@oked/sdk 0.1.8 → 0.2.1

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Files changed (2) hide show
  1. package/dist/classify.js +278 -132
  2. package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/classify.js CHANGED
@@ -2,10 +2,25 @@ import path from "path";
2
2
  import os from "os";
3
3
  import { findSqlInCommand } from "./describe.js";
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  import { TIER_ORDER } from "./degraded.js";
5
- // Tier 1 - safe: auto-allow, no notification (Read, Glob, ls, git status, etc.)
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- // Tier 2 - warning: terminal log only, no push (Write/Edit inside project dir)
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- // Tier 3 - review: push notification required (Write/Edit outside project, unknown bash)
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- // Tier 4 - high_stakes: push + number matching (rm -rf, git push, DROP TABLE, etc.)
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+ // Classification is EFFECT-BASED, not command-name-based. We don't keep an
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+ // allowlist of "safe commands"; instead we detect the few categories of effect
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+ // that warrant a human in the loop, and DEFAULT TO NO PROMPT for everything
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+ // else. Running a command, reading, copying a file, a DB SELECT, or deleting a
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+ // /tmp scratch file must never prompt — only destructive, irreversible, or
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+ // outward-facing operations do.
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+ //
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+ // Tier 1 - safe: auto-allow, silent. No detected side effect (reads, queries,
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+ // and any command we don't recognize as mutating — the default).
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+ // Tier 2 - warning: terminal log only, no push. A reversible LOCAL mutation
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+ // (file create/copy/move, /tmp delete, local git, install,
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+ // code-exec, SQL INSERT/CREATE).
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+ // Tier 3 - review: push notification, tap to approve. Prompt-worthy but not
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+ // catastrophic: sensitive-path writes (~/.ssh, shell rc, system
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+ // dirs, OKed's own config), sudo, outward message/email sends.
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+ // Tier 4 - high_stakes: push + number matching. Destructive / irreversible /
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+ // external: rm of non-temp data, DROP/TRUNCATE/DELETE FROM,
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+ // git push / reset --hard / branch -D, mkfs / dd-to-device /
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+ // shutdown, curl POST/DELETE, ssh/scp, npm publish, kill.
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  // Tools that are always safe (read-only, no side effects)
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  const SAFE_TOOLS = new Set([
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  "Read",
@@ -40,80 +55,11 @@ const SAFE_TOOL_ALIASES = new Set([
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  const REVIEW_TOOLS = new Set([]);
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  // Tools that are always high stakes
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  const HIGH_STAKES_TOOLS = new Set([]);
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- // Bash commands classified as safe (read-only, informational)
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- const SAFE_COMMANDS = [
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- /^ls\b/,
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- /^pwd$/,
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- /^echo\b/,
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- /^cat\b/,
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- /^head\b/,
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- /^tail\b/,
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- /^wc\b/,
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- /^date$/,
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- /^whoami$/,
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- /^which\b/,
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- /^type\b/,
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- /^file\b/,
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- /^stat\b/,
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- /^du\b/,
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- /^df\b/,
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- /^uname\b/,
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- /^env$/,
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- /^printenv\b/,
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- /^node\s+(-v|--version)/,
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- /^npm\s+(list|ls|--version|-v|view|info|outdated|audit)\b/,
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- /^npx\s+-v/,
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- /^git\s+(status|log|diff|branch|remote|show|tag|stash\s+list|ls-files|ls-tree|ls-remote|check-ignore|check-attr|rev-parse|rev-list|describe|cat-file|blame|shortlog|reflog|name-rev|whatchanged|for-each-ref|symbolic-ref|merge-base|var|grep|count-objects|show-ref|cherry|verify-commit|fsck)\b/,
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- /^git\s+config\s+(--get|--get-all|--get-regexp|--list|-l)\b/,
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- /^docker\s+(ps|images|inspect|logs)\b/,
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- /^docker\s+compose\s+(ps|logs)\b/,
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- /^tree\b/,
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- /^find\b/,
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- /^grep\b/,
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- /^rg\b/,
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- /^fd\b/,
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- /^jq\b/,
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- /^curl\s+-s.*\|\s*(jq|python|node)/, // curl piped to parser (usually read-only)
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- /^curl\b/, // curl without -X defaults to GET (high-stakes patterns checked first)
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- // himalaya (email CLI) read-only ops. Listing/reading mail or folder state
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- // never mutates anything remotely. Only `message send|reply|forward` and
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- // `message delete` / `folder delete|expunge|purge` matter; those land in
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- // the review/high-stakes paths.
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- /^himalaya\s+(account|folder|envelope|message\s+(?:read|export|search|copy|move)|attachment\s+(?:download|list)|template|search)\b/,
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- // cd just changes directory — no side effect of its own. Any dangerous
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- // command chained after it (`cd x && rm -rf`) is caught per-stage.
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- /^cd\b/,
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- // sed without -i / --in-place only prints to stdout (read-only). In-place
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- // edits are detected as a write op (below) before this is reached.
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- /^sed\b/,
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- // gh read-only subcommands — listing/viewing PRs, issues, runs, etc.
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- /^gh\s+(pr|issue|repo|run|workflow|release|api)\s+(list|view|status|diff|checks)\b/,
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- // Test runners — running the project's own tests is part of the dev loop.
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- // (Arbitrary node/npx/python execution is `warning`, see WARNING_COMMANDS.)
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- /^npm\s+(test|t)\b/,
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- /^npx\s+(tsx|ts-node|jest|vitest|mocha|ava|cypress|playwright|tsc)\b/,
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- /^(jest|vitest|mocha|pytest|ava)\b/,
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- /^python3?\s+-m\s+pytest\b/,
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- // Shell control-flow keywords. A compound like `for f in *; do cmd; done`
98
- // is split on `;` into stages; these keyword stages carry no risk of their
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- // own, and any real command in the body is classified per-stage. Dangerous
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- // commands hidden in a $(...) on a keyword line are still caught by the
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- // high-stakes scan, which runs on the full command first.
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- /^(for|while|until|do|done|then|else|elif|fi|case|esac|if|select)\b/,
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- /^(done|fi|esac|\}|\{|:|true|false)\s*$/,
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- // Inert shell builtins / flow helpers with no side effects.
105
- /^sleep\b/,
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- /^exit\b/,
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- /^return\b/,
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- /^seq\b/,
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- /^test\b/,
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- /^\[\[?\s/, // [ ... ] and [[ ... ]] conditionals
111
- // `<cmd> --help` / `--version` just prints usage. (Dangerous verbs like
112
- // `git push` are matched by HIGH_STAKES on the full command first.)
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- /\s--(help|version)\b/,
114
- // Read-only npm subcommands beyond the install/version ones above.
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- /^npm\s+(prefix|root|bin|whoami|ping|docs|repo|why|explain|pkg\s+get|config\s+get)\b/,
116
- ];
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+ // NOTE: there is intentionally NO "safe commands" allowlist. Under the
59
+ // effect-based model, anything we don't detect as a mutation or a prompt-worthy
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+ // effect IS safe by default (reads, queries, `ls`, `grep`, `jq`, `awk`, `sort`,
61
+ // unknown commands, …). We only enumerate the things that DO warrant a log
62
+ // (WARNING_*) or a prompt (REVIEW_*, HIGH_STAKES_*).
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63
  // File deletion (rm/rmdir/trash). Checked PER-STAGE (not on the full command)
118
64
  // so the ephemeral-temp downgrade can run first: `something; rm /tmp/x` must be
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  // warning, but `rm /tmp/x` mixed with a non-temp delete in another stage stays
@@ -141,10 +87,6 @@ const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
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  // -c/-e, interpreter -e/-c bodies, heredocs), then classifySqlSeverity.
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  /\bdocker\s+(rm|rmi|system\s+prune)\b/,
143
89
  /\bdocker\s+compose\s+down\b/,
144
- /\bkill\b/,
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- /\bpkill\b/,
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- /\bkillall\b/,
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- /\bchmod\s+777\b/,
148
90
  /\bcurl\s+.*-X\s*(DELETE|PUT|POST|PATCH)\b/i,
149
91
  /\bcurl\s+.*--request\s*(DELETE|PUT|POST|PATCH)\b/i,
150
92
  // curl flags that send a request body (POST/PUT/PATCH) without an explicit -X
@@ -159,47 +101,83 @@ const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
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  /\bnpm\s+publish\b/,
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  /\bnpm\s+unpublish\b/,
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  /\bnpx\s+.*\s+deploy\b/,
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- // ssh to a remote host. Effects on the remote side cannot be undone from
163
- // here, so treat every interactive/remote-exec ssh as high_stakes. Matches
164
- // `ssh user@host ...` and `ssh -i key.pem ubuntu@1.2.3.4 ...`. The
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- // \bssh\s+ prefix (whitespace required) excludes `ssh-keygen`/`ssh-add`/
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- // `ssh-keyscan` which are local and reversible.
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- /\bssh\s+(?:\S+\s+)*\S+@\S+/,
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+ // NOTE: ssh is intentionally NOT a blanket high_stakes here. ssh is a
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+ // transport — the real effect is whatever runs on the remote host — so it's
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+ // classified by its remote command in classifySshStage (a read-only remote
107
+ // diagnostic shouldn't prompt; a destructive one still does). scp/rsync to a
108
+ // remote ARE file transfers (outward writes) and stay in HIGH_STAKES_STAGE.
168
109
  // himalaya destructive ops. message delete + folder delete/expunge/purge
169
110
  // wipe mail from the server irreversibly; account delete wipes local config.
170
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  /\bhimalaya\s+message\s+delete\b/,
171
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  /\bhimalaya\s+folder\s+(delete|expunge|purge)\b/,
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  /\bhimalaya\s+account\s+delete\b/,
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+ // Overwriting a raw block device (`> /dev/sda`, `… > /dev/nvme0n1`) destroys a
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+ // disk irreversibly. (dd to a device is in HIGH_STAKES_STAGE.)
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+ />\s*\/dev\/(sd|nvme|hd|disk|mmcblk|vd)\w*/,
117
+ ];
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+ // Destructive / irreversible commands matched PER-STAGE at the start of a stage
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+ // (after stripping a leading `sudo `), so the destructive WORD can't be hit
120
+ // inside an argument or a commit message (`git commit -m "kill the flaky test"`
121
+ // must not be high_stakes). These don't span pipes, so per-stage `^`-anchoring
122
+ // is both safe and precise.
123
+ const HIGH_STAKES_STAGE = [
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+ // Filesystem / disk destruction.
125
+ /^mkfs(\.\w+)?\b/,
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+ /^mkswap\b/,
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+ /^(fdisk|parted|gparted)\b/,
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+ /^dd\b.*\bof=\/dev\//,
129
+ /^shred\b/,
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+ /^truncate\b/, // `truncate -s 0 file` wipes contents
131
+ /^find\b.*\s-delete\b/, // `find … -delete` removes matches
132
+ // Power / system state.
133
+ /^(shutdown|reboot|halt|poweroff)\b/,
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+ // Remote/outward file transfer (almost always a remote target).
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+ /^scp\b/,
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+ /^rsync\b.*(--delete|\s\S+:)/, // rsync --delete, or to a host:path target
137
+ // Local git history/work destruction (force branch delete, tag delete,
138
+ // dropping/clearing stashed work). Reversible local git (add/commit/stash) is
139
+ // a WARNING marker below.
140
+ /^git\s+branch\s+(?:-D|--delete)\b/,
141
+ /^git\s+tag\s+(?:-d|--delete)\b/,
142
+ /^git\s+stash\s+(?:drop|clear)\b/,
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+ // Process termination.
144
+ /^kill\b/,
145
+ /^pkill\b/,
146
+ /^killall\b/,
147
+ // Wide-open permissions.
148
+ /^chmod\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*777\b/,
149
+ ];
150
+ // Outward-but-recoverable commands → review (prompt, simple approve). Sending
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+ // mail/messages can't be unsent, but it isn't destructive to local state, so it
152
+ // sits below high_stakes. Matched per-stage. (Destructive himalaya verbs —
153
+ // message delete, folder purge — are high_stakes in the full scan above.)
154
+ const REVIEW_COMMANDS = [
155
+ /^himalaya\s+message\s+(send|reply|forward)\b/,
173
156
  ];
174
- // Commands that auto-allow without a phone prompt but are logged (warning):
175
- // reversible/local actions where an audit line is enough.
157
+ // Local-mutation MARKERS for DETECTED side effects. These never gate a prompt —
158
+ // under the effect-based model anything not flagged destructive/outward/sensitive
159
+ // already auto-allows. They exist only to pick the `warning` (logged) vs `safe`
160
+ // (silent) label, and cover the local mutations we can recognize by shape but
161
+ // that aren't a plain file write (those are handled by extractShellWriteOps).
162
+ //
163
+ // Opaque code execution (node/npx/python/claude/test runners) is intentionally
164
+ // NOT here: we can't tell whether it mutated anything, and a destructive effect
165
+ // buried inside `node -e …` would slip through regardless of the label — so
166
+ // logging it adds terminal noise without buying safety. It stays `safe`, just
167
+ // like any other unrecognized command. A real file write it performs is a
168
+ // separate Bash/Write call that gets classified on its own.
176
169
  const WARNING_COMMANDS = [
177
- // Local, reversible git ops — branch/stage/commit/stash/switch. They touch
178
- // only the local repo and can be undone (amend, reset, checkout).
179
- // Destructive/remote git (push, reset --hard, clean, checkout -- .) is matched
180
- // by HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS above and wins first. `git stash drop|clear` is
181
- // excluded — those discard stashed work — so it stays `review`.
170
+ // Local, reversible git writes — stage/commit/switch/stash. They mutate the
171
+ // local repo but can be undone (amend, reset, checkout). Destructive git
172
+ // (push, reset --hard, branch -D, stash drop/clear) is caught above and wins.
182
173
  /^git\s+add\b/,
183
174
  /^git\s+commit\b/,
184
175
  /^git\s+checkout\s+-b\b/,
185
176
  /^git\s+switch\b/,
186
177
  /^git\s+stash\b(?!\s+(?:drop|clear))/,
187
- // PR creation is reversible (a PR can be closed); the underlying branch push
188
- // is separately high_stakes.
189
178
  /^gh\s+pr\s+create\b/,
190
- // Arbitrary code execution (node/npx/python/npm run/bun/deno). The spawned
191
- // process can do anything and its syscalls don't pass back through OKed, so
192
- // we don't prompt but keep a local trail. Known test runners and read-only
193
- // version flags are handled as `safe` (SAFE_COMMANDS) before reaching here.
194
- /^node\b/,
195
- /^npx\b/,
196
- /^python3?\b/,
197
- /^npm\s+run\b/,
198
- /^bun\b/,
199
- /^deno\b/,
200
- // Package installs run dependency postinstall scripts (code execution), so
201
- // they're not "safe" — but they're a constant part of the dev loop, so log
202
- // (warning) rather than prompt.
179
+ // Package installs always mutate node_modules and run dependency postinstall
180
+ // scripts — a known local mutation worth an audit line.
203
181
  /^npm\s+(install|ci|i|update|upgrade|rebuild|prune|dedupe)\b/,
204
182
  /^(pnpm|yarn)\s+(install|add|ci|up|upgrade)\b/,
205
183
  ];
@@ -227,14 +205,21 @@ function isEphemeralPath(filePath) {
227
205
  function isSensitiveWritePath(filePath) {
228
206
  if (!filePath)
229
207
  return true; // unknown target → err toward review
208
+ const home = os.homedir();
209
+ // Expand a leading `~` / `$HOME` / `${HOME}` to the real home dir BEFORE
210
+ // resolving. In a shell `echo x > ~/.zshrc` the tilde IS the home dir, but
211
+ // path.resolve treats `~` as a literal segment under cwd, which would miss
212
+ // sensitive home targets (shell rc, ~/.ssh, …) and silently downgrade them.
213
+ const expanded = filePath
214
+ .replace(/^~(?=\/|$)/, home)
215
+ .replace(/^\$\{?HOME\}?(?=\/|$)/, home);
230
216
  let resolved;
231
217
  try {
232
- resolved = path.resolve(filePath);
218
+ resolved = path.resolve(expanded);
233
219
  }
234
220
  catch {
235
221
  return true;
236
222
  }
237
- const home = os.homedir();
238
223
  const underHome = (rel) => {
239
224
  const base = path.join(home, rel);
240
225
  return resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep);
@@ -491,6 +476,146 @@ function classifyAssignmentStage(stage) {
491
476
  tier = maxTier(tier, classifyBashCommand(rest));
492
477
  return tier;
493
478
  }
479
+ /**
480
+ * `env [OPTION]... [NAME=VALUE]... [COMMAND [ARG]...]` runs COMMAND with a
481
+ * modified environment (a wrapper like sudo / an assignment prefix). Strips
482
+ * env's own options (`-i`, `-u NAME`, `-C dir`, `-`, `--unset=NAME`, …) and any
483
+ * leading NAME=VALUE pairs, then classifies the inner COMMAND from its original
484
+ * (quote-preserving) offset. `env` with no command just prints the environment
485
+ * → safe. Returns null if the stage doesn't start with `env`.
486
+ */
487
+ function classifyEnvStage(stage) {
488
+ const lead = /^env\b[ \t]*/.exec(stage);
489
+ if (!lead)
490
+ return null;
491
+ // env options that consume a following argument token.
492
+ const argTaking = new Set(["-u", "--unset", "-C", "--chdir", "-P", "-S", "--split-string"]);
493
+ const readToken = (from) => {
494
+ let i = from;
495
+ let quote = null;
496
+ while (i < stage.length) {
497
+ const ch = stage[i];
498
+ if (quote) {
499
+ if (ch === quote)
500
+ quote = null;
501
+ i++;
502
+ continue;
503
+ }
504
+ if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
505
+ quote = ch;
506
+ i++;
507
+ continue;
508
+ }
509
+ if (/\s/.test(ch))
510
+ break;
511
+ i++;
512
+ }
513
+ return i;
514
+ };
515
+ let i = lead[0].length;
516
+ while (i < stage.length) {
517
+ while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
518
+ i++;
519
+ if (i >= stage.length)
520
+ break;
521
+ const start = i;
522
+ i = readToken(i);
523
+ const tok = stage.slice(start, i);
524
+ if (tok === "-")
525
+ continue; // ignore-environment marker
526
+ if (tok.startsWith("--") && tok.includes("="))
527
+ continue; // --unset=NAME etc.
528
+ if (tok.startsWith("-")) {
529
+ if (argTaking.has(tok)) { // consume its argument token
530
+ while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
531
+ i++;
532
+ i = readToken(i);
533
+ }
534
+ continue;
535
+ }
536
+ if (/^\w+=/.test(tok))
537
+ continue; // NAME=VALUE
538
+ return classifyBashCommand(stage.slice(start).trim()); // first real word → the command
539
+ }
540
+ return "safe"; // `env` / `env -u X` with no command just prints the environment
541
+ }
542
+ // ssh options that consume a following argument token (the rest are flags).
543
+ const SSH_ARG_OPTS = new Set([
544
+ "-b", "-c", "-D", "-E", "-e", "-F", "-I", "-i", "-J", "-L", "-l", "-m",
545
+ "-O", "-o", "-p", "-Q", "-R", "-S", "-W", "-w",
546
+ ]);
547
+ /**
548
+ * `ssh [opts] [user@]host [remote command]` — ssh is a transport, so the tier
549
+ * comes from the REMOTE command, classified by the same effect rules as a local
550
+ * one (`ssh host ls` → safe; `ssh host 'rm -rf /data'` → high_stakes). An ssh
551
+ * with no command opens an interactive shell, and port/dynamic forwarding
552
+ * (`-L`/`-R`/`-D`/`-W`) grants opaque access — neither is inspectable, so both
553
+ * get a `review` floor (one prompt for remote access). Returns null if the stage
554
+ * isn't an ssh invocation. Excludes `ssh-keygen`/`ssh-add`/`ssh-keyscan` (the
555
+ * `^ssh\s` anchor requires whitespace, not a hyphen).
556
+ */
557
+ function classifySshStage(stage) {
558
+ const lead = /^ssh\s+/.exec(stage);
559
+ if (!lead)
560
+ return null;
561
+ const readToken = (from) => {
562
+ let i = from;
563
+ let quote = null;
564
+ while (i < stage.length) {
565
+ const ch = stage[i];
566
+ if (quote) {
567
+ if (ch === quote)
568
+ quote = null;
569
+ i++;
570
+ continue;
571
+ }
572
+ if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
573
+ quote = ch;
574
+ i++;
575
+ continue;
576
+ }
577
+ if (/\s/.test(ch))
578
+ break;
579
+ i++;
580
+ }
581
+ return i;
582
+ };
583
+ let i = lead[0].length;
584
+ let sawForward = false;
585
+ while (i < stage.length) {
586
+ while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
587
+ i++;
588
+ if (i >= stage.length)
589
+ break;
590
+ const start = i;
591
+ i = readToken(i);
592
+ const tok = stage.slice(start, i);
593
+ if (tok.startsWith("-")) {
594
+ if (/^-[LRDW]/.test(tok))
595
+ sawForward = true; // forwarding/tunnel
596
+ if (SSH_ARG_OPTS.has(tok)) { // separated option arg
597
+ while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
598
+ i++;
599
+ i = readToken(i);
600
+ }
601
+ continue;
602
+ }
603
+ // First non-option token is the [user@]host. Everything after it is the
604
+ // remote command (usually a single quoted string).
605
+ if (sawForward)
606
+ return "review";
607
+ let rest = stage.slice(i).trim();
608
+ if (!rest)
609
+ return "review"; // interactive shell
610
+ // Strip one wrapping quote layer so the remote command's own operators
611
+ // (`;`, `|`) are classified as command separators, not quoted data.
612
+ if (rest.length >= 2 && (rest[0] === '"' || rest[0] === "'") && rest[rest.length - 1] === rest[0]) {
613
+ rest = rest.slice(1, -1);
614
+ }
615
+ return classifyBashCommand(rest);
616
+ }
617
+ return "review"; // only options / a bare host token → treat as remote access
618
+ }
494
619
  function classifyBashCommand(command) {
495
620
  if (!command)
496
621
  return "safe";
@@ -526,6 +651,15 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
526
651
  if (pattern.test(trimmed))
527
652
  return "high_stakes";
528
653
  }
654
+ // Destructive/irreversible single commands, matched at stage start with any
655
+ // leading `sudo ` stripped (so `sudo mkfs …` is still caught, but the word
656
+ // can't fire inside an argument). These don't span pipes, so `^`-anchoring is
657
+ // precise and avoids prose false-positives.
658
+ const bareStage = trimmed.replace(/^sudo\s+/, "");
659
+ for (const pattern of HIGH_STAKES_STAGE) {
660
+ if (pattern.test(bareStage))
661
+ return "high_stakes";
662
+ }
529
663
  // Variable assignments: `NAME=value` (pure) or `NAME=$(cmd) rest` (env prefix
530
664
  // / capture). Classify the command-substitution inners and any trailing
531
665
  // command; a purely literal assignment is safe. Dangerous substitutions were
@@ -533,6 +667,18 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
533
667
  const assignTier = classifyAssignmentStage(trimmed);
534
668
  if (assignTier !== null)
535
669
  return assignTier;
670
+ // `env [opts] [NAME=VAL]... cmd` runs cmd with a modified environment. Strip
671
+ // the env prefix and classify the inner command (a dangerous inner was already
672
+ // caught by the high-stakes full scan). Bare `env` just prints the env → safe.
673
+ const envTier = classifyEnvStage(trimmed);
674
+ if (envTier !== null)
675
+ return envTier;
676
+ // ssh is a transport — classify the remote command it runs (interactive /
677
+ // port-forwarding ssh has no inspectable command → review floor). scp/rsync
678
+ // to a remote are file transfers and stay high_stakes (HIGH_STAKES_STAGE).
679
+ const sshTier = classifySshStage(trimmed);
680
+ if (sshTier !== null)
681
+ return sshTier;
536
682
  // sudo: privilege escalation. A high-stakes inner command was already caught
537
683
  // by the full-string scan above (\b patterns match through the `sudo` prefix);
538
684
  // anything else still warrants review.
@@ -545,34 +691,31 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
545
691
  const sql = findSqlInCommand(trimmed);
546
692
  if (sql)
547
693
  return classifySqlSeverity(sql);
548
- // File-mutating shell patterns. Content-creation idioms (echo > X, tee,
549
- // dd of=, touch, sed -i) are the bypass route from a denied Write, so they're
550
- // classified exactly like the Write/Edit tool: `warning` unless a target is a
551
- // sensitive path (system dir, secret store, shell rc, OKed config), which
552
- // stays `review`. cp/mv (which can clobber/relocate existing files) stay
553
- // review.
694
+ // File-mutating shell patterns (echo > X, tee, dd of=, touch, sed -i, cp, mv).
695
+ // A file write/copy/move is a reversible LOCAL mutation, classified like the
696
+ // Write/Edit tool: `warning` (logged) — UNLESS a target is a sensitive path
697
+ // (system dir, secret store, shell rc, OKed config), which stays `review`.
698
+ // (Overwriting a raw block device was already caught by the high-stakes scan.)
554
699
  const ops = extractShellWriteOps(trimmed);
555
700
  if (ops.length > 0) {
556
- const creates = ops.filter((o) => o.kind !== "copy" && o.kind !== "move");
557
- if (creates.length > 0) {
558
- return creates.some((o) => isSensitiveWritePath(o.target)) ? "review" : "warning";
559
- }
560
- return "review";
701
+ const targets = ops.map((o) => o.target);
702
+ return targets.some((t) => isSensitiveWritePath(t)) ? "review" : "warning";
561
703
  }
562
- // Check safe patterns
563
- for (const pattern of SAFE_COMMANDS) {
704
+ // Outward sends (email/message) → review.
705
+ for (const pattern of REVIEW_COMMANDS) {
564
706
  if (pattern.test(trimmed))
565
- return "safe";
707
+ return "review";
566
708
  }
567
- // Reversible/local commands (local git, gh pr create, code execution) →
568
- // warning: logged, no phone approval. Checked after SAFE so read-only git
569
- // (status/log/`stash list`) and known test runners stay fully silent.
709
+ // Local-mutation markers (local git, code execution, installs) → warning:
710
+ // logged, no prompt. Everything else is a read or an unrecognized command with
711
+ // no detected effect — and under the effect-based model that means `safe`.
570
712
  for (const pattern of WARNING_COMMANDS) {
571
713
  if (pattern.test(trimmed))
572
714
  return "warning";
573
715
  }
574
- // Default: review (require approval for unknown commands)
575
- return "review";
716
+ // Default: safe. No destructive/outward/sensitive effect was detected, so we
717
+ // do NOT put a human in the loop just for "running a command".
718
+ return "safe";
576
719
  }
577
720
  function classifySqlSeverity(sql) {
578
721
  if (/\bDROP\s+(TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|VIEW)\b/i.test(sql))
@@ -592,7 +735,10 @@ function classifySqlSeverity(sql) {
592
735
  // SQLite dot-commands (.tables, .schema, .dump, etc.) — safe unless they mutate
593
736
  if (/^\s*\./.test(sql) && !/^\s*\.(import|read|restore)\b/i.test(sql))
594
737
  return "safe";
595
- return "review";
738
+ // INSERT/ALTER and other non-destructive DML: a reversible row/schema change,
739
+ // not a data wipe → warning (logged, no prompt). Destructive SQL (DROP /
740
+ // TRUNCATE / DELETE FROM / UPDATE-without-WHERE) returned high_stakes above.
741
+ return "warning";
596
742
  }
597
743
  /**
598
744
  * Detects shell idioms that mutate the filesystem. Used by classify (to
package/package.json CHANGED
@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
1
1
  {
2
2
  "name": "@oked/sdk",
3
- "version": "0.1.8",
3
+ "version": "0.2.1",
4
4
  "description": "OKed SDK - human approval layer for AI agents",
5
5
  "type": "module",
6
6
  "main": "dist/index.js",