@oneuptime/common 14.0.10 → 14.0.11

package/Tests/Server/API/IncidentFormPublicRoutes.test.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,1653 @@
+jest.mock("../../../Server/Infrastructure/Redis", () => {
+  return {
+    __esModule: true,
+    default: {
+      getClient: jest.fn(),
+      isConnected: jest.fn(),
+    },
+  };
+});
+
+jest.mock("../../../Server/Utils/Logger", () => {
+  return {
+    __esModule: true,
+    default: {
+      debug: jest.fn(),
+      info: jest.fn(),
+      warn: jest.fn(),
+      error: jest.fn(),
+    },
+    getLogAttributesFromRequest: jest.fn().mockReturnValue({}),
+  };
+});
+
+import IncidentFormAPI, {
+  INCIDENT_FORM_FOREIGN_PAGE_MESSAGE,
+  INCIDENT_FORM_SUBMISSION_BODY_MESSAGE,
+} from "../../../Server/API/IncidentFormAPI";
+import { EncryptionSecret } from "../../../Server/EnvironmentConfig";
+import Redis from "../../../Server/Infrastructure/Redis";
+import {
+  INCIDENT_FORM_RATE_LIMIT_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
+  INCIDENT_FORM_READ_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
+  INCIDENT_FORM_SUBMIT_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
+  INCIDENT_FORM_TOTAL_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
+} from "../../../Server/Middleware/IncidentFormRateLimit";
+import UserMiddleware from "../../../Server/Middleware/UserAuthorization";
+import AccessTokenService from "../../../Server/Services/AccessTokenService";
+import IncidentCustomFieldService from "../../../Server/Services/IncidentCustomFieldService";
+import IncidentFormService, {
+  INCIDENT_FORM_NETWORK_NOT_ALLOWED_MESSAGE,
+  INCIDENT_FORM_NOT_AVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
+} from "../../../Server/Services/IncidentFormService";
+import IncidentFormSubmissionService from "../../../Server/Services/IncidentFormSubmissionService";
+import IncidentInternalNoteService from "../../../Server/Services/IncidentInternalNoteService";
+import IncidentService from "../../../Server/Services/IncidentService";
+import IncidentSeverityService from "../../../Server/Services/IncidentSeverityService";
+import ProjectService from "../../../Server/Services/ProjectService";
+import UserService from "../../../Server/Services/UserService";
+import CaptchaUtil from "../../../Server/Utils/Captcha";
+import CookieUtil from "../../../Server/Utils/Cookie";
+import { ExpressRouter } from "../../../Server/Utils/Express";
+import JSONWebToken from "../../../Server/Utils/JsonWebToken";
+import SameOriginRequest from "../../../Server/Utils/SameOriginRequest";
+import { expressErrorHandler } from "../../../Server/Utils/StartServer";
+import Incident from "../../../Models/DatabaseModels/Incident";
+import IncidentForm from "../../../Models/DatabaseModels/IncidentForm";
+import Dictionary from "../../../Types/Dictionary";
+import BadDataException from "../../../Types/Exception/BadDataException";
+import Email from "../../../Types/Email";
+import {
+  INCIDENT_FORM_PAGE_HEADER,
+  INCIDENT_FORM_PAGE_HEADER_VALUE,
+  IncidentFormFieldSetting,
+} from "../../../Types/Incident/IncidentFormPublic";
+import { JSONObject } from "../../../Types/JSON";
+import Name from "../../../Types/Name";
+import ObjectID from "../../../Types/ObjectID";
+import {
+  afterAll,
+  afterEach,
+  beforeAll,
+  beforeEach,
+  describe,
+  expect,
+  it,
+} from "@jest/globals";
+import CookieParser from "cookie-parser";
+import express from "express";
+import http from "http";
+import jwt from "jsonwebtoken";
+import { AddressInfo } from "net";
+import timers from "timers";
+
+/*
+ * A handler's refusal travels as next(err), and Express leaves a router
+ * whose layers are exhausted with setImmediate(done, err). Common's jest
+ * environment is jsdom, which has no setImmediate - without this every
+ * refusal would hang the request instead of reaching the error handler. Lend
+ * jsdom Node's own, as MultipartFormData.test.ts does.
+ */
+if (
+  typeof (globalThis as unknown as { setImmediate?: unknown }).setImmediate !==
+  "function"
+) {
+  (globalThis as unknown as { setImmediate: unknown }).setImmediate =
+    timers.setImmediate;
+}
+
+/*
+ * The public incident form routes, driven through a real Express app with
+ * cookie-parser, the JSON body parser and the production error handler -
+ * the real IncidentFormAPI router, the real limiter, the real user
+ * middleware and the real IncidentFormService. Only the data layer (and the
+ * captcha provider and Redis) are stubbed.
+ *
+ * It pins what the public form page has to handle - the status codes and
+ * the messages - and the one property the page depends on most: a visitor's
+ * own OneUptime session cookie, which rides along because the page is served
+ * on the dashboard's host, never turns into a 401. A 401 would send the
+ * dashboard client to the login page (losing the report being typed), or
+ * sign the visitor out of their real session. A cookie that no longer
+ * decodes, an expired one and a junk one are all simply ignored, and a
+ * valid one is ignored too: forms are anonymous.
+ */
+
+const PROJECT_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID(
+  "5d7f3c0a-4c55-4d3e-9a3e-2d4a7d1c9f01",
+);
+const OTHER_PROJECT_ID: string = "5d7f3c0a-4c55-4d3e-9a3e-2d4a7d1c9f02";
+const FORM_ID: string = "a1b2c3d4-0000-4000-8000-0000000000f1";
+const SHARE_KEY: string = "7c9e6679-7425-40de-944b-e07fc1f90ae7";
+const OFF_SHARE_KEY: string = "7c9e6679-7425-40de-944b-e07fc1f90ae8";
+const LOCKED_SHARE_KEY: string = "7c9e6679-7425-40de-944b-e07fc1f90ae9";
+const UNKNOWN_SHARE_KEY: string = "0f8fad5b-d9cb-469f-a165-70867728950e";
+const SEVERITY_ID: string = "b0000000-0000-4000-8000-0000000000f1";
+const INCIDENT_ID: string = "e0000000-0000-4000-8000-0000000000f1";
+const USER_ID: ObjectID = new ObjectID("33333333-3333-4333-8333-333333333333");
+
+// The client address our proxy would append, and one outside the allowlist.
+const ALLOWED_IP: string = "198.51.100.23";
+const OTHER_IP: string = "203.0.113.7";
+
+// This instance, as HTTP_PROTOCOL and HOST configure it, and another site.
+const INSTANCE_ORIGIN: string = "https://oneuptime.example.com";
+const FOREIGN_ORIGIN: string = "https://evil.example";
+
+const INVALID_ACCESS_TOKEN_MESSAGE: string =
+  "AccessToken is invalid or expired. Please refresh your token.";
+
+type MockedFn = ReturnType<typeof jest.fn>;
+
+const getClientMock: MockedFn = Redis.getClient as unknown as MockedFn;
+const isConnectedMock: MockedFn = Redis.isConnected as unknown as MockedFn;
+
+/*
+ * A counting Redis fake. `countFloor` makes every counter read at least
+ * that much, which is how a test puts a caller over a limit without firing
+ * hundreds of requests first.
+ */
+class FakeRedisClient {
+  public counters: Map<string, number> = new Map();
+  public countFloor: number = 0;
+
+  // A pipeline counting a key this matches fails, as a broken Redis would.
+  public failKeysMatching: RegExp | null = null;
+
+  public pipeline(): FakePipeline {
+    return new FakePipeline(this);
+  }
+
+  public keysMatching(fragment: string): Array<string> {
+    return Array.from(this.counters.keys()).filter((key: string) => {
+      return key.includes(fragment);
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+type QueuedCommand = () => [Error | null, unknown];
+
+class FakePipeline {
+  private commands: Array<QueuedCommand> = [];
+  private keys: Array<string> = [];
+
+  public constructor(private client: FakeRedisClient) {}
+
+  public incr(key: string): FakePipeline {
+    this.keys.push(key);
+    this.commands.push((): [Error | null, unknown] => {
+      const next: number = Math.max(
+        (this.client.counters.get(key) || 0) + 1,
+        this.client.countFloor,
+      );
+      this.client.counters.set(key, next);
+      return [null, next];
+    });
+
+    return this;
+  }
+
+  public expire(): FakePipeline {
+    this.commands.push((): [Error | null, unknown] => {
+      return [null, 1];
+    });
+
+    return this;
+  }
+
+  public async exec(): Promise<unknown> {
+    const failKeysMatching: RegExp | null = this.client.failKeysMatching;
+
+    if (
+      failKeysMatching &&
+      this.keys.some((key: string): boolean => {
+        return failKeysMatching.test(key);
+      })
+    ) {
+      throw new Error("connection reset");
+    }
+
+    return this.commands.map((command: QueuedCommand) => {
+      return command();
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+function buildForm(data: {
+  shareKey: string;
+  isEnabled?: boolean;
+  ipWhitelist?: string;
+}): IncidentForm {
+  const form: IncidentForm = new IncidentForm();
+  form._id = FORM_ID;
+  form.projectId = PROJECT_ID;
+  form.name = "Report a Problem";
+  form.description = "Tell us what is broken.";
+  form.isEnabled = data.isEnabled !== false;
+  form.shareKey = new ObjectID(data.shareKey);
+  form.incidentSeverityId = new ObjectID(SEVERITY_ID);
+  form.allowReporterToChooseSeverity = false;
+  form.descriptionSetting = IncidentFormFieldSetting.Optional;
+  form.customFieldSettings = {};
+  form.isReporterDetailsRequired = true;
+  form.successMessage = "Thanks - we are on it.";
+  form.ipWhitelist = data.ipWhitelist || "";
+  return form;
+}
+
+const FORMS: Array<IncidentForm> = [
+  buildForm({ shareKey: SHARE_KEY }),
+  buildForm({ shareKey: OFF_SHARE_KEY, isEnabled: false }),
+  buildForm({ shareKey: LOCKED_SHARE_KEY, ipWhitelist: "198.51.100.0/24" }),
+];
+
+const PUBLIC_FORM: JSONObject = {
+  name: "Report a Problem",
+  description: "Tell us what is broken.",
+  descriptionSetting: "Optional",
+  isReporterDetailsRequired: true,
+  customFields: [],
+  isCaptchaRequired: false,
+};
+
+const ANSWERS: JSONObject = {
+  title: "Checkout is down",
+  description: "Every order fails.",
+  reporterName: "Jane Doe",
+  reporterEmail: "jane@example.com",
+};
+
+const SUBMISSION_RESULT: JSONObject = {
+  incidentNumber: "INC-42",
+  successMessage: "Thanks - we are on it.",
+};
+
+// Signed with a secret this instance no longer uses: a rotation happened.
+const STALE_ACCESS_TOKEN: string = jwt.sign(
+  {
+    userId: USER_ID.toString(),
+    email: "viewer@example.com",
+    name: "Viewer",
+    isMasterAdmin: false,
+    isGlobalLogin: true,
+    sessionId: "44444444-4444-4444-8444-444444444444",
+  },
+  `${EncryptionSecret.toString()}-before-rotation`,
+  { expiresIn: 15 * 60 },
+);
+
+// Signed with the right secret, but past its lifetime.
+const EXPIRED_ACCESS_TOKEN: string = jwt.sign(
+  {
+    userId: USER_ID.toString(),
+    email: "viewer@example.com",
+    name: "Viewer",
+    isMasterAdmin: false,
+    isGlobalLogin: true,
+    sessionId: "44444444-4444-4444-8444-444444444444",
+    exp: Math.floor(Date.now() / 1000) - 60,
+  },
+  EncryptionSecret.toString(),
+);
+
+function validAccessToken(): string {
+  return JSONWebToken.signUserLoginToken({
+    tokenData: {
+      userId: USER_ID,
+      email: new Email("viewer@example.com"),
+      name: new Name("Viewer"),
+      timezone: null,
+      isMasterAdmin: false,
+      isGlobalLogin: true,
+      sessionId: ObjectID.generate(),
+    },
+    expiresInSeconds: 15 * 60,
+  });
+}
+
+interface HttpResult {
+  status: number;
+  headers: http.IncomingHttpHeaders;
+  body: JSONObject | null;
+}
+
+function send(data: {
+  port: number;
+  method: "GET" | "POST";
+  path: string;
+  clientIp?: string;
+  cookies?: Dictionary<string> | undefined;
+  headers?: http.OutgoingHttpHeaders | undefined;
+  /*
+   * Without the header the form page's API client adds to every request:
+   * what an <img>, a link, a frame or a no-cors fetch sends.
+   */
+  withoutPageHeader?: boolean | undefined;
+  body?: unknown;
+  // Sent as it is, with the content-type the headers give: not JSON.
+  rawBody?: string | undefined;
+}): Promise<HttpResult> {
+  return new Promise<HttpResult>(
+    (resolve: (result: HttpResult) => void, reject: (e: Error) => void) => {
+      const payload: string =
+        data.method === "POST" && data.body !== undefined
+          ? JSON.stringify(data.body)
+          : "";
+
+      const headers: http.OutgoingHttpHeaders = {
+        // What the public form page's API client sends.
+        tenantid: "",
+        ...(data.withoutPageHeader
+          ? {}
+          : { [INCIDENT_FORM_PAGE_HEADER]: INCIDENT_FORM_PAGE_HEADER_VALUE }),
+        // What our proxy appends: the client address, the trusted hop.
+        "x-forwarded-for": data.clientIp || ALLOWED_IP,
+        ...(data.headers || {}),
+      };
+
+      const cookieHeader: string = Object.entries(data.cookies || {})
+        .map(([name, value]: [string, string]) => {
+          return `${name}=${value}`;
+        })
+        .join("; ");
+
+      if (cookieHeader) {
+        headers["cookie"] = cookieHeader;
+      }
+
+      if (payload) {
+        headers["content-type"] = "application/json";
+        headers["content-length"] = Buffer.byteLength(payload);
+      }
+
+      if (data.rawBody !== undefined) {
+        headers["content-length"] = Buffer.byteLength(data.rawBody);
+      }
+
+      const request: http.ClientRequest = http.request(
+        {
+          host: "127.0.0.1",
+          port: data.port,
+          path: data.path,
+          method: data.method,
+          headers,
+        },
+        (response: http.IncomingMessage) => {
+          const chunks: Array<Buffer> = [];
+
+          response.on("data", (chunk: Buffer) => {
+            chunks.push(chunk);
+          });
+
+          response.on("end", () => {
+            const raw: string = Buffer.concat(chunks).toString("utf8");
+            let body: JSONObject | null = null;
+
+            try {
+              body = raw ? (JSON.parse(raw) as JSONObject) : null;
+            } catch {
+              body = { raw };
+            }
+
+            resolve({
+              status: response.statusCode || 0,
+              headers: response.headers,
+              body,
+            });
+          });
+        },
+      );
+
+      request.on("error", reject);
+
+      if (payload) {
+        request.write(payload);
+      }
+
+      if (data.rawBody !== undefined) {
+        request.write(data.rawBody);
+      }
+
+      request.end();
+    },
+  );
+}
+
+/*
+ * A limiter refusal is written by Response.sendErrorResponse ({ message });
+ * a handler's refusal goes through the production error handler ({ error }).
+ * The page's API client reads either.
+ */
+function errorMessageOf(result: HttpResult): unknown {
+  return result.body?.["message"] ?? result.body?.["error"];
+}
+
+// Only what the page would see: the status and the body.
+function seen(result: HttpResult): { status: number; body: unknown } {
+  return { status: result.status, body: result.body };
+}
+
+describe("the public incident form routes over HTTP", () => {
+  let server: http.Server;
+  let port: number;
+  let client: FakeRedisClient;
+  let incidentCreate: MockedFn;
+  let getPublicForm: MockedFn;
+  let submitPublicForm: MockedFn;
+  let onPlan: MockedFn;
+
+  const readPath: (shareKey: string) => string = (shareKey: string) => {
+    return `/api/incident-form/public/${shareKey}`;
+  };
+
+  const submitPath: (shareKey: string) => string = (shareKey: string) => {
+    return `/api/incident-form/public/${shareKey}/submit`;
+  };
+
+  beforeAll(async () => {
+    const app: express.Express = express();
+    app.use(CookieParser());
+    app.use(express.json());
+    /*
+     * As StartServer mounts it: "data[title]=..." from a plain HTML form
+     * becomes the very object a JSON body gives.
+     */
+    app.use(express.urlencoded({ extended: true }));
+    app.use("/api", new IncidentFormAPI().getRouter());
+    app.use(expressErrorHandler);
+
+    server = http.createServer(app);
+
+    await new Promise<void>((resolve: () => void) => {
+      server.listen(0, "127.0.0.1", resolve);
+    });
+
+    port = (server.address() as AddressInfo).port;
+  });
+
+  afterAll(async () => {
+    await new Promise<void>((resolve: () => void) => {
+      server.close(() => {
+        resolve();
+      });
+    });
+  });
+
+  beforeEach(() => {
+    client = new FakeRedisClient();
+    getClientMock.mockReturnValue(client);
+    isConnectedMock.mockReturnValue(true);
+
+    jest
+      .spyOn(IncidentFormService, "findOneBy")
+      .mockImplementation((async (findBy: {
+        query: { shareKey?: ObjectID };
+      }): Promise<IncidentForm | null> => {
+        return (
+          FORMS.find((form: IncidentForm) => {
+            return (
+              form.shareKey?.toString() === findBy.query.shareKey?.toString()
+            );
+          }) || null
+        );
+      }) as never);
+
+    jest.spyOn(IncidentCustomFieldService, "findBy").mockResolvedValue([]);
+    jest.spyOn(IncidentSeverityService, "findBy").mockResolvedValue([]);
+
+    /*
+     * The plan check reads the project's subscription, which this suite has
+     * no database for. Left real, it would pass only where billing is off:
+     * CI's Common job runs with BILLING_ENABLED=true, the read fails, the
+     * check fails closed, and every form here would answer "not available".
+     * The check itself is pinned in IncidentFormPublicForm.test.ts; the
+     * off-plan test below turns it the other way.
+     */
+    onPlan = jest
+      .spyOn(IncidentFormService, "isProjectOnPlan")
+      .mockResolvedValue(true as never) as unknown as MockedFn;
+
+    // HOST is not configured in a unit run; the instance says it is this.
+    jest
+      .spyOn(SameOriginRequest, "getInstanceOrigin")
+      .mockReturnValue(INSTANCE_ORIGIN);
+
+    incidentCreate = jest
+      .spyOn(IncidentService, "create")
+      .mockImplementation((async (): Promise<Incident> => {
+        const incident: Incident = new Incident();
+        incident._id = INCIDENT_ID;
+        incident.projectId = PROJECT_ID;
+        incident.incidentNumber = 42;
+        incident.incidentNumberWithPrefix = "INC-42";
+        return incident;
+      }) as never) as unknown as MockedFn;
+
+    jest
+      .spyOn(IncidentFormSubmissionService, "create")
+      .mockImplementation((async (createBy: { data: unknown }) => {
+        return createBy.data;
+      }) as never);
+    jest
+      .spyOn(IncidentInternalNoteService, "create")
+      .mockImplementation((async (createBy: { data: unknown }) => {
+        return createBy.data;
+      }) as never);
+
+    jest.spyOn(CaptchaUtil, "isCaptchaEnabled").mockReturnValue(false);
+
+    /*
+     * What a signed-in visitor's valid session touches in the user
+     * middleware. Nothing here reads the database.
+     */
+    jest.spyOn(UserService, "isUserBlocked").mockResolvedValue(false);
+    jest.spyOn(UserService, "updateLastActive").mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+    jest
+      .spyOn(AccessTokenService, "getUserGlobalAccessPermission")
+      .mockResolvedValue(null);
+    jest.spyOn(ProjectService, "updateLastActive").mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+
+    getPublicForm = jest.spyOn(
+      IncidentFormService,
+      "getPublicForm",
+    ) as unknown as MockedFn;
+    submitPublicForm = jest.spyOn(
+      IncidentFormService,
+      "submitPublicForm",
+    ) as unknown as MockedFn;
+  });
+
+  afterEach(() => {
+    jest.restoreAllMocks();
+  });
+
+  describe("200", () => {
+    it("serves the form's questions, uncached", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(SHARE_KEY),
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(result)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: PUBLIC_FORM });
+      expect(result.headers["cache-control"]).toBe(
+        "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate",
+      );
+      expect(result.headers["pragma"]).toBe("no-cache");
+
+      // The plan gate stays on the path; only its database read is stubbed.
+      expect(onPlan).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(String(onPlan.mock.calls[0]![0])).toBe(PROJECT_ID.toString());
+    });
+
+    it("declares the incident and answers with its number and the success message", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(result)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: SUBMISSION_RESULT });
+      expect(result.headers["cache-control"]).toBe(
+        "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate",
+      );
+      expect(incidentCreate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * The tenant the user middleware reads from a header or the body is
+     * never where the incident goes: that is always the form's project.
+     */
+    it("declares in the form's project whatever tenant the request names", async () => {
+      await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        headers: { tenantid: OTHER_PROJECT_ID },
+        body: { data: ANSWERS, projectId: OTHER_PROJECT_ID },
+      });
+
+      const created: Incident = (
+        incidentCreate.mock.calls[0]![0] as { data: Incident }
+      ).data;
+
+      expect(created.projectId?.toString()).toBe(PROJECT_ID.toString());
+    });
+
+    it("takes the share key in any case", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(SHARE_KEY.toUpperCase()),
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("400", () => {
+    it("names every problem with the answers, and declares nothing", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        body: { data: { title: " ", reporterEmail: "jane" } },
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+        "Title is required. Your Name is required. Your Email is not a valid email address.",
+      );
+      expect(incidentCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ["no body", undefined],
+      ["a body without answers", { title: "Down" }],
+      ["answers that are not an object", { data: "Down" }],
+    ])("refuses %s", async (_label: string, body: unknown) => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        body,
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+        INCIDENT_FORM_SUBMISSION_BODY_MESSAGE,
+      );
+      expect(submitPublicForm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * The provider round trip is the one thing stubbed here: its refusal is
+     * a BadDataException, exactly as CaptchaUtil throws it.
+     */
+    it("refuses a submission the captcha provider rejects, when the instance has a captcha on", async () => {
+      jest.spyOn(CaptchaUtil, "isCaptchaEnabled").mockReturnValue(true);
+      const verifyCaptcha: MockedFn = jest
+        .spyOn(CaptchaUtil, "verifyCaptcha")
+        .mockRejectedValue(
+          new BadDataException(
+            "Captcha verification failed. Please try again.",
+          ),
+        ) as unknown as MockedFn;
+
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        body: { data: ANSWERS, captchaToken: "solved-token" },
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(400);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+        "Captcha verification failed. Please try again.",
+      );
+      expect(verifyCaptcha).toHaveBeenCalledWith({
+        token: "solved-token",
+        remoteIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+      });
+      expect(incidentCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it("declares once the captcha provider accepts the token", async () => {
+      jest.spyOn(CaptchaUtil, "isCaptchaEnabled").mockReturnValue(true);
+      jest.spyOn(CaptchaUtil, "verifyCaptcha").mockResolvedValue(undefined);
+
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        body: { data: ANSWERS, captchaToken: "solved-token" },
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(result)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: SUBMISSION_RESULT });
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("403", () => {
+    it("refuses to show a form to a network it does not allow", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(LOCKED_SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: OTHER_IP,
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+        INCIDENT_FORM_NETWORK_NOT_ALLOWED_MESSAGE,
+      );
+    });
+
+    it("refuses a submission from a network it does not allow", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(LOCKED_SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: OTHER_IP,
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+        INCIDENT_FORM_NETWORK_NOT_ALLOWED_MESSAGE,
+      );
+      expect(incidentCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * The address checked is the one our proxy appended, not one the caller
+     * wrote into X-Forwarded-For themselves.
+     */
+    it("cannot be talked round by a forged X-Forwarded-For entry", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(LOCKED_SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: `${ALLOWED_IP}, ${OTHER_IP}`,
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(403);
+    });
+
+    it("serves an allowed network", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(LOCKED_SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(200);
+    });
+  });
+
+  /*
+   * Any website can have a visitor's browser send these requests - the API
+   * answers every origin, and a plain HTML form or an <img> needs no
+   * preflight - from the visitor's own address: inside the form's IP
+   * allowlist, and on the budget everybody behind that address shares. Such
+   * a request is refused before anything counts it or looks the link up.
+   * The form's own page is served, and so is a caller that is not a browser
+   * but sends what the page sends; a read must carry the page's header and
+   * a submission's body must be JSON, whoever sends them.
+   */
+  describe("a request another site's page had a browser send", () => {
+    // What a plain HTML form on another site posts.
+    const FORGED_FORM: string =
+      "data%5Btitle%5D=Forged+outage&data%5BreporterName%5D=CEO&data%5BreporterEmail%5D=ceo%40corp.example";
+
+    const OWN_PAGE: http.OutgoingHttpHeaders = {
+      origin: INSTANCE_ORIGIN,
+      "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin",
+    };
+
+    it("refuses a plain HTML form another site auto-posts from inside the allowlist, before anything counts it", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(LOCKED_SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+        headers: {
+          origin: FOREIGN_ORIGIN,
+          "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site",
+          "content-type": "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+        },
+        rawBody: FORGED_FORM,
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(INCIDENT_FORM_FOREIGN_PAGE_MESSAGE);
+      expect(submitPublicForm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(incidentCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(client.counters.size).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    // A preflighted JSON request carries the same Origin.
+    it("refuses the same request sent as JSON: the body's type is not what stops it", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(LOCKED_SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+        headers: { origin: FOREIGN_ORIGIN, "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site" },
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(INCIDENT_FORM_FOREIGN_PAGE_MESSAGE);
+      expect(incidentCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(client.counters.size).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ["a cross-site read", { "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site" }],
+      ["a read from another site's page", { origin: FOREIGN_ORIGIN }],
+      ["a read from an opaque origin (a sandboxed frame)", { origin: "null" }],
+      /*
+       * A status page on its owner's domain, or a DNS-rebinding name pointed
+       * at this server: the browser calls it same-origin, but it is not
+       * this instance's page.
+       */
+      [
+        "a read from another host the browser calls same-origin",
+        {
+          origin: "https://status.customer.example",
+          "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin",
+        },
+      ],
+    ])(
+      "refuses %s, before anything counts it",
+      async (_label: string, headers: http.OutgoingHttpHeaders) => {
+        const result: HttpResult = await send({
+          port,
+          method: "GET",
+          path: readPath(SHARE_KEY),
+          headers: headers,
+        });
+
+        expect(result.status).toBe(403);
+        expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(INCIDENT_FORM_FOREIGN_PAGE_MESSAGE);
+        expect(getPublicForm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(client.counters.size).toBe(0);
+      },
+    );
+
+    /*
+     * Thirty-one posts to a made-up link from another site's page, through
+     * one visitor's browser: counted, they would have used up the 30 per 15
+     * minutes everybody behind that address shares across every form.
+     */
+    it("cannot use up the budget of the address it sends from", async () => {
+      for (let attempt: number = 0; attempt < 31; attempt++) {
+        const refused: HttpResult = await send({
+          port,
+          method: "POST",
+          path: submitPath(ObjectID.generate().toString()),
+          clientIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+          headers: { origin: FOREIGN_ORIGIN, "sec-fetch-site": "cross-site" },
+          body: { data: ANSWERS },
+        });
+
+        expect(refused.status).toBe(403);
+      }
+
+      const colleague: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+        headers: OWN_PAGE,
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(colleague)).toEqual({
+        status: 200,
+        body: SUBMISSION_RESULT,
+      });
+
+      /*
+       * Only the colleague's own report was counted: once by address, once
+       * by form and address, and once against the form's ceiling.
+       */
+      expect(
+        client
+          .keysMatching(`:submit:i:${ALLOWED_IP}:`)
+          .map((key: string): number => {
+            return client.counters.get(key)!;
+          }),
+      ).toEqual([1]);
+      expect(Array.from(client.counters.values())).toEqual([1, 1, 1]);
+    });
+
+    it("serves the form's own page: its read and its report", async () => {
+      const read: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        headers: OWN_PAGE,
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(read)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: PUBLIC_FORM });
+
+      const report: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        headers: OWN_PAGE,
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(report)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: SUBMISSION_RESULT });
+      expect(incidentCreate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * Over plain HTTP - the self-hosting default - a browser sends another
+     * site's <img>, link or no-cors fetch with neither Origin nor
+     * Sec-Fetch-Site, so the check above cannot see where it came from. It
+     * cannot add a header, though, and the form's page always does.
+     */
+    it("refuses a read another site's <img> sends over plain HTTP, from inside the allowlist, before anything counts it", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(LOCKED_SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+        withoutPageHeader: true,
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(INCIDENT_FORM_FOREIGN_PAGE_MESSAGE);
+      expect(result.headers["cache-control"]).toBe(
+        "no-store, no-cache, must-revalidate",
+      );
+      expect(getPublicForm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(client.counters.size).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * Six hundred and one images with made-up links, loaded by one
+     * visitor's browser in a loop: counted, they would have used up the 600
+     * reads a minute everybody behind that address shares, and a colleague
+     * opening a real form would be told to wait.
+     */
+    it("cannot use up the read budget of the address it sends from", async () => {
+      for (let attempt: number = 0; attempt < 601; attempt++) {
+        const refused: HttpResult = await send({
+          port,
+          method: "GET",
+          path: readPath(ObjectID.generate().toString()),
+          clientIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+          withoutPageHeader: true,
+        });
+
+        expect(refused.status).toBe(403);
+      }
+
+      // The page's own read, as a browser sends it over plain HTTP.
+      const colleague: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(colleague)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: PUBLIC_FORM });
+
+      // Only the colleague's read was counted: by address, and by form and address.
+      expect(
+        client
+          .keysMatching(`:read:i:${ALLOWED_IP}:`)
+          .map((key: string): number => {
+            return client.counters.get(key)!;
+          }),
+      ).toEqual([1]);
+      expect(Array.from(client.counters.values())).toEqual([1, 1]);
+    }, 60_000);
+
+    /*
+     * What a browser really sends with the page's own read: a GET to its own
+     * origin carries no Origin, and over plain HTTP no Sec-Fetch-Site either
+     * - only the page's header says where it came from. Over HTTPS the
+     * browser adds Sec-Fetch-Site: same-origin.
+     */
+    it.each([
+      ["over plain HTTP: the page's header and nothing else", {}],
+      ["over HTTPS", { "sec-fetch-site": "same-origin" }],
+    ])(
+      "serves the form page's own read %s",
+      async (_label: string, headers: http.OutgoingHttpHeaders) => {
+        const result: HttpResult = await send({
+          port,
+          method: "GET",
+          path: readPath(LOCKED_SHARE_KEY),
+          clientIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+          headers: headers,
+        });
+
+        expect(seen(result)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: PUBLIC_FORM });
+      },
+    );
+
+    /*
+     * Opening the read's own address in the address bar is a navigation:
+     * the browser says the visitor made it (Sec-Fetch-Site: none), but it
+     * carries no header of a page's, so it is not the form's page reading.
+     */
+    it("refuses the read's address opened in the address bar", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        headers: { "sec-fetch-site": "none" },
+        withoutPageHeader: true,
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(403);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(INCIDENT_FORM_FOREIGN_PAGE_MESSAGE);
+      expect(client.counters.size).toBe(0);
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * The page's header is asked of a read only. A submission cannot come
+     * from another site's page unnoticed - every POST carries its Origin,
+     * and a JSON body is preflighted - so a caller that is not a browser
+     * submits without it.
+     */
+    it("takes a submission without the page's header", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        withoutPageHeader: true,
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(result)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: SUBMISSION_RESULT });
+    });
+
+    it("takes the JSON the page's API client sends, charset and all", async () => {
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        headers: {
+          ...OWN_PAGE,
+          "content-type": "application/json;charset=UTF-8",
+        },
+        rawBody: JSON.stringify({ data: ANSWERS }),
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(result)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: SUBMISSION_RESULT });
+    });
+
+    it.each([
+      ["from the form's own page", OWN_PAGE],
+      ["from a caller that is not a browser", {}],
+    ])(
+      "refuses a submission that is not JSON %s, before anything counts it",
+      async (_label: string, headers: http.OutgoingHttpHeaders) => {
+        for (const contentType of [
+          "application/x-www-form-urlencoded",
+          "text/plain",
+        ]) {
+          const result: HttpResult = await send({
+            port,
+            method: "POST",
+            path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+            headers: { ...headers, "content-type": contentType },
+            rawBody: FORGED_FORM,
+          });
+
+          expect(result.status).toBe(400);
+          expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+            INCIDENT_FORM_SUBMISSION_BODY_MESSAGE,
+          );
+        }
+
+        expect(submitPublicForm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(incidentCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+        expect(client.counters.size).toBe(0);
+      },
+    );
+  });
+
+  describe("404", () => {
+    it.each([
+      ["a link no form holds", UNKNOWN_SHARE_KEY],
+      ["a form that is turned off", OFF_SHARE_KEY],
+      ["a link that is not a share key", "report-a-problem"],
+    ])(
+      "answers %s with the one not-available message",
+      async (_label: string, shareKey: string) => {
+        const read: HttpResult = await send({
+          port,
+          method: "GET",
+          path: readPath(shareKey),
+        });
+        const submitted: HttpResult = await send({
+          port,
+          method: "POST",
+          path: submitPath(shareKey),
+          body: { data: ANSWERS },
+        });
+
+        for (const result of [read, submitted]) {
+          expect(result.status).toBe(404);
+          expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+            INCIDENT_FORM_NOT_AVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
+          );
+        }
+
+        expect(incidentCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      },
+    );
+
+    it("answers a project off plan exactly as a link no form holds", async () => {
+      jest
+        .spyOn(IncidentFormService, "isProjectOnPlan")
+        .mockResolvedValue(false as never);
+
+      const offPlan: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(SHARE_KEY),
+      });
+      const unknown: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(UNKNOWN_SHARE_KEY),
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(offPlan)).toEqual(seen(unknown));
+      expect(offPlan.status).toBe(404);
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("429", () => {
+    it("refuses a caller over the read limit, saying when to come back", async () => {
+      client.countFloor = 10_000;
+
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(SHARE_KEY),
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(429);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+        INCIDENT_FORM_READ_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
+      );
+      expect(Number(result.headers["retry-after"])).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+      expect(getPublicForm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it("refuses a caller over the submission limit, declaring nothing", async () => {
+      for (let i: number = 0; i < 10; i++) {
+        expect(
+          (
+            await send({
+              port,
+              method: "POST",
+              path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+              body: { data: ANSWERS },
+            })
+          ).status,
+        ).toBe(200);
+      }
+
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(429);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+        INCIDENT_FORM_SUBMIT_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
+      );
+      expect(Number(result.headers["retry-after"])).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+      expect(incidentCreate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(10);
+    });
+  });
+
+  /*
+   * The form's hourly ceiling - sixty incidents across every address -
+   * bounds the pages a leaked link can cause. Only a submission that passed
+   * every check spends it: if refused requests did, anyone holding the link
+   * - even from outside the IP allowlist, or without solving the captcha -
+   * could use it up with requests that declare nothing, and lock the form
+   * for everybody, silently, hour after hour.
+   */
+  describe("the form's hourly ceiling", () => {
+    // Ten requests from each of six addresses: within each one's own budget.
+    async function sendFromSixAddresses(data: {
+      firstOctet: number;
+      shareKey: string;
+      body: unknown;
+    }): Promise<Array<number>> {
+      const statuses: Array<number> = [];
+
+      for (let address: number = 1; address <= 6; address++) {
+        for (let attempt: number = 0; attempt < 10; attempt++) {
+          statuses.push(
+            (
+              await send({
+                port,
+                method: "POST",
+                path: submitPath(data.shareKey),
+                clientIp: `${data.firstOctet}.0.0.${address}`,
+                body: data.body,
+              })
+            ).status,
+          );
+        }
+      }
+
+      return statuses;
+    }
+
+    test("is never spent by requests the IP allowlist, the captcha or the answers refuse", async () => {
+      // Outside the form's allowlist (198.51.100.0/24).
+      expect(
+        new Set(
+          await sendFromSixAddresses({
+            firstOctet: 11,
+            shareKey: LOCKED_SHARE_KEY,
+            body: { data: ANSWERS },
+          }),
+        ),
+      ).toEqual(new Set([403]));
+
+      // A captcha that fails.
+      jest.spyOn(CaptchaUtil, "isCaptchaEnabled").mockReturnValue(true);
+      jest
+        .spyOn(CaptchaUtil, "verifyCaptcha")
+        .mockRejectedValue(
+          new BadDataException(
+            "Captcha verification failed. Please try again.",
+          ),
+        );
+
+      expect(
+        new Set(
+          await sendFromSixAddresses({
+            firstOctet: 12,
+            shareKey: LOCKED_SHARE_KEY,
+            body: { data: ANSWERS },
+          }),
+        ),
+      ).toEqual(new Set([403]));
+      expect(
+        new Set(
+          await sendFromSixAddresses({
+            firstOctet: 12,
+            shareKey: SHARE_KEY,
+            body: { data: ANSWERS },
+          }),
+        ),
+      ).toEqual(new Set([400]));
+
+      jest.spyOn(CaptchaUtil, "isCaptchaEnabled").mockReturnValue(false);
+
+      // Bodies that are not a submission, and answers that do not pass.
+      expect(
+        new Set(
+          await sendFromSixAddresses({
+            firstOctet: 13,
+            shareKey: SHARE_KEY,
+            body: {},
+          }),
+        ),
+      ).toEqual(new Set([400]));
+      expect(
+        new Set(
+          await sendFromSixAddresses({
+            firstOctet: 14,
+            shareKey: SHARE_KEY,
+            body: { data: { reporterName: "No title" } },
+          }),
+        ),
+      ).toEqual(new Set([400]));
+
+      expect(incidentCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(client.keysMatching(":submit:f:")).toEqual([]);
+
+      // The office inside the allowlist can still report.
+      const insider: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(LOCKED_SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: ALLOWED_IP,
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(insider)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: SUBMISSION_RESULT });
+      expect(incidentCreate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
+      expect(client.keysMatching(":submit:f:")).toHaveLength(1);
+    }, 60_000);
+
+    test("declares at most sixty incidents an hour, from however many addresses", async () => {
+      for (let address: number = 1; address <= 60; address++) {
+        expect(
+          (
+            await send({
+              port,
+              method: "POST",
+              path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+              clientIp: `10.3.0.${address}`,
+              body: { data: ANSWERS },
+            })
+          ).status,
+        ).toBe(200);
+      }
+
+      const refused: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        clientIp: "10.3.1.1",
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(refused.status).toBe(429);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(refused)).toBe(
+        INCIDENT_FORM_TOTAL_RATE_LIMIT_MESSAGE,
+      );
+      expect(Number(refused.headers["retry-after"])).toBeGreaterThan(0);
+      expect(Number(refused.headers["retry-after"])).toBeLessThanOrEqual(
+        60 * 60,
+      );
+      expect(incidentCreate).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(60);
+    }, 60_000);
+
+    test("refuses with a 503, declaring nothing, when it cannot be counted", async () => {
+      client.failKeysMatching = /:submit:f:/;
+
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(503);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+        INCIDENT_FORM_RATE_LIMIT_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
+      );
+      expect(incidentCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("503", () => {
+    it("refuses submissions while the rate limit counter is unavailable", async () => {
+      isConnectedMock.mockReturnValue(false);
+
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(result.status).toBe(503);
+      expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(
+        INCIDENT_FORM_RATE_LIMIT_UNAVAILABLE_MESSAGE,
+      );
+      expect(submitPublicForm).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+      expect(incidentCreate).not.toHaveBeenCalled();
+    });
+
+    it("still shows the form while the counter is unavailable", async () => {
+      isConnectedMock.mockReturnValue(false);
+
+      const result: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(SHARE_KEY),
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(result)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: PUBLIC_FORM });
+    });
+  });
+
+  describe("a visitor's own OneUptime session never gets in the way", () => {
+    const deadSessions: Array<
+      [string, Dictionary<string>, http.OutgoingHttpHeaders]
+    > = [
+      [
+        "an access-token cookie from before a secret rotation",
+        { [CookieUtil.getUserTokenKey()]: STALE_ACCESS_TOKEN },
+        {},
+      ],
+      [
+        "an expired access-token cookie",
+        { [CookieUtil.getUserTokenKey()]: EXPIRED_ACCESS_TOKEN },
+        {},
+      ],
+      [
+        "a junk access-token cookie",
+        { [CookieUtil.getUserTokenKey()]: "not-a-jwt" },
+        {},
+      ],
+      ["a junk bearer token", {}, { authorization: "Bearer not-a-jwt" }],
+    ];
+
+    it.each(deadSessions)(
+      "answers a request carrying %s exactly as one carrying none",
+      async (
+        _label: string,
+        cookies: Dictionary<string>,
+        headers: http.OutgoingHttpHeaders,
+      ) => {
+        for (const [method, path, body] of [
+          ["GET", readPath(SHARE_KEY), undefined],
+          ["POST", submitPath(SHARE_KEY), { data: ANSWERS }],
+          ["GET", readPath(OFF_SHARE_KEY), undefined],
+          ["POST", submitPath(SHARE_KEY), { data: { title: "" } }],
+        ] as Array<["GET" | "POST", string, unknown]>) {
+          const withSession: HttpResult = await send({
+            port,
+            method,
+            path,
+            cookies,
+            headers,
+            body,
+          });
+          const withoutSession: HttpResult = await send({
+            port,
+            method,
+            path,
+            body,
+          });
+
+          expect(withSession.status).not.toBe(401);
+          expect(seen(withSession)).toEqual(seen(withoutSession));
+        }
+      },
+    );
+
+    /*
+     * Nothing on these routes touches the visitor's cookies, so nothing can
+     * sign them out of the session they have on this host.
+     */
+    it.each(deadSessions)(
+      "never sets or clears a cookie for a request carrying %s",
+      async (
+        _label: string,
+        cookies: Dictionary<string>,
+        headers: http.OutgoingHttpHeaders,
+      ) => {
+        const read: HttpResult = await send({
+          port,
+          method: "GET",
+          path: readPath(SHARE_KEY),
+          cookies,
+          headers,
+        });
+        const submitted: HttpResult = await send({
+          port,
+          method: "POST",
+          path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+          cookies,
+          headers,
+          body: { data: ANSWERS },
+        });
+
+        expect(read.headers["set-cookie"]).toBeUndefined();
+        expect(submitted.headers["set-cookie"]).toBeUndefined();
+      },
+    );
+
+    it("treats a signed-in visitor as just a visitor: the same answer, and an incident that names no user", async () => {
+      const cookies: Dictionary<string> = {
+        [CookieUtil.getUserTokenKey()]: validAccessToken(),
+      };
+
+      const read: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "GET",
+        path: readPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        cookies,
+      });
+      const submitted: HttpResult = await send({
+        port,
+        method: "POST",
+        path: submitPath(SHARE_KEY),
+        cookies,
+        body: { data: ANSWERS },
+      });
+
+      expect(seen(read)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: PUBLIC_FORM });
+      expect(seen(submitted)).toEqual({ status: 200, body: SUBMISSION_RESULT });
+      expect(submitted.headers["set-cookie"]).toBeUndefined();
+
+      const created: { data: Incident; props: JSONObject } = incidentCreate.mock
+        .calls[0]![0] as { data: Incident; props: JSONObject };
+
+      expect(created.data.createdByUserId).toBeUndefined();
+      expect(created.props).toEqual({ isRoot: true });
+      expect(
+        Object.keys(
+          getPublicForm.mock.calls[0]![0] as Record<string, unknown>,
+        ).sort(),
+      ).toEqual(["clientIp", "shareKey"]);
+    });
+
+    /*
+     * The CRUD routes on the same router do need to know who is calling, so
+     * a dead session is still a 401 there - the answer that makes the
+     * dashboard client refresh its session. Only the public routes waive it.
+     */
+    it("still answers the signed-in CRUD routes beside them with a 401", async () => {
+      for (const [method, path] of [
+        ["POST", "/api/incident-form/get-list"],
+        [
+          "POST",
+          `/api/incident-form/${ObjectID.generate().toString()}/get-item`,
+        ],
+      ] as Array<["GET" | "POST", string]>) {
+        const result: HttpResult = await send({
+          port,
+          method,
+          path,
+          cookies: { [CookieUtil.getUserTokenKey()]: STALE_ACCESS_TOKEN },
+          body: {},
+        });
+
+        expect(result.status).toBe(401);
+        expect(errorMessageOf(result)).toBe(INVALID_ACCESS_TOKEN_MESSAGE);
+      }
+    });
+  });
+});
+
+/*
+ * Route matching, read from the router itself. The public routes sit beside
+ * the model's CRUD routes under /incident-form; neither may ever catch the
+ * other's requests. Express matches in registration order, and BaseAPI
+ * registers the CRUD routes first.
+ */
+describe("the public routes and the CRUD routes never collide", () => {
+  type RouteHandler = (...args: Array<unknown>) => unknown;
+
+  interface RouterLayer {
+    route?: {
+      path: string;
+      methods: Dictionary<boolean>;
+      stack: Array<{ handle: RouteHandler }>;
+    };
+    match: (path: string) => boolean;
+  }
+
+  const router: ExpressRouter = new IncidentFormAPI().getRouter();
+  const layers: Array<RouterLayer> = (
+    router as unknown as { stack: Array<RouterLayer> }
+  ).stack.filter((layer: RouterLayer) => {
+    return Boolean(layer.route);
+  });
+
+  // Every registered route that would answer this request, in order.
+  function routesFor(method: string, path: string): Array<string> {
+    return layers
+      .filter((layer: RouterLayer) => {
+        return (
+          Boolean(layer.route!.methods[method.toLowerCase()]) &&
+          layer.match(path)
+        );
+      })
+      .map((layer: RouterLayer) => {
+        return `${method} ${layer.route!.path}`;
+      });
+  }
+
+  function firstMiddlewareFor(method: string, path: string): unknown {
+    const layer: RouterLayer | undefined = layers.find(
+      (candidate: RouterLayer) => {
+        return (
+          Boolean(candidate.route!.methods[method.toLowerCase()]) &&
+          candidate.match(path)
+        );
+      },
+    );
+
+    return layer?.route?.stack[0]?.handle;
+  }
+
+  const shareKey: string = ObjectID.generate().toString();
+  const id: string = ObjectID.generate().toString();
+
+  it("sends a form link only to the public routes", () => {
+    expect(routesFor("GET", `/incident-form/public/${shareKey}`)).toEqual([
+      "GET /incident-form/public/:shareKey",
+    ]);
+    expect(
+      routesFor("POST", `/incident-form/public/${shareKey}/submit`),
+    ).toEqual(["POST /incident-form/public/:shareKey/submit"]);
+  });
+
+  it.each([
+    ["POST", "/incident-form"],
+    ["POST", "/incident-form/get-list"],
+    ["GET", "/incident-form/get-list"],
+    ["POST", "/incident-form/count"],
+    ["POST", `/incident-form/${id}/get-item`],
+    ["GET", `/incident-form/${id}/get-item`],
+    ["PUT", `/incident-form/${id}`],
+    ["POST", `/incident-form/${id}/update-item`],
+    ["DELETE", `/incident-form/${id}`],
+    ["POST", `/incident-form/${id}/delete-item`],
+  ])(
+    "sends %s %s only to its CRUD route, behind the signed-in user middleware",
+    (method: string, path: string) => {
+      const matched: Array<string> = routesFor(method, path);
+
+      expect(matched).toHaveLength(1);
+      expect(matched[0]).not.toContain("/public/");
+      expect(firstMiddlewareFor(method, path)).toBe(
+        UserMiddleware.getUserMiddleware,
+      );
+    },
+  );
+
+  /*
+   * A share key is a UUID, so it is never "get-item". Were one spelled like
+   * a CRUD suffix, the CRUD route - registered first - would take it, with
+   * its authentication: never the other way round.
+   */
+  it("lets the CRUD route win the one path both could match", () => {
+    expect(routesFor("GET", "/incident-form/public/get-item")).toEqual([
+      "GET /incident-form/:id/get-item",
+      "GET /incident-form/public/:shareKey",
+    ]);
+    expect(firstMiddlewareFor("GET", "/incident-form/public/get-item")).toBe(
+      UserMiddleware.getUserMiddleware,
+    );
+  });
+});