@oked/sdk 0.1.8 → 0.2.0
This diff represents the content of publicly available package versions that have been released to one of the supported registries. The information contained in this diff is provided for informational purposes only and reflects changes between package versions as they appear in their respective public registries.
- package/dist/classify.js +190 -126
- package/package.json +1 -1
package/dist/classify.js
CHANGED
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@@ -2,10 +2,25 @@ import path from "path";
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import os from "os";
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import { findSqlInCommand } from "./describe.js";
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import { TIER_ORDER } from "./degraded.js";
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//
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//
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//
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//
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// Classification is EFFECT-BASED, not command-name-based. We don't keep an
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// allowlist of "safe commands"; instead we detect the few categories of effect
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// that warrant a human in the loop, and DEFAULT TO NO PROMPT for everything
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// else. Running a command, reading, copying a file, a DB SELECT, or deleting a
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// /tmp scratch file must never prompt — only destructive, irreversible, or
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// outward-facing operations do.
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//
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// Tier 1 - safe: auto-allow, silent. No detected side effect (reads, queries,
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// and any command we don't recognize as mutating — the default).
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// Tier 2 - warning: terminal log only, no push. A reversible LOCAL mutation
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// (file create/copy/move, /tmp delete, local git, install,
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// code-exec, SQL INSERT/CREATE).
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// Tier 3 - review: push notification, tap to approve. Prompt-worthy but not
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// catastrophic: sensitive-path writes (~/.ssh, shell rc, system
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// dirs, OKed's own config), sudo, outward message/email sends.
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// Tier 4 - high_stakes: push + number matching. Destructive / irreversible /
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// external: rm of non-temp data, DROP/TRUNCATE/DELETE FROM,
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// git push / reset --hard / branch -D, mkfs / dd-to-device /
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// shutdown, curl POST/DELETE, ssh/scp, npm publish, kill.
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// Tools that are always safe (read-only, no side effects)
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const SAFE_TOOLS = new Set([
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"Read",
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@@ -40,80 +55,11 @@ const SAFE_TOOL_ALIASES = new Set([
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const REVIEW_TOOLS = new Set([]);
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// Tools that are always high stakes
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const HIGH_STAKES_TOOLS = new Set([]);
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//
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/^cat\b/,
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/^head\b/,
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/^tail\b/,
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/^wc\b/,
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/^date$/,
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/^whoami$/,
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/^which\b/,
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/^type\b/,
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/^file\b/,
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/^stat\b/,
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/^du\b/,
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/^df\b/,
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/^uname\b/,
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/^env$/,
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/^printenv\b/,
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/^node\s+(-v|--version)/,
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/^npm\s+(list|ls|--version|-v|view|info|outdated|audit)\b/,
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/^npx\s+-v/,
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/^git\s+(status|log|diff|branch|remote|show|tag|stash\s+list|ls-files|ls-tree|ls-remote|check-ignore|check-attr|rev-parse|rev-list|describe|cat-file|blame|shortlog|reflog|name-rev|whatchanged|for-each-ref|symbolic-ref|merge-base|var|grep|count-objects|show-ref|cherry|verify-commit|fsck)\b/,
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/^git\s+config\s+(--get|--get-all|--get-regexp|--list|-l)\b/,
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/^docker\s+(ps|images|inspect|logs)\b/,
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/^docker\s+compose\s+(ps|logs)\b/,
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/^tree\b/,
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/^find\b/,
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/^grep\b/,
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/^rg\b/,
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/^fd\b/,
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/^jq\b/,
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/^curl\s+-s.*\|\s*(jq|python|node)/, // curl piped to parser (usually read-only)
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/^curl\b/, // curl without -X defaults to GET (high-stakes patterns checked first)
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// himalaya (email CLI) read-only ops. Listing/reading mail or folder state
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// never mutates anything remotely. Only `message send|reply|forward` and
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// `message delete` / `folder delete|expunge|purge` matter; those land in
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// the review/high-stakes paths.
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/^himalaya\s+(account|folder|envelope|message\s+(?:read|export|search|copy|move)|attachment\s+(?:download|list)|template|search)\b/,
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// cd just changes directory — no side effect of its own. Any dangerous
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// command chained after it (`cd x && rm -rf`) is caught per-stage.
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/^cd\b/,
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// sed without -i / --in-place only prints to stdout (read-only). In-place
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// edits are detected as a write op (below) before this is reached.
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/^sed\b/,
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// gh read-only subcommands — listing/viewing PRs, issues, runs, etc.
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/^gh\s+(pr|issue|repo|run|workflow|release|api)\s+(list|view|status|diff|checks)\b/,
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// Test runners — running the project's own tests is part of the dev loop.
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// (Arbitrary node/npx/python execution is `warning`, see WARNING_COMMANDS.)
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/^npm\s+(test|t)\b/,
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/^npx\s+(tsx|ts-node|jest|vitest|mocha|ava|cypress|playwright|tsc)\b/,
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/^(jest|vitest|mocha|pytest|ava)\b/,
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/^python3?\s+-m\s+pytest\b/,
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// Shell control-flow keywords. A compound like `for f in *; do cmd; done`
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// is split on `;` into stages; these keyword stages carry no risk of their
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// own, and any real command in the body is classified per-stage. Dangerous
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// commands hidden in a $(...) on a keyword line are still caught by the
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// high-stakes scan, which runs on the full command first.
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/^(for|while|until|do|done|then|else|elif|fi|case|esac|if|select)\b/,
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/^(done|fi|esac|\}|\{|:|true|false)\s*$/,
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// Inert shell builtins / flow helpers with no side effects.
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/^sleep\b/,
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/^exit\b/,
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/^return\b/,
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/^seq\b/,
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/^test\b/,
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/^\[\[?\s/, // [ ... ] and [[ ... ]] conditionals
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// `<cmd> --help` / `--version` just prints usage. (Dangerous verbs like
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// `git push` are matched by HIGH_STAKES on the full command first.)
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/\s--(help|version)\b/,
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// Read-only npm subcommands beyond the install/version ones above.
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/^npm\s+(prefix|root|bin|whoami|ping|docs|repo|why|explain|pkg\s+get|config\s+get)\b/,
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-
];
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// NOTE: there is intentionally NO "safe commands" allowlist. Under the
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// effect-based model, anything we don't detect as a mutation or a prompt-worthy
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// effect IS safe by default (reads, queries, `ls`, `grep`, `jq`, `awk`, `sort`,
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// unknown commands, …). We only enumerate the things that DO warrant a log
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// (WARNING_*) or a prompt (REVIEW_*, HIGH_STAKES_*).
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// File deletion (rm/rmdir/trash). Checked PER-STAGE (not on the full command)
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// so the ephemeral-temp downgrade can run first: `something; rm /tmp/x` must be
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// warning, but `rm /tmp/x` mixed with a non-temp delete in another stage stays
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@@ -141,10 +87,6 @@ const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
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// -c/-e, interpreter -e/-c bodies, heredocs), then classifySqlSeverity.
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/\bdocker\s+(rm|rmi|system\s+prune)\b/,
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/\bdocker\s+compose\s+down\b/,
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/\bkill\b/,
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/\bpkill\b/,
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/\bkillall\b/,
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/\bchmod\s+777\b/,
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/\bcurl\s+.*-X\s*(DELETE|PUT|POST|PATCH)\b/i,
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/\bcurl\s+.*--request\s*(DELETE|PUT|POST|PATCH)\b/i,
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// curl flags that send a request body (POST/PUT/PATCH) without an explicit -X
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@@ -170,36 +112,73 @@ const HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS = [
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/\bhimalaya\s+message\s+delete\b/,
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/\bhimalaya\s+folder\s+(delete|expunge|purge)\b/,
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/\bhimalaya\s+account\s+delete\b/,
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// Overwriting a raw block device (`> /dev/sda`, `… > /dev/nvme0n1`) destroys a
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// disk irreversibly. (dd to a device is in HIGH_STAKES_STAGE.)
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/>\s*\/dev\/(sd|nvme|hd|disk|mmcblk|vd)\w*/,
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];
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// Destructive / irreversible commands matched PER-STAGE at the start of a stage
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// (after stripping a leading `sudo `), so the destructive WORD can't be hit
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// inside an argument or a commit message (`git commit -m "kill the flaky test"`
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// must not be high_stakes). These don't span pipes, so per-stage `^`-anchoring
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// is both safe and precise.
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const HIGH_STAKES_STAGE = [
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// Filesystem / disk destruction.
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/^mkfs(\.\w+)?\b/,
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/^mkswap\b/,
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/^(fdisk|parted|gparted)\b/,
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/^dd\b.*\bof=\/dev\//,
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/^shred\b/,
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/^truncate\b/, // `truncate -s 0 file` wipes contents
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/^find\b.*\s-delete\b/, // `find … -delete` removes matches
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// Power / system state.
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/^(shutdown|reboot|halt|poweroff)\b/,
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// Remote/outward file transfer (almost always a remote target).
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/^scp\b/,
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/^rsync\b.*(--delete|\s\S+:)/, // rsync --delete, or to a host:path target
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// Local git history/work destruction (force branch delete, tag delete,
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// dropping/clearing stashed work). Reversible local git (add/commit/stash) is
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// a WARNING marker below.
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/^git\s+branch\s+(?:-D|--delete)\b/,
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/^git\s+tag\s+(?:-d|--delete)\b/,
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/^git\s+stash\s+(?:drop|clear)\b/,
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// Process termination.
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/^kill\b/,
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/^pkill\b/,
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/^killall\b/,
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// Wide-open permissions.
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/^chmod\s+(?:-\S+\s+)*777\b/,
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];
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// Outward-but-recoverable commands → review (prompt, simple approve). Sending
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// mail/messages can't be unsent, but it isn't destructive to local state, so it
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// sits below high_stakes. Matched per-stage. (Destructive himalaya verbs —
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// message delete, folder purge — are high_stakes in the full scan above.)
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const REVIEW_COMMANDS = [
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/^himalaya\s+message\s+(send|reply|forward)\b/,
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];
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//
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//
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// Local-mutation MARKERS for DETECTED side effects. These never gate a prompt —
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// under the effect-based model anything not flagged destructive/outward/sensitive
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// already auto-allows. They exist only to pick the `warning` (logged) vs `safe`
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// (silent) label, and cover the local mutations we can recognize by shape but
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// that aren't a plain file write (those are handled by extractShellWriteOps).
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//
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// Opaque code execution (node/npx/python/claude/test runners) is intentionally
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// NOT here: we can't tell whether it mutated anything, and a destructive effect
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// buried inside `node -e …` would slip through regardless of the label — so
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// logging it adds terminal noise without buying safety. It stays `safe`, just
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// like any other unrecognized command. A real file write it performs is a
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// separate Bash/Write call that gets classified on its own.
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const WARNING_COMMANDS = [
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// Local, reversible git
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//
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//
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// by HIGH_STAKES_COMMANDS above and wins first. `git stash drop|clear` is
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// excluded — those discard stashed work — so it stays `review`.
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// Local, reversible git writes — stage/commit/switch/stash. They mutate the
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// local repo but can be undone (amend, reset, checkout). Destructive git
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// (push, reset --hard, branch -D, stash drop/clear) is caught above and wins.
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/^git\s+add\b/,
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/^git\s+commit\b/,
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/^git\s+checkout\s+-b\b/,
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/^git\s+switch\b/,
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/^git\s+stash\b(?!\s+(?:drop|clear))/,
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// PR creation is reversible (a PR can be closed); the underlying branch push
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// is separately high_stakes.
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/^gh\s+pr\s+create\b/,
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//
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//
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// we don't prompt but keep a local trail. Known test runners and read-only
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// version flags are handled as `safe` (SAFE_COMMANDS) before reaching here.
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/^node\b/,
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/^npx\b/,
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/^python3?\b/,
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/^npm\s+run\b/,
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/^bun\b/,
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/^deno\b/,
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// Package installs run dependency postinstall scripts (code execution), so
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// they're not "safe" — but they're a constant part of the dev loop, so log
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// (warning) rather than prompt.
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// Package installs always mutate node_modules and run dependency postinstall
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// scripts — a known local mutation worth an audit line.
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/^npm\s+(install|ci|i|update|upgrade|rebuild|prune|dedupe)\b/,
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/^(pnpm|yarn)\s+(install|add|ci|up|upgrade)\b/,
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];
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@@ -227,14 +206,21 @@ function isEphemeralPath(filePath) {
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function isSensitiveWritePath(filePath) {
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if (!filePath)
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return true; // unknown target → err toward review
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const home = os.homedir();
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// Expand a leading `~` / `$HOME` / `${HOME}` to the real home dir BEFORE
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// resolving. In a shell `echo x > ~/.zshrc` the tilde IS the home dir, but
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// path.resolve treats `~` as a literal segment under cwd, which would miss
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// sensitive home targets (shell rc, ~/.ssh, …) and silently downgrade them.
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const expanded = filePath
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.replace(/^~(?=\/|$)/, home)
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.replace(/^\$\{?HOME\}?(?=\/|$)/, home);
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let resolved;
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try {
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resolved = path.resolve(
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resolved = path.resolve(expanded);
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}
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catch {
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return true;
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}
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const home = os.homedir();
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const underHome = (rel) => {
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const base = path.join(home, rel);
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return resolved === base || resolved.startsWith(base + path.sep);
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@@ -491,6 +477,69 @@ function classifyAssignmentStage(stage) {
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491
477
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tier = maxTier(tier, classifyBashCommand(rest));
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return tier;
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}
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/**
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481
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* `env [OPTION]... [NAME=VALUE]... [COMMAND [ARG]...]` runs COMMAND with a
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482
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* modified environment (a wrapper like sudo / an assignment prefix). Strips
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* env's own options (`-i`, `-u NAME`, `-C dir`, `-`, `--unset=NAME`, …) and any
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484
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* leading NAME=VALUE pairs, then classifies the inner COMMAND from its original
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485
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* (quote-preserving) offset. `env` with no command just prints the environment
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* → safe. Returns null if the stage doesn't start with `env`.
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*/
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488
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function classifyEnvStage(stage) {
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489
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const lead = /^env\b[ \t]*/.exec(stage);
|
|
490
|
+
if (!lead)
|
|
491
|
+
return null;
|
|
492
|
+
// env options that consume a following argument token.
|
|
493
|
+
const argTaking = new Set(["-u", "--unset", "-C", "--chdir", "-P", "-S", "--split-string"]);
|
|
494
|
+
const readToken = (from) => {
|
|
495
|
+
let i = from;
|
|
496
|
+
let quote = null;
|
|
497
|
+
while (i < stage.length) {
|
|
498
|
+
const ch = stage[i];
|
|
499
|
+
if (quote) {
|
|
500
|
+
if (ch === quote)
|
|
501
|
+
quote = null;
|
|
502
|
+
i++;
|
|
503
|
+
continue;
|
|
504
|
+
}
|
|
505
|
+
if (ch === '"' || ch === "'") {
|
|
506
|
+
quote = ch;
|
|
507
|
+
i++;
|
|
508
|
+
continue;
|
|
509
|
+
}
|
|
510
|
+
if (/\s/.test(ch))
|
|
511
|
+
break;
|
|
512
|
+
i++;
|
|
513
|
+
}
|
|
514
|
+
return i;
|
|
515
|
+
};
|
|
516
|
+
let i = lead[0].length;
|
|
517
|
+
while (i < stage.length) {
|
|
518
|
+
while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
|
|
519
|
+
i++;
|
|
520
|
+
if (i >= stage.length)
|
|
521
|
+
break;
|
|
522
|
+
const start = i;
|
|
523
|
+
i = readToken(i);
|
|
524
|
+
const tok = stage.slice(start, i);
|
|
525
|
+
if (tok === "-")
|
|
526
|
+
continue; // ignore-environment marker
|
|
527
|
+
if (tok.startsWith("--") && tok.includes("="))
|
|
528
|
+
continue; // --unset=NAME etc.
|
|
529
|
+
if (tok.startsWith("-")) {
|
|
530
|
+
if (argTaking.has(tok)) { // consume its argument token
|
|
531
|
+
while (i < stage.length && /\s/.test(stage[i]))
|
|
532
|
+
i++;
|
|
533
|
+
i = readToken(i);
|
|
534
|
+
}
|
|
535
|
+
continue;
|
|
536
|
+
}
|
|
537
|
+
if (/^\w+=/.test(tok))
|
|
538
|
+
continue; // NAME=VALUE
|
|
539
|
+
return classifyBashCommand(stage.slice(start).trim()); // first real word → the command
|
|
540
|
+
}
|
|
541
|
+
return "safe"; // `env` / `env -u X` with no command just prints the environment
|
|
542
|
+
}
|
|
494
543
|
function classifyBashCommand(command) {
|
|
495
544
|
if (!command)
|
|
496
545
|
return "safe";
|
|
@@ -526,6 +575,15 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
|
|
|
526
575
|
if (pattern.test(trimmed))
|
|
527
576
|
return "high_stakes";
|
|
528
577
|
}
|
|
578
|
+
// Destructive/irreversible single commands, matched at stage start with any
|
|
579
|
+
// leading `sudo ` stripped (so `sudo mkfs …` is still caught, but the word
|
|
580
|
+
// can't fire inside an argument). These don't span pipes, so `^`-anchoring is
|
|
581
|
+
// precise and avoids prose false-positives.
|
|
582
|
+
const bareStage = trimmed.replace(/^sudo\s+/, "");
|
|
583
|
+
for (const pattern of HIGH_STAKES_STAGE) {
|
|
584
|
+
if (pattern.test(bareStage))
|
|
585
|
+
return "high_stakes";
|
|
586
|
+
}
|
|
529
587
|
// Variable assignments: `NAME=value` (pure) or `NAME=$(cmd) rest` (env prefix
|
|
530
588
|
// / capture). Classify the command-substitution inners and any trailing
|
|
531
589
|
// command; a purely literal assignment is safe. Dangerous substitutions were
|
|
@@ -533,6 +591,12 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
|
|
|
533
591
|
const assignTier = classifyAssignmentStage(trimmed);
|
|
534
592
|
if (assignTier !== null)
|
|
535
593
|
return assignTier;
|
|
594
|
+
// `env [opts] [NAME=VAL]... cmd` runs cmd with a modified environment. Strip
|
|
595
|
+
// the env prefix and classify the inner command (a dangerous inner was already
|
|
596
|
+
// caught by the high-stakes full scan). Bare `env` just prints the env → safe.
|
|
597
|
+
const envTier = classifyEnvStage(trimmed);
|
|
598
|
+
if (envTier !== null)
|
|
599
|
+
return envTier;
|
|
536
600
|
// sudo: privilege escalation. A high-stakes inner command was already caught
|
|
537
601
|
// by the full-string scan above (\b patterns match through the `sudo` prefix);
|
|
538
602
|
// anything else still warrants review.
|
|
@@ -545,34 +609,31 @@ function classifyBashCommand(command) {
|
|
|
545
609
|
const sql = findSqlInCommand(trimmed);
|
|
546
610
|
if (sql)
|
|
547
611
|
return classifySqlSeverity(sql);
|
|
548
|
-
// File-mutating shell patterns
|
|
549
|
-
//
|
|
550
|
-
//
|
|
551
|
-
//
|
|
552
|
-
//
|
|
553
|
-
// review.
|
|
612
|
+
// File-mutating shell patterns (echo > X, tee, dd of=, touch, sed -i, cp, mv).
|
|
613
|
+
// A file write/copy/move is a reversible LOCAL mutation, classified like the
|
|
614
|
+
// Write/Edit tool: `warning` (logged) — UNLESS a target is a sensitive path
|
|
615
|
+
// (system dir, secret store, shell rc, OKed config), which stays `review`.
|
|
616
|
+
// (Overwriting a raw block device was already caught by the high-stakes scan.)
|
|
554
617
|
const ops = extractShellWriteOps(trimmed);
|
|
555
618
|
if (ops.length > 0) {
|
|
556
|
-
const
|
|
557
|
-
|
|
558
|
-
return creates.some((o) => isSensitiveWritePath(o.target)) ? "review" : "warning";
|
|
559
|
-
}
|
|
560
|
-
return "review";
|
|
619
|
+
const targets = ops.map((o) => o.target);
|
|
620
|
+
return targets.some((t) => isSensitiveWritePath(t)) ? "review" : "warning";
|
|
561
621
|
}
|
|
562
|
-
//
|
|
563
|
-
for (const pattern of
|
|
622
|
+
// Outward sends (email/message) → review.
|
|
623
|
+
for (const pattern of REVIEW_COMMANDS) {
|
|
564
624
|
if (pattern.test(trimmed))
|
|
565
|
-
return "
|
|
625
|
+
return "review";
|
|
566
626
|
}
|
|
567
|
-
//
|
|
568
|
-
//
|
|
569
|
-
//
|
|
627
|
+
// Local-mutation markers (local git, code execution, installs) → warning:
|
|
628
|
+
// logged, no prompt. Everything else is a read or an unrecognized command with
|
|
629
|
+
// no detected effect — and under the effect-based model that means `safe`.
|
|
570
630
|
for (const pattern of WARNING_COMMANDS) {
|
|
571
631
|
if (pattern.test(trimmed))
|
|
572
632
|
return "warning";
|
|
573
633
|
}
|
|
574
|
-
// Default:
|
|
575
|
-
|
|
634
|
+
// Default: safe. No destructive/outward/sensitive effect was detected, so we
|
|
635
|
+
// do NOT put a human in the loop just for "running a command".
|
|
636
|
+
return "safe";
|
|
576
637
|
}
|
|
577
638
|
function classifySqlSeverity(sql) {
|
|
578
639
|
if (/\bDROP\s+(TABLE|DATABASE|INDEX|VIEW)\b/i.test(sql))
|
|
@@ -592,7 +653,10 @@ function classifySqlSeverity(sql) {
|
|
|
592
653
|
// SQLite dot-commands (.tables, .schema, .dump, etc.) — safe unless they mutate
|
|
593
654
|
if (/^\s*\./.test(sql) && !/^\s*\.(import|read|restore)\b/i.test(sql))
|
|
594
655
|
return "safe";
|
|
595
|
-
|
|
656
|
+
// INSERT/ALTER and other non-destructive DML: a reversible row/schema change,
|
|
657
|
+
// not a data wipe → warning (logged, no prompt). Destructive SQL (DROP /
|
|
658
|
+
// TRUNCATE / DELETE FROM / UPDATE-without-WHERE) returned high_stakes above.
|
|
659
|
+
return "warning";
|
|
596
660
|
}
|
|
597
661
|
/**
|
|
598
662
|
* Detects shell idioms that mutate the filesystem. Used by classify (to
|