@oneuptime/common 12.0.21 → 12.0.23

package/Server/Services/NetworkDeviceAutoImportRuleService.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,181 @@
+import DatabaseService from "./DatabaseService";
+import Model from "../../Models/DatabaseModels/NetworkDeviceAutoImportRule";
+import { OnCreate, OnUpdate } from "../Types/Database/Hooks";
+import CreateBy from "../Types/Database/CreateBy";
+import UpdateBy from "../Types/Database/UpdateBy";
+import CaptureSpan from "../Utils/Telemetry/CaptureSpan";
+import LIMIT_MAX from "../../Types/Database/LimitMax";
+import BadDataException from "../../Types/Exception/BadDataException";
+import RulePatternMatchUtil from "../../Utils/Rules/RulePatternMatchUtil";
+import ScanTargetUtil from "../../Utils/NetworkDiscovery/ScanTargetUtil";
+
+/*
+ * Write-time validation for auto-import rules, following the
+ * NetworkSiteAssignmentRuleService contract: a condition that can only ever
+ * match nothing is rejected where the user can see it, not logged about by
+ * the engine long after they left the form.
+ */
+
+/*
+ * What a sysObjectID condition may contain: an optional leading dot, then
+ * digits, dots and '*' wildcards. Hoisted so the literal is not the object
+ * of a member expression, which `wrap-regex` and Prettier cannot agree on —
+ * same reason as CidrMatchUtil.
+ */
+const OID_PATTERN_SHAPE: RegExp = /^\.?[\d.*]+$/;
+export class Service extends DatabaseService<Model> {
+  public constructor() {
+    super(Model);
+  }
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onBeforeCreate(
+    createBy: CreateBy<Model>,
+  ): Promise<OnCreate<Model>> {
+    this.validateCriteria({
+      ipMatchTarget: createBy.data.ipMatchTarget,
+      sysNamePattern: createBy.data.sysNamePattern,
+      sysDescrPattern: createBy.data.sysDescrPattern,
+      sysObjectIdPattern: createBy.data.sysObjectIdPattern,
+    });
+
+    return { createBy, carryForward: null };
+  }
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onBeforeUpdate(
+    updateBy: UpdateBy<Model>,
+  ): Promise<OnUpdate<Model>> {
+    const dataKeys: Array<string> = Object.keys(updateBy.data || {});
+
+    const isCriteriaChange: boolean =
+      dataKeys.includes("ipMatchTarget") ||
+      dataKeys.includes("sysNamePattern") ||
+      dataKeys.includes("sysDescrPattern") ||
+      dataKeys.includes("sysObjectIdPattern");
+
+    if (!isCriteriaChange) {
+      return { updateBy, carryForward: null };
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The update may clear one criterion while another only exists on the
+     * stored row, so validate the RESULTING state of every matched row.
+     */
+    const existingRules: Array<Model> = await this.findBy({
+      query: updateBy.query,
+      select: {
+        _id: true,
+        ipMatchTarget: true,
+        sysNamePattern: true,
+        sysDescrPattern: true,
+        sysObjectIdPattern: true,
+      },
+      limit: LIMIT_MAX,
+      skip: 0,
+      props: {
+        isRoot: true,
+      },
+    });
+
+    const data: Record<string, unknown> = updateBy.data as unknown as Record<
+      string,
+      unknown
+    >;
+
+    for (const existingRule of existingRules) {
+      this.validateCriteria({
+        ipMatchTarget: dataKeys.includes("ipMatchTarget")
+          ? (data["ipMatchTarget"] as string | null)
+          : existingRule.ipMatchTarget,
+        sysNamePattern: dataKeys.includes("sysNamePattern")
+          ? (data["sysNamePattern"] as string | null)
+          : existingRule.sysNamePattern,
+        sysDescrPattern: dataKeys.includes("sysDescrPattern")
+          ? (data["sysDescrPattern"] as string | null)
+          : existingRule.sysDescrPattern,
+        sysObjectIdPattern: dataKeys.includes("sysObjectIdPattern")
+          ? (data["sysObjectIdPattern"] as string | null)
+          : existingRule.sysObjectIdPattern,
+      });
+    }
+
+    return { updateBy, carryForward: null };
+  }
+
+  private validateCriteria(data: {
+    ipMatchTarget?: string | null | undefined;
+    sysNamePattern?: string | null | undefined;
+    sysDescrPattern?: string | null | undefined;
+    sysObjectIdPattern?: string | null | undefined;
+  }): void {
+    const ipMatchTarget: string = (data.ipMatchTarget || "").trim();
+    const sysNamePattern: string = (data.sysNamePattern || "").trim();
+    const sysDescrPattern: string = (data.sysDescrPattern || "").trim();
+    const sysObjectIdPattern: string = (data.sysObjectIdPattern || "").trim();
+
+    /*
+     * A rule with no conditions matches nothing (see AutoImportRuleMatcher) —
+     * and would read as "match everything" to whoever finds it later.
+     */
+    if (
+      !ipMatchTarget &&
+      !sysNamePattern &&
+      !sysDescrPattern &&
+      !sysObjectIdPattern
+    ) {
+      throw new BadDataException(
+        "At least one of Host IP Is In, System Name Pattern, System Description Pattern, or System Object ID Pattern is required.",
+      );
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Well-formedness only, deliberately NOT the scan-size ceiling: matching
+     * an address against 10.0.0.0/8 is a containment check, not a sweep, so
+     * a condition covering a huge block is legitimate here even though a
+     * scan target that size is not.
+     */
+    if (ipMatchTarget && !ScanTargetUtil.isValid(ipMatchTarget)) {
+      throw new BadDataException(
+        `"${ipMatchTarget}" is not a valid Host IP condition. ${ScanTargetUtil.getSyntaxHint()}`,
+      );
+    }
+
+    this.validatePattern("System Name Pattern", sysNamePattern);
+    this.validatePattern("System Description Pattern", sysDescrPattern);
+    this.validateOidPattern(sysObjectIdPattern);
+  }
+
+  private validatePattern(title: string, pattern: string): void {
+    if (!pattern || RulePatternMatchUtil.isSupportedPattern(pattern)) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    throw new BadDataException(
+      `${title} is neither a valid regular expression nor a '*' wildcard pattern, so it would never match: ${pattern}`,
+    );
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * The sysObjectID condition is NOT free-text: an OID is a dotted numeric
+   * arc, matched as a literal-dot '*' glob or an arc prefix (see
+   * AutoImportRuleMatcher.matchesOidPattern — regex-first matching would make
+   * "1.3.6.1.4.1.9.*" match enterprise 94 too). So the only characters that
+   * can ever match anything are digits, dots and '*'; anything else is a
+   * pattern that silently never fires, which is exactly what this service
+   * exists to reject at the write.
+   */
+  private validateOidPattern(pattern: string): void {
+    if (!pattern) {
+      return;
+    }
+
+    if (!OID_PATTERN_SHAPE.test(pattern)) {
+      throw new BadDataException(
+        `System Object ID Pattern must be an OID prefix (1.3.6.1.4.1.9) or a '*' wildcard OID pattern (1.3.6.1.4.1.9.*) — digits, dots and '*' only: ${pattern}`,
+      );
+    }
+  }
+}
+
+export default new Service();

package/Server/Services/UserService.ts

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ import ProductAnalytics from "../Utils/ProductAnalytics";
 import MarketingEventUtil from "../Utils/Marketing/MarketingEventUtil";
 import { MarketingEventType } from "../../Types/Marketing/MarketingEvent";
 import UserTotpAuthService from "./UserTotpAuthService";
+import UserTwoFactorBackupCodeService from "./UserTwoFactorBackupCodeService";
 import UserWebAuthnService from "./UserWebAuthnService";
 import BadDataException from "../../Types/Exception/BadDataException";
 import NotFoundException from "../../Types/Exception/NotFoundException";
@@ -819,6 +820,18 @@ export class Service extends DatabaseService<Model> {
     const verifiedTwoFactorAuthMethodCount: number =
       await this.countVerifiedTwoFactorAuthMethods(userId);
 
+    /*
+     * Read separately from the method count above, and NOT added to it. See
+     * the note on `deriveTwoFactorAuthStatus`: folding recovery codes into the
+     * configured-method count would report an account whose authenticator is
+     * gone as fully set up, and login would keep sending it to the challenge
+     * screen until the last code was spent.
+     */
+    const unusedTwoFactorBackupCodeCount: number =
+      await UserTwoFactorBackupCodeService.countUnusedForUser({
+        userId: userId,
+      });
+
     return {
       hasPassword: Boolean(user.password),
       isEmailVerified: Boolean(user.isEmailVerified),
@@ -828,6 +841,7 @@ export class Service extends DatabaseService<Model> {
         verifiedMethodCount: verifiedTwoFactorAuthMethodCount,
       }),
       verifiedTwoFactorAuthMethodCount: verifiedTwoFactorAuthMethodCount,
+      unusedTwoFactorBackupCodeCount: unusedTwoFactorBackupCodeCount,
       hasPendingPasswordResetLink: hasPendingPasswordResetLink,
     };
   }
@@ -845,6 +859,17 @@ export class Service extends DatabaseService<Model> {
    * Counting unverified rows would therefore report a user who has never once
    * typed a code as fully configured -- and that user is precisely the one an
    * operator is looking at the page to help.
+   *
+   * BACKUP CODES ARE NOT COUNTED HERE, for a related reason one step further
+   * on. This number decides `deriveTwoFactorAuthStatus`, which decides whether
+   * login shows the two factor CHALLENGE or sends the account through
+   * enrolment. An account whose only remaining material was recovery codes
+   * would, if they counted, be shown a challenge it cannot answer except by
+   * spending a code -- one per sign-in, with no way to enrol a new
+   * authenticator, until the last one is gone. Recovery codes are the way back
+   * in to an account with a factor it cannot reach; they are not a factor.
+   * `UserAuthenticationStatus.unusedTwoFactorBackupCodeCount` reports them
+   * separately.
    */
   @CaptureSpan()
   private async countVerifiedTwoFactorAuthMethods(
@@ -1036,6 +1061,23 @@ export class Service extends DatabaseService<Model> {
       },
     });
 
+    /*
+     * The recovery codes go with the authenticators, and this is not
+     * bookkeeping. A backup code signs somebody in on its own, so a reset that
+     * cleared the TOTP secret but left a printed list of codes alive would
+     * have revoked nothing that an attacker who took the phone -- and the
+     * paper next to it -- still holds. "Reset two factor auth" has to mean all
+     * of the second-factor material, not the part that is easiest to see.
+     *
+     * It also matters in the harmless direction: the user is about to be sent
+     * through enrolment at their next sign-in, and codes minted against an
+     * authenticator that no longer exists are dead weight nobody would think
+     * to clear.
+     */
+    await UserTwoFactorBackupCodeService.deleteAllForUser({
+      userId: user.id!,
+    });
+
     /*
      * Ordered after the deletes, not before. A session that survives a reset
      * is a session that never has to prove the second factor again, which

package/Server/Services/UserTwoFactorBackupCodeService.ts

@@ -0,0 +1,355 @@
+import DatabaseService from "./DatabaseService";
+import Model from "../../Models/DatabaseModels/UserTwoFactorBackupCode";
+import TwoFactorBackupCode, {
+  BackupCodeSetSize,
+} from "../Utils/TwoFactorBackupCode";
+import CreateBy from "../Types/Database/CreateBy";
+import { OnCreate } from "../Types/Database/Hooks";
+import QueryHelper from "../Types/Database/QueryHelper";
+import BadDataException from "../../Types/Exception/BadDataException";
+import LIMIT_MAX from "../../Types/Database/LimitMax";
+import SortOrder from "../../Types/BaseDatabase/SortOrder";
+import ObjectID from "../../Types/ObjectID";
+import PositiveNumber from "../../Types/PositiveNumber";
+import OneUptimeDate from "../../Types/Date";
+import CaptureSpan from "../Utils/Telemetry/CaptureSpan";
+import logger from "../Utils/Logger";
+
+/**
+ * How many of a user's backup codes are left, for the profile page and the
+ * admin's account view.
+ *
+ * `total` and `unused` are both reported rather than just the remaining count
+ * because they answer different questions: "have you set backup codes up at
+ * all" and "how many can you still use". A user with ten codes and a user who
+ * has spent all ten both have a `total` of ten, and only the second needs to
+ * be told to regenerate.
+ */
+export interface TwoFactorBackupCodeStatus {
+  total: number;
+  unused: number;
+
+  /*
+   * When the current set was minted, or null if there are none. Read off the
+   * newest row rather than stored separately -- regeneration replaces the
+   * whole set in one call, so every row in a set shares a creation time to
+   * within a few milliseconds.
+   */
+  generatedAt: Date | null;
+}
+
+export class Service extends DatabaseService<Model> {
+  public constructor() {
+    super(Model);
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * The model denies create to everyone, so the only way a row is written is
+   * `regenerateForUser` below, as root. This hook is the second lock on the
+   * same door: it refuses any create that did not come through there.
+   *
+   * Worth having both because the two guards fail differently. The table
+   * permission is enforced by the CRUD API layer and is bypassed wholesale by
+   * `isRoot`, which every internal caller uses -- so a future service that
+   * reaches for `UserTwoFactorBackupCodeService.create()` with a plaintext
+   * code, or with no owner, would sail past it. What lands in `codeHash` is
+   * the credential; there is no recovering from writing the wrong thing there.
+   */
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onBeforeCreate(
+    createBy: CreateBy<Model>,
+  ): Promise<OnCreate<Model>> {
+    if (!createBy.data.userId) {
+      throw new BadDataException("User id is required");
+    }
+
+    if (!createBy.data.codeHash) {
+      throw new BadDataException("Backup code hash is required");
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * A code that arrives already spent is a caller confusing itself about
+     * which end of the lifecycle it is at. Codes are minted usable and are
+     * spent only by `consumeCode`.
+     *
+     * Deleted rather than set to undefined: `exactOptionalPropertyTypes` is on,
+     * so the property being ABSENT and the property holding `undefined` are
+     * different things to the compiler, and only the first is allowed here.
+     */
+    delete createBy.data.usedAt;
+
+    return {
+      createBy: createBy,
+      carryForward: {},
+    };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Mint a fresh set of backup codes for one user, replacing whatever they
+   * had, and return the PLAINTEXT codes.
+   *
+   * This is the only moment the plaintext exists anywhere. The caller shows it
+   * to the user once and then it is gone -- only the keyed digests are stored,
+   * so nothing (not this service, not a master admin, not a database dump) can
+   * produce the codes again. That is the property the feature is worth having
+   * for, and it is why the API route wraps this in a response the UI is
+   * expected to make the user acknowledge.
+   *
+   * REPLACING rather than adding is deliberate. "Generate more codes" would
+   * leave the codes from a list the user printed, lost and then regenerated
+   * over still working, which defeats the point of regenerating after a
+   * suspected compromise.
+   *
+   * ALL OR NOTHING, and this is the part that needs care. The old set is
+   * deleted first, then the new rows are written one at a time -- so a failure
+   * partway through the loop would otherwise leave the account holding a few
+   * rows that WERE written and that the caller, having thrown, never showed to
+   * anybody. `getStatusForUser` would then report "4 backup codes" to a user
+   * who has never seen one of them: codes that are unusable in practice and
+   * that hide the fact that they have no recovery route left. That is the
+   * worst state this feature can produce, because it looks exactly like the
+   * good one.
+   *
+   * So a failure is compensated: everything written for this user is removed,
+   * and the account ends with NO codes and an error on screen. "You have no
+   * backup codes" is a state the profile page already tells the user to fix;
+   * "you have four codes you have never seen" is not.
+   *
+   * The compensating delete is itself best-effort -- if it also fails there is
+   * nothing further to try -- but it turns a silent, permanent trap into two
+   * consecutive infrastructure failures.
+   */
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  public async regenerateForUser(data: {
+    userId: ObjectID;
+    count?: number | undefined;
+  }): Promise<Array<string>> {
+    const count: number = data.count || BackupCodeSetSize;
+
+    await this.deleteAllForUser({ userId: data.userId });
+
+    const codes: Array<string> = TwoFactorBackupCode.generateCodeSet(count);
+
+    try {
+      for (const code of codes) {
+        const backupCode: Model = new Model();
+        backupCode.userId = data.userId;
+        backupCode.codeHash = TwoFactorBackupCode.hashCode({
+          code: code,
+          userId: data.userId,
+        });
+
+        await this.create({
+          data: backupCode,
+          props: {
+            isRoot: true,
+          },
+        });
+      }
+    } catch (err) {
+      try {
+        await this.deleteAllForUser({ userId: data.userId });
+      } catch (cleanupError) {
+        /*
+         * Swallowed so the ORIGINAL failure is what the caller sees. The
+         * cleanup error is the less useful of the two -- it explains why the
+         * rollback did not happen, not why the write did not.
+         */
+        logger.error(cleanupError);
+      }
+
+      throw err;
+    }
+
+    return codes;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Spend one of this user's backup codes, if the submitted code is one of
+   * them and has not been used already.
+   *
+   * ONE STATEMENT, ON PURPOSE
+   *
+   * The obvious shape -- find the row, check `usedAt`, then update it -- has a
+   * window between the read and the write, and "single use" is the entire
+   * guarantee a backup code offers. Two sign-in attempts carrying the same
+   * code that arrive together would both read a null `usedAt` and both be let
+   * in, which is precisely the property an attacker who has watched somebody
+   * type a code off a printed list would exploit.
+   *
+   * `usedAt IS NULL` in the WHERE clause moves the decision inside Postgres,
+   * where the row lock settles it: the first statement to reach the row
+   * updates it, the second matches nothing. `RETURNING "_id"` is what turns
+   * that into an answer for the caller -- an UPDATE that matched no rows and
+   * an UPDATE that matched one are otherwise indistinguishable from here.
+   *
+   * Written as raw parameterized SQL rather than through the ORM because no
+   * write path on DatabaseService both takes a non-primary-key predicate and
+   * reports what it matched. Column and table names are literals in this file,
+   * never caller input, and all three values are bound parameters.
+   *
+   * `deletedAt IS NULL` is included because soft-deleted rows are still
+   * physically present; without it, a code from a set that regeneration
+   * replaced would still sign somebody in.
+   *
+   * @returns true when a code was spent, false when the code was wrong,
+   *          already used, or belongs to somebody else.
+   */
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  public async consumeCode(data: {
+    userId: ObjectID;
+    code: string;
+  }): Promise<boolean> {
+    const normalizedCode: string = TwoFactorBackupCode.normalizeCode(data.code);
+
+    /*
+     * Refused before the query rather than hashed and looked up. An empty
+     * submission cannot be anybody's code, and letting it through would mean
+     * one round trip per empty request on a route an attacker can call.
+     */
+    if (!normalizedCode) {
+      return false;
+    }
+
+    const codeHash: string = TwoFactorBackupCode.hashCode({
+      code: normalizedCode,
+      userId: data.userId,
+    });
+
+    const rows: Array<{ _id: string }> = await this.getRepository()
+      .manager.query(
+        `UPDATE "UserTwoFactorBackupCode"
+            SET "usedAt" = $1, "updatedAt" = CURRENT_TIMESTAMP
+          WHERE "userId" = $2
+            AND "codeHash" = $3
+            AND "usedAt" IS NULL
+            AND "deletedAt" IS NULL
+      RETURNING "_id"`,
+        [OneUptimeDate.getCurrentDate(), data.userId.toString(), codeHash],
+      )
+      /*
+       * For an UPDATE the postgres driver hands back `[rows, rowCount]` rather
+       * than a bare row array, so the rows have to be unwrapped. Written
+       * defensively: a driver that returns the bare array instead must read as
+       * "no code was spent", never as a silent success.
+       */
+      .then((result: unknown): Array<{ _id: string }> => {
+        if (!Array.isArray(result)) {
+          return [];
+        }
+
+        const first: unknown = result[0];
+
+        return Array.isArray(first) ? (first as Array<{ _id: string }>) : [];
+      });
+
+    return rows.length > 0;
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * How many codes this user has, and how many are still spendable.
+   *
+   * Counted rather than fetched: the rows carry a credential digest and there
+   * is no caller that needs them, so nothing is loaded that a stray log line
+   * could then print.
+   */
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  public async getStatusForUser(data: {
+    userId: ObjectID;
+  }): Promise<TwoFactorBackupCodeStatus> {
+    const total: PositiveNumber = await this.countBy({
+      query: {
+        userId: data.userId,
+      },
+      props: {
+        isRoot: true,
+      },
+    });
+
+    if (total.toNumber() === 0) {
+      return {
+        total: 0,
+        unused: 0,
+        generatedAt: null,
+      };
+    }
+
+    const unused: number = await this.countUnusedForUser({
+      userId: data.userId,
+    });
+
+    const newest: Model | null = await this.findOneBy({
+      query: {
+        userId: data.userId,
+      },
+      select: {
+        createdAt: true,
+      },
+      sort: {
+        createdAt: SortOrder.Descending,
+      },
+      props: {
+        isRoot: true,
+      },
+    });
+
+    return {
+      total: total.toNumber(),
+      unused: unused,
+      generatedAt: newest?.createdAt || null,
+    };
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * How many unused codes this user has left.
+   *
+   * Split out from `getStatusForUser` because the login path needs exactly
+   * this number and nothing else: it decides whether the two factor challenge
+   * screen offers "use a backup code" at all, and it is answered on every
+   * two-factor sign-in.
+   *
+   * `usedAt: QueryHelper.isNull()` rather than `usedAt: null`. A bare null
+   * predicate is dropped by TypeORM rather than compiled to `IS NULL`, so the
+   * count would silently include spent codes and the login page would offer a
+   * recovery route to a user with nothing left to recover with.
+   */
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  public async countUnusedForUser(data: { userId: ObjectID }): Promise<number> {
+    const unused: PositiveNumber = await this.countBy({
+      query: {
+        userId: data.userId,
+        usedAt: QueryHelper.isNull(),
+      },
+      props: {
+        isRoot: true,
+      },
+    });
+
+    return unused.toNumber();
+  }
+
+  /**
+   * Drop every backup code this user has.
+   *
+   * Called by regeneration, and by UserService.resetTwoFactorAuth -- an
+   * operator resetting two factor auth for somebody who lost a device must
+   * take the recovery codes with it. Leaving them behind would mean the reset
+   * did not actually revoke the account's second-factor material, which is the
+   * one thing the operator pressed the button to do.
+   */
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  public async deleteAllForUser(data: { userId: ObjectID }): Promise<void> {
+    await this.deleteBy({
+      query: {
+        userId: data.userId,
+      },
+      limit: LIMIT_MAX,
+      skip: 0,
+      props: {
+        isRoot: true,
+      },
+    });
+  }
+}
+
+export default new Service();

package/Server/Utils/Monitor/NetworkInventoryUtil.ts

@@ -15,7 +15,9 @@ import EndpointAttachmentUtil, {
 } from "../../../Utils/Monitor/EndpointAttachmentUtil";
 import SnmpSystemInfo from "../../../Types/Monitor/SnmpMonitor/SnmpSystemInfo";
 import SnmpEntityInfo from "../../../Types/Monitor/SnmpMonitor/SnmpEntityInfo";
-import SnmpVendorTemplateUtil from "../../../Types/Monitor/SnmpMonitor/SnmpVendorTemplate";
+import SnmpVendorTemplateUtil, {
+  SnmpVendorTemplate,
+} from "../../../Types/Monitor/SnmpMonitor/SnmpVendorTemplate";
 import ObjectID from "../../../Types/ObjectID";
 import OneUptimeDate from "../../../Types/Date";
 import logger from "../Logger";
@@ -55,6 +57,9 @@ export default class NetworkInventoryUtil {
         select: {
           _id: true,
           siteId: true,
+          // For the vendor-template auto-apply below.
+          autoApplyVendorHealthTemplate: true,
+          snmpOids: true,
         },
         props: {
           isRoot: true,
@@ -150,6 +155,39 @@ export default class NetworkInventoryUtil {
       if (vendor) {
         deviceUpdate["vendor"] = vendor.substring(0, 100);
       }
+
+      /*
+       * Vendor health template auto-apply — the automatic counterpart of the
+       * dashboard's vendor-template banner, for devices that opted in
+       * (auto-imported devices do; hand-made ones keep the manual flow).
+       *
+       * Deliberately narrow: only when the device has NO health OIDs at all.
+       * An existing list — template-seeded and pruned, or hand-built — is
+       * the operator's, and a poll must never edit it. That also makes this
+       * one-shot in practice: the first poll that fingerprints the vendor
+       * seeds the list, and every later poll sees a non-empty list and
+       * leaves it alone (including after the operator empties it on purpose
+       * AND turns the toggle off; with the toggle still on, an emptied list
+       * re-seeds next poll, which is what "auto-apply" says on the tin).
+       */
+      if (
+        ownedDevice.autoApplyVendorHealthTemplate &&
+        (ownedDevice.snmpOids || []).length === 0 &&
+        systemInfo?.sysObjectId
+      ) {
+        const vendorTemplate: SnmpVendorTemplate | undefined =
+          SnmpVendorTemplateUtil.matchBySysObjectId(systemInfo.sysObjectId);
+
+        if (vendorTemplate) {
+          deviceUpdate["snmpOids"] = SnmpVendorTemplateUtil.mergeOids(
+            [],
+            vendorTemplate.id,
+          );
+          logger.debug(
+            `Auto-applied the "${vendorTemplate.label}" vendor health template to network device ${deviceId.toString()} (sysObjectID ${systemInfo.sysObjectId}).`,
+          );
+        }
+      }
       if (entityInfo?.model) {
         deviceUpdate["deviceModel"] = entityInfo.model.substring(0, 100);
       }