  136. package/dist/internal/crypto/key-prefix.d.ts +1 -1
  137. package/dist/internal/crypto/key-prefix.js +1 -1
  138. package/dist/internal/crypto/pq/kyber.d.ts +1 -1
  139. package/dist/internal/crypto/pq/kyber.js +1 -1
  140. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.d.ts +9 -0
  141. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.d.ts.map +1 -1
  142. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.js +16 -0
  143. package/dist/internal/crypto/random.js.map +1 -1
  144. package/dist/internal/crypto/symmetric/aes-gcm-siv.d.ts +1 -1
  145. package/dist/internal/crypto/symmetric/aes-gcm-siv.js +1 -1
  146. package/dist/internal/crypto/symmetric/mac.d.ts +3 -3
  147. package/dist/internal/crypto/symmetric/mac.js +3 -3
  148. package/dist/internal/crypto/utils.d.ts +2 -2
  149. package/dist/internal/crypto/utils.js +2 -2
  150. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/envelope.d.ts +21 -21
  151. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/envelope.d.ts.map +1 -1
  152. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/envelope.js +25 -25
  153. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/envelope.js.map +1 -1
  154. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/index.d.ts +2 -2
  155. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  156. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/index.js +3 -3
  157. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/index.js.map +1 -1
  158. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/pq-ratchet-serialize.d.ts +5 -5
  159. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/pq-ratchet-serialize.d.ts.map +1 -1
  160. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/pq-ratchet-serialize.js +4 -4
  161. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/pq-ratchet-serialize.js.map +1 -1
  162. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/primitives.d.ts +261 -6
  163. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/primitives.d.ts.map +1 -1
  164. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/primitives.js +468 -6
  165. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/primitives.js.map +1 -1
  166. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/sender-key-message.d.ts +4 -3
  167. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/sender-key-message.d.ts.map +1 -1
  168. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/sender-key-message.js +97 -76
  169. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/sender-key-message.js.map +1 -1
  170. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/signal-message.d.ts +39 -34
  171. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/signal-message.d.ts.map +1 -1
  172. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/signal-message.js +236 -152
  173. package/dist/internal/encoding/proto/signal-message.js.map +1 -1
  174. package/dist/internal/groups/access-control.d.ts +170 -0
  175. package/dist/internal/groups/access-control.d.ts.map +1 -0
  176. package/dist/internal/groups/access-control.js +284 -0
  177. package/dist/internal/groups/access-control.js.map +1 -0
  178. package/dist/internal/groups/change-actions.d.ts +57 -0
  179. package/dist/internal/groups/change-actions.d.ts.map +1 -0
  180. package/dist/internal/groups/change-actions.js +827 -0
  181. package/dist/internal/groups/change-actions.js.map +1 -0
  182. package/dist/internal/groups/change-authorization.d.ts +16 -0
  183. package/dist/internal/groups/change-authorization.d.ts.map +1 -0
  184. package/dist/internal/groups/change-authorization.js +120 -0
  185. package/dist/internal/groups/change-authorization.js.map +1 -0
  186. package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/encrypted-state.d.ts +12 -2
  187. package/dist/internal/groups/encrypted-state.d.ts.map +1 -0
  188. package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/encrypted-state.js +122 -22
  189. package/dist/internal/groups/encrypted-state.js.map +1 -0
  190. package/dist/internal/groups/group-id.d.ts +9 -9
  191. package/dist/internal/groups/group-id.d.ts.map +1 -1
  192. package/dist/internal/groups/group-id.js +11 -12
  193. package/dist/internal/groups/group-id.js.map +1 -1
  194. package/dist/internal/groups/index.d.ts +16 -6
  195. package/dist/internal/groups/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  196. package/dist/internal/groups/index.js +9 -1
  197. package/dist/internal/groups/index.js.map +1 -1
  198. package/dist/internal/groups/invite-link.d.ts.map +1 -0
  199. package/dist/internal/groups/invite-link.js.map +1 -0
  200. package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/manager.d.ts +212 -43
  201. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.d.ts.map +1 -0
  202. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js +1945 -0
  203. package/dist/internal/groups/manager.js.map +1 -0
  204. package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.d.ts +32 -0
  205. package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.d.ts.map +1 -0
  206. package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.js +111 -0
  207. package/dist/internal/groups/sdk-store.js.map +1 -0
  208. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.d.ts +98 -0
  209. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.d.ts.map +1 -0
  210. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.js +1235 -0
  211. package/dist/internal/groups/server-engine.js.map +1 -0
  212. package/dist/internal/groups/trust-root.d.ts +32 -0
  213. package/dist/internal/groups/trust-root.d.ts.map +1 -0
  214. package/dist/internal/groups/trust-root.js +91 -0
  215. package/dist/internal/groups/trust-root.js.map +1 -0
  216. package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/types.d.ts +190 -41
  217. package/dist/internal/groups/types.d.ts.map +1 -0
  218. package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/types.js +3 -2
  219. package/dist/internal/groups/types.js.map +1 -0
  220. package/dist/internal/groups/wire.d.ts +68 -0
  221. package/dist/internal/groups/wire.d.ts.map +1 -0
  222. package/dist/internal/groups/wire.js +708 -0
  223. package/dist/internal/groups/wire.js.map +1 -0
  224. package/dist/internal/manager/manager.d.ts +4 -4
  225. package/dist/internal/manager/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  226. package/dist/internal/manager/manager.js +28 -17
  227. package/dist/internal/manager/manager.js.map +1 -1
  228. package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/chains.d.ts +1 -1
  229. package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/chains.d.ts.map +1 -1
  230. package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/chains.js +10 -10
  231. package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/chains.js.map +1 -1
  232. package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/ratchet.d.ts +3 -3
  233. package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/ratchet.d.ts.map +1 -1
  234. package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/ratchet.js +3 -3
  235. package/dist/internal/protocol/double-ratchet/ratchet.js.map +1 -1
  236. package/dist/internal/protocol/pqxdh/pqxdh.d.ts.map +1 -1
  237. package/dist/internal/protocol/pqxdh/pqxdh.js +3 -3
  238. package/dist/internal/protocol/pqxdh/pqxdh.js.map +1 -1
  239. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.d.ts.map +1 -1
  240. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js +32 -18
  241. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption-v2.js.map +1 -1
  242. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
  243. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js +35 -21
  244. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/decryption.js.map +1 -1
  245. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.d.ts.map +1 -1
  246. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js +8 -14
  247. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption-v2.js.map +1 -1
  248. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts +9 -4
  249. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.d.ts.map +1 -1
  250. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js +7 -15
  251. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/encryption.js.map +1 -1
  252. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts +56 -11
  253. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.d.ts.map +1 -1
  254. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js +278 -158
  255. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/proto/index.js.map +1 -1
  256. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts +45 -0
  257. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.d.ts.map +1 -0
  258. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js +77 -0
  259. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root.js.map +1 -0
  260. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts +65 -10
  261. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  262. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js +44 -1
  263. package/dist/internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types.js.map +1 -1
  264. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/index.d.ts +1 -1
  265. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts +41 -4
  266. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  267. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js +113 -12
  268. package/dist/internal/protocol/sender-keys/manager.js.map +1 -1
  269. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/index.d.ts +1 -1
  270. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/index.js +1 -1
  271. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/message.d.ts +1 -1
  272. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/message.js +1 -1
  273. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/rs/codec.d.ts +3 -3
  274. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/rs/codec.d.ts.map +1 -1
  275. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/rs/index.js +2 -2
  276. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/rs/index.js.map +1 -1
  277. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/rs/lagrange.d.ts +1 -1
  278. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/rs/lagrange.js +1 -1
  279. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/rs/lagrange.js.map +1 -1
  280. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/serialize.d.ts +8 -2
  281. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/serialize.d.ts.map +1 -1
  282. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/serialize.js +335 -152
  283. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/serialize.js.map +1 -1
  284. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/state-machine.js +5 -5
  285. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/state-machine.js.map +1 -1
  286. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/types.d.ts +1 -1
  287. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/ml-kem-braid/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  288. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/spqr.d.ts +10 -10
  289. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/spqr.d.ts.map +1 -1
  290. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/spqr.js +14 -14
  291. package/dist/internal/protocol/spqr/spqr.js.map +1 -1
  292. package/dist/internal/protocol/triple-ratchet/ratchet.d.ts +3 -3
  293. package/dist/internal/protocol/triple-ratchet/ratchet.d.ts.map +1 -1
  294. package/dist/internal/protocol/triple-ratchet/ratchet.js +5 -5
  295. package/dist/internal/protocol/triple-ratchet/ratchet.js.map +1 -1
  296. package/dist/internal/protocol/username/generate.d.ts +1 -1
  297. package/dist/internal/protocol/username/generate.js +1 -1
  298. package/dist/internal/protocol/username/hash.d.ts +1 -1
  299. package/dist/internal/protocol/username/hash.js +1 -1
  300. package/dist/internal/protocol/username/link.d.ts +1 -1
  301. package/dist/internal/protocol/username/link.js +1 -1
  302. package/dist/internal/protocol/username/proof.d.ts +1 -1
  303. package/dist/internal/protocol/username/proof.js +1 -1
  304. package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/x3dh.d.ts.map +1 -1
  305. package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/x3dh.js +6 -6
  306. package/dist/internal/protocol/x3dh/x3dh.js.map +1 -1
  307. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/auth-credential.d.ts +14 -11
  308. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/auth-credential.d.ts.map +1 -1
  309. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/auth-credential.js +68 -29
  310. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/auth-credential.js.map +1 -1
  311. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/client-zk-group-cipher.d.ts +2 -2
  312. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/client-zk-group-cipher.js +2 -2
  313. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/server-params.d.ts +1 -1
  314. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/server-params.d.ts.map +1 -1
  315. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/server-params.js.map +1 -1
  316. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/uid-struct.d.ts +2 -0
  317. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/uid-struct.d.ts.map +1 -1
  318. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/uid-struct.js +4 -0
  319. package/dist/internal/protocol/zk/groups/uid-struct.js.map +1 -1
  320. package/dist/internal/sesame/device-registry.d.ts +18 -13
  321. package/dist/internal/sesame/device-registry.d.ts.map +1 -1
  322. package/dist/internal/sesame/device-registry.js +13 -9
  323. package/dist/internal/sesame/device-registry.js.map +1 -1
  324. package/dist/internal/sesame/manager.d.ts +1 -1
  325. package/dist/internal/sesame/manager.d.ts.map +1 -1
  326. package/dist/internal/sesame/manager.js +66 -34
  327. package/dist/internal/sesame/manager.js.map +1 -1
  328. package/dist/internal/sesame/types.d.ts.map +1 -1
  329. package/dist/internal/sesame/types.js +7 -2
  330. package/dist/internal/sesame/types.js.map +1 -1
  331. package/dist/internal/session/builder.js +3 -3
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  333. package/dist/internal/session/cipher.d.ts +2 -2
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  974. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/MediaAttachmentTransfer.md +0 -51
  975. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/MediaAttachmentTransferCheckpoint.md +0 -69
  976. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/MediaAttachmentTransferOptions.md +0 -67
  977. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/MediaAttachmentUploadJobData.md +0 -19
  978. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/MediaAttachmentUploadResponse.md +0 -25
  979. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/PlanMediaAttachmentCleanupJobsInput.md +0 -61
  980. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/PlanMediaAttachmentDeleteSyncInput.md +0 -25
  981. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/PlanMediaAttachmentDownloadJobInput.md +0 -161
  982. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/PlanMediaAttachmentOpenInput.md +0 -25
  983. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/PlanMediaAttachmentProcessingInput.md +0 -83
  984. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/PlanMediaAttachmentUploadJobInput.md +0 -147
  985. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/PrepareMediaAttachmentUploadOptions.md +0 -144
  986. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/ResolveMediaAttachmentOptions.md +0 -55
  987. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/ResolvedMediaAttachment.md +0 -109
  988. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/interfaces/TusMediaAttachmentTransferOptions.md +0 -85
  989. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/CreateMediaAttachmentPointerInput.md +0 -15
  990. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentCheckpointCallback.md +0 -19
  991. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentCleanupReason.md +0 -9
  992. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentErrorCode.md +0 -9
  993. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentFlag.md +0 -9
  994. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentJobExecutionStatus.md +0 -9
  995. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentJobOperation.md +0 -9
  996. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentJobPriority.md +0 -9
  997. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentJobSkipReason.md +0 -9
  998. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentJobSource.md +0 -9
  999. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentKnownIds.md +0 -9
  1000. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentMessageType.md +0 -9
  1001. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/type-aliases/MediaAttachmentProgressCallback.md +0 -19
  1002. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/MEDIA_ATTACHMENT_POLICY_DEFAULTS.md +0 -47
  1003. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/MEDIA_ATTACHMENT_POLICY_PRESETS.md +0 -95
  1004. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/MediaAttachmentCleanupReason.md +0 -27
  1005. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/MediaAttachmentErrorCode.md +0 -75
  1006. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/MediaAttachmentFlag.md +0 -23
  1007. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/MediaAttachmentJobExecutionStatus.md +0 -19
  1008. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/MediaAttachmentJobOperation.md +0 -31
  1009. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/MediaAttachmentJobPriority.md +0 -23
  1010. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/MediaAttachmentJobSource.md +0 -51
  1011. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/MediaAttachmentMessageType.md +0 -15
  1012. package/docs/api/namespaces/media/variables/downloadMediaAttachment.md +0 -30
  1013. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/README.md +0 -61
  1014. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/classes/DisplayableFingerprint.md +0 -108
  1015. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/classes/Fingerprint.md +0 -104
  1016. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/classes/ScannableFingerprint.md +0 -209
  1017. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/base64ToBytes.md +0 -21
  1018. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/clearFingerprintCache.md +0 -15
  1019. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/compareSafetyNumbers.md +0 -25
  1020. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/createFingerprintData.md +0 -60
  1021. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/extractQrData.md +0 -34
  1022. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/generateCompositeSafetyNumber.md +0 -39
  1023. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/generateEmojiFingerprint.md +0 -24
  1024. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/generateSingleKeyReferenceSafetyNumber.md +0 -51
  1025. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/generateVerifySchemeUrl.md +0 -32
  1026. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/generateVerifyUrl.md +0 -49
  1027. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/isValidSafetyNumber.md +0 -21
  1028. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/isVerifyUrl.md +0 -45
  1029. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/functions/parseVerifyUrl.md +0 -31
  1030. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/interfaces/FingerprintData.md +0 -52
  1031. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/interfaces/SafetyNumber.md +0 -49
  1032. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/interfaces/VerifyLinkConfig.md +0 -28
  1033. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/interfaces/VerifyUrlParams.md +0 -49
  1034. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/type-aliases/CompareResult.md +0 -21
  1035. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/variables/DEFAULT_VERIFY_LINK_CONFIG.md +0 -12
  1036. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/variables/FINGERPRINT_ITERATIONS.md +0 -12
  1037. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/variables/FINGERPRINT_VERSION.md +0 -12
  1038. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/variables/VERIFY_BASE_URL.md +0 -11
  1039. package/docs/api/namespaces/safety/variables/VERIFY_SCHEME_URL.md +0 -11
  1040. package/docs/api/type-aliases/Base64.md +0 -20
  1041. package/docs/api/type-aliases/BraidPolicy.md +0 -11
  1042. package/docs/api/type-aliases/Bytes.md +0 -20
  1043. package/docs/api/type-aliases/Ciphertext.md +0 -21
  1044. package/docs/api/type-aliases/DeviceType.md +0 -11
  1045. package/docs/api/type-aliases/DownloadedAttachment.md +0 -11
  1046. package/docs/api/type-aliases/GroupId.md +0 -27
  1047. package/docs/api/type-aliases/Hex.md +0 -20
  1048. package/docs/api/type-aliases/HookName.md +0 -11
  1049. package/docs/api/type-aliases/PostQuantumPolicy.md +0 -11
  1050. package/docs/api/type-aliases/PreparedAttachmentUpload.md +0 -14
  1051. package/docs/api/type-aliases/PrivateKey.md +0 -22
  1052. package/docs/api/type-aliases/ProgressCallback.md +0 -45
  1053. package/docs/api/type-aliases/PublicKey.md +0 -22
  1054. package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectCompleteUploadRequest.md +0 -19
  1055. package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectDeleteRequest.md +0 -19
  1056. package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectDownloadRequest.md +0 -19
  1057. package/docs/api/type-aliases/RemoteObjectUploadRequest.md +0 -42
  1058. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SCKAMode.md +0 -11
  1059. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SealedSenderAuth.md +0 -15
  1060. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaCleanupInput.md +0 -9
  1061. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaCleanupResult.md +0 -9
  1062. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaDownloadInput.md +0 -9
  1063. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaDownloadResult.md +0 -9
  1064. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaOperationResult.md +0 -9
  1065. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaUploadInput.md +0 -9
  1066. package/docs/api/type-aliases/SignalProtocolClientMediaUploadResult.md +0 -9
  1067. package/docs/api/type-aliases/Signature.md +0 -21
  1068. package/docs/api/type-aliases/Unsubscribe.md +0 -15
  1069. package/docs/api/variables/BraidPolicy.md +0 -21
  1070. package/docs/api/variables/DEFAULT_DEVICE_ID.md +0 -12
  1071. package/docs/api/variables/DOUBLE_RATCHET_SPEC.md +0 -11
  1072. package/docs/api/variables/GROUP_V2_PREFIX.md +0 -11
  1073. package/docs/api/variables/KEY_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS_DEFAULT.md +0 -11
  1074. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_MESSAGE_KEYS.md +0 -14
  1075. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_PREKEY_AGE_MS_DEFAULT.md +0 -11
  1076. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_RECEIVER_CHAINS.md +0 -14
  1077. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_REGISTRATION_ID.md +0 -16
  1078. package/docs/api/variables/MAX_SKIP.md +0 -11
  1079. package/docs/api/variables/MESSAGE_FORMAT.md +0 -11
  1080. package/docs/api/variables/MIN_REGISTRATION_ID.md +0 -16
  1081. package/docs/api/variables/ML_KEM_BRAID_SPEC.md +0 -11
  1082. package/docs/api/variables/ONE_TIME_PREKEY_BATCH_SIZE.md +0 -21
  1083. package/docs/api/variables/PQXDH_SPEC.md +0 -11
  1084. package/docs/api/variables/PostQuantumPolicy.md +0 -21
  1085. package/docs/api/variables/SENDER_KEY_FORMAT.md +0 -11
  1086. package/docs/api/variables/SENDER_KEY_SPEC.md +0 -11
  1087. package/docs/api/variables/SESAME_SPEC.md +0 -11
  1088. package/docs/api/variables/SESSION_FORMAT.md +0 -11
  1089. package/docs/api/variables/SPQR_LIMITS_DEFAULTS.md +0 -11
  1090. package/docs/api/variables/X3DH_SPEC.md +0 -9
  1091. package/docs/api/variables/defaultSignalLogger.md +0 -32
  1092. package/local/store/mock/README.md +0 -27
  1093. package/remote/relay/mock/README.md +0 -32
  1094. /package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/invite-link.d.ts +0 -0
  1095. /package/dist/internal/{groups-v2 → groups}/invite-link.js +0 -0
package/CHANGELOG.md CHANGED
@@ -1,5 +1,1375 @@
1
1
  # Changelog
2
2
 
3
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.11
4
+
5
+ - **BREAKING: device provisioning no longer requires React Native, and
6
+ `getDeviceMetadata` moved to its own subpath.** `device/provisioning`
7
+ statically imported `react-native` and `expo-constants` at module scope.
8
+ Both are optional peer dependencies, so the package's own contract says a
9
+ consumer may have neither — but a static import of an absent package throws
10
+ `ERR_MODULE_NOT_FOUND` before the module runs, which made the entire
11
+ device-linking surface unimportable in Node and in the browser. The two
12
+ imports existed for three fields of one function. Provisioning itself is a
13
+ protocol and already takes the device's description as a
14
+ `LocalDeviceMetadata` parameter, so it is now platform-free, and
15
+ `getDeviceMetadata` lives at
16
+ `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/device/expo-metadata`. It is no longer
17
+ re-exported from the `device` barrel. Callers off Expo build the four
18
+ fields themselves; callers on Expo change one import path. No key
19
+ agreement, payload, or wire byte changed.
20
+
21
+ - **`local/vault` no longer drags Expo SecureStore in behind the
22
+ interface.** The barrel re-exported
23
+ `ExpoSecureStoreSignalProtocolSecretVault`, so importing the vault
24
+ *contract* failed without `expo-secure-store` installed. The barrel now
25
+ exports only `ISignalProtocolLocalSecretVault`; the implementation keeps
26
+ its own subpath, `local/vault/expo-secure-store`, which is where every
27
+ caller in this repository already imported it from.
28
+
29
+ - **New check: `node ./scripts/smoke-import-surface.mjs`, wired into CI.**
30
+ Packs the package, installs it into a consumer outside the repository whose
31
+ `node_modules` has every optional peer removed, and imports all 59
32
+ published export subpaths. Entry points that are genuinely bound to a
33
+ platform are listed explicitly, and the list is verified in both
34
+ directions, so an exemption that stops being true fails the check rather
35
+ than lingering. Nothing caught the two defects above: the checks that name
36
+ every subpath resolve types without ever loading a module, and the checks
37
+ that load modules run from inside the repository, where the optional peers
38
+ are installed as devDependencies and Node's resolver finds them.
39
+
40
+ - **Bundling the sealed-sender codec no longer pulls React Native in with
41
+ it.** The codec imported two base64 helpers from the `internal/crypto`
42
+ barrel, and that barrel also exports `generateRandomBytes`, whose
43
+ third-choice runtime fallback is a dynamic `import('expo-crypto')`. The
44
+ fallback is correct — it is how the SDK finds a secure random source on
45
+ Expo, behind two other sources and a `try`/`catch` — but a bundler
46
+ resolves what it can reach without asking whether the branch will run, and
47
+ `expo-crypto` reaches `react-native`, whose entry point is Flow rather than
48
+ TypeScript. Anything bundling the codec for a server or a browser was
49
+ therefore parsing a mobile UI framework, and any bundler without a Flow
50
+ loader stopped there. The helpers now come from `internal/crypto/utils`,
51
+ which imports nothing but types, so the reachable graph ends where the
52
+ encoding does. No encoder, decoder, or byte changed.
53
+
54
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.10
55
+
56
+ - **BREAKING: the quickstart adapters are named for what they are —
57
+ in memory, not mocks.** Nothing in either adapter is a test double: the
58
+ protocol and the cryptography are real, and only the infrastructure is
59
+ simulated. The name said otherwise, and readers discounted the quick
60
+ start because of it. The `mock` subpaths are gone rather than aliased —
61
+ this is a pre-1.0 alpha with no customers, so a compatibility layer would
62
+ only preserve the wrong word. Update imports and identifiers:
63
+
64
+ | Before | After |
65
+ |---|---|
66
+ | `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/local/store/mock` | `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/local/store/memory` |
67
+ | `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/remote/relay/mock` | `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/remote/relay/memory` |
68
+ | `mockStore()` | `inMemoryStore()` |
69
+ | `mockRelay()` | `inMemoryRelay()` |
70
+ | `MockSignalProtocolStore` | `InMemorySignalProtocolStore` |
71
+ | `MockSignalProtocolStoreOptions` | `InMemorySignalProtocolStoreOptions` |
72
+ | `MockSignalProtocolRelayServer` | `InMemorySignalProtocolRelayServer` |
73
+ | `MockSignalProtocolRelayServerOptions` | `InMemorySignalProtocolRelayServerOptions` |
74
+ | `MockStoreFailureController` | `StoreFailureController` |
75
+ | `MockStoreFailureOptions` | `StoreFailureOptions` |
76
+ | `MockRelayFailureController` | `RelayFailureController` |
77
+ | `MockRelayFailureOptions` | `RelayFailureOptions` |
78
+ | `MockStorageWriteError` | `InjectedStorageWriteError` |
79
+
80
+ The failure controllers moved with the adapters and kept their behavior.
81
+ They were never test doubles either — they are deterministic, seeded
82
+ failure injection for the documented recovery exercises — so they lost
83
+ the `Mock` prefix instead of the subpath.
84
+ No runtime behavior changed: the storage-failure error message drops the
85
+ word "mock" and `InjectedStorageWriteError` reports the new class name,
86
+ and nothing else on the wire, in storage, or in the failure semantics
87
+ moved. The doc-snippet runner that executes every shipped snippet is now
88
+ `scripts/run-doc-snippets.mjs` with a `doc-snippet:` marker, because the
89
+ snippets it runs were never mock snippets.
90
+
91
+ - **`protobufjs` is no longer a dependency of the published package**, and
92
+ the eval gate that proves it is now part of CI. The relay's sealed-sender
93
+ certificate issuer was the last module importing it, through
94
+ `protobufjs/minimal`'s `Writer` — which generates no code, so it was never
95
+ what made the SDK throw `EvalError` under a strict Content-Security-Policy,
96
+ but it did pull `protobufjs` and `long` into every install to write four
97
+ fields. Issuance now goes through the same hand-written sealed-sender codec
98
+ that validates the certificates it produces, so the field numbers an
99
+ Ed25519 signature is computed over are described in one module instead of
100
+ two that had to agree. The package declares six direct production
101
+ dependencies and resolves to six packages in total; `protobufjs` remains a
102
+ development dependency, where the wire tests use it as an independent
103
+ oracle. The bytes are unchanged, which is the whole of the risk here — a
104
+ certificate is a signature over exactly these bytes, and any shift would
105
+ have invalidated every one already issued. Golden vectors captured from the
106
+ old writer before the rewrite pin the issued bytes for four shapes,
107
+ including a multi-byte UUID and an expiry above 2^53, and each is
108
+ re-validated through the certificate chain with real keys.
109
+
110
+ - **A varint that cannot fit a `uint32` is refused at the encoder instead of
111
+ written wrong.** `encodeVarint` stops at five bytes, so it truncated
112
+ anything above 4294967295 — 2^32 came out as `80 00`, which the 64-bit
113
+ decoder then correctly rejected as non-canonical — and it wrote `NaN` as 0
114
+ and `1.5` as 1. All three now throw a named error at the point the mistake
115
+ is made. Callers that need the wider range already have `encodeVarint64`.
116
+ Nothing in this package encoded a value in the refused range.
117
+
118
+ One decode-side strictness note that belongs with the wire work above and
119
+ was not recorded when it landed: an unknown field encoded as a group (wire
120
+ types 3 and 4) is rejected rather than skipped, where `protobufjs` skipped
121
+ it. Groups are deprecated, no schema here uses them, and skipping one
122
+ correctly means matching its end tag — a parser state this format has no
123
+ reason to carry.
124
+
125
+ - **The sealed-sender wire codec is hand-written, and no signed certificate
126
+ region is re-encoded on the way through.** Its five message types and the
127
+ `UnidentifiedSenderMessage.Type` enum were assembled at runtime by
128
+ `protobufjs` reflection, which compiles its encoders with `new Function` —
129
+ the construct a `script-src 'self'` policy blocks — and they are now static
130
+ encoders and decoders over the shared wire primitives. Every byte is
131
+ unchanged, which carries more weight here than anywhere else in the wire
132
+ work: a server certificate's signature is computed over its serialized
133
+ inner bytes and a sender certificate's over its own, so a shift in field
134
+ order, in a nested length prefix, or in whether an explicitly-set zero
135
+ reaches the wire would invalidate every certificate already issued. The
136
+ decoders hand signed regions back as the raw bytes they arrived as, never
137
+ as a re-encoded structure. The 19 committed golden vectors pin all of it in
138
+ both directions. Two decode paths do change, both for messages that were
139
+ already malformed or came from a peer this version does not know: an inner
140
+ message whose `type` names no declared arm — including an absent field,
141
+ which reads as 0 — now decodes to the value that arrived, where reflection
142
+ substituted the enum's first arm and so reported a `PREKEY_MESSAGE` the
143
+ sender never wrote, and callers that route on the value must narrow it with
144
+ `isSealedSenderContentType`; and a message with no `senderCertificate`
145
+ decodes to empty wrapper fields, which certificate validation rejects,
146
+ instead of raising `TypeError` from a null dereference. A third shift is
147
+ smaller still: string fields decode through `TextDecoder`, which maps
148
+ invalid UTF-8 to U+FFFD replacement characters where reflection produced
149
+ other strings — for one shape, an empty string the required-field check
150
+ then rejected. A certificate whose `senderUuid` is not valid UTF-8
151
+ therefore now decodes instead of failing that check; such bytes can only
152
+ exist under a trusted issuer's signature, and every issuer this SDK has
153
+ shipped writes valid UTF-8.
154
+
155
+ - **The SPQR wire and ratchet-state serializer no longer builds its schema
156
+ at runtime**, so the post-quantum ratchet works under a `script-src 'self'`
157
+ policy. The ML-KEM Braid codec described its eight messages to
158
+ `protobufjs` reflection, which compiles each encoder with `new Function` —
159
+ the one construct a strict Content-Security-Policy forbids, and the reason
160
+ the SDK threw `EvalError` in a hardened browser, an extension service
161
+ worker, or anywhere else code generation is off. The eight messages now
162
+ have hand-written encoders and decoders over the wire primitives, and the
163
+ module imports nothing from `protobufjs`. Every exported function keeps
164
+ its name and signature, and the presence rules that decide what reaches
165
+ the wire are unchanged: an explicitly-set zero is still written, an absent
166
+ field still decodes to its typed zero rather than `undefined`, and the
167
+ `V1Msg` `inner_msg` oneof still emits exactly one arm. That matters more
168
+ than usual here, because the encoder, decoder, and authenticator messages
169
+ are *persisted* ratchet state — an install that upgrades has to decode the
170
+ bytes it wrote before it upgraded. Byte identity is pinned by 49 golden
171
+ vectors covering each message, each oneof arm, empty and maximal repeated
172
+ fields, and epochs at 0, 1, 2^32, 2^53−1, 2^53+1, and 2^64−1.
173
+
174
+ Three behaviors moved, each away from silent corruption. A persisted
175
+ decoder chunk that carries an index but no data used to yield a map entry
176
+ holding `undefined`, which surfaced later as a confusing failure inside
177
+ Reed–Solomon reconstruction; it is now rejected where it is read, naming
178
+ the chunk — nothing in this package has ever written that shape, so it can
179
+ only come from corrupt state. Encoding state that violates its declared
180
+ types — a field that is not the `Uint8Array` it claims, a size that is
181
+ negative or above 4294967295 — now throws a named error where the old
182
+ encoder silently wrapped the value and wrote wrong bytes. And
183
+ `isSerializationReady()` now always returns `true`: with static codecs
184
+ there is no schema to build and no not-ready state to report
185
+ (`initSerialization()` stays as an awaitable no-op for callers that
186
+ sequence on it).
187
+
188
+ - **The Double Ratchet and sender-key message codecs no longer build their
189
+ wire types at runtime.** `SignalProtocolMessage`,
190
+ `PreKeySignalProtocolMessage`, `SenderKeyMessage`, and
191
+ `SenderKeyDistributionMessage` were encoded and decoded through
192
+ `protobufjs` reflection, which compiles each encoder with `new Function` —
193
+ the exact construct a `script-src 'self'` policy blocks. All four are now
194
+ hand-written encoders and `ProtoReader` decode loops over the shared wire
195
+ primitives, and neither module imports `protobufjs`. Nothing on the wire
196
+ moves: the twenty committed golden vectors for these two modules pin every
197
+ byte in both directions, including the behavior that is easiest to lose in
198
+ a rewrite — presence, not value, decides what is written, so a counter of
199
+ 0 and a prekey id of 0 stay distinguishable from an absent field, an empty
200
+ bytes field still reaches the wire and is still dropped on decode, and
201
+ unknown fields are still skipped. Decoding is stricter in one respect
202
+ inherited from the primitives: a field whose wire type contradicts its tag
203
+ is now rejected rather than read as its declared type.
204
+
205
+ - **The protobuf wire primitives now cover 64-bit varints and the field
206
+ shapes the message schemas actually use**, which is the groundwork for
207
+ encoding every message here without `protobufjs` — and so without the
208
+ runtime code generation that a `script-src 'self'` policy blocks. The
209
+ varint helpers stopped at 32 bits in five bytes, so the SPQR epoch, a
210
+ uint64, had no representation that survived a round trip; there are now
211
+ bigint encode and decode functions with a ten-byte ceiling, alongside
212
+ helpers for bool, enum, string, fixed64, embedded-message, and repeated
213
+ fields, and a `ProtoReader` cursor that owns the read-tag-dispatch-skip
214
+ loop every decoder repeats. The existing 32-bit functions are untouched
215
+ and byte-compatible. Two contracts are deliberately stricter than
216
+ `protobufjs`: a varint must be canonically encoded, because these bytes
217
+ are signed and MAC'd and a redundant encoding would make the signed byte
218
+ string malleable; and a field whose wire type contradicts its tag is
219
+ rejected rather than misread. Nothing on the wire moves — no encoder has
220
+ ever emitted the forms now refused.
221
+
222
+ - **The public repository's snippet check no longer requires an unpublished
223
+ file.** `0.1.0-alpha.8` removed the internal pricing preview from the
224
+ export, but `run-mock-snippets.mjs` — which ships in both repositories —
225
+ still read it unconditionally, so the public "shipped mock snippets" CI job
226
+ failed with ENOENT from the `0.1.0-alpha.9` push onward. The runner now
227
+ validates that file's snippets only where the file exists, which is the
228
+ boundary the export already draws. `ossf/scorecard-action` also moves to
229
+ v2.4.4 (dependabot, applied here so the export carries it).
230
+
231
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.9
232
+
233
+ - **BREAKING: the multi-recipient content ceiling is the reference's
234
+ 96 KiB, and the shared payload is stored once, not once per
235
+ recipient.** The 256 KiB ceiling was a misreading of the reference,
236
+ which validates what each recipient will *receive* against the same
237
+ 96 KiB message-size constant it applies to individual sends — its
238
+ 256 KiB constant is an HTTP entity-read cap on the whole request, not
239
+ a content bound. Worse, the fan-out stored a full copy of the shared
240
+ ciphertext in every recipient's row, so one full-size send to a large
241
+ group multiplied itself by the device count inside a single
242
+ transaction — the reference's message store instead inserts one
243
+ shared multi-recipient payload and hands each recipient a pointer,
244
+ and this relay now does the same: per-recipient rows keep only their
245
+ 48 bytes of key material, delivery reassembles the exact wire form,
246
+ and the shared payload row shares the message queue's retention.
247
+ Found by this round's adversarial review; the ceiling boundary and
248
+ the once-per-send storage each carry a revert-proven test.
249
+
250
+ - **The mock relay's send dedup is now sender-scoped, matching the
251
+ Convex backend**, and `clientMessageId` is documented as requiring
252
+ global uniqueness: sealed senders are anonymous by design, so every
253
+ sealed send to a device shares one dedup namespace, and a reused
254
+ counter or timestamp from two senders would silently collapse into
255
+ one stored message.
256
+
257
+ - **The change-log walk now stops where the tenure ends, not where
258
+ readability ends.** The S10a work narrowed the change log's entry gate to
259
+ members but left the walk's continue condition on the weaker readable
260
+ set, so a removal that left another of the requester's aliases pending —
261
+ an ACI member whose PNI was invited, then the ACI removed — kept serving
262
+ post-tenure history to a principal the group now lists only as invited,
263
+ from any `fromVersion` inside the old tenure. Both gates now share one
264
+ membership predicate: the walk serves through the tenure-ending
265
+ transition, inclusive, and nothing after it. Versioned `getGroup` had the
266
+ sibling misclassification: a requester with no tenure at all fell into
267
+ the same `before_join` refusal as the join-version floor, telling a
268
+ revoked-then-re-invited member that their membership was intact. The
269
+ no-tenure case is now refused as `not_a_member`, `before_join` is raised
270
+ only against a live tenure, and the accepted-join read translates
271
+ `not_a_member` into `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED`. Found by this round's
272
+ adversarial review; the alias-removal walk, the versioned-read reasons,
273
+ the empty-page fault, and the snapshot-regression guard each carry a
274
+ revert-proven test, and the S10a catch-up test now proves the snapshot
275
+ mechanism against a server whose log throws.
276
+
277
+ - **The Node store now implements all of `ISignalProtocolLocalStore`, and the
278
+ compiler enforces it.** `NodeSignalProtocolStore` was missing 37 of the
279
+ interface's 72 members — the whole Sesame device-record, sender-key,
280
+ skipped-sender-key, and message-record surfaces, plus metadata and the
281
+ prekey-recovery helpers — so multi-device linking and both group APIs were
282
+ unavailable to any Node process, and passing the store as `adapters.storage`
283
+ needed a cast. All 37 are implemented against the same encrypted, atomically
284
+ committed state document the adapter already used, and the class now carries
285
+ an `implements ISignalProtocolLocalStore` clause, so a missing member or a
286
+ drifted signature fails the build instead of surfacing as a runtime gap. The
287
+ store also joins the shared storage contract with extended boundaries and the
288
+ shared sender-key resolution contract, which the other adapters already ran.
289
+
290
+ - **The Node store's registration ID survives a restart.** It was held in an
291
+ in-memory `Map` inside an adapter whose entire purpose is persistence, so
292
+ every process start reported registration ID 0 and every peer read the
293
+ restart as a reinstall. It is now part of the persisted state document,
294
+ keyed by identity type so ACI and PNI stay distinct. Kyber prekey usage
295
+ markers, previously in-memory for the same reason, persist alongside it.
296
+
297
+ - **BREAKING: the group change log is served in pages.** `getGroupChanges`
298
+ returned the entire remaining log in one response — in practice the
299
+ Convex transport silently truncated its restore at 4096 changes with no
300
+ has-more signal, which is worse: a long log simply stopped syncing. The
301
+ endpoint now returns `{ entries, hasMore }`: at most 64 entries per
302
+ request, `hasMore` set only when the page was cut for size with the
303
+ requester still a member, and each resumed request authorized
304
+ independently at its own `fromVersion` snapshot. A walk that ends at the
305
+ log's tip or at the requester's own tenure-ending transition is complete
306
+ and says so — a removed member never sees `hasMore` dangle past the
307
+ change that removed them. The client sync loop pages until done,
308
+ resuming from the last verified revision, and treats a has-more page
309
+ that served nothing as a server fault rather than looping on it. The
310
+ reference's clients also drive an explicit paging loop off a has-more
311
+ signal, though their resume cursor is server-supplied where ours is the
312
+ client's own last verified revision; the page size here follows the
313
+ shape, not a verified reference constant. The Convex transport bounds
314
+ its storage restore to one page plus the look-ahead entry that decides
315
+ `hasMore`, so the read cost now scales with the page rather than with
316
+ `min(history, 4096)`.
317
+
318
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.8
319
+
320
+ - **An internal pricing exploration is no longer published, and business
321
+ planning is now structurally unexportable.** `docs/pricing-preview.html` —
322
+ an internal pricing and revenue exploration — was allowlisted into the
323
+ public export in `0.1.0-alpha.5`. Nothing linked to it and it was never in
324
+ the npm package, but it had no business being public. It is removed from
325
+ the allowlist, and the release policy now refuses any file whose name
326
+ matches pricing, revenue, or business-model patterns, so re-adding one
327
+ becomes a deliberate policy edit instead of a one-line allowlist change.
328
+
329
+ - **The assurance figures are now a build product.** The figures table in
330
+ `docs/ASSURANCE.md` was hand-maintained and had gone stale across two
331
+ releases. `npm run assurance:update` regenerates it from a real run and
332
+ refuses to write figures from a failing run; `release:verify` refuses to
333
+ cut an export when the figures are more than three days old. The README no
334
+ longer duplicates the numbers — it points at the one generated table.
335
+
336
+ - **README: the product speaks before the disclaimer.** The Signal
337
+ non-affiliation paragraph moved below the benefit bullets (still above the
338
+ fold); the nav line gains `open-e2ee.dev` and `docs.open-e2ee.dev`, which
339
+ the README previously never linked; the hard-coded patch version — four
340
+ releases stale at time of fix — is replaced by the `0.1.0-alpha` maturity
341
+ line, with the npm badge carrying the exact version; the weekly-downloads
342
+ badge, which renders a near-zero number for a days-old package, is
343
+ replaced by a native-modules count that states a real differentiator.
344
+
345
+ - **`COMMERCIAL.md` answers the highest-intent click.** Commercial licensing
346
+ previously dead-ended at an email address. The new file states who needs a
347
+ commercial license, what it changes and does not change, the public tiers,
348
+ and how buying works. Shipped in the npm package too.
349
+
350
+ - **A contribution surface that tells the truth about the export model.**
351
+ `CONTRIBUTING.md` explains that `main` is generated, why PRs are ported
352
+ rather than merged, and that issues are triaged in public;
353
+ `CODE_OF_CONDUCT.md`, issue templates (with a security-reporting
354
+ off-ramp), and a PR template complete the set.
355
+
356
+ - **Vulnerability reporting: private GitHub reporting and a safe harbor.**
357
+ `SECURITY.md` now offers GitHub private vulnerability reporting alongside
358
+ email, and commits to a good-faith safe harbor for security research.
359
+
360
+ - **`docs/E2EE.md` grew from a summary into the architecture explainer its
361
+ README billing promises** — server-becomes-relay, device as source of
362
+ truth, identity as device keys, recovery as a product decision, metadata
363
+ visibility, and the new failure modes, each linking to the doc that goes
364
+ deeper. Its "ML-KEM (Kyber)" phrasing is corrected to "ML-KEM (FIPS 203)",
365
+ matching the distinction this changelog drew in `0.1.0-alpha.6`.
366
+
367
+ - **The npm package no longer ships 1.8 MB of generated API reference.**
368
+ `docs/api` (391 generated files) stays in the repository for browsing but
369
+ leaves the tarball; installs should not pay for reference docs that are
370
+ regenerable and hosted.
371
+
372
+ - **Supply-chain hardening.** Every workflow action is pinned to a commit
373
+ SHA; dependabot watches npm production dependencies and workflow actions
374
+ weekly; CodeQL runs the security-extended queries on every push, PR, and
375
+ weekly schedule.
376
+
377
+ - **The composition guide leads with the shipped API.** The "Target
378
+ Composition" section — `deviceStorage`, `createExpoDeviceStorage`,
379
+ `signal.messages.subscribe`, none of which exist in the package — sat above
380
+ the real API at the top of `docs/CLIENT_COMPOSITION.md`, which is exactly
381
+ the position that gets copy-pasted. It moved to the bottom under "Future
382
+ Direction (Not Shipped)" behind an explicit these-imports-fail warning.
383
+
384
+ - **The Node store README no longer claims an interface the adapter does not
385
+ implement.** `NodeSignalProtocolStore` covers the core single-device
386
+ surface but not the Sesame device-record, sender-key, or message-record
387
+ portions of `ISignalProtocolLocalStore` — and it has no `implements`
388
+ clause, so the compiler was never checking the README's claim. The README
389
+ now states the real coverage and points multi-device and group users at
390
+ the interface docs. Completing the adapter is tracked work; documenting
391
+ the boundary honestly could not wait for it.
392
+
393
+ - **BREAKING: the group change log is for members; pending principals catch
394
+ up by snapshot.** The change log authorizes at the snapshot at
395
+ `fromVersion`, and a pending-profile-key entry appears in that roster, so
396
+ an invitee could walk the log forward from their invitation — reading, for
397
+ the whole invitation-to-acceptance window, a narration `getGroup` refuses
398
+ them by name, including who made each change. The server now requires the
399
+ requester to be a *member* of the authorizing snapshot (rejecting with the
400
+ distinct reason `not_a_member`), which closes the log to invitees outright
401
+ and, for members, states the tenure bound that the roster check previously
402
+ provided by accident.
403
+
404
+ Pending principals do not lose their catch-up path — they lose the log as
405
+ the mechanism. A pending client now advances by fetching the current state
406
+ as a fresh signed baseline, verified and installed whole, which is also
407
+ how the reference ecosystem's clients behave whenever the server does not
408
+ recognize them as a member. Acceptance is unaffected: it was always
409
+ submitted against the current state, which is exactly what the snapshot
410
+ provides. The specification records this as S10a, with the C1/C3 span
411
+ rules restated to make explicit what was previously implicit: a pending
412
+ view is a provisional baseline, not a span with living continuity, and a
413
+ member's span begins at the verified transition or baseline that makes
414
+ them a member.
415
+
416
+ One behavioral consequence: an invitee whose invitation is withdrawn no
417
+ longer receives the deletion as a signed change (the log that carried it
418
+ is closed to them). The next catch-up finds the current state refused and
419
+ surfaces `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED`, mutating nothing — the cached pending
420
+ view remains the last verified state, and a later re-invitation serves a
421
+ fresh baseline. Members are untouched: removal and ban still arrive as
422
+ verified transitions through the log, never as refusals.
423
+
424
+ - **A full 256 KiB multi-recipient payload is accepted, as advertised.** The
425
+ content ceilings are enforced on the base64 columns as string-length
426
+ limits, and the multi-recipient limit was computed as `ceil((n / 3) * 4)`
427
+ instead of `4 * ceil(n / 3)` — two characters short of what 256 KiB
428
+ actually encodes to, since 262144 is not a multiple of 3. A payload at
429
+ exactly the advertised ceiling was refused with a 413. The single-recipient
430
+ limit was computed the same way but 96 KiB divides by 3, so only the
431
+ multi-recipient bound was wrong.
432
+
433
+ - **A FORBIDDEN group read now says which question it answers, and only a
434
+ membership refusal reads as revocation.** Two different rejections share
435
+ the 403 `FORBIDDEN` code on the group read paths: "you may not read this
436
+ group at all" (banned, or absent from the authorizing roster) and "you may
437
+ not read this version of it" (the join-version floor added in the
438
+ removal-revocation work). They differed only in message text, and the
439
+ client treated any `FORBIDDEN` on a pinned baseline read as
440
+ `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED` — so a floor rejection, raised while the membership
441
+ itself was fine, would have been reported to the application as a revoked
442
+ membership. The rejections now carry a machine-readable `reason`
443
+ (`not_readable` / `before_join`) alongside the code, the client interprets
444
+ only `not_readable` as revocation and propagates everything else, and the
445
+ conformance tests assert on the reason rather than on message wording.
446
+
447
+ - **A multi-recipient send may name each device only once, and retry
448
+ requests are rate limited.** The multi-recipient path is deliberately
449
+ exempt from the per-recipient inbound-bytes budget, matching the
450
+ reference, because a group-send token is supposed to price it. That
451
+ exemption assumes one call fans out to *distinct* devices. The reference
452
+ gets that from its wire format, which parses recipients into a map keyed
453
+ by service ID, so duplicates collapse before the handler ever sees them;
454
+ our flat array does not, so one endorsed device repeated a thousand times
455
+ in a single call stored a thousand copies of the ciphertext against an
456
+ unmetered budget. The handler now rejects a repeated `(userId, deviceId)`
457
+ with a 400 rather than collapsing it, since a repeat is a client bug and
458
+ quietly picking between two conflicting key blocks would bury it.
459
+
460
+ `sendRetryRequest` was unmetered too, and nothing else on that path bounds
461
+ it: a retry request carries no caller-supplied content to charge by size,
462
+ and it names an original sender the caller never has to have talked to, so
463
+ there is no relationship to check either. It is now counted per requester
464
+ against a token bucket sized for the legitimate case — a client returning
465
+ from a broken session asks for one per message it could not decrypt — and
466
+ refuses only a caller that keeps asking indefinitely.
467
+
468
+ - **BREAKING: group-send tokens are verified before any account is read, and
469
+ sealed sends carry the recipient identities they claim.** A group-send
470
+ token is a signature over ACIs, but sealed sends name recipients by user
471
+ ID, so the relay resolved every named recipient to its stored ACI — up to
472
+ one indexed read per recipient, a thousand on the multi-recipient path —
473
+ *before* it could check the token. An anonymous caller holding a garbage
474
+ token could bill that work to the deployment on every call, on the one
475
+ path that is deliberately exempt from the per-recipient send budget
476
+ because the token is supposed to be the gate.
477
+
478
+ The order is now the reference implementation's, where sealed payloads
479
+ name recipients by service ID and the token is checked against the request
480
+ before any account is touched: the caller supplies the ACI it claims for
481
+ each recipient, the entire cryptographic check runs against those claims
482
+ first, and only then is each claim bound to the recipient's stored
483
+ account. A caller who lies about a binding has necessarily already
484
+ presented a token our own group server issued over the claimed set, so
485
+ the reads it spends were an authenticated member's to spend.
486
+
487
+ The claims ride the existing plumbing: the endorsement cache now stores,
488
+ next to each member's endorsement, the ACI it was issued over — the
489
+ identity that is *correct* to claim, as opposed to whatever a later lookup
490
+ would resolve — and the send paths pass them through. This changes the
491
+ app-owned `EndorsementCacheStore` interface (entries are now
492
+ `{ endorsement, aciBytes }` records rather than raw bytes) and adds
493
+ `targetAciBytes` / per-recipient `aciBytes` arguments to the sealed send
494
+ mutations, required when authorizing by group-send token.
495
+
496
+ - **One ACI, one account.** Nothing stopped two user IDs from registering
497
+ the same ACI: `identify` is host-owned and unvalidated, and the second
498
+ account to claim an ACI would inherit every authorization decision made
499
+ about the first — sealed-sender access, group-send endorsements, identity
500
+ binding. The `accounts` table now has an `aciBytes` index and
501
+ `rememberAccount` refuses a claim on an ACI already registered to a
502
+ different user ID with a 409 `CONFLICT`. A deployment that already holds
503
+ duplicate-ACI rows keeps working — the check reads one claimant and the
504
+ duplicate surfaces as the intended 409 rather than an untyped error — but
505
+ which of the two accounts is refused depends on index order, so resolve
506
+ such rows deliberately before deploying.
507
+
508
+ - **Removal and ban now revoke historical group-state reads.** `getGroup` with
509
+ an explicit version authorized the requester against the roster of the
510
+ *requested* snapshot, so anyone removed or banned at version N could keep
511
+ fetching every snapshot of their former tenure indefinitely — a removal that
512
+ does not revoke read access is not a removal. The server now authorizes
513
+ every full-state read against the group as it is *now*, and adds the floor
514
+ that snapshot-based authorization used to provide by accident: a member may
515
+ not read state from before the version they joined at, so membership grants
516
+ the group from when you joined, not its history.
517
+
518
+ The change log deliberately keeps snapshot-at-`fromVersion` authorization,
519
+ as the group specification already required: the walk serves entries only
520
+ while the requester stays readable and stops at — and includes — the change
521
+ that removed them, which is how a polling member learns of their removal.
522
+ Authorizing the log at the current state would 403 them into silence. What
523
+ this leaves reachable to a former member is bounded and not new: changes
524
+ from within their own tenure, ending at their removal — bytes they were
525
+ served while entitled.
526
+
527
+ One client-visible consequence: a join that is accepted and then revoked
528
+ before the joiner reads its baseline snapshot — an admin removing them in
529
+ the race window — now fails with `GROUP_ACCESS_REVOKED` instead of
530
+ reporting a membership the client could never verify or use. Nothing is
531
+ installed locally, and the principal becomes the ordinary re-entitlement
532
+ case: a later re-add serves a fresh signed baseline.
533
+
534
+ An invitation grants the current state and nothing else. A
535
+ pending-profile-key entry entitles its holder to read the group as it is —
536
+ acceptance needs that — but it is not a tenure, and its wire format pins
537
+ `joinedAtVersion` to zero, so deriving a history floor from it would read
538
+ as "joined at the beginning of time". An invitee who never accepts holds
539
+ the group master key, so every snapshot the server serves them decrypts;
540
+ versioned reads are therefore refused outright for pending principals.
541
+
542
+ This bounds `getGroup` only. The change log authorizes against the
543
+ snapshot at `fromVersion`, and a pending-profile-key entry appears in that
544
+ roster, so an invitee can still walk the log forward from their
545
+ invitation — a window during which they could already fetch the current
546
+ state at will, though the log additionally names who made each change.
547
+ Flooring the log would deny a pending member the entries they need to
548
+ reach the state their acceptance is submitted against, so closing that
549
+ window means changing how pending members catch up, not adding a check.
550
+
551
+ - **The relay's send paths are bounded: per-recipient inbound budget, a
552
+ content-size ceiling, and a device-existence check on sealed sends.** None
553
+ of the component's send paths was rate limited or size limited, so one
554
+ caller — anonymous on the sealed path, any authenticated account on the
555
+ identified one — could grow a victim's message queue without bound for the
556
+ full seven-day retention window. Three bounds close this, each matching the
557
+ reference implementation's shape: message content is capped at 96 KiB for a
558
+ single-recipient envelope and 256 KiB for the shared multi-recipient
559
+ payload; single-recipient sends spend from a per-*recipient* byte budget
560
+ (4 MiB burst, 1 MiB/minute sustained) — keyed by the target because a
561
+ sealed sender is anonymous by design, so a per-sender limit on that path is
562
+ either meaningless or a hole; and `sendUnidentified` now refuses a target
563
+ device that does not exist, the check its multi-recipient sibling always
564
+ had. The multi-recipient path is deliberately not metered, also matching
565
+ the reference: the group-send token already prices it, and a per-recipient
566
+ budget there would let one noisy group partially starve delivery to its
567
+ quietest member.
568
+
569
+ The shared bucket is bounded from the sender side too. Keying by target is
570
+ forced on the sealed path — the sender is anonymous by design — but on the
571
+ identified path the sender is known, and a single authenticated account
572
+ must not be able to drain a victim's whole budget and starve every other
573
+ sender: identified sends also spend a per-(sender, recipient) sub-limit of
574
+ a quarter of the shared bucket. Neither bucket can be spent by a request
575
+ that goes on to fail: the charges are written in the mutation's own
576
+ transaction, so a send that 410s on the stale-device check — or trips the
577
+ other limit — rolls its charge back with everything else.
578
+
579
+ - **The `STALE_DEVICE` error no longer discloses the recipient's current
580
+ registration ID.** The 410 thrown when a sender's view of a device is stale
581
+ echoed back `currentRegistrationId` — the live value — to any
582
+ account-authenticated caller, with no rate limit. That is the same read the
583
+ prekey-bundle fetch serves, minus its rate limiter: a free oracle for
584
+ watching registration-ID changes (device reinstalls) on arbitrary devices.
585
+ The error now names the stale device and nothing else, which is the
586
+ reference implementation's 410 body; the sender's recovery path is
587
+ unchanged, since recovering means re-fetching the bundle anyway.
588
+
589
+ - **BREAKING: no group identifier travels on a message envelope any more.**
590
+ Every relayed message carried a plaintext `groupId` alongside its target, and
591
+ the relay stored it on each `messages` row for the seven-day retention
592
+ window. Grouping those rows by that column yielded the set of accounts that
593
+ received traffic for a group, so a relay operator could reconstruct rosters
594
+ without breaking any encryption. The column is gone, and so are the `groupId`
595
+ arguments on `messages.send`, `sendUnidentified`, and
596
+ `sendMultiRecipientUnidentified`, and the field on the envelopes those
597
+ functions return.
598
+
599
+ What replaces it is a message type. A group message is now typed
600
+ `sender_key`, which tells the receiver to decrypt the payload as a framed
601
+ SenderKeyMessage — and nothing else. The receiver reads the frame's
602
+ distribution identifier, which is opaque, and resolves the group against its
603
+ own sender key store. The envelope says how to decrypt, never which group.
604
+ This also removes a small trust problem: the receiver no longer selects a
605
+ sender key using a group id the sender asserted.
606
+
607
+ This closes the group's *name*, not the group *partition*. The distribution
608
+ identifier is unencrypted and stable for the life of a sender key, one send
609
+ produces byte-identical ciphertext on every recipient's row, and the
610
+ multi-recipient sealed path hands the relay a roster. A relay can still
611
+ partition delivery pairs into unlabeled groups; it can no longer put a
612
+ meaningful, cross-send label on one. The component README states the
613
+ remaining channels explicitly.
614
+
615
+ Sealed sender needed its own channel for this, because the outer envelope of
616
+ a sealed message is always `unidentified_sender` and cannot carry an inner
617
+ type. Sealed envelopes now begin with a content-type byte inside the seal,
618
+ matching the `Type` enum of the reference implementation's
619
+ `UnidentifiedSenderMessage.Message` (`PREKEY_MESSAGE`, `MESSAGE`,
620
+ `SENDERKEY_MESSAGE`, `PLAINTEXT_CONTENT`), and `SealOptions.groupId` —
621
+ encrypted, never populated by the send path — is removed in favour of
622
+ `contentType`. This is a wire-format change to sealed sender for both V1 and
623
+ V2.
624
+
625
+ Deploying this against an existing Convex deployment needs a manual step:
626
+ Convex validates stored documents against the new schema during the push,
627
+ before any of your code runs, so a `messages` row still carrying a `groupId`
628
+ fails the deploy and no migration can run ahead of it. Clear the `messages`
629
+ table — or stop sending and let the seven-day retention window drain it —
630
+ before deploying. Messages are transient and clients re-request undelivered
631
+ ones. See "Upgrading" in the component README.
632
+
633
+ - **Fixed: on React Native, one member's sender key could permanently break
634
+ another's group messages.** The store indexes sender keys by the frame's
635
+ distribution identifier so a receiver can resolve a group without being told
636
+ which one. Every other adapter scopes that index by sender; the React Native
637
+ adapter keyed a flat pointer on the identifier alone, so a second sender
638
+ presenting the same identifier overwrote the first, and the displaced
639
+ sender's group messages failed to decrypt until it rotated. Distribution
640
+ identifiers are chosen by their sender and travel in the clear, so this was
641
+ reachable by any account sharing a group with the victim. The pointer key is
642
+ now scoped by sender and device.
643
+
644
+ - **Fixed: on React Native, a host that issues colon-scoped user IDs could not
645
+ receive group messages at all.** The adapter joins composite storage keys on
646
+ `:` and split the sender key record key from the right, which silently
647
+ mis-assigns the components when a user ID contains a `:` of its own — and
648
+ nothing constrains user IDs, since they come from the host application's
649
+ identify hook, where a tenant- or issuer-scoped subject is ordinary. Every
650
+ group message resolved to nothing on such a deployment, deterministically and
651
+ permanently. The same join made a group ID a prefix of `<groupId>:<sub>`, so
652
+ deleting a group's sender keys also swept any group whose ID extended it.
653
+
654
+ Key components are now percent-escaped before they are joined, so no
655
+ identifier can carry a separator into a key or a scan prefix. This also
656
+ retires the residue left by the sender-scoping fix above, which had only
657
+ pushed the collision behind the same assumption.
658
+
659
+ Sender key records and pointers are unaffected on upgrade for a deployment
660
+ whose IDs contain neither `:` nor `%`, because such values escape to
661
+ themselves; only the values that were already broken move. Retry records are
662
+ different, and do move for everyone: their key is scanned by session ID, and
663
+ a session ID is `<userId>:<deviceId>`, so it always carries a separator. That
664
+ separator was load-bearing in the same way — a session ID of `alice:1` has
665
+ scan prefix `alice:1:`, which also matches the records of user `alice:1` on
666
+ device 2 — so the escaping applies there too.
667
+
668
+ The cost is that retry records written before the upgrade are not reachable
669
+ by session ID afterwards, so a retry request for a message sent before the
670
+ upgrade cannot be served and the sender's peer re-requests or gives up. They
671
+ are not leaked: the expiry sweep and the clear-all path scan the whole record
672
+ prefix and filter on the stored timestamp, so they are reaped on the normal
673
+ retention schedule regardless of key format.
674
+
675
+ - **BREAKING: the `plaintext_content` envelope type is removed.** It was in the
676
+ relay's message-type union and the client's accepted list, but no send path
677
+ ever produced one and neither decrypt path handled one — an envelope carrying
678
+ it fell through to the pairwise ratchet and failed there. The reference uses
679
+ the corresponding sealed content type to carry a decryption-error receipt
680
+ when no session exists; this SDK delivers those over a dedicated relay
681
+ channel instead, so the type has no role here. The sealed-sender parser now
682
+ rejects the content-type byte outright rather than mapping it to an envelope
683
+ type with no handler. `docs/DEVIATIONS.md` §6.2 records the difference.
684
+
685
+ The literal is also gone from the relay's stored `messageType` union, so it
686
+ carries the same deploy-time hazard as the `groupId` removal above: a stored
687
+ row whose `messageType` is `plaintext_content` fails Convex schema validation
688
+ during the push. Clearing the `messages` table handles both at once.
689
+
690
+ - **Sealed sender reads its content-type enum through a static import.** Four
691
+ call sites in `client/sealed-sender-ops.ts` and
692
+ `client/signal-service-cipher.ts` reached for
693
+ `internal/protocol/sealed-sender/types` with `await import(...)` on every
694
+ seal and unseal, to read `SealedSenderContentType` and the V2 version bytes.
695
+ Two of them were already redundant with a static import of the same module at
696
+ the top of the same file, and `client/client.ts` had none. This is a
697
+ consistency and readability change, not a bug fix: the module has runtime
698
+ exports, so a resolved dynamic import always carries the enum.
699
+
700
+ - **Sealed sender envelope parsing is now canonical and validated.** Both the
701
+ V1 and V2 inner-envelope parsers accepted a payload with trailing bytes, an
702
+ unrecognised content-type byte, a truncated varint, or a missing content
703
+ hint. Parsing runs after authentication, so none of these was reachable by an
704
+ attacker, but two distinct byte strings could parse to identical content and
705
+ an unknown content type fell through to a routing default. The parsers now
706
+ reject all four, and the content hint is a required field rather than an
707
+ optional one.
708
+
709
+ - **`maxSenderKeyAge` is bounded at 90 days.** The age-based rotation policy
710
+ already expired locally generated sender keys after a configurable interval,
711
+ defaulting to the 14 days the reference implementation uses, and the group
712
+ send path caught that expiry to rotate and redistribute before retrying. The
713
+ interval itself was unbounded, so a host could configure an age no key would
714
+ reach and switch rotation off without saying so. It is now clamped to 90
715
+ days, the same ceiling the reference applies to its own remotely configured
716
+ value — the difference being that this value comes from the host application
717
+ rather than from the SDK, which is what makes the clamp load-bearing rather
718
+ than belt-and-braces. A sender key is the group material no ratchet
719
+ refreshes, so a member who holds it can read everything sent under it until
720
+ it rotates; membership changes normally force that sooner, and the age bound
721
+ is what covers a group whose membership never changes. A configured value
722
+ that is not a positive finite number now falls back to the default instead of
723
+ being used, since such a value states no policy at all and a zero is far more
724
+ often an unset field than a request to rotate constantly. Both the clamp and
725
+ the fallback log a warning.
726
+
727
+ - **`maxSenderKeyAge` is also bounded below, at one hour.** The interval had no
728
+ lower bound, and one that is too short fails in a way that is worse than not
729
+ rotating: expiry is enforced on the send path, which answers it by rotating
730
+ the key and fanning a distribution message out to every other member over
731
+ sequential network calls, then retrying the encrypt — against the age of the
732
+ key it just created. Configure an interval shorter than that fan-out takes
733
+ and the retry finds the new key expired too, so every group send fails
734
+ permanently, having burned a rotation and a message to every member on each
735
+ attempt. Since the field is milliseconds, a host that means fourteen days and
736
+ passes `14` reaches this, and it does so without ever sending a message that
737
+ would reveal the mistake in testing.
738
+
739
+ Values below the floor are raised to it with a warning rather than rejected.
740
+ Unlike the ceiling this is not a security bound — rotating sooner is strictly
741
+ safer — so the honest reading of an unreachably short interval is "rotate as
742
+ often as this implementation can actually deliver", which is what a host that
743
+ wants aggressive rotation was asking for. An hour clears the worst realistic
744
+ fan-out by a wide margin while leaving deliberately aggressive policies
745
+ intact, which a bound measured in days would not. `SENDER_KEY_AGE_FLOOR` is
746
+ exported alongside `SENDER_KEY_AGE_CEILING`.
747
+
748
+ Note what the clamp leaves you with if you hit it by mistake: a host that
749
+ passes `14` meaning days now rotates hourly, which is a distribution message
750
+ to every member of every group every hour. That is functional but not free,
751
+ and the warning is how you find out it is happening — which is the argument
752
+ for clamping rather than rejecting, since the alternative was group messaging
753
+ that simply did not work.
754
+
755
+ Separately, the expiry check no longer skips a locally generated key whose
756
+ stored creation time is missing or non-positive. Such a key is the one whose
757
+ life is genuinely unbounded, so waiving the age check on it exempted exactly
758
+ the case the check exists for; it is now treated as expired, which the send
759
+ path answers by rotating to a key whose age is known.
760
+
761
+ - **Sender key identifiers are now opaque random UUIDs, closing a group
762
+ metadata leak.** A sender key's id was built as
763
+ `groupId:userId:deviceId:timestamp`, and that id travels the wire as the
764
+ SenderKeyMessage `distribution_uuid` — a field outside the ciphertext that
765
+ every relay on the delivery path reads off each group message. Sealed sender
766
+ does not cover this: it conceals the frame from the relay but not from the
767
+ rest of the path, and a deployment may have it disabled. A passive observer
768
+ could therefore reconstruct group rosters by grouping messages on a field it
769
+ cannot be prevented from reading. Ids are now random UUIDv4s carrying no
770
+ group, sender, device, or clock, matching the reference implementation's
771
+ random distribution UUID. The sender-keys specification states the
772
+ requirement in a new section on identifier opacity. This also fixes a
773
+ rotation bug: receivers detect a rotation by
774
+ comparing the incoming id against their stored state, so two rotations inside
775
+ the same millisecond produced an identical id and the second went unnoticed —
776
+ the rotation tests previously needed a `Date.now()` mock advancing a
777
+ millisecond per call to stay green, and now run against the real clock.
778
+ - **BREAKING: the Expo store now keeps sender keys on the device instead of
779
+ sending them to a remote store.** Every sender-key and skipped-key operation
780
+ was proxied to an optional `ISignalProtocolRemoteSenderStateStore`, which
781
+ took the chain key and the sender's private signature key as parameters and
782
+ wrote them to whatever backend the application supplied. Those two values
783
+ together are enough to read every message on a sender's group chain and to
784
+ forge new ones, so a server holding them would nullify group message
785
+ confidentiality and authenticity; the skipped-key methods handed over the
786
+ message keys themselves. The reference implementation keeps its sender key
787
+ store local for exactly this reason. No shipped relay implemented the
788
+ interface, so in practice these calls threw and Expo group messaging did not
789
+ work at all — the fix is a real local implementation, not a guard.
790
+
791
+ Sender key records and skipped message keys now live in the Expo store's own
792
+ SQLCipher-encrypted database. The `sender_keys` table holds each record as
793
+ one row so a rotation's current and previous states can never be written
794
+ apart, and its `distribution_id` column is renamed `group_id` to match what
795
+ it has always contained. A new `skipped_sender_keys` table replaces the
796
+ remote skipped-key calls and bounds itself by evicting the lowest chain
797
+ indexes first.
798
+
799
+ `ISignalProtocolRemoteSenderStateStore` is removed, along with the `relay`
800
+ option on `expoStore()` and the corresponding `ExpoSignalProtocolStore`
801
+ constructor parameter. `expoStore({ relay })` becomes `expoStore()`. The
802
+ `sender_keys` schema change is not migrated: applications own Expo database
803
+ migrations, and any existing rows hold state that should not have left the
804
+ device.
805
+ - **Device teardown no longer orphans key material, and the provisioning cron
806
+ no longer risks stalling.** `purgeDeviceStorage` deleted at most 4096 rows
807
+ per prekey table in a single transaction and stopped there. A device's
808
+ one-time prekeys have no ceiling — the component marks a consumed prekey
809
+ rather than deleting it, and no cron reclaims consumed rows — so a
810
+ long-lived device could exceed that and leave the remainder behind, keyed to
811
+ a deviceId a later link reuses. Teardown now deletes a fixed budget and
812
+ schedules a continuation until nothing remains. The device's identity
813
+ registration is always deleted in the first pass and `fetchPreKeyBundle`
814
+ gates on that row, so the device is unreachable the moment teardown returns
815
+ even while the sweep continues. Separately, the provisioning cleanup cron
816
+ swept 100 sessions per transaction while each `linked_pending_ack` row
817
+ cascades into a full device teardown; a cron that exceeds Convex's
818
+ per-mutation limits does not degrade, it stalls, and expired sessions then
819
+ stop being reaped at all. That sweep now uses a batch of 10 and relies on
820
+ its existing self-reschedule for throughput.
821
+ - **Provisioning teardown now identifies the device it linked by an opaque
822
+ token rather than a millisecond timestamp.** Device rows are reused across
823
+ registrations, so rollback matched the device's `linkedAt` stamp to avoid
824
+ reaping a device the user had legitimately re-registered into the freed
825
+ slot. Two links landing in the same millisecond on the same slot produce
826
+ equal stamps, and teardown would then unlink the wrong — newer — device.
827
+ Every registration and link now mints a `linkToken`; it is never returned to
828
+ clients. A test that removes and re-registers without advancing the clock at
829
+ all fails against the old stamp comparison.
830
+ - **Removed five exported Convex row types that described tables no consumer
831
+ can read.** `ConvexIdentityKey`, `ConvexEcSignedPreKey`, `ConvexEcPreKey`,
832
+ `ConvexKemPreKey`, and `ConvexKemLastResortPreKey` were unreferenced and
833
+ every one of them disagreed with `component/schema.ts`: all five omitted the
834
+ `identityType` discriminator, `ConvexIdentityKey` claimed a `deviceId` and a
835
+ raw `publicKey` where the real table holds a per-account
836
+ `compositeIdentity`, and both one-time prekey types documented that keys are
837
+ "DELETED when consumed" when the component marks `consumedAt` and leaves the
838
+ row for the sweep. The premise was wrong to begin with — the component's
839
+ tables are isolated, so an application cannot obtain these rows under any
840
+ type. The file header claiming nine component tables, one of them a
841
+ `prekeyBundleFetches` table that no longer exists, is corrected. The
842
+ surviving `FetchedPreKeyBundle` is now derived from the component's own
843
+ return validator instead of hand-written, so it cannot drift again.
844
+ - **`ConvexSignalProtocolRelayApi` now carries real argument and return
845
+ types.** Its 43 function references were declared as bare
846
+ `FunctionReference<'mutation'>` / `<'query'>`, so every argument the relay
847
+ adapter passed to the component was `any` and a mismatch surfaced only as a
848
+ runtime validator rejection in the deployment. The type is now *derived*
849
+ from `defineConvexSignalProtocolBackend`'s return type via `ApiFromModules`
850
+ rather than restated by hand, which is what makes it meaningful — a
851
+ hand-written contract can drift from the functions it describes, and this
852
+ one had. The `getProvisioningMessage` return cast is removed as a
853
+ consequence: the reference now carries the component's own return
854
+ validator, so a component change that stops satisfying the interface fails
855
+ to compile instead of being cast away.
856
+ - **Fixed sealed-sender fallback detection**, which decided whether to retry a
857
+ failed sealed send on the identified path by testing whether the error
858
+ message contained the substring `'Unauthorized'`. That was wrong in both
859
+ directions: any unrelated failure whose message happened to contain the word
860
+ — a rate limit, an app-level wrapper — downgraded the send to identified
861
+ delivery and disclosed the sender to the relay, while a genuine
862
+ `code: 'UNAUTHORIZED'` rejection whose message did not spell the word went
863
+ undetected and surfaced as a hard send failure. Detection now reads the
864
+ structured `ConvexError` payload; the string contract is removed with no
865
+ fallback.
866
+ - **Rewrote `docs/SCHEMA.md`.** It described a 7-table schema the application
867
+ was instructed to define itself, with a multi-tenant `appId` column, index
868
+ names, a `deliveredAt` field, and a `sender_key_distribution` message type
869
+ that exist nowhere in the codebase, plus cleanup crons the component already
870
+ runs. The component owns all sixteen tables; the document now describes what
871
+ is stored, what the relay can and cannot see, and the real retention
872
+ behavior.
873
+
874
+ - **Sealed sender can now be enabled.** `oe-groups trust-root` exports the
875
+ Ed25519 sender-certificate root alongside the group trust root, printing both
876
+ labelled (`group trust root:` / `sealed sender trust root:`). Previously only
877
+ the group root was printed, so there was no supported way to obtain the value
878
+ clients pin in `sealedSender.trustRoots`; inbound sealed-sender validation
879
+ stayed disabled and every send fell back to identified delivery, disclosing
880
+ the sender to the relay. The derivation now lives in one shared module
881
+ (`internal/protocol/sealed-sender/trust-root`) used by both the CLI and the
882
+ relay's certificate issuance, so the printed root cannot drift from the key
883
+ the deployment signs with, and a contract test pins the two as equal.
884
+ Corrects the `sealedSender` configuration docs, which required a
885
+ `SEALED_SENDER_SIGNING_KEY` environment variable that has never existed.
886
+
887
+ - **`getProvisioningMessage` now returns `expiresAt`**, the session's absolute
888
+ deadline in epoch milliseconds (`null` when the session is unknown). The
889
+ Convex component already returned it, but the relay interface did not declare
890
+ it and the adapter cast it away, so no client could compute expiry locally.
891
+ The mock relay was brought to parity at the same time: it models the
892
+ acknowledgment's own TTL window granted by `completeProvisioning` — without
893
+ which a link completed near the deadline strands a device the client has
894
+ already persisted keys for — rejects expired sessions in
895
+ `connectNewDevice`, `sendProvisioningMessage`, `completeProvisioning`, and
896
+ `acknowledgeProvisioning`, and reports expiry as a computed status instead of
897
+ writing `expired` from inside a read. The shared relay contract suite now
898
+ pins all three behaviors.
899
+ - **Security (Convex component):** the component now declares
900
+ `OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET` as a typed component environment variable and
901
+ reads it through the declared-environment accessor. Convex components are
902
+ isolated from app deployment environment variables, so the previous
903
+ `process.env` read was unreachable in any real `app.use()` install and
904
+ every group, credential-issuance, and sender-certificate call failed at
905
+ runtime; apps must forward the secret with
906
+ `app.use(signalProtocol, { env: { OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET: app.env.OE_GROUPS_SERVER_SECRET } })`.
907
+ The test-only injection seam is now default-deny: it refuses configuration
908
+ outside a recognized test runner instead of allowing it whenever a
909
+ deployment marker is absent.
910
+ - **Breaking (relay API):** removed `getGroupMembers` from the relay surface
911
+ — the component, the app wrapper, `ConvexSignalProtocolRelayServer`, the
912
+ mock adapter (including its `setGroupMembers` test seam), and
913
+ `ISignalProtocolRelayServer`. The relay keeps no server-side group
914
+ membership map by design; relayed group sends now require
915
+ `SendOptions.groupMemberUserIds`, which the relay resolves to devices via
916
+ `getActiveDevices`. Group sends without a roster previously dropped the
917
+ message to zero recipients while reporting success.
918
+ - Fixed cross-sender message suppression: `clientMessageId` deduplication is
919
+ now scoped to the sending account. The key was previously
920
+ `(targetUserId, targetDeviceId, clientMessageId)`, so two senders that mint
921
+ non-random client message IDs — a counter or a timestamp — silently
922
+ suppressed each other's messages to a shared recipient, and the suppressed
923
+ sender was handed the other sender's message ID and server timestamp.
924
+ Same-sender retries still collapse as before.
925
+ - Documented two properties the component does not provide, both previously
926
+ unstated or overstated. **Group metadata privacy:** the relay can still
927
+ approximate a group's recipient set from delivery metadata — `messages` rows
928
+ carry a plaintext `groupId`, and the unencrypted `distributionUuid` in the
929
+ SenderKeyMessage frame embeds `groupId:senderUserId:senderDeviceId` — so the
930
+ component README's previous claim to keep no membership map has been
931
+ corrected to describe what removing `getGroupMembers` actually buys. Closing
932
+ the leak requires opaque distribution identifiers in the sender-key layer and
933
+ is tracked separately. **Device-scoped authorization:** `identify` resolves an
934
+ account, not a device, so every `deviceId` argument is a caller-chosen
935
+ routing selector and any session for an account can drain that account's
936
+ other device queues, send as any of its device IDs, and rotate any of its key
937
+ material.
938
+ - Fixed silent message loss for skipped multi-recipient sealed-sender
939
+ recipients: the client now consumes the server's `uuids404` list,
940
+ refreshes those users' device lists, and redelivers per-device instead of
941
+ discarding the field while reporting the send as delivered.
942
+ - Fixed provisioning acknowledgment data loss: completing a session now
943
+ grants the acknowledgment its own full session TTL (previously the ack
944
+ deadline was whatever remained of the original five-minute window, and
945
+ the every-minute cleanup cron could delete the freshly linked device
946
+ before the ack arrived), `acknowledgeProvisioning` rejects expired
947
+ sessions instead of racing the cron for the device's survival, and
948
+ session teardown deletes only the device the session created (matched by
949
+ its `linkedAt` stamp) with a full cascade of its key material, queued
950
+ messages, and heartbeats. Dead `patch`-before-`throw` writes that Convex
951
+ transaction rollback always discarded were removed, along with the never
952
+ persisted stored `expired` status; `getProvisioningMessage` now also
953
+ returns `expiresAt` so subscribed clients can compute expiry locally.
954
+ - Retry requests now expire with the same seven-day TTL as messages, backed
955
+ by an hourly cleanup cron; `getPendingMessages` and
956
+ `getPendingRetryRequests` filter expired rows at read time instead of
957
+ serving them until the next cron pass.
958
+ - Reduced write contention on the per-account identity row: mutations now
959
+ skip the account patch when the caller's identity bytes are unchanged,
960
+ instead of unconditionally rewriting the row (an OCC conflict hotspot
961
+ between a user's own concurrent mutations and sealed sends addressed to
962
+ them).
963
+ - Corrected the exported `FetchedPreKeyBundle` type to the actual wire shape
964
+ (`registrationId`, `ecSignedPreKey`, `ecOneTimePreKey`,
965
+ `kemLastResortPreKey`, `kemOneTimePreKey`); the previous declaration
966
+ omitted `registrationId` and named four of five fields incorrectly.
967
+ - `getActiveDevices` now caps its device scan at `MAX_DEVICES` instead of a
968
+ hardcoded 5, and the missing-snapshot guard in `getGroupChanges` throws
969
+ structured `ConvexError` data instead of a plain `Error`.
970
+ - Extended the installable Convex component to own the complete relay backend,
971
+ adding isolated devices, identity and prekey storage, message and retry
972
+ queues, provisioning sessions, and sender-certificate issuance behind five
973
+ new public wrapper namespaces.
974
+ - Added `@convex-dev/rate-limiter` as an optional child component and enforce a
975
+ ten-per-minute prekey-bundle fetch limit for each authenticated
976
+ fetcher/target pair.
977
+ - Standardized component rejections on structured `ConvexError` data carrying
978
+ `{ code, status, message }`, including sealed-sender authorization failures
979
+ that retain an `Unauthorized:` message prefix for current client fallback
980
+ handling.
981
+ - Added an installable Convex component defined as
982
+ `defineComponent('signalProtocol')`, with isolated group state, change, and
983
+ snapshot tables plus a `defineConvexSignalProtocolBackend()` app-wrapper
984
+ factory. The credential-issuance wrappers resolve application identity and
985
+ pass explicit ACI and optional PNI bytes into the component; group
986
+ operations remain authorized solely by their zero-knowledge presentations
987
+ and carry no caller identity.
988
+ - Added the `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/convex.config` export for mounting
989
+ the component with `app.use(signalProtocol)`.
990
+ - **Breaking (Convex group backend):** removed `defineConvexGroupServer`,
991
+ `defineConvexGroupServerForTest`, `convexGroupServerTables`, and the
992
+ `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/remote/relay/convex/server` export. The
993
+ pre-launch factory and app-owned tables are replaced directly by the
994
+ component and wrapper, with no compatibility aliases.
995
+
996
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.7
997
+
998
+ - **Security (Convex group server):** structured rejection data now survives
999
+ real deployments. Engine rejections and the adapter's own conflict and
1000
+ missing-group rejections are thrown as `ConvexError` values carrying
1001
+ `{ code, status, message }`; production Convex strips custom properties
1002
+ from plain errors, which silently disabled the client's documented
1003
+ `VERSION_CONFLICT` rebase-and-retry path on live deployments.
1004
+ - Fixed the Convex group server reading snapshots and changes through a
1005
+ partial index range with a post-filter, which scanned every stored row for
1006
+ the group on each lookup; catch-up reads for long-lived groups could exceed
1007
+ Convex transaction limits and permanently fail. Snapshot lookups now use
1008
+ the full compound index and change reads constrain the version range in
1009
+ the index.
1010
+ - **Security (groups):** the pending-member, requesting-member, and
1011
+ banned-member collections are now bounded by the same 1000-entry limit as
1012
+ full members, enforced during change application and on every validated
1013
+ state, with the client-side structural validation mirroring the caps. A
1014
+ single change could previously inflate a group's stored state without
1015
+ bound.
1016
+ - The Convex group server now derives its server parameters once per isolate
1017
+ and caches them keyed by the environment secret, instead of re-deriving on
1018
+ every request; the deployment seed is also zeroized when validation of the
1019
+ configured secret fails, and `identify()` returning no identity is
1020
+ rejected with a structured `UNAUTHORIZED` error instead of a `TypeError`.
1021
+ - Fixed `oe-groups trust-root` failing on Windows by importing its runtime
1022
+ modules via `file://` URLs.
1023
+ - **Security (relay group bridge):** `ConvexSignalProtocolRelayServer.submitGroupChange`
1024
+ now rejects legacy six-argument submissions carrying a caller-selected
1025
+ epoch, matching `ConvexGroupServer`'s S13 guard; the relay bridge is now
1026
+ certified by its own run of the §14 conformance suite, and endorsement
1027
+ issuance is cryptographically verified against the reference server in the
1028
+ parity suite.
1029
+ - Documented that the Convex group-server modules must be mounted inside the
1030
+ relay's generated `api.signal` namespace (`convex/signal/groups.ts` and
1031
+ `convex/signal/zkAuth.ts`); the previous top-level placement compiled
1032
+ cleanly but never enabled the relay's `groupServer` capability. Also
1033
+ documented snapshot-retention growth, the placeholder-PNI prohibition for
1034
+ `identify()`, and updated `docs/DEVIATIONS.md` to describe the enforcing
1035
+ group server and its unblinded profile-key issuance deviation.
1036
+ - Added the production `defineConvexGroupServer` integration at
1037
+ `@open-e2ee/signal-protocol-sdk/remote/relay/convex/server`, including
1038
+ package-scoped canonical-state, signed-change, and historical-snapshot
1039
+ tables; S1–S14 enforcement; auth/profile-key credential issuance;
1040
+ group-send endorsements; environment-secret custody; and the
1041
+ `oe-groups trust-root` CLI. Profile-key credential issuance receives the
1042
+ raw profile key and is not blinded. The public
1043
+ `ConvexSignalProtocolRelayApi` now makes `groups` and `zkAuth` optional,
1044
+ and the relay advertises its `groupServer` capability only when both API
1045
+ modules are configured.
1046
+ - **Breaking (groups):** client configuration now accepts one versioned,
1047
+ serialized `trustRoot` instead of separate credential, change-signing,
1048
+ profile-key credential, and endorsement trust fields. Group identities are
1049
+ derived from the client's own identity configuration, and group state
1050
+ defaults to the SDK storage layer. Relays may expose an optional
1051
+ `groupServer` capability containing the server and credential-issuance
1052
+ transports; clients use it automatically while retaining explicit server
1053
+ and issuer overrides for custom deployments. Configuring groups without
1054
+ either the relay capability or complete explicit overrides now fails with a
1055
+ targeted configuration error, and configured endorsement verification must
1056
+ match the endorsement root in the pinned blob. No compatibility aliases are
1057
+ provided.
1058
+ - **Breaking (groups): removed the borrowed `v2` naming from the group
1059
+ system.** `GroupsV2Manager` is now `GroupManager`,
1060
+ `GroupsV2ManagerOptions` is now `GroupManagerOptions`, the client
1061
+ configuration key is now `groups`, and the client group methods no longer
1062
+ carry a `V2` suffix. The implementation now lives entirely under
1063
+ `internal/groups/`. No compatibility aliases are provided.
1064
+ - **Breaking (group identifiers):** `GROUP_V2_PREFIX` is now
1065
+ `GROUP_ID_PREFIX`, and group IDs use the package-owned
1066
+ `open-e2ee:group:` prefix. The pre-launch prefix has no migration or
1067
+ dual-read path.
1068
+ - **Breaking (group validation):** `validateChange` is now
1069
+ `validateChangeStructure` to make clear that it checks well-formedness, not
1070
+ authorization. It now rejects already-banned additions and promotion
1071
+ targets that are absent after explicit ACI/PNI-to-ServiceId widening.
1072
+ - **Breaking (group membership):** group setup now requires the account's
1073
+ profile-key credential issuer, trust root, and 32-byte profile key.
1074
+ `createGroup()` and `addGroupMember()` accept either a target with verified
1075
+ presentation material for an immediate add or a ServiceId-only invitation;
1076
+ invited targets call `acceptGroupMemberInvitation()` and present their own
1077
+ profile key. The old `{ aciBytes, profileKey }` direct-add path is removed,
1078
+ and runtime inputs must match exactly one variant's complete field and byte
1079
+ domains instead of being omitted, partially discarded, or processed
1080
+ ambiguously.
1081
+ - Fixed pending-member promotion comparing 16-byte ACI/PNI values directly
1082
+ with 17-byte ServiceIds, silently skipping valid promotions. Promotions now
1083
+ fail when the pending entry is absent or the destination is already a
1084
+ member, preserve the invited role, and apply in the normative action order.
1085
+ - Fixed `AccessRequired.ANY` excluding non-members, and implemented the full
1086
+ target-sensitive group authorization table including self-leave,
1087
+ self-decline, self-withdraw, invite-link requests, and member-label access.
1088
+ - Fixed group mutations encoding their editor as a raw 16-byte ACI instead of
1089
+ a canonical 17-byte ServiceId, and consistently use full ServiceIds for
1090
+ authorization principals and banned-member checks.
1091
+ - Fixed encrypted group state storing only the 32-byte group identifier in
1092
+ `publicKey`; it now stores the canonical 96-byte serialized
1093
+ `GroupPublicParams` required for credential verification.
1094
+ - **Breaking (group server contract):** group changes now carry exact
1095
+ server-accepted `actions`, `changeEpoch`, and the independently presented
1096
+ invite-link password; clients no longer submit a replacement encrypted
1097
+ snapshot. Group servers must also implement the password-gated reduced
1098
+ `getGroupJoinInfo` read and exact-version `getGroup` snapshots for race-safe
1099
+ post-join baselines. Every full-state response now carries a
1100
+ `baselineSignature` over its group ID, version, and exact encrypted-state
1101
+ bytes; clients accept signed snapshots only for a first baseline or after
1102
+ their own verified revocation ends an entitlement span. Change submissions
1103
+ no longer carry a caller-selected epoch: the server derives epoch 0, 5, or
1104
+ 6 from the canonical accepted actions and signs it, and clients recompute
1105
+ the same value exactly before applying the change.
1106
+ - **Security (groups):** every applied change is now checked for its server
1107
+ signature, group binding, strict sequence, pre-state authorization, and
1108
+ structural validity. Signatures bind the exact accepted actions together
1109
+ with their compatibility epoch.
1110
+ - **Breaking (group state storage):** `IGroupStateStore` now atomically stores
1111
+ accepted state with a durable sender-key rotation barrier and exposes
1112
+ revision-checked barrier read/clear methods. Removal, ban, and termination
1113
+ block every group-send path until rotation succeeds, including after
1114
+ callback failure or client reconstruction. Endorsement invalidation remains
1115
+ non-fatal.
1116
+ - **Security (group sending):** managed groups now require verified accepted
1117
+ state at send time showing an unterminated group, current ACI membership,
1118
+ and no ban on either of the sender's own identifiers. A stored master key
1119
+ with missing state fails closed until sync restores a verified baseline;
1120
+ ad-hoc sender-key groups with no group master key remain unaffected.
1121
+ - **Security (group governance):** every non-terminated group must retain at
1122
+ least one stored administrator. Creation, server-side atomic application,
1123
+ complete-state client transitions, and signed baselines enforce the same
1124
+ result-state invariant; last administrators may leave only while installing
1125
+ a successor atomically. The deliberately member-free invite-link projection
1126
+ remains private and is exempt only for its single additive self-join or
1127
+ self-request action, with direct membership installed through the complete
1128
+ signed baseline that follows.
1129
+ - **Security (groups):** authentication credentials now represent a missing
1130
+ PNI as true absence instead of a shared nil-UUID principal. Issuance and
1131
+ client encryption/decryption reject nil identifiers; the reference server
1132
+ applies ACI/PNI alias matching to roles, reads, bans, deterministic
1133
+ attribution, and requester-specific pending status without attempting to
1134
+ decrypt opaque identifiers.
1135
+ - **Security (groups):** access-control fields now enforce their
1136
+ specification-defined domains on creation, mutation, and decryption.
1137
+ Out-of-domain hostile state fails closed, so `members = ANY` cannot become a
1138
+ password-free self-add or third-party recruitment path.
1139
+ - **Security (groups):** every creation or action path that introduces or
1140
+ changes a profile-key ciphertext now requires a credential presentation
1141
+ bound to the submitted ACI, profile key, and group. Missing, empty, or
1142
+ mismatched proofs are rejected, pending invitations carry no profile
1143
+ material, and verified request credentials are stripped before state or
1144
+ signed history is persisted.
1145
+ - **Security (group creation):** creation submissions no longer carry
1146
+ client-asserted invitation provenance or pre-existing requesting and banned
1147
+ entries. The enforcing server derives the creator and timestamp, signs only
1148
+ canonical version zero, and the creator verifies and caches that exact
1149
+ baseline instead of its optimistic submission.
1150
+ - **Security (groups):** group actions now have exact per-action field
1151
+ surfaces. The reference relay rejects client-asserted inviters, timestamps,
1152
+ join revisions, labels, and PNIs where those fields are not defined; derives
1153
+ accepted provenance and join metadata itself; and signs only that canonical
1154
+ form. One shared exhaustive wire-domain validator makes the reference server
1155
+ reject malformed submissions before applying or signing and makes clients
1156
+ reject malformed signed actions and baselines before decrypting or
1157
+ installing them, including wrong primitive, container, byte, enum,
1158
+ timestamp, and join-revision types.
1159
+ - **Security (groups):** nil or undecryptable pending, requesting, and banned
1160
+ entry targets are now retained byte-for-byte as inert quarantined entries
1161
+ instead of making a signed revision permanently unappliable. Activation
1162
+ targets remain strict, and administrator delete actions can remove
1163
+ quarantined entries by their preserved ciphertext.
1164
+ - **Security (groups):** change-log reads in the executable reference server
1165
+ are authorized at the requested historical snapshot and include the first
1166
+ signed transition that removes, bans, or un-invites the requester, while
1167
+ withholding every later transition.
1168
+ - Fixed PNI-to-ACI promotion when both ACI- and PNI-keyed invitations exist.
1169
+ Equal-role aliases are consumed atomically into one ACI member; conflicting
1170
+ roles are rejected by both authorization monitors and can be resolved by
1171
+ declining either invitation before promotion. Self-decline attribution now
1172
+ follows the invitation alias named by the action, including when the same
1173
+ requester also matches an ACI membership.
1174
+ - **Breaking (groups):** omitting `serverSigningPublicKey` no longer silently
1175
+ selects unsigned group history. Deployments without a conforming signing
1176
+ server must explicitly set `allowUnauthenticatedGroupHistory: true`, which
1177
+ continues to emit the documented security warning.
1178
+ - The development-only in-memory relay is now the executable reference for the
1179
+ complete encrypted group-server authorization contract: zk presentation
1180
+ verification, server-derived requester attribution, pre-state authorization,
1181
+ atomic sequencing, group binding, exact-byte signing, reduced invite reads,
1182
+ independent invite-password checks, ACI/PNI field separation, and
1183
+ representation-independent structural validation. Repeated invite joins are
1184
+ idempotent. No production enforcing group server is supplied; explicitly
1185
+ opting into operation without a pinned signing key emits the documented
1186
+ non-conforming-deployment warning.
1187
+ - Fixed `deserializeGroupPublicParams()` calling CommonJS `require()` from the
1188
+ ESM package, which crashed the first real server-side group credential
1189
+ verification before the proof could be checked.
1190
+
1191
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.6
1192
+
1193
+ - **Breaking (key derivation): the X3DH and PQXDH info strings now name this
1194
+ application and this KEM.** `X3DH_INFO_DEFAULT` becomes `OpenE2EE` and
1195
+ `PQXDH_INFO_DEFAULT` becomes `OpenE2EE_X25519_SHA-256_ML-KEM-1024`; they were
1196
+ `WhisperText` and `WhisperText_X25519_SHA-256_CRYSTALS-KYBER-1024`. Both
1197
+ parameters were wrong. PQXDH §2.2 requires the info string to name the
1198
+ `pqkem` actually in use, and the SDK runs ML-KEM-1024 (FIPS 203), not
1199
+ round-3 CRYSTALS-Kyber — so two implementations feeding an identical label
1200
+ derived _different_ shared secrets, which is precisely what the info string
1201
+ exists to prevent. And §2.1 defines `info` as an identifier of the
1202
+ application deriving the key; this SDK is not Signal Messenger. **Sessions
1203
+ established under the old labels derive a different `SK` and cannot be
1204
+ continued** — clear session state or re-establish. Nothing else about the
1205
+ derivation changed. An application that needs `libsignal`'s known-answer
1206
+ vectors can still set `protocolStrategy.keyExchangeInfoString` to the old
1207
+ label explicitly. `docs/DEVIATIONS.md` §2.1 recorded this as an open
1208
+ specification violation and now records it as fixed.
1209
+ - **Breaking (naming): every remaining exported identifier spelled `Signal`
1210
+ now spells `SignalProtocol`.** "Signal" alone names a product and an
1211
+ organization this project has no affiliation with; the specifications it
1212
+ implements are the Signal Protocol, and the exported names now say so. This
1213
+ renames roughly ninety exports — `MockSignalStore` to
1214
+ `MockSignalProtocolStore`, `ISignalLocalStore` to `ISignalProtocolLocalStore`,
1215
+ `SignalServiceCipher` to `SignalProtocolServiceCipher`, `defaultSignalLogger`
1216
+ to `defaultSignalProtocolLogger`, `SignalMessage` and `PreKeySignalMessage` to
1217
+ `SignalProtocolMessage` and `PreKeySignalProtocolMessage`, and so on
1218
+ throughout. No aliases are provided. Nothing on the wire changes: the message
1219
+ type names were protobuf type labels, which protobuf does not serialize, and
1220
+ every domain-separation and key-derivation constant is untouched — including
1221
+ the `Signal_ZKGroup_*`, `Signal_ZKCredential_*`, and `Signal_PQCKA_*`
1222
+ families, which are byte inputs to key derivation rather than names.
1223
+ - The public-surface guard now asserts that each retired name stays absent, and
1224
+ is typechecked in CI. It is entirely type-level, so running it under jest —
1225
+ which transpiles without typechecking — could never have failed; only `tsc`
1226
+ can catch a reintroduced name.
1227
+ - **Breaking (`SessionEstablisher`): `failedDeviceErrors` is now required.** The
1228
+ exported `SessionEstablisher` type declared it optional, so an implementation
1229
+ could return a result that said nothing about which devices failed and why.
1230
+ Every implementation must now return the array; return `[]` when nothing
1231
+ failed. Implementations that already populate it need no change.
1232
+ - Changed device establishment to surface a failing device's own error instead
1233
+ of a generic wrapper, and to route it through the retry classifier so a
1234
+ transient failure is retried rather than failing the whole send on the first
1235
+ attempt.
1236
+ - Fixed the retry classifier treating permanent session-establishment failures
1237
+ as retryable. `UNTRUSTED_IDENTITY`, `SIGNATURE_VERIFICATION_FAILED`,
1238
+ `RECIPIENT_NOT_REGISTERED`, and `PREKEY_FETCH_RATE_LIMITED` now fail
1239
+ immediately. They reach the classifier only because of the change above;
1240
+ retrying a security event delays it reaching the caller, and retrying a
1241
+ prekey-drainage rate limit aggravates the condition it reports.
1242
+ - Fixed the exported in-memory relay delivering reorder-buffered envelopes to a
1243
+ first subscriber, which duplicated messages that reordering had already held
1244
+ back, and fixed reorder state being lost when a subscriber was replaced.
1245
+
1246
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.5
1247
+
1248
+ - **Breaking (wording and one error message): "Signal" is no longer used as a
1249
+ loose shorthand.** Prose names the specifications "the Signal Protocol", the
1250
+ product "Signal Messenger", and the reference implementation `libsignal`;
1251
+ shipped source comments say "the reference implementation". Compatibility
1252
+ shorthand such as "Signal-style", "Signal-aligned", and "Signal-grade" is
1253
+ gone. Protocol domain-separation strings are untouched and remain
1254
+ byte-identical. The Expo storage error message no longer carries a "Signal
1255
+ Protocol " prefix; it now reads `Expo storage DB bindings not configured.
1256
+ Configure them from the host app before using Expo storage.` Anything
1257
+ matching on that text must be updated.
1258
+ - Corrected group-system source comments that described the permission model as
1259
+ server-enforced. The checks in `access-control.ts` run on the client over
1260
+ already-decrypted state and bind an honest client, not a hostile one — the
1261
+ server sees only opaque state and a version number. Change application order
1262
+ is this SDK's own choice, taken from the proto field numbering for
1263
+ determinism, not an order the specifications define; and the SDK does not
1264
+ encrypt avatar content.
1265
+ - Changed the exported in-memory relay to upsert EC and KEM one-time prekeys by
1266
+ `keyId`. Re-uploading a batch is now idempotent; consumers that relied on
1267
+ duplicate uploads inflating prekey counts will observe the corrected count.
1268
+ - Changed the exported in-memory relay to enforce device IDs 1-5 and the
1269
+ production-contract `Maximum devices limit reached` error. Removed and
1270
+ disabled devices are excluded from active fanout, and unknown users now have
1271
+ no invented device.
1272
+ - Fixed `MockSignalProtocolRelayServer.clear()` retaining idempotency receipts, which
1273
+ made a reused `clientMessageId` look already accepted after reset.
1274
+ - Fixed the exported mock store and relay to structured-clone mutable values at
1275
+ every persistence/API boundary, matching serialization ownership in durable
1276
+ adapters for sessions, users, devices, prekeys, sender keys, and envelopes.
1277
+ - Added opt-in, seeded mock failure controls for latency, disconnect/reconnect,
1278
+ duplicate and reordered delivery, storage writes, authorization rejection,
1279
+ and one-time-prekey exhaustion. Default construction is unchanged.
1280
+ - Fixed duplicate relay delivery requesting a SESAME resend after the session
1281
+ layer had already rejected the replay, which could surface plaintext twice.
1282
+ Duplicate envelopes are now acknowledged without a retry request.
1283
+ - Fixed session-establishment persistence failures being misreported as a
1284
+ problem with the peer. An adapter failure at the atomic commit seam now
1285
+ surfaces as `KEY_STORAGE_ERROR` with the adapter failure retained as the
1286
+ cause, instead of `RECIPIENT_NOT_REGISTERED` or `INVALID_PREKEY_BUNDLE`, so
1287
+ applications retry their own storage rather than refetching a bundle.
1288
+ - Added shared storage contracts for Mock, Node, Web/IndexedDB, and Expo
1289
+ adapters, plus an extensible relay contract. Fixed Web/IndexedDB `UserRecord`
1290
+ decoding so `DeviceRecord.identityKey` remains an owned `Uint8Array`.
1291
+ - Documentation now labels mock examples as real protocol and cryptography over
1292
+ simulated in-memory infrastructure. CI executes every classified mock snippet
1293
+ from the shipped onboarding, recipe, composition, and pricing docs against
1294
+ the packed package.
1295
+ - Fixed the npm publish workflow folding registry warnings into the value it
1296
+ read as the current `latest` version. A warning containing a hyphen parsed as
1297
+ a prerelease, which after a stable release would have routed a prerelease to
1298
+ the `latest` dist-tag.
1299
+
1300
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.4
1301
+
1302
+ - **Security: a forged message header could force unbounded key derivation
1303
+ before authentication.** When an inbound message triggered a DH ratchet, the
1304
+ loop that drains the previous receiving chain ran once per message claimed by
1305
+ the header's `previousCounter` field — an attacker-controlled value that is
1306
+ not authenticated, and cannot be, because the message key that would
1307
+ authenticate it is what the loop derives. A single forged header could
1308
+ therefore pin a CPU and grow the session record without bound, from an
1309
+ unauthenticated sender. The catch-up is now bounded by the same skip limit
1310
+ that already governed the current chain, and rejects before deriving or
1311
+ storing anything.
1312
+ - **Fixed: registration IDs could be generated as `16384`,** one past the 14
1313
+ bits the wire format reserves. Multi-recipient sealed sender masks with
1314
+ `0x3FFF` rather than rejecting, so such an ID was written to the wire as `0`,
1315
+ affecting roughly 1 install in 16,384. The range is now `[1, 16383]`.
1316
+ - Fixed: the `AuthCredentialPresentation` documentation stated its privacy
1317
+ property backwards, describing the server as able to decrypt the ACI and PNI
1318
+ ciphertexts to learn which member is authenticating. The server verifies the
1319
+ proof without learning the member; only holders of the group's secret params
1320
+ can decrypt. The comment ships in the public package.
1321
+ - Docs: `docs/DEVIATIONS.md` records where this profile follows, deliberately
1322
+ departs from, and extends the Signal Protocol specifications, and states
1323
+ plainly that the SDK is not wire-compatible with Signal Messenger or
1324
+ `libsignal`.
1325
+
1326
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.3
1327
+
1328
+ - Fix: the first inbound responder session is no longer archived into itself
1329
+ when a storage adapter surfaces device records synthesized from live protocol
1330
+ state; SESAME device state is snapshotted before protocol decryption, so a
1331
+ brand-new session can never appear pre-existing. Receiving on that session
1332
+ now records responder metadata correctly.
1333
+ - Tests: the SESAME "Receiving Messages" spec suite now exercises the real
1334
+ SesameManager end to end (previously a file-local mock), covering active-
1335
+ session receive, responder synchronization, delayed and out-of-order
1336
+ delivery, transactional PreKey persistence, and identity replacement.
1337
+
1338
+ ## 0.1.0-alpha.2
1339
+
1340
+ - **Fixed: every first message from a new contact was reported as an identity
1341
+ key change.** The receiver pinned a device's identity as the bare 32-byte
1342
+ X25519 key but compared incoming PreKeyMessages against the 67-byte versioned
1343
+ X25519 + Ed25519 composite tuple. The two encodings could never be equal, so
1344
+ first contact logged a SECURITY warning, fired `onIdentityKeyChanged` and
1345
+ `onSecurityEvent('identity_key_changed')`, and set `pendingVerification` -
1346
+ which gates sending. Apps surfacing those events showed a "safety number
1347
+ changed" warning to users who had never talked before, training them to
1348
+ dismiss the one warning that matters. First contact is now trust-on-first-use
1349
+ as documented; a genuine identity change on an already-pinned device still
1350
+ raises the event.
1351
+ - **`DeviceRecord.identityKey` is now always the 67-byte composite tuple**, the
1352
+ same identity the relay publishes and safety numbers are computed over, so
1353
+ pinning and verification finally refer to the same thing. Zero length still
1354
+ means unpinned. `SesameManager.addDevice()` and `syncDeviceList()` reject
1355
+ identity bytes that are not a valid composite tuple instead of pinning a
1356
+ partial key. **Breaking for persisted state:** device records written by
1357
+ `0.1.0-alpha.1` hold 32-byte keys and will be treated as a changed identity.
1358
+ No migration is provided - this is pre-`1.0` and the alpha is not deployed;
1359
+ clear device records or re-pair.
1360
+ - Fixed the mock storage adapter unpinning a device as soon as its session was
1361
+ archived, and dropping `pendingVerification`, which defeated the send gate.
1362
+ - Fixed `syncDeviceList()` treating a device list carrying no identity keys as
1363
+ an identity change for every device, dropping live sessions and raising a
1364
+ security event on each sync.
1365
+ - Added `keys.canonicalizeDeviceIdentityKey()`, `keys.isValidDeviceIdentityKey()`,
1366
+ `keys.compareDeviceIdentityKeys()`, and `keys.UNPINNED_DEVICE_IDENTITY_KEY`.
1367
+ - Docs: signed prekey and Kyber last-resort prekey rotation is driven by
1368
+ `KEY_REFRESH_INTERVAL_MS_DEFAULT` (2 days), not the weekly cadence the JSDoc
1369
+ and prekey docs claimed. `docs/ERROR_HANDLING.md` no longer references a
1370
+ `signal.trustIdentity()` method that does not exist; the real API is
1371
+ `acceptIdentityRotation()`.
1372
+
3
1373
  ## 0.1.0-alpha.1
4
1374
 
5
1375
  - Initial public alpha for the OpenE2EE Signal Protocol SDK's independently versioned,