@oneuptime/common 12.0.13 → 12.0.15

package/Server/Services/AnalyticsDatabaseService.ts

@@ -1542,6 +1542,159 @@ export default class AnalyticsDatabaseService<
     return { ...sort, _id: direction } as Sort<TBaseModel>;
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Bounds the rows an `ORDER BY ... , _id` find has to sort, without
+   * changing which rows it returns.
+   *
+   * ClickHouse can read in sorting-key order — and stop early — only when the
+   * ORDER BY lines up with the table's physical key. The `_id` tiebreaker
+   * appended by `toPaginationStableSort` is deliberately NOT a sorting-key
+   * column, so it denies that plan: the engine reads every row matching the
+   * WHERE, sorts the lot in memory, then discards all but one page. On the
+   * Logs viewer that turned a 100-row page into a full-window scan and tripped
+   * the 3 GiB `max_memory_usage` ceiling (Code 241, surfacing as
+   * "Server Error").
+   *
+   * Weakening the tiebreaker would reintroduce the skip/repeat paging bug it
+   * was added to fix, so bound the input instead. `min(k)` over the top
+   * `skip + limit` values of the leading sort key `k` is a rank statistic of
+   * k's MULTISET: it does not depend on which of several tied rows the inner
+   * LIMIT happened to keep. Every row that could reach position `skip + limit`
+   * satisfies `k >= min(k)`, and every row tied at the boundary value is
+   * admitted — so the page is exactly the page the unbounded query returns.
+   * That is what makes this a pure cost change: every gate below is a
+   * performance gate, and getting one wrong can only make a query slower,
+   * never lose or repeat a row.
+   *
+   * The inner pass reads one narrow key column in physical order and stops at
+   * `skip + limit` rows, so it costs far less than the wide outer read it
+   * saves.
+   *
+   * `min()` is nested over a subquery rather than taken as the N-th value via
+   * `ORDER BY k DESC LIMIT 1 OFFSET n - 1` on purpose: on a final page with
+   * fewer than `skip + limit` matching rows the latter returns no row, the
+   * scalar is NULL, `k >= NULL` is NULL, and the page comes back empty.
+   * `min()` over the available rows degrades to the smallest matching value.
+   */
+  private toSortKeyBoundaryFilter(
+    findBy: FindBy<TBaseModel>,
+    sort: Sort<TBaseModel>,
+    options: { hasGroupBy: boolean; databaseName: string },
+  ): Statement | null {
+    /*
+     * Under GROUP BY the predicate would restrict the aggregation INPUT
+     * rather than the page, so it would change results. Mirrors the
+     * tiebreaker's own exemption, leaving grouped finds byte-identical.
+     */
+    if (options.hasGroupBy) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Without an `_id` column there is no off-key tiebreaker — the six
+     * `includeBaseColumns: false` aggregate targets — so the ORDER BY is
+     * already key-aligned and the bound would be pure overhead. Same
+     * condition toPaginationStableSort bails on.
+     */
+    const hasIdColumn: boolean = this.model.tableColumns.some(
+      (column: AnalyticsTableColumn): boolean => {
+        return column.key === "_id";
+      },
+    );
+
+    if (!hasIdColumn) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    const leadingSortKey: string | undefined = Object.keys(sort || {})[0];
+
+    if (!leadingSortKey) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * Only a column in the physical sorting key can be read in order, so
+     * only there can the off-key `_id` term have cost anything. Off-key
+     * leads (e.g. Log by `severityText`) already plan a bounded top-N and
+     * an extra pass would be pure waste.
+     */
+    if (!this.model.sortKeys.includes(leadingSortKey)) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * A non-required column is `Nullable(...)` in the DDL, and `k >= NULL`
+     * is NULL — the predicate would DROP those rows rather than just
+     * narrowing the scan. Fail safe to today's behavior.
+     */
+    const leadingSortColumn: AnalyticsTableColumn | null =
+      this.model.getTableColumn(leadingSortKey);
+
+    if (!leadingSortColumn || !leadingSortColumn.required) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * `findOneById` funnels a point lookup through `findOneBy` carrying the
+     * model's default sort. At most one row can match, so bounding it would
+     * double a query that has no ordering problem to begin with.
+     */
+    if ((findBy.query as Record<string, unknown> | undefined)?.["_id"]) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    /*
+     * The predicate is valid only BECAUSE of LIMIT/OFFSET: it admits the
+     * rows that can reach position `skip + limit` and no more. Guards the
+     * `new PositiveNumber(undefined)` -> NaN path that exists upstream.
+     */
+    const limit: number = Number(findBy.limit);
+    const skip: number = Number(findBy.skip);
+
+    if (!Number.isFinite(limit) || !Number.isFinite(skip)) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    const boundaryRowCount: number = skip + limit;
+
+    if (boundaryRowCount <= 0) {
+      return null;
+    }
+
+    const isDescending: boolean =
+      (sort as Record<string, SortOrder | undefined>)[leadingSortKey] !==
+      SortOrder.Ascending;
+
+    /*
+     * The bound must be computed over the same row set the outer query
+     * filters on, so the WHERE is regenerated rather than shared: appending
+     * one Statement into two places would bind its parameters twice.
+     */
+    const boundaryWhereStatement: Statement =
+      this.statementGenerator.toWhereStatement(findBy.query);
+
+    const boundaryStatement: Statement = SQL` AND ${leadingSortKey} `;
+
+    boundaryStatement.append(isDescending ? SQL`>=` : SQL`<=`);
+    boundaryStatement.append(
+      isDescending
+        ? SQL` (SELECT min(${leadingSortKey}) FROM (SELECT ${leadingSortKey} FROM ${options.databaseName}.${this.model.tableName} WHERE TRUE `
+        : SQL` (SELECT max(${leadingSortKey}) FROM (SELECT ${leadingSortKey} FROM ${options.databaseName}.${this.model.tableName} WHERE TRUE `,
+    );
+    boundaryStatement.append(boundaryWhereStatement);
+    boundaryStatement.append(this.getRetentionReadFilter());
+    boundaryStatement.append(SQL` ORDER BY ${leadingSortKey} `);
+    boundaryStatement.append(isDescending ? SQL`DESC` : SQL`ASC`);
+    boundaryStatement.append(
+      SQL` LIMIT ${{
+        value: boundaryRowCount,
+        type: TableColumnType.Number,
+      }}))`,
+    );
+
+    return boundaryStatement;
+  }
+
   public toFindStatement(findBy: FindBy<TBaseModel>): {
     statement: Statement;
     columns: Array<string>;
@@ -1577,6 +1730,18 @@ export default class AnalyticsDatabaseService<
       }),
     );
 
+    /*
+     * Keeps the `_id` tiebreaker affordable. Result-preserving by
+     * construction, so it is appended to the WHERE without touching the
+     * ORDER BY above. Null whenever the bound cannot help or cannot be
+     * proven safe.
+     */
+    const sortKeyBoundaryStatement: Statement | null =
+      this.toSortKeyBoundaryFilter(findBy, findBy.sort!, {
+        hasGroupBy: Boolean(groupByStatement),
+        databaseName: databaseName,
+      });
+
     const statement: Statement = SQL``;
 
     statement.append(SQL`SELECT `.append(select.statement));
@@ -1586,6 +1751,10 @@ export default class AnalyticsDatabaseService<
       .append(whereStatement)
       .append(this.getRetentionReadFilter());
 
+    if (sortKeyBoundaryStatement) {
+      statement.append(sortKeyBoundaryStatement);
+    }
+
     if (groupByStatement) {
       statement.append(SQL` GROUP BY `).append(groupByStatement);
     }

package/Server/Services/DatabaseService.ts

@@ -2886,6 +2886,107 @@ class DatabaseService<TBaseModel extends BaseModel> extends BaseService {
     await repository.manager.query(sql, params);
   }
 
+  /*
+   * Add one to a numeric column and return what it became, in a SINGLE
+   * statement.
+   *
+   * This exists for counters that GATE something, where the read and the
+   * write cannot be allowed to come apart. The motivating case is the failed
+   * attempt counter on a notification-channel verification code: read the
+   * count, decide, then write it back, and N requests racing each other all
+   * read the same pre-increment value and all decide they are under the
+   * limit — which is precisely the shape an attacker running a brute-force
+   * loop produces. `atomicAddToColumnsByIdWithoutHooks` closes the
+   * lost-update half of that but cannot answer "and what is it now?", and
+   * `getRepository().increment()` cannot either.
+   *
+   * RETURNING makes the increment and the observation the same operation, so
+   * every concurrent caller gets a distinct value and the k-th attempt is
+   * refused no matter how the requests interleave.
+   *
+   * COALESCE so a NULL counter starts from zero rather than staying NULL.
+   *
+   * The column and table identifiers come from entity metadata, never from
+   * the caller, and the id is bound as a parameter. Hooks, the `version`
+   * bump and access control are all skipped: use ONLY for trusted internal
+   * counter writes.
+   */
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  public async atomicIncrementColumnValueByOneAndGetValue(data: {
+    id: ObjectID;
+    columnName: keyof TBaseModel;
+  }): Promise<number> {
+    if (!data.id) {
+      throw new BadDataException("id is required");
+    }
+
+    const repository: Repository<TBaseModel> = this.getRepository();
+    const metadata: EntityMetadata = repository.metadata;
+
+    const column: ColumnMetadata | undefined =
+      metadata.findColumnWithPropertyName(data.columnName as string);
+
+    if (!column) {
+      throw new BadDataException(
+        `atomicIncrementColumnValueByOneAndGetValue: unknown column "${String(
+          data.columnName,
+        )}" on "${metadata.tableName}"`,
+      );
+    }
+
+    const primaryColumnName: string =
+      metadata.primaryColumns[0]?.databaseName || "_id";
+
+    const quoted: string = `"${column.databaseName}"`;
+
+    const sql: string = `UPDATE "${metadata.tableName}" SET ${quoted} = COALESCE(${quoted}, 0) + 1 WHERE "${primaryColumnName}" = $1 RETURNING ${quoted}`;
+
+    const result: unknown = await repository.manager.query(sql, [
+      data.id.toString(),
+    ]);
+
+    /*
+     * TypeORM's Postgres driver returns `[rows, affectedCount]` for an UPDATE
+     * and a bare row array for everything else, so both shapes are unwrapped
+     * rather than one being assumed.
+     */
+    const rows: Array<unknown> = Array.isArray(result)
+      ? Array.isArray(result[0])
+        ? (result[0] as Array<unknown>)
+        : (result as Array<unknown>)
+      : [];
+
+    const row: unknown = rows[0];
+
+    if (!row || typeof row !== "object" || Array.isArray(row)) {
+      /*
+       * Nothing came back, so the row does not exist — deleted underneath us,
+       * or never there. Callers gate on the returned count, so this must be an
+       * error and not a zero, which would read as a fresh allowance.
+       */
+      throw new BadDataException(
+        `Item with ID ${data.id.toString()} not found`,
+      );
+    }
+
+    const value: unknown = (row as Record<string, unknown>)[
+      column.databaseName
+    ];
+
+    const parsed: number =
+      typeof value === "number" ? value : parseInt(String(value), 10);
+
+    if (!Number.isFinite(parsed)) {
+      throw new BadDataException(
+        `atomicIncrementColumnValueByOneAndGetValue: "${String(
+          data.columnName,
+        )}" did not return a number`,
+      );
+    }
+
+    return parsed;
+  }
+
   @CaptureSpan()
   protected async atomicIncrementColumnValueByOne(data: {
     id: ObjectID;

package/Server/Services/GlobalOidcProjectService.ts

@@ -4,18 +4,138 @@ import Team from "../../Models/DatabaseModels/Team";
 import { LIMIT_PER_PROJECT } from "../../Types/Database/LimitMax";
 import ObjectID from "../../Types/ObjectID";
 import CreateBy from "../Types/Database/CreateBy";
-import { OnCreate, OnUpdate } from "../Types/Database/Hooks";
+import { OnCreate, OnDelete, OnUpdate } from "../Types/Database/Hooks";
 import UpdateBy from "../Types/Database/UpdateBy";
 import CaptureSpan from "../Utils/Telemetry/CaptureSpan";
 import validateGlobalProviderProjectTeams, {
   resolveAttachmentProjectId,
 } from "../Utils/ValidateGlobalProviderProjectTeams";
+import {
+  GLOBAL_SSO_AUTHORIZATION_CACHE_TTL_MS,
+  GlobalProviderAttachments,
+  clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches,
+  doAttachmentsGovernProject,
+  globalProviderCacheKey,
+  globalSsoAttachmentsCache,
+  loadAttachmentsOnce,
+} from "../Utils/GlobalSsoAuthorization";
+import DeleteBy from "../Types/Database/DeleteBy";
 
 export class Service extends DatabaseService<Model> {
   public constructor() {
     super(Model);
   }
 
+  /**
+   * Whether this provider's attachments cover `projectId`.
+   *
+   * Only consulted when the provider has `restrictToAttachedProjects` on -
+   * attachments are the PROVISIONING allow-list by default, not an access
+   * boundary, and reading them as one without the admin asking would lock
+   * existing users out of projects they legitimately reach.
+   *
+   * "No attachment rows at all" means instance-wide, matching the login
+   * router's default-all mode. "Rows exist but none are enabled" is a
+   * different answer and denies - otherwise an admin disabling the last
+   * attachment would WIDEN the provider to every project.
+   *
+   * Cached for 60s, with concurrent misses sharing one query.
+   */
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  public async doesProviderGovernProject(data: {
+    globalOidcId: ObjectID;
+    projectId: ObjectID;
+  }): Promise<boolean> {
+    const key: string = globalProviderCacheKey("oidc", data.globalOidcId);
+
+    const cached: GlobalProviderAttachments | undefined =
+      globalSsoAttachmentsCache.get(key);
+
+    if (cached !== undefined) {
+      return doAttachmentsGovernProject(cached, data.projectId);
+    }
+
+    const attachments: GlobalProviderAttachments = await loadAttachmentsOnce(
+      key,
+      async (): Promise<GlobalProviderAttachments> => {
+        /*
+         * Fetched WITHOUT the isEnabled filter so a disabled row still counts
+         * as "this provider has attachments"; the enabled ones are selected
+         * out below.
+         */
+        const rows: Array<Model> = await this.findBy({
+          query: { globalOidcId: data.globalOidcId },
+          select: { _id: true, projectId: true, isEnabled: true },
+          limit: LIMIT_PER_PROJECT,
+          skip: 0,
+          props: { isRoot: true },
+        });
+
+        const loaded: GlobalProviderAttachments = {
+          hasAnyAttachmentRows: rows.length > 0,
+          enabledProjectIds: rows
+            .filter((row: Model) => {
+              return Boolean(row.isEnabled) && Boolean(row.projectId);
+            })
+            .map((row: Model) => {
+              return row.projectId!.toString();
+            }),
+        };
+
+        globalSsoAttachmentsCache.set(
+          key,
+          loaded,
+          GLOBAL_SSO_AUTHORIZATION_CACHE_TTL_MS,
+        );
+
+        return loaded;
+      },
+    );
+
+    return doAttachmentsGovernProject(attachments, data.projectId);
+  }
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onBeforeDelete(
+    deleteBy: DeleteBy<Model>,
+  ): Promise<OnDelete<Model>> {
+    // Detaching a project has to take effect now, not in 60s, on this node.
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+    return { deleteBy, carryForward: null };
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Cleared again AFTER the write commits. A clear that runs before the row
+   * lands can be immediately re-filled with the pre-change answer by a
+   * concurrent request, handing the old attachment set another full TTL.
+   */
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onDeleteSuccess(
+    onDelete: OnDelete<Model>,
+    _itemIdsBeforeDelete: Array<ObjectID>,
+  ): Promise<OnDelete<Model>> {
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+    return onDelete;
+  }
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onCreateSuccess(
+    _onCreate: OnCreate<Model>,
+    createdItem: Model,
+  ): Promise<Model> {
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+    return createdItem;
+  }
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onUpdateSuccess(
+    onUpdate: OnUpdate<Model>,
+    _updatedItemIds: Array<ObjectID>,
+  ): Promise<OnUpdate<Model>> {
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+    return onUpdate;
+  }
+
   @CaptureSpan()
   protected override async onBeforeCreate(
     createBy: CreateBy<Model>,
@@ -38,6 +158,9 @@ export class Service extends DatabaseService<Model> {
       projectId,
     });
 
+    // A new attachment narrows (or widens) which projects the provider governs.
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+
     return { createBy, carryForward: null };
   }
 
@@ -78,6 +201,8 @@ export class Service extends DatabaseService<Model> {
       }
     }
 
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+
     return { updateBy, carryForward: null };
   }
 }

package/Server/Services/GlobalOidcService.ts

@@ -1,10 +1,142 @@
 import DatabaseService from "./DatabaseService";
 import Model from "../../Models/DatabaseModels/GlobalOidc";
+import ObjectID from "../../Types/ObjectID";
+import CaptureSpan from "../Utils/Telemetry/CaptureSpan";
+import CreateBy from "../Types/Database/CreateBy";
+import DeleteBy from "../Types/Database/DeleteBy";
+import UpdateBy from "../Types/Database/UpdateBy";
+import { OnCreate, OnDelete, OnUpdate } from "../Types/Database/Hooks";
+import {
+  GLOBAL_SSO_AUTHORIZATION_CACHE_TTL_MS,
+  GlobalProviderTrust,
+  clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches,
+  globalProviderCacheKey,
+  globalSsoProviderTrustCache,
+  loadTrustOnce,
+} from "../Utils/GlobalSsoAuthorization";
 
 export class Service extends DatabaseService<Model> {
   public constructor() {
     super(Model);
   }
+
+  /**
+   * What the SSO-enforcement middleware needs to know about this provider:
+   * whether it is still usable at all, and whether the admin opted it into
+   * attachment-scoped access.
+   *
+   * Called on every authenticated request against an SSO-enforced project, so
+   * the answer is cached for 60s and concurrent misses share one query.
+   * Without this lookup, turning a provider off leaves every token it ever
+   * issued working until each one expires - up to thirty days.
+   */
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  public async getProviderTrust(
+    providerId: ObjectID,
+  ): Promise<GlobalProviderTrust> {
+    const key: string = globalProviderCacheKey("oidc", providerId);
+
+    const cached: GlobalProviderTrust | undefined =
+      globalSsoProviderTrustCache.get(key);
+
+    if (cached !== undefined) {
+      return cached;
+    }
+
+    return loadTrustOnce(key, async (): Promise<GlobalProviderTrust> => {
+      const provider: Model | null = await this.findOneBy({
+        query: { _id: providerId.toString() },
+        select: {
+          _id: true,
+          isEnabled: true,
+          restrictToAttachedProjects: true,
+        },
+        props: { isRoot: true },
+      });
+
+      /*
+       * A deleted provider and a disabled one are the same answer: no. Both
+       * are cached, so a revoked provider does not cost a query per request.
+       */
+      const trust: GlobalProviderTrust = {
+        isUsable: Boolean(provider && provider.isEnabled),
+        restrictToAttachedProjects: Boolean(
+          provider && provider.restrictToAttachedProjects,
+        ),
+      };
+
+      globalSsoProviderTrustCache.set(
+        key,
+        trust,
+        GLOBAL_SSO_AUTHORIZATION_CACHE_TTL_MS,
+      );
+
+      return trust;
+    });
+  }
+
+  /*
+   * Cache invalidation runs in the SUCCESS hooks, not the before-hooks: a
+   * clear that happens before the row is written can be immediately re-filled
+   * with the pre-change answer by a concurrent request, which would hand a
+   * disabled provider another full TTL of life on the very node that served
+   * the disable. Clearing in both is deliberate - the before-hook narrows the
+   * window, the success hook closes it.
+   *
+   * These caches are per-process, so the hooks make a change immediate on the
+   * node that served it and the TTL bounds every other node.
+   */
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onBeforeUpdate(
+    updateBy: UpdateBy<Model>,
+  ): Promise<OnUpdate<Model>> {
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+    return { updateBy, carryForward: null };
+  }
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onUpdateSuccess(
+    onUpdate: OnUpdate<Model>,
+    _updatedItemIds: Array<ObjectID>,
+  ): Promise<OnUpdate<Model>> {
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+    return onUpdate;
+  }
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onBeforeDelete(
+    deleteBy: DeleteBy<Model>,
+  ): Promise<OnDelete<Model>> {
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+    return { deleteBy, carryForward: null };
+  }
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onDeleteSuccess(
+    onDelete: OnDelete<Model>,
+    _itemIdsBeforeDelete: Array<ObjectID>,
+  ): Promise<OnDelete<Model>> {
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+    return onDelete;
+  }
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onBeforeCreate(
+    createBy: CreateBy<Model>,
+  ): Promise<OnCreate<Model>> {
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+    return { createBy, carryForward: null };
+  }
+
+  @CaptureSpan()
+  protected override async onCreateSuccess(
+    _onCreate: OnCreate<Model>,
+    createdItem: Model,
+  ): Promise<Model> {
+    clearGlobalSsoAuthorizationCaches();
+    return createdItem;
+  }
 }
 
 export default new Service();