@oked/sdk 0.2.0 → 0.3.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/classify.js +97 -9
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/classify.js
CHANGED
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@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ import { TIER_ORDER } from "./degraded.js";
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// dirs, OKed's own config), sudo, outward message/email sends.
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// Tier 4 - high_stakes: push + number matching. Destructive / irreversible /
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// external: rm of non-temp data, DROP/TRUNCATE/DELETE FROM,
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-
// git push / reset --hard / branch -D, mkfs / dd-to-device /
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// git push --force / reset --hard / branch -D, mkfs / dd-to-device /
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// shutdown, curl POST/DELETE, ssh/scp, npm publish, kill.
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// Tools that are always safe (read-only, no side effects)
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const SAFE_TOOLS = new Set([
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@@ -75,7 +75,9 @@ const DELETE_PATTERNS = [
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// Scanned on the FULL command (some patterns, e.g. download|shell, span a pipe).
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// File deletion lives in DELETE_PATTERNS (per-stage) instead, see above.
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const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
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78
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-
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// Force push rewrites remote history irreversibly. A plain push is downgraded
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79
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// to `warning` in WARNING_COMMANDS below. Mirrors describe.ts force detection.
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/\bgit\s+push\b[^\n]*\s(?:--force(?:-with-lease)?|-f)\b/,
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/\bgit\s+reset\s+--hard\b/,
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/\bgit\s+clean\s+-f/,
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/\bgit\s+checkout\s+--\s+\./,
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@@ -101,12 +103,11 @@ const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
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/\bnpm\s+publish\b/,
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/\bnpm\s+unpublish\b/,
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/\bnpx\s+.*\s+deploy\b/,
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// ssh
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//
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//
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//
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//
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/\bssh\s+(?:\S+\s+)*\S+@\S+/,
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// NOTE: ssh is intentionally NOT a blanket high_stakes here. ssh is a
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// transport — the real effect is whatever runs on the remote host — so it's
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// classified by its remote command in classifySshStage (a read-only remote
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// diagnostic shouldn't prompt; a destructive one still does). scp/rsync to a
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// remote ARE file transfers (outward writes) and stay in HIGH_STAKES_STAGE.
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// himalaya destructive ops. message delete + folder delete/expunge/purge
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// wipe mail from the server irreversibly; account delete wipes local config.
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/\bhimalaya\s+message\s+delete\b/,
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@@ -170,12 +171,16 @@ const REVIEW_COMMANDS = [
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const WARNING_COMMANDS = [
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// Local, reversible git writes — stage/commit/switch/stash. They mutate the
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// local repo but can be undone (amend, reset, checkout). Destructive git
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// (push, reset --hard, branch -D, stash drop/clear) is caught above and wins.
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// (force push, reset --hard, branch -D, stash drop/clear) is caught above and wins.
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/^git\s+add\b/,
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/^git\s+commit\b/,
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/^git\s+checkout\s+-b\b/,
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/^git\s+switch\b/,
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/^git\s+stash\b(?!\s+(?:drop|clear))/,
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// Plain push (no force). Outward, but the remote keeps full history and the
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// push is recoverable, so by policy it logs rather than prompts. Force push is
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// high_stakes in the full scan above and wins before reaching here.
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/^git\s+push\b/,
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/^gh\s+pr\s+create\b/,
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// Package installs always mutate node_modules and run dependency postinstall
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// scripts — a known local mutation worth an audit line.
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@@ -540,6 +545,83 @@ function classifyEnvStage(stage) {
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}
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return "safe"; // `env` / `env -u X` with no command just prints the environment
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}
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// ssh options that consume a following argument token (the rest are flags).
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const SSH_ARG_OPTS = new Set([
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"-b", "-c", "-D", "-E", "-e", "-F", "-I", "-i", "-J", "-L", "-l", "-m",
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"-O", "-o", "-p", "-Q", "-R", "-S", "-W", "-w",
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]);
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/**
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* `ssh [opts] [user@]host [remote command]` — ssh is a transport, so the tier
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* comes from the REMOTE command, classified by the same effect rules as a local
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* one (`ssh host ls` → safe; `ssh host 'rm -rf /data'` → high_stakes). An ssh
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* with no command opens an interactive shell, and port/dynamic forwarding
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* (`-L`/`-R`/`-D`/`-W`) grants opaque access — neither is inspectable, so both
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* get a `review` floor (one prompt for remote access). Returns null if the stage
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* isn't an ssh invocation. Excludes `ssh-keygen`/`ssh-add`/`ssh-keyscan` (the
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* `^ssh\s` anchor requires whitespace, not a hyphen).
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*/
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function classifySshStage(stage) {
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const lead = /^ssh\s+/.exec(stage);
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if (!lead)
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return null;
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const readToken = (from) => {
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let i = from;
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let quote = null;
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while (i < stage.length) {
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const ch = stage[i];
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if (quote) {
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if (ch === quote)
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quote = null;
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i++;
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continue;
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}
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if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
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quote = ch;
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i++;
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continue;
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}
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if (/\s/.test(ch))
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break;
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i++;
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}
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return i;
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};
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let i = lead[0].length;
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let sawForward = false;
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while (i < stage.length) {
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while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
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i++;
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if (i >= stage.length)
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break;
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const start = i;
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i = readToken(i);
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const tok = stage.slice(start, i);
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if (tok.startsWith("-")) {
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if (/^-[LRDW]/.test(tok))
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sawForward = true; // forwarding/tunnel
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if (SSH_ARG_OPTS.has(tok)) { // separated option arg
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while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
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i++;
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i = readToken(i);
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}
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continue;
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}
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// First non-option token is the [user@]host. Everything after it is the
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// remote command (usually a single quoted string).
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if (sawForward)
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return "review";
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let rest = stage.slice(i).trim();
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if (!rest)
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return "review"; // interactive shell
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// Strip one wrapping quote layer so the remote command's own operators
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// (`;`, `|`) are classified as command separators, not quoted data.
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if (rest.length >= 2 && (rest[0] === '"' || rest[0] === "'") && rest[rest.length - 1] === rest[0]) {
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rest = rest.slice(1, -1);
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}
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return classifyBashCommand(rest);
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}
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return "review"; // only options / a bare host token → treat as remote access
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}
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function classifyBashCommand(command) {
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if (!command)
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return "safe";
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@@ -597,6 +679,12 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
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const envTier = classifyEnvStage(trimmed);
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if (envTier !== null)
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return envTier;
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// ssh is a transport — classify the remote command it runs (interactive /
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// port-forwarding ssh has no inspectable command → review floor). scp/rsync
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// to a remote are file transfers and stay high_stakes (HIGH_STAKES_STAGE).
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const sshTier = classifySshStage(trimmed);
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if (sshTier !== null)
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return sshTier;
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// sudo: privilege escalation. A high-stakes inner command was already caught
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// by the full-string scan above (\b patterns match through the `sudo` prefix);
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// anything else still warrants review.
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