@oneuptime/common 14.0.10 → 14.0.12

package/Tests/Server/Middleware/McpDelegationAuthorization.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,862 @@
+import {
+  afterEach,
+  beforeEach,
+  describe,
+  expect,
+  jest,
+  test,
+} from "@jest/globals";
+
+/*
+ * PasswordHash carries a pre-existing TS5.9 diagnostic that fails any suite
+ * whose runtime require graph reaches it; nothing password-related is under
+ * test here, so it is replaced with a factory.
+ */
+jest.mock("../../../Server/Utils/PasswordHash", () => {
+  return {
+    __esModule: true,
+    default: {
+      hash: jest.fn(),
+      verify: jest.fn(),
+      generateSalt: jest.fn(),
+      needsUpgrade: jest.fn(),
+      applyPepper: jest.fn(),
+    },
+  };
+});
+
+jest.mock("../../../Server/Utils/Logger", () => {
+  return {
+    __esModule: true,
+    default: {
+      debug: jest.fn(),
+      info: jest.fn(),
+      warn: jest.fn(),
+      error: jest.fn(),
+    },
+    getLogAttributesFromRequest: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({}),
+  };
+});
+
+jest.mock("../../../Server/Utils/Response", () => {
+  return {
+    __esModule: true,
+    default: {
+      sendErrorResponse: jest.fn(),
+    },
+  };
+});
+
+import McpDelegationAuthorization from "../../../Server/Middleware/McpDelegationAuthorization";
+import AccessTokenService from "../../../Server/Services/AccessTokenService";
+import ProjectService from "../../../Server/Services/ProjectService";
+import TeamMemberService from "../../../Server/Services/TeamMemberService";
+import UserService from "../../../Server/Services/UserService";
+import {
+  ExpressRequest,
+  ExpressResponse,
+  NextFunction,
+  OneUptimeRequest,
+} from "../../../Server/Utils/Express";
+import McpDelegationToken, {
+  McpDelegationClaims,
+} from "../../../Server/Utils/Mcp/McpDelegationToken";
+import McpOAuthConfig from "../../../Server/Utils/Mcp/McpOAuthConfig";
+import Response from "../../../Server/Utils/Response";
+import Email from "../../../Types/Email";
+import BadDataException from "../../../Types/Exception/BadDataException";
+import Exception from "../../../Types/Exception/Exception";
+import ExceptionCode from "../../../Types/Exception/ExceptionCode";
+import ExceptionMessages from "../../../Types/Exception/ExceptionMessages";
+import NotAuthenticatedException from "../../../Types/Exception/NotAuthenticatedException";
+import Name from "../../../Types/Name";
+import ObjectID from "../../../Types/ObjectID";
+import Permission, {
+  UserGlobalAccessPermission,
+  UserTenantAccessPermission,
+} from "../../../Types/Permission";
+import UserType from "../../../Types/UserType";
+import { getJestSpyOn } from "../../Spy";
+
+/*
+ * How the API authorizes a request the MCP server makes for a member who
+ * connected an MCP client with OAuth.
+ *
+ * The delegation token is the only thing standing between "an MCP client that
+ * may read one project" and "a full session for that member", so this suite
+ * pins both halves:
+ *
+ *   WHAT IS REFUSED - every way of presenting the header that is not a valid,
+ *   current token minted by this server; a blocked member; a member who has
+ *   left the project; the header together with an API key.
+ *
+ *   WHAT A VALID TOKEN IS WORTH - the member's identity, in exactly ONE
+ *   project (the token's, whatever the request's own headers say), as a User
+ *   and never a MasterAdmin, with the member's live permissions, read-only
+ *   when the grant is.
+ *
+ * Tokens are minted with the real McpDelegationToken, so the verification
+ * here is the real one. Only the services that reach Postgres are stubbed.
+ */
+
+type SpyInstance = ReturnType<typeof getJestSpyOn>;
+type MockedFn = ReturnType<typeof jest.fn>;
+
+const sendErrorResponseMock: MockedFn =
+  Response.sendErrorResponse as unknown as MockedFn;
+
+const HEADER: string = "x-oneuptime-mcp-delegation";
+
+const USER_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID("11111111-1111-4111-8111-111111111111");
+const PROJECT_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID(
+  "22222222-2222-4222-8222-222222222222",
+);
+const OTHER_PROJECT_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID(
+  "33333333-3333-4333-8333-333333333333",
+);
+const THIRD_PROJECT_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID(
+  "44444444-4444-4444-8444-444444444444",
+);
+const GRANT_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID("55555555-5555-4555-8555-555555555555");
+const TEAM_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID("66666666-6666-4666-8666-666666666666");
+
+const CLIENT_ID: string = "https://claude.ai/oauth/mcp-client-metadata";
+const CLIENT_NAME: string = "Claude";
+
+const claimsWith: (
+  overrides?: Partial<McpDelegationClaims>,
+) => McpDelegationClaims = (
+  overrides: Partial<McpDelegationClaims> = {},
+): McpDelegationClaims => {
+  return {
+    userId: USER_ID,
+    userEmail: new Email("member@example.com"),
+    userName: "Mia Member",
+    projectId: PROJECT_ID,
+    grantId: GRANT_ID,
+    clientId: CLIENT_ID,
+    clientName: CLIENT_NAME,
+    canWrite: true,
+    ...overrides,
+  };
+};
+
+const mintToken: (
+  overrides?: Partial<McpDelegationClaims>,
+  now?: Date,
+) => string = (
+  overrides: Partial<McpDelegationClaims> = {},
+  now?: Date,
+): string => {
+  return McpDelegationToken.sign(claimsWith(overrides), now);
+};
+
+const buildRequest: (
+  headers: Record<string, string | Array<string>>,
+  body?: Record<string, unknown>,
+) => ExpressRequest = (
+  headers: Record<string, string | Array<string>>,
+  body: Record<string, unknown> = {},
+): ExpressRequest => {
+  return {
+    headers,
+    body,
+    params: {},
+    query: {},
+    cookies: {},
+  } as unknown as ExpressRequest;
+};
+
+const globalPermission: () => UserGlobalAccessPermission =
+  (): UserGlobalAccessPermission => {
+    return {
+      _type: "UserGlobalAccessPermission",
+      projectIds: [OTHER_PROJECT_ID, PROJECT_ID, THIRD_PROJECT_ID],
+      globalPermissions: [
+        Permission.Public,
+        Permission.User,
+        Permission.CurrentUser,
+      ],
+    };
+  };
+
+const tenantPermission: () => UserTenantAccessPermission =
+  (): UserTenantAccessPermission => {
+    return {
+      _type: "UserTenantAccessPermission",
+      projectId: PROJECT_ID,
+      permissions: [
+        {
+          _type: "UserPermission",
+          permission: Permission.ProjectMember,
+          labelIds: [],
+        },
+        {
+          _type: "UserPermission",
+          permission: Permission.ReadProjectIncident,
+          labelIds: [],
+        },
+      ],
+    };
+  };
+
+describe("McpDelegationAuthorization", () => {
+  const res: ExpressResponse = {} as ExpressResponse;
+
+  let next: MockedFn;
+  let isEnabledSpy: SpyInstance;
+  let isUserBlockedSpy: SpyInstance;
+  let userLastActiveSpy: SpyInstance;
+  let projectLastActiveSpy: SpyInstance;
+  let globalPermissionSpy: SpyInstance;
+  let tenantPermissionSpy: SpyInstance;
+  let teamIdsSpy: SpyInstance;
+
+  let cachedGlobalPermission: UserGlobalAccessPermission;
+  let cachedTenantPermission: UserTenantAccessPermission;
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    jest.clearAllMocks();
+
+    next = jest.fn();
+
+    cachedGlobalPermission = globalPermission();
+    cachedTenantPermission = tenantPermission();
+
+    isEnabledSpy = getJestSpyOn(McpOAuthConfig, "isEnabled").mockReturnValue(
+      true,
+    );
+    isUserBlockedSpy = getJestSpyOn(
+      UserService,
+      "isUserBlocked",
+    ).mockResolvedValue(false);
+    userLastActiveSpy = getJestSpyOn(
+      UserService,
+      "updateLastActive",
+    ).mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    projectLastActiveSpy = getJestSpyOn(
+      ProjectService,
+      "updateLastActive",
+    ).mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    globalPermissionSpy = getJestSpyOn(
+      AccessTokenService,
+      "getUserGlobalAccessPermission",
+    ).mockResolvedValue(cachedGlobalPermission);
+    tenantPermissionSpy = getJestSpyOn(
+      AccessTokenService,
+      "getUserTenantAccessPermission",
+    ).mockResolvedValue(cachedTenantPermission);
+    teamIdsSpy = getJestSpyOn(
+      TeamMemberService,
+      "getTeamIdsForUser",
+    ).mockResolvedValue([TEAM_ID]);
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  /*
+   * The middleware answers refusals itself (Response.sendErrorResponse) and
+   * must never reject: Express 4 does not catch a rejected async middleware.
+   */
+  const authorize: (req: ExpressRequest) => Promise<void> = async (
+    req: ExpressRequest,
+  ): Promise<void> => {
+    await expect(
+      McpDelegationAuthorization.authorize(
+        req,
+        res,
+        next as unknown as NextFunction,
+      ),
+    ).resolves.toBeUndefined();
+  };
+
+  const refusal: () => Exception = (): Exception => {
+    expect(sendErrorResponseMock).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    expect(next).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+
+    return sendErrorResponseMock.mock.calls[0]![2] as Exception;
+  };
+
+  const expectNoIdentity: (req: ExpressRequest) => void = (
+    req: ExpressRequest,
+  ): void => {
+    const oneuptimeRequest: OneUptimeRequest = req as OneUptimeRequest;
+
+    expect(oneuptimeRequest.userAuthorization).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(oneuptimeRequest.userType).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(oneuptimeRequest.tenantId).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(oneuptimeRequest.mcpOAuth).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(oneuptimeRequest.userGlobalAccessPermission).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(oneuptimeRequest.userTenantAccessPermission).toBeUndefined();
+    expect(oneuptimeRequest.userTeamIds).toBeUndefined();
+  };
+
+  const expectAccepted: () => void = (): void => {
+    expect(sendErrorResponseMock).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    expect(next).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    // next() with no argument: an argument would be routed as an error.
+    expect(next.mock.calls[0]).toEqual([]);
+  };
+
+  describe("hasDelegationToken", () => {
+    test("is true for a valid token", () => {
+      expect(
+        McpDelegationAuthorization.hasDelegationToken(
+          buildRequest({ [HEADER]: mintToken() }),
+        ),
+      ).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    const presentButUseless: Array<[string, string | Array<string>]> = [
+      ["garbage", "not-a-token"],
+      ["an empty value", ""],
+      ["whitespace", "   "],
+      ["a repeated header", ["a", "b"]],
+    ];
+
+    test.each(presentButUseless)(
+      "is true for %s: presence, not validity, is what claims the request",
+      (_label: string, value: string | Array<string>) => {
+        expect(
+          McpDelegationAuthorization.hasDelegationToken(
+            buildRequest({ [HEADER]: value }),
+          ),
+        ).toBe(true);
+      },
+    );
+
+    test("is false when the header was not sent", () => {
+      expect(
+        McpDelegationAuthorization.hasDelegationToken(
+          buildRequest({ apikey: ObjectID.generate().toString() }),
+        ),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("is false for a request with no headers at all", () => {
+      expect(
+        McpDelegationAuthorization.hasDelegationToken(
+          {} as unknown as ExpressRequest,
+        ),
+      ).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("the header name is the one the MCP server sends, in lower case", () => {
+      expect(McpDelegationToken.HEADER_NAME).toBe(HEADER);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("authorize - what is refused", () => {
+    test("OAuth switched off: 401, even for a token that would otherwise verify", async () => {
+      isEnabledSpy.mockReturnValue(false);
+
+      const req: ExpressRequest = buildRequest({ [HEADER]: mintToken() });
+
+      await authorize(req);
+
+      const error: Exception = refusal();
+
+      expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthenticatedException);
+      expect(error.code).toBe(ExceptionCode.NotAuthenticatedException);
+      expectNoIdentity(req);
+      // Refused before anything is looked up.
+      expect(isUserBlockedSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(tenantPermissionSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    test("the header together with an API key: 400, whichever of the two would have been good", async () => {
+      const req: ExpressRequest = buildRequest({
+        [HEADER]: mintToken(),
+        apikey: ObjectID.generate().toString(),
+      });
+
+      await authorize(req);
+
+      const error: Exception = refusal();
+
+      expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(BadDataException);
+      expect(error.code).toBe(ExceptionCode.BadDataException);
+      expectNoIdentity(req);
+    });
+
+    test("an EMPTY apikey header beside the token is still two credentials", async () => {
+      const req: ExpressRequest = buildRequest({
+        [HEADER]: mintToken(),
+        apikey: "",
+      });
+
+      await authorize(req);
+
+      expect(refusal()).toBeInstanceOf(BadDataException);
+      expectNoIdentity(req);
+    });
+
+    const unusableTokens: Array<[string, () => string | Array<string>]> = [
+      [
+        "an empty header",
+        (): string => {
+          return "";
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "garbage",
+        (): string => {
+          return "not-a-token";
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "a token whose signature was altered",
+        (): string => {
+          const token: string = mintToken();
+          const last: string = token.slice(-1) === "A" ? "B" : "A";
+
+          return `${token.slice(0, -1)}${last}`;
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "a token whose payload was swapped for another project's",
+        (): string => {
+          const real: Array<string> = mintToken().split(".");
+          const forged: Array<string> = mintToken({
+            projectId: OTHER_PROJECT_ID,
+          }).split(".");
+
+          // Somebody else's payload under this token's signature.
+          return `${real[0]}.${forged[1]}.${real[2]}`;
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "an expired token (minted two minutes ago; it lives for one)",
+        (): string => {
+          return mintToken({}, new Date(Date.now() - 2 * 60 * 1000));
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "a token dated an hour in the future",
+        (): string => {
+          return mintToken({}, new Date(Date.now() + 60 * 60 * 1000));
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "the header sent twice (an array)",
+        (): Array<string> => {
+          return [mintToken(), mintToken()];
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "a valid token with a Bearer prefix left on",
+        (): string => {
+          return `Bearer ${mintToken()}`;
+        },
+      ],
+      [
+        "a valid token with trailing whitespace",
+        (): string => {
+          return `${mintToken()} `;
+        },
+      ],
+    ];
+
+    test.each(unusableTokens)(
+      "%s: 401, and the request leaves with no identity",
+      async (_label: string, build: () => string | Array<string>) => {
+        const req: ExpressRequest = buildRequest({ [HEADER]: build() });
+
+        await authorize(req);
+
+        const error: Exception = refusal();
+
+        expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthenticatedException);
+        expect(error.code).toBe(ExceptionCode.NotAuthenticatedException);
+        expectNoIdentity(req);
+        // A token that does not verify names nobody: nothing is looked up.
+        expect(isUserBlockedSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(globalPermissionSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(tenantPermissionSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(teamIdsSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      },
+    );
+
+    test("a request with no delegation header at all, handed to this middleware anyway: 401", async () => {
+      const req: ExpressRequest = buildRequest({});
+
+      await authorize(req);
+
+      const error: Exception = refusal();
+
+      expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthenticatedException);
+      expectNoIdentity(req);
+      expect(isUserBlockedSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    test("a refusal never says why the token was no good", async () => {
+      await authorize(buildRequest({ [HEADER]: "not-a-token" }));
+      const garbageMessage: string = refusal().message;
+
+      jest.clearAllMocks();
+
+      await authorize(
+        buildRequest({
+          [HEADER]: mintToken({}, new Date(Date.now() - 2 * 60 * 1000)),
+        }),
+      );
+      const expiredMessage: string = refusal().message;
+
+      expect(expiredMessage).toBe(garbageMessage);
+    });
+
+    test("a session JWT in the delegation header is not a delegation token", async () => {
+      /*
+       * The reverse of the reason these are not JWTs: a credential of one
+       * kind must not verify as the other, in either direction.
+       */
+      const jwtLike: string =
+        "eyJhbGciOiJIUzI1NiIsInR5cCI6IkpXVCJ9.eyJ1c2VySWQiOiIxIn0.c2lnbmF0dXJl";
+
+      const req: ExpressRequest = buildRequest({ [HEADER]: jwtLike });
+
+      await authorize(req);
+
+      expect(refusal()).toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthenticatedException);
+      expectNoIdentity(req);
+    });
+
+    test("a blocked member: 401 with the blocked message, and no permissions are loaded", async () => {
+      isUserBlockedSpy.mockResolvedValue(true);
+
+      const req: ExpressRequest = buildRequest({ [HEADER]: mintToken() });
+
+      await authorize(req);
+
+      const error: Exception = refusal();
+
+      expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthenticatedException);
+      expect(error.message).toBe(ExceptionMessages.UserBlocked);
+      expect(isUserBlockedSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect((isUserBlockedSpy.mock.calls[0]![0] as ObjectID).toString()).toBe(
+        USER_ID.toString(),
+      );
+      expect(globalPermissionSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(tenantPermissionSpy).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expectNoIdentity(req);
+    });
+
+    test("a blocked-lookup that fails is an error, not a pass", async () => {
+      const failure: Error = new Error("database unavailable");
+
+      isUserBlockedSpy.mockRejectedValue(failure);
+
+      const req: ExpressRequest = buildRequest({ [HEADER]: mintToken() });
+
+      await authorize(req);
+
+      expect(refusal()).toBe(failure);
+      expectNoIdentity(req);
+    });
+
+    test("a member who has left the project (no tenant permission): 401, and next is never called", async () => {
+      tenantPermissionSpy.mockResolvedValue(null);
+
+      const req: ExpressRequest = buildRequest({ [HEADER]: mintToken() });
+
+      await authorize(req);
+
+      const error: Exception = refusal();
+
+      expect(error).toBeInstanceOf(NotAuthenticatedException);
+      expect(error.code).toBe(ExceptionCode.NotAuthenticatedException);
+      expect(error.message).toContain("no longer a member");
+
+      // No permission set is left on the request for a later handler to trust.
+      const oneuptimeRequest: OneUptimeRequest = req as OneUptimeRequest;
+
+      expect(oneuptimeRequest.userTenantAccessPermission).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(oneuptimeRequest.userGlobalAccessPermission).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(oneuptimeRequest.userTeamIds).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    test("a permission lookup that fails is an error, not a request with no permissions", async () => {
+      const failure: Error = new Error("database unavailable");
+
+      tenantPermissionSpy.mockRejectedValue(failure);
+
+      await authorize(buildRequest({ [HEADER]: mintToken() }));
+
+      expect(refusal()).toBe(failure);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("authorize - what a valid token is worth", () => {
+    const authorizeValid: (
+      overrides?: Partial<McpDelegationClaims>,
+      extraHeaders?: Record<string, string>,
+      body?: Record<string, unknown>,
+    ) => Promise<OneUptimeRequest> = async (
+      overrides: Partial<McpDelegationClaims> = {},
+      extraHeaders: Record<string, string> = {},
+      body: Record<string, unknown> = {},
+    ): Promise<OneUptimeRequest> => {
+      const req: ExpressRequest = buildRequest(
+        { [HEADER]: mintToken(overrides), ...extraHeaders },
+        body,
+      );
+
+      await authorize(req);
+      expectAccepted();
+
+      return req as OneUptimeRequest;
+    };
+
+    test("the request is the member's: id, address and name come from the token", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(req.userAuthorization?.userId.toString()).toBe(USER_ID.toString());
+      expect(req.userAuthorization?.email.toString()).toBe(
+        "member@example.com",
+      );
+      expect(req.userAuthorization?.name).toBeInstanceOf(Name);
+      expect(req.userAuthorization?.name?.toString()).toBe("Mia Member");
+    });
+
+    test("it is a User request and never a MasterAdmin one, whoever the member is", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid();
+
+      /*
+       * The token carries no master-admin claim and the middleware reads no
+       * user row for one: an agent acting for an instance administrator gets
+       * what that person's teams grant in the project.
+       */
+      expect(req.userType).toBe(UserType.User);
+      expect(req.userType).not.toBe(UserType.MasterAdmin);
+      expect(req.userAuthorization?.isMasterAdmin).toBe(false);
+      expect(req.userAuthorization?.isGlobalLogin).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("the tenant is the token's project", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(req.tenantId?.toString()).toBe(PROJECT_ID.toString());
+    });
+
+    const tenantOverrides: Array<[string, Record<string, string>]> = [
+      ["a tenantid header", { tenantid: OTHER_PROJECT_ID.toString() }],
+      ["a projectid header", { projectid: OTHER_PROJECT_ID.toString() }],
+    ];
+
+    test.each(tenantOverrides)(
+      "%s naming another project is ignored: the project comes from the credential, never the caller",
+      async (_label: string, headers: Record<string, string>) => {
+        const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid({}, headers);
+
+        expect(req.tenantId?.toString()).toBe(PROJECT_ID.toString());
+        expect(Object.keys(req.userTenantAccessPermission || {})).toEqual([
+          PROJECT_ID.toString(),
+        ]);
+        expect(
+          (tenantPermissionSpy.mock.calls[0]![1] as ObjectID).toString(),
+        ).toBe(PROJECT_ID.toString());
+      },
+    );
+
+    test("a projectId in the request body naming another project is ignored too", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid(
+        {},
+        {},
+        { projectId: OTHER_PROJECT_ID.toString() },
+      );
+
+      expect(req.tenantId?.toString()).toBe(PROJECT_ID.toString());
+    });
+
+    test("records which grant and which client, for the audit trail", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(req.mcpOAuth?.grantId.toString()).toBe(GRANT_ID.toString());
+      expect(req.mcpOAuth?.clientId).toBe(CLIENT_ID);
+      expect(req.mcpOAuth?.clientName).toBe(CLIENT_NAME);
+    });
+
+    test("a grant that may write is not read-only", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid({ canWrite: true });
+
+      expect(req.mcpOAuth?.isReadOnly).toBe(false);
+    });
+
+    test("a grant that may not write IS read-only", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid({ canWrite: false });
+
+      expect(req.mcpOAuth?.isReadOnly).toBe(true);
+    });
+
+    test("it is not an API key request", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(req.apiKeyId).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(req.apiKeyName).toBeUndefined();
+    });
+
+    test("strips the multi-tenant header, so nothing downstream can widen the request to every project", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid(
+        {},
+        { "is-multi-tenant-query": "true" },
+      );
+
+      expect(req.headers).not.toHaveProperty("is-multi-tenant-query");
+    });
+
+    test("the member's global permission is narrowed to the one project", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(
+        req.userGlobalAccessPermission?.projectIds.map(
+          (projectId: ObjectID): string => {
+            return projectId.toString();
+          },
+        ),
+      ).toEqual([PROJECT_ID.toString()]);
+
+      // Everything else about it is the member's own.
+      expect(req.userGlobalAccessPermission?.globalPermissions).toEqual([
+        Permission.Public,
+        Permission.User,
+        Permission.CurrentUser,
+      ]);
+      expect(req.userGlobalAccessPermission?._type).toBe(
+        "UserGlobalAccessPermission",
+      );
+    });
+
+    test("narrowing copies: the cached permission object the service handed back still lists every project", async () => {
+      await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(
+        cachedGlobalPermission.projectIds.map((projectId: ObjectID): string => {
+          return projectId.toString();
+        }),
+      ).toEqual([
+        OTHER_PROJECT_ID.toString(),
+        PROJECT_ID.toString(),
+        THIRD_PROJECT_ID.toString(),
+      ]);
+    });
+
+    test("carries the member's LIVE permissions in that project, keyed by the project", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(req.userTenantAccessPermission).toEqual({
+        [PROJECT_ID.toString()]: cachedTenantPermission,
+      });
+
+      // Read for this member, in the token's project, on this request.
+      expect(tenantPermissionSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(
+        (tenantPermissionSpy.mock.calls[0]![0] as ObjectID).toString(),
+      ).toBe(USER_ID.toString());
+      expect(
+        (tenantPermissionSpy.mock.calls[0]![1] as ObjectID).toString(),
+      ).toBe(PROJECT_ID.toString());
+    });
+
+    test("the token grants no permission of its own: a member with fewer permissions gets fewer", async () => {
+      const viewerOnly: UserTenantAccessPermission = {
+        _type: "UserTenantAccessPermission",
+        projectId: PROJECT_ID,
+        permissions: [],
+      };
+
+      tenantPermissionSpy.mockResolvedValue(viewerOnly);
+
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid({ canWrite: true });
+
+      expect(
+        req.userTenantAccessPermission?.[PROJECT_ID.toString()]?.permissions,
+      ).toEqual([]);
+    });
+
+    test("carries the member's teams in that project, for owned-scope permissions", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(req.userTeamIds).toEqual([TEAM_ID]);
+      expect((teamIdsSpy.mock.calls[0]![0] as ObjectID).toString()).toBe(
+        USER_ID.toString(),
+      );
+      expect((teamIdsSpy.mock.calls[0]![1] as ObjectID).toString()).toBe(
+        PROJECT_ID.toString(),
+      );
+    });
+
+    test("the tenant lookup reuses the global permission already being fetched", async () => {
+      await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(globalPermissionSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+
+      const options: {
+        userGlobalAccessPermission?: unknown;
+      } = tenantPermissionSpy.mock.calls[0]![2] as {
+        userGlobalAccessPermission?: unknown;
+      };
+
+      await expect(options.userGlobalAccessPermission).resolves.toBe(
+        cachedGlobalPermission,
+      );
+    });
+
+    test("a member with no global permission cached still gets through on their tenant permission", async () => {
+      globalPermissionSpy.mockResolvedValue(null);
+
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(req.userGlobalAccessPermission).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(req.userTenantAccessPermission).toEqual({
+        [PROJECT_ID.toString()]: cachedTenantPermission,
+      });
+    });
+
+    test("is asked whether the member is blocked on every request", async () => {
+      await authorizeValid();
+      jest.clearAllMocks();
+      next = jest.fn();
+      await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(isUserBlockedSpy).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    test("marks the project and the member as active, as a session request does", async () => {
+      await authorizeValid();
+
+      expect(
+        (projectLastActiveSpy.mock.calls[0]![0] as ObjectID).toString(),
+      ).toBe(PROJECT_ID.toString());
+      expect((userLastActiveSpy.mock.calls[0]![0] as ObjectID).toString()).toBe(
+        USER_ID.toString(),
+      );
+    });
+
+    test("a token for another project authorizes THAT project, and only it", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid({
+        projectId: THIRD_PROJECT_ID,
+      });
+
+      expect(req.tenantId?.toString()).toBe(THIRD_PROJECT_ID.toString());
+      expect(
+        req.userGlobalAccessPermission?.projectIds.map(
+          (projectId: ObjectID): string => {
+            return projectId.toString();
+          },
+        ),
+      ).toEqual([THIRD_PROJECT_ID.toString()]);
+      expect(Object.keys(req.userTenantAccessPermission || {})).toEqual([
+        THIRD_PROJECT_ID.toString(),
+      ]);
+    });
+
+    test("a member with no name still gets a Name on the request", async () => {
+      const req: OneUptimeRequest = await authorizeValid({ userName: "" });
+
+      expect(req.userAuthorization?.name).toBeInstanceOf(Name);
+      expect(req.userAuthorization?.name?.toString()).toBe("");
+    });
+  });
+});