@omnicross/core 0.1.10 → 0.2.1

package/dist/outbound-api.d.cts

@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@
 import { VoucherConfig } from '@omnicross/contracts/voucher-types';
-import { c as EndpointRoutingConfig, G as GatewayBinding, U as UserMessageQueueConfig, b as ConcurrencyQueueConfig, n as OutboundApiDeps, r as OutboundApiServerStatus, t as OutboundFormatUrls, A as AccountProbeConfig, a as AllowanceSchedulingConfig, F as FingerprintConfig, q as OutboundApiServerConfig, m as ModelPrefixTargets, x as OutboundProxyConfig, s as OutboundEndpoint, R as RequestRole, Q as ModelRef, k as KindMappedEndpoint, l as ModelKind, O as OutboundKeyDb, o as OutboundApiKeyCreated } from './types-C2MwkLah.cjs';
-export { C as ChatDispatchMode, E as ENDPOINT_MODEL_KINDS, d as GatewayBindingFallback, e as GatewayBindingKeyScope, f as GatewayBindingModelMode, g as GatewayBindingTarget, h as GatewayModelMapping, K as KeySpendReader, i as KeySpendSeeder, j as KeySpendTracker, M as MessagesModelKind, p as OutboundApiKeyInfo, u as OutboundKeyActivationMode, v as OutboundKeyDbRow, w as OutboundKeyPolicy, y as ResponsesModelKind, V as VoucherCreateInput, z as VoucherDb, B as computeVoucherGrant, D as generateVoucherCode, H as hashVoucherCode, I as newVoucherId, J as startOfLocalDay, L as startOfLocalWeek, N as toVoucherInfo, P as voucherCodePrefix } from './types-C2MwkLah.cjs';
+import { c as EndpointRoutingConfig, G as GatewayBinding, U as UserMessageQueueConfig, b as ConcurrencyQueueConfig, X as AnthropicConfigSegment, S as SearchServerConfig, n as OutboundApiDeps, r as OutboundApiServerStatus, t as OutboundFormatUrls, A as AccountProbeConfig, a as AllowanceSchedulingConfig, F as FingerprintConfig, q as OutboundApiServerConfig, m as ModelPrefixTargets, y as OutboundProxyConfig, I as ImagesServerConfig, s as OutboundEndpoint, R as RequestRole, W as ModelRef, k as KindMappedEndpoint, l as ModelKind, x as OutboundPermission, O as OutboundKeyDb, o as OutboundApiKeyCreated } from './types-D-oHYusb.cjs';
+export { C as ChatDispatchMode, E as ENDPOINT_MODEL_KINDS, d as GatewayBindingFallback, e as GatewayBindingKeyScope, f as GatewayBindingModelMode, g as GatewayBindingTarget, h as GatewayModelMapping, K as KeySpendReader, i as KeySpendSeeder, j as KeySpendTracker, M as MessagesModelKind, p as OutboundApiKeyInfo, u as OutboundKeyActivationMode, v as OutboundKeyDbRow, w as OutboundKeyPolicy, z as ResponsesModelKind, V as VoucherCreateInput, B as VoucherDb, D as computeVoucherGrant, H as generateVoucherCode, J as hashVoucherCode, L as newVoucherId, N as startOfLocalDay, P as startOfLocalWeek, Q as toVoucherInfo, T as voucherCodePrefix } from './types-D-oHYusb.cjs';
 import { ProxyConfig } from '@omnicross/contracts/account-tokens-types';
 import { AuditConfig } from '@omnicross/contracts/audit-types';
 import { BillingConfig } from '@omnicross/contracts/billing-types';
 import { WebhookDestination, WebhookConfig } from '@omnicross/contracts/webhook-types';
+import { e as ImageApiLimits } from './types-Be-yt_6T.cjs';
+import { S as SearchApiProviderConfigs } from './types-CbCZqLGg.cjs';
+import http from 'node:http';
+import { c as SearchFrontendMode } from './frontends-Doz0RaWu.cjs';
+import { S as SearchRuntime } from './runtime-t8AZacFF.cjs';
 export { AUDIT_REDACTED, redactAuditText } from './outbound-api/auditRedact.cjs';
 export { AuditCaptureContext, beginAuditCapture } from './outbound-api/auditCapture.cjs';
 export { BillingCaptureContext, beginBillingCapture } from './outbound-api/billingCapture.cjs';
 import { K as KeyCostLimits, M as ModelRestriction } from './keyPolicy-zdWTu3CQ.cjs';
 export { a as KeyExpiryInput, b as KeyExpiryResult, c as KeySpend, Q as QuotaDecision, d as checkKeyQuota, e as computeKeyExpiry } from './keyPolicy-zdWTu3CQ.cjs';
-import http from 'node:http';
-import { IngressFormat } from './provider-proxy/types.cjs';
-export { S as SUBSCRIPTION_PROVIDER_IDS, e as endpointSupportsSubscription, i as isSubscriptionProviderId, p as parseModelRef, a as pickModelRefFromList, r as resolveRoute } from './routeResolver-CVFE8KKe.cjs';
+import { D as IngressFormat } from './types-BSIJdsyl.cjs';
+export { S as SUBSCRIPTION_PROVIDER_IDS, e as endpointSupportsSubscription, i as isSubscriptionProviderId, p as parseModelRef, a as pickModelRefFromList, r as resolveRoute } from './routeResolver-Da0yvkL1.cjs';
 export { BoundAccountFallbackPolicy, BoundAccountSelectionError, BoundAccountSelectionFailureReason, boundAccountSelectionMessage, isBoundAccountSelectionError } from './pipeline/BoundAccountSelectionError.cjs';
 import '@omnicross/contracts/health-logging-types';
 import './logger-4GvQNzhE.cjs';
@@ -21,7 +25,10 @@ import '@omnicross/contracts/llm-config';
 import './transformer/types.cjs';
 import '@omnicross/contracts/completion-types';
 import './transformer/TransformerService.cjs';
-import './ProviderProxy-QdwNV6l1.cjs';
+import './ProviderProxy-Bz_nkOwq.cjs';
+import '@omnicross/contracts/image-generation-types';
+import 'node:fs/promises';
+import '@omnicross/contracts/search-types';
 import '@omnicross/contracts/usage-stats-types';
 import '@omnicross/contracts/subscription-types';
 import '@omnicross/contracts/usage-types';
@@ -62,6 +69,8 @@ declare const DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_PORT = 8765;
 interface ApplyConfigInput {
     enabled: boolean;
     networkBinding: boolean;
+    /** Additive Images URL publication; serving still depends on runtime capability. */
+    imagesEnabled?: boolean;
     endpoints: EndpointRoutingConfig[];
     /** Independent resource bindings; absent preserves legacy endpoint routing. */
     bindings?: GatewayBinding[];
@@ -73,6 +82,20 @@ interface ApplyConfigInput {
     /** Voucher segment (voucher-redemption #9). Read live per request; absent ⇒
      *  disabled ⇒ the `/redeem` endpoint is inert (zero regression). */
     voucher?: VoucherConfig;
+    /** Anthropic-protocol segment (claude-api-protocol-fidelity, §10). Read live
+     *  per request; the heartbeat value is hot-applied to the stream synthesizer. */
+    anthropic?: AnthropicConfigSegment;
+    /**
+     * Search assembly segment (plan 阶段5). Read live per request for the Codex
+     * frontend's mode; the runtime itself is wired once through `deps`.
+     */
+    search?: SearchServerConfig;
+}
+/** Prepared listener/config publication used by the daemon's settings transaction. */
+interface PreparedOutboundApiConfig {
+    publish(): Promise<void>;
+    rollback(): Promise<void>;
+    dispose(): Promise<void>;
 }
 declare class OutboundApiServer {
     private readonly deps;
@@ -86,6 +109,11 @@ declare class OutboundApiServer {
     private userMessageQueue;
     private concurrencyQueue;
     private voucherConfig;
+    private anthropicConfig;
+    private searchConfig;
+    private imagesEnabled;
+    /** R10 `/api/hello` switch (§10 `anthropic.apiHello`, default true). */
+    private apiHelloEnabled;
     private readonly rateLimiter;
     /**
      * Redeem-attempt limiter (voucher-redemption #9, design D6) — a SEPARATE bucket
@@ -111,12 +139,35 @@ declare class OutboundApiServer {
      * in place (read live per request — no restart).
      */
     applyConfig(input: ApplyConfigInput): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Prepare any new listener before persistence when the target can coexist with
+     * the current socket. A live fixed-port address-only change cannot be made
+     * failure-atomic on every supported platform because the replacement cannot
+     * coexist with the old socket, so reject it before persistence instead of
+     * performing a fallible close-then-bind during publication.
+     */
+    prepareConfig(input: ApplyConfigInput): Promise<PreparedOutboundApiConfig>;
     /** Start the listener on `bindAddr:port`, falling back on EADDRINUSE. */
     start(bindAddr: string, port: number): Promise<number>;
     /** Bind once; on EADDRINUSE retry with an ephemeral port (port 0). */
-    private listen;
+    private listenDetached;
+    private createHttpServer;
+    private installConfigSnapshot;
+    private captureRuntimeSnapshot;
+    private installRuntimeSnapshot;
+    private restoreRuntimeSnapshot;
+    private closeServer;
+    /** Publication already swapped the authoritative pointer; retirement cannot fail it. */
+    private closePublishedServer;
+    private announcePublishedListener;
     /** Per-request handler. Auth is enforced on EVERY request (incl. loopback). */
     private onRequest;
+    /**
+     * Serve `HEAD /api/hello` (exact path, query tolerated) with a bare 200 —
+     * returning true when it handled the request. Unauthenticated by design and
+     * gated on `anthropic.apiHello` (default true).
+     */
+    private tryServeApiHello;
     /**
      * Serve `GET|HEAD /health` (+ `/healthz`) from the injected provider, returning
      * true when it handled the request. 200 when `ok`, else 503; secret-free body.
@@ -321,6 +372,142 @@ declare function saveServerConfig(store: ApiServerSettingsStore, config: Outboun
 /** Apply a partial patch to a config, returning the merged whole. */
 declare function mergeServerConfig(current: OutboundApiServerConfig, patch: Partial<OutboundApiServerConfig>): OutboundApiServerConfig;
 
+/** Immutable upper bounds used by both tolerant reads and strict admin writes. */
+declare const IMAGE_SERVER_HARD_CEILINGS: Readonly<{
+    queue: Readonly<{
+        maxConcurrentJobsPerAccount: 8;
+        maxQueuedJobs: 1000;
+        queueTimeoutMs: number;
+        generationTimeoutMs: number;
+    }>;
+    temporary: Readonly<{
+        maxActiveScopes: 256;
+        maxTotalBytes: number;
+        maxTenantBytes: number;
+        staleAfterMs: number;
+        cleanupIntervalMs: number;
+    }>;
+    limits: Readonly<ImageApiLimits>;
+    references: Readonly<{
+        ttlMs: number;
+        maxArtifactBytes: number;
+        maxTotalBytes: number;
+        maxTenantBytes: number;
+        maxEntries: 1000000;
+        maxCalls: 2000000;
+        maxResponses: 1000000;
+        maxTombstones: 2000000;
+        tombstoneTtlMs: number;
+        cleanupIntervalMs: number;
+    }>;
+    evidenceTtlMs: number;
+}>;
+/** Migration-safe default: configured off, finite everywhere, and remote-disabled. */
+declare const DEFAULT_IMAGES_SERVER_CONFIG: Readonly<ImagesServerConfig>;
+/** Tolerant read normalization: malformed members fall back or clamp, never throw. */
+declare function normalizeImagesServerConfig(value: unknown): ImagesServerConfig;
+/** Strict structural/range validation. Daemon validation adds filesystem and resolver policy. */
+declare function validateImagesServerConfig(value: unknown): string[];
+
+/**
+ * The persisted `search` config section — tolerant read, strict report.
+ *
+ * Two functions over the same shape, exactly as the Images section does it:
+ * {@link normalizeSearchServerConfig} never throws (a malformed member falls
+ * back or is dropped, so a bad config cannot take the daemon down), and
+ * {@link validateSearchServerConfig} says what was unusable so an operator can
+ * fix it.
+ *
+ * **Nothing here ever echoes a configured VALUE.** Every validation message
+ * names a FIELD. An API key, a Basic-auth password and an internal hostname are
+ * all things a validation log must not leak, and the cheapest way to guarantee
+ * that is a rule with no exceptions rather than a per-field judgement call.
+ *
+ * @module outbound-api/searchServerConfig
+ */
+
+/** The frozen defaults, for comparison and for callers with no config at all. */
+declare const DEFAULT_SEARCH_SERVER_CONFIG: Readonly<SearchServerConfig>;
+/** Tolerant read: unusable members are DROPPED, which leaves them unconfigured. */
+declare function normalizeSearchApiProviderConfigs(value: unknown): SearchApiProviderConfigs;
+/** Tolerant read of the whole section. Never throws; an absent section is the default. */
+declare function normalizeSearchServerConfig(value: unknown): SearchServerConfig;
+/**
+ * Report what a `search` section got wrong, field by field.
+ *
+ * Returns `[]` for a valid (or absent) section. Callers surface the list the
+ * way the Images config's errors are surfaced — reported, not thrown — because
+ * a search misconfiguration must not prevent the gateway from serving text.
+ */
+declare function validateSearchServerConfig(value: unknown, path?: string): string[];
+
+/**
+ * The Codex search route — `POST /v1/alpha/search`.
+ *
+ * ## Compatibility source
+ *
+ * From `docs/design/search-baseline/wire-baseline.md` §1, over 11 real audit
+ * records produced by `codex-tui` 0.151.0 and 0.152.0:
+ *
+ * The request and response contracts are pinned from the Codex 0.152.0 typed
+ * API definitions and standalone-search integration fixtures. Codex sends text
+ * queries under `commands.search_query[].q` and requires a string `output` in
+ * the JSON response; structured `results` are optional opaque DTOs.
+ *
+ * ## What this route does about that
+ *
+ * The default mode is `off`, and `off` answers with a structured
+ * `unsupported_capability` error instead of the generic 404 (plan §15). That is
+ * strictly more informative than today's behavior and claims nothing.
+ *
+ * Enabling `managed` accepts Codex text-search commands plus the legacy flat
+ * query spellings used by early Omnicross clients. Other Codex command kinds
+ * are rejected because the shared runtime currently exposes text search only.
+ *
+ * ## The designed side effect
+ *
+ * A dispatched request reaches route resolution and is given a `sessionKey`, so
+ * the audit body store finally persists `/v1/alpha/search` exchanges. The
+ * capture that 阶段0 proved impossible becomes possible when a real client talks
+ * to an enabled route.
+ *
+ * @module outbound-api/searchRoute
+ */
+
+/** The path observed on every one of the 11 baselined records. */
+declare const codexSearchRoutePath = "/v1/alpha/search";
+/** Everything the handler needs, injected so it is testable without a daemon. */
+interface CodexSearchRouteDeps {
+    /** Resolved ONCE per request by the caller, before any wire bytes. */
+    readonly mode: SearchFrontendMode;
+    /**
+     * The single shared runtime. Absent behaves exactly like mode `off`.
+     *
+     * Selection and fallback policy live INSIDE it (阶段3): this route never
+     * builds a candidate list, and adding a per-request policy override here
+     * would be the second fallback order the extraction exists to prevent.
+     */
+    readonly runtime?: SearchRuntime | null;
+    /** Cancellation, wired to the client connection by the caller. */
+    readonly signal?: AbortSignal;
+    /**
+     * Audit hook. The route calls this with the raw body and the parsed object so
+     * the caller can stash the body and derive the session key — the mechanism
+     * that unblocks `/v1/alpha/search` body capture (see the module note).
+     */
+    readonly onRequestBody?: (raw: string, parsed: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
+}
+/** `POST` + a path ending in `/alpha/search`. Nothing else is this route. */
+declare function isCodexSearchRequest(method: string | undefined, url: string | undefined): boolean;
+/**
+ * Serve one `POST /v1/alpha/search`.
+ *
+ * Always answers: a structured JSON error or a structured JSON result, never a
+ * hang, never a bare 404. The caller has already authenticated the request and
+ * resolved `deps.mode`.
+ */
+declare function handleCodexSearchRequest(req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse, deps: CodexSearchRouteDeps): Promise<void>;
+
 /**
  * Either the winning route projected to the resolver shape, or `none` — no
  * enabled route for this key/endpoint could serve the request. There is no
@@ -690,7 +877,15 @@ declare function createNamedKey(db: OutboundKeyDb, name: string): Promise<Outbou
  * Mint the local gateway key used by native CLI configuration adapters. Unlike
  * a user-distributed key it is explicitly loopback-only and endpoint-scoped.
  */
-declare function createIntegrationKey(db: OutboundKeyDb, name: string, allowedEndpoints?: OutboundEndpoint[]): Promise<OutboundApiKeyCreated>;
+declare function createIntegrationKey(db: OutboundKeyDb, name: string, allowedEndpoints?: OutboundPermission[]): Promise<OutboundApiKeyCreated>;
+declare const LEGACY_OUTBOUND_PERMISSIONS: readonly OutboundPermission[];
+/** Strict write-edge validator. Stored-row reads use fail-closed interpretation below. */
+declare function validateOutboundPermissions(value: unknown): OutboundPermission[];
+/**
+ * Authoritative legacy interpretation. Absence preserves only the four historic
+ * families; malformed persisted data denies all instead of widening access.
+ */
+declare function effectiveOutboundPermissions(value: unknown): readonly OutboundPermission[];
 /**
  * A verified key + the enforcement inputs carried from the row so the wire layer
  * runs its policy checks WITHOUT a second DB read (mirrors `maxConcurrency`).
@@ -698,7 +893,7 @@ declare function createIntegrationKey(db: OutboundKeyDb, name: string, allowedEn
 interface VerifiedKey {
     id: string;
     kind?: 'client' | 'integration';
-    allowedEndpoints?: OutboundEndpoint[];
+    allowedEndpoints: OutboundPermission[];
     loopbackOnly?: boolean;
     /**
      * The key's per-key concurrency ceiling, carried from the row so the wire
@@ -920,4 +1115,4 @@ declare function getOutboundApiServer(deps?: OutboundApiDeps, onPortChange?: (po
 /** Reset the singleton (tests / teardown only). */
 declare function __resetOutboundApiServerForTests(): void;
 
-export { AccountProbeConfig, AllowanceSchedulingConfig, type ApiServerSettingsStore, type ApplyConfigInput, ConcurrencyQueueConfig, ConcurrencyQueueFullError, ConcurrencyWaitCancelledError, ConcurrencyWaitTimeoutError, DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_PROBE, DEFAULT_ALLOWANCE_SCHEDULING, DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY_QUEUE, DEFAULT_FINGERPRINT, DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_PORT, DEFAULT_USER_MESSAGE_QUEUE, EndpointRoutingConfig, FingerprintConfig, type GateAcquireOptions, type GateAcquisition, type GateSlot, type GateStatusEntry, GatewayBinding, type GatewayBindingResolution, KeyCostLimits, type KeyVerification, KeyedMutex, KindMappedEndpoint, ModelKind, type ModelPrefixKind, ModelPrefixTargets, OUTBOUND_API_SERVER_CONFIG_KEY, OutboundApiDeps, OutboundApiKeyCreated, OutboundApiServer, OutboundApiServerConfig, OutboundApiServerStatus, OutboundConcurrencyGate, OutboundEndpoint, OutboundFormatUrls, OutboundKeyDb, OutboundProxyConfig, OutboundRateLimiter, RequestRole, type ResolveGatewayBindingInput, type SerialAcquireOptions, type SerialQueueStatusEntry, SerialQueueTimeoutError, type SerialSlot, UserMessageQueueConfig, UserMessageSerialQueue, type VerifiedKey, __resetOutboundApiServerForTests, candidateBackgroundModelIds, candidateGatewayBindings, classifyModelPrefix, createIntegrationKey, createNamedKey, defaultServerConfig, detectModelKind, detectRequestRole, endpointToIngressFormat, formatUrls, gatewayBindingToEndpointConfig, getOutboundApiServer, handleVoucherRedeem, hashKey, isConcurrencyRejection, isKindMappedEndpoint, isRedeemRequest, isSerialQueueTimeout, isUserMessageRequest, legacyEndpointsToBindings, loadServerConfig, mergeServerConfig, modelKindsForEndpoint, normalizeAccountProbe, normalizeAllowanceScheduling, normalizeAudit, normalizeBilling, normalizeFingerprint, normalizeGatewayBindings, normalizePrefixTargets, normalizeProxyConfig, normalizeProxySegment, normalizeQueueSegments, normalizeServerConfig, normalizeVoucher, normalizeWebhookDestination, normalizeWebhookSegment, randomBase62, resolveGatewayBinding, resolvePrefixTarget, saveServerConfig, validateEndpointModelConfig, verifyKey, verifyPresentedKey };
+export { AccountProbeConfig, AllowanceSchedulingConfig, type ApiServerSettingsStore, type ApplyConfigInput, type CodexSearchRouteDeps, ConcurrencyQueueConfig, ConcurrencyQueueFullError, ConcurrencyWaitCancelledError, ConcurrencyWaitTimeoutError, DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_PROBE, DEFAULT_ALLOWANCE_SCHEDULING, DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY_QUEUE, DEFAULT_FINGERPRINT, DEFAULT_IMAGES_SERVER_CONFIG, DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_PORT, DEFAULT_SEARCH_SERVER_CONFIG, DEFAULT_USER_MESSAGE_QUEUE, EndpointRoutingConfig, FingerprintConfig, type GateAcquireOptions, type GateAcquisition, type GateSlot, type GateStatusEntry, GatewayBinding, type GatewayBindingResolution, IMAGE_SERVER_HARD_CEILINGS, ImagesServerConfig, KeyCostLimits, type KeyVerification, KeyedMutex, KindMappedEndpoint, LEGACY_OUTBOUND_PERMISSIONS, ModelKind, type ModelPrefixKind, ModelPrefixTargets, OUTBOUND_API_SERVER_CONFIG_KEY, OutboundApiDeps, OutboundApiKeyCreated, OutboundApiServer, OutboundApiServerConfig, OutboundApiServerStatus, OutboundConcurrencyGate, OutboundEndpoint, OutboundFormatUrls, OutboundKeyDb, OutboundPermission, OutboundProxyConfig, OutboundRateLimiter, type PreparedOutboundApiConfig, RequestRole, type ResolveGatewayBindingInput, SearchServerConfig, type SerialAcquireOptions, type SerialQueueStatusEntry, SerialQueueTimeoutError, type SerialSlot, UserMessageQueueConfig, UserMessageSerialQueue, type VerifiedKey, __resetOutboundApiServerForTests, candidateBackgroundModelIds, candidateGatewayBindings, classifyModelPrefix, codexSearchRoutePath, createIntegrationKey, createNamedKey, defaultServerConfig, detectModelKind, detectRequestRole, effectiveOutboundPermissions, endpointToIngressFormat, formatUrls, gatewayBindingToEndpointConfig, getOutboundApiServer, handleCodexSearchRequest, handleVoucherRedeem, hashKey, isCodexSearchRequest, isConcurrencyRejection, isKindMappedEndpoint, isRedeemRequest, isSerialQueueTimeout, isUserMessageRequest, legacyEndpointsToBindings, loadServerConfig, mergeServerConfig, modelKindsForEndpoint, normalizeAccountProbe, normalizeAllowanceScheduling, normalizeAudit, normalizeBilling, normalizeFingerprint, normalizeGatewayBindings, normalizeImagesServerConfig, normalizePrefixTargets, normalizeProxyConfig, normalizeProxySegment, normalizeQueueSegments, normalizeSearchApiProviderConfigs, normalizeSearchServerConfig, normalizeServerConfig, normalizeVoucher, normalizeWebhookDestination, normalizeWebhookSegment, randomBase62, resolveGatewayBinding, resolvePrefixTarget, saveServerConfig, validateEndpointModelConfig, validateImagesServerConfig, validateOutboundPermissions, validateSearchServerConfig, verifyKey, verifyPresentedKey };

package/dist/outbound-api.d.ts

@@ -1,18 +1,22 @@
 import { VoucherConfig } from '@omnicross/contracts/voucher-types';
-import { c as EndpointRoutingConfig, G as GatewayBinding, U as UserMessageQueueConfig, b as ConcurrencyQueueConfig, n as OutboundApiDeps, r as OutboundApiServerStatus, t as OutboundFormatUrls, A as AccountProbeConfig, a as AllowanceSchedulingConfig, F as FingerprintConfig, q as OutboundApiServerConfig, m as ModelPrefixTargets, x as OutboundProxyConfig, s as OutboundEndpoint, R as RequestRole, Q as ModelRef, k as KindMappedEndpoint, l as ModelKind, O as OutboundKeyDb, o as OutboundApiKeyCreated } from './types-BB8pxk_3.js';
-export { C as ChatDispatchMode, E as ENDPOINT_MODEL_KINDS, d as GatewayBindingFallback, e as GatewayBindingKeyScope, f as GatewayBindingModelMode, g as GatewayBindingTarget, h as GatewayModelMapping, K as KeySpendReader, i as KeySpendSeeder, j as KeySpendTracker, M as MessagesModelKind, p as OutboundApiKeyInfo, u as OutboundKeyActivationMode, v as OutboundKeyDbRow, w as OutboundKeyPolicy, y as ResponsesModelKind, V as VoucherCreateInput, z as VoucherDb, B as computeVoucherGrant, D as generateVoucherCode, H as hashVoucherCode, I as newVoucherId, J as startOfLocalDay, L as startOfLocalWeek, N as toVoucherInfo, P as voucherCodePrefix } from './types-BB8pxk_3.js';
+import { c as EndpointRoutingConfig, G as GatewayBinding, U as UserMessageQueueConfig, b as ConcurrencyQueueConfig, X as AnthropicConfigSegment, S as SearchServerConfig, n as OutboundApiDeps, r as OutboundApiServerStatus, t as OutboundFormatUrls, A as AccountProbeConfig, a as AllowanceSchedulingConfig, F as FingerprintConfig, q as OutboundApiServerConfig, m as ModelPrefixTargets, y as OutboundProxyConfig, I as ImagesServerConfig, s as OutboundEndpoint, R as RequestRole, W as ModelRef, k as KindMappedEndpoint, l as ModelKind, x as OutboundPermission, O as OutboundKeyDb, o as OutboundApiKeyCreated } from './types-Dvlpjn0d.js';
+export { C as ChatDispatchMode, E as ENDPOINT_MODEL_KINDS, d as GatewayBindingFallback, e as GatewayBindingKeyScope, f as GatewayBindingModelMode, g as GatewayBindingTarget, h as GatewayModelMapping, K as KeySpendReader, i as KeySpendSeeder, j as KeySpendTracker, M as MessagesModelKind, p as OutboundApiKeyInfo, u as OutboundKeyActivationMode, v as OutboundKeyDbRow, w as OutboundKeyPolicy, z as ResponsesModelKind, V as VoucherCreateInput, B as VoucherDb, D as computeVoucherGrant, H as generateVoucherCode, J as hashVoucherCode, L as newVoucherId, N as startOfLocalDay, P as startOfLocalWeek, Q as toVoucherInfo, T as voucherCodePrefix } from './types-Dvlpjn0d.js';
 import { ProxyConfig } from '@omnicross/contracts/account-tokens-types';
 import { AuditConfig } from '@omnicross/contracts/audit-types';
 import { BillingConfig } from '@omnicross/contracts/billing-types';
 import { WebhookDestination, WebhookConfig } from '@omnicross/contracts/webhook-types';
+import { e as ImageApiLimits } from './types-Dm4_36V4.js';
+import { S as SearchApiProviderConfigs } from './types-CbCZqLGg.js';
+import http from 'node:http';
+import { c as SearchFrontendMode } from './frontends-Doz0RaWu.js';
+import { S as SearchRuntime } from './runtime-t8AZacFF.js';
 export { AUDIT_REDACTED, redactAuditText } from './outbound-api/auditRedact.js';
 export { AuditCaptureContext, beginAuditCapture } from './outbound-api/auditCapture.js';
 export { BillingCaptureContext, beginBillingCapture } from './outbound-api/billingCapture.js';
 import { K as KeyCostLimits, M as ModelRestriction } from './keyPolicy-zdWTu3CQ.js';
 export { a as KeyExpiryInput, b as KeyExpiryResult, c as KeySpend, Q as QuotaDecision, d as checkKeyQuota, e as computeKeyExpiry } from './keyPolicy-zdWTu3CQ.js';
-import http from 'node:http';
-import { IngressFormat } from './provider-proxy/types.js';
-export { S as SUBSCRIPTION_PROVIDER_IDS, e as endpointSupportsSubscription, i as isSubscriptionProviderId, p as parseModelRef, a as pickModelRefFromList, r as resolveRoute } from './routeResolver-C0mkkZaM.js';
+import { D as IngressFormat } from './types-By9Tg6-I.js';
+export { S as SUBSCRIPTION_PROVIDER_IDS, e as endpointSupportsSubscription, i as isSubscriptionProviderId, p as parseModelRef, a as pickModelRefFromList, r as resolveRoute } from './routeResolver-STwMz_G4.js';
 export { BoundAccountFallbackPolicy, BoundAccountSelectionError, BoundAccountSelectionFailureReason, boundAccountSelectionMessage, isBoundAccountSelectionError } from './pipeline/BoundAccountSelectionError.js';
 import '@omnicross/contracts/health-logging-types';
 import './logger-4GvQNzhE.js';
@@ -21,7 +25,10 @@ import '@omnicross/contracts/llm-config';
 import './transformer/types.js';
 import '@omnicross/contracts/completion-types';
 import './transformer/TransformerService.js';
-import './ProviderProxy--ROec6VI.js';
+import './ProviderProxy-Ckr6oTrE.js';
+import '@omnicross/contracts/image-generation-types';
+import 'node:fs/promises';
+import '@omnicross/contracts/search-types';
 import '@omnicross/contracts/usage-stats-types';
 import '@omnicross/contracts/subscription-types';
 import '@omnicross/contracts/usage-types';
@@ -62,6 +69,8 @@ declare const DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_PORT = 8765;
 interface ApplyConfigInput {
     enabled: boolean;
     networkBinding: boolean;
+    /** Additive Images URL publication; serving still depends on runtime capability. */
+    imagesEnabled?: boolean;
     endpoints: EndpointRoutingConfig[];
     /** Independent resource bindings; absent preserves legacy endpoint routing. */
     bindings?: GatewayBinding[];
@@ -73,6 +82,20 @@ interface ApplyConfigInput {
     /** Voucher segment (voucher-redemption #9). Read live per request; absent ⇒
      *  disabled ⇒ the `/redeem` endpoint is inert (zero regression). */
     voucher?: VoucherConfig;
+    /** Anthropic-protocol segment (claude-api-protocol-fidelity, §10). Read live
+     *  per request; the heartbeat value is hot-applied to the stream synthesizer. */
+    anthropic?: AnthropicConfigSegment;
+    /**
+     * Search assembly segment (plan 阶段5). Read live per request for the Codex
+     * frontend's mode; the runtime itself is wired once through `deps`.
+     */
+    search?: SearchServerConfig;
+}
+/** Prepared listener/config publication used by the daemon's settings transaction. */
+interface PreparedOutboundApiConfig {
+    publish(): Promise<void>;
+    rollback(): Promise<void>;
+    dispose(): Promise<void>;
 }
 declare class OutboundApiServer {
     private readonly deps;
@@ -86,6 +109,11 @@ declare class OutboundApiServer {
     private userMessageQueue;
     private concurrencyQueue;
     private voucherConfig;
+    private anthropicConfig;
+    private searchConfig;
+    private imagesEnabled;
+    /** R10 `/api/hello` switch (§10 `anthropic.apiHello`, default true). */
+    private apiHelloEnabled;
     private readonly rateLimiter;
     /**
      * Redeem-attempt limiter (voucher-redemption #9, design D6) — a SEPARATE bucket
@@ -111,12 +139,35 @@ declare class OutboundApiServer {
      * in place (read live per request — no restart).
      */
     applyConfig(input: ApplyConfigInput): Promise<void>;
+    /**
+     * Prepare any new listener before persistence when the target can coexist with
+     * the current socket. A live fixed-port address-only change cannot be made
+     * failure-atomic on every supported platform because the replacement cannot
+     * coexist with the old socket, so reject it before persistence instead of
+     * performing a fallible close-then-bind during publication.
+     */
+    prepareConfig(input: ApplyConfigInput): Promise<PreparedOutboundApiConfig>;
     /** Start the listener on `bindAddr:port`, falling back on EADDRINUSE. */
     start(bindAddr: string, port: number): Promise<number>;
     /** Bind once; on EADDRINUSE retry with an ephemeral port (port 0). */
-    private listen;
+    private listenDetached;
+    private createHttpServer;
+    private installConfigSnapshot;
+    private captureRuntimeSnapshot;
+    private installRuntimeSnapshot;
+    private restoreRuntimeSnapshot;
+    private closeServer;
+    /** Publication already swapped the authoritative pointer; retirement cannot fail it. */
+    private closePublishedServer;
+    private announcePublishedListener;
     /** Per-request handler. Auth is enforced on EVERY request (incl. loopback). */
     private onRequest;
+    /**
+     * Serve `HEAD /api/hello` (exact path, query tolerated) with a bare 200 —
+     * returning true when it handled the request. Unauthenticated by design and
+     * gated on `anthropic.apiHello` (default true).
+     */
+    private tryServeApiHello;
     /**
      * Serve `GET|HEAD /health` (+ `/healthz`) from the injected provider, returning
      * true when it handled the request. 200 when `ok`, else 503; secret-free body.
@@ -321,6 +372,142 @@ declare function saveServerConfig(store: ApiServerSettingsStore, config: Outboun
 /** Apply a partial patch to a config, returning the merged whole. */
 declare function mergeServerConfig(current: OutboundApiServerConfig, patch: Partial<OutboundApiServerConfig>): OutboundApiServerConfig;
 
+/** Immutable upper bounds used by both tolerant reads and strict admin writes. */
+declare const IMAGE_SERVER_HARD_CEILINGS: Readonly<{
+    queue: Readonly<{
+        maxConcurrentJobsPerAccount: 8;
+        maxQueuedJobs: 1000;
+        queueTimeoutMs: number;
+        generationTimeoutMs: number;
+    }>;
+    temporary: Readonly<{
+        maxActiveScopes: 256;
+        maxTotalBytes: number;
+        maxTenantBytes: number;
+        staleAfterMs: number;
+        cleanupIntervalMs: number;
+    }>;
+    limits: Readonly<ImageApiLimits>;
+    references: Readonly<{
+        ttlMs: number;
+        maxArtifactBytes: number;
+        maxTotalBytes: number;
+        maxTenantBytes: number;
+        maxEntries: 1000000;
+        maxCalls: 2000000;
+        maxResponses: 1000000;
+        maxTombstones: 2000000;
+        tombstoneTtlMs: number;
+        cleanupIntervalMs: number;
+    }>;
+    evidenceTtlMs: number;
+}>;
+/** Migration-safe default: configured off, finite everywhere, and remote-disabled. */
+declare const DEFAULT_IMAGES_SERVER_CONFIG: Readonly<ImagesServerConfig>;
+/** Tolerant read normalization: malformed members fall back or clamp, never throw. */
+declare function normalizeImagesServerConfig(value: unknown): ImagesServerConfig;
+/** Strict structural/range validation. Daemon validation adds filesystem and resolver policy. */
+declare function validateImagesServerConfig(value: unknown): string[];
+
+/**
+ * The persisted `search` config section — tolerant read, strict report.
+ *
+ * Two functions over the same shape, exactly as the Images section does it:
+ * {@link normalizeSearchServerConfig} never throws (a malformed member falls
+ * back or is dropped, so a bad config cannot take the daemon down), and
+ * {@link validateSearchServerConfig} says what was unusable so an operator can
+ * fix it.
+ *
+ * **Nothing here ever echoes a configured VALUE.** Every validation message
+ * names a FIELD. An API key, a Basic-auth password and an internal hostname are
+ * all things a validation log must not leak, and the cheapest way to guarantee
+ * that is a rule with no exceptions rather than a per-field judgement call.
+ *
+ * @module outbound-api/searchServerConfig
+ */
+
+/** The frozen defaults, for comparison and for callers with no config at all. */
+declare const DEFAULT_SEARCH_SERVER_CONFIG: Readonly<SearchServerConfig>;
+/** Tolerant read: unusable members are DROPPED, which leaves them unconfigured. */
+declare function normalizeSearchApiProviderConfigs(value: unknown): SearchApiProviderConfigs;
+/** Tolerant read of the whole section. Never throws; an absent section is the default. */
+declare function normalizeSearchServerConfig(value: unknown): SearchServerConfig;
+/**
+ * Report what a `search` section got wrong, field by field.
+ *
+ * Returns `[]` for a valid (or absent) section. Callers surface the list the
+ * way the Images config's errors are surfaced — reported, not thrown — because
+ * a search misconfiguration must not prevent the gateway from serving text.
+ */
+declare function validateSearchServerConfig(value: unknown, path?: string): string[];
+
+/**
+ * The Codex search route — `POST /v1/alpha/search`.
+ *
+ * ## Compatibility source
+ *
+ * From `docs/design/search-baseline/wire-baseline.md` §1, over 11 real audit
+ * records produced by `codex-tui` 0.151.0 and 0.152.0:
+ *
+ * The request and response contracts are pinned from the Codex 0.152.0 typed
+ * API definitions and standalone-search integration fixtures. Codex sends text
+ * queries under `commands.search_query[].q` and requires a string `output` in
+ * the JSON response; structured `results` are optional opaque DTOs.
+ *
+ * ## What this route does about that
+ *
+ * The default mode is `off`, and `off` answers with a structured
+ * `unsupported_capability` error instead of the generic 404 (plan §15). That is
+ * strictly more informative than today's behavior and claims nothing.
+ *
+ * Enabling `managed` accepts Codex text-search commands plus the legacy flat
+ * query spellings used by early Omnicross clients. Other Codex command kinds
+ * are rejected because the shared runtime currently exposes text search only.
+ *
+ * ## The designed side effect
+ *
+ * A dispatched request reaches route resolution and is given a `sessionKey`, so
+ * the audit body store finally persists `/v1/alpha/search` exchanges. The
+ * capture that 阶段0 proved impossible becomes possible when a real client talks
+ * to an enabled route.
+ *
+ * @module outbound-api/searchRoute
+ */
+
+/** The path observed on every one of the 11 baselined records. */
+declare const codexSearchRoutePath = "/v1/alpha/search";
+/** Everything the handler needs, injected so it is testable without a daemon. */
+interface CodexSearchRouteDeps {
+    /** Resolved ONCE per request by the caller, before any wire bytes. */
+    readonly mode: SearchFrontendMode;
+    /**
+     * The single shared runtime. Absent behaves exactly like mode `off`.
+     *
+     * Selection and fallback policy live INSIDE it (阶段3): this route never
+     * builds a candidate list, and adding a per-request policy override here
+     * would be the second fallback order the extraction exists to prevent.
+     */
+    readonly runtime?: SearchRuntime | null;
+    /** Cancellation, wired to the client connection by the caller. */
+    readonly signal?: AbortSignal;
+    /**
+     * Audit hook. The route calls this with the raw body and the parsed object so
+     * the caller can stash the body and derive the session key — the mechanism
+     * that unblocks `/v1/alpha/search` body capture (see the module note).
+     */
+    readonly onRequestBody?: (raw: string, parsed: Record<string, unknown>) => void;
+}
+/** `POST` + a path ending in `/alpha/search`. Nothing else is this route. */
+declare function isCodexSearchRequest(method: string | undefined, url: string | undefined): boolean;
+/**
+ * Serve one `POST /v1/alpha/search`.
+ *
+ * Always answers: a structured JSON error or a structured JSON result, never a
+ * hang, never a bare 404. The caller has already authenticated the request and
+ * resolved `deps.mode`.
+ */
+declare function handleCodexSearchRequest(req: http.IncomingMessage, res: http.ServerResponse, deps: CodexSearchRouteDeps): Promise<void>;
+
 /**
  * Either the winning route projected to the resolver shape, or `none` — no
  * enabled route for this key/endpoint could serve the request. There is no
@@ -690,7 +877,15 @@ declare function createNamedKey(db: OutboundKeyDb, name: string): Promise<Outbou
  * Mint the local gateway key used by native CLI configuration adapters. Unlike
  * a user-distributed key it is explicitly loopback-only and endpoint-scoped.
  */
-declare function createIntegrationKey(db: OutboundKeyDb, name: string, allowedEndpoints?: OutboundEndpoint[]): Promise<OutboundApiKeyCreated>;
+declare function createIntegrationKey(db: OutboundKeyDb, name: string, allowedEndpoints?: OutboundPermission[]): Promise<OutboundApiKeyCreated>;
+declare const LEGACY_OUTBOUND_PERMISSIONS: readonly OutboundPermission[];
+/** Strict write-edge validator. Stored-row reads use fail-closed interpretation below. */
+declare function validateOutboundPermissions(value: unknown): OutboundPermission[];
+/**
+ * Authoritative legacy interpretation. Absence preserves only the four historic
+ * families; malformed persisted data denies all instead of widening access.
+ */
+declare function effectiveOutboundPermissions(value: unknown): readonly OutboundPermission[];
 /**
  * A verified key + the enforcement inputs carried from the row so the wire layer
  * runs its policy checks WITHOUT a second DB read (mirrors `maxConcurrency`).
@@ -698,7 +893,7 @@ declare function createIntegrationKey(db: OutboundKeyDb, name: string, allowedEn
 interface VerifiedKey {
     id: string;
     kind?: 'client' | 'integration';
-    allowedEndpoints?: OutboundEndpoint[];
+    allowedEndpoints: OutboundPermission[];
     loopbackOnly?: boolean;
     /**
      * The key's per-key concurrency ceiling, carried from the row so the wire
@@ -920,4 +1115,4 @@ declare function getOutboundApiServer(deps?: OutboundApiDeps, onPortChange?: (po
 /** Reset the singleton (tests / teardown only). */
 declare function __resetOutboundApiServerForTests(): void;
 
-export { AccountProbeConfig, AllowanceSchedulingConfig, type ApiServerSettingsStore, type ApplyConfigInput, ConcurrencyQueueConfig, ConcurrencyQueueFullError, ConcurrencyWaitCancelledError, ConcurrencyWaitTimeoutError, DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_PROBE, DEFAULT_ALLOWANCE_SCHEDULING, DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY_QUEUE, DEFAULT_FINGERPRINT, DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_PORT, DEFAULT_USER_MESSAGE_QUEUE, EndpointRoutingConfig, FingerprintConfig, type GateAcquireOptions, type GateAcquisition, type GateSlot, type GateStatusEntry, GatewayBinding, type GatewayBindingResolution, KeyCostLimits, type KeyVerification, KeyedMutex, KindMappedEndpoint, ModelKind, type ModelPrefixKind, ModelPrefixTargets, OUTBOUND_API_SERVER_CONFIG_KEY, OutboundApiDeps, OutboundApiKeyCreated, OutboundApiServer, OutboundApiServerConfig, OutboundApiServerStatus, OutboundConcurrencyGate, OutboundEndpoint, OutboundFormatUrls, OutboundKeyDb, OutboundProxyConfig, OutboundRateLimiter, RequestRole, type ResolveGatewayBindingInput, type SerialAcquireOptions, type SerialQueueStatusEntry, SerialQueueTimeoutError, type SerialSlot, UserMessageQueueConfig, UserMessageSerialQueue, type VerifiedKey, __resetOutboundApiServerForTests, candidateBackgroundModelIds, candidateGatewayBindings, classifyModelPrefix, createIntegrationKey, createNamedKey, defaultServerConfig, detectModelKind, detectRequestRole, endpointToIngressFormat, formatUrls, gatewayBindingToEndpointConfig, getOutboundApiServer, handleVoucherRedeem, hashKey, isConcurrencyRejection, isKindMappedEndpoint, isRedeemRequest, isSerialQueueTimeout, isUserMessageRequest, legacyEndpointsToBindings, loadServerConfig, mergeServerConfig, modelKindsForEndpoint, normalizeAccountProbe, normalizeAllowanceScheduling, normalizeAudit, normalizeBilling, normalizeFingerprint, normalizeGatewayBindings, normalizePrefixTargets, normalizeProxyConfig, normalizeProxySegment, normalizeQueueSegments, normalizeServerConfig, normalizeVoucher, normalizeWebhookDestination, normalizeWebhookSegment, randomBase62, resolveGatewayBinding, resolvePrefixTarget, saveServerConfig, validateEndpointModelConfig, verifyKey, verifyPresentedKey };
+export { AccountProbeConfig, AllowanceSchedulingConfig, type ApiServerSettingsStore, type ApplyConfigInput, type CodexSearchRouteDeps, ConcurrencyQueueConfig, ConcurrencyQueueFullError, ConcurrencyWaitCancelledError, ConcurrencyWaitTimeoutError, DEFAULT_ACCOUNT_PROBE, DEFAULT_ALLOWANCE_SCHEDULING, DEFAULT_CONCURRENCY_QUEUE, DEFAULT_FINGERPRINT, DEFAULT_IMAGES_SERVER_CONFIG, DEFAULT_OUTBOUND_PORT, DEFAULT_SEARCH_SERVER_CONFIG, DEFAULT_USER_MESSAGE_QUEUE, EndpointRoutingConfig, FingerprintConfig, type GateAcquireOptions, type GateAcquisition, type GateSlot, type GateStatusEntry, GatewayBinding, type GatewayBindingResolution, IMAGE_SERVER_HARD_CEILINGS, ImagesServerConfig, KeyCostLimits, type KeyVerification, KeyedMutex, KindMappedEndpoint, LEGACY_OUTBOUND_PERMISSIONS, ModelKind, type ModelPrefixKind, ModelPrefixTargets, OUTBOUND_API_SERVER_CONFIG_KEY, OutboundApiDeps, OutboundApiKeyCreated, OutboundApiServer, OutboundApiServerConfig, OutboundApiServerStatus, OutboundConcurrencyGate, OutboundEndpoint, OutboundFormatUrls, OutboundKeyDb, OutboundPermission, OutboundProxyConfig, OutboundRateLimiter, type PreparedOutboundApiConfig, RequestRole, type ResolveGatewayBindingInput, SearchServerConfig, type SerialAcquireOptions, type SerialQueueStatusEntry, SerialQueueTimeoutError, type SerialSlot, UserMessageQueueConfig, UserMessageSerialQueue, type VerifiedKey, __resetOutboundApiServerForTests, candidateBackgroundModelIds, candidateGatewayBindings, classifyModelPrefix, codexSearchRoutePath, createIntegrationKey, createNamedKey, defaultServerConfig, detectModelKind, detectRequestRole, effectiveOutboundPermissions, endpointToIngressFormat, formatUrls, gatewayBindingToEndpointConfig, getOutboundApiServer, handleCodexSearchRequest, handleVoucherRedeem, hashKey, isCodexSearchRequest, isConcurrencyRejection, isKindMappedEndpoint, isRedeemRequest, isSerialQueueTimeout, isUserMessageRequest, legacyEndpointsToBindings, loadServerConfig, mergeServerConfig, modelKindsForEndpoint, normalizeAccountProbe, normalizeAllowanceScheduling, normalizeAudit, normalizeBilling, normalizeFingerprint, normalizeGatewayBindings, normalizeImagesServerConfig, normalizePrefixTargets, normalizeProxyConfig, normalizeProxySegment, normalizeQueueSegments, normalizeSearchApiProviderConfigs, normalizeSearchServerConfig, normalizeServerConfig, normalizeVoucher, normalizeWebhookDestination, normalizeWebhookSegment, randomBase62, resolveGatewayBinding, resolvePrefixTarget, saveServerConfig, validateEndpointModelConfig, validateImagesServerConfig, validateOutboundPermissions, validateSearchServerConfig, verifyKey, verifyPresentedKey };