@oked/sdk 0.3.1 → 0.3.2

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package/dist/classify.js CHANGED
@@ -60,17 +60,26 @@ const HIGH_STAKES_TOOLS = new Set([]);
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  // effect IS safe by default (reads, queries, `ls`, `grep`, `jq`, `awk`, `sort`,
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  // unknown commands, …). We only enumerate the things that DO warrant a log
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  // (WARNING_*) or a prompt (REVIEW_*, HIGH_STAKES_*).
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- // File deletion (rm/rmdir/trash). Checked PER-STAGE (not on the full command)
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- // so the ephemeral-temp downgrade can run first: `something; rm /tmp/x` must be
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- // warning, but `rm /tmp/x` mixed with a non-temp delete in another stage stays
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- // high_stakes. Matching the bare word also catches it inside a loop body or a
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- // $(...) substitution stage.
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- const DELETE_PATTERNS = [
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- /\brm\b/,
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- /\brmdir\b/,
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- /\btrash\b/,
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- /\btrash-put\b/,
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- ];
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+ // File deletion (rm/rmdir/trash), detected in COMMAND POSITION only. Checked
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+ // PER-STAGE (not the full command) so the ephemeral-temp downgrade can run
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+ // first. Earlier this matched the bare word `\brm\b` anywhere, which fired on
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+ // `rm` sitting in an ARGUMENT — a branch name (`git push origin fix-rm-thing`),
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+ // a filename (`touch fix-rm.txt`), or echo text — turning benign commands
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+ // (including file creation) into false high_stakes prompts. Now it only fires
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+ // when the delete word is the command being run.
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+ //
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+ // DELETE_LEAD strips leading command wrappers / loop-body keywords (and their
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+ // flags) so a real delete that isn't literally first — `sudo rm`, `command rm`,
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+ // `xargs -0 rm`, `do rm` (from `for …; do rm …; done`) — still anchors at start.
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+ // Wrappers that take their own structured args (env, ssh, NAME=…, sh -c) are
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+ // handled by their dedicated stage classifiers, which recurse into the inner
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+ // command, so they're intentionally not here.
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+ const DELETE_LEAD = /^(?:(?:sudo|command|exec|builtin|time|nice|xargs|then|do|else)\b\s*(?:-\S+\s+)*)+/;
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+ // rm/rmdir/trash at the (lead-stripped) start of the stage, at the start of a
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+ // line, or immediately inside a substitution/subshell/group ($( ), `…`, ( ),
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+ // { ). Deliberately NOT after `;`/`|`/`&`/a quote, so a delete word sitting in
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+ // quoted DATA (echo text, a commit message) doesn't match.
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+ const DELETE_COMMAND_RE = /(?:^|[\n`({]|\$\()\s*(?:rm|rmdir|trash|trash-put)\b/;
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  // Bash commands classified as high stakes (destructive, irreversible, external).
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  // Scanned on the FULL command (some patterns, e.g. download|shell, span a pipe).
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  // File deletion lives in DELETE_PATTERNS (per-stage) instead, see above.
@@ -636,6 +645,20 @@ function classifySshStage(stage) {
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  }
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  return "review"; // only options / a bare host token → treat as remote access
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  }
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+ /**
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+ * `sh -c '<shell>'` / `bash -c "<shell>"` (also zsh/ksh/dash, and combined flags
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+ * like `-lc`) runs the quoted argument AS shell. Recurse on the body so its
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+ * effect is classified by the same rules — mirrors classifySshStage. Only fires
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+ * when the shell IS the stage's command; a `-c` flag on another tool (e.g.
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+ * `grep -c`) is unaffected because the stage doesn't start with a shell name.
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+ * Returns null if the stage isn't a `sh -c`-style invocation.
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+ */
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+ function classifyShellCStage(stage) {
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+ const m = stage.match(/^(?:bash|sh|zsh|ksh|dash)\b[^'"]*?\s-[A-Za-z]*c\s+(['"])([\s\S]*?)\1/);
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+ if (!m)
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+ return null;
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+ return classifyBashCommand(m[2]);
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+ }
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  function classifyBashCommand(command) {
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  if (!command)
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  return "safe";
@@ -687,15 +710,15 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
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  * is folded in by the caller. Returns the stage's tier (default `safe`).
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  */
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  function classifyStageShellEffects(stage) {
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- // File deletion, per-stage so the ephemeral-temp carve-out can win: deleting
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- // only throwaway temp files (/tmp, $TMPDIR, /var/folders, …) → warning; any
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- // non-temp target (or the temp root itself) → high_stakes.
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+ // File deletion in COMMAND POSITION, per-stage so the ephemeral-temp carve-out
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+ // can win: deleting only throwaway temp files (/tmp, $TMPDIR, /var/folders, …)
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+ // → warning; any non-temp target (or the temp root itself) → high_stakes.
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+ // A delete word sitting in an argument (filename, branch name, echo text) is
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+ // NOT a deletion — that's the false positive DELETE_COMMAND_RE avoids.
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  if (isEphemeralOnlyDeletion(stage))
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  return "warning";
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- for (const pattern of DELETE_PATTERNS) {
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- if (pattern.test(stage))
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- return "high_stakes";
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- }
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+ if (DELETE_COMMAND_RE.test(stage.replace(DELETE_LEAD, "")))
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+ return "high_stakes";
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  // Destructive/irreversible single commands, matched at stage start with any
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  // leading `sudo ` stripped (so `sudo mkfs …` is still caught, but the word
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  // can't fire inside an argument). These don't span pipes, so `^`-anchoring is
@@ -731,6 +754,14 @@ function classifyStageShellEffects(stage) {
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  const sshTier = classifySshStage(stage);
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  if (sshTier !== null)
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  return sshTier;
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+ // `sh -c '<shell>'` / `bash -c "<shell>"` runs the quoted argument AS shell —
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+ // recurse so its effect is classified by the same rules (mirrors ssh). This
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+ // is why the command-position delete scan above can ignore quoted text: a real
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+ // shell-out like `bash -c 'rm -rf /important'` is caught HERE, by re-running
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+ // the body as a command, while `echo 'rm …'` (data) is not.
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+ const shellCTier = classifyShellCStage(stage);
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+ if (shellCTier !== null)
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+ return shellCTier;
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  // sudo: privilege escalation. A high-stakes inner command was already caught
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  // by the full-string scan above (\b patterns match through the `sudo` prefix);
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  // anything else still warrants review.
package/dist/describe.js CHANGED
@@ -859,6 +859,14 @@ function parseRmTargets(argsString) {
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  i++;
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  if (i >= str.length)
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  break;
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+ // A shell command separator (`;`, `|`, `||`, `&&`, `&`), a redirect (`>`,
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+ // `>>`, `2>`, `&>`), a closing `)`/`}`, a comment, or a newline ends the rm
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+ // argument list — everything after belongs to a different command. Without
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+ // this, a compound `if …; then rm -rf "$P"; else echo "…"; fi` would sweep
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+ // the trailing `;`/`else`/`echo`/`fi` (and the echo's text) in as "files",
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+ // rendering a bogus "Delete N files recursively".
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+ if (/^(?:&?\d*[<>]|[;|&`)}#\n])/.test(str.slice(i)))
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+ break;
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  let token;
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  if (str[i] === '"') {
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  const close = str.indexOf('"', i + 1);
@@ -884,7 +892,9 @@ function parseRmTargets(argsString) {
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  }
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  else {
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  const start = i;
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- while (i < str.length && !/\s/.test(str[i]))
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+ // Stop the bare token at whitespace OR a separator/redirect char, so
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+ // `"$P";` and `$P;` both yield just the path.
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+ while (i < str.length && !/[\s;|&<>`)}#]/.test(str[i]))
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  i++;
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  token = str.slice(start, i);
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  }
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@oked/sdk",
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- "version": "0.3.1",
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+ "version": "0.3.2",
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  "description": "OKed SDK - human approval layer for AI agents",
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  "type": "module",
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  "main": "dist/index.js",