@oked/sdk 0.2.0 → 0.2.1

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Files changed (2) hide show
  1. package/dist/classify.js +88 -6
  2. package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/classify.js CHANGED
@@ -101,12 +101,11 @@ const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
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  /\bnpm\s+publish\b/,
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  /\bnpm\s+unpublish\b/,
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  /\bnpx\s+.*\s+deploy\b/,
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- // ssh to a remote host. Effects on the remote side cannot be undone from
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- // here, so treat every interactive/remote-exec ssh as high_stakes. Matches
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- // `ssh user@host ...` and `ssh -i key.pem ubuntu@1.2.3.4 ...`. The
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- // \bssh\s+ prefix (whitespace required) excludes `ssh-keygen`/`ssh-add`/
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- // `ssh-keyscan` which are local and reversible.
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- /\bssh\s+(?:\S+\s+)*\S+@\S+/,
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+ // NOTE: ssh is intentionally NOT a blanket high_stakes here. ssh is a
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+ // transport — the real effect is whatever runs on the remote host — so it's
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+ // classified by its remote command in classifySshStage (a read-only remote
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+ // diagnostic shouldn't prompt; a destructive one still does). scp/rsync to a
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+ // remote ARE file transfers (outward writes) and stay in HIGH_STAKES_STAGE.
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  // himalaya destructive ops. message delete + folder delete/expunge/purge
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  // wipe mail from the server irreversibly; account delete wipes local config.
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  /\bhimalaya\s+message\s+delete\b/,
@@ -540,6 +539,83 @@ function classifyEnvStage(stage) {
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  }
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  return "safe"; // `env` / `env -u X` with no command just prints the environment
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  }
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+ // ssh options that consume a following argument token (the rest are flags).
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+ const SSH_ARG_OPTS = new Set([
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+ "-b", "-c", "-D", "-E", "-e", "-F", "-I", "-i", "-J", "-L", "-l", "-m",
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+ "-O", "-o", "-p", "-Q", "-R", "-S", "-W", "-w",
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+ ]);
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+ /**
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+ * `ssh [opts] [user@]host [remote command]` — ssh is a transport, so the tier
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+ * comes from the REMOTE command, classified by the same effect rules as a local
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+ * one (`ssh host ls` → safe; `ssh host 'rm -rf /data'` → high_stakes). An ssh
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+ * with no command opens an interactive shell, and port/dynamic forwarding
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+ * (`-L`/`-R`/`-D`/`-W`) grants opaque access — neither is inspectable, so both
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+ * get a `review` floor (one prompt for remote access). Returns null if the stage
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+ * isn't an ssh invocation. Excludes `ssh-keygen`/`ssh-add`/`ssh-keyscan` (the
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+ * `^ssh\s` anchor requires whitespace, not a hyphen).
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+ */
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+ function classifySshStage(stage) {
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+ const lead = /^ssh\s+/.exec(stage);
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+ if (!lead)
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+ return null;
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+ const readToken = (from) => {
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+ let i = from;
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+ let quote = null;
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+ while (i < stage.length) {
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+ const ch = stage[i];
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+ if (quote) {
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+ if (ch === quote)
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+ quote = null;
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+ i++;
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
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+ quote = ch;
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+ i++;
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ if (/\s/.test(ch))
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+ break;
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+ i++;
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+ }
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+ return i;
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+ };
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+ let i = lead[0].length;
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+ let sawForward = false;
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+ while (i < stage.length) {
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+ while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
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+ i++;
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+ if (i >= stage.length)
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+ break;
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+ const start = i;
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+ i = readToken(i);
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+ const tok = stage.slice(start, i);
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+ if (tok.startsWith("-")) {
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+ if (/^-[LRDW]/.test(tok))
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+ sawForward = true; // forwarding/tunnel
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+ if (SSH_ARG_OPTS.has(tok)) { // separated option arg
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+ while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
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+ i++;
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+ i = readToken(i);
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+ }
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+ continue;
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+ }
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+ // First non-option token is the [user@]host. Everything after it is the
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+ // remote command (usually a single quoted string).
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+ if (sawForward)
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+ return "review";
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+ let rest = stage.slice(i).trim();
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+ if (!rest)
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+ return "review"; // interactive shell
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+ // Strip one wrapping quote layer so the remote command's own operators
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+ // (`;`, `|`) are classified as command separators, not quoted data.
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+ if (rest.length >= 2 && (rest[0] === '"' || rest[0] === "'") && rest[rest.length - 1] === rest[0]) {
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+ rest = rest.slice(1, -1);
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+ }
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+ return classifyBashCommand(rest);
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+ }
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+ return "review"; // only options / a bare host token → treat as remote access
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+ }
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  function classifyBashCommand(command) {
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  if (!command)
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  return "safe";
@@ -597,6 +673,12 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
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  const envTier = classifyEnvStage(trimmed);
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  if (envTier !== null)
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  return envTier;
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+ // ssh is a transport — classify the remote command it runs (interactive /
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+ // port-forwarding ssh has no inspectable command → review floor). scp/rsync
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+ // to a remote are file transfers and stay high_stakes (HIGH_STAKES_STAGE).
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+ const sshTier = classifySshStage(trimmed);
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+ if (sshTier !== null)
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+ return sshTier;
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  // sudo: privilege escalation. A high-stakes inner command was already caught
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  // by the full-string scan above (\b patterns match through the `sudo` prefix);
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  // anything else still warrants review.
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
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  {
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  "name": "@oked/sdk",
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- "version": "0.2.0",
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+ "version": "0.2.1",
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  "description": "OKed SDK - human approval layer for AI agents",
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  "type": "module",
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  "main": "dist/index.js",